Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 28, No. 3 (2006), pp. 447–65 DOI: 10.1355/cs28-3e © 2006 ISEAS ISSN 0219-797X print / ISSN 1793-284X electronic

China, the United States, and Mainland Southeast Asia: Opportunism and the Limits of Power LAWRENCE E. GRINTER

Chinese and American policies toward mainland Southeast Asia exhibit interesting and complicsated aspects as both great powers hedge against the future. Beijing has close relations with the Burmese Government as does Washington with Thailand. Vietnam, however, is more resistant to serious engagement with either China or the United States. Cambodia and Laos are afterthoughts for both Beijing and Washington. As China and the United States seek to influence mainland Southeast Asia, they encounter limits to their policies. The Burmese junta is wary of too much Chinese penetration and seeks to manipulate the availability of its oil and gas sales among Beijing, Tokyo, and New Delhi. Washington, despite close military relations with Bangkok, finds Bangkok willing to substantially engage economically with the Chinese. In conclusion, China views mainland Southeast Asia from a strategic viewpoint while the United States, preoccupied with Iraq and Afghanistan, usually concentrates on governance and democracy issues in mainland Southeast Asia. Keywords: China’s rise, United States, mainland Southeast Asia, opportunism, Myanmar, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in major power strategies.

Introduction Chinese and American policies toward mainland Southeast Asia, while not at the competitive or ideological levels of the Cold War era, show interesting and complicated aspects while periodically tending toward zero-sum outcomes as both sides hedge against future developments. Both great powers have close, even quasi-client relations with countries on the mainland — the United States with Thailand, 447

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and China with Myanmar. Relations with Vietnam are more difficult, meeting cautious resistance from Hanoi given the historic Chinese invasions of Vietnam and American bombing of northern Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s. Laotian and Cambodian affairs, while largely an afterthought for Washington, are more important for Beijing which pulls resources and trade out of these two Indochinese countries and has begun damming the Upper Mekong River system. For the United States, which has no need for Cambodian or Laotian exports, the human rights policies of the Phnom Penh and Vientiane regimes draw Washington’s attention. Ostensibly China would seem to have advantages in dealing with mainland Southeast Asian governments: China’s close proximity to the area and the area’s authoritarian governments allow Beijing to deal relatively simply with the four dictatorial regimes in the area. But the United States, as the global champion of human rights and market economics, also has an appeal to the poor and repressed populations of the area. However, these immediate differences become complicated as Beijing and Washington pursue their actual interests and activities on the ground: mainland Southeast Asian governments are sovereign, independent entities led by nationalistic, if often troubled, regimes, jealous of their interests and generally skilled at playing off big powers against each other. They seem to have adopted a kind of hedging “dual-strategy” toward both the United States and China: seeking or at least not opposing U.S. security involvement in the area, while engaging China in diplomatic and economic terms. In short, there are limits to and opportunities for Beijing’s and Washington’s influence with mainland Southeast Asia. China’s policies toward the area show a mix of opportunism and longer term design crafted to enhance PRC leverage, block or counterbalance U.S. and Indian influence, and secure these smaller states for Chinese advantage. Except for Thailand, China is dealing with authoritarian governments; thus a kind of “authoritarian comradeship” exists in Beijing’s dealings with Yangon, Hanoi, Vientiane and Phnom Penh. However, mainland Southeast Asia also has known serious difficulties in past relations with China, and suspicions underlie local reactions to the Chinese in spite of government-to-government “cordiality”. Moreover, the regimes in Myanmar and Cambodia are unstable enough to cause concern, even embarrassment, for Beijing as the PRC pursues its announced “peaceful rise”, now “peaceful development”, diplomacy, and its continuing UN Security Council role. For the United States, currently preoccupied with the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the evolving Weapons of Mass Destruction

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(WMD) challenges from North Korea and Iran, mainland Southeast Asia is clearly less important than it is for China. Moreover, Thailand, the sole democracy on the mainland, stands in sharp contrast to the authoritarian governments ruling Myanmar, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. And so the U.S. Government which, in both its executive and legislative branches, trumpets economic freedom and human rights, often finds all but one mainland Southeast Asia government hostile to or critical of a number of American policies. From a great power viewpoint China benefited in Southeast Asia from the end of U.S. military operations in Indochina in the mid-1970s and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Today the Russians show little inclination to try again to become a player in Southeast Asia. However Washington rekindled its security relations with selected Southeast Asian states, particularly Thailand and Singapore. By contrast, China retains close, if problematic, relations with the Burmese junta and has cultural, business and some military ties with Thailand. But these relations and residuals have not been sufficient to preclude worries in Southeast Asia about China’s growing power and likely future behaviour. In 2003 the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) decided on a new policy portrayal, assiduously promoted by Chinese officials, academics, and media: China was engaged in a “peaceful rise”. Zheng Bijian, influential at the Beijing Central Party School, and probably one of the “peaceful rise” architects, stated: “The concept of ‘peaceful rise’ initiated by China has forcefully addresses [sic] ‘the China threat theory’ and ‘the China collapse theory’ and also allows China’s neighboring countries and various countries in the world to feel relief (Yuan 2006, pp. 26–28). So it is against China’s overall diplomatic positioning that her relations with mainland Southeast play out as Beijing conveys the PRC as a benign counter to American influence and Indian activities in the area. This study explores the dynamics and differences of Chinese and U.S. policies toward mainland Southeast Asia with the objective of understanding the opportunities for and limits to great power activity in the region. Myanmar: The Junta Plays for Cash Communist China’s closest ties in mainland Southeast Asia continue to be with Myanmar. Myanmar was the first Southeast Asian nation to recognize the PRC and it did so for various reasons (StuartFox 2004, p. 129). From Myanmar’s initial neutrality to its more recent embrace with China, as the junta became ostracized by the

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international community, Beijing has chosen to prop up the Yangon junta’s fortunes to such an extent that the PRC has gradually cast a strategic presence onto Myanmar designed to counter Indian moves toward mainland Southeast Asia and U.S. policies aimed at reforming the junta and calling attention to its stifling of Aung San Suu Kyi’s democracy movement. There continue to be reports that the Chinese operate intelligence stations on Burmese territory (Haacke 2006, pp. 26–27; Yuan 2006, p. 37), sell the Burmese PLA military equipment at concessionary rates, subsidize the regime financially, pay for Burmese officers to attend Chinese schools, and use the isolated state as an outpost for Chinese containment of Indian and U.S. power. For leverage the Chinese use a variety of loans and grants, as well as direct investments. Previous loans have been written off. Chinese military assistance to Myanmar may be pushing US$2 billion, including PLA underwriting of Burmese naval stations in the Great Coco Islands and on Hainggyi Island. Of strategic interest to Beijing are proposed oil pipelines constructed across Myanmar, allowing alternative means of getting Middle East oil into China without having to transit the Malacca Straits. Pakistan is providing the same kind of alternative for China (Vaughn and Morrison 2006, p. 24). Wayne Bert accurately caught the nature of the Beijing-Yangon axis with this observation: Myanmar represents the fulfillment of maximum Chinese objectives of obtaining reliable strategic allies and useful economic partners. Myanmar also matches the status of China as an authoritarian and undemocratic state, but Burma’s xenophobia and seclusion are far more pronounced, resembling more closely the China of three decades ago. (Bert 2004, p. 263)

However it is not entirely easy going for Beijing, given the corruption in Myanmar’s junta, and the difficulties of holding the generals to their commitments on ports, roads, airfields and trade. And there is the question of Chinese citizens working in Myanmar — the numbers can vary in any year from 200,000 to possibly half a million and, like the Chinese in Vietnam, these people can get caught in ethnic and political conflicts or extortionism by Yangon even as Chinese dominate Myanmar’s small businesses. The movement of Chinese traders and goods into northern Myanmar has produced such a Chinese economic colonization that, for example, Burmese are resettling out of central Mandalay to satellite towns (Bert 2004, p. 266). Given the sensitivities, Beijing and the junta rotate high level visits back and forth including defense ministers and civilian leaders. Both sides describe relations as “friendly” and “fraternal”, which, by mid-2004,

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had produced over fifty memoranda of understandings, agreements and exchanges of notes (Vaughn and Morrison 2006, p. 24). From a strategic basis, Beijing wants a Burmese regime that is pliant, stable, pro-Chinese, anti-Indian and anti-American, while also linking Yunnan province trade to Indian Ocean ports through Myanmar. But complicating Beijing’s design is the difficulty of dealing with the junta — there are rake-offs in Chinese construction projects including a large container yard at Bhamo, a deep water port at Kyaukphu, a highway connecting to the port and recent work on other port facilities along the Parmese Littoral.1 Chinese bids on oil and gas exploration also have been slow rolled by Yangon, as the generals play to see if the Indians, the Japanese, or the Thai’s will up the ante.2 And the bizarre relocation of the government capital from Yangon to Naypyidaw near Pyinmana, some 400 kilometres to the north, nearly bankrupted the government.3 So the generals are looking for cash in all directions.4 By contrast, U.S. policy toward Myanmar, a country Washington does not have vital interests with, has been politically focused and moralistic in tone. U.S. businesses have minimal involvement in Myanmar, and diplomatic relations remain stymied at below the ambassadorial level. Supporting Suu Kyi at international and ASEAN levels, American policy and British policy has kept attention focused on the Burmese junta’s abject human rights behaviour and its drug exports.5 David Steinberg, a senior Asian specialist at Georgetown University and author of several books on Myanmar, commented on the results of Myanmar’s misgovernance over half a century: There is obvious corruption, there is no independent arbitration mechanism, the judiciary is not independent, there is no predictability as the rules change all the time, infrastructure is inadequate, there is government intervention at all levels, and interministerial coordination is minimal at best.6

However, U.S. efforts to affect change in Myanmar have met with only partial acceptance among Southeast Asian capitals; and Washington lost the effort to block Myanmar from ASEAN admission in 1977. One recent encouraging development: ASEAN members pressed Yangon to step down from hosting the 2006 ASEAN summit and Yangon reluctantly agreed. The move quickly brought a series of high level Chinese assurances and visits to Yangon reflecting Beijing’s desire for stability in Myanmar over any democratic transition which might threaten Chinese economic interests and diplomatic leverage (Yuan 2006, pp. 38–39). Yet another development that may provide

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some alternative to China’s grip on Myanmar is Indian bids on Burmese oil and gas.7 Nevertheless the United States, in spite of a long history of sanctions on Myanmar, has not entirely foregone economic engagement with Yangon; the Unocal project and Yadana Pipeline Project show “that the US is not willing to completely shut out US investment in Myanmar or give up U.S. business interests in the country’s policymaking process” (Bert 2004, p. 263). Still, it is doubtful Washington can fundamentally weaken Beijing’s influence over Myanmar until the junta loses power. Vietnam: Resistant to Courtship Streets and boulevards in Vietnamese cities are named for Vietnamese patriots who fought Chinese invaders over the centuries. Indeed, it is only twenty-seven years since China’s last military invasion. Thus the fact of China, its huge presence next to and difficult history with the Vietnamese, is always evident in Hanoi’s security planning and diplomacy. When the Second Indochina War ended in 1975, communist China and communist Vietnam found themselves on opposite sides of the Cambodia quagmire and resultant genocide — the Chinese backing Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese with Soviet assistance supporting Hun Sen and his anti-Khmer Rouge guerrillas. Ultimately, in December 1978, the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia, setting up a government friendly to Hanoi. After the PLA then invaded northern Vietnam in early 1979, it took until 1991 for the China and Vietnam to normalize relations. Today, on the surface, things are fine: the two communist parties have “cordial” relations, and a long negotiated land border arrangement was finalized in December 1999 and a Tonkin Gulf demarcation was signed in December 2000.8 But Vietnamese recall China’s historic invasions and pacification campaigns, and the 1979 episode might have gone much worse for Vietnam if not for PLA incompetence (and Deng Xiaoping’s “teach them a lesson” limited goals). The more recent pattern of dispute and resolution between China and Vietnam shows a relatively sophisticated, patient approach by both sides. And it has evolved through stages: Vietnam’s gradual exhaustion in Cambodia and the army’s 1989 exit; China’s subsequent softening toward Hanoi and its client in Phnom Penh, Hun Sen; the sustained negotiations on territorial disputes including the Paracel and Spratly Islands; and finally the discussions over other water and continental

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shelf claims in the South China Sea and the Gulf of Tonkin. The results have been impressive despite persistent disagreement over final sovereignty claims on portions of the Spratly and Paracel Islands and the surrounding seabeds (Amer 2004, pp. 322–23). Showcasing the new cooperation were two recent state visits, the first by SRV President Tran Duc Luong to Beijing in July 2005, and the reciprocal visit, by President Hu Jintao of China to Hanoi in early November 2005. During the Luong visit Chinese and Vietnamese businessmen signed fourteen deals totalling slightly over US$1 billion. Viet-Chinese trade may now be almost US$8 billion annually, with China sending machinery, telecommunications equipment, pharmaceuticals, fertilizer, and vehicles, while the Vietnamese export crude oil, coal, coffee, fish and produce to China. An economic corridor — both road and rail — is being vitalized to complete a Kunming-HanoiHaiphong route as an outlet for southwestern Chinese trade.9 Chinese President Hu’s November 2005 visit to Vietnam emphasized joint exploration for offshore oil and gas, with the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) being paired with a major Vietnamese oil firm to explore in Beibu Bay.10 Thus a slowly growing economic inter-dependence seems to be sidelining, for now, the deeper suspicions between China and Vietnam. And Hanoi publicly supports Beijing’s “one-China” policy toward Taiwan, but without any special spin, given the large Taiwanese investments in Vietnam. But how long will the cordiality last once the Chinese push real naval power down into the South China Sea and around Vietnam’s offshore oil claims? Finally it is likely the Chinese privately have cautioned Hanoi about any fundamental “tilt” toward the United States or India. U.S. Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld’s visit to the SRV in early June 2006 produced predictably careful statements by both Hanoi and Washington denying discussion of future use of Vietnamese military bases. “We have no plans for access to military facilities in Vietnam,” Rumsfeld told reporters in Singapore before departing for Hanoi. However, he added, “We do have evolving military-to-military relations. And Vietnam is an important country.”11 So Washington has ways of reminding Southeast Asia (and Beijing) that it can be a useful “balancer” in the area, given regional concerns about and hedging toward China’s long-term ambitions. With Hanoi’s desire for “diversity”, “multilateralism” and “responsible partners” in its foreign affairs,12 relations with Washington continue in a formative stage. The year 2005 was the 10th anniversary of the normalization of relations, and the 5th anniversary of the U.S.-

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SRV Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA). There are nearly 1.5 million Vietnamese-Americans and another two million U.S. veterans of the Second Indochina War. Former South Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky visited the SRV on a January 2004 goodwill trip, and U.S.-Viet cooperation continues on Prisoner of War (POW) and MIA issues. Nearly 2,500 Vietnamese are studying in the U.S. and about 100 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have offices in Vietnam.13 But 2005 also was the 30th anniversary of Saigon’s fall, the 60th anniversary of Ho Chi Minh’s declaration of independence from the French, the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Indochinese Communist Party, and the 115th birthday of Ho Chi Minh; so U.S.SRV relations, while pragmatic, still show definite sensitivities. Nevertheless, U.S.-SRV trade, spurred by the BTA, reached $6.5 billion in 2004 (with a nearly $4 billion U.S. deficit). The United States now purchases over 20 per cent of Vietnam’s exports.14 Both sides saw the BTA providing valuable experience for the Vietnamese to help Hanoi’s push for WTO admission with key contents focused on trade, intellectual properties and the service sector (Vo 2005, p. 6). But the episodes of U.S. organized labour charging Vietnam with dumping seafood on the American market likely will be repeated in the future by other countries absorbing Vietnamese exports. Other aspects of the relationship show the United States pressing the Vietnamese on protection of minority rights, freedom of religion, and pirating of copyrighted merchandise.15 The State Department classifies Vietnam as a “country of particular concern”. In March 2005, I witnessed an intriguing discussion in Ho Chi Minh City between senior U.S. and Vietnamese diplomats as they addressed American concerns over Vietnam’s human rights record. A Vietnamese official responded: We are moving toward a more universal interpretation of human rights. But each nation has its own norms and values. In Vietnam this can’t happen overnight. And we can’t risk disturbances. Our top priority remains political and social stability. So we can not accept other political parties or individuals’ right to bear arms. We can’t do that.16

U.S.-SRV military-to-military relations are not close, although there have been three U.S. Navy ship visits to Vietnam and a fourth one is expected this year. As mentioned, U.S. Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld’s visit to Vietnam in June 2006 was notable for its cautious statements. So far Washington provides no economic or training assistance to Vietnam’s armed forces, although an International Military Education

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and Training (IMET) agreement has been reached. Vietnamese officers attend courses at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, a DoD facility. However, drawing Vietnam into some kind of a China “containment” arrangement is highly unlikely given Hanoi’s experience with both the Americans and the Chinese.17 Nevertheless Hanoi and Washington have begun sharing intelligence on terrorism, drugs and smuggling.18 The mixed and evolving nature of U.S.-Vietnamese relations and the challenge of managing the differences was addressed by the current U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam, Michael Marine, in October 2005: In fact — and to some extent counter-intuitively — the closer the two countries become and the broader their relationship is, the greater the number of areas in which contention can arise. I think this is where the United States and Vietnam now are, but it’s not something we should seek to change.19

Thus Hanoi has set clear limits beyond which it will not lean toward either Beijing or Washington, carefully shying away from explicit military arrangements as the SRV continues it thrust into the global economy. Thailand: Pro-United States, but Balancing Thailand has been the sole democracy in mainland Southeast Asia, with a parliamentary system, a bicameral legislature and a generally free press. It is also the only Southeast Asian state not to be colonized. Previously plagued by military intervention in its politics, since the mid-1990s Thailand had stabilized with peaceful elections and constitutional changes of government. Then came the September 2006 bloodless coup against the caretaker government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. A return to civilian rule and new elections are expected in 2007. Enjoying a market economy, and retaining the confidence of external business investors, Thailand has experienced decent economic growth since overcoming the recession of 1997/98. The extraordinary political success of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who had brought Thailand its first single-party dominant government under the Thai Rak Thai Party, ended abruptly in Spring 2006 under mounting opposition pressure mainly focused on alleged corruption scandals. Thaksin, through his wealth, consolidation of power, and crony capitalism, went down an authoritarian path almost rivalling Thailand’s previous military dictators. But with his

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haphazard style of leadership, Thaksin reshuffled his cabinet ten times between 2001 and 2005. Following his re-election in February 2005, he ordered another major reshuffle as he sought to deal with the southern insurgency, the avian flu crisis and mounting opposition to his rule.20 Thaksin was a caretaker prime minister pending new national elections, until removed in the September 2006 coup. Despite the relative stability of Thai politics, and an increasingly robust economy bolstered by substantial foreign investment, Thailand remains challenged by a variety of internal security problems including drug trafficking, border insecurity and a separatist insurgency in the south. Thailand’s long and sensitive border with Myanmar has produced cautious and conciliatory approaches by Bangkok towards Yangon. But the Burmese junta, long challenged by ethnic insurgencies, periodically pursues insurgents into Thai territory heightening tensions between the two countries. Nevertheless the Thaksin government claimed some progress in engaging Yangon about the problems.21 An unannounced quick trip by Thaksin to Myanmar in early August 2006 added to speculation about which issues he took up with the current Burmese strongman, Senior General Than Shwe.22 Thailand’s relations with Malaysia are periodically troubled by Muslim secessionist violence in Thailand’s far south. Over the years Bangkok has used a variety of approaches — civil, police, and military — and Thaksin has shifted emphasis back and forth, but nothing so far has fundamentally quelled the long festering separatist agitation which exploded again in the summer of 2006. Finally the flow of drugs from Myanmar across the “Golden Triangle” affects Thailand, Laos and even China. Given Thailand’s modern transportation system, and corruption among its enforcement personnel, Thailand is a serious trans-shipment and export point for methamphetamines, heroin, and opium. Toward Washington, the Royal Thai Government continues to be the United States’ closest friend and ally in mainland Southeast Asia and a government which, along with Singapore in the straits area, usually backs U.S. policies. Shortly after the pro-U.S. Indochina governments collapsed in 1975, Bangkok backed away from close association with Washington, and American forces vacated Thai military bases as Bangkok sought to deal with the new communist dictatorships in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. In the 1980s, Bangkok and Beijing found themselves in a common objective of getting the Vietnamese army out of Cambodia, even at the odious price (odious for Thailand) of supporting the Pol Pot Khmer Rouge guerrilla resistance against the Soviet-equipped Vietnamese occupation. Chinese arms began to

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flow into Thailand including tanks, armoured personnel carriers and several naval frigates. Later came anti-aircraft missiles, diesel-electric submarines and some second/third generation Chinese fighter jets.23 Then, after a period of reassessment, as the Vietnamese grew exhausted in Cambodia, Bangkok began a rebalancing with Washington. Today the United States is Thailand’s largest trade partner and substantial American business investments are the case in Thailand. The two countries have close military relations with the annual “Cobra Gold” and “CARAT” exercises being the largest in East Asia and drawing in other ASEAN participants. Joint counter-drug efforts and U.S. weapons sales also underwrite the security relationship. As Bangkok sought more flexibility in its foreign policy options in the 1980s and 1990s, it labelled its approach “omni-directionality” which “showcased the evolution of Thailand from being a simple client of the United States to becoming a key regional player in its own right (Chambers 2004, p. 461). But omni-directionality at the high policy level was hedged by keeping the strong security assistance relationship between Bangkok and Washington. And the “Cobra Gold” land, air, and sea exercises took on added prominence given Vietnam’s military occupation of Cambodia in the 1980s. Nevertheless, there were stops and starts in the broader policy interactions between the United States and Thailand, and the renormalization had its zig-zags: The postmilitary governments of prime ministers Chuan, Banharn, and Chavalit implemented military assistance agreements with Beijing while also pursuing a policy of “constructive engagement” with Yangon. After the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis, Bangkok had no choice but to accept IMF conditionalities and eventually Thailand was rewarded with limited new U.S. assistance (Chambers 2004, pp. 460–63; Vaughn and Morrison 2006, p. 25), a noticeable contrast to China, which promptly offered financial assistance to Bangkok. Thaksin’s zig-zags in foreign relations ultimately settled down with the net effect of pledging full support to the United States on the GWOT, providing overflight, refuelling and port access for U.S. operations in Afghanistan, closer counter-terrorism cooperation with other ASEAN governments. Also, after some dithering, Thaksin granted leases on Sattahip naval base and Utapao airbase to the United States in the build-up to the Iraq invasion. After Thailand sent a small force contingent to Iraq, the Bush administration officially designated Thailand a “major nonNATO ally” (MNNA). China, as we see, operates differently towards Thailand. While Beijing has no explicit security alliance with Bangkok, Chinese military equipment is provided to the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTAF)

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at “friendship prices”. Chinese business families are influential in Thailand, with the corollary that centuries of inter-marriage within Thailand’s Chinese and Thai communities has produced social classes and business alliances that are substantially Sinicized. Former Prime Minister Thaksin for one, is of Sino-Thai ethnicity. More recent Chinese policy toward Thailand is prompted by southwest China’s relative poverty (especially Yunnan Province), and its proximity to Thailand’s comparative wealth, and trading and infrastructure advantages. Indeed, Bangkok has sought to position itself as a kind of energy “land bridge” to southwestern China, by proposing Chinese-financed linking of tanker connections at Andaman Sea ports across the Thailand’s Kra Isthmus into the Gulf of Thailand for trans-shipment north thru Thailand to Yunnan Province. This Thai alternative to the Malacca Strait route has been discussed for years, but Myanmar probably has the inside track with Beijing on the oil pipeline gambit. But Thailand also needs Chinese resources, for example, limestone and coal, so there are some mutual inter-dependencies. A 2003 Chinese-Thai Free Trade Agreement (FTA) also plays an important role. In 1992 the Asian Development Bank (ADB) initiated its “Greater Mekong Subregional Economic Zone” (GMS) project as a basis for economic and development cooperation among the six countries bordering or experiencing flows from the Mekong River. The idea has been to promote infrastructure and trade connections and corridors between southwest China and mainland Southeast Asia — both eastwest within Southeast Asia, and north-south linking Kunming with Chiang Rai. Sino-Thai economic connections appear to be the core emphasis of the ADB concept (Masviriyakul 2004, pp. 303–5). Linking Yunnan Province into Southeast Asia’s trade and infrastructure continues as a key piece of China’s “Develop the West” strategy with Thailand and Myanmar figuring most prominently. As one analyst observed: This strategy fits within GMS and China-ASEAN Free Trade Area schemes, creating additional opportunities to trade with ASEAN members and to implement the “go global” strategy of China to the outside world. Yunnan Province established a Lancang-Mekong River subregional economic cooperation and trade development centre to boost trade and investment areas (Masviriyakul, 2004, p. 306). The Chinese have designated Yunnan border districts for trade relations with Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand, and specific towns and outlets are prominently marked for business. Thailand, in turn, has the infrastructure to become the principal trading state in the Mekong sub-region and for outlets of Chinese goods, which should also

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help poverty reduction in northern and northeast Thailand (although a flood of Chinese fruits and other produce is clearly competing with Thai agriculture). Other Sino-Thai cooperation under the GMS framework now includes air links between Bangkok, Chiang Mai and Yunnan, Upper Mekong River navigation studies, road-building to eventually produce three possible routes linking Thailand to Yunnan, and feasibility studies on a railway connecting the two countries. So Thailand’s continuing U.S. security alliance, and increasing Chinese economic links produce a duality of big-power influence in keeping with Thailand’s historic balancing approach in its foreign policy choices. Cambodia and Laos: Resources and Vulnerabilities The basic attraction of Cambodia and Laos to China is timber products and fish, but the implications of the Upper Mekong River’s hydroelectric power potential is also affecting relations. The United States, with no need of Cambodian or Laotian resources, keeps its policies focused on the human rights and governance issues, and encourages market liberalization in Phnom Penh and Vientiane. Both Cambodia and Laos are governed by corrupt authoritarian regimes that have proven easily persuadable to see their countries’ natural resources sold to various bidders, and with little concern for the related environmental and cultural damage. This phenomenon and the inability or unwillingness of Hun Sen’s regime in Phnom Penh, and Khantay Siphandone’s Lao People’s Republic to stop the plundering has become a serious agenda item for international organizations and environmental protection groups. Cambodian forests are being cut down by local loggers selling to Chinese, Thai and Vietnamese interests. Laotian timber is being harvested by the Lao Army and sold off. The Upper Mekong River system flows are being intersected by Chinese dam building projects. Precious Cambodian antiquities at Angkor Wat and Angkor Thom are being stolen by local smugglers for the international market. All this is occurring as Cambodia’s politicians, despite episodes of rapprochement, quarrel incessantly over power and privileges, and Lao rulers seek the cash to sustain their dictatorship. The deforestation of mainland Southeast Asia, initially Thailand and Myanmar, began to ring environmental alarm bells nearly thirty years ago amidst increasing scrutiny by NGOs and attempts, poorly enforced, by Bangkok and Yangon, to limit the logging. China’s accelerating demand for wood products, exacerbated by logging bans

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in the PRC after the disastrous 1998 floods, has seen Chinese timber needs swing aggressively toward Southeast Asia’s forests. Indonesian, Malaysian, and Burmese loggers are the principal wood product suppliers to the Chinese market; and much of that harvesting is illegal. While Myanmar continues to have more than half of the remaining natural forests in mainland Southeast Asia, and they are depleting rapidly (Lang and Hu 2006, p. 179), the impact on smaller Cambodia of Chinese and Thai timber demand is even greater, such that concerted NGO pressure and publicity about the scale of abuses resulted in sharp, if temporary, declines in the destruction of Cambodian forests in the early 2000s. However, given corruption among Cambodian officials and continued pressure by loggers to extract Cambodian timber, one authoritative 2006 assessment concluded: “It is too early to assert that the pressure from international donor organizations and monitoring by NGOs has saved Cambodian forests from rapid depletion” (Lang and Hu 2006, p. 182). Laos is ruled by an even more secretive and cohesive one-party apparat than Cambodia; it has completely interblended its single party, the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) and its legislature, such that all fifty-three parliamentarians are also members of the Central Committee (Forbes and Cutler 2006, p. 175). The principal Laotian leader is President General Khantay Siphandane, a successor to Kaysone who was the core operative in the takeover and disastrous communization of Laos beginning with the fall of Vientiane in August 1975 and subsequent liquidation of the historic Laotian monarchy. No opposition groups are permitted in Laos, few NGOs operate there, and no real human rights or political freedoms exist. Finally Laos remains one of the poorest countries in the world. AIDS has reached serious proportions, and the country’s transportation infrastructure is inadequate to modernization needs; the country has no railroads and the road system is badly under-developed. Not surprisingly Vientiane is hoping to dam enough tributaries of the Mekong River to produce electricity for export. China’s other principal impact on Cambodia and Laos involves damming the upper portions of the Mekong River (called the Lancang by the Chinese). Dam building on the Salween River (called the Nu by the Chinese), which parallels the Mekong before turning west into Myanmar, is also affecting Myanmar’s ecosystem. The Mekong is the largest river in Southeast Asia and journeys through or along the borders of China, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Cambodians depend for 50 per cent of their diet protein on Mekong River fish. Laos is waiting to discover if Chinese dam building up

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river will leave them enough water flow to generate electricity for export (Liebman 2005, p. 287). China’s newly focused interest in the Mekong and Salween sRivers generates from its own increasingly critical water problems — much of China’s territory is arid, and the PRC’s current water use levels cannot be sustained. The Yellow River is running dry before it gets to the sea, old wells are being abandoned, the overall water-table is sinking and three massive canals are envisioned to connect China’s watery south to its arid north. All this is being exacerbated by China’s massive urbanization and industrialization, and the resultant pollution. Seeking to capture much more hydropower, China has turned a sharp eye on the upper reaches of the Mekong and Salween Rivers. The PRC has plans to build eight dams on the upper Mekong by 2019 with the potential of generating even more electricity than the Three Gorges Dam. Chinese plans for the Upper Salween involve thirteen more dams. As an environmentalist in Thailand stated about PRC plans for the Salween: Turning a natural river into a series of huge bathtubs is going to have a hideous impact on the ecological integrity of the Salween. Fish migration routes will be destroyed. Downstream some of the last great teak forests on earth will be buried under water.24

And as a Cambodian cabinet minister put it recently: “What can we do? They are upstream. They are a richer country operating in their own sovereign territory. How can we stop them?” (Liebman 2005, p. 290). In the shadow of China’s dam building on the Upper Mekong and Salween Rivers rests Laos’ principal hope to generate electricity power for export: the Nam Theun 2 hydroelectric project on the Nakai Plateau. The World Bank, in a controversial move, is providing loans, and completion might occur around 2009 (Forbes and Cutler 2005, p. 178), but much depends on drought conditions and whether future Chinese dam building will allow the Laotians enough water flow to generate electricity. Even as Laos pushes its own project, Chinese dam building on the Upper Mekong is already having downstream effects: in 2004 the Mekong reached record lows along the Laos and Thailand border. One Oxfam representative, referring to the Cambodia fish catch in 2005, stated: “The river is more or less dead. The fish cannot spawn when it’s dry (Liebman 2005, pp. 293–94). The Mekong is now fluctuating unpredictably, and unusual amounts of silt and sediment are accumulating. Pollution from Chinese

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toxic waste dumping also is affecting downstream countries, especially Cambodia and its delicate Tonle Sap ecosystem. The Mekong River Commission is alarmed — China has declined to join the commission — the members are Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam. To date the PRC has made few concessions to the downstream Mekong states. So much, then, at least at this point, for China’s “peaceful rise” as it affects sharing Mekong River water flows with mainland Southeast Asia. As always, Cambodia and Laos remain substantially affected by, and vulnerable to, the power and activities of the larger states operating in and near them. They are the two poorest and possibly least effectively governed states in all Southeast Asia. While not riven by war and turmoil as in the 1960s and 1970s, Cambodia and Laos still are dependent variables in the geopolitical and economic equations of mainland Southeast Asia. Conclusion China, which borders fourteen other countries, clearly sees mainland Southeast Asia as having important consequences for the PRC, particularly for China’s southwestern region. Beijing’s border arrangements and its political, security and economic relations with Yangon and Hanoi are particularly critical for the PRC. Myanmar’s instability, corruption and mal-development test Beijing’s patience and CCP dexterity. However, given Myanmar’s utility to Beijing, Chinese policy is designed to shape, within the limitations it encounters, the Burmese government’s choices in ways that benefit China’s longterm strategic interests. particularly as a counter to India and as an outlet for oil trans-shipment. With the Vietnamese, Beijing employs a variety of soft power approaches that are meeting with general success. Nevertheless, all mainland Southeast Asian countries are experiencing the realities and pressures of China’s rise as Beijing, also hedging against U.S. policies, periodically tests and adjusts how its actions resonate in the region. By contrast the United States engagement with mainland Southeast Asia is not of a strategic nature and it has different effects from China’s, although there are also local worries over possible long-term U.S. motives and staying power. U.S. policy has particularly important consequences for Thailand, which keeps its security options tied to Washington and is a de facto military ally of the United States. Nevertheless Bangkok, and all Southeast Asian capitals, wait for clarification of the long-term implications of China’s rise.

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NOTES * This article represents the views of the author and not necessarily those of the U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defence or any other U.S. Government agency. 1

A concise history of modern Burmese-PRC relations, and the mutual sensitivities, is in Jurgen Haacke, Myanmar’s Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 25–33. Also see Helen James, “Myanmar’s International Relations Strategy: The Search for Security”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 26, no. 3 (2004): 535.

2

Myanmar may have 90 tcf of natural gas. Despite New Delhi’s traditional reservations about the nature of the Burmese regime, more recent Indian actions to partially offset the Chinese grip on Myanmar have produced policy changes including economic assistance, port upgrades, road building, cooperation against insurgent movements, and limited Indian arms sales to Yangon.

3

Speculation as to the motives for the junta relocating the government from the urban sprawl of Yangon, a city of five million people, ran from astrological explanations, to fear of a U.S. military invasion, to getting the seat of government away from discontented urban masses and the political opposition. See Tin Maung Maung Than, “Myanmar: Challenges Galore But Opposition Failed to Score”. In Southeast Asian Affairs, 2006, edited by Daljit Singh and Lorraine C. Salazar, pp. 190–91 (Singapore: ISEAS, 2006).

4

Larry Jagan, “China’s Uneasy Alliance with Myanmar”, Asia Times Online, 24 February 2006.

5

U.S. counter-drug policy toward Myanmar is codified in presidential determinations which, for fiscal year 2006 was released on 15 September 2005, and listed Myanmar as a “major drug transit or major illicit drug-producing” country, having “failed demonstratively” to live up to its obligations under international counternarcotics agreements. See Tin Maung Maung Than, “Myanmar: Challenges Galore but Opposition Failed to Score”, op. cit., p. 194.

6

David Steinberg, “Sanctions Rarely Work”, The Irrawaddy Online Edition, 1 April 2003.

7

Nevertheless, the Burmese Government has played it shrewdly between Beijing and New Delhi, gaining agreements to sell offshore gas to both but with a particularly notable concession from India that Myanmar would be guaranteed earnings for its gas year after year even if it is not able to access the gas. See Sudha Ramachandrau, “Myanmar on Laughing Gas”, , 18 May 2006, and Ramachandrau, “India Embraces Myanmar on Its Own Terms”, , 28 June 2006. For a historical policy perspective on the agenda shifts by both New Delhi and Rangoon leading to a deepening joint engagement, see Jurgen Haacke (2006), pp. 33–39.

8

For details see Yuan, China-ASEAN Relations (2006), p. 33.

9

Economist, “Country Profile, Vietnam”, 2005, op cit., p. 14. Also Asia Pulse/VNA, “China, Vietnam Find Love”, Asia Times Online, 21 July 2005.

10

Asia Pulse/XIC, “Hu Calls for Closer Vietnam/China Links”, Asia Times Online, 3 November 2005.

11

Bill Hayden, “Rumsfeld in Vietnam as Ties Warm”, BBC News, 4 June 2006.

12

Briefing to author at Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hanoi, 3 March 2005.

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13

U.S. Consulate data, Ho Chi Minh City.

14

U.S. Embassy data, Hanoi.

15

The release in 2005 of a prominent Vietnamese Baptist minister, the Reverend Than Van Truong, returned to his family on 17 September 2005, illustrated Vietnamese authorities’ worries about religion. A former Vietnamese army officer, Truong’s first arrest came in May 2003 when he was held without charges for nine months after distributing Bibles. He was rearrested in June 2004, diagnosed as “delusional” for believing in God, and sent to a mental hospital. “Religious Groups Vexed in Vietnam”, ZENT.org News Agency, 25 September 2005.

16

A Vietnamese diplomat in Hanoi stated to the author about media coverage of SRV human rights problems: “Journalists can find good and bad here. But they need to be fair to us. We want mutual understanding”. 3 March 2005.

17

See this notion in Jim Lobe, “Pentagon Woos Vietnam”, Asia Times OnLine, 19 July 2003. And the carefully expressed counter to this notion during U.S. Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld’s visit to Vietnam in early June 2006. See Hayden, op. cit., BBC News, 4 June 2006.

18

Simon Montlake, “Military Ties Warm Between US, Vietnam”, Christian Science Monitor, 7 February 2006.

19

Ambassador Marine to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, as quoted in Grant McCool, “Vietnam at WTO’s Doorstep”, Asia Times OnLine, 12 January 2006.

20

“Southeast Asia”, Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, no. 18 (2006): 577.

21

Jane’s, op cit., p. 575.

22

Aung Zaw, “Thaksin’s Mystery Trip”, The Irrawaddy Online, 4 August 2006.

23

Yuan, China-ASEAN Relations, op. cit., pp. 42–43.

24

William Boot, “A Damming Indictment”, The Irrawaddy Online, 4 August 2006.

REFERENCES CITED Amer, Ramses. 2004. “Assessing Sino-Vietnamese Relations through the Management of Contentious Issues”. Contemporary Southeast Asia 26, no. 2 (August): 320–45. Bert, Wayne. 2004. “Burma, China and the U.S.A.”, Pacific Affairs 77, no. 2 (Summer): 263–82. Chambers, Paul. 2004. “U.S.-Thai Relations After 9/11: A New Era of Cooperation?” Contemporary Southeast Asia 26, no. 3 (December): 460–79. Economy, Elizabeth. 2005. “China’s Rise in Southeast Asia: Implications for the United States”. Journal of Contemporary China 14, no. 44 (August): 409–25. Forbes, Dean and Cecile Cutler. 2006. “Laos in 2005: 30 Years of the Peoples Democratic Republic”. Asian Survey XLVI, no. 1 (January–February): 175–79. Haacke, Jurgen. 2006. Myanmar’s Foreign Policy: Domestic Influences and International Implications, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies. Lang, Graeme and Cathy Hu Wan-Chan. 2006. “China’s Impact on Forests in Southeast Asia”. Journal of Contemporary Asia 36, no. 2: 167–94.

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Liebman, Alex. 2005. “Trickle-down Hegemony? China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ and Dam Building on the Mekong”. Contemporary Southeast Asia 27, no. 2 (August): 281–304. Masviriyakul, Siriluk. 2004. “Sino-Thai Strategic Economic Development in the Greater Mekong Subregion (1992–2003)”. Contemporary Southeast Asia 26, no. 2 (August): 302–19. Stuart-Fox, Martin. 2004. “Southeast Asia and China: The Role of History and Culture in Shaping Future Relations”. Contemporary Southeast Asia 26, no. 1 (April): 116–39. Vaughn, Bruce and Wayne M. Morrison. 2006. “China-Southeast Asia Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications for the United States”, Washington, D.C.: CRS Report for Congress, 4 April. Vo, Tri Thanh. 2005. “Vietnam’s Trade Liberalization and International Economic Integration: Evolution, Problems, and Challenges”. ASEAN Economic Bulletin 22, no. 1 (April): 75–91. Yuan, Jing-Dong. 2006. China-ASEAN Relations: Perspectives, Prospects and Implications for U.S. Interests. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute.

LAWRENCE E. GRINTER is Professor of Asian Studies at the Air War College, Maxwell Airforce Base, Alabama, U.S.A.

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