American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. LXVIII, 1994, No.4, pp 475-500

The Apprehension of the Act of Being in Aquinas by Orestes J. Gonzalez

As a consequence of the indications promulgated in 1879 by Leo XIII, the First-Cause-related notion of ‘act of being,’ inserted by Aquinas into the Aristotelian tradition, received considerable attention in this century. Two scholars in the perennial philosophy of St. Thomas merit singling out: Cornelio Fabro and Etienne Gilson. The use of the notion of act of being in the understanding of a variety of problems by these two authors is well known.2 Surprisingly, however, in what concerns the specifics of the operation by which the intellectual faculty of man apprehends the act of being, one finds in Fabro only scattered comments, not a categorical exposition.3 Fabro nonetheless expresses a clear position on this issue throughout his writings. Gilson’s remarkable achievements on this topic, on the other hand, are also well known4 and have had a very large influence in 1

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In his Encyclical Letter Aeterni Patris of 4 August 1879, Pope Leo XIII underscored the importance of the teachings of the Angelic Doctor, Thomas Aquinas, for the Magisterium of the Church and encouraged the use of Aquinas’ methodology in philosophical and theological research. See Leonis XIII, Acta Sanctae Sedis, vol. 12, (1894), 97-115. 2 See, for example, Cornelio Fabro: Partecipazione e causalita and Etienne Gilson: Elements of Christian Philosophy. 3 His, is for example the following synthetic formulation: “the method of Thomistic metaphysics is not intuitive nor demonstrative, it goes by ‘unraveling and reduction;’ which means to move on from the more vague determinations to the more proper ones, from one act to another, from one potency to another, from multiple and superficial acts to the more constant ones, and thus on to the ultimate or first act which is the ‘act of being.’ Such a mode of operation (of going after the more foundational perfections), however; does not make any sense, if it doesn’t imply emergence in conscience of the ultimate act—the act of being—the act that quenches the process, because the process itself does not begin without a certain apprehension of the quenching point and the mode in which it is found;” Partecipazione e Causalita, Societa Editrice Internazionale, Torino, 1960, p. 63. 4 In Thomist Realism (Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 1986): 199-205, for example, he expresses his understanding of this issue as follows: “what the senses perceive exists, and existence is included in what the senses perceive, but the senses are only the bearers of a message which they are incapable of reading, for only the intellect can decipher it. We thus find ourselves led on to the question whose answer we are seeking, and is now possible to see where the answer will be found. In order for man to perceive being with his intellect, an existent must be given to him, an existent perceptible to his sensibility. Therefore, it would be incorrect to pose the problem only from the point of view of the existential judgment, for before we can affirm existence it is necessary to apprehend it. It would be equally incorrect, however, to seek the cause of our knowledge of the existence of some object in a ‘species intelligibilis’ of actual existence. Whatever intelligible species the intellect is provided with, it can only conceive universals. But Copyright © 1995 by the American Catholic Philosophical Association

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contemporary Thomistic thought.5 Though fundamentally in agreement with their positions, the present paper goes on further to develop the issue of the intellectual operation by which the act of being is apprehended. It is certain that to structure some reflections about the apprehension of the act of being is not an easy task. In this matter the essentials are so basic that they tend to remain unnoticed and generally what one expresses does not reflect the richness and fullness of what is implied. Concurrently, one encounters the tendency to constant digression as an almost insurmountable obstacle because the theme is virtually related to any aspect of human cognition. The subject therefore demands to be presented clearly and concisely. To conform to some extent with these demands, the argumentations presented in this paper will rely heavily on paraphrasing and the repetitious use of technical terms from the writings of Aquinas. The discussion, however, is developed in the form of random comments. Aquinas’s moderate realist epistemology is presupposed. Before starting, we must consider briefly three well established points of reference expressed in the sequence words-concepts-things. It is undeniable that a profound entitative difference justifies the distinct the intellect is able to see being in the sensible objects we perceive. The continuity of sense and intellect in the knowing subject permits us to do this. However, when the concept of being is abstracted from a concrete existent perceived with the senses, the judgment which predicates being of this existent attributes being to it according to the way it is conceived by the intellect, namely, as ‘seen’ in the sensible datum from which it is abstracted. With its first thrust the intellect apprehends what is most profound in its object: the actus essendi. Therefore, one could say that existence accompanies all our perceptions, for we are not able to directly apprehend any other existents than those with sensible quiddities, and we cannot apprehend them other than as existing. Experience is a witness to the fact that this is what happens.” 5 The considerations presented in this paper prescind from the lively debated question regarding the diverse conceptualizations expressed by the terms ‘existence’ and ‘act of being.’ Reading the works of Aquinas one certainly finds that he used the Latin verb esse to signify in more than one way. As J.M. De Torre points out in his Christian Philosophy (Vera-Reyes Inc. 1981), p. 336: “no literal English rendering could convey the meaning which this technical Latin expression had for St. Thomas. It does not refer to the mere fact of existing, of ‘being there,’ especially if this is taken in a spatial or temporal sense. The meaning of the Latin esse is not properly expressed by the infinitive ‘to be,’ for this may refer only to the function of the copula in a proposition. Nor is the abstract term ‘existence’ adequate, for we are dealing with the most concrete of realities.” In its fundamental meaning, however, what the term esse properly expresses is the ‘action’ of being. We have chosen to work with the expression ‘act of being’ since this English phrase denominates more directly and more accurately the perfection found in the things of nature from which the very notion of being (‘ens’) arises: “ens sumitur ab actu essendi” (De Ver.1,1). And for Aquinas “esse (quod dupliciter dicitur) uno modo significat actum essendi” (ST.1.3.4.2). When St. Thomas makes use of the term esse to mean actus essendi he is making reference, as De Torre rightly affirms, to the most actual of all actualities, the most perfect of all perfections, the inmost principle and source of all the actuality, perfection, reality, and even of knowability, of anything that is. Copyright © 1995 by the American Catholic Philosophical Association

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separation between the worlds of linguistic expressions, conceptual thoughts and the extramental subsisting things of nature. Such separation is known to be a sure guideline for philosophical reflection. The phrase “extramental subsisting thing of nature” indicates a particular reality whose distinctive characteristic is the intrinsic possession of one individual act of being as, for example, in yourself, in each one of your friends, in your dog, and so on.6 Conceptual thoughts and linguistic expressions, on the other hand, are products of human creativity. Any act of knowledge is productive of intellectual conceptions and these, in turn, are expressed through the appropriate terms and canons of a given language. The systematization of the intellection of the act of being provided in this paper arises in part from the use of these notions and distinctions. The point of departure for the present reflections is a thesis introduced in previous papers.7 It was argued there that the apprehension of the act of being is accomplished in the human intellect through a natural habit described by Aquinas with the Latin intellectus principiorum or the habit of first principles. In general, the first principles reach the intellect by way of well formulated propositions. The first principles are intellectual conceptions and, as is the case with any intellectual conception, are transmitted to posterity through linguistic expressions. The assent given by the human intellect to these general norms of truth is automatic and infallible. And this is so because the intelligible content signified in this kind of propositions has the strength of what is absolutely and immediately self-evident. In the human intellect, the natural habit grasps the self-evident truth of these primary propositions. Whether or not the truth of the first principles may reach that habit at any moment in time through an alternative way and not only through the mediation of explicitly formulated propositions is a valid question because it is conceivable that the same intellectual content may come directly from the things of nature. As a matter of fact one does not 6

This doctrine appears very early in the writings of Aquinas and remains invariable throughout his career: “Oportet quod in omnibus univocis sit communitas secundum rationem naturae et non secundum esse, quia unum esse non est nisi in una re;” In I Sent.35.1.4. “Habet enim res unaquaeque in seipsa esse proprium ab omnibus aliis distinctum;” SCG.1.14.n.2. “Unius rei est unum esse substantiale;” ST.1.77.2.ad 3. “Esse quod pertinet ad ipsam hypostasim secundum se, impossibile est in una hypostasi multiplicari: quia impossibile est quod unius rei non sit unum esse;” ST.3.17.2. “Nihil ponitur in genere secundum esse suum, sed ratione quidditatis suae; quod ex hoc patet, quia esse uniuscuiusque est ei proprium, et distinctum ab esse cuiuslibet alterius rei;” De Pot.7.3. “Esse non potest esse commune per modum generis, cum singula contents in genere differant secundum esse;” In IV Sent.12.1.1.1.ad 2. 7 See Anuario Filosofico (University of Navarre, Spain): Vol. 22, No. 2, 1989, 147-160 and Vol. 24, No. 1, 1991, 139-151. Copyright © 1995 by the American Catholic Philosophical Association

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have to be a metaphysician to use the first principles. It is precisely through this alternative way that we hope to further substantiate the thesis that what the intellectus principiorum is ultimately grasping is the act of being of the things of nature. In the first article of question 15 of De Veritate, two operations by which the human intellect is capable of reaching truth are described, discursive reasoning and simple intellection.8 Discursive reasoning or ratiocinatio is likened in that article of De Veritate to a certain motion in which a defined beginning and a defined end are included in the movement. According to Aquinas the initial truth that makes discursive reasoning possible is the truth of the first principles. The process of discursive reasoning ends when agreement is established between the truth of a conclusion and the truth with which the process began. The initial truth of the first principles is the one that the intellect receives through a direct, nondiscursive, immediate mode of apprehension, the act of simple intellection.9 This kind of access to the truth is the one that interest us because of its bearing for our thesis. The act of simple intellection of truth is accomplished in the human intellect precisely through the natural habit of intellectus principiorum.10 Question 15 of De Veritate firmly establishes a restriction that governs the process of discursive reasoning: the truth of the first principles has to be present in the intellectual faculty at the very inception of the process.11 From this observation, certain things follow. First, it becomes manifest that the natural habit of first principles must be active at the outset of all intellectual activity whatsoever. More importantly, in this observation we begin to find some indication that the apprehension of the truth of the first principles accomplished by the natural habit for immediate intellection does not necessarily refer to the grasping of that truth from the well developed propositional formulas of the metaphysician. Explaining the act 8

The act of simple intellection of truth described there is different from the so called first and second operations of the intellect: abstraction and judgment. The proper “place” for these other two operative moments of the intellectual faculty of man and their function in the intellectual apprehension of the act of being appear to some extent indicated on pp. 496-497, and in the conclusions. 9 “Non (potest) mens humane ex uno in aliud discurrere nisi eius discursus ab aliqua simplici acceptione veritatis (incipiat),” De Ver.15.1. 10 “(Non) est in homine una specialis potentia per quam simpliciter et absolute sine discursu cognitionem veritatis obtineat, sed tails veritatis acceptio inest sibi secundum quendam habitum naturalem qui dicitur intellectus principiorum,” ibid. 11 “Rationis discursus ab aliquid certum (non pervenit) nisi (fiat) examinatio eius quod per discursum invenitur ad principia prima in quae ratio resolvit;” De Ver.15.1. Copyright © 1995 by the American Catholic Philosophical Association

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of this simple intellection of truth Aquinas actually taught that “someone is said to have performed such act when he somehow reads truth within the very essence of the thing.”12 It seems expedient then to determine more accurately the role that the things of nature play in this way of access to the truth. As we shall see immediately, evidence for the underlined implication is not lacking in Aquinas. Propositions and linguistic expressions in general direct the attention of the intellect towards known and formulated intelligible realities, but those same intelligible realities can be apprehended directly from the things of nature.13 With respect to the first principles in particular Aquinas expressly affirms that “it is from the sensible things of nature that we receive the knowledge of the principles.”14 And often he accentuates that there is no access to the principles except through the sensible faculties which are the ones in direct contact with the sensible things of nature.15 These texts prove that to consider the act of simple intellection accomplished by the natural habit of the speculative intellect as a reading of the truth of the first principles directly in the sensible things of nature through the senses, is a genuine doctrine in Aquinas. It is beyond doubt that he is asserting that no teacher other than the things of nature can give that truth to man. In providing us with this view Aquinas also remarks that no other intellectual 12

De Ver.15.1: “Intellectus enim simplicem et absolutam cognitionem designare videtur; ex hoc enim aliquis intelligere dicitur quod intus in ipsa rei essentia veritatem quodammodo legit.” 13

“Ipsa verbs doctoris audits, vel visa in scripts, hoc modo se habent ad causandam scientiam in intellectu sicut res quae sunt extra animam, quia ex utriusque intellectus intentiones intelligibiles accipit;” De Ver.11.1.ad 11. “Sicut igitur dignius est doceri a Deo quam ab homine, ita dignius est accipere scientiam per sensibiles creaturas quam per hominis doctrinam;” ST.3.12.3.ad 2. “Omnis veritatis cognitio ab alio est: vel per modum quidem disciplinae, ut a magistro; vel per modum revelations ut a Deo; vel per inventionem, ut ab ipsis rebus;” In Ioan.7.2. 14

Q. disp. De anima,4,ad 6: “Cognitio enim principiorum a sensiblilibus accipitur.” Also: “Sed ipsorum principiorum cognitio in nobis ex sensibilibus causatur;” SCG.2.83. 15 “Cognitio principiorum accipitur a sensu;” In Boet. De Trin.1.1.1.ad 4. “Cognitio principiorum provenit nobis ex sensu;” ST.1-2.51.1. “Sic igitur intellectus humanus habet aliquam formam, scilicet ipsum intelligibile lumen, quod est de se sufficiens ad quaedam intelligibilia cognoscenda: ad ea scilicet in quorum notitiam per sensibilia possumus devenire;” ST.1-2.109.1. “Oportet quod in intellectu nostro sint quaedam quae intellectus noster naturaliter cognoscit, scilicet prima principia, quamvis etiam ista cognitio in nobis non determinetur nisi per acceptionem a sensibus;” De Ver.8.15. “Quamvis intellectu sit superior sensu, accipit tamen aliquo modo a sensu, et eius objects prima et principalia in sensibilibus fundantur;” ST.1.84.8.ad 1. “In nobis perfectum iudicium intellectus habetur per conversionem ad sensibilia, quae sunt prima nostrae cognitions principia;” ST.2-2.73.3. “Primorum autem principiorum cognitio a sensibus (ex sensibilibus) ortum habet;” De Ver.10.13. `Prima autem principia scientiarum speculativarum sunt per sensum accepta;” ST.1-2.3.6. Copyright © 1995 by the American Catholic Philosophical Association

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creature can communicate the truth of the first principles to man; only God himself could do so through the things of nature in the order that he has established.16 With this explanation one can also say that the parameters of truth are naturally brought into operation on a permanent basis by God, both by giving to the soul the capacity of attaining truth and by giving to the things of nature the capacity of causing truth in the soul.17 In his ordinary intellectual activity man is constantly using the truth of the first principles. This does not mean, however, that he is simultaneously and explicitly expressing that truth in the form of formulated metaphysical propositions. Knowledge of the things of nature is usually expressed in the form of truthful propositions, but those propositions are not the first principles. They are propositions expressed in accordance with the truth of the first principles. It is true, on the other hand, and the nature of discursive reasoning demands it, that to be able to express anything truthfully, the truth of the first principles has to be somehow present in the intellectual faculty. From this the following implication becomes obvious: The truth of the first principles ought not to be considered as a regular kind of truth that one normally expresses in propositions, but as a deeper, unexpressed, actualized, and non-formulated truth needed for the proper functioning of natural reason in man. A more direct evidence for this can be found in Aquinas when he declares that there exists a close relationship between the truth of the first principles and the Divine Truth. He tells us, for example, that “the soul does 16

“Deus hominis scientiae causa est excellentissimo modo; quia et ipsam animam intellectuali lumine insignivit, et notitiam primorum principiorum ei impressit. Homo autem alteri homini causa sciendi quodammodo existit, non sicut notitiam principiorum tradens. Angelus potest hominem docere, non quidem ipsorum principiorum notitiam tradendo, ut Deus facit;” De Ver.11.3. “Ille qui docet, non causat veritatem, sed causat cognitionem veritatis in discente. Propositiones enim quae docentur, sunt verae antequam sciantur, quia veritas non dependet a scientia nostra, sed ab existentia rerum;” De Ver.11.3.ad 6. “Deus perfecte operatur ut causa prima; requiritur tamen operatio naturae ut causae secundae. Posset tamen Deus effectum naturae etiam sine natura facere; vult tamen facere mediante natura, ut servetur ordo in rebus;” De Pot.3.7.ad 16. 17 “Veritas quae in anima causatur a rebus non sequitur aestimationem animae sed existentiam rerum;” De Ver.1.2.ad 3. “Veritas increata et intellectus divinus est veritas non mensurata nec facta, sed veritas mensurans et faciens duplicem veritatem; unam scilicet in ipsis rebus, inquantum facit eas secundum quod sunt in intelectu divino; et aliam quam facit in animabus nostris, quae est veritas mensurata tantum et non mensurans;” In Iohan.18.6.n. 2365. “Res naturales, ex quibus intellectus noster scientiam accipit, mensurant intellectum nostrum. Sic ergo intellectus divinus est mensurans non mensuratus; res autem naturales, mensurans et mensurata; sed intellectus noster est mensuratus non mensurans quidem res naturales;” De Ver.1.2. “Mensura secundum seipsam est determinativa et modificativa aliorum;” ST.2-2.27.6. “Ipsa enim ratio veritatis in quadam adaequatione sive commensuratione consistit. Denominatur autem aliquid mensuratum vel commensuratum ab aliquo exteriori, sicut pannus ab ulna;” De Ver.21.4.ad 5. Copyright © 1995 by the American Catholic Philosophical Association

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not judge of things according to any kind of truth, but according to the Primary Truth, inasmuch as it is reflected in the soul, as in a mirror, by reason of the first principles of the understanding.”18 Elsewhere he describes the truth of the first principles as a likeness of the divine truth,19 or as an image of the divine truth,20 or he would even say that the divine truth is the pattern from which the truth of the first principles issues.21 One conclusion emerges very quickly from this argumentation. What the intellectus principiorum naturally reads in the things of nature is not any kind of truth, but a truth of a superior order which immediately becomes the only one, implied and unexpressed standard of truth of the intellect.22 In addition to this, however, it also emerges from Aquinas that the likeness of the divine truth contained in the truth of the first principles is not caused by God directly and immediately. Rather it is caused indirectly by the likeness of God that is found in the creatures.23 And the primary perfection through which the likeness of God is infallibly present in all created things is no

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ST.1.16.6.ad 1: “Anima non secundum quamcumque veritatem iudicat de rebus omnibus; sed secundum veritatem primam, inquantum resultat in ea sicut in specula, secundum prima intelligibilia.” 19 “Naturalis cognitio est quaedam similitudo divinae veritatis menti nostrae impressa;” Quodlibet 8.4. 20 “Qaedam sunt vera in quibus omnes homines concordant, sicut sunt prima principia intellectus tam speculativi quam practici: secundum quod universaliter in mentibus omnium divinae veritatis quasi quaedam imago resultat. Inquantum ergo quaelibet mens quicquid per certitudinem cognoscit, in his principiis intuetur, secundum quae de omnibus iudicatur, facta resolutione in ipsa, dicitur omnia in divina veritate vel in rationibus aeternis videre, et secundum eas de omnibus iudicare;” SCG.3.47.n.7. 21 “A veritate intellectus divini exemplariter procedit in intellectum nostrum veritas primorum principiorum secundum quam de omnibus iudicamus;” De Ver.1.4.ad 5. 22 “Primae veritatis similitudo refulget in mente humana;” ST.2-2.173.1.ad 2. “Nos in veritate increata aliquid videre dicimur, secundum quod per eius similitudinem in mente nostra resultantem de aliquo iudicamus, ut cum per principia per se nota iudicamus de conclusionibus;” De Ver.10.11.ad 12. 23 “Similitudo causae nostro intellectui imprimitur non immediate ex causa, sed ex effectu, in quo similitudo causae resplendet. Homo igitur in statu post peccatum indigit ad cognoscendum Deum medio, quod est quasi speculum, in quo resultat ipsius Dei similitudo. Oportet enim ut per ea quae facta sunt, in invisibilia eius veniamus;” De Ver. 18.1.ad 1. “Secundum prima principia universaliter in mentibus omnium divinae veritatis quasi quaedam imago resultat. Tamen cognitio Dei quae ex mente humane accipi potest non excedit illud genus cognitionis quod ex sensibilibus sumitur;” SCG.3.47.n.7. “(Cognitio principiorum determinatur) per acceptionem a sensibus;” De Ver.8.15. “Sicut enim nihil habet rationem appetibilis nisi per similitudinem primae bonitatis, ita nihil est cognoscibile nisi per similitudinem primae veritatis;” De Ver.22.2.ad 1. “Hanc autem inviolabilem veritatem in sui similitudine, quae est menti nostrae impressa cognoscimus inquantum aliqua naturaliter cognoscimus ut per se nota, ad quae omnia alia examinamus, secundum ea de omnibus iudicantes;” De Ver.10.8. Copyright © 1995 by the American Catholic Philosophical Association

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other than the act of being.24 For this reason, in addition to the above, we also conclude that the argument presented here indirectly reinforces our thesis: the truth of the first principles may come more precisely from the act of being of the sensible things of nature. The characterization of the truth of the first principles as a truth of a higher order leads immediately one to think that to have access to such truth a special illumination may be required. One could also think of the truth of the first principles as a truth that has been always there, innate, in the intellectual faculty of man. None of these ideas can be validated in Aquinas. The intellect, before it has access to the truth, is always “like a clean tablet on which nothing is written.”25 And he is plain and positive in saying that “one finds no truth in man if it were not because man grasps truth in the things of nature.”26 Hence the truth of the first principles is not an innate truth; it is a truth of a higher order that the intellect grasps in the ordinary interaction with the sensible things of nature. In the grasping of such truth no special illumination is involved. In Aquinas truth—even when considered as a perfection of the intellect27—admits of more or less intensity. This doctrine is expressed, for 24

“Si vero loquamur de veritate secundum quod est in rebus, sic omnes sunt verae una prima veritate, cui unumquodque assimilatur secundum suam entitatem;” ST.1.16.6. “Assimilatio autem cuiuslibet substantiae creatae ad Deum est per ipsum esse;” SCG.2.53.n.5. “Est igitur esse proprius effectus primi agentis, scilicet Dei;” SCG.3.66.n.4. “Deum cognoscimus ex perfectionibus procedentibus in creaturas ab ipso. Inter quas prima est ipsum esse. Intellectus autem noster eo modo apprehendit eas, secundum quod sunt in creaturis: et secundum quod apprehendit, ita significat per nomina;” ST.1.13.3. et 13.11.ad 3. “Licet veritas intellectus nostri a re causetur, non tamen oportet quod in re per prius inveniatur ratio veritatis: sicut neque in medicina per prius invenitur ratio sanitatis quam in animali; virtus enim medicinae, non sanitas eius, causat sanitatem. Et similiter esse rei, non veritas eius, causat veritatem intellectus;” ST.1.16.1.ad 3. “Denominatur autem res vera a veritate quae est in intellectu divino vel in intellectu humano, sicut denominatur cibus sanus a sanitate quae est in animali, et non sicut a forma inhaerente; sed a veritate quae est in ipsa re (quae nihil est aliud quam entitas intellectui adaequata, vel intellectum sibi adaequans) sicut a forma inhaerente, sicut cibus denominatur sanus a qualitate sua, a qua sanus dicitur;” De Ver.1.4. 25

ST.1.79.2: “Intellectus autem humanus in principio est sicut tabula rasa in qua nihil est scriptum, ut Philosophus dicit in III De Anima.” Also: “Intellectus noster comparatur tabulae in qua nihil est scriptum;” De Ver.8.9. “Anima enim, secundum se considerata, est in potentia ad intelligibilia cognoscenda: est enim sicut tabula in qua nihil est scriptum;” ST.3.9.1. 26 In Epist. ad Rom.3.1.n. 255: “Secundum quod accipitur veritas ex parte rei, homo de se non habet veritatem.” 27 Si autem attendatur ordo inter verum et bonum ex parte perfectibilium, a vero enim non sunt nata perfici nisi illa quae possunt aliquod ens percipere in seipsis vel in seipsis habere secundum suam rationem, et non secundum illud esse quod ens habet in seipso: et huiusmodi sunt solum ea Copyright © 1995 by the American Catholic Philosophical Association

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example, in the answer to the first objection in article 9 of the Disputed Question on Charity. There Aquinas, in order to explain the different degrees of intensity in truth that one can ascribe to the truths of faith, makes use of an analogy through which he declares that the truth of the first principles is more intense than the truth of the conclusions. What is interesting to note in this response is that, in the elaboration of this second analogue, he identifies the act of being as the cause of it. The text reads as follows: “If we focus on the act of being which in accordance with Aristotle’s second book of Metaphysics is the cause of truth (as he says there, the order of things is the same in act of being and in truth), it follows that where there is more being there is more truth. And it is for this cause (‘propter hoc’) that in demostrative sciences one tends to believe more the principles than the conclusions.”28 Since the Latin clause propter hoc is the technical way of expressing a cause-effect relationship, through this argument Aquinas is showing that the strength of the truth of the first principles rests on the act of being. The closer the intellectual content of the principle is to the act of being, the stronger the truth it expresses. In this explicit connection, one cannot fail to discover more evidence in support of the thesis that the truth of the first principles is measured by the act of being of extramental subsisting things. Among the first principles, Aquinas describes one as the ‘first indemonstrable principle.’ It is with respect to this principle that he establishes a subordination of principles. Notice, for example, from the Summa Theologiae: “in speculative knowledge nothing hinders the principle of one demonstration or of one science from being the conclusion of another demonstration or science.”29 Again, “among these principles there is a certain order, so that some are contained implicitly in others; thus all principles are reduced, as to their first principle to this: (the first quae immaterialiter aliquid recipiunt, et sunt cognoscitiva;” De Ver. 21.3. “Immaterialia solum possunt perfici vero;” De Ver. 22.1.ad 1. “Verum est perfectio intellectus;” ST.1-2.9.1.ad 3. “ Veritas enim quaedam perfectio est intelligentiae, sive intellectualis operationis;” SCG.1.60. “Verum nominat id in quod tendit intellectus;” ST.1.16.1. 28 De Caritate 1.9.ad 1: “Objectum fidei est verum; unde secundum quod contingit esse aliquid magis verum, sic etiam contingit aliquid magis credere. Cum autem veritas constet in adaequatione intellectus et rei, si consideretur veritas secundum rationem aequalitatis, quae non recipit magis vel minus, sic non contingit esse aliquid magis et minus verum; sed si consideretur ipsum esse rei, quod est ratio veritatis, sicut dicitur in II Metaphys., eadem est dispositio rerum in esse et veritate: unde quae sunt magis entia, sunt magis vera; et propter hoc etiam in scientiis demonstrativis magis creduntur principia quam conclusiones. Et sic etiam contingit in his quae sunt fidei.” 29 ST.1-2.13.3: “In speculativis nihil prohibet id quod est unius demonstrationis vel scientiae principium, esse conclusionem alterius demonstrationis vel scientiae.” Copyright © 1995 by the American Catholic Philosophical Association

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indemonstrable principle).”30 From this perspective one would expect to come across the first indemonstrable principle at the conclusion of an elaborate process of reasoning. This, however, is not at all the case. In his thorough way of dealing with important questions, Aquinas posits that “the first indemostrable principle cannot be the conclusion of any demonstration, nor the conclusion of any science.”31 And elsewhere he stresses that “there cannot be strictly true science if a right estimate of the first indemonstrable principle is lacking.”32 Consequently, if there is a truth that the natural habit for immediate intellection has to grasp in an absolute, simple and immediate way in the beginning of all discursive reasoning, that has to be the truth of the first indemonstrable principle. Without it there can be no intellectual knowledge at all. The term ‘right estimate’ is indicative of the kind of operation the habit of firs principles is called to perform behind any complete act of intellection.33 Expressed more clearly, if only a right estimate of the first indemonstrable principle is needed for the proper operation of the intellectual faculty, then this strongly suggests that in the initial grasping of the truth of the first principle an explicit access to the refined metaphysical formulations of the principle is not required. An implied awareness of this standard of truth seems to suffice. Up to this point we have not considered explicitly the accidental and essential perfections through which the things of nature make themselves known to the intellect. Briefly, the accidental and substantial forms are entitatively subordinated to the act of being and relate to it as ‘potency’ to ‘act.’34 Such subordination affects the order of knowledge directly. In 30

ST.2-2.1.7: “Ita se habent in doctrina fidei articuli fidei sicut principia per se nota in doctrina quae per rationem naturalem habetur. In quibus principiis ordo quidam invenitur, ut quaedam in aliis implicite contineantur: sicut omnia principia reducuntur ad hoc sicut ad primun, ‘impossibile es simul affirmare et negare’ ut patet per Philosophum in IV Metaphys.” 31 ST.1-2.13.3: “Primum tamen principium indemonstrabile non potest esse conclusio alicuius demonstrationis vel scientiae.” 32 ST.2-2,23.7.ad 2: “Non potest esse simpliciter vera scientia si desit recta aestimatio de primo et indemonstrabili principio.” 33 “Ex eodem provenit quod intellectus noster intelligit discurrendo, et componendo et dividendo: ex hoc scilicet quod non statim in prima apprehensione alicuius primi apprehensi, potest inspicere quidquid in eo virtute continetur;” ST.1.58.4.c. “Signum, proprie loquendo, non potest dici nisi aliquid ex quo deveniatur in cognitionem alterius quasi discurrendo;” De Ver.9.4.ad 4. “Si aliqua sunt quae statim sine discursu rationis apprehendantur, horum non dicitur esse ratio sed intellectus. (Hoc) modo accipiendo habitus principiorum dicitur;” In Sent.3.35.2.2a. 34 “Inter (perfectiones procedentes in creaturas a Deo) prima est ipsum esse;” ST.13.11.ad 3. “Esse autem est illud quod est magis intimum cuilibet, et quod profundius omnibus inest: cum sit formale respectu omnium quae in re sunt;” ST.1.8.1. “Ipsum esse est perfectissimum omnium: comparatur enim ad omnia ut actus. Nihil enim habet actualitatem, nisi inquantum est: unde Copyright © 1995 by the American Catholic Philosophical Association

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knowing the accidental and essential perfections of the things of nature, the intellect receives truth in the proportion these perfections can communicate through their participation in the act of being in the particular thing of nature where they are present. Aquinas argues in defense of this that “in the acquisition of knowledge from the things of nature, the act of being functions as the cause and measure of the truth of the intellect.”35 And one also finds confirmation for this important concession in what may be regarded as the formulation of a principle: “the notion of true regards the act of being itself simply and immediately.”36 Extending the doctrinal content of these statements one cannot fail to find here again further evidence to establish that the truth of the first principles has to come from the act of being. The act of being, as affirmed above, is the most profound perfection of a thing; it is an internal incommunicable metaphysical principle inseparable from the thing itself, from the essence of the thing, and from anything that exists in the thing. For these reasons it is difficult to picture how the act of being makes itself known to the intellect. Furthermore, because of its incommunicability, one might consider more appropriate to say that the act of being can never be in the intellect. One finds, nevertheless, that Aquinas considers the act of being as the light which makes the thing knowable: “everything is knowable inasmuch as it is in act, therefore, the actuality of a thing is like a certain light that makes it knowable.”37 In addition to this, Aquinas neatly discloses to us that the assertion ‘is’ has a primordial meaning as “that which, coming from the sensible things of nature, reaches the intellect by way of absolute actuality.”38 Consequently, although one cannot say that the act of being of a ipsum esse est actualitas omnium rerum, et etiam ipsarum formarum;” ST.1.4.1.ad 3. Hoc quod dico “esse” est inter omnia perfectissimum. Hoc quod dico “esse” est actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc perfectio omnium perfectionum;” De Pot.7.2.ad 9. Although essence and act of being are inseparable metaphysical principles of the things of nature, the apprehension of the essence will be considered in this paper only insofar as it is relevant to understand how the human intellect apprehends the act of being. 35 In Epist. ad Rom.3.1.n. 255: “Noster enim intellectus cognitionem accipit a rebus, et ideo causa et mesura veritatis ipsius est esse rei.” Also: “Ex hoc quod aliquid habet de entitate, secundum hoc natum est aequari intellectui et sic ratio veri sequitur rationem entis;” De Ver. l .1 .ad 5. “Et esse rei causat veritatem intellectus;” ST.1.16.1.ad 3. 36 ST.1.16.4: “Verum propinquius se habet ad ens quam bonum. Nam verum respicit ipsum esse simpliciter et immediate.” 37 In De Causis.6.n. 168: “Unumquodque cognoscitur per id quod est in actu et ideo ipsa actualitas rei est quoddam lumen ipsius.” Also: “Unumquodque autem cognoscitur per suam formam, et secundum quod est actu: unde quantum habet de forma et actu, tantum habet de luce;” In 1 Tim.6.3.n. 268. 38 In Periherm.1.5: “Hoc verbum ‘est’ significat enim primo illud quod cadit in intellectu per Copyright © 1995 by the American Catholic Philosophical Association

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thing is in the intellect in the same way that it is in the thing, one can say that the act of being somehow informs the intellect and somehow becomes object of the intellect. For no essence actually present in nature makes itself known to the intellect without simultaneously making known its proper participation in act of being. For the intellectual order proper to human beings, the act of being is like a light that somehow has to make its way to the intellect; it has to affect the intellect; it somehow has to cause an impression on the intellect; it is the light without which nothing is knowable. One can identify in Aquinas another interesting piece of information in the distinction between the object of a given faculty and its ratio obecti.39 This is best seen with the example of color and light for the sensible faculty of sight. Both realities, the color as the object of sight and light as its ratio objecti, are grasped in one and the same act by this sensible faculty.40 The technical term ‘object,’ as used here, does not properly designate the subsisting thing itself but rather a perfection or principle inhering in the subsisting thing which the faculty grasps in its contact with the thing, for example, sight grasps color. The technical term ratio objecti, conversely, designates in this context a principle that affects the object in such a way that without it the object cannot be reached by the potency. The object becomes object in act for the potency only when it is affected by a ratio objecti. In the absence of light, for example, colors are not actually visible. In the case of the intellectual faculty of man, Aquinas recognizes as object the quiddity of the things of nature inasmuch as it is found participating in the act of being.41 I have referred to this doctrine indirectly in the preceding paragraph. There we saw that the act of being is like a light that makes the thing knowable. And Aquinas insists in saying that the underlying cause of modum actualitatis absolute: nam ‘est’ simpliciter dictum, significat in actu esse, et ideo significat per modum verbi.” 39 “Objectum enim et id quod est ratio objecti, ad eadem potentiam pertinent;” De Ver.24.6. “Idem autem actus cadit super objectum, et super rationem objecti;” ST.1-2.12.4. 40 “Necesse est quod idem specie sit actus qui fertur in rationem objecti, et qui fertur in objectum sub tali ratione: sicut est eadem specie visio quae videtur lumen, et qua videtur color secundum luminis rationis;” ST.2-2.25.1. “Quandocumque videtur color, eodem actu videtur lumen;” ST.12.8.3.ad2. “Ad eamdem potentiam visivam pertinet videre colorem, et lumen, quod est ratio videndi colorem et simul cum ipso videtur;” ST.1-2.57.2.ad2. “Lumen enim est quo videtur color, unde se habet ad colorem quasi formale; et sic color et lumen sunt unum tantum visibile, et simul a visu videtur;” De Ver.8.14. ad 6. 41 “Quidditas autem rei est proprie objectum intellectus;” De Ver.1.12. “Ojectum autem proprium intellectus est quidditas rei;” ST.1.85.6. “Intellectus tamen incomplexus, intelligendo quod quid est, apprehendit quidditatem rei in quadam comparatione ad rem: quia apprehendit eam ut huus rei qudditatem;” SCG.1.59. “Unde illud solum est capibile ab intellectu nostro quod habet quidditatem participantem esse;” In De Causis.6.n. 175. Copyright © 1995 by the American Catholic Philosophical Association

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the knowability of the things of nature is precisely the act of being: “everything, in so much as it has act of being, to that extent is it knowable.”42 Furthermore, without participating in the act of being the quiddity of the things of nature amounts to nothingness, i.e. nothing real, in such an absolute way that it cannot even be an object for the created intellect.43 These grounds seem to be sufficient to establish that quiddity and act of being are related to one another as object to ratio objecti for the intellectual faculty just as color and light are for the sensible faculty of sight. If this is to be the case, one would expect then to see that, just as both color and light are grasped by the same sense of sight, so are quiddity and act of being grasped by one and the same intellectual faculty. There is no question that in Aquinas the apprehension of the quiddity implies the apprehension of another element. In his commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics, Aquinas remarks that the name ‘intellectus’ properly describes an immediate apprehension that accompanies the apprehension of the quiddity of a thing.44 This implicit apprehension of a second element in the act of intellection of the quiddity of a thing is usually described in Aquinas as the apprehension of the truth of the first principles.45 The question then is the following: What does the 42

ST.1.16.3: “Unumquodque auten inquantum habet de esse, intantum est cognoscibile.” Also: “Quicquid enim esse potest, intelligi potest;” SCG.2.98.n. 9. “Sicut deficit aliquid ab entitate, ita deficit a cognsocibilitate;” ST.1.89.7.ad 3. “Oportet quod quicquid quocumque modo habet esse non sit extraneum ab ojecto intellectus;” SCG.3.54. 43 These constraints, in fact, are a trait in St. Thomas way of philosophizing: without act of being, a possible essence or quiddity is identified by Aquinas with the mind of God. “Ex hoc ipso quod quidditati esse attribuitur, esse dicitur: quia antequam esse habeat, nihil est, nisi forte in intellectu creantis, ubi non est creatura, sed creatrix essentia;” De Pot.3.5.ad 2. The quiddity as the ordinary object of the human intellect, that is to say, a quiddity actually existing in the material world, could be either the substantial form or any of the sensible or non-sensible accidental perfections of a particular subsistent thing in nature. “Actualitas formae accidentalis causatur ab actualitate subjecti;” ST.1.77.6. “Unde et eadem intellectiva potentia cognoscimus substantia et accidentia;” In Ethic.6.1.n.13. “Cognoscere enim colorem et cognoscere sonum sunt diversi actus secundum species, si ad sensum referantur, quia haec secundum se sensibilia sunt; non autem si referantur ad intellectum, quia ab intellectu comprehenduntur sub una communi ratione objecti, scilicet entis;” De Malo 2.4. “Ratio ipsius entis nobis ignota esse non potest;” De Ver.11.1. ad 3. “Ratio autem entis ab actu essendi sumitur;” De Ver.l.l.ad 3 “Ratio entis statim intellectus apprehendit;” De Ver.11.1. 44 “Dicitur autem intellectus ex eo quod intus legit intuendo essentiam rei. Uncle et in tertio de Anima dicitur quod objectum proprium intellectus est ‘quod quid est.’ Et sic convenienter cognitio principiorum quae statim innotescunt cognito ‘quod quid est,’ intellectus nominatur;” In Ethic.,6.5.n. 1179. 45 “Cum enim actus alicuius potentiae non se extendat ultra virtutem sui objecti, omnis operatio quae non potest reduci in eandem rationem objecti oportet quod sit alterius potentiae quae habeat aliam objecti rationem. Objectum autem intellectus est quid, ut dicitur in III De anima, et propter Copyright © 1995 by the American Catholic Philosophical Association

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intellect find in the quiddity of the things of nature that always and immediately makes known to the intellect the truth of the first principles? And the answer cannot be other than its ratio objecti, its participation in the act of being. Thus presented, the direct connection that Aquinas establishes between the grasping of the quiddity and the grasping of the truth of the first principles becomes another proof for the thesis that what the habit of first principles is ultimately grasping is the act of being of the sensible things of nature. To say that the act of intellection is somehow determined by the information provided to the intellect by the sensible faculties is not equivalent to saying that the essential perfections of the things of nature, which are the proper object of the intellect, are grasped by the senses. Aquinas teaches that “although the intellect is superior to the senses, in a certain manner it receives from the senses, and its first and principal objects are founded in sensible things.”46 The information that comes from the things of nature through the sensible faculties is put together by the internal senses in what Aquinas calls a sensible phantasm. It is through the phantasm that the information received in the senses is presented to the intellect. Phantasms directly related to the sensible things of nature have a very important property in that they faithfully reflect what has been received in the senses as coming from the thing outside the knower and nothing invented or created in the cognitive faculties of the knower. Quiddity and act of being are not apprehended by the senses, yet both must somehow proceed in their way to the intellect through the sensible phanstasm which is the only way to reach the intellect.47 In view of such restrictions, a greater participahoc actio intellectus extenditur quantum potest extendi virtus eius quod quid est. Per hanc (apprehensionem quidditatis) autem statim ipsa principia prima cognita fiunt, ex quibus cognitis ulterius ratiocinando pervenitur in conclusionem notitiam;” De Ver.15.2.ad 3. “Nomen intellectus sumitur ex hoc quod intima rei cognoscit; est enim intelligere quasi intus leggere; et sic dicitur proprie intelligere cum intelligimus illa quae statim nota sunt intellectui notis rerum quidditatibus, sicut sunt prima principia, quae cognoscimus cum terminos cognoscimus; unde intellectus habitus principiorum dicitur;” De Ver.1.12. “Circa illas propositiones (intellectus) errare non potest, quae statim cognoscuntur cognita terminorum quidditate, sicut accidit circa prima principia: ex quibus etiam accidit infallibilitas veritatis, secundum certitudinem scientiae, circa conclusiones;” ST.1.85.6. “Quandoque vero intellectus possibilis determinatur ad hoc quod totaliter adhaereat uni parti; sed hoc est quandoque ab intelligibili immediate, quando ex ipsis intelligibilibus statim veritatis propositionum intelligibilium infallibiliter apparet. Et haec est disposotio intelligentis principia, quae statim cognoscuntur notis terminis, ut Philosophus dicit (I Posteriorum, text VI). Et sic ex ipso quod quid est, intellectus immediate determinatur ad huiusmodi propositiones;” De Ver.14.1. 46 ST.1.84.8.ad 1: “Quamvis intellectus sit superior sensu, accipit tamen aliquo modo a sensu, et eius objecta prima et principalia in sensibilibus fundantur.” 47 “Pro tanto dicitur cognitio mentis a sensu originem habere, non quod omne illud quod mens Copyright © 1995 by the American Catholic Philosophical Association

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tion in the act of being by a particular thing of nature is expected to produce a phantasm with a greater capacity to act on the intellect. In accordance with this Aquinas grants that “the sensible faculties enjoy a certain superiority in regard to the capacity of acting on the intellect and causing knowledge. And this is due to their greater proximity to the exterior things of nature which are the cause and measure of our knowledge.”48 It is apparent then, that the greater or lesser impact the act of being of a given extramental thing is able to cause in the intellect has to be transmitted through the sensible faculties which are the ones in direct contact with the sensible things of nature. Related to the natural habit for immediate intellection is not only the phantasm but also the possible intellect, the principles themselves, and the agent intellect. Since the relationship between this natural habit and phantasm will be the object of our consideration later, we should briefly review here Aquinas’s doctrines concerning the relationship between this habit and the other three elements just mentioned. With respect to the possible intellect Aquinas asserts that the natural habit of first principles is found in that part of the intellectual faculty subject to habits, that is to say, in the possible intellect.49 Yet before any act of intellectual knowledge, the natural habit for immediate intellection exists in the possible intellect only as an incomplete habit because in man no natural habit comes entirely from the soul. Thus, as Aquinas puts it, “there are in man certain natural habits, owing their existence, partly to the soul, and partly to some extrinsic principle: in cognoscit, sensus apprehendat; sed quia ex his quae sensus apprehendit mens in aliqua ulteriora manuducitur;” De Ver.10.6.ad 2. “Quamvis esse sit in rebus sensibilibus, tamen rationem essendi, vel intentionem entis, sensus non apprehendit, sicut nec aliquam formam substantialem, nisi per accidens, sed tantum accidentia sensibilia;” In I Sent.19.5.1.ad 6. “Quod ergo sensu propio non cognoscitur, si sit aliquid universale apprehenditur intellectu; non tamen omne quod intellectu apprehendi potest in re sensibili potest dici sensibile per accidens, sed statim quod ad occursum rei sensatae apprehenditur intellectu. Sicut statim cum video aliquem loquentem, vel movere se ipsum, apprehendo per intellectum vitam eius, unde possum dicere quod video eum vivere;” In De Anima 2.13. 48 De Ver.18.8.ad 3: “Vel dicendum, quod inferiores vires quantum ad aliqud superiores sunt, maxime in virtute agendi et causandi, ex hoc ipso quod sunt propinquiores rebus exterioribus, quae sunt causa et mensura cognitionis nostrae.” Also: “Illa quae habent deficiens esse, secundum hoc deficiunt a cognoscibilitate intellectus nostri, quod deficiunt a ratione agendi;” DeVer.2.5.ad 12. 49 “Non autem ponitur quod intellectus agens sit subjectum habituum, sed magis possibilis: unde ipsa potentia quae habitui naturali subiicitur, magis videtur esse potentia passiva quam activa;” De Ver.16.1.ad 13. “Non oportet quod si intellectus agens non indiget habitu, intellectus possibilis non indigeat. Quod enim intellectus agens habitu non indigeat ad sui operationem, ex hoc contingit quod intellectus agens nihil recipit ab intelligibilibus, sed magis formam suam eis tribuit, faciendo ea intelligibilia actu; intellectus autem possibilis e contrario se habet;” De Ver.20.2.ad 5. Copyright © 1995 by the American Catholic Philosophical Association

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one way indeed in the apprehensive powers; in another way, in the appetitive powers. For in the apprehensive powers there may be a natural habit by way of a beginning on the part of the soul itself: thus the intellectus principiorum is called a natural habit.”50 And immediately after this, he explains that the incomplete part of the habit found by nature in the soul cannot operate “except through the intelligible species which the knower has received from phantasms.”51 The idea then seems to be this. According to Aquinas, in the entative make-up of the intellectual faculty one finds that the habit for immediate intellection is present in the possible intellect as a permanent, and incomplete, innate, natural habit. In the completion of this habit two components converge: one that comes from the internal—natural— constitution of the faculty, namely, the empty, perfectible habit, and another one which is exterior to the faculty, namely, the component from which the habit receives its proper content. In his description of the habit of intellectus principiorum, Aquinas also teaches that the principles in their explicit expression are a reality entirely different from the habit itself. Essentially and properly, a habit is that by which the faculty is able to perform certain acts with ease and facility. Through the habit of grammar for example a person makes a correct sentence. The habit of grammar is not the sentence he makes but a capacity he has for making sentences. In an analogous way, the indemonstrable principles are the product of an intellectual act accomplished through the natural habit for immediate intellection. Aquinas makes explicit this point in the following statement: “the indemonstrable principles are not the habit itself whereby we hold those principles, but are the principles the habit of which we possess.”52 And elsewhere one also finds him saying that “there is in the human soul a natural habit called intellectus principiorum by means of which the soul knows the principles of speculative sciences.”53 Also, in describing the intellectual virtues of wisdom, science and intellectus, he 50

ST.1-2.51.1: “(Non) contingit in hominibus esse habitus naturales ita quod sint totaliter a natura. Sunt ergo in hominibus aliqui habitus naturales, tamquam partim a natura existentes et partim ab exteriori principio; aliter quidem in apprehensivis potentiis, et aliter in appetitivis. In apprehensivis enim potentiis potest esse habitus naturalis secundum inchoationem; ex parts ipsius animae: sicut intellectus principiorum dicitur esse habitus naturalis.” Also: “Intellectus principiorum consequitur ipsam naturam humanam;” ST.2-2.5.4..ad 3. 51 ST.1-2.51.1: “(Termini principiorum intellectus) cognoscere non potest nisi per species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus acceptas. Et propter hoc, cognitio principiorum provenit nobis ex sensu.” 52 ST.1-2.94.1: “Principia indemonstrabilia in speculativis non sunt ipse habitus principiorum, sed sunt principia quorum est habitus.” 53 De Ver.16.1: “Animae humanae est quidam habitus naturalis quo principia speculativarum scientiarum cognoscit, quem vocamus intellectum principiorum.” Copyright © 1995 by the American Catholic Philosophical Association

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explains that “in this case, the name intellectus does not designate the intellectual faculty itself but a habit whereby man, with the cooperation of the agent intellect, naturally knows the indemonstrable principles.”54 The completed habit of intellectus principiorum in the possible intellect as understood by Aquinas appears to be more like a ‘permanent perfected yet perfectible perfection’ within the faculty by means of which the assent that carries the weight of a principle is elicited. We should emphasize here, as we did above, that although Aquinas describes this internal standard of truth as a likeness of the divine truth present in the human intellect,55 the content proper to this habit comes from the exterior; this habit is a ‘perfected yet perfectible’ principle of operation in the intellect precisely because its content is given to it little by little by the sensible things of nature. With even greater clarity Aquinas shows that the natural habit for immediate intellection is not to be identified with the agent intellect. In article 5 of the Disputed Question De Anima, he addresses that question directly to conclude that “the agent intellect must exist before the habit of first principles” and he points out that the “agent intellect is the cause of the habit.”56 The same idea is found expounded in the Sum ma Theologiae when he considers the possibility of corruption in habits in general. There he states that “the agent intellect can not have a contrary. Wherefore if in the possible intellect there is a habit caused immediately by the agent intellect, such a habit is in all respects absolutely incorruptible. Such are the habits of the first principles both speculative and practical, which cannot be corrupted by any forgetfulness or deception whatever.57 As an outcome of this one might say that the empty habit of intellectus principiorum in the possible intellect is informed directly and exclusively by the light of the agent intellect. This is not at all the case, however, because the agent intellect cannot act on the possible intellect except through the mediation of the information received in the senses from the sensible things of nature. Aquinas is unyielding in this 54

In Ethic.6.5.n. 1179: “Accipitur autem hic ‘intellectus’ non pro ipsa intellectiva potentia, sed pro habitu quodam quo homo ex virtute luminis intellectus agentis naturaliter cognoscit principia indemonstrabilia.” 55 “Huusmodi autem rationis lumen, quo principia huiusmodi sunt nobis nota, est nobis a Deo inditum, quasi quaedam similitudo increatae veritatis in nobis resultantis.” De Ver.11.1. 56 De Anima.1.5: “Quidam vero crediderunt intellectum agentem non esse aliud quam habitum principiorum indemonstrabilium in nobis. Sed hoc esse non potest, qua etiam ipsa principia indemonstrabilia cognoscimus abstrahendo a singularibus, ut docet Philosophus in I Poster. Unde oportet praeexistere intellectum agentem habitui principiorum sicut causam ipsius.” 57 ST.1-2.53.1: “Intellectui agenti (non) potest aliqui esse contrarium. Unde si aliquis habitus sit in intellectu possibile immediate ab intellectu agente causatus, talis habitus est incorruptibilis et per se et per accidens. Huiusmodi autem sunt habitus primorum principiorum, tam speculabilium quam practicorum, qui nulla oblivione vel deceptione corrumpi possunt.” Copyright © 1995 by the American Catholic Philosophical Association

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point as is seen, for example, when he reasons as follows: “the very habit of first principles is derived from the sensible things of nature, and thus, this habit is the effect of the agent intellect whose function is to act on the phantasm.”58 There is no question that for Aquinas the empty habit of intellectus principiorum in the possible intellect finds its proper content in the sensible things of nature with the cooperation of the agent intellect and the phantasm. Another important observation can be made with regard to the relationship that Aquinas perceives between the natural habit for immediate intellection and the intelligible species. For he makes known to us that “the intellect requires intelligible species whereby to understand: and, consequently, there is need of a natural habit in addition to the power.”59 It is unquestionable that here the natural habit in the possible intellect is being presented as a reality which is not caused by the intelligible species. The inference, on the contrary, leads one to conclude that Aquinas conceives the natural habit as a means whereby the intellect apprehends or identifies a certain natural ordering contained or impressed in the intelligible species that have reached the intellect. Now the species capacity to transmit information about any ordering must come from the sensible things of nature. Aquinas states something similar to this when he says that “order belongs properly to the things of nature and flows from them into our knowledge.”60 And for him, the foundation of our knowledge is derived precisely from the extramental sensible things themselves where the ordering in act of being is the same as the ordering in truth.61 By nature, it seems, where the ordering is really impressed is in the subsisting things, and the intellectual faculty of man has, also by nature, the capacity for grasping that ordering in the natural habit. Indeed, the major ordering one finds in the 58

SCG.2.78.n. 7: “Nec tamen intelligendum est quod intellectus agens sit habitus per modum quo habitus est in secunda specie qualitatis, secundum quod quidam dixerunt intellectum agentem esse habitum principiorum. Quia ille habitus principiorum est acceptus a sensibilibus (II Posteriorum) et sic oportet quod sit effectus intellectus agentis, cuius est phantasmata, quae sunt intellecta in potentia, facere intellecta in actu.” 59 ST.1-2.62.3.ad 1: “Intellectus indiget speciebus intelligibilis, per quas intelligat: et ideo oportet quod in eo ponatur aliquis habitus naturalis superadditus potentiae.” 60 ST.2-2.26.1.ad 2: “Ordo autem principalius invenitur in ipsis rebus; et ex eis derivatur ad cognitionem nostram.” Also: “Intellectus ex necessitate tendit in illud ad quod naturaliter ordinatur;” De Mato 3.3. “Specierum autem aliqualis ordinatio habitum efficit;” De Ver.24.4.ad 9. 61 “Sensibilia sunt prima principia cognitionis humane;” ST.2-2.154.5.ad 3. “Sensibilia sunt prima nostrae cognitionis principia;” ST.2-2.173.3. “Eadem est dispositio rerum in esse et veritate;” De Caritate 1.9.ad 1. “Cum autem eadem sit dispositio rerum in esse sicut in veritate, quaecumque sunt entia per participationem, sunt vera per participationem;” ST.1-2.3.7. Copyright © 1995 by the American Catholic Philosophical Association

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things of nature is no other than a gradation according to their proper participation in act of being. Evidence that this is the way Aquinas understands this issue can also be found in the following remark: “the intellect is not perfected by the form of a stone, as such, but inasmuch as such form participates of a certain likeness to that which is above the human intellect.”62 To put it another way, among other functions the species has that of being the vehicle of an information that only a natural habit can grasp. It was mentioned earlier that the agent intellect cannot act directly on the possible intellect. The proper object of the action of the agent intellect is the phantasm. Only through the phantasm can the agent intellect indirectly act on the possible intellect. In the Summa Theologiae Aquinas expresses this doctrine as follows: “the agent intellect is not the object of the possible intellect; rather, it is that whereby the objects are made intelligible in act: for which, besides the presence of the agent intellect, we require the presence of phantasms.”63 In the eighteenth article of the Disputed Question De Anima, he notes more explicitly that “the agent intellect is not directly active with respect to the possible intellect; rather, it’s action aims directly at the phantasm.”64 By contrast, with regard to the way the phantasm itself acts on the possible intellect, Aquinas is equally adamant in pointing out that the phantasm cannot act directly on the possible intellect. He explains, for example, that “that which comes from the inferior faculties, the senses, can be received in the possible intellect only in so far as it takes in act the property of intelligibility from the agent intelect.”65 He comments also that the “forms abstracted from the sensible things of nature cannot act on our intellectual faculty, except in so far as they become immaterial by the light of the agent intellect, and thus in some way are made homogeneous with the possible intellect on which they must act.”66 Elsewhere he postulates that 62

ST.1-2.3.6: “Manifestum est autem quod forma lapidis, vel cuuslibet rei sensibiles, est inferior homine. Unde per formam lapidis non perficitur intellectus inquantum est talis forma, sed inquantum in ea participatur aliqua similitudo alicuius quod est supra intellectum humanum, scilicet lumen intelligibile, vel aliquid huiusmodi. In formis sensibilibus participatur aliqua similitudo superiorum substantiarum (precipue Dei).” 63 ST.1.79.4.ad 3: “Intellectus agens non se habet ut objectum intellectus possibilis, sed ut faciens objecta in actu: ad quod requiritur praeter praesentiam intellectus agentis, praesentiam phantasmatum.” 64 De Anima.1.18.ad 11: “Intellectus agens non est activum respectu intellectus possibilis directe: sed magis respectu phantasmatum.” 65 De Ver.18.8.ad 3: “Id quod ad inferiori est, non (potest) ab intellectu possibili accipi nisi secundum quod accipit formam intelligibilitatis ab intellectu agenti.” 66 De Ver.10.6.ad 1: “Formae sensibiles, vel a sensibilibus abstractae, non possunt agere in mentem nostram, nisi quatenus per lumen intellectus agentis immateriales redduntur, et sic efficiuntur quoddamodo homogeneae intellectu possibili in quem agunt.” Copyright © 1995 by the American Catholic Philosophical Association

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with respect to the possible intellect the phantasm is the instrumental and secondary agent, whereas the active intellect is the principal and first one. For this reason he concludes that what is received in the possible intellect is caused by both agent intellect and phantasm, and not by one of them in isolation.67 To sum up: it is obvious that in order to inform the empty habit of intellectus principiorum in the possible intellect both phantasm and agent intellect need one another. The interaction between agent intellect and phantasm generates two elements: a weakened intelligible light and an intelligible species containing that light. This intelligible entity composed of a unity between species and weakened intelligible light is the reality capable of acting on the possible intellect.68 Aquinas attributes the weakening of the intelligible light to the phantasm: “the intelligible light of the human intellect is obscured to such an extent that it must suffer from a defect, namely, from the necessity of being determined and modified by the phantasms.”69 He also maintains that the truth that the intellect is capable of grasping is limited by that weakened intelligible light: “to man is not granted to know the fullness of the truth he is capable of knowing because the intellectual light proper to man is obscured by the necessary contact it has to have with the sensible faculties. To everyone, however, is given the power to know a greater or lesser intensity of that truth according to the greater or lesser intellectual light he is endowed with.”70 At times this limitation is linked more directly to the need 67

“In receptione qua intellectus possibiles species rerum accipit a phantasmatibus, se habent phantasmata ut agens instrumentale et secundarium; intellectus vero agens ut agens principale et primum. Et ideo actionis effectus relinquitur in intellectu possibili secundum conditionem utriusque, et non secundum conditionem alterius tantum;” De Ver.10.6.ad 7. In De Malo.16.12.ad 3 one also reads: “Sicut lumen dat coloribus quandam virtutem instrumentalem faciendi immutationem spiritualem in sensu, ita phantasmata, in quantum instrumentaliter agunt in virtute intellectus agentis, faciunt intellectum possibilem in actu intelligibilium specierum.” 68 “Intelligibilia non sunt lux tantum sed species rei intellectae simul, et lumen;” Quodlibet 7.1. “Intellectualis hominum operatio secundum duo perficitur; scilicet secundum lumen intelligibile, et secundum species intelligibiles; ita tamen quod secundum species fit apprehensio rerum; secundum lumen intelligibile perficitur iudicium de apprehensis;” De Maio 16.12. “Per formam lapidis non perficitur intellectus inquantum est talis forma, sed inquantum in ea participatur aliqua similitudo alicuius quod est supra intellectum humanum, scilicet lumen intelligibile, vel aliquid huiusmodi;” ST.1-2.3.6. 69 De Ver.8.3.ad 3: “In intellectu humano, intelligibile lumen obumbratur in tantum ut necesse sit a phantasmatibus accipere; et cum continuo, et tempore, et discurrendo de uno in aliud.” 70 In Boet. De Trin. Prooem.l,l,ad 4: “Lumen intellectuale ubi est purum, sicut in Angelis, sine difficultate omnia cognita naturaliter demonstrat, ita quod in eis est omnia naturalia cognoscere; in nobis autem lumen huiusmodi est obumbratum per coniunctionem ad corpus et ad vires corporeas; et ex hoc est quod non est in nobis omnino veritatem cognoscere, scilicet propter impedimenta. Sed unusquisque hoc magis vel minus habet in potestate, secundum quod lumen intellectuale est in ipso purius.” Also, “Intellectualis natura excedit rationalem quantum ad Copyright © 1995 by the American Catholic Philosophical Association

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of the phantasm in the act of intellection as, for example, when he observes that “the human intellect cannot grasp the pure intelligible truth because its nature requires it to understand by turning to the phantasm;”71 or when he affirms that “intellectual knowledge does not consist in the phantasms themselves, but in our contemplating in them the purity of the intelligible truth.”72 On several occasions he also acknowledges that the more powerful the light illuminating the phantasm the more truth the knower receives in the possible intellect. As, for example, when he says that “the stronger the human intellect is, the much higher an intelligible truth can be brought to light from the species derived from created things,”73 or again when speaking about the intellectus principiorum: “the habit of first principles results from man’s very nature, which is equally shared by all. Nevertheless, the strength of the principles is more known to one than to another, according to the greater capacity of intellect.”74 The nature of this intelligible entity, composed of species and weakened intelligible light, is clearly identified by Aquinas when he compares the action of the agent intellect in the act of intellection with the action of light in the cognitive act of the sense of sight. Thus, he reports, “physical light is seen through itself only in so far as it is the cause for the visibility of visible things and a kind of form making them actually visible. Similarly, we understand the light of the agent intellect, in so far as it is the cause responsible of making intelligible species

modum cognoscendi eamdem intelligibilem veritatem: nam intellectualis natura statim apprehendit veritatem, ad quam rationalis natura per inquisitionem rationis pertingit. Et ideo ad id quod intellectus apprehendit, ratio per quendam motum pertingit;” ST.1-2.5.1. 71 ST.1.111.1: “Sed intellectus humanus non potest ipsam intelligibilem veritatem nudam capere: quia connaturale est ut intelligat per conversionem ad phantasmata.” Also, “Homini, secundum statum praesentis vitae, est connaturalis modus cognoscendi veritatem intelligibilem per phantasmata;” ST.1-2.5.1.ad 2. 72 ST.2-2.180.5.ad 2: “Sed tamen intellectualis cognitio non sistit in ipsis phantasmatibus, sed in eis contemplatur puritatem intelligibiles veritatis.” 73 ST.1.111.1.ad 2: “Ex speciebus a creaturis acceptis, tanto altior elicitur intelligibilis veritatis quanto intellectus humanus fuerit fortior.” 74 ST.2-2.5.4.ad 3: “Intellectus principiorum consequitur ipsam naturam humanam, quae aequaliter in omnibus invenitur. Et tamen secundum maiorem capacitatem intellectus, unus magis cognoscit virtutem principiorum quam alius.” Also, “Ex phantasmatibus, a sensu acceptis secundum naturalem ordinem tanto excellentior cognitio intellectualis habetur quanto lumen intelligibile in homine fortius fuerit;” ST.1.12.13.ad 2. “Cum cognitio hominis a sensu incipiat, quasi ab exteriori, manifestum est quod quanto lumen intellectus est fortius, tanto potest magis ad intima penetrare. Lumen autem naturale nostri intellectus est finitae virtutis: unde usque ad determinatum aliquid pertingere potest;” ST.2-2.8.1. Copyright © 1995 by the American Catholic Philosophical Association

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actually intelligible.”75 In short, to be able to exercise a complete act of intellection the intellectual faculty of man needs to apprehend two components: the intelligible species which determines the object of the act of intellection and a weakened intelligible light which determines the strength of the assent given in judgement. After being informed by the species and the weakened intelligible light, the intellectual faculty is ready to complete the act of intellection with an explicit intellectual verbalization of knowledge. This proper operation of the intellect results in an intellectual conception which could either be a complete thought, as when expressed in a proposition, or a concept as when expressed in a term. From the intelligible species the intellect expresses concepts and from the light apprehended by the habit of intellectus principiorum the intellect gives the assent in judgements. In general, the assent expressed in any judgement whatsoever comes forth in accordance with that internal standard of truth contained in the natural habit for immediate intellection. The right estimate of truth grasped by the natural habit for immediate intellection through a weakened intelligible light is operative in everyday life. In a sense, it receives different expressions in the intellectual history of every man and of all humanity until it reaches a purified metaphysical formulation in the first indemonstrable principle. Aquinas eloquently synthesizes this vision when he says that “in the process of reasoning a certain revolving like a circle takes place, because the intellectual faculty of man begins with one simple act of intellection, proceed through many and ends with one.”76 In other words, at the inception of all reasoning the human 75

De Ver.10.8.ad 10: “Lux corporalis non videtur per essentiam, nisi quatenus fit ratio visibilitatis visibilium et forma quaedam dans esse eis actu visibile. Et similiter lumen intellectus agentis per seipsum a nobis intelligitur, inquantum est ratio specierum intelligibilium, faciens eas intelligibiles actu.” Also, “lumen intellectus agentis in nobis non sufficit ad distinctam rerum cognitionem habendam, nisi secundum species receptas quas informat, ut lux coloris;” In II Sent.3.3.4.ad 4. And “non est necesse ut ille qui videt colorem aliquem, videat substantiam solis; sed ut videat lumen solis, prout eo color illustratur. Similiter non est necessarium ut ille qui cognoscit aliquod intelligibile, videat essentiam divinam; sed quod percipiat lumen intelligibile, quod a Deo originaliter manat, prout ipso est aliquid intelligibile actu;” De Ver.18.1.ad 10. Moreover, “illustratio divini radii in vita praesenti non fit sine velaminibus phantasmatum qualicumque: qua connaturale est homini, secundum statum praesentis vitae, ut non intelligat sine phantasmate;” ST.2-2.174.2.ad 4. 76 1n De Diuin. Nom.7.2: “Inquisitio enim rationis ad simplicem intelligentiam veritatis terminatur, sicut incipit a simplici intelligentia veritatis quae consideratur in primis principiis; et ideo, in processu rationis est quaedam convolutio ut circulus, dum ratio, ab uno incipiens, per multa procedens, ad unum terminatur.” Also, “ratio enim discurrit considerando actus ac defectus et habitudinem unius rei ad aliam. Et nisi resolvat usque ad intellectum veritatis, vana est ratio. Unde quando accipit veritatem rei, habet earn quasi centrum;” In Epist. ad Tim.6.1.n. 238. Copyright © 1995 by the American Catholic Philosophical Association

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intellect receives first an internal standard of truth which makes the process of reasoning possible; secondly, it uses this internal standard of truth in all judgements whatsoever; and third, the process ends with the explicit formulation of that internal standard of truth in the first indemonstrable principle. The circle-like movement is completed when man discovers that, although unexpressed and implied, the first indemonstrable principle was there always from the very beginning as the center around which all true knowledge revolves. It is for this reason that, in addition to the phantasm, Aquinas points out time and discursive reasoning as two other causes responsible for the clouding of the intelligible light innate to our intellectual faculty. In Aquinas’s understanding, the notion of ‘ens’ arises precisely from the act of being and not from the essence of the things of nature. There is nothing more self-evident to the intellect than the actuality in being and the truth that actuality in being cannot be denied and affirmed at the same time. The act of being is the most evident perfection the human intellect finds in the sensible things of nature; the act of being apprehended by the human intellect is the foundation of truth, the foundation of the notion of ens, and the foundation of the intellectual conception of the first principle.77 To systematize this treatment of the comprehensive matter of the apprehension of the act of being, the intellectual faculty of man and the act of intellection can be characterized within a framework of four different phases, namely, an entitative, a perfective, an operative, and a conclusive moment. Entitative moment: Prior to knowledge, the intellectual faculty of man is endowed with an agent intellect, a possible intellect, and an empty habit, the natural habit that allows the faculty to accomplish acts of immediate intellection. This last element belongs to the entitative constitution of the faculty. The empty habit of intellectus pricipiorum is not knowledge. That the intellectual faculty of man possesses an empty habit before any kind of knowledge whatsoever, amounts to say simply that, by nature, this faculty is “Intellectus vero animae a sensibilibus accipit intelligibilem veritatem; et cum quodam discursu rationis earn intelligit;” ST.2-2.180,6,ad 2. “Homo enim habet cognitionem obumbratam, et cum discursu veritatis notitiam sumentem;” De Ver.24.3. 77 “Illud autem quod prirno intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et in quo omnes conceptions resolvit est ens;” De Ver.1.1. “Hoc nomen res in hoc differt ab ente, quod ens sumitur ab actu esendi, sed nomen rei exprimit qudditatem sive essentiam entis;” De Ver.1.1. “Naturaliter igitur intellectus noster cognoscit ens, et ea quae sunt per se entis inquantum huusmodi; in qua cognition fundatur primorum principiorum notitia, ut non esse simul affirmare et negare;” SCG.2.83.n 32. “Hoc principium, impossibile est esse et non esse simul, dependet ex intellectu entis;” In Metaphys.4.6.n. 605. Copyright © 1995 by the American Catholic Philosophical Association

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equipped with the necessary means to perfectly exercise the act of intellection. The empty natural habit exists in the possible intellect. Perfective moment: An intelligible entity composed of intelligible species and weakened intelligible light, which arises from the interaction between phantasm and agent intellect, informs the possible intellect. The intensity of the intelligible light that accompanies the species reflects the impact that the act of being of sensible things of nature causes in the knowing faculties of the soul. Such impact is transmitted through the phantasm and elevated to the intelligible order by the illumination of the agent intellect. The intensity of intelligible light that reaches the possible intellect in a particular instance, reflects the intensity of the particular extramental act of being from which it comes. Here the act of being itself is what illuminates the possible intellect through the light of the agent intellect. The weakened intelligible light is like a natural order that any intelligible species directly related to the sensible things of nature is commanded to carry, namely, the order of reflecting the corresponding extramental intensity in act of being. To grasp such ordering, a natural habit is needed in the possible intellect. In the perfective moment, therefore, the natural habit apprehends its proper content. The intelligible species functions as its vehicle. Thus the apprehension of the act of being completes the empty habit and this, in turn, becomes a ‘permanent perfected yet remaining perfectible’ standard of truth in the intellect: in the intellectual history of every human being, the perfected habit is constantly growing in intensity as it calibrates the reality of what is real in the essence of anything that is.78 Operative moment: Once the possible intellect has been informed by the data provided by the sensible faculties, the intellectual faculty exercises the capacity it has to make use of that information. At this moment, an explicit act of intellectual verbalization of knowledge is properly accomplished: the intellectual faculty produces through its proper operations an intellectual conception. This knowledge is manifested in two ways, first, through concepts conceived in accordance with the intelligible species, and secondly, through the certatinty of judgemental assents conceived in accordance with the light apprehended by the natural habit for immediate intellection. In the linguistic expression of this knowledge, concepts become terms and the strength of the assent becomes an affirmative ‘is’ that unites the subject and predicate in a proposition. As seen above, the ultimate reference of the ‘is,’ is “that which, coming from the sensible things of 78

This habit does not fully calibrate the act of being of God and spiritual creatures because we cannot fully grasp their essences and act of being. Our natural knowledge of their perfections therefore does not come from acts of immediate intellection but rather from discursive reasoning. Copyright © 1995 by the American Catholic Philosophical Association

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nature, informs the intellect by way of absolute and substantial actuality in being.” Therefore, any true proposition whatsoever can be viewed as a particular expression of an internal standard of truth contained in the natural habit for immediate intellection. Conclusive moment: The mind of the metaphysician is capable of deliberately orienting his human capacity for intellectual verbalization of knowledge and focusing it directly towards that internal standard of truth grasped by the natural habit for immediate intellection. It is through this highly sophisticated process that the human mind explicitly arrives at the proper metaphysical content of both the notion of ‘ens’ and the first indemonstrable principle. This notion and principle are intellectual conceptions that arise directly from the weakened intelligible light after it has informed the possible intellect and not from the intelligible species that envelop in particular instances that weakened intelligible light. In the conclusive moment, the internal light of truth grasped by the natural habit for immediate intellection is identified as the root and principle of all knowledge. Thus, in our intellectual life, a circle-like movement is brought to an end because, beginning with the reception of an unexpressed internal standard of truth in the habit of intellectus pricipiorum, the intellectual faculty proceeds through many expressions of the truth to finally arrive at the highest expression of all in the first indemonstrable principle: the actuality in being, as the most immediate reality to the intellect, cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time. Metaphysicians, however, find many other different ways of expressing their conceptions of what is contained in the habit for immediate intellection. The act of being inherent to sensible things of nature is constantly making an impact in the intellectual faculty. It seems proper to say that the entitative natural habit responsible for actuating the intellect’s response to that impact grows as a personal possession; this habit is being persistently strengthened with its use in every act of intellection. To a certain extent, it seems also proper to say that the natural habit for immediate intellection expands as it embraces all things including their Cause through the perfection that it apprehends, namely, the act of being. The unification in one perfection conveyed here does not come from the habit; it comes from the ‘common denominator’ of the things of nature, their act of being. The conclusion, then, is the following. The act of being of the sensible things of nature is joined to the truth of the first principle through the light of the agent intellect. The process seems to take place as follows: from above, the agent intellect illuminates in the phantasm all the information transmitted from the sensible things of nature. From below, with the aid of the light of Copyright © 1995 by the American Catholic Philosophical Association

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the agent intellect, the impact of the act of being, which is somehow contained in the information transmitted through the phantasm, illuminates the possible intellect. The real illumination of the possible intellect then is accomplished by the act of being. In everyday life, the intensity of the act of being of extramental subsisting things is reflected over and over again for the intellect under the aspect of weakened intelligible light. With the terminology used above, one can also express this conclusion by saying that the object of the intellect, the quiddity, becomes intelligible species; whereas its ratio objecti, its participation in act of being, becomes a weakened participation in intelligible light. From the apprehension of this ratio objecti there emerges immediatelly in the intellect a right estimate of the truth of the first indemonstrable principle. New Rochelle, New York

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