CONTRADICTORY APPROACHES: DISCUSSING SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM IN CENTRAL EUROPE1 MILOŠ BRUNCLÍK & MICHAL KUBÁT

Abstract: Attentive students of Central European political regimes may come across a striking phenomenon: political scientists of the region differ sharply from most of English-writing researchers on how they understand Central European political regimes. Whereas the latter group of political analysts usually refers to these regimes as semi-presidential, their counterparts in Central Europe generally claim that these regimes are parliamentary. Our article is an analysis of the two contradicting approaches on the nature of democratic regimes in Central Europe. This examination is carried out in the context of the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia. Major changes in the position of president took place in these countries. This is why the question of the nature of their political regimes is a frequent subject of both discussions and analyses. This difference is explained by different theoretical as well as methodological approaches. Keywords: semi-presidentialism, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, parliamentary regime.

Introduction Democratic regimes, their types and functioning are inseparable parts of a comparative political research. While originally most of the research was concentrated on distinctions between parliamentary and presidential regimes, since the 1990s the concept of semi-presidentialism has gained a widespread scholarly attention as well. This trend is closely related to the political changes that were brought about by the fall of the communist systems in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989. Even though more than 25 years have elapsed since the democratic transition, the comparative research on Central European democratic regimes with a particular focus on presidents keeps going and has recently become even more intensive (Hloušek 2013). This analysis of a scholarly reflection on the Central European democratic regimes shows a striking phenomenon. Whereas some scholars regard these regimes as semi-presidential, some other classifies 1

This article has been elaborated within research project no. 15-01907S (title: “Does Direct Election Matter? Analysing the Effect of Direct Election of President on the Working of the Political Regime in the Czech Republic”). The project is sponsored by the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic.

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them as parliamentary. We argue that this remarkable difference is mainly determined by a different theoretical understanding of semi-presidentialism and by a different methodological approach. The article is concerned with the difference between most of Englishwriting scholars on the one hand, and most of Central European scholars on the other hand. We focus on how they assess these regimes in order to identify the reasons for this striking contrast. The article comprises three countries: Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. These countries implemented important changes of their institutional settings. Poland adopted a new constitution in 1997 which differs significantly from the previous one and which substantially changed the Polish political regime. In Slovakia a number of constitutional amendments were adopted between 1999 and 2001. These changes (including the direct election of president) were designed as a reaction to the rule of the former Slovak Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar who moved Slovakia closer to illiberal democracies. After a long debate the Czech Republic too introduced the popular election of the president in 2012, which subsequently changed the position of the president in the Czech politics. Hence, all these institutional changes are reasons, why the three regimes have traditionally been objects of an uninterrupted political research since the 1990s. Due to the impressive number of such contributions the following text reviews only a selection from the literature which is nevertheless – as we believe – a representative sample that reflects the overall academic coverage of the topic. The article is organized as follows: first we present the most important scholarship on the concept of semi-presidentialism, which we can be distinguished into two major approaches: “the Duvergerian” and “postDuvergerian” traditions. Then we provide an overview of literature on Central European regimes and how the regimes are classified in these studies by both “English writing” scholars and authors coming from Central European countries2. Finally, we identify reasons of why they differ so sharply in their regime classifications.

Two Ways to Define Semi-Presidentialism The source of the disagreement over classifying the Central European regimes lies in the concept of semi-presidentialism. In relevant literature cumulated over past decades there is a large number of definitions of semi2

For the purposes of this article we understand the “English-writing” scholars as those scholars of any nationality who publish mostly in English and who are based in research institutions in West Europe and the USA. Analogically, the Central European scholars are those whose workplace is in one of the Central European countries: Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. They mostly publish in their native languages.

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presidentialism (e.g. O’Neil 1993; Lijphart 1994; Pasquino 1997; Lijphart 1999; Elgie 1999; Cheibub 2007) which need not to be discussed here at length. It suffices to say that there is no consensus on how to define semi-presidential regime not to speak of authors who have even rejected to recognize semipresidentialism as a separate democratic regime type (e.g. Siaroff 2003). From the large pool of various definitions two major approaches can be discerned: the Duvergerian approach and post-Duvergerian approach (cf. Elgie 2015, 4). To be sure, the Duvergerian approach is derived from the work by Maurice Duverger, the first scholar who has analyzed semi-presidentialism in conceptual as well as empirical terms. His definition, which was evolving over several years, was finalized in the late 1970s3. Particularly Duverger’s article published in 1980 became a well-known concept of comparative politics as well as a starting point for other scholars concerned with semi-presidentialism. He defined semi-presidentialism by “three elements: (1) the president of the republic is elected by universal suffrage, (2) he possesses quite considerable powers; (3) he has opposite him, however, a prime minister and ministers who possess executive and governmental power and can stay in office only if the parliament does not show its opposition to them” (Duverger 1980, 167). Many other scholars followed Duverger’s definition and tried to improve it. For example, Giovanni Sartori emphasizes “dual authority” of the executive (popularly elected president and prime minister), which is conditioned by three factors: 1) the president is independent from parliament, but he is not entitled to govern alone, and his will must be conveyed and processed via his government 2) the government is independent of the president. It is subject to no-confidence vote and needs parliamentary support, 3) the dual authority of executive allows for different balances and also for shifting prevalence of power within the executive (Sartori 1997). The post-Duvergerian tradition (Elgie 2015, 4) was established by Robert Elgie who recognizes the importance of the concept for the comparative research. However, he significantly altered the original definition suggested by Duverger as he eliminated the second definitional feature: (“quite considerable powers”), because it is hard for scholars to agree on what is meant by this feature. He defined it as a system, where “a popularly elected fixed term president exists alongside a prime-minister and cabinet, who are responsible to parliament” (Elgie 1999, 13). Elgie claims that the key advantage of this definition lies in the fact that is serves as a clear-cut formal criterion which eliminates the previous ambiguity in classifying semi-presidential regimes. This definition is considered by many authors (including Elgie himself) as a “standard” or universally accepted (Elgie 2007; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones 2010) and is currently used by a number of authors of large comparative studies 3

For details on this process see (Bahro et al. 1998; Elgie 1999).

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as well as shorter articles (Elgie & Moestrup 2007; Elgie & Moestrup 2008; Elgie, et al. 2011; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2010). As it will be shown below, the two contending approaches to semipresidentialism overlap to a certain extent with two groups of scholars (the Central European scholars and English-writing scholars) who attempted to classify democratic regimes in Central European countries4.

Central European Regimes from the Central European Perspective: Parliamentary or Semi-Presidential? It is quite typical of Central Europe that intensity and content of discussions on Central European regimes have almost always been closely related to political and constitutional developments. This fact is most obvious in Poland, where a major discussion on the Polish regime was taking place in the 1990s, when Poland was going through a complicated constitutional development. The discussion peaked in 1997, when Poland adopted the new constitution5. The regime that existed between 1992 and 1997, i.e. the regime based on the “small” constitution, was often described as “non-parliamentary”. The “non-parliamentary” form of government was interpreted in different ways. Scholars tended to call the regime “semi-presidential” (Bankowicz 2013, 174), “mixed“, being “between the model of the fifth French republic and parliamentary cabinet model” (Graczyk 1997, 90), “tending to parliamentary-presidential system” (Ciapala 1999, 39), “leaning on the French model” (the fifth French republic) (Kallas 2003, 531), premier-presidential (Jasiewicz 1997, 147), “hybrid of rationalized parliamentarism6 and semi-presidentialism”(Antoszewski 2012, 50) etc. Those researchers, who did not put the term “parliamentarism” aside, spoke about a parliamentarism “with a strengthened president” (Lisicka, 2002, 48), or 4

5

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It should be noted that by far not all English-writing scholars play down the importance of presidential powers in their definitions. Indeed, this group is very diverse. For example, the key to the Shugart and Carey’s (Samuels’) distinction between their two subtypes of semi-presidentialism (premier-presidential vs. president-parliamentary) lies in the fact that in the latter case “presidents possess formal, constitutional authority to dismiss the premier and/or the cabinet” (see Shugart & Carey 2010, 30). The discussion on the Polish regime, resp. on the position of the president, revived between 2007 and 2010, when conflicts between the president Lech Wałęsa and the Prime Minister Donald Tusk were taking place. The competence conflict was referred to the Constitutional Court, which finally ruled in favor of the Prime Minister (see Dudek 2013, 229-302). The term „rationalized parliamentarism” is used mainly in Czech literature. It is a parliamentary regime, where prime minister and the cabinet are particularly strengthened vis-á-vis parliament. The government remains politically accountable to the parliament, but the former is protected against the latter by various constitutional (e.g. constructive vote of no-confidence) and political (e.g. party discipline) tools to ensure stability and functionality of the parliamentary regime (see Kubát 2013, 34-54; Kysela 2008a, 32 and 36).

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about presidential competences that go beyond usual patterns of parliamentary regimes, or about a regime which is partly parliamentary and partly it has “nothing to do with parliamentarism” (Czajowski 1993, 12-13). In contrast, there has been a clear scholarly consensus on how to classify the Polish regime after 1997. The experts unanimously consider the regime a parliamentary one. It should be noted that the term “parliamentary cabinet regime”7 took roots in the Polish debate (Antoszewski 2012, 55; Bankowicz 2010, 176; Raciborski 2003, 89-97; Wiatr 2006, 154). In the Czech Republic the discussion was not primarily concerned with the issue of the form of government as such, but rather with the president, who has been a traditional object of the political science and constitutional law debate that occasionally comprises analyses of the president in the Czechoslovak political regime between 1918 and 1938 (Mlejnek 2014; Broklová 2011). The debate about the Czech political regime started off after 2012, when the direct election of the president was introduced, and accelerated in 2013 in connection to the first direct election of the president (Kopeček & Mlejnek 2013). In the past there was almost a unanimous agreement that the Czech Republic was a parliamentary regime, even though the role of the president was very specific (relatively strong) (Gerloch et al. 2002, 191; Filip 2013; Klíma 2004, 44; Kysela & Kühn 2007; Kysela 2008b, 235; Vodička & Cabada 2003, 154; Wintr 2006, 51-2). After the 2012 constitutional amendment and the 2013 presidential elections some scholars indicated that the Czech Republic could move closer to the semi-presidential government (Kysela 2013). Such conclusions about the tendency towards semi-presidentialism were, however, carefully formulated: “In the long term horizon the possibility even exists of a transformation from a parliamentary to semi-presidential regime” (Kopeček & Mlejnek 2013, 75). Kudrna went even further to argue that the Czech Republic became a semi-presidential regime (Kudrna 2013). Such statements are rather rare, though. First of all, the constitutional change is still very recent and the research on the Czech regime after 2012 has just started. So far most scholars have argued that despite the 2012 constitutional change the Czech regime is still a parliamentary one (Bureš et al. 2013, 66; Gerloch et al. 2013, 168; cf. Hloušek 2014; Wintr 2013). At the most some argue that the direct election “has moved it [the Czech regime] from the ideal form of parliamentarism” (Brunclík 2014, 77), or that the Czech parliamentary regime is “deformed and dysfunctional” (Kubát 2014, 55). 7

“Parliamentary cabinet regime” (reżim parlamentarno-gabinetowy) is a concept, which has settled mainly in the Polish literature and to some extent overlaps with the above concept of rationalized parliamentarism. It is a parliamentary regime, in which the key role is played by government headed by prime minister, who is – compared to other constitutional institutions (head of state, parliament) strengthened by constitutional as well as political means (see Antoszewski & Herbut 2012, 173).

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In Slovakia the debate has had a different character. The discussion was widely affected by the Slovak semi-authoritarian regime in the 1990s. The problems of consolidation of democracy in Slovakia became the most relevant issues, whereas the question of the form of government was secondary. Even if such considerations about the form of government in Slovakia (clearly a parliamentary one) appeared, they were embedded strictly in a formal constitutional context (Kresák 1996). Furthermore, the introduction of the popular election of the president in 1999 was not driven by an effort to turn the Slovak parliamentary regime into a semi-presidential one; rather it was conceived as a part and parcel of the democratic consolidation after Vladimír Mečiar’s fall (Kopeček ed. 2006). All in all, the discussion about the form of government after 1999 has been almost non-existent. Even though some scholars have touched upon this question, they do not view the Slovak regime as semi-presidential one (Horváth 2005; Spáč 2013, 126).

Central European Regimes in Works of the English-Writing Scholars By far the most ambiguities and different conclusions have appeared in the discussion on the Polish case. Whereas most scholars considered Poland as a semi-presidential regime before 1997 (Metcalf 2000; Millard 2007; Siaroff 2003; Goetz & Wollmann 2001), other authors came to different conclusions. Some of them regarded Poland as a case of a “limited presidentialism” (Derbyshire & Derbyshire 1996), whereas Baylis argues that “the parliamentary features of the Polish system appear to date to have dominated” (Baylis 1996). In 1997 Poland adopted a new constitution that severely limited the president and strengthened the cabinet and the prime minister. Siaroff puts Poland among “parliamentary systems with a ‘presidential corrective’”(Siaroff 2003, 308) and Köker describes Poland as a “parliamentary system” (Köker 2013). Yet, other scholars (Elgie 2011, 24; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones 2009) regard Poland as a semi-presidential regime, usually having adopted the Elgie’s definition. As McMenamin quite symptomatically put it: “The 1997 constitution reduced the president’s power to the benefit of the prime minister but most importantly it confirmed the semi-presidential system in Poland”(McMenamin 2008, 122). As far as the Czech Republic is concerned, the classification of its regime appeared almost unanimous: the Czech Republic was mostly regarded as a parliamentary regime (Baylis 1996, 299; Goetz & Wollmann, 2001; Sedelius & Ekman, 2008, 15; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009, 673). Only exceptionally the Czech Republic was classified differently – as a “dual system” (Derbyshire & Derbyshire, 1996). It was not until 2012 (with the newly introduced popular election of the president), when a classification of the Czech case started to

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change. Robert Elgie – in line with his own definition of semi-presidentialism – now considers the Czech Republic to be a semi-presidential regime (Elgie 2015). The development of an assessment of the Slovak case among Western scholars has had a similar trajectory. Whereas prior to 1999 Slovakia was unambiguously classified as a parliamentary regime (Derbyshire & Derbyshire 1996, 4; Baylis 1996, 299; Easter 1997, 184-211), a number of studies published after 1999 regards Slovakia as a semi-presidential regime (Protsyk 2011, 101), even though some scholars (Sedelius & Ekman 2008; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones 2009, 673) still classify Slovakia as a parliamentary regime8.

Explaining the Different Classifications of Central European Regimes How can be the striking differences between the two groups of authors explained? There are two major reasons: theoretical and methodological. As for the theoretical reasons, there is a clear difference in understanding of semipresidential regimes. An increasing number of English wiriting scholars have adopted Elgie’s definition. This definition has two important features: minimalist and institutionalist. The minimalist definition of semipresidentialism is a concept with a small intension and a wide extension. In this regard, it is logical that those, who subscribe to the minimalist definition, may find a large number of cases of semi-presidentialism around the world, including Central Europe (cf. Elgie 2015), whereas those who reject it may find only few cases. As far as the institutionalist feature of the definition is concerned, its major advantage is that it allows researchers to classify political regimes in various countries quite easily and unambiguously, solely on the basis of constitutional texts. In contrast most of Central European authors understand the concept of semi-presidentialism differently. Even though they do not often explicitly refer to any concrete definition of semi-presidentialism, they consider the criterion of presidential power as crucial. Jerzy Wiatr defines semi-presidentialism by the fact that prime minister and government are subordinated both to a directly elected president and parliament (Wiatr 2006, 123). According to Miroslav Novák semi-presidentialism is basically nothing more than a “parliamentary regime plus a strengthened president” (Novák 2008, 9-15). This means that there is a government headed by a prime minister accountable to a parliament. The president is elected directly and has more powers than presidents in parliamentary regimes. These powers are either constitutional or emanate from 8

Schleiter and Morgan-Jones quite paradoxically treat Slovakia as a parliamentary regime, even though they subscribe to Elgie’s definition (Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009, 673).

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a political situation in which the president is backed by a parliamentary majority. The issue of the political majority is perceived as of extreme importance by Hloušek, Kopeček and Šedo. According to them, a regime is semi-presidential, if the president, who is not accountable to the parliament, is the head of a powerful political movement (government or opposition), which provides him with a loyal base for enforcing his own policies. If he/she cannot rely on such a movement, it is a parliamentary regime with a directly elected president (Hloušek et al. 2011, 114). The strong role of the president is also emphasized by Antoszewski and Herbut who define semi-presidentialism by a dual executive consisting of a president and a government led by a prime minister. The president is elected by universal suffrage, and is not responsible to parliament. He has competence not only in domestic affairs, but particularly also in foreign policy. On the contrary, the government is weakened and is responsible both to the parliament (through no-confidence vote) and to the president, who may recall it (Antoszewski & Herbut 2006, 179). Marek Bankowicz emphasizes the overall strength of the whole executive (not only president) and characterized semipresidentialism by three basic features: 1) the executive prevails over the legislature, 2) the president plays an important political role and participates in the exercise of power, 3) there are two active bodies of the executive: the popularly elected president and the government headed by the prime minister, who is politically accountable to the parliament (Bankowicz 2013, 30). As it can be seen from the previous overview, the Central European scholars explicitly or implicitly subscribe to Duverger and his followers (e.g. Sartori 1997, 131-135; Pasquino 19979). Perhaps all the analyses by the Central European scholars are concerned with presidential powers, powerful president respectively, as a key feature of semi-presidentialism, the mode of election is not regarded as the decisive feature. Furthermore, most of Central European scholars build their definition not only on institutional features, but also on behavioral outcomes. This difference is related to the distinction between institutional and behavioral approach to semi-presidentialism10. Thus, although institutional settings in various countries may be different, the actual working of their regimes may be very similar or even the same. And conversely, the same institutional setting may not result in the same way the regimes work in practice. In Central and Eastern Europe “it is not exceptional that a directly elected president is in a position that does not distinguish him from the head of 9

10

As Gianfranco Pasquino argues: Semi-presidential systems “cannot be created just by strengthening some features of parliamentary systems, for instance, by directly electing the President of the Republic...” (Pasquino 1997, 129). As Shugart argues, the “institutional approach defines the authority patterns of the executive and assembly and how they are constitutionally related to one another. A behavioral approach, on the other hand, focuses on extra-constitutional factors such as the party system and leadership dynamics” (Shugart 2005, 327).

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state in a neighbouring country who is elected by the parliament” (Hloušek, Kopeček, Šedo 2011, 114). Similarly, Tavits argues that popular election of president does not make difference to the way political regimes work (e.g. in terms of presidential activism) (Tavits 2011). In addition, it is important to understand the context in which the direct election of the president was introduced in Central European countries. It was often conditioned by historical circumstances which are not related to an effort to strengthen a president or to create a new political regime with a president, who disposes of the chief executive authority. Some Central and East European countries introduced the direct election of president in line with a “general democratization spirit of time” after 1989 (Mlejnek 2011, 15). The direct election of president was designed in order to contrast new regimes with old communist regimes, where no free and fair election took place. At that time the key political assumption was simple: the more free and fair elections, the more democracy. Having this approach in mind, it is only natural that Central European scholars regard the Polish, Czech and Slovak regimes as parliamentary despite the directly elected presidents. Besides that the Central European authors do not limit themselves to the analysis of the president, but very often they analyze the executive power as a whole. This approach leads to more complex and detailed analyses and, as a result, to a more fine-grained differentiation of various types of democratic regimes. Whereas the differentiation of various types of semi-presidentialism is less frequent, Central European authors often identify more types of parliamentarism. Hence, Polish scholars often describe Poland as “cabinet-parliamentary regime”, and Czech scholars often use the term “rationalized parliamentarism”. This is a crucial point. While in a rationalized parliamentarism the cabinet (led by the prime minister) has the largest say within the executive, in semi-presidential regimes it is rather the president, whose position is stronger. In other words, it is assumed that in parliamentary regimes a prime minister holds powers of the chief executive irrespective of the mode of election of the president. Finally, the difference in classification of the three regimes is caused not only by different theoretical features, but also by different methodological points of departure. The Central European scholars do not start their research with an a priori definition of semi-presidentialism, which would then be applied on the political regimes. Instead, they proceed the other way round: first they analyze a political practice and only after that they determine the nature of a political regime. However, many other scholars start with a (clear-cut minimalist) definition of semi-presidentialism. Hence, the selection of cases that are to be included in their comparative analysis is determined by the definition. This point can be well illustrated by Slovak authors Darina Malová and Marek Rybář who elaborated a chapter for the volume edited by Elgie. They argue that “The constitutional amendment of 1999 established in Slovakia a semi-

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presidential arrangement as defined in this volume” (Malová & Rybář, 2008, 180). At the same time, however, they prove in their chapter that the constitutional changes weakened the president, which has also been shown by other studies, and that the working of the Slovak regime does not differ from the parliamentary model (Tavits 2011, 119-129). However, the thesis on “Slovak semi-presidentialism” is not a result of an analysis of the Slovak case. On the contrary, their subscription to the semi-presidentialism in Slovakia is rather a subscription to Elgie’s definition11.

Conclusion Those, who closely observe a scholarly discussion on the political regimes in Central European countries, have certainly come across a striking difference in how these regimes are classified. Whereas some scholars classify the regimes as semi-presidential, others tend to classify them as parliamentary ones. We argue that the key to this disagreement resides in a different theoretical (and also methodological) approach. The first group of scholars adopts the purely institutional and minimalist definition suggested by Elgie. Hence, they tend to classify the Central European regimes as semi-presidential. These scholars belong to “post-Duvergerian” tradition of semi-presidentialism and come from mostly “English-writing” authors. The second group of scholars (Central European ones) remained faithful to Duverger’s concept of semipresidentialism which – unlike – Elgie and his followers – takes account of presidential powers. Thus they tend to classify the regimes as parliamentary ones.

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