Meeting of the Aristotelian Society held at Senate House, University of London, on 9 March 2009 at 4:15pm.

X—A DEFENCE OF CATEGORICAL REASONS RUSS SHAFER-LANDAU In this paper I offer two arguments designed to defend the existence of categorical reasons, which I define as those justifying considerations that obtain independently of their relation to an agent’s commitments. The first argument is based on certain paradigm cases meant to reveal difficulties for practical instrumentalism—the view, as I define it here, that categorical reasons do not exist, because all reasons must serve the commitments of the agents to whom they apply. The second argument relies on considerations of responsibility and blame to establish the existence of categorical reasons.

I Categorical reasons, as I will define them here, are reasons that obtain independently of their relation to an agent’s commitments. Such reasons do not depend for their existence on their being instrumental to the achievement of any of an agent’s desires, goals or cares. I believe that there are categorical reasons for action, and will offer two arguments on their behalf. If there are categorical reasons for action, then practical instrumentalism is false. Practical instrumentalism (henceforth, just instrumentalism) is the view that the only reasons there can be are socalled hypothetical reasons, i.e. reasons to do things that are in some way ancillary to the achievement of one’s commitments (cares, desires, wants, goals, etc.). Apart from the intrinsic interest of the matter, showing that there are categorical practical reasons, and that instrumentalism is false, is important for at least two reasons. First, it would enable us to resist relativistic arguments that assume that moral requirements entail excellent reasons for action, but make reasons contingent on our commitments, thereby making the content of moral requirements contingent on our commitments. Second, it would provide us with ©2009 The Aristotelian Society Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. cix, Part 2 doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2009.00264.x

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an adequate reply to arguments that assume a commitment-independent source of moral requirements, and then proceed, with the help of instrumentalism, to the conclusion that there may be no good reason to abide by morality’s demands.

II Both of my arguments for categorical reasons, and against instrumentalism, begin by directing our attention to a familiar sort of example: that of the dedicated, successful immoralist. Imagine a person who is very sharp, very cunning, but also deeply malicious. His happiness is directly proportioned to the misery he wreaks. His top priority in life is to cause pain and suffering, even if, as he knows, such conduct will likely bring an early death, or a long incarceration. We intuitively regard such a person as (at the least) morally obligated to desist from the cruel treatment he longs to impose. Don’t we also believe that there are excellent reasons for him to so refrain—namely, all of those considerations that constitute the wrongness of his actions? The reasons to refrain from cruelty are (at a minimum) the very considerations that make his actions wrong in the first place. Consider an experienced torturer working on behalf of an authoritarian government. Such a person not only endorses the legitimacy of the regime, but takes active pleasure in breaking his victims. His greatest joy is stripping the last vestiges of dignity from those who initially resist his demands. At a given session, as he is about to apply the electrodes, he pauses to consider the merits of his action. He sees that doing so will get him what he most wants, and will frustrate none of his desires. He proceeds accordingly. Consider a different case, one in which a person can very easily rescue another. A child has strayed from her parents on a busy city street, and is about to toddle into the path of an oncoming car. The bystander sees what is happening. He need only reach an arm down to the child to save her from an awful death. Rather than doing so, he watches in delight as the child is run over and killed. If there were nothing to be said against these actions and omissions—no considerations that opposed, extinguished, or overturned the case these agents might make for their cruel conduct— then it is hard to see how their actions could be wrong. But they ob©2009 The Aristotelian Society Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. cix, Part 2 doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2009.00264.x

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viously are wrong. And the sorts of considerations just mentioned— those directly relevant to matters of justification (and, in this particular context, those that indict the agent’s cruelty)—are precisely what reasons are. Reasons are, by definition, considerations that favour or oppose, that make something appropriate, legitimate, or justified (or the reverse). So, if we think that there is a plausible story to tell about why the dedicated evildoer is wrong for indulging his inclinations, then we are committed to there being reasons for him to refrain. And this despite the fact that, by hypothesis, he has no commitments that would be furthered by his doing so. But surely, some will say, the moral monster has some commitments that will be furthered were he to refrain from cruelty. And that shows that he will, after all, have some reason to refrain. But we’ve no grounds for thinking this a categorical reason. Whatever reasons he has to desist will stem straightforwardly from his aversion to jail, or his desire to avoid the potential harms inflicted by his vengeful victims, etc. There are two things we can say here. First, and fairly obviously, even if all real people in the real world do have at least some ends that would be served by avoiding cruelty, we can imagine a possible world in which our misanthrope does not. The instrumentalist’s rejection of categorical reasons is meant to express a necessary truth—reasons must further what an agent cares about—and so is vulnerable if there are possible contexts in which this truth fails to obtain. In the scenarios I am imagining, the ruthless immoralist has no commitments that would be served were he to refrain from his cruelty. But there are, nevertheless, excellent reasons for him to so refrain—namely, and at the very least, all of the considerations that make his proposed actions immoral. More importantly, we don’t want to make the case against cruelty dependent on an instrumental link with this man’s goals. Suppose, for instance, that our torturer wanted to avoid the censure that he would earn were his actions publicized. The best way to minimize his risk is to stop doing what he does. Though this, let us grant, does provide him a reason to stop, it isn’t the only, or nearly the strongest, reason to do so. The cruelties he perpetrates are opposed by a host of considerations that make no mention of his aims. These considerations are reasons—reasons to refrain from deliberately inflicting misery. And these reasons will, first and foremost, mention the suffering of his victims, and the absence of their consent to his ©2009 The Aristotelian Society Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. cix, Part 2 doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2009.00264.x

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treatment. If the immoralist’s aversion to being found out enters into it at all, it is only in a subordinate role, as a consideration that may supply an additional reason to refrain from his actions, one that is likelier than the others to motivate him to do the right thing. Here is the argument in a nutshell: (1) If there are reasons for these dedicated immoralists to refrain from their evil deeds, then practical instrumentalism is false. (2) There are such reasons. (3) Therefore practical instrumentalism is false. The first premiss is meant to be acceptable both to fans and to critics of categorical reasons. The dedicated immoralists that I am imagining are precisely those who lack any commitments that would be furthered were they to hew to the moral path. So there should be no controversy on this score. Premiss (2) is another matter. I have tried to reveal its attractions with the examples of the dedicated evildoers. So long as we think—as all of us do—that there are genuine considerations to oppose their cruelty, and also think that such considerations obtain independently of their commitments, then premiss (2) is secure. That would be enough to establish the existence of categorical reasons. Instrumentalists will likely charge that the argument begs the question, because (as they will see it) the examples and considerations that support premiss (2) are insufficiently independent of the conclusion being argued for. An ideal argument is one whose premisses can find support from those who are as yet uncommitted on the matter at hand. If the only reason to endorse a premiss is that one already accepts the conclusion it is meant to support, then the argument that incorporates that premiss is question-begging. The instrumentalist will likely insist that the only ones willing to ratify premiss (2) are those who are already committed to rejecting instrumentalism. I don’t think that instrumentalists are right about that. But before saying why, we might undertake a brief excursus on the matter of begging questions. Begging a question is sometimes unavoidable. In ethics, the likeliest scenarios are ones in which one is advancing fundamental normative or evaluative commitments. It is hard to avoid begging a question if one encounters someone who denies that pain is ever bad, or denies that there is anything immoral about humiliat©2009 The Aristotelian Society Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. cix, Part 2 doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2009.00264.x

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ing vulnerable innocents. Perhaps the only way to avoid a petitio in these circumstances is to show that one’s interlocutor is contradicting himself. This is the fond hope of Kantians and others—to show that those with patently immoral sensibilities are in some way undercutting their own commitments and displaying some internal incoherence. Perhaps the Kantians are right. It would be lovely were it so. But let us pursue other possibilities, ones that do not vindicate the existence of categorical reasons by attributing a contradiction to those who refuse to acknowledge them. On this alternative line, those who oppose our basic normative and evaluative commitments can coherently reject the claims we hold so dear. Any defence of our deepest commitments will have to come from the sorts of bolstering considerations that are involved in revealing a belief to be situated within a network of mutually supporting beliefs. But such a defence will not be able to avoid the charge of begging the question. The other beliefs we enlist on behalf of our original claim may be no more persuasive to opponents than the position originally in need of support. Unless we can reveal a contradiction in our opponent’s position, we may have to beg a question somewhere. The most likely point is, as I have said, with regard to our fundamental normative and evaluative commitments. And we are certainly in the neighbourhood, when considering an endorsement (or rejection) of categorical reasons. This is not yet to concede that this first argument is questionbegging. But what if it were? There is independent reason for thinking that question-begging claims and arguments are ones that agents may sometimes be justified in believing. I am justified in believing myself to be conscious, even if others regard me as an unthinking automaton whose protestations are merely programmed behaviours. If I am imprisoned on false charges, I am justified in believing myself innocent, even if all publicly available evidence convinces everyone else of the justice of the sentence. If, having cried wolf one too many times, my next cry is unheeded and disbelieved, I am nonetheless justified in believing that there is such an animal before me if I see it approaching and ready to attack. In each of these cases, we can easily imagine that any evidence that I offer to substantiate my claim will be taken as confirming the hypotheses of the doubters who surround me. The credibility of my ©2009 The Aristotelian Society Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. cix, Part 2 doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2009.00264.x

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testimony will invariably be rejected, as it is expressive of a conclusion that the sceptics will not accept. In this context, anything I say on my behalf is bound to be question-begging. But I am nevertheless justified in regarding my supporting beliefs, and the claims they seek to vindicate, as eminently plausible. I don’t say that our belief in the existence of considerations that oppose the actions of the immoralist is as epistemically secure as the contested beliefs in the examples just given. That is not the point of introducing them. Rather, the examples are designed to show that some question-begging claims are credible and justifiedly held. So even if the various beliefs that condemn the actions of the immoralist beg the question against the instrumentalist, such beliefs might be epistemically justified. To pursue this path, we would need to distinguish between those question-begging beliefs that are, and those that are not, justifiedly held. I don’t intend to embark on such a discussion, because I do not believe that the considerations that support premiss (2) are, in fact, question-begging. I don’t believe that only those already convinced of instrumentalism’s failure will find these considerations compelling. What is true is that dedicated instrumentalists will find something to resist. I submit that those who have yet to develop a considered view about the existence of categorical reasons will find the considerations that support the second premiss natural and highly plausible. They won’t need convincing that there is something to be said against the torturer’s actions, and something to be said in favour of easily preventing a child from being needlessly killed. They will then discover that such considerations, when conjoined with an uncontroversial definition of reasons, and the absence of any relevant commitments on the immoralist’s part, entail the existence of categorical reasons. The only ones who will deny the appeal of such considerations are those whose theoretical commitments already require them to do so. That is not enough to show that the argument is unsound.

III A second argument on behalf of categorical reasons also relies on our views about the dedicated immoralist, but shifts the focus to matters of responsibility and blameworthiness. Consider those who ©2009 The Aristotelian Society Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. cix, Part 2 doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2009.00264.x

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freely commit themselves to blowing up civilians in crowded areas. Such people are (with perhaps rare exceptions) highly capable of assessing options, gathering information to discover how best to pursue their chosen goals, and taking the needed steps to ensure that their goals are met. They are not insane. They are genuine agents, responsible for their deeds. They are as blameable as agents can be. We would rescind our condemnation if such people were literally compelled to do what they did. We would mitigate the blame were we to discover that they had been coerced or manipulated into doing what they had done. But on the assumption that the killers have autonomously elected to proceed in their undertaking, then they are, at the very least, rightly subject to blame. One is blameworthy for an action only if there is some reason to refrain from committing it. Because the killers are blameworthy for their deeds, there is a reason that opposes their actions. Since this reason does not depend on the ends that the killers happen to have, the reason is a categorical one. That they have violated or ignored it is the basis of their blameworthiness. We have here the makings of a second argument for categorical reasons: (1) If someone is blameworthy for doing something, then there is a reason for that person not to do it. (2) Autonomous fanatics are blameworthy for their killings. (3) Therefore there is a reason for these fanatics not to perpetrate such killings. (4) Such a reason, by hypothesis, is neither the content of one of the fanatic’s commitments, nor instrumental in securing or protecting one of his commitments. (5) Therefore such a reason applies to the fanatic independently of his commitments. (6) Therefore there is at least one categorical reason. There are only three premisses to the argument. I think that each one is highly plausible. Premiss (4). Premiss (4) is a stipulation that comports with the relevant possibilities, and should be granted by all parties to the debate. It is easy to conjure situations in which perfect instrumentally rational deliberation, begun from a fanatic’s existing commitments, would generate no consideration that opposed his deadly undertak©2009 The Aristotelian Society Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. cix, Part 2 doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2009.00264.x

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ings. It seems to me that any weak points contained in the argument would have to be found in association with premiss (1) or premiss (2). So let’s turn our attention to these. Premiss (1). Premiss (1) seems to me a conceptual truth. If there are no reasons for an agent to refrain from a given action, then committing it cannot merit blame. Being deserving of blame entails that one has (at a minimum) ignored a relevant consideration that opposes the action that one has performed. If one has complied with all relevant and applicable reasons, then there is no room for criticism. And if there is nothing criticizable about an agent’s actions, then the person is not properly blameable for his or her behaviour. So a person is blameworthy for an action only if there is some reason that stands against it. That is what the first premiss says. There are two important routes to criticizing this first premiss, but I don’t think that either of them is successful in the end. The first argues by counterexample. The second claims that blameworthiness requires only that there be a reason that opposes the culpable action, but not that there be a reason for the agent to refrain. Let’s take these criticisms in order. (a) Here is a purported counterexample to premiss (1): a person intentionally sets out to do something that strikes us as just terrible. He has no justification and no excuse. So he is blameworthy. But through his inadvertence, or some fortunate accident, what he ends up doing isn’t at all bad, and may even be quite good. Imagine a disgruntled employee who believes that the coffee he is about to hand his supervisor is laced with poison. He is delighted—he put the poison in there, and hopes for a lethal effect. But unbeknownst to him, the ‘poison’ is just saccharine, and the coffee is served up exactly to his employer’s tastes. Surely such a person is blameworthy for what he’s done. But there is no reason to avoid handing someone a cup of coffee prepared just the way he likes it. So we have warranted blame for an action without there being a reason to refrain from it. Thus premiss (1) is false. We can concoct many such similar examples, but I think that they will all fail of their purpose, and for the same reason. The key to understanding why is to focus on the precise basis for the assignment of blame. In this case, it is the possession of malevolent intentions. ©2009 The Aristotelian Society Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. cix, Part 2 doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2009.00264.x

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There is a reason not to act with such intentions. If there weren’t, it is difficult to see why we would criticize a person for having them. As we know, actions can be described in many different ways. There is no reason to refrain from handing a perfectly tasty cup of coffee to someone who will enjoy it. But that is not what we are blaming the employee for. We are blaming him for trying to poison his boss. And there is a reason not to do that. Further, it’s precisely because the employee ignores this reason, or takes this disfavouring reason as a favouring reason, that we believe him to be culpable for the way he’s acted in this case. For all such examples—ones in which a person is clearly culpable, though his action under at least one description is innocuous or even attractive—we must attend carefully to the specific aspect of his behaviour that is earning criticism. My contention is that once we do this, we will identify a reason that is being ignored or intentionally disrespected, and that this indifference to the force of applicable reasons is going to explain the blameworthiness of the agent in question. If that is right, then we don’t yet have grounds for rejecting premiss (1). (b) Here is another criticism of the first premiss. This criticism begins with a subtle distinction between a reason that opposes an action, and a reason for an agent which opposes that action. Critics who advance this second objection concede that blameworthiness requires a reason that opposes the blameable action. But they deny that this reason must be one that applies to each blameable agent. In effect, they reject my argument’s first premiss, (1) If someone is blameworthy for doing something, then there is a reason for that person not to do it, while endorsing a close cousin: (1⬘) If one is blameworthy for doing something, then there is a reason not to do it. Critics will argue, however, that (1⬘), when conjoined with premiss (2), does not yield (3). And they are right about that. So if we must replace (1) with (1⬘), my argument collapses. Here is the core thought that underlies this criticism. Warranted blame occurs within a practice that is defined by a legitimate set of rules that are effective in achieving a valuable purpose. Blame is de©2009 The Aristotelian Society Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. cix, Part 2 doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2009.00264.x

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served whenever these justified rules call for it, and they may do so even when there is no reason for a given individual to abide by these rules. Consider a familiar illustration. Suppose that hard determinism is true, but rather than abandoning our practices of blame, we choose to retain them. We implement them through a set of rules that assign blame when it is socially efficacious to do so. There may be no reason for an agent who is unconcerned with the rules (and the consequences of violating them) to refrain from disobedience. But this will not immunize her from blame, on the assumption that the rules which specify its assignment are justified. Once we grant that assumption, it is true that there is a reason to adhere to the relevant rules. This reason is provided by the justification of the social practices that the blaming rules are designed to enforce and protect. But the reason is a general one; it need not apply to each person whose actions fall within the scope of these rules. So (1⬘) is true, but (1) is not. And that’s bad news for me, since it is (1) that is needed to make my argument go through. I agree that (1) is what is really needed. But I also think that the challenge to it is unsuccessful. Any system of warranted blame must allow for the existence of legitimate excuses. And it seems to me that an agent has an excellent excuse if there was no reason for her to refrain from doing what she did. If a justified system of rules and criticism fails to provide an agent with a reason for obedience, then it is illegitimate to criticize her for failing to meet its standards. Blame points to a personal failing. But there is nothing necessarily amiss with the character of an agent who strays from norms that fail to provide her with reasons. Indeed, it would be grossly unfair to criticize a person for flouting rules that supply her with no reasons for compliance. (1⬘) allows for this kind of unfairness. (1) does not. (1⬘) severs the tie between blameworthiness and personal shortcoming. (1) does not. These points give us reason to prefer (1) to (1⬘). Premiss (2). Premiss (2) tells us that autonomous fanatics are blameworthy for their killings. It can be supported thus: if any agents are blameworthy for their actions, surely those who are bent on evil are among them. This is so whether the immoralists are doing evil for its own sake, or doing what is in fact evil, all the while characterizing their actions to themselves as ones that are aimed at a good. An informed, uncoerced, rational fanatic is the perfect exemplar of the ©2009 The Aristotelian Society Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. cix, Part 2 doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2009.00264.x

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blameable agent. His consistency is no proof against criticism. His intelligence and cunning, his ability to select appropriate means to his chosen ends, render him more, rather than less, liable to blame. The standard exculpation conditions do not apply here. The dedicated evildoers are not compelled to act as they do, but have chosen their path and have ruthlessly pursued it in the absence of duress, coercion, necessity or factual ignorance. As far as I can tell, there are only three ways to try to falsify the second premiss, and so deny that autonomous fanatics are blameworthy for their murderous deeds. The first emphasizes the importance of a reason’s accessibility as a precondition of blame. On this line, fanatics are immune from blame, because their existing commitments will prevent them from seeing the reasons that oppose their misdeeds. If they cannot see these reasons, then (it is said) they are not blameable for ignoring them. The second way to reject premiss (2) is to deny the existence of autonomous fanatics. The last is to deny that anyone is blameworthy for anything. (a) The first way in which we might deny that blame accrues to autonomous fanatics is to insist that being blameworthy for something requires that an agent has a reason that she has failed to adequately respect. Having a reason implies the reason’s accessibility—one has a reason to f only if one either appreciates that reason, or can, in some suitable way, be brought to appreciate it. And since the relevant evildoers are those whose commitments bear no instrumental relation to the relevant reasons to refrain, such people do not have any reason to avoid undertaking their atrocities. This means that they are not to blame for the harm they do. The following counter-argument sets out the relevant line of thought: (1ca) If an agent is blameworthy for doing something, then that agent must have an accessible reason not to do it. (2ca) Dedicated immoralists with no commitments that would be served were they to refrain from evildoing do not have any accessible reason to so refrain. (3ca) Therefore such immoralists are not blameworthy for their evil deeds. Although I cannot give a full assessment of this argument, I think that there are problems for both premisses, and that the accommo©2009 The Aristotelian Society Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. cix, Part 2 doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2009.00264.x

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dations needed to make its conclusion palatable lead directly to a recognition of categorical reasons. Though initially plausible, premiss (2ca) may yet be false. Depending on how we are to understand a reason’s accessibility, it may be that a reason is accessible to an agent even if acting upon it does not serve one of her pre-existing commitments. For one might arrive at true practical conclusions through a variety of routes that extend well beyond flawless instrumental reasoning. If that is so, then premiss (2ca) could be false for many or even all dedicated immoralists. There is also reason to worry about (1ca). The premiss gains support from this thought: if we are rightly subject to blame for something that we did (or failed to do), then we must have had an opportunity to avoid the blameworthy behaviour. And there is such an opportunity only if the bases of the blame—the considerations whose flouting explains our culpability—are accessible to us. If we cannot recognize the error of our ways, then we are blameless for our deeds, since we will have had no effective opportunity to avoid culpability. So dedicated immoralists (like the rest of us) are truly blameless if the reasons that oppose their actions are inaccessible to them. I am unsure whether these reasons really are inaccessible (see the brief discussion of (2ca) above), but let’s proceed as if they were. Still, an inability to appreciate the existence or force of such reasons does not immunize us from blame, if we are blameable for having endorsed our ends in the first place. To see this, imagine a person who has promised another to meet him at a certain place and time, but then, through her culpable negligence, finds that it is impossible to fulfil the promise. This current inability does not cancel her liability to blame. So, too, if the fanatic’s prior culpable choices are rendering him unable to see the merits of refraining from his actions, then his present inability to appreciate these considerations does not immunize him from blame. The question thus devolves to one about whether the fanatic’s initial choices to ally himself with evil ends are choices that he is blameable for. And why wouldn’t they be? I am not imagining a person who has been brainwashed or neurologically manipulated, but someone who makes choices that are as uncoerced and as informed as those of anyone with more ordinary moral preferences. As far as I can see, the only reason to suspend blame here is owing to an as©2009 The Aristotelian Society Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. cix, Part 2 doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2009.00264.x

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sumption that no one’s choices are blameable. Such a view may be true. But so long as we are willing to blame anyone for the choices that he makes, then we should be prepared to blame the fanatic for his. And that means that his subsequent immoral choices and actions, even if they are endorsed by his instrumentally rational deliberations, are ones for which he is blameworthy. That is just what premiss (2) states. Defenders of the counter-argument know that freeing the worst among us from blame is not a pleasant prospect. They may try to remove the sting of its conclusion by insisting that they are still able to seriously criticize the various malefactors we have been discussing. We can’t say of them that they have culpably done what they ought not to have done, for (on this line) this would imply that they had a reason to do otherwise. But we can say of them that they are evil people, that they are abhorrent, and that their actions are despicable, atrocious, etc. We can register certain negative evaluations, and strong ones at that.1 All we are blocked from doing is ascribing culpable wrongness to such agents, since proper blame entails an accessible reason that an agent is failing to adequately respect. I think that there is a deep problem with this line of thought. The problem is this: all of these negative evaluations themselves presuppose the existence of reasons that have been ignored. We are meant to be barred from depicting consistent immoralists as blameworthy. Yet we are allowed to say that they are evil, awful, horrific, etc. But what is the basis for such criticisms? Isn’t is the very fact that these agents have not paid sufficient attention to relevant, highly important (indeed peremptory) reasons to refrain from their misdeeds? To merit such epithets means that these agents have failed to adequately respect the reasons that oppose their actions. There must be something that explains why an agent’s actions qualify as atrocious, depraved, evil, etc. The explanation will require citation of considerations that oppose such actions. And such considerations are reasons. By hypothesis, these reasons are not ones that the moral monsters have. But they are not thereby immune from all evaluative criticism. And this forces us to ask: why should the assignment of blame require that an agent have an accessible reason that she is ignoring, although other very strong (quasi-) 1

See Harman (1975) and Williams (1995) for this criticism of premiss (1), as well as for this specific line of defence regarding negative evaluations of the consistent evildoer. ©2009 The Aristotelian Society Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. cix, Part 2 doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2009.00264.x

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moral criticism does not? I don’t think there is a good answer to this question. Instrumentalists see how jarring it is to be unable to denounce the moral monster. So, while denying that he is blameworthy, they nevertheless insist that he is evil, awful, demonic, etc. Such criticisms implicate the existence of reasons that have been ignored. These reasons exist even if the moral monsters do not have them. These reasons exist even if they bear no instrumental link to the commitments of such agents. These are categorical reasons. Admittedly, I have not offered anything like a full evaluation of the counter-argument (1ca)–(3ca). But for present purposes we can do without such an assessment. For even if we were to ignore my reservations about its premisses and concede the soundness of the counter-argument, this would be at best a Pyrrhic victory for instrumentalists. To see this, assume for the moment that the conclusion of the counter-argument is true, and that dedicated immoralists are not to blame for their actions. We must then ask whether they are properly subject to other, strong forms of evaluative criticism. Summing up my line of replies from the previous paragraphs, we can see that there is trouble either way. Suppose they are beyond all criticism. Those who blow up buses of schoolchildren or detonate bombs at civilian funerals are not evil, malign, or depraved; their actions are not horrific, atrocious, odious, or despicable. There is surely something deeply wrong with an instrumentalist position that licenses such immunity. Yet if dedicated immoralists are properly subject to these negative evaluations, this susceptibility to criticism implies the existence of categorical reasons. On the safe assumption that dedicated immoralists really do merit some of the criticisms just mentioned, then categorical reasons exist—even if such evildoers are not blameworthy for their deeds. (b) A second criticism of premiss (2) claims that autonomous fanatics are not blameworthy for their actions, because there can be no such thing as an autonomous fanatic. This criticism, sometimes heard in Kantian corners, strikes me as highly implausible. If the claim is more than an instance of a wholesale denial of personal autonomy, then there must be some special reason that agents are unable to autonomously elect evil, though they are able to freely attach themselves to the good. But what could this special reason be? The ©2009 The Aristotelian Society Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. cix, Part 2 doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2009.00264.x

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evil, recall, need not be conceptualized as such—the autonomous fanatic may tell himself that what he is doing is good, and be a dedicated evildoer nonetheless. And he may surely pursue what he really cares about while free of coercion, and in possession of relevantly full information. Certainly, absent clear and compelling argument, we are warranted in abiding by the general maxim that anything apparently conceivable is possible. It appears that we can conceive of the autonomous fanatic. Thus, absent a very strong argument to the contrary, we are right to suppose that such fanatics can exist. (c) A last basis for rejecting premiss (2) comes from the assertion that no one is blameworthy for anything. This might be true. If so, my second argument is unsound. I can’t say anything here to falsify this potential criticism. All I can do is to express the conviction, shared by almost everyone, that at least some people are rightly blameable for their poor choices and actions. The examples used to substantiate this conviction seem to me more compelling than any of the premisses employed in arguments to defeat them. Because my second argument rests in part on this undefended conviction, it is best to conceive of its conclusion conditionally: if anyone is blameworthy for any of her choices, then there are categorical reasons. We get to this conclusion by means of a conceptual truth (premiss 1), an uncontroversial statement of possibilities (premiss 4), and a highly plausible premiss (2) that expresses a deeply commonsensical assessment of evildoing.

IV The notion of a categorical reason has a storied past, and this lineage may contribute to some misunderstandings that it is best to forestall. There are certain elements that are commonly associated with the idea of a categorical reason, but whose defence is no part of my current brief. I am thinking specifically of the notions that categorical reasons always override any possibly competing reasons, that they apply of necessity to all rational agents, and that they exist either by virtue of being the outcome of successful rational deliberation or by virtue of being entailed by presuppositions common to all exercises of rational agency. The categorical reasons whose existence I am defending are not ©2009 The Aristotelian Society Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. cix, Part 2 doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2009.00264.x

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defined by reference to any of these features, but rather are to be understood simply as those reasons that exist independently of any instrumental link to an agent’s existing commitments. A fuller account of the source of such reasons may lead naturally to one or more of these traditional ideas, but they are not essential elements in the story that I wish to tell here. I have offered the beginnings of a case for categorical reasons. The complete account would have to reconstruct and criticize the arguments for instrumentalism that have been offered by numerous philosophers. That is certainly a task for another day. But I think it reasonable to venture a thought about where we stand prior to such an extensive examination of instrumentalist arguments. And that, I think, is squarely on the side of categorical reasons. The explanation for this is one that Philippa Foot has recently offered, in the recantation of her earlier instrumentalist views (Foot 2001, ch. 2).2 She has become puzzled by the predominance of instrumentalist views, and thinks that a more natural starting point for investigating practical reasons is one that assigns intrinsic importance to considerations of self-interest, morality, and what we care about. Indeed, when we reflect on deeply held assumptions about the ultimate sources of our reasons, it strikes her, as it does me, that we do and ought to start with a recognition that each of these three sources is fundamental, and that none is to receive preferential status over the other two. This does not foreclose the possibility that excellent arguments may be introduced to reduce the sources from three to two, or perhaps even to one. But absent such arguments, we are right to reject the demand that we begin our thinking with the claim that just one of these sources is to be privileged above the others. Instrumentalism makes this very claim, and is therefore suspect. Though it may eventually overcome our suspicions, the burden is on instrumentalism’s defenders to justify such a move. It should not, in any event, be regarded as the default view about the nature and source of our practical reasons. If we are ever to accept instrumentalism, we must not only find fault with the arguments that I (and others) have offered on behalf of categorical reasons. We must also be impressed enough to move away from the default position of pluralism about the ultimate sources of practical reasons.

2

She there expresses reservations about the views defended in Foot (1972).

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V The most powerful kind of philosophical criticism is one that reveals a contradiction in its target. I have not presented such a criticism of practical instrumentalism, because I do not believe that instrumentalism entails a contradiction. Nor must instrumentalists exemplify any kind of practical inconsistency in behaviour or commitment. Most defenders of categorical reasons, following Kant, have tried to sustain such charges. Their vindication would be welcome news for friends of categorical reasons. But I am not optimistic about this most direct route to instrumentalism’s refutation. If a view is not internally contradictory, then any successful criticism of it must proceed by adducing non-conclusive but highly plausible reasons, cogently put together to make a strong, albeit defeasible, case. That is what I have tried to do here. Of course, what counts as a plausible reason is relative to antecedent beliefs and commitments. If one is already devoted to instrumentalism, then one will find the considerations I have offered less plausible than anyone else. But that does not distinguish the instrumentalist from (say) the sceptic about other minds. Such people can have internally consistent views, and will regard with great suspicion the supporting evidence introduced by their critics. Still, for those not antecedently wedded to this scepticism, the falsifying evidence can be compelling. I think that the very same thing is true of practical instrumentalism. We cannot prove that there are categorical reasons. But when we vividly contemplate a world without them, one in which there is literally no consideration that stands against the actions of a torturer, and none in favour of easily rescuing a child from imminent death, most of us will find that instrumentalism has as much appeal as the various sorts of scepticism that we take seriously only in the study.3 3

This paper has gone through a number of different incarnations over the past couple of years. I am grateful to Harry Adamson, Simon Blackburn, Jerry Cohen, Steve Darwall, David Enoch, David Killoren, Hallvard Lillehammer, Mike Martin, Ellie Mason, Anthony Price, Peter Railton, Geoff Sayre-McCord, Tom Senor, Barry Ward and David Wiggins for forcing me to think much harder about some of the claims and arguments that appeared in earlier drafts. Many thanks to audiences at the University of Michigan, Edinburgh University, Northern Illinois University, the University of Arkansas-Fayetteville, Union College, the Institute for Advanced Study at Hebrew University, the Colloquium in Legal and Social Philosophy at University College London, the Aristotelian Society, and the Moral Sciences Club at Cambridge University for their acute comments on earlier versions of this essay. ©2009 The Aristotelian Society Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. cix, Part 2 doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2009.00264.x

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Department of Philosophy University of Wisconsin, Madison 600 N. Park Street Madison, wi 53726 usa [email protected]

REFERENCES Foot, Philippa 1972: ‘Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives’. Philosophical Review, 81, pp. 305–16. ——2001: Natural Goodness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Harman, Gilbert 1975: ‘Moral Relativism Defended’. Philosophical Review, 83, pp. 3–22. Williams, Bernard 1995: ‘Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame’. In his Making Sense of Humanity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

©2009 The Aristotelian Society Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. cix, Part 2 doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2009.00264.x