Unity and Disunity in the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN)

ABSTRACT: Problems of unity can affect an armed opposition group at many stages of its existence - during the war, peace negotiations, and its transition to political party. In this paper, we assess to what extent internal divisions affected the performance of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador. We find that while the FMLN suffered significant internal divisions in the early years of the war, the group remained remarkably unified from 1983 onwards. Significant divisions among the groups began to show themselves during the later years of the war, but they did not become exacerbated until after the war’s conclusion when the FMLN suffered from repeated fracturing. The FMLN only began to present itself as a programmatically coherent party in 2005 and this ideological homogeneity allowed it to conclude a series of partnerships with moderate, non-revolutionary sectors of Salvadoran society and achieve victory in the 2009 presidential elections.

Michael E. Allison Associate Professor Department of Political Science The University of Scranton [email protected] Alberto Martin Alvarez Profesor Investigador Centro Universitario de Investigaciones Sociales Universidad de Colima, México Email: [email protected]

Forthcoming in Latin American Politics and Society 2012

The Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) signed a negotiated settlement with the Government of El Salvador on January 16, 1992, paving the way for its reincorporation into society as a political party. The FMLN has since participated in four elections for the presidency and six elections for both municipal and legislative office. Through these elections, the FMLN has successfully transformed itself into the largest bloc in the congress, captured the important position of the mayor of the capital in three consecutive elections, and after finishing second in three consecutive presidential elections, won the presidency in 2009 (Almeida 2010). The FMLN has become one of the most successful armed opposition groups turned political party throughout the world. As expected, however, the road from five small political-military organizations to the casa presidencial was not one without its fair share of difficulties. Numerous factors impact the electoral performance of new political parties such as the FMLN. Their performance is affected by electoral rules (proportional representation versus single member district voting), barriers to participation (i.e., registration requirements and electoral thresholds), incumbency advantages, and other factors largely outside of their control (i.e., the economy, the socio-demographic composition of society, existing parties, etc.). Prior research on the electoral performance of former armed groups has also emphasized broad public support (Ryan 1994), electoral rules (Shugart 1992), and insurgent group experience (Allison 2006, 2010). An additional challenge faced by new parties and one that they can better control involves the extent to which the group can maintain unity. Divisions often undermine new party success as they lead to the loss of key leaders and party militants, sympathetic interest groups, and

potential voters. Therefore, a new political party will be more likely to succeed if it can avoid fracturing or it minimizes the damage should divisions inevitably occur. Scholars have recently begun to pay greater attention to explaining why some insurgent groups remain united through war while others splinter into several factions (Kydd and Walter 2006). In a recent study of the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland and the Karen National Union in Burma, Kenny (2010) argues that we should refer to two related, but distinct, types of unity. Structural integrity refers to an organization’s ability to remain unified, to avoid fragmentation and “the splitting of an organization into two or more separate organizations” (535). Cohesion refers to the “creation and maintenance of cooperative effort toward the attainment of the organization’s goals” (533). For Kenny, both structural integrity and cohesion are important factors that help to explain insurgent group success. Research on negotiated settlements to civil war has also pointed to the breakup of insurgent coalitions during negotiations and the early postwar period (Lounsbery and Cook 2011). Stedman (1993) found that intra-group differences often became exacerbated when groups had to decide between continuing the war and pursuing a political settlement. Frequently, individuals and groups on both sides of a negotiated settlement disagree as to whether negotiations are an end goal or whether they should be used as a delaying tactic so that their military forces have time to regroup. These differences might lead to fragmentation as “spoilers” attempt to undermine the peace process (Stedman 1997). It is not surprising, then, that wartime coalitions break down, sometimes violently, when negotiated settlements are under consideration. In other situations, intra-group conflict intensifies after the war’s conclusion. Atlas and Licklider

(1999) found that conflict within former rebel groups led to either a renewal of civil war between the original protagonists or between the groups that had originally comprised the group. They found that “once a settlement is reached and the fundamental us/them dichotomy begins to break down, the cohesiveness of groups on either side dissipates, and disputes among allies who are now more cognitively aware of their differences and conflicting interests can easily result” (51). These differences are likely to come to the forefront as disagreements emerge over candidate selection, policy initiatives, and the viability of alliances with “non-revolutionary” parties and mass-based organizations. For some authors, the degree of ideological cohesion is an important variable that helps to explain the electoral performance of political parties. According to Freidenberg, García, and Llamazares (2008:162), ideologically cohesive parties might be more successful from the standpoint of elections and policy implementation because they are able to send clearer messages to voters about their future conduct in government. Other authors have emphasized how ideological factors define and limit the range of strategic options at the party’s disposal (Garcé 2011). For Panebianco (1995: 91-93), internal factions or tendencies can be explained by the struggle for control over the distribution of organizational incentives, what he calls “areas of organizational uncertainty.” These are the main power resources of the organization and include the party`s finances, specialized knowledge, relationships with the organizational environment, communication channels, power to interpret the organizational rules, and recruitment. A party’s degree of cohesion depends on whether control is dispersed or concentrated. Intraparty ideological conflicts may have a central place in those political parties with roots as an armed left-wing organization. While Latin American authoritarian

regimes used repression and patronage to ensure obedience and loyalty, the revolutionaries’ radical ideology was often their main appeal to attracting and retaining recruits. Therefore, ideology remains central to ensuring militants’ loyalty. This places these organizations before the challenge of softening their discourse and program as a condition for winning elections and, at the same time, being faithful to the party’s revolutionary past. The party’s electoral success depends on how it solves this challenge. Divisions that result in the expulsion or withdrawal of dissidents, while disruptive in the short-term, might or might not help the new political party in the long run. A clean break will allow those remaining to focus on governing, or preparing to govern, without having to manage so many internal conflicts. Decision-making should be more efficient and the party’s message and policy positions more coherent. The short-term loss might make the party stronger in the longer-term if voters do not become disillusioned by what some consider petty internal politics. To apply Kenny’s concepts to political parties, the group’s loss of structural integrity (fragmentation) might lead to improved cohesion. These groups can fracture, then, at almost any moment: in the midst of civil war, during peace negotiations, and as a political party. Fragmentation might weaken (loss of key leaders, militants, and voters) or strengthen (stream-lined decision-making, coherent platform and consistent message) a new political party. In this paper, we analyze the major divisions within the FMLN both as a revolutionary group and as a political party and ask to what extent divisions impacted wartime and electoral performance. We find that while the FMLN suffered significant internal divisions in the early years, the group remained remarkably unified from 1983 onwards. The structural integrity and cohesion that developed during the second half of the war continued during the peace negotiations

even though significant divisions among the groups began to show themselves during these years. The FMLN then suffered from repeated fracturing during its first ten years as a political party, only beginning to present itself as a programmatically coherent party in 2005. We argue that this development allowed the party to conclude a partnership with non-revolutionary sectors, eventually leading to victory in the 2009 presidential elections.

CIVIL WAR Throughout most of the twentieth century, an alliance between the armed forces and economic elite governed El Salvador (Baloyra-Herp 1982, Lungo 1996, Stanley 1996). However, several armed groups emerged to challenge this alliance during the Cold War. In 1970, individuals who had earlier left the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCS) formed the Popular Forces of Liberation – Farabundo Martí (FPL). Led by the former PCS General Secretary, Cayetano Carpio, they created the FPL because of what they considered the PCS’ exclusive and unrealistic focus on the electoral route to power. Early recruits included members of Christian base communities and union activists who had experienced state repression (Almeida 2008; Martín 2010).1 Strategically, the FPL supported a prolonged popular war based on the Chinese and Vietnamese experiences whereby it would gain momentum and support in the countryside before moving to the cities. It sought to overthrow the regime using “all methods of struggle,” both violent and nonviolent (Carpio cited in Montgomery 1982: 120). The People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP), established two years after later, consisted of a large middle class and female following and counted several disappointed former adherents of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) and the PCS among its ranks. Unlike the FPL, the ERP believed that is was

important for the people to experience the failure of reformism before they would support mass insurrection. However, both organizations strongly emphasized armed struggle. [INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] The Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN or RN) grew out of an ERP division in 1975. After renowned poet and ERP member Roque Dalton questioned its neglect of significant political work, he was executed on the orders of its high command. Those who agreed with Dalton’s criticism and were outraged at his murder quit and formed the RN. While the RN paid considerable attention to political work, it also pursued a military strategy of urban warfare in hopes of provoking mass insurrection. A fourth organization, the Revolutionary Party of the Workers of Central America (PRTC), was established in 1976 and operated primarily in the capital of San Salvador. Unlike the other groups, the PRTC maintained more of a regional revolutionary outlook that would involve all of Central America, rather than El Salvador specifically. Similar to the RN, several members had previously been associated with the ERP (Montgomery 1982: 122). Finally, the PCS officially created an armed wing, the Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL), in March 1980. The PCS was a small but at times influential communist party of Soviet orientation founded in 1930. It was faithful to the guidelines of “pacific coexistence” advocated by the Soviet Union until 1961. After a brief and unsuccessful two-year interval in which the party tried to build an armed structure in the wake of the Cuban revolution, the PCS followed a strategy of participation in the political system and the prosecution of a bourgeois revolution as the first step towards a socialist future. This strategy explains its alliances with progressive, but non-revolutionary, groups throughout

the 1960s and 1970s. While the PCS had the longest history of political activity in the country, it remained subordinate to the other groups in terms of military capabilities.2 Reformist officers led a military coup against President Carlos Humberto Romero in October 1979. While several centrist and center left groups held out hopes of nonviolent reform, the “reactions from the guerrilla groups varied, with the ERP calling for insurrection, the FPL viewing the coup as merely an attempt to improve the system of domination and calling for stepped-up pressure, and the FARN taking a more optimistic view of the potential for change” (Byrne 1996: 54). Within weeks, conservative military officers gained control of the new government and most civilians resigned in protest. Two months later, the FPL, RN and PCS established the Political-Military Committee (CPM). While the CPM was a first step towards achieving structural integrity, neither the ERP nor the PRTC participated. The ERP had remained isolated since Dalton’s killing and the FPL, RN, and PCS were reluctant to work with the PRTC because of its regional structure, foreign leadership based in Honduras, and insignificant military capabilities. The groups took another step towards the creation of a single organization with the creation of the Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU) at a May 1980 meeting in Havana. While the ERP was included as a result of Cuban pressure, unity remained elusive because the FARN withdrew after the other four failed to engage reformist military officers and with their “adoption of the Leninist principle of democratic centralism and the formation of a unified revolutionary [vanguard] party” (Montgomery 1982: 131-132). The RN favored making decisions via consensus and refused majority rule at which time the FPL, PCS, and ERP released a statement expelling them from the DRU (Ramos 2009). The four organizations would reconcile in October and form the

FMLN, with the addition of the PRTC in December. When the FMLN formed, its five groups were sufficiently unified as they “agreed on the struggle for socialism, they accepted the use of arms as a possibility for revolution, they shared a Marxist analytical and theoretical framework, they concluded that social democracy and reformism were not viable, the same with regards to elections, and they believed that it was impossible to achieve democracy, social justice, and progress for the benefit of the popular sectors within the limits of capitalism” (Béjar 1996: 64). At the same time, important differences remained. Each organization “maintained its own statutes, conserved its own organic structure, procured its own financing and independently elected its leaders. Militants maintained discipline to their organization and not to the FMLN” (Zamora 2003: 52; see also Byrne 1996: 77, 204 and McClintock 1998: 52). The groups remained divided over the interpretation of the national reality, the appropriateness of alliances, and the strategy for taking power (Zamora 2003: 45-48; see also Byrne 1996: 77 and Sáenz de Tejada 2007: 84-85). They disagreed about whether the FMLN should pursue a prolonged popular war or insurrection strategy and how much attention to dedicate to political work. The groups had achieved structural integrity, but cohesion remained elusive. One early event where the FMLN’s lack of cohesion undermined its performance came during the failed January 1981 “final offensive.” According to McClintock (1998:54), the FMLN disagreed whether national conditions were appropriate for an attack, the RN did not participate, and the ERP did not share its weapons. The FPL insisted upon a strategy of prolonged popular war while others supported a popular insurrection (Montgomery 1982: 131). The difficulties were compounded by the fact that the organizations still did not trust each other leading them to overestimate, or lie about,

how many fighters each would provide. According to ERP interviews, all five organizations participated but the other four left forces in reserve. These internal frictions were not the only reason for the failed offensive. However, they highlight the difficulties of reconciling the operations of distinct political-military organizations. A second indication that the FMLN had not succeeded in creating a cohesive organization occurred when certain organizations raised the need to seek a negotiated end the conflict. The available information suggests that the PCS, RN and the Popular Social Christian Movement (MPSC) explored the possibility of negotiations with the governing junta controlled by the PDC prior to March’s Constituent Assembly elections (US Department of State 1982).3 According to former RN leader and member of the FMLN General Command Eduardo Sancho (2004), the FMLN signed a pact in Havana in 1982 on the initiative of the RN and the ERP whereby it agreed to renounce its pursuit of a dictatorship of the proletariat and to accept a democratic process. Not everyone agreed with the declaration and after making clear his reservations, FPL General Secretary Carpio signed the agreement.4 It is important to mention that the Cuban and Sandinista governments supported the combined strategy of negotiation and armed struggle and even pressured Carpio into accepting this change (Sancho 2004; Kruijt 2008: 64).5 Havana was apparently willing to sacrifice the revolution in El Salvador (and Guatemala) in exchange for the consolidation of the Sandinista Revolution. In August 1983, the Cuban government made the U.S. Government aware of its willingness to stop supplying weapons to the FMLN and to persuade its leaders to participate in the political process in exchange for the US ceasing its support for the Contras (US Department of State 1983).6

The U.S. escalation in El Salvador and the dim prospect for a quick FMLN triumph were responsible for the new Cuban perspective. These strategic changes were at the origin of a major crisis within the FPL. At that time, two views co-existed about the need to accelerate the unification process within the FMLN and the viability of negotiations. In terms of further unification, part of the leadership proposed to divide the national territory between the different organizations. However, Carpio argued that the FPL should maintain a national presence because it was the group around which a future integration of the revolutionary movement should occuran integration under his own leadership. He also viewed government negotiations as synonymous with betrayal of revolutionary principles and, therefore, should be used only for tactical purposes and without sacrificing the ultimate goal of socialism. Mélida Anaya Montes (Ana María), the FPL’s number two, supported a strategy that combined armed struggle and negotiations that might lead to the integration of a government of national unity with non-revolutionary forces. According to Facundo Guardado, Anaya Montes always sought to "break the rigid Leninist Marcial [Carpio]" (2008). The war’s prolongation gave greater political weight and credibility to her position and the FPL agreed to support her strategy at a Central Committee meeting in Managua in early 1983.7 Carpio perceived that he was losing control of the organization to Anaya Montes and other young commanders. This conflict was the catalyst for her murder on April 6, 1983 and Carpio’s subsequent suicide one week later.8 The death of its general secretary and the ascendance of a younger more pragmatic generation of militants made a political opening within the FPL possible as her death “largely helped to de-radicalize the FPL” and the new leadership, especially Salvador Sánchez Cerén, moved closer to the PCS

(Guardado 2008). This FPL-PCS alliance emerged based upon a shared strategy of negotiation and the integration of a postwar government of broad participation. Their rapprochement lasted for the remainder of the war and stood opposed to the other major existing line represented by the ERP. While the rivalry was based primarily upon the design of the political and military strategy, control over resources and territory were also important. However, the "absolutism" of armed struggle as the option to seize power disappeared with Carpio’s death and military tactics became increasingly subordinated to the political project. The FMLN grew more cohesive and its first direct dialogue with the government occurred in August, four months after Carpio’s death (Samayoa 2003: 41). As part of the US-organized counterinsurgency, Constituent Assembly elections were held in 1982, presidential in 1984, and legislative and municipal in 1985. The political liberalization led to a reactivation of civil society (Brockett 2005), but it did not lead to any significant fragmentation or disintegration of the FMLN as it continued to reject elections as tools of the counterinsurgency.9 The FMLN did not focus on resolving the war through negotiations until the final eighteen months of the conflict. While “there were differences within and among the parties in the FMLN as to the possibility of winning a favorable solution through negotiations, and on the relative importance of military and negotiating strategies” (Byrne 1996: 202), the primary difference revolved around the preferred pace and structure of negotiations. For the ERP, negotiations should not be rushed, nor should a very detailed timetable be established. The ERP also entered into dialogue with the government apart from the other organizations (Lungo 1996: 2627). While tensions occurred, there is no evidence that any organization flatly refused to negotiate or attempted to derail the peace process. One major challenge at the time, but

not necessarily between the organizations, was the secrecy with which the leadership conducted negotiations. This secrecy led to serious disagreements with the base once the final accords became public. In return for ending the war, accepting the democratic process, and becoming a political party, FMLN negotiators won important reforms to the country’s military and police institutions that would guarantee their survival once they disarmed. However, there was a truth commission, but no trials. There were some land transfers to the demobilized, but no changes to the neoliberal direction of the economy. The leadership had to convince the rank-and-file that the accords were the best that they could do and were worth the decade of sacrifice (Byrne 1996: 77-78, 89; Lungo 1996: 26-27). While there was some disillusionment with the non-revolutionary scope of the agreement, no serious exodus of leaders or militants occurred. A long-term divide that would mark the postwar period also surfaced when the ERP and the RN adopted positions more consistent with social democracy while the FAL, FPL, and the PRTC remained socialist in orientation (Béjar 1996: 59-60). Prior to this period, the FMLN rejected social democracy and reformism. However, for the ERP and RN, El Salvador and the world had changed. This ideological difference would immediately dominate battles within the new party. The FMLN’s structural integrity would soon fracture but greater organizational cohesion would eventually occur nearly ten years after the war’s conclusion with the consolidation of the revolutionary socialist project.

POLITICAL PARTY The FMLN and the government celebrated the end to the war at a ceremony at Chapultepec Castle, Mexico City on January 16, 1992. Though the agreement on the

primacy of armed revolution kept them sufficiently unified throughout the war, postwar challenges threatened and eventually destroyed this unity when the FMLN had to select candidates, draft a political platform, establish electoral alliances, and decide whether it wanted to be a permanent opposition party or a party intent on governing. These were obvious challenges for any leftist party in the post-Cold War period, perhaps more so for one simultaneously transitioning from a revolutionary organization to a political party. The FMLN was formed by statute in 1993 yet it remained a party composed in turn by the five original political-military organizations. The party adopted the principle of equal representation in its main decision making bodies in order to ensure that no single organization could dominate the others through their control (FMLN sf). Therefore, regardless of each organization’s size, each would have the same rights and opportunities for political participation with an equal number of representatives from the organizations making up the party’s leadership structures and main committees. For example, the first Political Commission - the party’s steering committee - was formed by three members of each organization, incorporating members of the General Command and the political committees. They also agreed that departmental and municipal representation would be proportional to the distribution of militants in each department and municipality and that each group had the right to maintain its own statutes, management bodies, and material and financial resources (FMLN sf). Despite the adoption of a structure designed to accommodate a diversity of leadership, organizational cultures and ideological nuances, the arrival of peace made it clear that it was the presence of a common external enemy and military necessity that had created incentives to maintain their alliance. Internal differences surfaced at the FMLN’s

I Regular Convention in September 1993 when the ERP (now the Renewed Expression of the People) formally abandoned Marxism-Leninism and proclaimed its commitment to social democracy. ERP General Secretary Joaquin Villalobos, argued that the fall of the Eastern Bloc, the crisis of Marxist–Leninism, and El Salvador’s political opening called for a renewal of the left away from extremism. The ERP and the RN criticized the PCS, PRTC, and FPL for not recognizing that “the country changed and had initiated a Democratic Revolution” (Cienfuegos 1993: 18). These organizations were more open to collaborating with non-revolutionary political actors, even the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), in order to resolve the country’s social, political, and economic challenges. The other historical organizations were not interested in working with ARENA, regardless of the outcome (Chávez 1993: 44). While recognizing that the country had indeed changed, they believed that the FMLN first had to prevent the reestablishment of a dictatorship under civilian guise (Guevara 1993: 74). Faced with the pronouncement by the ERP and RN, the PCS, PRTC and FPL reaffirmed their identities as Marxist revolutionary organizations intent on constructing socialism. Several ERP militants also criticized the authoritarian way in which its leadership “decreed” the party’s ideology as social democratic. This sector of the militancy had proposed democratizing the decision-making process as a prelude to discussing changes to its ideology. This unilateral decision led to a strong internal disagreement and to the abandonment of a portion of the base and, later, to the collapse of the ERP (Luers 1998). Many FMLN leaders and militants had a difficult time reconciling their “anti-system” past and their new position as part of that system (Bejár 1996). Former PCS militant Dagoberto Gutiérrez (2009) reflected that “During the war the FMLN was always within

society and outside the system; after the war the FMLN was out of society and into the system. The FMLN party was born after the war, and this was a different thing. It was already an instrument of the state, part of the democratic game, the game that is called democracy as understood in a bourgeois way... The FMLN was no longer a revolutionary party when it came into the system.” The party’s organization and the ERP and RN’s declaration to pursue social democracy would eventually lead to the fragmentation of the historic FMLN. Between 1993 and 1994, the ERP and the RN increasingly came to believe that the decisionmaking process would always disadvantage their minority views. The FMLN voted to reform its party structures, removing the General Command and elevating the Political Commission to the primary decision-making body. The commission needed ten of the fifteen members to agree to the election of a coordinator. Given that the ERP and RN controlled six votes, they could block decisions supported by the majority, such as when the commission was unable to satisfy a two-thirds requirement for selecting the party’s coordinator position (Luciak 2001: 97). In 1994, however, the FMLN reformed the coordinator selection process and the decision-making process more generally so that it only required a three-fifths vote (nine out of fifteen). This rule change greatly disadvantaged the ERP and RN. Following the adoption of the more easily attainable 60% threshold, the FPL-FAL-PRTC could make decisions without the ERP or the RN. A key issue where the ERP-RN stance was defeated involved the selection of the 1994 presidential candidate. The ERP-RN argued that the FMLN should establish an alliance with the PDC and choose someone such as the social-democratic Abraham Rodriguez. They thought that a center-right, reformist candidate, would be the best option for

continuing the country’s transformation (Martínez 2004). The FMLN should have established an alliance with moderates in the business and political communities opposed to ARENA’s policies yet fearful of the FMLN. Similar arguments would be made over the next fifteen years. The FAL, FPL and PRTC preferred Rubén Zamora of the Democratic Convergence (CD), an individual with whom the FMLN had had good relations during the war. In the end, the ERP and RN were outvoted three-to-two. It was at this point that the ERP and RN realized that the FMLN had lost the election and that there was little room for debate and consensus within the FMLN (Martínez 2004). As long as the majority ruled and the FAL, FPL, and PRTC were steadfast in their alliance, the ERP and RN could not win any major party decision. Following Zamora’s selection, some believe that the ERP and RN failed to fully support him, hindering its electoral performance (Luciak 2001: 100). [INSERT TABLES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE] Neither the FMLN-CD-MNR candidate nor the ARENA candidate, Armando Calderón Sol, surpassed the 50 percent required for a first round victory. Zamora captured 32 percent of the vote in losing to Calderón Sol in a runoff. The FMLN also captured 21% of the national vote and 21 of the Assembly’s 84 seats while ARENA won 39 seats. While the FMLN became the country’s second-largest political party, the results did not meet its expectations and helped deepen its internal crisis. In May, an episode occurred that illustrated the sharp differences among the various groups when ERP and RN legislators, including Villalobos, Sancho, and Ana Guadalupe Martínez, argued that the party should integrate into the Legislative Assembly’s Board of Directors. The other deputies disagreed and said that first it was necessary to amend the Rules of the

Assembly. Following this confrontation, seven deputies aligned with the ERP and RN broke party discipline and accepted two positions on the Board in return for supporting ARENA’s controversial budget and assembly president selection. This deal was a direct rejection of the FMLN’s decision not to integrate into the Board before procedural changes were agreed upon and an example of disintegration within the FMLN. Whereas the FMLN remained a single political party, its component organizations were no longer working towards a common end. Three months later and in the context of the party’s extraordinary convention, the ERP and the RN undertook to redefine the FMLN as social democratic and to dissolve the five groups, a proposal that was not accepted by the rest of the organization (Martín 2006: 118). For these two groups, the peace agreements represented a point of arrival and formed the backbone of the changes that El Salvador needed. The way forward was one of deepening political moderation; in essence, to act within the limits of the political regime and market economy. On the contrary, an important sector of the other organizations argued that the Peace Agreements were merely a first step that opened the way to seizing political power by peaceful means and moving towards ways of political and economic organizing that would transcend representative democracy and capitalism. Differences between the two factions continued that year as the ERP/RN deputies negotiated with ARENA and the National Conciliation Party (PCN) on legislative matters and criticized some of the FMLN’s more confrontational actions (Béjar 1996: 68). The division was caused by differences over the FMLN’s program, political strategy, and vision for the future direction of the country, many of the same issues that had been involved in the earlier selection of the left’s presidential candidate (Martínez 2004). The

ERP-RN deputies were suspended by the FMLN leadership. Since it was impossible that their ideas could be imposed within the FMLN, the ERP and RN left in December 1994.10 The structural integrity of the FMLN had collapsed and in March 1995 the ERP, RN, and the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) formed the Democratic Party (PD). The abandonment of the leadership and activists of both organizations, along with a third of the FMLN’s legislative representation and 14 mayors, was a major blow to the new political party. In this context, the FMLN held its II Regular Convention with its main objective of rebuilding the organization after these crises. Sánchez Cerén was nominated General Secretary and the leadership initiated the process of unifying the FMLN into a single revolutionary party, a task for which it appointed a "Unification Commission" (Envío 1995). The delegates amended the statutes to define the FMLN as a "party of tendencies” that militants could join voluntarily and that would exist on an equal basis. The new structure was more flexible because it offered the possibility of incorporating new members directly into the FMLN. Previously new members could only join through one of the five organizations. The arrangement was also designed to build a single party despite the lack of ideological homogeneity of the groups that comprised it. The PRTC (June), the PCS (August), and the FPL (December) dissolved themselves the following year. Initially, each organization’s leadership and militancy was supposed to integrate into its own tendency. However, regulations drafted by the National Council in July to regulate the tendencies prohibited the construction of organizational structures along those lines (FMLN 1995). Regardless, the FMLN’s members maintained informal channels of organization and leadership that co-existed alongside the formal structures. They discussed policy proposals and strategy and even held their own local

meetings. These tendencies became highly stable fractions with an ability to mobilize militants during subsequent party conventions. In the 1997 elections, the FMLN captured 27 legislative seats, which translated into roughly one-third of all assembly seats, and retained its status as the second-largest legislative bloc. After attempting to occupy that political center, the ERP-RN dominated PD only succeeded in electing one deputy and lost standing as a political party under the country’s electoral rules.11 Its alliance with the governing party, individuals whom the FMLN had just spent 12-years attempting to overthrow, alienated many traditional FMLN supporters and contributed to its electoral failure (Peñate 2004). The division was very public, involved the airing of dirty secrets from the war, and involved claims and counterclaims of treason and cooperation with the CIA. While this public fighting was quite messy and embarrassing, the electoral impact on the FMLN appears to have been quite negligible. The PD captured less than one percent of the vote and the FMLN became the second largest legislative party, increasing its seat total from 21 to 27 and its mayors from 15 to 35. The FMLN also captured the capital for what would be the first of three consecutive victories. The fragmentation that occurred with the departure of seven deputies and the dissolution of its historic groups did not make the organization any more cohesive. When the ERP and the RN left the party, the remaining groups reacted publicly as a cohesive organization even though important differences remained. However, a new realignment began in late 1995 after the remaining organizations dissolved and mechanisms for selecting party officials changed. Thus began a new battle for the loyalties of the remaining militants. At the height of 1997 it was obvious that there was a strong polarization between two major tendencies. Some differences were similar to those that

had earlier divided the ERP and RN from the FPL, FAL, and PRTC. One tendency known publicly as "orthodox" or "revolutionary socialist" was led by Schafik Handal (PCS) and Sánchez Cerén (FPL). Not surprisingly, the orthodox tendency was comprised of a significant number of former PCS and, to a lesser extent, FPL leaders. They struggled to retain the FMLN as a revolutionary socialist party identified with MarxismLeninism. Guardado, a former member of the FPL Political Commission, and Raul Mijango, a former ERP commander, were at the forefront of the “renovating” trend.12 Among the renovators were former leaders and mid-level cadres of the PRTC, the RN, and the FPL, several of them municipal and departmental elected officials. They favored establishing alliances within the business community and shifting towards something resembling European social democracy, reforms the earlier ERP-RN dissidents had sought as well. Each tendency’s leaders were visibly charismatic and had become renowned figures because of their experiences as commanders and even founders of the guerrillas. The persistence of military leaders in the main positions of power has been constant since the FMLN’s founding as a political party. Their charisma has given them considerable autonomy from the membership, allowing them to control the party’s main structures and decision-making processes. It is precisely this independence, together with greater ideological homogeneity, which allowed the party to conclude a series of partnerships and achieve victory in 2009. These ideological and strategic differences resulted in a prolonged dispute over what Panebianco (1995) calls organizational power resources. From the new party’s creation up to 2005, the internal factions would fight for control over the highest levels of power inside the party: the Political Committee, the National Convention, the National

Council, and the specialized committees. Therefore, as discussed below, departmental and national conventions that would designate candidates for elected office became the arena of struggle between reformers and orthodox. The control of Conventions also ensured control of the National Council which was responsible for the selection of the Political Committee (up to 2001) and the General Coordinator. The Political Committee, in turn, was in charge of electoral alliances and designating officers for important technical commissions, including Organization (in charge of selecting new militants), Administration and Finances, and the Court of Honor (used to expel dissidents). The open confrontation between the orthodox and renovating tendencies began after Guardado became General Coordinator at the IV Regular Convention in 1996. The orthodox tendency soon began to perceive a conservative and “pro–neoliberal” drift in Guardado and initiated a campaign to regain control of the party (Villacorta 1998: 1151). Control of the base and departmental directorates, the main organs of the party locally and regionally, became a primary battleground. The capture of local directorates would allow either tendency to control the National Convention and from there the other important positions inside the party. The dispute even reached the positions corresponding to the FMLN on the Legislature’s Board of Directors, where the different groups within the party negotiated the sharing of the positions (La Prensa Gráfica 2000). It is no surprise, then, that this struggle for control also extended to the selection of candidates. In preparing for the March 1999 elections, the militants were equally divided between the two major tendencies. Originally, the FMLN considered several presidential candidates unaffiliated with the organization’s revolutionary past. The renovating tendency endorsed Hector Silva (the popular center-left mayor of San Salvador) while the

orthodox tendency supported Salvador Arias (an economist and agrarian adviser to the FMLN) and Victoria Marina de Avilés (the former human rights ombudswomen). When two nominating conventions failed to settle on a presidential and vice-presidential ticket, a third convention was needed where the party agreed on Guardado and Nidia Díaz, a member of the PRTC Political Commission during the war. While Guardado believed that he was an ideal candidate (Luciak 2001: 115), many insiders and outsiders found the final ticket unsatisfactory. The FMLN passed up three well respected candidates whose selection would have made it more attractive to those other than its historic followers. Instead, the FMLN selected two commanders concerned with expanding the party’s support beyond its historic base even though their candidacies were unlikely to accomplish that goal. The FMLN continued to present itself as a divided party, unable to manage its internal differences, and untrustworthy of the presidency. After the tainted primary process, Guardado captured less than 30% of the vote and lost to ARENA’s Francisco Flores. The image projected by the party at that time was that its leaders were more interested in discussing internal assessments of power than in proposing a program to govern El Salvador. Guardado accepted responsibility for the poor performance and resigned as coordinator. However, he also blamed his poor performance on the orthodox wing’s lack of support once its preferred candidate had lost the nomination (Wade 2008). In many ways, this was a repeat of 1994 when those that had lost the debate concerning that year’s presidential candidate were criticized for not supporting the official candidate enthusiastically enough. However in neither case would more “effort” have changed the election’s outcome.

In July 1999, the confrontation was repeated - albeit with a lower degree of verbal sparring - in the X Special Convention held to elect the party leadership and candidates for the 2000 legislative and municipal elections. The convention confirmed the equal strength of the two main tendencies, but it also indicated the revolutionary socialist group’s superior control over the organization’s management bodies. Former PRTC Fabio Castillo leader now aligned with this trend was elected General Coordinator. Ileana Rogel and Raul Mijango, both representing the renovating group, were elected Assistant Coordinators.13 The National Council and the Political Commission were integrated by a majority of orthodox-affiliated representatives (La Prensa Gráfica 1999). This moment marked the beginning of greater coherence and ideological homogeneity within the party and the progressive marginalization and eventual disintegration of the renovating group. During the XIII Regular Convention in December 2000, a statutory reform was approved by decree that prohibited the existence of internal tendencies and insisted on the revolutionary socialist character of the party. The decree can be interpreted as an attempt to silence the renovating tendency, now a distinct minority within the organization. The convention also adopted a mechanism for choosing the party’s leaders and candidates for elected office (Puyana 2008: 214). The mechanism was used extensively between 2001 and 2004 and became a powerful source of confrontation. Despite these divisions, the FMLN's electoral performance improved in legislative and municipal elections that year. For the third consecutive legislative election, the FMLN increased both its vote and seat share in winning a plurality of seats with thirty-one. The FMLN was followed closely by ARENA, which captured twenty-nine seats. ARENA had occupied the presidency and possessed the largest number of deputies in the Assembly since 1989.

The FMLN again appeared to be moving towards greater cohesion when the orthodox and renovating tendencies were officially abandoned. However, significant internal policy differences between the orthodox and the renovating tendencies resurfaced in 2001. In May the renovating group headed by Guardado and Francisco Jovel decided not to attend the scheduled special convention to protest the National Council’s decision to extend its mandate and that of the Political Commission for six months instead of going ahead with September’s internal elections. The reformers had hoped to take control of the organization in those elections. They instead organized a convention parallel to the official one in order to choose their candidates for internal party elections (Artiga 2006: 59). In October, the orthodox-controlled Court of Honor expelled Guardado from the FMLN. The official reason was that he had made a trip to Spain without permission of the party and "other issues." A few days later and within this escalating dynamic of factional struggle, renovating deputies voted in favor of a free trade agreement with Chile, defying party discipline and the leadership that opposed the treaty. The November 2001 party leadership elections marked the end of this stage of ideological heterogeneity in which the FMLN had passed since its founding. Once again, the elections were not largely about individual candidates, but as part of a struggle between tendencies, now called "internal currents" (the name adopted after statutory reforms prohibited the formation of tendencies). The orthodox group regained control of the General Coordinator position with the selection of Sánchez Cerén, half the departmental directorates, and several of the country’s most important municipalities. During December’s XV Regular Convention, the renovating current accused the revolutionary socialists of having committed fraud in the primaries. At the same time, the

renovators broke party discipline on the 2002 General Budget vote (Artiga 2001: 1149). These events clearly reflected the extent to which the internal situation had deteriorated and six renovating members, including Jovel, were expelled from the FMLN. Guardado and other former FMLN formed the Renovating Movement (MR) in April 2002, a party characterized as the “democratic left, social-democratic and heir to the traditions of the popular organizations of the last thirty years.” Though the MR was comprised of several key historical FMLN figures and had aligned with the PDC and the Social Democratic Party (PSD), it attained less than 2% of the national vote in 2003. Like the PD, the MR failed to surpass the 3% threshold required by Salvadoran electoral laws and ceased to exist. The FMLN went on to capture thirty-one seats with 34% of the national vote and remained the largest legislative bloc. The FMLN appeared to be in a strong position from which to launch a competitive candidate for the 2004 presidential election. It possessed the greatest number of legislative seats and voters appeared to want an alternative to the incumbent ARENA party according to opinion polls. However, internal divisions again led to the selection of a suboptimal candidate. A new reformist faction within the FMLN led by a popular Santa Tecla mayor, Oscar Ortíz, pushed for many of the same internal reforms and external alliances as had the renovators and the ERP/RN. However, at July’s XVII Regular Convention, the orthodox Schafik Handal defeated Ortiz to become the FMLN’s presidential candidate. While the dominance of the orthodox current made Handal’s candidacy a foregone conclusion, his candidacy was not well received outside the party. Similar to 1999’s selection of Guardado, the FMLN was criticized for selecting a candidate directly tied to its revolutionary past and not a candidate with widespread popular support. Whereas

ARENA successfully modernized its image with young presidential candidates having no connections to the war or to right-wing deaths squads of the 1980s, the FMLN failed to modernize its image and to promote new leadership, thus leaving itself open to these sorts of attacks (Peñate 2004). The FMLN leadership did not place much faith in polling data and instead chose the candidate with the highest unfavorables. Handal captured a disappointing 36% of the vote in losing to ARENA’s Elías Antonio Saca. Handal’s defeat initially improved the reformists’ position. However, the orthodox wing regained control over the party apparatus with a convincing win in November 2004 when Medardo Gonzalez was elected General Coordinator.14 The new Political Commission was composed mostly of former commanders or mid-level PCS and FPL militants (15 of 23 members), nearly all members of the revolutionary socialist group. In total, almost 75% of the national party elite came from the former leadership of the guerrillas, evidence of minimal leadership renewal. While it is true that over the years the governing bodies have opened to militants who had ascended to no higher than midlevel ranks in the guerrillas, the leaderships’ legitimacy still comes largely from participation in the war, which is consistent with the party’s renewed commitment to revolutionary principles on the basis of past struggle against the state. The revolutionary socialist current promoted a new modification of statutes aimed at eliminating internal elections altogether which the reformers perceived as an attempt to monopolize decision-making in the organization (Puyana 2008: 214). Both sides clashed in the April 2005 XX Regular Convention where the reform proposal managed to move forward. The reform resulted in a primary system that ratified candidates and party officials that had been nominated by the leadership. Before this next step could be

implemented, however, a group of seven deputies and various mayors from the renovating current of the party, as well as 350 militants, left the FMLN in June. Among them one finds several historic leaders such as Ileana Rogel, Julio Martínez, Celina de Monterrosa and Nejapa mayor Rene Canjura. Shortly thereafter they founded the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR) (El País 2005, Wade 2008: 44). Although the FMLN’s representation was reduced to 24 seats for the remainder of the legislative period, these events marked the final triumph of revolutionary socialist group. From this point forward, the reformers failed to be a broad-based force within the party and were instead limited to small regional fiefdoms - the best known case being Oscar Ortiz. Some dispersion in the control of organizational resources existed between 1992 and 2005 which helps to explain the lack of cohesion in the ruling coalition and the existence of factions (Panebianco 1995). However, the revolutionary socialists had now succeeded in controlling the organization’s resources. Domingo Santacruz, an old PCS leader, maintained the Presidency of the Court of Honor. Zoila Quijada, a former mid– level PCS militant, headed the National Organization Commission and was backed by former PCS leader José Luis Merino. Former PCS militant Roberto Lorenzana has been the Secretary of Communications since 2010. The General Coordinator position has been occupied by the orthodox former–FPL Medardo Gonzalez since 2004. Finally, the orthodox wing has had the majority on the Political Committee and the National Council. The consolidation of the orthodox current over organizational resources resulted in greater ideological coherence and the reaffirmation of the party’s revolutionary principles.15 In a 2004 doctrinal document drafted by order of the National Council, the FMLN established its strategy to create a socialist state by first taking over the

government and deepening democracy (FMLN 2004). To attain power, they raised the possibility of concluding a series of short-term political alliances with non-revolutionary sectors. In fact, Handal had already entered into electoral alliances with former colleagues such as ERP commander Jorge Meléndez of the Social Democratic Movement and RN commander Roberto Cañas of Fatherland for All. According to José Luis Merino, "The road to socialism passes through the democratization of the country, in that sense all the democratic forces are our potential allies...We have a strategic objective that might take ten, 20 or 30 years, because until one arrives at conscience: one arrives at socialism. To get there you have to consolidate democracy” (El Faro 2005).16 The strategy is similar to that taken by the PCS in the seventies: the seizure of power through elections in alliance with other non-revolutionary political forces and, from there, the transformation of the country’s political and economic system. Obviously there are qualitative differences as to the meaning of the concept of socialism proposed by the FMLN today, a concept that maintains similarities with the model driven by Venezuela’s Chavez (El Faro 2005). It is a socialism that reduces and subordinates private property to social interests and deepens and radicalizes representative democracy via "popular control" (FMLN 2004). With the orthodox wing in control, the party has also re-emphasized the need to return to a Leninist organizational model that stresses the quality of the militants and their ideological formation rather than their sheer numbers (Acevedo 2006). In the 2006 legislative and municipal elections, both the FDR and the FMLN sought to represent the revolutionary left. Unlike the PD and MR before them, the FDR did not attempt to claim the center or center-left between the FMLN and ARENA. However, the FDR suffered the same fate as the PD and MR, failing to capture a single

legislative seat. The only position it won was mayor of Nejapa. The FMLN, on the other hand, successfully overcame the loss of several deputies in the previous assembly and actually increased its seat total to thirty-two with nearly 40% of the vote. However, it saw its control of the country’s municipalities decline by fifteen. While the 2006 elections were not entirely positive, the party’s improved ideological cohesion and programmatic coherence paid dividends in 2009 when the FMLN realized an alliance with nonrevolutionary sectors in support of journalist Mauricio Funes. Funes had shown interest in being the party’s presidential candidate in 2004, but Handal’s presence and the determination of a core group that he be their candidate, prevented any serious consideration. However, with Handal’s sudden death while returning from Evo Morales’ inauguration in Bolivia in 2006 and a party apparatus now firmly under the control of the revolutionary socialist wing, there was no risk in pursuing an alliance with a popular social democratic candidate. After having purged the renovators, the politically inexperienced Funes would not be able to ally with other moderates within the party to outmaneuver the revolutionary socialists. An alliance of this nature with a non-revolutionary at the head of the ticket could not have been concluded until the internal conflict within the party was resolved. Funes had been gathering support outside the FMLN to boost his candidacy as early as late 2007. Critical support came from a small group of entrepreneurs of smalland medium-sized businesses, former state officials and professionals, a group later known as the “Friends of Mauricio.” The widely held perception among this group that ARENA governance meant corruption and benefits for a privileged few, would lead them to opt for change. According to Gerardo Cáceres, “We are people who are not happy with

how ARENA has managed public affairs, especially in the last period…we expect a change where there are clear rules, where there are no privileges” (2008). The Friends of Mauricio’s most well-known figures are the Cáceres family (Gerardo, Francisco and Carlos), businessman Miguel Menéndez, former PCN leader Luis Lagos, General David Munguía Payés and economist Alex Segovia. These businessmen had been excluded from the circle of businessmen favored by prior ARENA governments. ARENA privileged the financial sector, which in turn had ramifications in the export of coffee, the development of hotels and malls, and the production of beer, cement, and fertilizers. Certain businessmen from these industries enjoyed a virtual monopoly over complete areas of the economy through the protection and privileges granted by state officials (ECA 2005). The influence of these large employers on economic policy making was so extensive that some began speak of “state capture” (IUDOP 2005). The movement’s middle management served as political operators at the local level and was essentially comprised of professionals without access to positions in the government bureaucracy (El Faro 2010). The FMLN’s contact with Funes was facilitated by media entrepreneur and former FPL militant Franzi "Hato" Hasbún. The presidential ticket was announced with Sánchez Cerén as vice presidential candidate at the XXIII Regular Convention held at the Cuscatlán Stadium on September 11, 2007, nearly eighteen months before the election. The Friends of Mauricio established its own ad hoc electoral propaganda machine and civic movement, attaining a presence in more than half of the municipalities and raising substantial campaign funds (Cáceres 2008). They carried out an extensive lobbying campaign to assure Salvadoran businessmen that Funes would not make drastic changes in the field of economic policy

and to "center" a candidate supported by a leftist party whose avowed objective remains the achievement of socialism. This credibility was important given that Sánchez Cerén of the orthodox wing was his running mate. Funes’ selection helped the FMLN to attract greater support from centrist voters than had previous FMLN presidential candidates (Azpuru 2010). In interviews with several Friends of Mauricio, although not asked directly, none gave the impression that they would have supported a moderate FMLN candidate in 2004 or a candidate other than Funes in 2009. This FMLN-Friends of Mauricio alliance defeated Rodrigo Ávila of ARENA in March. The FMLN polled nearly 70,000 votes more than ARENA and won an absolute first round majority (51.3% versus 48.7%). These totals were somewhat surprising given that in the January municipal elections ARENA won 26 municipalities more than the FMLN (122 versus 96 when including those the FMLN won in coalition). The FMLN, however, did win 35 legislative seats compared to ARENA’s 32. The FDR again failed to capture any seats and won only one municipality in an alliance with the CD. The FMLN’s improved performance from January’s municipal and legislative elections was due in great part to Mauricio Funes. After nearly forty years of struggle, the FMLN had finally captured the presidency. While the FMLN is now an ideologically coherent party, its main challenge is to govern in collaboration with Funes, a figure independent from and more moderate than the FMLN on such key issues as foreign affairs and the economic policy. The FMLN seeks to withdraw from the Dominican Republic - Central American Free Trade Agreement with the United States (DR-CAFTA) and join the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA). Funes has refused to do so and instead strengthened relations with the US. Foreign policy disagreements also emerged in response to the Honduran coup.

President Funes supported President Obama and Honduran President Porfirio Lobo’s efforts to reintegrate the country into the international community without restoring Manuel Zelaya to power, something that the FMLN considered unacceptable. Funes was rewarded with a state visit from Obama in March 2011. On the domestic front, Funes opposed reforms to the Law of the Census (RNPN) that had been adopted by the FMLN with the support of ARENA dissidents in the Grand Alliance for Unity (GANA). But perhaps the measure which has furthest strained relations between the party and Funes is his decision to revitalize the civic movement that supported his candidacy. For the FMLN, the Citizens Movement for Change (MCC) is Funes’ effort to build his own political platform and to challenge them electorally despite his statements that the movement is simply tasked with supporting his policies and monitoring his promises. The FMLN elected its 57-member National Council and 19-member Political Committee at the October 2010 XXVI regular convention that will carry the party through the 2012, 2014, and 2015 election cycle. They reaffirmed Medardo Gonzalez as general coordinator and chose former San Salvador mayor and deputy minister of health Violeta Menjívar assistant coordinator. At the Convention, Jose Luis Merino emphasized the need to maintain the unity of the people and the party so that they have the energy and force to continue with the country’s transformation and to prevent the right from regaining power (Inside Costa Rica 2010). Merino also stated that Funes was chosen simply to alleviate fears of an FMLN victory and now that that fear has been overcome, the party will push an FMLN militant to bring about socialismo cuscatleco. Funes and FMLN disagreements have become more intense with the recent move by Funes and several rightwing parties to weaken the Constitutional Court. These

differences are likely to only become more intense as the country prepares for the 2012 and 2014 election, an election in which Funes is constitutionally barred from competing.

CONCLUSION During the 1970s, the five political-military groups differed significantly in terms of their membership, preferred strategies and tactics, analysis of country conditions, and plans for how society would be organized once they had attained power. In the 1980s, wartime unity was driven in part by its perceived necessity in toppling the military and then civilian regime. From this perspective, the FMLN was encouraged by the successful example of the FSLN, the extreme violence of the Salvadoran military and ARENAdirected death squads, and Cuban pressure. Even though significant differences existed among the five, the main conflicts at that time were motivated for control of each political-military organization, the FPL for example, rather than the FMLN as a whole. These conflicts were intense because each organization controlled its own finances, logistics, recruitment, and so on. The structural integrity and cohesion that the FMLN had achieved came under stress immediately upon the war’s conclusion and its transition to political party. In terms of cohesiveness, several ERP and RN leaders wanted to adopt a political and economic ideology more consistent with social democracy while the FPL, FAL, and PRTC’s leaders sought to maintain the party’s revolutionary socialist orientation. The ideological and strategic differences within the FMLN sparked an intense battle for control of the organization’s power resources. While the official names of the factions changed over time, victories by the more revolutionary socialist groups to

control the party’s organizational power resources led to repeated fracturing of the FMLN and to the creation of electoral alternatives with roots in the revolutionary years. The process by which the revolutionary socialist group captured power resources gradually passed through the local and departmental directives before occupying the highest positions in the decision–making bodies of the party. The successful monopolization of power resources in 2005 led to the end of factionalism and the creation of a coherent party from the programmatic point of view. In the end, the FMLN had become more coherent not by undergoing a process of ideological moderation but by becoming more strongly socialist. Furthermore and contrary to recent findings on party adaptation and electoral success suggest, the FMLN managed to successfully transition from a group of armed Marxist–Leninist organizations without a significant renewal of the leadership and by maintaining its original ideology virtually intact. The dominant revolutionary socialist coalition imposed a greater centralization in the decision-making process, acquiring considerable autonomy from the membership, especially regarding the designation of candidates through the amendment of the party statutes in 2005. After the renovating group no longer posed a threat to the stability of the ruling coalition, the remaining leadership was now in a position to conclude an alliance with an outsider who did not subscribe to the FMLN’s socialist project. Their control over the FMLN was assured, however, because Mauricio Funes was not a member of the party and therefore lacked an organized base within it. At the same time, the temporary alliance with non–revolutionary sectors in a government of transition as a first step towards a government fully controlled by the party was consistent with an old idea grounded in the strategy of the orthodox leaders.

For nearly fifteen years, critics both inside and outside the FMLN questioned the party’s commitment to democracy and its ability to work with other parties and organized groups. They claimed that the FMLN could not win the presidency so as long as it remained internally divided, pursued a radical socialist platform and selected presidential candidates tied to its revolutionary past. The repeated fragmentation of the FMLN during its first decade as a political party likely worsened its municipal and legislative performance but had little effect on the outcomes of the 1999 and 2004 presidential elections. In 2009, the FMLN did not promote a former commander as its presidential candidate but its vice presidential candidate was a former FPL commander and leader of the revolutionary socialist group. Funes and Sanchez Cerén brought together the FMLN “hard vote” and hundreds of thousands of voters attracted by Funes’ image of moderation and honesty which gave the victory to the left. However, even with a cohesive FMLN competing in a two party race with the broadly popular Funes and a deteriorating economic and security situation, the FMLN still won by only 2.5% of the national vote.

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Table 1 An Overview of the Five Political-Military Organizations ORGANIZATION Popular Forces of Liberation – Farabundo Martí (FPL)

YEAR STRATEGY 1970 Prolonged popular war

LEADERSHIP** Salvador Cayetano Carpio†, Felipe Peña Mendoza†, Melida Anaya Montes†, Napoleón Romero†, Salvador Guerra, Dimas Rodríguez†, Salvador Sánchez Cerén, Jesus Rojas†, Fernando Ascoli, Facundo Guardado, Gerson Martínez, Medardo Gonzalez, Eduardo Linares People’s 1972* Insurrectionary Edgar Alejandro Rivas Mira†, Lil Revolutionary Strong emphasis Milagro Ramírez†, Vladimir Rogel†, Army (ERP) on the military Jorge Meléndez, Rafael Arce development of Zablah†, Joaquín Villalobos, Ana the organization Guadalupe Martínez, Ana Sonia Medina, Sonia Aguiñada Carranza, Juan Ramón Medrano, Claudio Armijo, Mercedes Letona National Resistance 1975 Revolutionary Ernesto Jovel†, Eduardo Sancho, Lil (RN) war Milagro Ramírez†, Roberto Cañas, Insurrectionary Chano Guevara Eugenio Chicas, José Luis Quan, Carlos Eduardo Rico Mira, Eduardo Solórzano, Raúl Hércules, Salvador Renderos† Revolutionary Party 1976 Central Francisco Jovel, Nidia Díaz, Manuel of the Workers of Americanism Melgar, Francisco Velis, Camilo Central America Insurrectionary Turcios†, Mario López, Luis Díaz†, (PRTC) Humberto Mendoza†, Fabio Castillo, Luis Corvera, Margarita Alfaro† Armed Forces of 1980 Electoral Schafik Handal, Miguel Saenz Liberation (FAL) competition Varela, Dagoberto Gutiérrez, Insurrectionary Domingo Santacruz, Américo Araujo, Norma Guevara, José Luis Merino, Dagoberto Sosa, Raúl Alexander Granillo, Mario Aguiñada Carranza *Began to be structured in 1970 but made its public appearance in March 1972 ** Stable members of the political commission or equivalent body †Deceased or expelled before or during the war.

Political Party ARENA FMLN PCN PDC CDU CDU-PDC MAC MU MSN LIDER PUNTO

Table 2 Presidential Elections (1994-2009) 1994 1999 2004 First Round Second First Round First Round Round 49.11% 68.35% 51.96% 57.71% 24.99%* 31.65% 29.05%** 35.68% 5.34% 3.82% 2.71% 16.27% 5.68% 7.5% 3.9% 0.82% 2.41% 1.05% 1.63% 0.36%

2009 First Round 48.68% 51.32%

* In 1994, the FMLN presented supported a coalition candidate along with the CD and MNR. ** In 1999, the FMLN presented a joint candidate with the small Social Christian Union (USC).

Table 3 Legislative Elections (1994-2009) 1997 2000 2003 Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes 33% 27 35% 31 34% 35% 28 36% 29 32% 8% 10 7% 6 7% 9% 11 9% 13 13% 3.5% 2 5% 3 6% 2% 1 1% 1 3% 2 1% 4% 3 2% 2

Political 1994 Party Votes Seats FMLN 21% 21 ARENA 45% 39 PDC 18% 18 PCN 6% 4 CD/CDU 4.5% 1 MU 2.5% 1 PD PLD PRSC PAN PSD MR FDR Other 3% 1.5% 5% Valid 1,345,277 84 1,119,603 84 1,210,313 Votes *The PSD-PDC-MR won one seat in coalition in 2003.

Seats 31 27 4 16 5

2006 Votes 40% 39% 7% 11% 3%

Seats 32 34 6 10 2

2009 Votes 43% 39% 7% 9% 2%

Seats 35 32 5 11 1

1* 2% 1% 84

6% 1,005,285

84

1,573,779

84

2,215,589

84

Notes 1

Some Christian Democratic youth activists had also connected with Jesuit priests and

Christian base communities of central and northern El Salvador beginning as early as the late 1960s. The first base community was established in Suchitoto in late 1969 and contact between the priests and the FPL and ERP militants go back to 1972 or 1973. 2

The PCS lost much of its influence in the university and, later, the unions after the

creation of the FPL and the ERP, and later of the RN. 3

The source of this information is a telegram sent by US Ambassador to El Salvador

Dean Hinton to the Department of State discussing his conversation with Chávez Mena. 4

A declassified CIA cable confirms that the guerrilla commanders were holding meetings

in Havana during summer 1982 where they were discussing strategies to continue the fight. Nevertheless, US intelligence did not know the exact content of the conversations (CIA 1982). 5

Francisco Jovel, commander in chief of the PRTC and eyewitness to the fact, says that

Fidel Castro convinced Salvador Cayetano Carpio of the critical importance of negotiations with the government to the FMLN’s strategy. 6

Ricardo de la Espriella, the president of Panama, acted as intermediary.

7

Lorena Peña, states that after the gathering, Carpio handed a document to the Central

Committee members accusing Anaya of treason, of having become “bourgeois” and of being separated from the interest of the masses. 8

The FPL Political Commission blamed Carpio for the assassination. Carpio committed

suicide when confronted by the accusation. An investigation carried out by a judge in Managua concluded that Rogelio Bazzaglia was the intellectual author responsible for the

crime and had acted on his own initiative because he disagreed with the political line imposed by the FPL. Bazzaglia was Anaya’s chief of security (Morales Carbonell 2008). 9

The differences were with the FDR. For example, in 1982 Ungo spoke in Washington

about the FMLN-FDR not interfering in the March 1982 electoral process. However, at the same time, the FMLN was threatening peasant associations linked to the PDC in order to prevent their participation in the elections. 10

Other ERP / RN leaders and base remained in the FMLN and, as in the case of Eugenio

Chicas, on the Political Commission. Organically, from 1994–2000, a tendency known as the Tendencia Democrática” remained in the party. 11

The PD subsequently merged with the CD, the Popular Labor Party (PPL), the

Movement of Christian Democratic Unification (MUDC), and the Faith and Hope (FE) Party to form the United Democratic Center (CDU) in 1998. 12

Both were members of the FMLN Political Commission in 1997. Francisco Jovel,

former General Secretary of the PRTC was also a member of the renovating tendency. 13

At this time, Gerson Martínez, a former member of the FPL Political Commission,

headed a third minority tendency known as the “institutionalist tendency.” 14

Former member of the FPL Political Commission and currently a leader of the

revolutionary socialist tendency. 15

Control over the party apparatus by the ex-leaders of the PCS has as its symbolic

victory Handal’s elevation to iconic revolutionary alongside Farabundo Martí. 16

Better known by his nom de guerre “Ramiro Vásquez”; he was the principal military

leader of the PCS during the 1980s, as well as one of the architects of creating the FAL.