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America's Sticky Power Author(s): Walter Russell Mead Source: Foreign Policy, No. 141 (Mar. - Apr., 2004), pp. 46-53 Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4147548 Accessed: 09/09/2010 19:53 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=wpni. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

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rica'S

STICKY U.S. militagy force and culturalappealhavekeptthe UnitedStatesat thetop

of theglobalorder.But thehegemoncannotliveonguns andHollywood alone. U.S. economicpoliciesand institutionsact as "stic~y power,"attractingothercountriesto the U.S. systemand thentrappingthemin it. Sticky powercan helpstabilizeIraq,bringruleof law to Russia,andpreventarmed conflictbetweenthe UnitedStatesandChina. By Walter Russell Mead havealwaysthoughtthattheirreligious inceitsearliest theUnited States has andAmericans years, behaved as a global power. Not always capable of dispatching great fleets and mightyarmiesto everycornerof the planet, theUnitedStateshasnonethelessinvariably keptone eye on the evolutionof the globalsystem,andthe U.S. militaryhas long servedinternationally.The United Stateshas not always boastedthe world'slargestor most influentialeconomy,but the countryhas always regardedtradein globalterms,generallynudgingthe world toward economicintegration.U.S. ideological impulseshavealso beenglobal.Thepoet RalphWaldo Emersonwrote of the firstshot firedin the American Revolution as "the shot heard 'round the world," Walter Russell Mead is the Henry A. Kissingersenior fellow in U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. This essay is adapted from his forthcoming book, Power, Terror,Peace, and War:America'sGrand Strategyin a World at Risk (New York:Knopf, 2004). 46

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and politicalvaluesshouldprevailaroundthe globe. Historically,securitythreatsand trade interests compelledAmericansto think globally.The British sailedacrossthe Atlanticto burnWashington,D.C.; the Japanese flew from carriers in the Pacific to

bombPearlHarbor.TradewithAsiaandEurope,as well as within the WesternHemisphere,has always

beenvitalto U.S.prosperity. U.S.President Thomas Jefferson sent the Navy to the Mediterraneanto fight against the Barbarypirates to safeguardU.S.

tradein 1801. Commodore MatthewPerryopened up Japanin the 1850s partlyto assuredecenttreat-

o

washed up on Japaneseshores. And the last shots in the U.S. Civil War were fired from a Confeder-

.

mentforsurvivors of sunkenU.S.whalingshipsthat ate commerceraiderattackingUnionshippingin

the remote waters of the Arctic Ocean. 0 The rise of the United Statesto superpowerstatus followedfromthisglobaloutlook.In the 20th cen-

.

America's Sticky Power

]

tury, as the Britishsystem of empireand commerce weakened and fell, U.S. foreign-policymakersfaced

own free will [see sidebaron page 51]. Nye's insights on soft power have attractedsigthreepossiblechoices:propup the BritishEmpire, nificant attention and will continue to have an ignore the problem and let the rest of the world go important role in U.S. policy debates. But the disabout its business,or replaceBritainand take on the tinction Nye suggests between two types of hard and economic power-has dirtyjob of enforcinga world order.Betweenthe power-military onset of WorldWarI and the beginningof the Cold received less consideration than it deserves.TradiWar,theUnitedStatestriedall three,ultimatelytak- tional military power can usefully be called sharp ing Britain'splace as ,the gyroscope of world order. power; those resisting it will feel bayonets pushing However,the Americanswerereplacingthe British and prodding them in the direction they must go. at a momentwhen the rulesof the game were chang- This poweris the foundationof the U.S. system.Ecoing forever.The United Statescould not becomejust nomic power can be thought of as sticky power, anotherempireor greatpower playingthe old games which comprisesa set of economic institutionsand of dominancewith rivalsand allies.Suchcompetition policiesthat attractsotherstowardU.S. influenceand led to war, and war between great powers was no then traps them in it. Togetherwith soft power (the longer an acceptablepart of the internationalsys- values, ideas, habits, and politics inherent in the tem. No, the United States was going to have to system), sharp and sticky power sustain U.S. hegeattempt something that no other nation had ever mony and make something as artificialand historaccomplished,somethingthat manytheoristsof inter- ically arbitraryas the U.S.-ledglobal system appear national relationswould swear was impossible.The desirable,inevitable,and permanent. UnitedStatesneededto builda systemthat could end thousands of years of great power conflicts, conSHARP POWER structinga frameworkof power that would bring enduringpeaceto the whole world-repeating glob- Sharppower is a very practicaland unsentimental ally what ancientEgypt,China, and Rome had each thing. U.S. militarypolicy follows rules that would on a regionalbasis. have been understandable to the Hittites or the accomplished To complicatethe task a bit more, the new hege- Roman Empire.Indeed,the U.S. militaryis the instimon would not be able to use some of the methods tution whose commandstructureis most like that of available to the Romans and others. Reducing the Old Worldmonarchies-the president,afterconsulworld's countries and civilizations to tributary tation with the Joint Chiefs,issuesorders,which the provinceswas beyond any military power the United States could or would bring to bear. The United Stateswould have to developa new way for sovereignstatesto coexistin a world of weaponsof massdestruction and of pricklyrivalriesamong religions,races,cultures,and states. In his 2002 book, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World'sOnly SuperpowerCan't Go It Alone, Har- military,in turn, obeys. Of course, securitystartsat home, and since the vardUniversitypoliticalscientistJosephS. Nye Jr.discussesthe varietiesof powerthatthe UnitedStatescan 1823 proclamationof the Monroe Doctrine,the cardeployas it buildsits world order.Nye focuseson two dinal principle of U.S. security policy has been to types of power: hard and soft. In his analysis,hard keep Europeanand Asian powers out of the Westpower is militaryor economicforcethat coercesoth- ern Hemisphere.Therewould be no intriguinggreat ersto follow a particularcourseof action.By contrast, powers, no intercontinental alliances, and, as the soft power-cultural power, the power of example, United States became stronger, no European or the power of ideasand ideals-works more subtly;it Asian militarybases from Point Barrow,Alaska, to makes others want what you want. Soft power the tip of Cape Horn, Chile. The makers of U.S. security policy also have upholdsthe U.S.worldorderbecauseit influencesothers to like the U.S. system and support it of their focused on the world's sea and air lanes. During

LikeSamson inthetempleofthePhilistines, a U.S.economy wouldinflictenormous, collapsing ontherestoftheworld. unacceptable damage

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peacetime,such lanes are vital to the prosperityof the United States and its allies; in wartime, the United Statesmust control the sea and air lanes to support U.S. allies and supply military forces on other continents. Britainwas almost defeated by Germany's U-boats in World War I and II; in today's world of integratedmarkets,any interruption of trade flows through such lanes would be catastrophic. Finally (and fatefully),Ahe United States considersthe MiddleEastan areaof vitalconcern. From a U.S. perspective,two potential dangerslurkin the MiddleEast.First,someoutside power, such as the Soviet Union during the Cold War,can try to control MiddleEasternoil or at least interferewith securesuppliesfor the United Statesand its allies.Second,one countryin the MiddleEastcouldtakeoverthe regionand try to do the same thing. Egypt, Iran, and, most recently,Iraq have all tried andthanks largely to U.S. policy-have all failed. For all its novel dangers,today's efforts by al Qaeda leader Osama bin Ladenand his followersto createa theocraticpowerin the regionthatcouldcontrol oil resourcesand extend dictatorialpower throughoutthe Islamicworldresemblesother threatsthatthe UnitedStateshas facedin this regionduringthe last 60 years. As part of its sharp-powerstrategy to addressthese priorities,the United States maintains a system of alliances and bases intended to promote stability in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. Overall, as of the end of September 2003, the United States had just over 250,000 uniformedmilitarymembersstationed outside its frontiers (not counting those involved in Operation IraqiFreedom); around 43 percent were stationed on NATO territory and approximately 32 percent in Japan and South Korea. Additionally, the United States has the abilityto transportsignificantforcesto these theaters and to the Middle East should tensions rise, and it preservesthe ability to control the sea lanes and air corridors necessaryto the securityof its forwardbases.Moreover,the UnitedStatesmaintains the world's largest intelligenceand electronic surveillanceorganizations.Estimatedto exceed $30 billion in 2003, the U.S. intelligencebudget is larger than the individualmilitarybudgetsof SaudiArabia, Syria,and North Korea.

Over time, U.S. strategic thinking has shifted towardoverwhelmingmilitarysuperiorityas the surest foundation for national security.That is partly for the obvious reasonsof greatersecurity,but it is partly also becausesupremacycan be an importantdeterrent.Establishingan overwhelmingmilitarysupremacy mightnot onlydeterpotentialenemiesfrommilitary attack;it mightalso discourageotherpowersfromtrying to matchthe U.S. buildup.In the long run,advocates maintain, this strategycould be cheaper and saferthan stayingjusta nose in frontof the pack. MARCH

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America's Sticky Power

STICKY POWER Economic, or sticky, power is different from both sharpand soft power-it is basedneitheron military compulsionnor on simplecoincidenceof wills. Considerthe carnivoroussundewplant,which attractsits prey with a kind of soft power, a pleasingscent that lures insects toward its sap. But once the victim has touched the sap, it is stuck;it can't get away.That is sticky power; that is how economic power works. Stickypower has a long history.Both Britainand the United Statesbuilt global economic systemsthat attractedothercountries.Britain'sattractedthe United Statesintoparticipating in the Britishsystemof trade and investmentduringthe 19th century.The London financial markets provided investment capital that enabledU.S. industriesto grow,while Americansbenefited from trading freely throughout the British Empire. Yet, U.S. global trade was in some sense hostage to the BritishNavy-the United Statescould tradewith the world as long as it had Britain'sfriendship, but an interruptionin that friendshipwould mean financial collapse. Therefore, a strong lobby againstwar with Britainalways existed in the United States.Trade-dependentNew Englandalmost seceded fromthe UnitedStatesduringthe Warof 1812, and at every crisis in Anglo-Americanrelations for the next century,Englandcould count on a stronglobby of merchantsand bankerswho would be ruined by war betweenthe two English-speakingpowers. The world economy that the UnitedStatesset out to leadafterWorldWarIIhad fallenfarfromthe peak of integrationreachedunder Britishleadership.The two world wars and the Depressionrippedthe delicate webs that had sustainedthe earliersystem.In the Cold Waryears,as it struggledto rebuildand improve upon the Old Worldsystem,the UnitedStateshad to change both the monetary base and the legal and politicalframeworkof the world'seconomicsystem. The United States built its sticky power on two foundations:an internationalmonetary system and free trade. The BrettonWoods agreementsof 1944 made the U.S. dollar the world's central currency, and while the dollar was still linked to gold at least in theory for another generation, the U.S. Federal Reserve could increase the supply of dollars in responseto economicneeds.The resultfor almost 30 years was the magic combination of an expanding monetarybase with price stability.These conditions helped produce the economic miracle that transformed living standardsin the advancedWestand in Japan. The collapse of the BrettonWoods system in 1973 usheredin a global economic crisis,but, by the 50

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1980s, the systemwas functioningalmost as well as ever with a new regimeof floating exchangeratesin which the U.S. dollarremainedcritical. Theprogresstowardfreetradeandeconomicintegration representsone of the great unheraldedtriumphs of U.S. foreign policy in the 20th century. Legaland economicexperts,largelyfrom the United States or educated in U.S. universities,helped poor countries build the institutions that could reassure foreigninvestors,evenas developingcountriesincreasinglyreliedon state-directedplanningand investment to jump-starttheir economies. Insteadof gunboats, internationalfinancialinstitutionssent bankersand consultantsaroundthe world. Behindall this activitywas the UnitedStates'willingnessto open its markets-even on a nonreciprocal basis-to exports from Europe, Japan, and poor nations.Thispolicy,partof the overallstrategyof containing communism, helped consolidate support aroundthe world for the U.S. system.The role of the dollar as a global reservecurrency,along with the expansionarybiasof U.S.fiscalandmonetaryauthorities,facilitatedwhat becameknown as the "locomotive of the globaleconomy"and the "consumerof last resort."U.S. tradedeficitsstimulatedproductionand consumptionin the rest of the world, increasingthe prosperityof othercountriesand theirwillingnessto participatein the U.S.-ledglobal economy. Openingdomesticmarketsto foreigncompetitors remained(andremains)one of the most controversial elementsin U.S. foreignpolicy duringthe Cold War. U.S.workersand industriesfacingforeigncompetition bitterlyopposedsuchopenings.Othersworriedabout the long-termconsequencesof the trade deficitsthat transformedthe UnitedStatesinto a net international debtorduringthe 1980s. Sincethe Eisenhoweradministration,predictionsof imminentcrises(inthevalueof thedollar,domesticinterestrates,or both)havesurfaced wheneverU.S. relianceon foreignlendinghas grown, but those negativeconsequenceshaveyet to materialize.Theresulthas beenmorelikea repetitionon a global scaleof the conversionof financialdebt to political strengthpioneered by the founders of the Bank of Englandin 1694 andrepeateda centurylaterwhenthe UnitedStatesassumedthe debt of the 13 colonies. In both of those cases,the stock of debtwas purchased by the rich and the powerful, who then acquired an interest in the stability of the government that guaranteedthe value of the debt. Wealthy Englishmenopposed the restoration of the Stuarts to the throne because they feared it would undermine the value of their holdings in the Bank of

Power

Goes

Soft

oftpoweris thesecondhalfof theequationHarvard UniversitypoliticalscientistJosephS. Nye Jr.firstpresentedin his 1990 essay"SoftPower" in FOREIGN POLICY. As opposed to hard power,

whichencompassesmilitaryand economicmight,soft poweris the powerof attractionto U.S.idealsand culture.It drawsothersto supportor at leastacceptU.S. hegemony and policy. During the Cold War, for was an importantfacet instance,U.S. anti-imperialism of soft power. The United Statesnever built a large colonialempire,and oftenit activelypressedEuropean states to grant independenceto their colonies after WorldWarII. Politicaldemocracyand humanrights have global appeal;when the UnitedStatesis seen as supportingthese values,U.S. soft power grows. AfterWorldWarII, the U.S. governmentworked to build a global system with broad international support, but the actions of U.S. companies, nonprofits, universities,and millions of individualsprovided the real energy.ElvisPresley,WaltDisney,and MarilynMonroe did as much to carryout this project as former U.S. Secretaryof State John Foster Dullesand formerU.S.TreasurySecretaryC. Douglas Dillon. And W. EdwardsDeming, the productivity guruwho transformedpostwarJapaneseindustry,had an influencerivalingthatof Gen.DouglasMacArthur. And multinationals originallybasedin theUnitedStates extended their sales, production, and management around the world, recruitingtalented non-U.S. citizens and propellingthe most successfulinto corporate

leadership.The activityof thesecompaniesin helping to createa multinational,multiculturalworkspacein a climateof mutualrespectremainscriticalto the success of the U.S. projectfor the freeworld. The desire of tens of millions of people around the world to live in the United Statesis also powerful evidence of soft power. The remittances that immigrantssend to their families back home give people worldwidea stakein U.S. successand a sense of participationin Americanlife. Also, hundredsof thousands of foreign students come to the United Statesto study each year.While not all returnhome lovingthe UnitedStates,many come away with new networks of friends and contacts. Finally,the generosityof U.S. humanitarianassistance abroadenhancesU.S. soft power.Conventional surveysrank the United Statesamong the world's less generouspowers when consideringonly official developmentaid. However, as former U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopmentofficialCarolC. Adelman has argued,such developmentassistancecomprises only 17 percentof total U.S. giving overseas. Whenremittancesareincluded,61 percentof all U.S. assistancecomes fromthe privatesector,and international giving by U.S. foundationsnow reachessome $3 billion per year. Private giving may have more impacton foreignperceptionsthangovernmentassistance-and thus strengthensU.S. soft power. -WR.M

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America's Sticky Power

A

Sticky

History

Lesson in WorldWarI experience ermany's shows how "sticky power"-the power of one nation'seconomicinstitutionsand policies-can act as a weapon. During the long yearsof peace beforethe war,Germany was drawn into the British-led world tradingsystem, and its economy becamemore and more trade-dependent. Local industries dependedon importedraw materials.German manufacturersdepended on foreign markets. Germany imported wheat and beef from the Americas,wherethe vast and fertileplainsof the United Statesand the pampas of South America producedfood muchmorecheaplythan German agriculturecould do at home. By 1910, such economic interdependencewas so great that many,includingNorman Angell,authorof The Great Illusion, thought that wars had become so ruinouslyexpensive that the age of warfarewas over. Not quite.Stickypowerfailedto keepWorld War I from breaking out, but it was vital to Britain'svictory.Oncethe war started,Britaincut off the world trade Germany had grown to depend upon, while, thanks to Britain'sRoyal Navy, the Britishand their allies continued to enjoy access to the rest of the world's goods. Shortagesof basic materialsand foods dogged Germanyall during the war. By the winter of 1916-17, the Germanswere seriouslyhungry. Meanwhile,hoping to even the odds, Germany tried to cut the Allies off from world markets with the U-boatcampaignsin the NorthAtlantic. That move brought the United States into the war at a time when nothing else could have saved the Allied cause. Finally,in the fall of 1918, morale in the Germanarmedforces and among civilianscollapsed, fueled in part by the shortages.These conditions,not militarydefeat, forcedthe German leadershipto ask for an armistice.Sticky power was Britain'sgreatestweapon in World War I. It may very well be the United States' greatestweapon in the 21st century. -WR.M. 52

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England. Likewise, the propertied elites of the 13 colonies came to support the stability and strength of the new U.S. Constitution because the value of their bonds rose and fell with the strength of the national government. Similarly,in the last 60 years, as foreignershave acquireda greatervalue in the United States-governmentand privatebonds, directand portfolio private investments-more and more of them have acquiredan interestin maintainingthe strengthof theU.S.-ledsystem.A collapseof theU.S.economyand the ruin of the dollar would do more than dent the prosperityof the United States. Without their best customer,countriesincludingChinaandJapanwould fall into depressions.The financialstrengthof every countrywould be severelyshakenshouldthe United States collapse. Under those circumstances, debt becomesa strength,not a weakness,and othercountriesfearto breakwith the UnitedStatesbecausethey need its market and own its securities.Of course, pressedtoo far,a largenationaldebt can turnfrom a sourceof strengthto a cripplingliability,and the United States must continue to justify other countries' faith by maintainingits long-termrecordof meeting its financialobligations.But, like Samsonin the temple of the Philistines,a collapsingU.S.economywould inflictenormous,unacceptabledamageon the restof the world. That is stickypower with a vengeance. THE SUM OF ALL POWERS? The UnitedStates'globaleconomicmightis therefore not simply,to use Nye's formulations,hard power thatcompelsothersor soft powerthat attractsthe rest of the world. Certainly,the U.S. economicsystemprovides the UnitedStateswith the prosperityneededto underwriteits securitystrategy,but it also encourages U.S.economic othercountriesto acceptU.S.leadership. might is stickypower. How will sticky power help the United States addresstoday's challenges?One pressingneed is to the ensurethatIraq'seconomicreconstruction integrates nation more firmlyin the global economy.Countries with open economiesdeveloppowerfultrade-oriented businesses;the leadersof thesebusinessescanpromote economicpoliciesthatrespectpropertyrights,democracy,and the ruleof law. Suchleadersalso lobbygovernmentsto avoidthe isolationthatcharacterized Iraq and Libya under economic sanctions.And looking beyondIraq,the allureof accessto Westerncapitaland global marketsis one of the few forcesprotectingthe ruleof law from even furthererosionin Russia.

China'sriseto global prominencewill offera key test case for sticky power. As China develops economically,it shouldgain wealththat could supporta militaryrivalingthatof the UnitedStates;Chinais also gainingpoliticalinfluencein the world. Someanalysts in both China and the United Statesbelievethat the laws of historymean that Chinesepower will someday clash with the reigningU.S. power. Sticky power offers a way out. China benefits from participatingin the IJ.S.economic system and integratingitself into the global economy. Between 1970 and 2003, China'sgrossdomesticproductgrew froman estimated$106 billionto morethan $1.3 trillion. By 2003, an estimated$450 billion of foreign money had flowed into the Chineseeconomy.Moreover, China is becoming increasinglydependenton both importsand exportsto keepits economy(andits militarymachine)going.Hostilitiesbetweenthe United Statesand Chinawould crippleChina'sindustry, and cut off suppliesof oil and otherkey commodities. Stickypower works both ways, though. If China

cannot affordwar with the UnitedStates,the United Stateswill havean increasinglyhardtime breakingoff commercialrelationswith China.In an eraof weapons of mass destruction,this mutualdependenceis probablygood for both sides.Stickypowerdid not prevent World War I, but economic interdependenceruns deeper now; as a result, the "inevitable"U.S.-Chinese conflictis less likelyto occur. Stickypower,then, is importantto U.S. hegemofor two reasons:It helps preventwar, and, if war ny comes, it helpsthe UnitedStateswin. But to exercise power in the real world, the pieces must go back together.Sharp,sticky,and soft power work together to sustainU.S. hegemony.Today,even as the United States'sharpand sticky power reach unprecedented reflectsa crisisin levels,the rise of anti-Americanism U.S. soft powerthat challengesfundamentalassumptions and relationshipsin the U.S. system.Resolving the tension so that the differentforms of power reinforceone anotheris one of the principalchallengesfacing U.S. foreignpolicy in 2004 and beyond. II

Want to KnowMore?

Joseph S. Nye Jr.introducedthe concept of soft power in his seminalessay "SoftPower" (FOREIGN POLICY,Fall 1990). His morerecentTheParadox ofAmericanPower:Why The World'sOnly Superpower Can't Go It Alone (New York:Oxford UniversityPress,2002) is the best and most original book on how the United States can deploy differentkinds of power. The ancient Greek historian Thucydides is often credited with developing the basic doctrines of foreign policy realism in his classic The History of the Peloponnesian War (New York:Harper & brothers,1836), but soft power played a majorrole in his account of the war between Athens and Sparta. Reading premodernhistories, such as Livy'sHistory of Rome (New York:Harper & brothers, 1892) and Ibn Khaldun'sMuqaddimah: An Introduction to History (New York: Pantheon Books, 1958), with Nye's distinctions in mind will provide food for thought about the different forms that power can take. For insighton the tangledrelationshipbetweenBritainand the UnitedStatesand U.S. global interests duringthe 18th and 19th century,see WalterRussellMead'sSpecialProvidence:AmericanForeign Policy and How It Changedthe World(New York:Knopf,2001). RobertJervisexplainshow the United Stateshas always definedits interestsglobally in "The CompulsiveEmpire"(FOREIGN POLICY, 2003). RobertSkidelsky's July/August John MaynardKeynes:Fightingfor Freedom,193 7-1946 (New York:Viking Press, 2001) describesthe economic concerns of Britishand U.S. authorities as they looked to build the post-WorldWar II global financial system. Charles P. Kindleberger'sclassic A Financial History of WesternEurope (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1984) illuminates BrettonWoods and a wide range of sticky-power issues. See also Carol C. Adelman's "The Privatizationof Foreign Aid: ReassessingNational Largesse"(ForeignAffairs, November/December2003). )For links to relevantWeb sites, access to the FP Archive,and a comprehensiveindex of related FOREIGNPOLICYarticles, go to www.foreignpolicy.com. MARCH

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