Alliance Politics

Fall 2008 Political Science 790:395:03 Th. 2:15 p.m.–5:15 p.m. Hickman 123

Jeffrey M. Ritter [email protected] Offc. Hrs. see below Hickman 314

Course Description: Military alliances are among the oldest forms of international institutions. Alliances affect almost every aspect of international politics, from the flows of trade and investments to the incidence of war to the character of international law. This seminar will focus on the origins of alliances, the ways in which alliances affect the behaviors of states, and the ways that alliances have changed over time. In addition to the modern social-scientific literature on alliances, we will also read some historical accounts and some original treaty texts. Some previous academic study of international relations is assumed. This course is intended to be a seminar, an opportunity for you to explore our chosen subject in depth, with just a bit of guidance. You must read, and you must be prepared to talk about what you’ve read. The reading load tends to be heavy, and the readings are not all user-friendly. Pace yourself; don’t leave everything for the night before class every week. This seminar is also intended to be an opportunity for you to conduct a serious research project of your own. Your goal is to produce a work of actual scholarship that could be assigned as reading in a future course comparable to this one. By far, the most difficult part of the process is the development of an appropriate research question. Expect to devote a significant amount of time to developing your research question in October. We will meet once a week. Because this is a seminar, rather than a lecture, I do expect you to attend regularly: if none of you participates, there is no course. I will announce my formal office hours as soon as my schedule becomes clear. If you need to reach me, you are not likely to succeed by phone, but I try to respond to e-mail promptly. I maintain a website (http://rci.rutgers.edu/˜jeffritt) where I may post readings on a temporary basis in the event of some problem with e-reserves. I will also set up a Sakai site for announcements and possible supplemental material. Assignments and announcements posted on these website should be treated as annexes to this syllabus, and you will be responsible for them. Grading: Grades will be assigned on the following basis: 1) Participation (20%). You should attend class regularly and at the end of the semester I should not have to strain my memory to recall whether or not you are capable of speech. 2) Research Design (20%). Due October 30 (now a scarier date than Halloween). This is essentially your term paper proposal. You will outline a theoretical question and explain your strategy for gathering evidence that will help answer it. We will devote an entire class 1

session on October 16 to discussing the nature of the term paper. Most students seem to feel that this is much more difficult than writing the actual paper itself, so manage your schedule in anticipation. 3) Research Paper (60%). You will identify a theoretical research question and provide a preliminary answer based upon your own original research into a few (2–4) carefully-chosen alliances. Length will vary from 25 to 35 pages, depending on your specific question and cases. Texts: All required readings will be available through the libraries’ electronic reserve system. If you cannot locate a reading in e-reserves, check the course website before contacting me to report it missing. Since I am saving you a small fortune in textbook costs, buy yourself enough coffee to insure that you can stay awake in class and complete the readings. Background readings are not required, but I strongly encourage you to look at them if you are new to the subject. Related readings are not required but are closely related to the assigned readings and might be of interest to you as you develop your research projects.

Course Schedule and Readings: September 4 Introduction: How To Read, or “Boring Stuff is Interesting” • Leanne Powner. 2007. Reading and Understanding Political Science. http://wwwpersonal.umich.edu/˜lpowner/tchdocs.htm. • Background: Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 2006. Alliances (chapter 15). Principles of International Politics: People’s Power, Preferences, and Perceptions. Congressional Quarterly Press. • Background: Morrow, James D. 2000. Alliances: Why Write Them Down? Annual Review of Political Science 3: 63–83. • Reference Source: Leeds, Brett Ashley, Jeffrey M. Ritter, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, and Andrew G. Long. 2002. Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815–1944. International Interactions 28: 237–260. See also http://atop.rice.edu/.

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September 11 Balance of Power, Balance of Threat • Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. Excerpts from chapters 6 & 8. Theory of International Politics. McGraw-Hill. • Doyle, Michael W. 1997. Balancing Power Classically (ch. 5). Ways of War and Peace. W.W. Norton. • Wagner, R. Harrison. 1994. Peace, War, and the Balance of Power. American Political Science Review 85, 3 (September): 727–749. • Walt, Stephen M. 1987. “Introduction” (ch. 1) and “Explaining Alliance Formation” (ch. 2). The Origins of Alliances. Cornell University Press. • Walt, Stephen M. 1988. Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southwest Asia. International Organization 42, 2 (Spring): 275–316. • Related: Wagner, R. Harrison. 1986. The Theory of Games and the Balance of Power. World Politics 38, 4 (July): 546-576. • Related: Wagner, R. Harrison. 2007. War and the State: The Theory of International Politics. University of Michigan Press. • Related: Walt, Stephen M. 1987. “On Bandwagoning” (ch. 5). The Origins of Alliances. Cornell University Press. • Related: The Walt–Kaufman debate. 1992. Security Studies 1, issues 1 & 4.

September 18 Alternatives to Balancing: Aggression, Restraint, Domestic Interests • Schweller, Randall L. 1994. Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In. International Security 19 (Summer): 72–107. • Schroeder, Paul. 1976. Alliances 1815–1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management. In Klaus Knorr, ed. Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems. University Press of Kansas. • Morrow, James D. 1991. Alliances and Asymmetry. American Journal of Political Science 35, 4 (November): 904-933. • Barnett, Michael N., and Jack S. Levy. 1991. Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-1973. International Organization 45, 3 (Summer): 369–395. • Related: Weitsman, Patricia A. Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War. Stanford University Press. • Related: Schroeder, Paul. 1994. Historical Reality vs. Neorealist Theory. International Security 19, 1 (Summer): 108–148. 3

• Related: Moul, William B. 1988. Great Power Nondefense Alliances and the Escalation to War of Conflicts Between Unequals, 1815–1939. International Interactions 15, 1: 25–43.

September 25 Signaling and Deterrence • Fearon, James D. 2002. Selection Effects and Deterrence. International Interactions 28: 5–29. • Smith, Alastair. 1995. Alliance Formation and War. International Studies Quarterly 39, 4 (Decemer): 405–435. [this article uses a fair amount of math; read for the message, don’t sweat the details] • Leeds, Brett Ashley. 2003. Do Alliances Deter Aggression? American Journal of Political Science 47, 3 (July): 427–439. • Kydd, Andrew. 2001. Trust Building, Trust Breaking: The Dilemma of NATO Enlargement. International Organization 55, 4 (Autumn): 801–828. • Related: Huth, Paul D. 1999. Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates. Annual Review of Political Science 2: 25–48.

October 2 Intra-Alliance Bargaining 1: Burden-Sharing • Olson, Mancur, and Richard Zeckhauser. 1966. An Economic Theory of Alliances. Review of Economics and Statistics 48, 3 (August): 266-279. • Conybeare, John A.C., and Todd Sandler. 1990. The Triple Alliance 1880–1914: A Collective Goods Approach. American Political Science Review 84, 4 (December): 1197–1206. • Sandler, Todd, and Keith Hartley. 1999. NATO Burden Sharing and Related Issues. Chapter 2 of Sandler and Hartley, The Political Economy of NATO: Past, Present, and Into the 21st Century. Cambridge University Press. (pp. 22–57) • Boyer, Mark A. 1989. Trading Public Goods in the Western Alliance System. Journal of Conflict Resolution 33, 4 (December): 700–727. • Fang Songying and Kristopher W. Ramsay. 2005. Burden-Sharing in Non-Binding Alliances. Manuscript.

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October 9 Intra-Alliance Bargaining 2: Entrapment, Defection, and Cohesion • Snyder, Glenn H. 1984. The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics. World Politics 36, 4 (July): 461–495. • Zagare, Frank C., and D. Marc Kligour. 2006. The Deterrence-Versus-Restraint Dilemma in Extended Deterrence: Explaining British Policy in 1914. International Studies Review 8: 623–641. • Leeds, Brett Ashley, Andrew Long, and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell. 2000. Reevaluating Alliance Reliability: Specific Threats, Specific Promises. Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, 5 (October): 686–699. • Risse-Kappan, Thomas. 1995. “Unworthy and Unreliable” Allies: violation of Alliance Norms During the 1956 Suez Crisis. Chapter 4 of Risse-Kappan, Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy. Princeton University Press. (pp. 83–104) • Related: Leeds, Brett Ashley. 2003. Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties. International Organization 57, 4 (Fall): 801–827. • Related: Rosen, Amanda M. 2006. Entrapped? German Motivations for Fighting the Great War. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.

October 16 Term Papers: Topics, Research, and Schedule • Van Evera, Stephen. 1997. Selections from Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Cornell University Press.

October 23 Early 19th Century European Alliance Politics: The Concert of Europe and Crises • Rich, Norman. 1992. “Peacemaking, 1814–1815” and “Peacekeeping, 1815–1823: The Concert of Europe.” Chapters 1 and 2 of N. Rich, Great Power Diplomacy 1814–1914. New York: McGraw-Hill. (pp. 1–27, 28–43) • Treaty texts: Treaty texts: “The Holy Alliance (with British note),” “Treaty of Alliance and Friendship between Great Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia, 20 November 1815 (Quadruple Alliance).” In Michael Hurst, ed., Key Treaties for the Great Powers 1814–1915. 2 volumes, 1972. • Bridge, F. Roy, and Roger Bullen. 1980. “From Revolution to War 1830–1854” Chapter 3 of Bridge and Bullen, The Great Powers and the European States System 1815–1914. New York: Longman. (pp. 48–80) 5

• Treaty texts: “Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi.” In Michael Hurst, ed., Key Treaties for the Great Powers 1814–1915. 2 volumes, 1972.

October 30 Mid-Century Wars and the “Bismarckian” System • Bridge, F. Roy, and Roger Bullen. 1980. “The Collapse of the Vienna System 1854– 1871.” Chapter 4 of Bridge and Bullen, The Great Powers and the European States System 1815–1914. New York: Longman. (pp. 81–111) • Carr, William. 1987. “Bismarck’s Foreign Policy 1871–1890.” Chapter 6 of W. Carr, A History of Germany 1815–1985. Third edition, Routledge/Edward Arnold. (pp. 146–162) • Wilson, Keith. 1997. “European Diplomacy, 1871–1914.” Chapter 11 of Martin Pugh, A Companion to Modern European History 1871–1945. Blackwell. (pp. 213–235) • Treaty texts: “Austro-German Alliance of 1879,” “League of the Three Emperors 1881,” “First Treaty of the Triple Alliance 1882,” “The Reinsurance Treaty,” and “Second Mediterranean Agreement.” In Michael Hurst, ed., Key Treaties for the Great Powers 1814–1915. 2 volumes, 1972.

November 11 Individual Cases (subject to change) • Mack Smith, Denis. 1968. Account of the Meeting at Plombieres. In Mack Smith, The Making of Italy: 1796–1870. Harper. (pp. 238–247) • Blumberg, Arnold. 1954. Russian Policy and the Franco-Austrian War of 1859. Journal of Modern History 26, 2 (June): 137–153. • Niu Jun. 1998. “The Origins of the Sino-Soviet Alliance.” Chapter 1 of Odd Orne Westad, Brothers In Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance 1945–1963. Woodrow Wilson Center/Stanford University Press. (pp. 47–89) (Note: subject to change) • Grenville, J.A.S., and Bernard Wasserstein. 1987. Treaty text: “Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assitance between the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union, Moscow, 14 February 1950.” In Grenville and Wasserstein, eds., The Major International Treaties Since 1945: A History and Guide with Texts. New York: Methuen. (pp. 165–168) (Note: subject to change)

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November 13 Ideology, Regime Type, and Identity Politics (subject to change) • Lai, Brian, and Dan Reiter. 2000. Democracy, Political Similiarity, and International Alliances 1816–1992. Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, 2 (April): 203–227. • Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor. 1996. Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations. International Organization 50, 1 (Winter): 109–139. (cf. Bennett, Leeds) • Gartzke, Erik, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2004. Why Democracies May Actually Be Less Reliable Allies. American Journal of Political Science 48, 4 (October); 775– 795. • Johnston, Alastair Iain. 1999. The Myth of the ASEAN Way? Explaining the Evolution of the ASEAN Regional Forum. Chapter 10 of H. Haftendorn, R. Keohane, and C. Wallander, eds., Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions Over Time and Space. Oxford University Press. (pp. 287–324) • Gheciu, Alexandra. 2005. Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the ‘New Europe.’ International Organization 59 (Fall): 973–1012.

November 20 Institutionalization and Alliance Design (subject to change) • Lipson, Charles. 1991. Why Are Some International Agreements Informal? International Organization 45, 4(Autumn): 495–538. • Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. The Rational Design of International Institutions. International Organization 55, 4 (Autumn): 761–799. • Wallander, Celeste. 2000. Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War. International Organization 54, 4 (Autumn): 705–735. • Leeds, Brett Ashley, and Sezi Anac. 2005. Alliance Institutionalization and Alliance Performance. International Interactions 31, 3: 183–202. • Grenville, J.A.S., and Bernard Wasserstein. 1987. Treaty texts: “North Atlantic Treaty between Belfium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy. . . ” and “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary. . . ” In Grenville and Wasserstein, eds., The Major International Treaties Since 1945: A History and Guide with Texts. New York: Methuen. (pp. 106–108, 147–149) • Related: Farrell, Joseph, and Matthew Rabin. 1996. Cheap Talk. Journal of Economic Perspectives 10, 3 (Summer): 103–118. • Related: Farrell, Joseph, and Robert Gibbons. 1989. Cheap Talk with Two Audiences. American Economic Review 79, 5 (December): 1214–1223. • Related: Morrow, James D. 1999. The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment, and Negotiation in International Politics. In David Lake and Robert Powell, eds., Strategic Choice and International Relations. Princeton University Press. 7

• Related: Fearon, James D. 1997. Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs. Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, 1 (February): 68–90. • Related: Kann, Robert A. 1976. Alliances Versus Ententes. World Politics 28, 4 (July): 611-621. • Related: Berridge, G. R. 1989. Ententes and Alliances. Review of International Studies 15, 3 (July): 251–260.

November 27 No Class: Thanksgiving Holiday

December 4 Wrap-up

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