A Noneist Account of the Doctrine of Creatio ex Nihilo

(Author: Paul Kabay, Canberra, Australia)

Abstract I spell out a problem with the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo: that, contra the doctrine of

creatio ex nihilo, it is not possible to efficiently cause something from nothing. I show that this objection presupposes that the theory of noneism is false. I postulate that the universe (i.e. the created order) is a non-existent item and so there is no problem with the claim that it was efficiently caused to come from nothing – the universe has no being anyway. After rehearsing the rather strong reasons in favour of the truth of noneism, I deal with two of objections that are peculiar to my claim that the universe lacks reality: that creation possesses characteristics that are sufficient to render it existent; and that a non-existent object has its properties independent of divine fiat. I show that there are sensible replies to both objections.

1. What exactly is the problem with the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo? According to the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, God created the universe out of nothing. This is usually fleshed out as follows: God efficiently caused the existence of the universe

sans a material cause. I am a theist but I'm not sure that I am willing to ascent to this doctrine. I sympathise with those theists who reject the doctrine and insist that creation did indeed involve a material cause. According to such traditions as Kashmir Shaivism and the pantheistic cosmology of John Leslie, God efficiently caused the universe to exist out of his own divine substance.1 There is good reason why some theists reject the claim that 1 For an account of the metaphysics of Kashmir Shaivism see Dyczkowski 1987. A recent account of Leslie's theology is to be found in Leslie 2001.

God does not require a material cause in order to create. One way to express this is in terms of the following argument: 1. If it is possible to efficiently cause the universe to come from nothing, then nothingness contains the potency for the universe to exist 2. It is not the case that nothingness contains the potency for the universe to exist 3. Therefore, it is not possible to efficiently cause the universe to come from nothing. Premise 2 seems obvious enough. After all, nothingness has no properties at all, and so no potencies. But why think premise 1 is true? By definition, an efficient cause is that which actualises a potency, which is located in a material cause. So if an efficient cause is to bring a universe into existence from nothing (by acting on nothingness, i.e. no material cause), then that can only be because nothingness contains the relevant potencies. If there are no potencies, then there is nothing for an efficient cause to actualise.

I find this to be a very powerful argument. But in this paper I will propose a solution to the problems that it raises for the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. It is, however, a rather radical solution and for this reason I do not necessarily advocate it. But it is a defensible position that may prove to be the final word on this matter. Before spelling out my proposed solution it might prove fruitful to look at a recent attempt to deal with the perceived difficulties of this doctrine of creation. In various articles and discussions on the internet, William Lane Craig has developed a standard reply to such difficulties that amounts to a denial of premise 1.2 For example. Craig has this to say about the relative merits of the theistic and atheistic accounts of the origin of the universe: … the conviction that an origin of the universe requires a causal explanation seems quite reasonable, for on the atheistic view, if the universe began at the Big Bang, there was not even the potentiality of the universe’s existence prior to the Big Bang, since nothing is prior to the Big Bang. But then how could the 2 See, for example, See http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5705 and http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=9205.

universe become actual if there was not even the potentiality of its existence? The theist may plausibly claim that it makes much more sense to say that the potentiality of the universe lay in the power of God to create it. (Craig 2011, 905) According to Craig, in order for God to be able to create the universe from nothing, it is not necessary for nothingness to possess the relevant potencies. This is because all the potentiality required for the existence of the universe is to be found within the divine nature itself. Specifically, the potentiality is to be found in God's power to create the universe. The fact, therefore, that nothingness has no potentiality is not at all relevant to the issue at hand.

What should we make of this reply? Any event of something coming into existence involves an efficient cause actualising the relevant potencies supplied by a material cause. The coming of the universe into existence is no different in this regard – it requires both an efficient cause and a material cause. The latter supplies the potency whilst the former actualises that potency. Now the question is this: what exactly does Craig mean when he claims that “... the potentiality of the universe lay in the power of God to create it”? He can't mean that God supplies the material cause (perhaps from his own being or from some prime matter) with the relevant potencies, for that would amount to a denial of

creatio ex nihilo. So he must mean that God supplies the efficient cause. The potentiality of the universe lay in the power of God to create the universe' means 'God has sufficient efficient causal power to create the universe'. But in that case, Craig is just plain wrong. An efficient cause is never sufficient to bring anything into existence – although it is necessary. All the efficient cause does is actualise a potency in a material cause. In a sense then Craig is equivocating on the term 'potentiality', for the sense in which an efficient cause has the potential to bring something into existence (meaning something like 'given the right conditions, this efficient cause would bring the universe into

existence') is not the relevant sense. The relevant sense is in terms of the potencies contained within a material cause, which the efficient cause would then actualise. But if nothing supplies the material cause, then the only way for an efficient cause to actualise a potency is for the potency to reside in nothing at all – which is absurd. The only way (assuming that the argument is sound - below I outline an interpretation of the argument that renders it unsound) for it to be true that “the potentiality for the universe lay in the power of God to create it” would be for God to supply both the efficient and material cause – but the latter is ruled out by the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo.

If this analysis is at all sound, then it would seem to be the case that the doctrine of

creatio ex nihilo is incoherent. It is interesting that at this point Craig is likely to deny that there is any incoherence in the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. I suspect that all he would concede is that God's act of creating the universe is ultimately mysterious. He would also add that the atheist is in an even worse position in this regard than the theist. This is because the atheist is willing to claim that the universe came into existence uncaused – not only in the absence of a material cause, but in the absence of any efficient cause as well. If the theist position is incoherent, then the atheist position is doubly incoherent - at least according to Craig.

Now that the creation of the world is ultimately mysterious is something that I'm sure is true. And I agree that atheism is in a far worse position than the theist when it comes to the fact of the origin of the universe. But I wonder if there is more that can be said in defence of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. That there is more to be said can be gleaned I think from an additional reply that Craig makes to the problems raised against the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. Craig asks us to “... think of cases where we could have efficient

causation without material causation.”3 Among such cases Craig focuses on abstract objects of various sorts: the equator, the centre of mass of the solar system, Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony, and Leo Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina. According to Craig, arguably these are all cases where something like an efficient cause brings about an entity sans material cause.

But what makes all these examples most interesting is the fact that Craig is a nominalist or fictionalist with respect to abstract objects. Moreover, he has distinct sympathy for a view known as noneism.4 Noneism is the view that some things do not exist. Craig is of the view that universals and other abstract objects are arguably among such non-existent items. Are we to take seriously then the line of thought that Craig has left undeveloped here? If so, then are we not pressed toward the claim that the created order is a nonexistent object, just as the various abstract objects listed above are non-existent, perhaps precisely because they are efficiently caused sans material cause It is this suggestion that I wish to explore in more detail throughout the remainder of the paper.

2. A Noneist Response My proposed reply to argument 1-3 above is to deny premise 1. It is not the case that it is possible to efficiently cause the universe to come from nothing only if nothingness contains the potency for the universe to exist. The fundamental assumption being made in premise 1 is that the created object requires that the potencies from which it comes are instantiated in something existent. And the problem in this case is that nothingness does not qualify in this regard – it is the absence of anything existent. And why is there a 3 http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5705 4 See, for example, his articles “Van Inwagen On Uncreated Beings” and “Why are (some) Platonists so insouciant?” at http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/PageServer?pagename=scholarly_articles_divine_aseity. See also Copan & Craig 2004: 180-9.

requirement that the material cause actually exist? If it did not exist, then you would have bought being from non-being and this is not possible: ex nihilo nihil fit – from nothing, nothing comes. But is my denial of premise 1 really a violation of this principle? I would like to suggest that it is not. To claim that it is a violation of this principle is to assume that the created object in question – the universe – is bought into existence. But if it is not the case that it is bought into existence, then the principle has not been violated. If the universe is a non-existent object, then it would be the case that the creation (the sense of which is to be established below) of the universe involves non-being coming from nonbeing. This is something that the principle ex nihilo nihil fit is compatible with.

But, you may ask, how does this even make sense? Is the idea of a non-existent object even coherent? That it is coherent presupposes a view known as noneism – the view that some things do not exist. Most recently defended by Richard Routley and Graham Priest, noneism has been espoused in one form or another by philosophers such as Thomas Reid, Alexius Meinong, and may even date back to the Epicureans. The main reason for espousing noneism is the simple fact that mathematics, science, and natural language make frequent and irreducible use of non-existent objects. All of us can contemplate or conceive of a square circle or the golden mountain or the fountain of youth, to cite three common examples from the literature. Some of us have worshipped Zeus or Ra. Many of us have enjoyed the adventures of the Star Ship Enterprise. Even my eight year old daughter knows that unicorns are quadrupeds and that dragons are famous for hoarding treasure. And that's not all. Physicists make extensive use of frictionless plains, ideal gases and perfectly elastic collisions in their modelling and explanations of physical reality – and it goes without saying that such things do not exist!

Not everyone thinks that noneism is true, or even coherent. The most common complaint is that because quantification is existentially loaded, quantifying over non-existent objects (e.g. some things do not exist or ∃x¬xE) is inherently contradictory. The usual response of the noneist is to deny that quantification is always existentially loaded. In addition to arguing that there are no good reasons for thinking that quantification is existentially loaded, the noneist points out that it would appear that natural language makes use of existentially neutral quantification – as the above examples illustrate. I do not intend to provide an extensive defence of noneism, as this has been done elsewhere.5 Instead I will focus my defence on the more unique aspects of my theory of creation and its use of noneism.

Before moving on with this defence, it may prove fruitful to return momentarily to my critique of Craig. We can see now that there is a sense in which Craig is right when he says that “the potentiality for the universe lay in God's power to create it.” All that is required to produce a non-existent object is an efficient cause. A material cause is not required. But how then are we to understand the nature of the power that God has for creating a non-existent object? Or, to put it another way, what does creation mean in this context? I suggest that we understand it to be analogous to the power a human has to compose a work of fiction. The efficient cause at work in the creation of the universe is akin to an act of imagination or conception in a human author. Might there be a problem, though, in speaking of this kind of act as an efficient cause? The concept of efficient cause has until now been exclusively used in a context in which its effect is something that is bought into existence from a material substratum. This paper extends the meaning outside this context to one that involves non-existent effects. I doubt there is a problem

5 See, for example, Priest 2005 and Routley 1980. For a critique of Noneism see Perszyk 1993.

here. After all, this in no way contradicts the essential features of the concept of efficient causation. The various principles that stand behind the concept, such as ex nihilo nihil fit, are in no way violated with this extension of meaning.

There are two main claims that I will defend in the remainder of this paper. First, that the universe is non-existent. Secondly, something is identical to the universe only because of divine fiat. The latter of these two must be understood correctly. I am not claiming that were it not for divine fiat, the universe would fail to exist – I am not advocating a doctrine of divine conservation. After all, I am denying that the universe exists. Note that I do not say “The universe exists and is kept in existence by divine fiat' (this is explicitly existentially loaded) or even “there is a universe because of divine fiat” (the italicised 'is' usually has existential connotations in this context). My use of quantifiers is existentially neutral. Rather, what I'm saying that that an object will only have the properties of our universe on the condition that God endows it with those properties – much in the same way that the only reason why there is a character of Sherlock Holmes is because Conan Doyle thought him up (putting aside some complications that I will discuss below). I defend this second central claim in section 4. But I now turn to a defence of the first of my claims.

3. Properties sufficient for existence? Why think that the claim that the universe fails to exist is so outlandish? I assume that most readers will think this claim is outlandish. This is so even for noneists such as Graham Priest and Richard Routley. Despite thinking that there are a plenitude more nonexistent objects than existent ones, most noneists would think that the universe is definitely not among them. After all, this world is paradigmatic of what it is to be an

existent object. The question I want to answer here is: what is it about the universe that makes us think that it exists?

The answer that most us would be tempted to give to this question is to point out that our experience of the universe, and the many objects contained within it, feels just a little too real for any denial of its existence to be plausible. To see what this point amounts to consider two items – a horse and a unicorn.6 According to the view in question, we know that horses, the universe and and other such objects, exist because we can enter into causal relations with them. Our bodies ever so slightly modify the geometry of the spacetime, and we can feed a horse or ride it around the paddock. But we cannot do any such things with a unicorn. It is impossible for us to enter into a causal relationship with a unicorn. And it is for this reason that we can say with such confidence that unicorns, unlike horses etc, do not exist.

As intuitive as this reasoning sounds, I believe that it is mistaken. At best it proves, not that the universe and the various objects that inhabit it exist, but rather that these things have the same ontological status as each other and as us. The reason why I can enter into causal relations with horses and the space-time around me is because we have an equivalent ontological status. Another way of saying the same thing is that horses, spacetime, and I exist relative to one another. Unicorns, on the other hand, do not. These mythical beasts fail to exist relative to us – they have a different ontological status to us.

Is this notion of ontological equivalence or relative existence coherent? At the very least it is a concept that the noneist should have no problem with. Fictional stories contain 6 Here I am comparing and contrasting an existent with a non-existent object. So by 'horse' I mean currently living horses. There are possible but non-existent horses and horses that existed in the past or will exist in the future – but I am not referring to such non-existent objects.

multiple items – enchanted forests, unicorns, and cunning gnomes - all of which are nonexistent for us. But these items have equivalent ontological status to one another - or are existent relative to one another. Some noneists are also of the view that, other than the actual world, possible worlds are non-existent concrete objects.7 But clearly the objects that exist within such worlds have identical ontological status and exist relative to one another. The concept of relative existence? No noneist should leave home without it.

Another important defence of the claim that this world exists, at least from a historical perspective, is that offered by Descartes. Descartes begins by proving his own existence, in addition to the fact that he has various experiences that inform him that the universe and all of its inhabitants exist. He also knows that he can trust these experiences as veridical. How so? Because from the fact that he has a clear idea of an all powerful and trustworthy God who guarantees that he has veridical experiences, and the fact that only this God could implant such an idea in his mind, it follows that his senses are veridical. His senses reliably reveal the universe as we know it. Therefore, the universe exists.

There are a number of points at which this argument has been critiqued. I won't go into any of these here. Rather, I will focus on the first step in his reasoning: Descartes' proof of his own existence. Central to this proof is Descartes' famous cogito: “I think therefore I am” (cogito ergo sum). There are a couple of ways to interpret this argument. The first is as a set of premises leading deductively to a conclusion: (1) What ever thinks exists (2) I think (3) therefore I exist. Premise (2) is rather obvious and needs no defence. But as a justification for premise (1), Descartes probably has in mind a principle that he cites elsewhere: “But from an attribute 7 See Priest 2005: 138-40, and Routley 1979.

we readily apprehend substance, because of the axiom that a nonentity can have no attributes, properties, or qualities.” It is almost certain that by this claim Descartes means something that is existentially loaded in a number of ways: “But from an attribute we readily apprehend [the existence of a] substance, because of the axiom that a nonentity a non-existent can have no attributes, properties, or qualities.” But arguing in this manner is to beg the question against noneism. If noneism is true, then the fact that something thinks is no evidence that it exists. But in that case Descartes' cogito is question begging as a defence of the existence of himself, God, and the universe.

But there is a second way to interpret the argument. According to this alternative, the

cogito is a type of transcendental argument. In asserting “I think therefore I am” Descartes is treating is own existence is a precondition for his own thinking, and so to even doubt his own existence requires that he exists. But even in this transcendental form, Descartes' cogito has problems. As with the points made about horses and unicorns above, all the cogito proves is, not that he exists, but that he and his thinking have the same ontological status, i.e. they exist relative to one another. You can have both existing or neither of them existing. What you can't have is (assuming that Descartes is essentially a thinking substance - something that Descartes would be wiling to concede) is one existing without the other – thinking in the absence of a thinker or a thinker that does not think. Once again we can conclude that the cogito fails to provide any good reason to think that the universe exists.

But there is a final worry that even a noneist may have with the coherence of the idea that the universe is a non-existent object. Until now all of us (including the noneist) have understood the objects of everyday life to be paradigmatic of what it means to be

existent. Given that they are not, the onus is on me to clarify exactly what existence amounts to such that it allows the objects of everyday life to be non-existent. 8 I don't think that this is a particularly difficult problem to resolve: an existent object has its properties independently of the propositions that characterise it, whilst a non-existent object has its properties because of or as a result of the propositions that characterise it. Or to put it even more simply: a non-existent object has its properties determined by something else; whilst an existent object has its properties independently of something else. So the universe would be existent if and only if it is what it is independently of something else. The universe is non-existent if and only if it is what it is in virtue of something else. So which is it? Existent or non-existent? Does it have its properties in virtue of something else? The answer to this question brings us to the issue of whether there are any positive reasons for thinking that the universe is in fact a non-existent object.

I think there are a number of reasons for thinking that the universe is a non-existent object. The first of these centres on the issue of whether the universe is what it is because of or independently of something else. Interestingly enough the Christian tradition has always thought that the universe exists in virtue of something else. The book of Genesis has the universe existing as a result of the propositions uttered by God: “Let there be light – and light appeared.”9 The Gospel of John takes it for granted that the divine Word or Logos is the basis of all of creation: “In the beginning the Word already existed … Through him God made all things.”10 Any arguments that show that the Christian Scriptures are divinely revealed will also provide support for the claim that the content of those scriptures is true. And given that part of the content states that the universe has its properties in 8 See Routley 1980: 697-768 for a discussion of the concept of existence. 9 Gen 1:3. 10 Jn 1: 1,3.

virtue of something else, this will support the claim that the universe does not exist.

But there are other arguments, besides those based on divine revelation, in favour of the claim that the universe is a non-existent object. If I am right that the only coherent account of creatio ex nihilo is a noneist account, then any argument for the doctrine of

creatio ex nihilo is an argument for the non-existence of the world. There are a number of such arguments.11 These are are arguably sound (by which I mean that the inferences are valid and the premises are more plausible than their negations), although they are not without their detractors.12 I have in mind here the empirical evidence for the claim that the universe has an absolute beginning (evidence that

supports Big Bang cosmology and

thermodynamics both of which entail that the entire universe – time, energy, matter, and space – has an absolute beginning), as well as various philosophical arguments that show that an infinite collections cannot be instantiated in reality or cannot be formed one member at a time (which they must be given the 'flow' of time).

Other types of arguments that might be used in order to show the non-reality of the world are arguments which involve pointing out that the universe instantiates impossible properties. Such arguments have an ancient pedigree, and date back to Parmenides and Zeno in the western tradition, and Shankara and other Indian philosophers in the eastern tradition. The most common approach in such analyses is to argue that the world instantiates various contradictions as a result of the fact that it is characterised by both change and diversity. Given that contradictions are impossible, it follows that the world lacks being. In the past such a position has been seen as grossly implausible. But the rise 11 An excellent semi-popular survey is Copan & Craig 2004: 197-248. 12 See for example Smith in Smith & Craig 1995, Oppy 2006, Sobel 2004. What these do show is that there are possible objections to the premises of the arguments in question. And as such a person is not compelled to accept them. What they do not show is that the negations of these premises are more plausible than the premises (and surely that is what counts in accessing if an argument is convincing).

of noneism in recent times, in my view, breathes new life into this metaphysic.

So there is a case to be made for thinking that the world is non-existent. But I will not make this case here. All I wish to do is draw attention to the fact that there is reason for thinking that the universe is non-existent and this should be taken as seriously as anything is in metaphysics.

4. Characterisation by divine fiat? Alright – it is possible for the universe to be a non-existent. There is even reason for thinking that it is in fact non-existent. But here I want to raise an issue that most noneists would think counts against the analysis I undertake in his paper. Is it true that ultimately a non-existent object has its properties in virtue of divine fiat? I am suggesting that something is identical to the universe because God made it that way, kind of in the same way that a fictional character (such as Sherlock Holmes) is the way it is because an author (Conan Doyle) made it so. I say 'kind of' because there is an important difference. I will now explain why a noneist would feel uncomfortable with my claim that something is identical to universe in virtue of divine fiat.

In his concise defence of noneism, Priest asks But did Doyle literally create Holmes? More generally, are non-existent objects the creation of the cognitive agents who imagine them, fear them, worship them, and so on? (Priest 2005:119) Priest argues that non-existent objects are not the creations of the cognitive agents who imagine them etc. In particular, Doyle's activities as an author did not determine the status of Holmes. To see his reasons, ask what it would mean to say that Doyle created Holmes. One understanding of this claim might be this: Doyle bought Holmes into existence. The

problem with this understanding, however, is that Holmes does not exist, rather he is a non-existent object. Perhaps, though, the claim is supposed to be understood counterfactually as: Holmes would not have existed had Doyle not written his stories. Putting aside the technical difficulties associated with understanding such counter-factuals, it would appear that this will not do either. The idea here is that there are worlds which are like ours except for the fact that Doyle did not write. In those worlds Holmes does not exist. That is true, but the status of Holmes in those worlds is exactly the same as he is in this world: non-existent. The question really is this: If Doyle had not written his stories,

would something have been Sherlock Holmes? The answer of course is, yes: “... in the worlds where Doyle died at birth, something is Sherlock Holmes – Sherlock Holmes.”13 Sherlock is the same non-existent object in those worlds just as much as he is in this one. The point is that there is no meaningful sense in which Doyle is the creator of Holmes, at least according to Priest. At best the relationship between Doyle and Holmes is expressed by saying that Doyle is the first to have imagined that object, and indeed, the first to have given that object the name we now use for it. But this is far from indicating some kind of dependence of Holmes on Doyle.

Now I think that at most Priest's analysis shows that Holmes has his properties independent of Doyle – not that he is independent of anything at all. This is so because Doyle does not exist in every world or at least does not write books about Holmes in every world. There are worlds in which there is no Doyle or no Doyle writing about Holmes and yet something is identical to Holmes. But I do not think that Priest has successfully shown that Holmes has his properties independent of just anything at all. What he has shown is that If there is something that determines the properties of Holmes, then it must be something that exists in every world in which something is identical to Holmes. Whatever 13 Priest 2005: 119.

that thing is it is not Doyle or any other human being for that matter.

But I do think that there is rather good reason for thinking that Holmes and other nonexistent objects are dependent on something for the properties that they possess. But for this thing, nothing would be identical to them. The reason I have for making this claim centres on a principle that no noneist would reject – the so-called Characterisation Principle (CP). According to the CP an object has the properties that it is characterised as having – not necessarily in this world, but in some world. The CP is usually cited as the reason why we can have knowledge of non-existent objects despite not standing in causal relations with such things. But the principle entails that the non-existent object is

characterised. And if it is characterised, then it is characterised by something – i.e. something must do the characterising. 'Characterising' is a verb and so something must be acting in the way the verb denotes But what? Well, given the analysis provided by Priest we know it cannot be a human such as Conan Doyle. What ever it is, it must be something that exists wherever something is identical to the object in question. How do I know that it is an existent thing and not another non-existent object? Well the series that consists of a characteriser and the thing that it characterises is an essentially ordered series (as opposed to a series that is accidentally ordered). Let C be the characteriser and O the non-existent object. Now either C exists or it does not. If not, then its ability to characterise O must be provided by the characteriser of C – call it CC. C can characterise O only in virtue of being characterised by CC (being non-existent, C's properties – including the property of characterising O – are characterised by CC). Now either CC is existent or it is not. If it is not, then it too can only characterise C in virtue of being characterised by a further characteriser CCC, and so on. But the series of non-existent objects cannot go on to infinity. At some point in the series must terminate with something

that exists which does not require a characteriser. Otherwise nothing would have the power to characterise anything. With out this existent characteriser, nothing would be identical to O. So there must be something existent that does all the hard work of characterising. The idea here, of course, is that only an existent object can be selfcharacterising.

That the characteriser is existent entails that it is not the non-existent objects themselves that act as their own characteriser i.e. a non-existent object is not self-characterising. But there is further reason to rule this possibility out other than the fact that these fail to be existent. Given that the series consisting of a characteriser and the object it characterises is essentially ordered, a non-existent object could not be it's own characteriser. For where would its power to characterise come from? It only has that power because it is being characterised as having that power – and so this can only come from an external source.

Ok we know that the characteriser of a non-existent object must be something other than the non-existent object itself, and it must be an existent object. But what else can we say about it? Well I think the only plausible candidate there is for such a thing is a mind of some sort. That this is so is borne out by the fact that non-existent objects are often specified in a way that cries out for an intentional explanation. How could a non-personal explanation account for the specific details of the plot of the Sherlock Holmes stories? Works of fiction are essentially the modelling of minded beings (the characters) and it seems to me that only a mind could have the power to model or simulate or replicate so faithfully the behaviours of minded beings (how often do we believe in the authenticity of fictional characters). So many non-existent objects have all the hall marks of being designed. In addition, we know that only minds can enter into casual relations with non-

existent objects. Only minds can worship, contemplate, conceive etc. non-existent objects. Non-personal or non-minded entities do not have the intentional powers to do this. Impersonal entities can only enter into causal relations with existent objects. Any causal powers an impersonal entity has will have as its proper end something existent.

Moreover, such a mind would have to exist in every world in which something is identical to a given non-existent object. So arguably, depending on the non-existent object concerned, such a mind would have to be metaphysically necessary. This is because some non-existent objects fail to exist in every possible world due to the fact that they instantiate contradictions (of which the universe is arguably an example, given the arguments of Zeno). To say anything more, however, would require more information about the particular non-existent object in question. Well, what if the object in question was the universe in which we live and move and have our being? The Mind (I think I can start spelling this with a capital 'M' from here on in) would have to be omniscient, as it knows everything about the universe – after all, it is the minded source behind everything that is true about the universe. Given that it is also the creator of the universe, and so immensely powerful, we are entitled to call this Mind 'God'.

So there we have it. Something is identical to the universe because of divine fiat. It is worth noting that this conclusion is rather congenial to traditional Christianity. This tradition has often thought that there is a rather significant ontological distinction between God and the created order. Traditionally this has been explicated in terms of God's necessity and creation's contingency. Now I do not wish to deny that there is this modal dimension to the ontological distinction between the divine and non-divine. But what I have done here is to provide an alternative or perhaps additional content to this idea.

Whereas God exists, we do not – and therein lies the ontological distinction between the divine and non-divine.

I tentatively conclude that the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo is coherent – at least given the coherence of noneism. But if the doctrine is coherent, I strongly suspect that it is true. I have found the various philosophical and scientific arguments for the creation of the universe to be rather persuasive. But showing this is really a topic for another paper, and in any case, this task has already been undertaken successfully elsewhere.14

14 Some of the best defences of these arguments are to be found in Craig & Sinclair 2009, Nowacki 2007, and Spitzer 2010.

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