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A Postscript to Education for Autonomy Ronald Swartz Oakland University, Michigan

Rabbi Tarfon said . . . It is not for thee to complete the work, but neither are thou free to desist from it. cited in Raskin That the education of young people at the present day conceals from them the part which sexuality will play in their lives is not the only reproach which we are obliged to make against it. Its other sin is that it does not prepare them for the aggressiveness of which they are destined to become the object. Sigmund Freud When I first read Professor Malla's comments about my interview with Thomas Szasz I was disappointed to hear that he saw "very little discussion or challenge" on my part. And when Malla claimed that "largely there is agreement between" Szasz and me, I was lost for words. Yet, as I struggled to make some kind of response to what I now consider to be Malla's misconceptions about my dialogue with Szasz, I remembered that in his recently published book The Gentle Art of Philosophical Polemics Joseph Agassi follows Plato and Martin Buber when he endorses the very insightful idea that "any criticism is better than a dismissal or an oversight" (1988, p. 5). Thus, after returning once again to the works of Plato, Buber, and Agassi, I have learned to appreciate and be grateful for Malla's response to the conversation I had with Szasz nearly five years ago; what follows will, I hope, be seen as an attempt to continue a dialogue rather than end it. Although Malla is not specific about what he views as "banal" in my discussion with Szasz, it should be acknowledged that much of what we said to each other is old hat; when Szasz and I recommended that public school systems should "offer hundreds of educational alternatives" we were not breaking new ground. On the contrary, I think I made it quite clear that this idea was advocated by people such as Paul Goodman over 30 years ago. However, in the last quarter of a century, the trend in public school systems in countries such as the United States, Canada, and England has not been in the direction of more creative choices for students and teachers. Instead we are living in what can be seen as the age of the revival of the standardized curriculum; in this new age of standardization it is not surprising that established educational authorities are taking seriously Mortimer Adler's recommendation about having the same course of study for all students. Moreover, the brief comments that Szasz and I made about Adler's views on education were an outgrowth of asking Szasz the question, "Do you have any recommendations for parents and teachers who must deal with children who are uncontrollable?" When I asked Szasz this question I considered it to be quite challenging; my opinion on this matter has not changed after reading Malla's critical comments. Furthermore, I was delighted when Szasz explored answers which did not resort to simple solutions that relied on the use of drugs. Although I agree with Malla that "certain forms of pharmaInterchange Vol. 20/4 °The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education 1989

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cological treatments are the only proven and effective methods of treatment for a small number of child psychiatric disorders," I nevertheless think that Szasz's views about forbidding child psychiatrists to prescribe drugs help us understand that existing psychiatric i nterventions for children have the potential to be misused and abused. When I recorded my interview with Szasz, I was quite impressed with his novel notion of viewing child psychiatrists as similar to Sunday school teachers, but I now think it is reasonable for child psychiatrists to use drug treatment as a legitimate medical intervention. My thinking on the use of drugs in child psychiatry has been significantly influenced by the arguments i n Psychiatry as Medicine where Fried and Agassi recommend that stimulants should temporarily be used with hyperactive children even though existing empirical evidence and theoretical models are "suspect and feeble" (1983, p. 109). Malla's claims about how certain pharmacological treatments are the only "proven and effective" means for dealing with some children should perhaps be viewed as a bit of an overstatement; the so-called proofs are often weak indeed. Also, in order to begin a serious reappraisal of the present psychiatric use of drug treatment with children, I would strongly recommend that Malla and his friends become familiar with Gerald Coles's book The Learning Mystique; in this book Coles clearly demonstrates how some child psychiatrists often leap "from if to it is true" (1987, p. 105). Chapter 5 of Coles's book is of particular interest because it deals with "Drugs and LD Explanations." As I see matters, Coles provides convincing arguments about how Dr. Harold N. Levinson often creates evidence to justify his use of drugs with children who have "learning problems." In order to understand how the recent history of psychiatry has often relied on weak proofs to justify certain medical interventions, it is helpful to read William A. Nolen's (1987) short essay, "Medical Zealots." This paper explains how in the 1930s and 1940s the frontal lobotomy became the "treatment of choice" for a number of schizophrenics. Now, of course, we all know that the lobotomy is no longer used by psychiatrists in the "enlightened" late 1980s. However, the point that has yet to be learned from the history of the lobotomy is that at times in the recent past weak proofs were indeed used as a means to justify dubious medical interventions. In a similar sense, when Szasz and I discussed the use of electroconvulsive therapy with children, he stated that he knows that this so-called medical intervention is a part of the past. Thus, Malla's discussion of electro-convulsive therapy seems to have totally missed the point. Szasz knows what child psychiatrists do these days, but he does not agree with or approve of what they are doing. And the critique of child psychiatry offered by Szasz seems to suggest that drug therapy with children is nothing more than the latest example of using a medical intervention as a means for social control. Now is not the time to discuss the very important idea that modern child psychiatry is perhaps used more as a means for social control than for the control of illness. Yet, before leaving Malla's ideas about what modern psychiatry has proven, I would like to comment on his concluding remarks which claim that "science has proven" that schizophrenia exists. Although I am unclear about what Malla means by the notion that science has proven the existence of an illness, my conjecture is that he is claiming that existing empirical evidence makes it obvious that intelligent people should say yes to the question, "Is the human condition now being diagnosed as schizophrenia an illness?" However, following the argument offered by Charles Culver and Bernard Gert in their book Philosophy in Medicine, I think that the dispute about schizophrenia "cannot be settled solely by reference to the facts" (1982, p. 4). Of course, in the debate about schizophrenia Szasz has argued that it should not be classified as an illness. In his latest book Insanity: The Idea and Its Consequences, Szasz attacks his critics such as E. Fuller Torrey whom Szasz considers to be "a zealous propagandist for the view that schizophrenia is a brain disease" (1989,

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p. 72). Torrey in his book Surviving Schizophrenia claims that Szasz's "theories are poetic nonsense" (1983, p. 3). The debate between Szasz and his many critics should be viewed as an open-ended critical dialogue which has the potential to clarify complex issues associated with questions such as, "Is the human condition now being diagnosed as schizophrenia an illness?" As such, even if Szasz's views are eventually shown to be in error, much. will have been learned partly because of his persistence in pursuing an unpopular line of reasoning. In addition, although I do not think that Malla has provided serious criticism of the views advocated by Szasz, Malla has nevertheless helped me to better understand a number of the problems raised in my brief encounter with Szasz. Unfortunately, I cannot comment on all the important problems suggested from my reading of Malla's . critical comments, but I would like to conclude with a brief discussion of two additional observations he has made. Malla's discussion of Szasz's rejection of the "Popperian idea of criticism" in the education of psychiatrists has much merit. And if Malla would take the time to read a few of the scattered essays I have published in the last 15 years, then he would see that on the issue of using some of Popper's ideas in the education of professionals and children I have more agreement with him than with Szasz. However, my conversations with Szasz, Agassi, and others who have discussed my academic work have convinced me that in my youth I was indeed a Popperian zealot who published highly flawed papers.' In order to have an adequate view of the role of criticism in an educational program people will have to devote much time trying to understand and solve significant educational problems such as, "How can we develop educational programs at all levels of schooling which encourage and allow individuals to creatively and constructively criticize their own ideas and the ideas of others?" Another part of Malla's critical comments which should not go unnoticed here is his claim that "power is essentially an equation and the reduction of the power of adults will, in practice, result in children exercising greater power in making decisions about their education." As it turns out, the "game of education for autonomy" does not necessarily have to be played as a zero-sum game where a teacher's power to influence the educational situation is in a reciprocal relationship with a student's power. When. it comes to giving children and adults autonomy in their lives and their education, power develops in quite irregular ways because variables.such as the ingenuity of individuals and the social policies that are endorsed can significantly influence the amount of power an individual might use to create worthwhile learning.2 Specifically, in a school such as A. S. Neill's Summerhill where academic curriculum is determined to a great extent by students, the power and autonomy of both students and teachers increase because neither of these two groups is forced to function in a hegemonic situation which dictates what should be taught and learned. It is interesting to note here that at schools such as Summerhill, the power of a teacher to influence a student's education may increase because teachers are free to create learning situations that may engage students in ways that could never be imagined in schools that have a standardized curriculum. In a similar sense, Szasz's recommendation about not allowing psychiatrists to prescribe drugs for children does not entail the notion that children should be empowered to take drugs whenever they wish. If Szasz's critique of child psychiatry is accompanied by the idea that children along with adults should not be given the power to use drugs, it is possible to imagine that Szasz's views have the potential to diminish adult power without increasing the power of children in certain areas of their lives. Briefly put, a thorough analysis of the policies used in social or educational situations which seek to develop human autonomy would likely reveal that in these circumstances power is not a simple equation. On the contrary, power in autonomous situations is an

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extremely complex phenomenon which is poorly understood. When people seek to be autonomous, power can metaphorically be viewed as a net filled with a bunch of irregularly shaped balloons whose size and number may change depending upon the ability of human beings to develop nets which meet their expanding or diminishing desire for autonomy. Finally, let me conclude with some personal observations. As I see matters, the issue of education for autonomy needs to begin with asking a question such as, "Do we want to struggle with the enormous number of problems associated with creating educational situations which increase the likelihood that human beings will become autonomous in significant ways such as determining their own curriculum?" Unlike Agassi (1987) in his interesting article "The Autonomous Student," I do not think it is fruitful to start a discussion about education for autonomy with the question, "Can a student be sufficiently autonomous?" Unfortunately, Agassi has put the cart before the horse; what first needs to be determined is whether the goal of autonomy is what we want for ourselves and those we teach. Furthermore, for individuals who choose autonomy as an aim for education and their life in general, it is extremely important to remember Freud's observation that in a civilized society people should be prepared "for the aggressiveness of which they are destined to become the object" (1961, p. 81). That is, those who seek to be autonomous should expect others to place huge obstacles in their way partly because freedom is so very terrifying for those who do not wish to be free. And Rabbi Tarfon's (1940) marvellous Mishnah metaphysical moralizing seems to be mistaken; when it comes to choosing autonomy as an aim for education, most people, most of the time, do desist.

Notes 1. See Ronald Swartz, "Mistakes as an Important Part of the Leaming Process," The High School Journal, Vol. 59, No. 6 (March 1976), pp. 246-257. This essay has been reprinted in the following: Ronald Swartz, Henry Perkinson, and Stephenie Edgerton, Knowledge and Fallibilism (New York: New York University Press, 1980), pp. 13-26; and, Orbit, Vol. 19, No. 4 (December 1988), pp. 1-13. For the criticism they have provided for my views on education for autonomy I would like to thank the following: Leonardas V. Gerulaitis, Michael Oliker, Richard Pipan, Robert Stern, Marla Swartz, Susan Swartz, and Jerry Taft. 2. My views on autonomy have been significantly influenced by the following: Walter Kaufmann, Without Guilt and Justice: From Decidophobia to Autonomy (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1973); Bertrand Russell, "Freedom Versus Authority in Education" in Sceptical Essays (London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1977), pp. 140-1.52; Bertrand Russell, "A Free Man's Workshop" and "Freedom and the Colleges" in Why 1 am Not a Christian, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957), pp. 94-103 and 179-192; Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1962); Friedrick A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969); Joseph Agassi, Towards a Rational Philosophical Anthropology (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977); and, John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Arlington Heights, Illinois: Harlan Davidson, Inc. 1947).

References Agassi, J. (1987, Winter). The autonomous student. Interchange, 18(4). Agassi, J. (1988). The gentle art of philosophical polemic. LaSalle, IL: Open Court. Coles, G. (1987). The learning mystique. New York: Pantheon Books. Culver, C. M., & Gert, B. (1982). Philosophy in medicine. New York: Oxford University Press. Freud, S. (1961). Civilization and its discontents (J. Strackey, Trans.). New York: W. W Norton.

A POSTSCRIPT TO EDUCATION FOR AUTONOMY Fried, Y., & Agassi, J. (1983). Psychiatry as medicine. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Nolen, W. A. (1987, Winter). Medical zealots. The American Scholar, 52-56. Raskin, S. (1940). Pirke Aboth. New York: Yehoash Farlag Gezelshaft. Szasz, T. (1989). Insanity: The idea and its consequences. New York: John Wiley. Torrey, E. F. (1983). Surviving schizophrenia. New York: Harper & Row.

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