Women and Dower Property in Twentieth-Century Palestine: The Case of Jabal Nablus Author(s): Annelies Moors Source: Islamic Law and Society, Vol. 1, No. 3, Gender, Family, and the Courts in Muslim Societies (1994), pp. 301-331 Published by: BRILL Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3399234 Accessed: 06/04/2009 16:20 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=bap. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

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WOMEN AND DOWER PROPERTY IN TWENTIETHCENTURY PALESTINE: THE CASE OF JABAL NABLUS* ANNRT.IrSMOORS (Leiden University and the Universityof Amsterdam)

Abstract An analysis of legal texts, marriage contracts, divorce registrations, court cases, and women's narrativespoints to a shift in women's access to dower propeity in Jabal Nablus, Palestine, between the 1930s and the 1980s. This shift is related to transformationsin propertyrelations and changing attitudes toward the meaning of gender. As husbands increasingly have come to be viewed as "providers," women have lost access to, and control over, dower property.At the same time, ambiguities and contradictions in the sources suggest that the trend toward conjugality and female dependency is neither complete nor a direct expression of women's greater subordination to men. Different categories of women take up different positions. Some women regard"giving up property"as an advantage.

Introduction

MARRIAGE ALTHOUGH paymentsarea majortopicin anthropology, the significance of dower (mahr)for women, particularlyas a means to gain access to property,has been neglected.1 Researchers have discussed dower primarilyas a mechanismfor the intergenerational transmissionof property,with special attentionto the mannerin which this process relates to social stratification(Schlegel and Eloul 1988). Admittedly, Goody (1973; 1990) regardsthe "indirectdowry"given by the groom's family to the brideto be a form of female property,but he overlooks historical, social, and locational specificities and pays little attentionto the ways in which social practicemay diverge from the legal doctrine.2 * Research for this essay was funded by the Foundation for Social and Cultural Sciences, which is subsidized by The Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO). I wish to thank colleagues who participated in the Cornell University workshop, "Gender, Family, and the Courts in Muslim Societies," for their helpful comments on an earlierversion of this essay. 1 Eickelman (1989), for example, devotes considerable attention to marriage, but no more than a few words to dower as women's property. 2 For a critique of Goody's understandingof the mahr as "indirectdowry," see Moors (1991). ? E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1994

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Anthropologists writingaboutPalestiniansin Israelhave noted in access to dower.Kressel(1977) regardsthe women's changes bride'sreceivinga largershareof the doweras an indicationof her greaterfreedom,while Rosenfeld(1980)regardsthe continuedexistenceof thebridalshareas an indicatorof women'scontinuingsubordination to men.Inthisessay,I examinechangesin women'saccess to dowerpropertyin JabalNablusfromtheearly1930suntilthelate 1980s.3Althoughthe size of the bridalsharealso has increasedin JabalNablus,I shall arguethatthe terms"ongoingsubordination" and"increased freedom"do not do justiceto the complexitiesof the processesof changethathave takenplace and ignorethe changing meaningsof the bride's share.I base my accounton (1) Nablus shari'arecords,includingmarriagecontracts,divorceregistrations, of courtcases;and(2) fieldworkanddiscussionswith andsummaries Palestinianwomenin thecity of Nablus,in thevillageof "al-Balad" (the pseudonymof a smallvillage in the Nablusregion),andin the therelevantreforms refugeecampsaroundthecity.Aftersummarizing in the personalstatuslaws, I shallanalyzemajorchangesthathave takenplace in the registrationof the dowerin marriagecontracts.I thenturnto the "voices"of womenthemselvesas theyemergefrom summariesof courts cases and stories they told me about their informus aboutthe anddivorces.Thecourtcasesummaries marriages circumstances in whichwomenwereableandwillingto turnto court to claimentitlements thattheyhadnotreceived;andtheoralhistories issues that women did not raisein court,eitherbecausethey expose wereunawareof theirrights,werenotinterestedin doingso, orwere not in a positionto act. By payingcarefulattentionto the differing mannerin whichthesesourcesrepresentchangesin women'saccess to dowerproperty,I hopeto presentan accountof shiftsin themeanin ing of dowerthatis sensitiveto theambiguitiesandcontradictions thesources. TheLegal Context

In the 1930s,JabalNabluswas ruledby the Britishunderthe Palestinemandate.At thattime,theshari'acourtsappliedtheOttomanLaw of Family Rights (OLFR)of 1917, which was based largely on Hanafidoctrine(theHanafilaw schoolwas the officialschoolin the 3 On women's access to pioperty through inheritance and paid labor, see Moors (1995 forthcoming).

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Ottoman empire), although it also made use of the opinions of the otherlaw schools to facilitate the introductionof certainreforms.4In 1948, the Jordanianarmy took control of the area and in 1950 the "WestBank"was annexedto Jordan.In 1951, Jordanproclaimedthe Jordanian Law of Family Rights (JLFR), which applied to the population of the West Bank. Since 1967, the West Bank has been underIsraeli militaryoccupation,but West Bank Palestiniansremain subject to Jordanianlegislation in mattersrelatingto personalstatus. The 1951 JLFR was superseded in 1976 by the JordanianLaw of PersonalStatus(JLPS),which appliedto the West Bank. Arranging marriages. According to Hanafi law, women whose marriageshad been arrangedduringtheirminorityby theirfathersor grandfatherscould not sever these marriagesafter reaching puberty; women in their legal majority,on the other hand, could both refuse marriagesarrangedfor them and arrangefor theirown marriages(see Tucker,this volume). The marryingof minorgirls was put to an end by the 1917 OLFR, which prohibited the marriage of boys under twelve and girls under nine. In addition, boys between the ages of twelve and eighteen and girls between the ages of nine and seventeen (consideredthe minimumand maximumages for the onset of puberty) could be married only with the permission of the court (Anderson 1951a: 116).5In the 1951 JLFR,the minimumage for such a marriage was raised to fifteen for both boys and girls; in addition,Article 6 of this law stipulatedthatif the age differentialbetweenbrideand groom was more than twenty years, the judge must ensure that the younger partnerwas not being forced to marryand that the marriagewas not contraryto her interests. The 1976 JLPS abolished the category of minorswho could be marriedonly with the permissionof the courtand fixed the minimumage of marriageat fifteen for girls and sixteen for boys (Art. 5). The effects of marriage.The marriagecontractrequiresthat a man pay the bride a mahrand provideher with maintenance(nafaqa),that is, food, clothing and a separate dwelling (maskan shar'i or bayt 4 This section is concerned only with major legal reforms in the area of personal status subsequentto the implementationof the first legislated code. I pay no attention to the historical transitionfrom legal practice based on the classical shari'a manuals to legal practice based on legal codes and legislation, a shift that resultedin the closure of open-endedforms of juridical argumentation(see Messick 1993). 5 The court might grant such permission on the ground of sufficient maturity, and, in the case of a girl, on the condition that her marriageguardianconsented.

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of herfinancialstatus.Marriagedoesnotresultin shar'O,irrespective communitypropertybetweenhusbandandwife; each partnerindependentlycontrolsany propertyownedbeforemarriageor acquired Marriedwomenarefreeto use theirpropertyas theyplease thereafter. anddo not needtheirhusbands'permissionto disposeof it (e.g., by donationor sale). Withregardto dower,no legal changeshaveoccurred,exceptthat the 1917 OLFRexplicitlyforbadethe bride'sparentsor relativesto acceptmoneyorgoodsin returnforgivingtheirdaughterin marriage. The dower is consideredthe bride'sproperty,and she cannotbe herjihaz(gold,clothing,andhousehold compelledto use it to purchase goods thatshe bringsintothe marriage)(Anderson1951b:188;also 1976JLPSart.61-62). Withrespectto maintenance, the 1951JLFRand the 1976 JLPS a extended man's financial (art.66a; 82) obligationstowardhis wife andchildren.At thesametime,themannerin whichmaintenance was calculatedchanged.Accordingto the 1951 JLFR,maintenanceno withreferenceto the financialstatusof both longerwas determined husbandandwife (as formulated in the 1917OLFR),butratherwith exclusivereferenceto thehusband'sfinancialstatus(Anderson1951b: 189, 193;1952:199). Whereasa womanhas no financialobligationswith regardto her husband,he has a qualifiedrightto limithis wife's freedomof movement,a rightthatpotentiallyhas financialimplications.Aftera husbandhaspaidthedower,his wife is obligedto live in his house.If she leavesthedwellingagainsthis will withouta validreason(suchas illtreatmentor notbeingprovidedwitha suitabledwelling),she legally (ndshiza).Herhusbandthenno longeris maybe declared"rebellious" andmayhaveherforciblyreturnedto obligedto payhermaintenance the conjugalhome. Because the 1951 JLFRexplicitly states that womenareallowedto leavetheconjugalhomein caseof maltreatment withoutlosingtheirmaintenance rights,it becamemoredifficultfor a manlegallyto suspendmaintaining his wife by claimingthatshewas rebellious.Legal sanctionsagainsta rebelliouswife were further limitedby theformulations of the1976JLPS,whichno longerallowed forherforciblereturnto herhusband's house(Welchman1988:875). Dissolution of marriage:unilateraltalaq.Accordingto Hanafilaw,

a husbandhas the unlimitedpowerunilaterallyto repudiatehis wife throughtalaq. If he pronouncesthe taldq beforethe marriagehas beenconsummated, the repudiation becomesoperativeimmediately.

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Otherwise,he may revoke a single talaq until the end of the waitingperiod - usually three menstrual cycles (but for post-menopausal women threecalendarmonthsand for pregnantwomen until delivery) - when the repudiationbecomes final. A third talaq, however, not only becomes irrevocableimmediately,but also makes it impossible for a man to remarryhis ex-wife unless a thirdpartymarriesher in the meantime.A woman may be repudiatedirrevocablyand immediately if her husbandpronouncesa tripletalaq. As her rights were limited, repudiation could be particularly injuriousto a woman. An irrevocablyrepudiatedwife must leave her husband's house and is entitled only to the deferred dower and to maintenanceduringthe waiting-period.6She retainscustody(hadana) over her sons until they reach the age of seven and over her daughters until they reachthe age of nine,when they are conveyedto theirfather. Duringthis period,her formerhusbandis obliged to pay maintenance for his children, a "caretakerwage" (ujrat ha.dana)to their mother and, if they still are being suckled,a "sucklingwage" (ujratirdd').If a womanremarries,she immediatelyloses her custodyrights. Certain protections gradually were introduced against the most problematicaspects of repudiation.The 1917 OLFR no longer consideredvalid a repudiationutterredin a state of drunkennessor under compulsion(Anderson1951c: 274). The 1951 JLFRreformdeclared conditionaltalaq void if intendedas an inducementto do somethingor a threat to abstain from an act. It also abolished the triple talaq pronouncedin one session, classifyingall taldqsas revocable,with the result that the marriagedissolved only after the waiting-periodhad passed without the husband taking back his wife (Anderson 1952: 201).7 This reformwas intendedto discouragedivorce on the spur-ofthe-moment,as the repudiatedwife had to spendthe waiting-periodin her husband'shouse. The effects of repudiationfor the wife also were partially mitigated. The 1951 JLFR extended the age limit of child custodyto nine for boys and eleven for girls;the 1976 JLPSincreased these to the onset of puberty.In addition,Article 134 of the 1976 JLPS introducedcompensationfor arbitraryrepudiation(taldq ta'assufi), giving a wife the right to ask for a maximumof one year's maintenance if her husbandrepudiatedherwithoutvalid reason. 6 If the marriagehad not been consummated,she was entitled only to half the dower. 7 Unless the talaq was uttered before the marriagewas consummated or was the thirdof three taldqs.

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Dissolution of marriage: tafriqand khul'. There are two ways in

whicha womanactivelymayseekthedissolutionof hermarriage.A khul' divorce allows a woman to be repudiatedby her husband (irrevocably)in returnfor a financialconsideration,usually her renunciation of herrightsto the deferreddowerandto maintenance; this formof divorcerequiresthe husband'scompliance.If a woman wantsa divorcewithoutherhusband'sconsentandwithouthavingto renounceherrights,andshepossessesa legallyvalidreason,she may ask a qadito dissolvethe marriagethroughtafrlq.AlthoughHIanafi law recognizeskhul',it makestafriqvirtuallyimpossible;it does, contractthatif her however,allowthewife to stipulatein hermarriage anotherwife, thenshe husbandcommitscertainacts,suchas marrying is divorced(seeTucker,thisvolume). The groundsfor tafrtqgraduallywereexpanded.The 1917OLFR alloweda womanto ask the courtto divorceherif herhusbandhad desertedher withoutprovidingmaintenanceor if he had become afflictedwith a grave disease that made her remainingwith him injurious(Anderson1951c:272). The 1951 JLFRallowedwomen in themarriage (andalso men)to inserta widevarietyof stipulations divorce to her.The of of the his contract,including delegation right same law extendedthe groundsfor tafriq to includefailureof a the absenceof a husbandof known husbandto providemaintenance, was provided,andlong incarcerawhereaboutseven if maintenance tionin prison(Anderson1952:202 ff.). in the 1917OLFR,which Oneformof tafrlq,alreadyincorporated allowseithera wife or husbandto askfor dissolutionof marriageon thegroundof "discordandstrife,"hadspecificpropertyconsequences as a wife was not automatically grantedherdeferreddower.If courtnot reconcile thecoupleandresponsibility could arbitrators appointed for the discordlay with the husband,the courtwoulddivorcethem, for the diswith thewife retainingall herrights;butif responsibility cordlay withthewife, thecourtwouldimposea khul'divorce,requirrights(in this ing the wife to renounceher dowerandmaintenance hiswife againstherwill withouthavingto case,a mancouldrepudiate foundthatresponsibility payherthedeferreddower).If thearbitrators for thediscordwas sharedby the two spouses,thenthe dowerwould be reducedby anamountthatreflectedtheirrespectiveculpability. In Islamiclaw, thedoweris genderedproperty par excellence,part andparcelof a marriagesystemthathighlightsgenderdifferences. Thesedifferencesmanifesta paradoxbetweena woman'sfull legal

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capacity to act with respect to her property,on the one hand, and constraintsimposed on her acting with regardto her own person, on the other.Twentieth-centuryreformsshow two majorchanges in the legal positionof women. First,buildingupon Hanafirecognitionof the importanceof the conjugal tie (e.g., by requiringseparatehousing, maskan shar'), the reforms have placed a greateremphasis on the conjugal relation (e.g., by calculating maintenanceaccording to the financialstatusof the husband,and by makinghasty repudiationmore difficult).8Second, the legal positionof women has improvedvis-a-vis her own kin (e.g., with regardto arrangingmarriages)and vis-a-vis her husband(e.g., with regardto obedience;by extendingthe grounds for tafrlq; by extending women's custody rights; and by allowing compensationfor arbitraryrepudiation).Yet, reformshave not always improved women's legal situation. The tendency to treat spouses equally underthe law has entailed certainprovisions that benefit the husbandratherthanthe wife (Welchman1988: 872).9 The Contracts Until the middle of the nineteenth-century,marriagecontractsformulated by notaries(oftenin a mannerthatreflectedthe class background of the parties; see Tucker 1988) were filed in general shari'a court registers.Beginningin the 1920s, marriagecontractswere recordedon printedforms and kept in separateregisters.10Such forms included space to record the name, age, place of residence, religion, and profession of both the bride and the groom; the names of agents or guardians,of witnesses, and of the courtregistrar;the maritalstatusof the bride (e.g., virgin [bikr]or non-virgin[thayyib]);the amountand the natureof the mahr, includingwhether payment of part of it was deferreduntil the dissolutionof marriage;and any specific marriage stipulations. In the early 1950s, the Jordaniansintroduced a new registrationform that solicited, in additionto the above, information 8 Antoun (1990: 57) takes exception to the idea that Islamic law emphasizes only patrilinealkinship, to the exclusion of conjugality. His argumentwould have been strongerhad he taken into considerationtrendsin legal reform. 9 Welchman (1988) mentions that the 1951 JLFR (in contrast to the 1917 OLFR) allows not only the wife but also the husbandto insert conditions into the marriagecontract, and that the 1976 JLPS gives men certain grounds on which to apply for tafrlq. 10 These changes in patternsof registering legal documents are related to the increasing emphasis on official court registration and growing state control (see Messick 1993).

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aboutthe place of birthandthe nationalityof groomandbride;the maritalstatusof thegroom;and"addenda" (tawdbi')to themahr,now recordedas a separatecategory.Duringthe BritishMandateperiod, most marriagesalreadywere recordedin court,usually the court locatednearestto thebride'splaceof residence,andby themid-1950s, virtuallythe entirepopulationregisteredtheir marriagesat court (Doumani1985). Thepromptdower:limitedgeographicaland social differences.My

calculationsof the averageamountof dower,recordedat regular intervals,indicatethatdifferencesbetweenthecityandtheruralareas In 1940,theaverage werelimitedthroughout theperiod1928-1988.11 (roundedoff) dowerin Nabluswas 60 PP (PalestinePounds)andin economicgrowthand the countryside50 PP. A periodof protracted to a dramatic increasein the inflationin themid-1940sled everywhere amountsregistered.Subsequently,the fightingin 1947/48 and the as the of thestateof Israel- referredto by Palestinians establishment nakba, or the catastrophe- resultedin the collapse of Nablus' economyandin a largenumberof destituterefugeessettlingin or near the city. Initially,thishada dramaticeffecton doweraverages,with the dowerdroppingconsiderablyandreachingits low pointin the gainedmomenearly1950s.By thelate 1950s,however,as migration tumandtheeconomicsituationstartedto improve,thedowerbeganto rise again.In 1964the averagedowerin the cityhadreached210 JD (JordanianDinars),while in the villages and in the campsit had increasedto 170JD and 140 JD,respectively.The 1967warresulted in severalyearsof economicstagnation, followingwhichthe average dower increasedagain,with differencesbetweencity, village and campsdiminishingfurther.By 1984,the averagedowerhadreached 1400 JD in Nablus, 1170 JD in the villages, and 1210 JD in the camps.Itwas onlybeginningin themid-1980sthattheaveragedower in Nablusandthe villages startedto stagnateand,in the camps,to decline. Whereasgeographicaldifferenceswere limited,therewere considerablesocial differentialswithinurbanandruralsettings.During themandatory period,urbandowersmanifestedmoredivergencethan 11 I analyzeda sampleof 10%of theurbanmarriagecontractsforeveryfourth year from 1928-1988 (including1987); and I analyzedthe village and camp contractsforeverytwelfthyearfrom1928-1976(forthecamps,beginningin 1952) and for every fourthyear from 1976-1988(including1987).I analyzedas many contractsas I couldlocatefor al-Balad(n = 220).

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those in rural areas. In Nablus, the relation between the top and bottom 20% of the dowersfor women marying for the first time was almost three to one, while in rural areas it was less than two and a half to one; in individualvillages the differenceswere even smaller, probablyas a consequenceof greatersocial homogeneity(by this time, the large estate ownershad moved to Nablus). The urbandifferential, although greaterthan the ruraldifferential,does not reflect the great differences in wealth between urbanhouseholds, and there was no directcorrelationbetweenthe occupationof the groom and the size of the dower. It is true that men who had a high-status profession registereda high dower, and those with a low-statusprofessiona low dower, but therewas a very large intermediatecategory of men who registeredvarying amounts.This suggests that the relatively limited dowerdifferentialsmentionedabovereflectthe maximumdivergencies betweenthe rich andthe poor. In the Jordanianperiod,the differencesbetweenthe registeredsums increased,but not uniformly.In Nablus, the relationbetween the top and bottom20% increasedonly slightly to a little over threeand a half to one, whereas the differencesin village dowers increasedto five to one. In contrastto the mandatoryperiod,the dowers in the ruralareas now became more divergentthanin the city. In the camps,differences also became more prominent. By the late 1950s, the greater differentials were due mainly to a rapid increase of high dowers, indicatingthat some men were willing and able to pay a larger sum. The increaseddifferentiationin the ruralareas is related to the rapid growth of migration labor, which created new forms of social inequalitiesin the ruralareas.Whereas,in 1952, 76% of ruralmen still registeredtheir occupationas farmer,by 1964 this had decreased to 48%. The large differences between the villages -when migration started,the numberof migrants,and their destination- also contributedto greaterdowerdifferentialsamongruralwomen. By the mid-1960s, differentials in the urban dowers started to decrease.This processcontinuedduringthe Israelioccupation,when it also made itself felt in the camps and villages. The employment situation had "stabilized"in the rural areas, with only 21% of the village grooms registeringas farmersin 1976 and no more than 15% in the early 1980s. In the 1970s and 1980s, the top and bottom 20% relatedto each otheras less thantwo and a half to one in all locations. The tokendower:an inventionof the modernizingelite. Coinciding with the decreasein social differentialsrelatingto the promptdower,

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beginningin themid-1960s,a significantchangeoccurredin registering the promptdower.In a few contracts,a tokendowerwas registered,e.g., one,five, ortenJD,tensilverdirhams,oronegoldlira.The contractsindicatethathighlyeducatedmaleprofessionalswere the firstto paya tokendower;in theearly1960sthemostcommonlymentionedoccupationof thesegroomswas engineer.Whenwomenalso in themarriage contractsbeginning beganto registertheiroccupations in the 1970s,anotherremarkable correlation emerged:a tokendower mostoftenwas recordedforwomenwhowereprofessionals.12 Theregisteringof a tokendowersignalledthebeginningof a new trend.In the 1970s the percentageof contractsmentioninga token dowerincreasedrapidlyand,by the mid-1980s,a tokendowerwas therewas no registeredin almosthalf the urbancontracts;thereafter furtherincrease.By thenit no longerwas only theprofessionals, but also men with more commonoccupationswho did so, although laborerswerestillundelrepresented. While the registrationof a token dowerinitiallywas an urban usuallylivedin thecity),beginningin the phenomenon (professionals mid-1970s,villagersstartedto recorda tokendower,andby themid1980s such a dowerwas registeredin aboutone-thirdof the village contracts,oftenby a groomwho was a trader,employee,teacher,or skilledlaborer,or who was self-employed.13 In the campsthe token dowerbecamemorecommonbeginningin theearly1980sandit has remainedmorelimitedin scopethanin the city. A tokendowerwas registeredin less thanone-thirdof all campcontracts,a percentage similarto thatof lower-classurbanites. As in thecity,beginningin the the of mid-1980s, percentage contractswith a tokendowerhardly increasedin thevillagesandcamps. Registering household goods: the urban lower-middle classes

takingthelead.In thelatemandatory period,householdgoods,oftena with a were recorded mirror, occasionallyin urbanconcupboard either a to the as tracts, promptdoweror as marriage supplement household stipulation.Registering goodsrapidlybecamemorewidespreadaftera separateheadingwas createdfor recording"addenda" 12 In a sampleof womenmarriedto professionalmen in the 1980s (n = 31), 57%of the womenwho hadno occupationreceiveda tokendower,while 82%of the womenwho wereemployedas professionals(e.g., doctor,dentist,pharmacist, universitylecturerandengineer)receiveda tokendower. 13 A tokendowerrarelywas registeredby ruralworkersand farmers.There were, however,considerabledifferencesbetweenvillagesthatwere not linkedto occupationalstatus.

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(tawabi') in the early 1950s. Thereafter, household goods were noted down under this heading. By the mid-1950s this was the case in more than half the urban contracts. In some cases, only the value of a set of household goods (taqm bayt) was recorded; in other cases, the items are described in detail, thereby making it possible to follow changes in consumer tastes. In the 1970s and 1980s household goods were registered even more frequently; in the 1980s this was the case in about three-quarters of the urban contracts. Whereas the token dower was introduced by the elite, the urban lower middle-classes took the lead in the registration of household goods. In the Jordanian period, men with a high-status profession, such as doctors, pharmacists and engineers, never recorded household goods; traders and teachers did so less frequently than the average; while laborers did so frequently. Gradually, the registration of household goods has moved up the social hierarchy, although the elite still avoid the practice. In 1988, the increasing tendency to "write down" household goods expressed itself further when, for the first time, the word "in cash" (naqdan) was added to the rubric "household goods", that is, "taqm bayt naqdan". In the villages, however, registering "addenda" remained uncommon until the 1980s, and even then it never exceeded 40% of the contracts. Also, in nearly one-third of these village contracts, not only household items but also gold was recorded under the heading of "addenda." Often, more than half the amount was to be spent on gold, with the exact weight of the gold written down. In such contracts the prompt dower was always a token one; yet, the recording of gold as "addenda" appears to be another way of recording a regular prompt dower. In the camps, household goods also were registered, but, especially in the 1950s, less frequently than among the lower-classes in Nablus. By the late 1970s, the percentage of camp contracts that record household goods had equalled that of Nablus. The increasing prominence of the deferred dower. Whereas the prompt dower was similar in urban and rural contexts during the period of the British mandate, there were great divergencies in the deferred dower. In the city, not only was a deferred dower registered in virtually all marriage contracts, but it also gradually became the most important part of the dower in monetary terms. In the 1930s, the deferred dower was equal to or higher than the prompt dower in almost half the contracts. By the 1940s, this had increased to three-

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quarters.In 1940, for instance,the average(roundedoff) urbandower was 60 PP promptand 80 PP deferred.More so than a high prompt dower, a high deferreddower was a characteristicof the wealthy or those strivingfor a higher status. The amountsregisteredas deferred dower differed more than in the case of the promptdower, with the relationbetween the top and bottom20% being four and a half to one (prompt:almostthreeto one). Duringthe Jordanianperiodthese trends continued,and the deferreddowerbecamethe most importantelement in the total dower. In the 1960s the urbandeferreddower was almost always higher than the promptdower, averaging210 JD promptand 340 JD deferredin 1964. Simultaneously,the difference between the top and bottom20%increasedto five to one. In rural areas during the British mandate, on the other hand, a deferreddower was registeredonly in one-thirdof the contractsand the amounts recorded were considerably lower than in the city; a deferreddower of only 30% of the total dowerwas common.In 1940, the average ruraldower was 50 PP (prompt)and 20 PP (deferred),if registered.Recording such a dower was more common in larger villages thatwere close to the city and in which agricultureno longerwas the only sourceof livelihood.Duringthe Jordanianperiodregisteringa deferreddower became more widespread:by 1964 this had increased to 68%, with skilled laborers,the self-employed,drivers,teachersand employees serving as trendsetters.Yet, the average rural deferred dower still was considerablylower than that in the cities; in 1964 it was 170 JD (prompt) and 110 JD (deferred), and in that period of rapidchange the differentialsbetweenruralwomen were considerable. In the camps, the deferreddower was in some respects similar to that of the poorer urbanites,while in others it mirroredthe specific backgroundof the refugees. Although a deferreddower always was registered,it was on average a smaller percentageof the total dower than in the city; in 1964 it averaged 140 JD (prompt) and 80 JD (deferred). The enormous differences among the dowers of refugee women, in particularin the first years of the nakba, probably are relatedto theirdifferingbackgrounds.The deferreddower of a woman of urbanorigin often was considerablyhigherthanthatof a woman of rural background. As in the Nablus region, in the coastal areas a deferred dower probably had been less common in the countryside thanin the cities. In the 1970s and 1980s, the villages and camps continuedto follow urbanpatterns.Beginning in the early 1970s, a deferreddower was

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registeredin all marriagecontractsand,especiallyfrom the late 1970s, the average amount increased rapidly everywhere. In 1984, the averagedeferreddower in the city reached2710 JD, in the ruralareas 1980 JD and in the camps 1530 JD. Simultaneouslythe differences between city, villages and camps decreasedconsiderably,and also in the villages and the camps the deferreddower was higher than the prompt dower. Even though social differentials within the various communities remained larger than was the case with the prompt dower, these also diminished.In the city and the camps the relation between the top and bottom20%was threean a half to one, and in the villages over four to one. Thus, the most strikingchangein dowerregistrationis the increased prominenceof the deferreddower.Ratherthanbeing recordedonly in a minorityof the marriagecontracts,registrationof the deferreddower has become universaland the amountsrecordedhave increasedmuch more rapidlythanthe prompt.In its most extremeform, this is visible in those contractsin which only a tokenprompt- but a high deferred - dower is registered.Thus, the emphasis in dower registrationhas shifted from recordinga sum of money for a woman at marriageto doing so in case of divorceor widowhood. To some extent, the decreasingimportanceof the promptdower is offset by the increasinglywidespreadinclusion of "addenda"in the contracts.As noted, in the contractsof ruralwomen thatmentiongold underthis heading,financial guaranteesat marriagewere made, even if only a token promptdower was recorded.More generally, while registering a token dower has become more widespread, both in a geographicaland a social sense, the recordingof householdgoods has moved up the social hierarchy,introducinganothermeans to record financial obligations. As a result, among those in the middle of the social hierarchy,a token promptdower might be accompaniedby the recordingof householdgoods as "addenda."Further,the recent addition of the word "in cash"pointsto a greaterconcernon the partof the bride's family for controlover these gifts, an inversionof the loss of controlthe bride'sfamily experienceswhen registeringa tokendower. Finally, therewere majordifferencesamongwomen in the importance of dower payments as a source of property.Geographically, differences in the amounts recordedremained limited, while social differences in dower payments were considerably less pronounced than differences in wealth. This implies, particularlywith respect to rural and poorer women, that the dower served as an important

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mechanismfor gainingaccessto property,at least in theory.It also was in the contractsof womenfrompoorerhouseholdsthatwritten weremostcommon,as in theircasemostoftennot only a guarantees deferreddowerbutalso a regularpromptdowerandhouseholdgoods wereregistered. Cases and Stories

of marriagecontractsrelateto How do thesetrendsin theregistration the storieswomentell aboutdower?To answerthisquestion,I shall first discussthe majordiscrepanciesbetweenthe registeredprompt dower and what women reportedreceiving,where possible with andI shallthenaddress referenceto relevantcourtcase summaries;14 the issue of the extentto whichthe greatercentralityof the deferred dowerin thecontracts haspracticalmeaningto thewomeninvolved. FromRecordedPromptDowerto Gifts The villages: the disappearanceof thefather's share. In ruralareas,

the storieswomentell aboutdowerduringthemandatory periodpoint to a large discrepancybetweenthe writtenmarriagecontractsand socialpractice.At thattime,it was commonin ruralPalestinefor the fatherof thebride- who, as hermarriageguardian, usuallyreceived the dower- not to convey the entire sum to his daughter(also Granqvist1931:118; 135 ff.; Rosenfeld1980:197).In al-Balad,for instance,the bride'sshareoftenwas limitedto one-thirdof the total promptdower,which, in the 1930s amountedto 10 or 20 PP. The courtcase summariesalso indicatethatruralwomen in the Jabal Nablusregiondid not alwaysreceivethe promptdowerspecifiedin the contracts.Yet thesewomenseem to have raiseda case against theirown kin only if a relativeotherthantheirfatherhadbeentheir marriageguardian. Elderlywomenexplainedto me thatin thosedays it was self-evidentto a ruralgirlthatherfatherwouldtakepartof her dower.Becausea womanwouldreturnto her father'shousein the eventof maritalproblems,turningagainsthimwouldweakenrather thanstrengthen herpositionvis-k-visherhusbandandhis kin. 14 I collected dower stories while conducting anthropological fieldwork in Jabal Nablus intermittentlyon and off between 1980-1989 for a total of over oneand-a-half years. I have analyzed summariesof dower cases for the same years as the sample of marriagecontracts(see note 11). For the period under investigation, dower cases never exceeded 10%of all courtcases. Most dower cases were filed by women demandingtheirdeferreddower.

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A phenomenonrelatedto fathers'retainingpartof theirdaughters' dower is exchange marriage. In the 1920s and 1930s, when only limited cash was available, such marriages were common in the villages.15Usually, a woman was offered in exchange for a wife for her brother,but a widower mightalso give his daughterin marriagein exchange for a bride for himself (which often resultedin a large age differentialbetween groom and bride).In such marriagecontracts,an identical regulardower would be registeredfor both brides,with the result that the fathers' shares would cancel each other. Brides frequently received less than the average bride's share, for exchange marriagesoften were an indicatorof poverty. In the 1950s, ruralwomen graduallybegan to receive an increasingly large shareof the dower.In al-Balad,by the late 1950s, the bride received one-half of the dower (as comparedwith one-thirdpreviously), and by the early 1970s, most brides received the entire prompt dower. A fathertook nothing,and, in some cases, might even supplement the dower (Rosenfeld 1980: 211 arguesthe same for the Lower Galilee). With the disappearance of the father's share, exchange marriagesbecameless common. The urbanpoor: female rights and male debts. In the mandatory period, lower-class urban women regularly received less than the amountspecified in the contracts,not because of the "father'sshare," but because the groom was unable to pay the full amount. In the villages, men of insufficient means resorted to exchange marriages and remainedin their father's house, even if it consisted of only one room. In Nablus, it was uncommon for the bride's father to keep a substantialpart of his daughter'sdower, so exchange marriageshad little materialbenefitfor the groom.In addition,in the city demandsfor housing were higher, and household goods usually were not homemade,butpurchasedin the market. Very few women turned to the courts solely for the purpose of recoveringfull dower from theirhusbands.The courtcase summaries indicate that a woman usually turnedto the court only to litigate for paymentof that partof the promptdower she had not yet received, if her husbandhad left her without any source of livelihood; in most court cases she also demanded maintenance(nafaqa) and, in some cases, legal conjugalresidence(maskanshar'). Manywomen told me 15 In al-Balad, 30% of the marriages between 1928 and 1947 were exchange marriages (n= 20). In Artas, 26.5% of all marriages were exchange marriages (Granqvist1931: 111).

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thatit was unusualfor a womanto file suitagainstherhusbandif he treatedher well in otherrespects.Confrontedwith the dilemmaof eitherclaimingherdowerrightsand,as a result,forcingherhusband into debt (and incurringthe blame for that), or allowing him to postponepayment,perhapsforegoingit entirely,manywomenchose the latteroption.Not wantingto jeopardizetheir marriages,they to relinquish someof theirmaterialrights,convincedthatthis preferred wouldstrengthen theirpositionwithinthefamily. Among the urbanpopulationof Nablus, it has become less commonfor womento refrainfromtakingtheirfull dowerbecause theirhusbandswereunableto payit. Abjectpovertyhas becomeless commonand,as will be explained,the dowergenerallyhas become less of a burdenforgroomsto pay. The urbanelite: the virtuesof presentinggifts. Urbanelite women

generallyemphasizedthattheyreceivedthe full doweranddid not need to use it to buy gold or householdgoods.Whileruralandless wealthy urbanwomenused partof theirdowerto buy gold, elite womenreceivedtheirgold as gifts fromtheirhusbands(andfathers) in theformof a supplement to thedower.Nordidtheyuse the dower to purchasehouseholdgoods (as is commonin the ruralareas)or clothing (a commonurbanpractice);their fathersusually would providefor these. Amongthe wealthy,therefore,dowerpayments closelyfollowedthe 1917OLFR:thedowerwas intendedforthebride herselfandshedidnotneedit to buygoldorotheritems. In the 1950s, a high promptdowerwas still recordedfor brides fromwealthyfamilies,althoughthe primaryemphasiswas on gifts, with in-lawsandkin attempting to outdoeachotherin providingthe bridewitheverythingshe mightneed.Therise in theregistration of a tokendowerbeginningin the 1960scan be seen as a culminationof theimportance of voluntarygiftsoverregisteredobligations,withthe bride'sfatherstatingthathis daughterdid not need a dower,as he himselfwouldprovideherwitheverything,whichthe groomandhis kin understood as an invitationto do thesame.Thebridesoftenfully to of a tokendower,whichtheyconsidered agreedwiththeregistration be an expressionof modernity.Receivinggifts ratherthana dower institusuitedgirlswhowerewell-educated, usuallyin a Westernized saleof with "the which the dower have led to their tion, may equating women."In financialterms,theydid notlose muchif a tokendower was recorded,for they still receivedthe expensivejewelleryat their engagementandweddingandmanyothervaluablegifts.

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manifesta specificcorrelation between As mentioned, thecontracts thenatureof thedowerandwhetherornotwomenwereprofessionally indicatethatevenin thelate 1940sand employed.Women'snarratives theirprofessionin the marriage when did not record women 1950s, contract,a tokendoweralreadywas occasionallyregisteredfor some women.Thesewomen,usuallyfromthe highlyeducatedprofessional moreprominenturbanfamilies,had compellingreasonsto support such formof dowerregistration.Even morethantheirnon-professionalcounterparts, theyregardedthemselvesas beingat theforefront modernization. of mighthavebeenusefulas Receivingdowerproperty witha a guaranteeto a dependent wife, theytoldme,butit contrasted professionalwoman's self-image as a "productivemember of society."Becauseprofessionalwomenoftenmarriedat a laterage, after working for several years and accumulatingconsiderable savings, they had even less need for the dower as a source of economicsecurity. The token dower: the risks involved. Whereas the token dower

initiallyservedas an indicatorof highstatus,havingbeen"invented" elite thatcouldaffordto expresstrustin thegroom by a modernizing familiesgraduallytook andreapthebenefitsof status,less prosperous a chanceand registereda tokendower.In this manner,the lower classesimitatedthedowerregistration practicesof theupperclassesin an attemptto increasetheirstatusand,in somecases,to receivemore gifts thana set dowerwouldhavebrought.Forthisreason,a groom might preferto recorda regulardower in an effort to avoid the of thebride'sfamily;a tokendowergenerally (unlimited) expectations was consideredto be "expensive."Whereasfor the better-offthe for economicsecurity,for dowerwas of relativelyminorimportance poorerwomenthe tokendowermeanttakingrisks.The stakeswere high:Thestrategymightbackfireif thebridedidnotreceivewhatshe andherfamilyhadexpected;andif onlya tokendowerwererecorded, she wouldnot even be able to excuseherhusbandfrommakingthe fullpayment. In othercases, a bride'spersonalconvictionsmightinduceherto downplaythe materialside of the marriage.Womenand theirkin sometimesmentionedideologicalreasonsto explaintheirpreference for a tokendower.Thoseof a strongreligiousconvictionoftencited the prophetichadlth,"Thelowerthe mahrthe greaterthe blessing" (aqalluhummahranaktharuhumbarakatan).Women on the left end

thedoweras relictof pasttimes(the of thepoliticalspectrum regarded

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theclasssystem.Theyemphasizedthe sale of women)thatsupported of the house together."Also, if a woman importance "buildingup knewthe manshe was to marryandtrustedhim, she mightnot care abouther dower,convincedthatgold meantlittle as comparedto a in particular, women suitablelife-partner. Undersuchcircumstances, who hadresourcesof theirownoftenwouldprefera tokendower,as thematerialside of themarriage, thiswouldfacilitatethearrangement of it notbeinga consideration. In genderterms,registeringa tokendowermeanttakinga risk:the brideandherfamilyhadto relyon thegroomandhis familyto bring thegiftsthatwererequired anddesired.Evenif thebridereceivedmore thansheexpected,thegroom'sfamilyexercisedcontroloverthenature of the gifts. Sucha doweris no longera clearandlegallyregistered right,and womenno longerare able to attemptto strengthentheir thefulldower. fromdemanding positionby refraining Registering householdgoods: a counterpractice?The discrepancy

betweenthe contractsandwomen'snarrativesis very differentwith respectto the registrationof householdgoods.Even lower middleclasswomenemphasizethatregisteringhouseholdgoodsis improper andis doneonlyby poorpeoplewho haveno trustin eachotherand who needto providesecurityfortheirdaughters. Theyarguethatit is self-evidentthat a husbandwill bringhis wife the best furniture available.Yet, the high percentageof contractsin whichhousehold goodsareregisteredindicatesthatfor manyof thesewomen,householdgoodswere,in fact,registered in theircontracts. The materialimplicationsof registeringhouseholdgoods are limited.Amongthe better-off,a brideinvariablyreceivesexpensive furniture.Amongthoselowerin the socialhierarchy,thereoftenis little correlationbetweenthe amountregisteredand the household tend to register goods the husbandbrought.Courtrepresentatives householdgoods using conventionalphrases,some specifyingthe mostbrides items,othersrecordingonlytheirvalue.Moreimportant, husbands their over furniture with forcing preferredstarting simple into debt. Analogousto recordinga set promptdower,registering was importantas a signal that the householdgoods as "addenda" womanhadrefrainedfrom"claiming." In the villages, on the otherhand, the meaningof registering householdgoodswas different.Whereasurbangroomswereexpected to bringhouseholdgoodseven if thesewerenot registered,thiswas notthecase in thevillage,wherethebridewas to purchasethemwith

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her dower. In al-Balad,half the dower usually was spent on gold and the otherhalf on householdgoods. Thus,whereasin Nablus recording household goods was regardedas a sign of distrustin the groom, in the rural areas recordingthem in the contractimplied a real shift of obligationsfrombrideto groom.This explainswhy, in the villages, the same category of men that introducedrecording a token dower those claiming a higher status- also was the first to registerhousehold goods. Once this process gained momentum and registering household goods became increasingly widespread, even village groomswho did not recordanythingin the contractscontributedto the costs of householdgoods. Toward consumptive property. In whatever way the dower was registered,brides always received gifts, often the most valuable propertythey ever acquired.Overtime, the natureof these dowergifts has changed. In the mandatory period, when sufficient cash was not always available, some rural brides acquired productive property. Although the norm at that time was that the dower should be paid in cash, at least until the 1940s it was difficult for ruralmen to pay the entire promptdower in this manner.Instead,the father of the groom sometimesofferedto registera piece of land or a numberof olive trees in the name of the bride(see also Granqvist1931: 119). Beginning in the late 1950s, this practicedecreased,as more men workedfor wages and cash became widely available. In the city, on the other hand, productivepropertywas never an importantcomponentof the dower, except perhapsfor smalleritems such as a sewing machine.Admittedly, beginning in the 1950s, some middle- and upper-classwomen, in particularthose who were professionallyemployed, put their prompt dower in a bank account or preferredto receive it as financial paper ratherthan gold. Still, gold, clothing, and household goods were the majorgifts bridesreceivedor purchasedwith theirpromptdower. For most women, gold was, and still is, the centralelement of the dower. By the late 1920s, gold jewellery had largely replaced silver (Weir 1989: 194). Gold jewellery served as a means to store wealth and as a form of security;if gold braceletswere registeredin the marriage contracts,theirweight was recorded.Both gold coins (22 carat) andheavy bracelets(21 carat)were an attractiveinvestmentsince they required little labor. Gradually, the "decorative" side of wearing jewellery became moreimportant.For the wealthy,gold jewellerywas not only a source of security, but also an expression of status. Increasingly those who could afford it began to wear smaller, but

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moreexpensivepiecesofjewellery,oftenimported piecesthatrequired hours skilled manufacture. of labor for their many Amongthe highly less well-offin the city,Italiangoldbecamemorefashionablebeginningin the 1960s,whilein the 1970s,thisalsowas thecasein villages like al-Balad,althoughto a lesserextent,as the21 caratbraceletsstill made up the majorpartof the dowergold. Italiangold was less valuableas an investment,as it was only 18 caratanda considerably largerpartof the priceconsistedof laborcosts andimportduties.In thelater1980s,however,Italiangoldbecameless popular,andin the villages some bridesturnedagainto gold coins. Overtime a larger part of the dowerwas spent on consumeritems, especiallywhen householdgoodsincreasingly in themarket. werepurchased socioPatternsrelatingto refugeewomendependon theirparticular economicpositionand location.Althoughcash was morereadily availablein thecoastalvillagesthanin theJabalNablusregion,some ruralwomenwho marriedbeforethe nakbahadreceivedproductive propertyas partof theirdower,just as thewomenin al-Baladsometimes did. Whereasin al-Baladthis was haltedwhen cash became morewidely available,refugeeslost access to productiveproperty becauseof the nakba.In some cases, the dowergifts in the camps were influencedby what brideswere used to receiving at home (except,of course,land).Theirdaughters,however,receiveddower giftssimilarto thoseof theurbanpoor. TheDeferredDower:a GreatDeception? The deferreddoweris a verydifferentmechanismforwomento gain access to propertythanthe promptdower.Womenare entitledto receivethe deferreddoweronlyif theyarerepudiated orwidowed,or have a validreasonto requesta dissolutionof marriageby the court (tafrlq).In the case of khul',whenherhusbandrepudiatesher for a consideration,she has to renounceher deferreddower and other rights.16

16 A woman also could stipulatein her marriagecontractthather husband had delegatedto her the powerto divorceherself.Inclusionof such a condition was rare;it was done in about0.1%of the contracts,and in approximately onequarterof the contractsin which such a stipulationwas included,the delegation was not limitedto a specificactionon the partof the husband(e.g., his marrying was problematic, anotherwife). Implementation becauseit was not clearwhether or not thehusbandcouldrevokethistalaq(Welchman1988:874).

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Talaq: receiving the deferreddower?For the earlieryears, official

registrationof taldq is not very reliable (a taldq pronouncedout of court was -

and still is -

valid). Other sources indicate that in the

mandatory period repudiation was not widespread in rural areas. Accordingto Granqvist,less than5% of the women in Artashad been divorced (1935: 269). A man was reluctantto repudiatehis wife, as this would mean not only that the dower he had paid would be lost, but also that he would again have to pay a dower for a new wife (Granqvist1935: 284). So the prompt dower served as a deterrentto repudiation.This is similarto what elderlywomen in al-Baladtold me. In a fit of anger a husband might send his wife away, but soon he would feel obliged to bringher back, as her laborwas crucialboth in the house and in the fields, and he could not affordto pay a dower for a new wife. In the eyes of the inhabitantsof al-Balad, divorce was something for rich urbanites.Indeed, not many women in al-Balad had been repudiated. Legal reformhas inducedmore men to registertalaq in court.Still, in the 1960s and 1970s there were on average only forty registered repudiationsfor every 1000 marriagecontracts;in the mid-1980s there were twenty-threeper 1000.17The numberof final repudiationswas considerablylower, as, in the years concerned,an average of 29% of these repudiationswere registeredin courtas havingbeen revoked. Did repudiatedwomen receive their deferreddower?In the 1970s and 1980s, 37%of the women who were finally repudiatedlitigatedin court to claim their deferreddower. This suggests both that many of them did not receive this dower automatically and that they were willing to fight for it. When it became possible to claim extended maintenance on the ground of arbitrarydivorce (talaq ta'assufi), a considerablenumberof finally repudiatedwomen did so; in the mid1980s almost one-third of them turned to court for extended maintenance. Poverty was a major incentive for women to request the court's intervention(althoughwomen from better-offfamilies also turnedto the courtif they did not receive the deferreddower).A repudiatedwife is requiredto leave her husband's house and usually returnsto her own family, unless she has an adult son with whom she can live or has a house of her own. As the maintenancestipendfor herself and 17 The first numberis based on data from the years 1964 and 1976; the second on data from the years 1984 and 1987. Repudiationhere does not include taldq for a compensation (khul).

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her childrenandthe caretakerwage are far too low to live on, she usuallybecomesfinanciallydependenton herown familyunlessshe has an independent sourceof income.Returning to a poorfamily,she as is soon to as frequently pressed remarry possible,often,if she has children,againstherwill, as she thenwill haveto give themup.Fora lower-classwoman,the deferreddoweroftenrepresentsa largesum of moneythatpotentiallymay strengthenher positionvis-a-visher own family.At the same time, an impoverishedhusbandmay face gravedifficultiesin payingthedeferreddower.Theimpactof poverty is evidentfromthe case summariesin whichmenpleadpovertyand offer to pay in instalments,andwomendemandthe amountof the promptdowernotyet received.Althoughsuchdetailswerenotalways recordedin thepost-mandatory period,in mostcasesa relativelylow deferreddowerwas registered,pointingto a lower-classbackground. In the 1980spaymentof the deferreddowerin instalmentswas still common,and men often bargainedabout the deferreddower by offeringto paya smallersumin cash. Whilewomenfrequently turnedto court,it was noteasyforthemto obtaintheir entitlements.As sessions often were adjourned,they neededthepatienceandsupportof theirrelativesandtimeandmoney to travelto the court.Once in courtthey had to fight attemptsto bargaindown the deferreddowerand to lower the monthlyinstala major ments.Theyalsohadto face theproblemof implementation, incentiveformanywomento settlefora lowercashsum.Inparticular, in timesof politicaltensionfew caseswerebroughtto theshari'acourt becauseimplementation involvedthe supportof thecivil (Israeli-run) administration. Finally,a man,wantingto repudiatehis wife might makeher life so miserablethatshe would opt for a khul' divorce, herrightsto thedeferreddower.Khul'was morecommon renouncing in the 1980s.18 thanunilateral repudiation, particularly Thelimitationsof tafriq.Did thelegalreformswhichgavewomen moreoptionsto obtaindissolutionof marriage(tafriq)withouthaving to renouncethe deferreddowerhave effects on women'saccess to It is truethatduringthemandatory periodwomenhadvery property? few validgroundsto requesta tafriq-divorce. Still,therewerewomen who initiateda separation,as, for instanceby demandingthe court's Theseoftenweretriple of theirhusband'srepudiation. confirmation 18 In 1964therewas one khul'divorceforeveryfinaltaliq; in 1976,therewas 1.6; in 1984, 3.3; andin 1987, 3.5.

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repudiationsthatthe husbandregrettedbut could not revoke,while the wife insistedon dissolving the marriage.Whenthe legal reformsgave women additional grounds to seek a judicial separation,the actual number of women litigating in court remained small; in the 1960s, 1970s, and mid-1980s therewere on average only ten cases of tafrlq for every 1000 marriages.19The two most importantgrounds for divorce were absence of the husbandand, increasingly,"discordand strife"(in which case, as noted, women do not automaticallyreceive theirdeferreddowerandotherentitlements). In practice,a woman's abilityto leave her husbandoften depended more on her relationwith her own kin than on her juridicalposition. Most commonly, a woman who felt ill-treatedby her husbandwould returnto her father'shouse "in a state of anger"(za'clna) and remain there as an offended and angry wife (har.dana).When her husband sent mediatorsto try to convince her to returnhome, she might place conditions on her return.If mediationdid not solve the problem,the har.danawife regularly sued for maintenanceand suitable housing, and the husbandthen triedto have her declaredndshiza(rebellious)in ordernot to be obliged to maintainher and to pressureher to return.In fact, this made it possible for a woman to obtaina divorce againsther husband's wishes, as she could then claim "discordand strife" (see also Antoun 1990: 42). In the 1960s, 1970s and mid-1980s,therewere on averagefour and a half khul'separationsfor every tafriq-dissolution.The main impetus for a woman to seek a tafrtq-dissolution was if her husband was absent or refused to consentto a khul'-separation.As noted, although the deferred dower may represent a considerable sum of money, especially for poor women, they often had to face majorobstacles to obtain this money. In particular,if they were interestedin obtaininga quick separationso thatthey mightremarry,manywomen opted for a khul'divorcein which they renouncedtheirdeferreddower. Widows: claiming as the exception. The material situation of a widow differs fundamentallyfrom that of a repudiatedwoman. This explainswhy only few widows - as comparedto divorc6es- turnto the courtto claim theirdeferreddower.20Before her husband'sestate is divided among his heirs (amongwhom the widow is included),the 19 The years analyzed are 1964, 1976, 1984, and 1987.

20 While many more widows than repudiated wives were entitled to the

deferreddower, only between one-thirdand one-quarterof the deferreddower cases were filed by widows.

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deferreddowermustfirstbe paidto her.Themannerin whichwidows dealwiththeirdeferreddowerresemblestheirattitudetowardinheritance.21If a widowhas at leastone son andherhusbandhas no other wives, she commonlyrenouncesherrightto the deferreddower.In suchcircumstances, theentireestateis inheritedby herchildren,who (in the case of sons),notonlyarelegallyobligatedto provideforher, but also are linkedto her by strongemotionalties. Both widows' narrativesandsummariesof courtcasesindicatethatwidowsdidnot hesitate to claim their deferreddower from their late husbands' agnatesif theydid not have sons, or if otherwives or theirchildren werecontending heirs. Thus,withregardto thepromptdower,women'snarratives pointto and the social between contracts systematicdiscrepancies marriage and limited locational contracts indicate Whereas the practice. very socialdifferences,thestorieswomentell aboutdowerpointto greater differences,especiallyin theBritishmandateperiod,bothbetweenthe averagesreceivedby ruralandurbanwomen,andbetweenwhatwas givento thewealthyandthepoor.Yetthestoriesalso indicatea rapid diminishingof thesedifferencesovertime,bothin ruralareaswhere the father's share has disappearedand husbandshave assumed increasedresponsibilityfor providinghouseholdgoods, and among theurbanlower-classes,wherehusbandshavea greaterabilityto pay theregistered sum. At the sametime, the narrativespointto a shift fromregistered promptdowerto gifts.Whereasduringthemandatory period,onlythe elitepresentedtheirdaughters withsubstantial gifts(dowry),thishas becomemuchmorecommon;evenin ruralareas,fathersgenerallyno when a longertakefromthe mahrandmay addto it. Furthermore, tokendoweris registered, thebridereceives,nota dowerto whichshe is legally entitled,but gifts offeredvoluntarilyby the groom.Over time,thegiftsreceivedby womenhavebecomeof a moreconsumptive nature,as indicatedfurtherby theshiftin registeringobligationsfrom regularpromptdowerto householdgoods. Onlysomewomenareentitledto claimthe deferreddower,which has becomecentralin the marriagecontracts,and even these have greatdifficultyobtainingthefull amountin practice,as divorceregistrationsandcourtcase summariesindicate.Whilemanyof them21 For a discussion of women's access to property through inheritance, see Moors (1994 forthcoming).

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especially widows and those who prefera rapidseparation- refrain from claiming the deferreddower, others- especially poorerwomen with childrenwho do not want to remarry- are preparedto put up a legal fight to gain theirentitlements. Constructinga Context:FromDower to Provider? To gain insight into the shifting meaningof dower in JabalNablus, I situate dower in the context of changing property relations and changesin the meaningof gender. The rural areas: from productive daughters to dependent wives. Although men often complain about the high costs involved in marriage, the social value of the promptdower appearsto have declined. For many men, rising housing costs - and not dower or the costs of the marriage celebrations- are the major obstacle to overcome in arranginga marriage.In the mandatoryperiod,when agriculturewas the majorsourceof livelihood and manypeasanthouseholdswere still engaged in subsistence production,sons in landowning households remainedlargely dependenton theirfatheruntilhis death.The cultural normrequiredthatbridesmove in with theirin-laws and that married sons remainin theirfather'shouse as long as he was alive; at most an additional room would be built for the new couple. In the 1950s, migrationincreased and agriculturequickly became a subsidiaryto variousforms of male wage-labor.Sons became less dependentupon their fathers, and it became socially accepted for a young couple to move into a house of their own. As the average cost of housing has increasedmorerapidlythanthe dower,buildinga house has become a largeroutlay for the groom's side thanthe dower.Women admittedly have a stake in their housing situation;but, in contrastto the dower, which belongs to the bride,the house belongs to the husband. At the same time, major transformationshave taken place in the gender division of labor. When productiveproperty,in the form of (access to) land and livestock, was still centralin social organization, kinshiprelationswere essential and women, who were active in various agriculturaltasks, were regardedas productive.When younger men increasinglyturnedto non-agrarianwork, changes occurrednot only in intergenerationalrelations but also in the gender division of labor.With cash income fromwage laborbecomingmoreimportantas a source of income and because it was mainly women who were involved in subsistenceactivities,women's labor generallyhas become

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less valued, women increasingly are defined as consumers rather than as producers, and they have defacto become economically dependent on their husbands. The redefinition of women as dependent wives rather than productive daughters has induced changes in the meaning and nature of the dower. Gradually, the bride's father has become less interested in taking a share of his daughter's dower, preferring that the groom spend his money on providing her with adequate housing.22 At the same time, conceptualizing women as consumers has had serious consequences for women's access to (productive) property. Until the 1960s, the dower signalled the beginning of a series of transactions in which village women bought and sold gold, cows, goats, and - to a lesser extent - land, depending on the market. Since the mid-1960s, however, women tend to sell their mahr gold not to purchase land and livestock, but to help their husband construct a house, to set him up in a small business, or to help him with the initial costs of migration. In part this is the result of the social "devaluation" of the dower. As land prices have risen much faster than the bride's share of the dower, women have less opportunity to buy this type of property. More important, however, is that independent ownership of productive property by women is discouraged, because such ownership conflicts with the greater emphasis on husbands as providers and women as (unproductive) consumers. It is within this context that the dower has become less important in property transfers. The emergence of the token dower can be seen both as a reflection of, and a contribution to, the shift from "daughter" to "wife". The groom no longer has to trust that the bride's father will convey the entire dower to his daughter, but rather the bride's family must have confidence in the groom's good intentions in providing the gifts. At the same time, the greater prominence of the deferred dower emphasizes a particular aspect of the conjugal relation: Women are regarded as needing property in the event of divorce and widowhood. Increasingly regarded as unproductive, women require a deferred dower so that they will not return to their family empty-handed. This shift in defining women (from "valuable" to "burdensome") is most 22 This argumentwas advancedby Rosenfeld(1980) in his discussionof dowerdevelopmentsin a villagein theLowerGalilee.Unfortunately, focusinghis attentionon the changingrelationsbetweenfathersand sons,he ignoresshiftsin the genderdivisionof laborandregardswomenas alwaysbeing"propertyless" andsubordinated (1980:210).

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evidentin the ruralareas,where the growingemphasison the deferred dowerhas been most prominent. The urbancontext:towardanotherform offemale productivity.The directionof historicalchange in the city, with its cash economy, has differedfrom thatof ruralareas.It is truethatin the city - and in the camps - the emphasis on conjugalityhas increased over time, and housing standardsand costs generally have risen more rapidly than the dower. Yet, these changes have not been as dramaticas in the rural areas. In the mandatoryperiod, there already was a greater emphasison conjugalityin Nablus thanin the ruralareas,and in those days urbanwomen, in contrastto their rural counterparts,generally were regarded as non-productive;even if they were active in the segregatedwomen's world, this activity was not recognized as productive work. It is not surprisingthat urbanwomen traditionallyhave investedtheirdowerin theirhusbands'endeavoursor in his house. It was in the city that educationfirst became availablefor women and thatprofessionalemploymentopportunitiesfor women developed. As female professionals increasingly are regarded as "productive members of society," the definition of these urbanwomen as nonproductive dependents has been modified. This has not, however, resulted in greater access to dower property. For women from a wealthy background,professionalemploymentonly made the dower less important.As heirs to theirfathers'property,marriedto wealthy men, they may alreadyhave achieved considerableeconomic autonomy. For social climbers,on the other hand- often younger refugee women who use their income to support their natal family - the material aspect of the dower remains of greater concern. Unlike previous generationswho sold their dower to purchaselivestock or, perhaps,land, these social climberstend to use the dower to support theirhusbandand children. Among the trend-settingurbanites, recording a token dower is related to the status-bearingaspects of receiving gifts rather than registering obligations, and is regarded as part of the process of modernization.The shift from promptto deferreddowerin such urban contracts can be interpretedin a similar manner.A (high) deferred doweremphasizesthe conjugaltie (ratherthanfinancialsecurityin the case of divorce), andit, too, is consideredan expressionof modernity. For these women, dowerpaymentsare relativelyunimportant,as they have access to other sources of property and are likely to receive valuablegifts (althoughthese will not be recordedas dower).

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Although the dower registrations of both rural and poorer women have to some extent followed the trend set by better-off urbanites, there are major differences. For rural women, registering a token dower and a high deferred dower is related to the shift in how they are perceived, that is, the shift from productive daughters to dependent wives. For lower-class urban women, such dower registrations imply taking a risk: They may receive more property at marriage, but have to wait and see. And while the deferred dower represents an important form of financial security in the case of divorce, in practice, it is difficult to obtain. About property and person. Why do women acquiesce in, or support, their limited control over dower property? The stories women tell indicate that they "give up dower property" in an effort to gain other advantages. First, the dower is not only "female property," but also part of the process of marriage. While women generally have lost control over the dower, they simultaneously have gained more say in their marriage arrangements, as it has become easier for women to refuse unattractive suitors. Many women interpret the process of historical change by focusing, not on the material assets they acquire at marriage, but on the person of the groom, including his capacity to provide. It is not unusual for women to attempt to bargain down the dower in order to marry a man about whom they are sure. Second, women situate themselves differentially on the crossroads of gender hierarchy and social inequalities. Among the elite (and later also the urban and rural lower classes), refraining from registering dower obligations indicates, not a loss of access to property, but a rise in social status. Some lower-class women, on the other hand, identifying with their male counterparts, prefer to register a token dower, as they regard it as a means to subvert class reproduction. Women in the rural areas have another reason to relish their declining control over property. Owning property, and in particular productive property, coincided for them with being defined as productive members of the household, which implied a very heavy workload rather than control over their own labor. As withdrawal from agricultural labor became an indicator of higher social status, women saw their loss of control in terms of gender as being compensated for both by a lighter workload and a higher social status. Once a husband has become the provider, it makes sense to invest in him.

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A Note on the Sources I have discussed changes in women's controlover dower propertyby working throughseveral different historical sources. While each of these sources representswomen's relation to dower property in a particularway, one aspect recurswith great tenacity: the (growing) emphasis on the husbandas provider.Legal reforms indicates a further shift from patrilinealitytowardsconjugality,defining women as wives ratherthan as daughters.The contracts,in which the deferred dower is increasinglyfrequent,underlinethe importanceof the loss of the husband as breadwinnerin case of divorce or widowhood. The limited numberof promptdower cases in the court recordsindicates that for many women, the conjugaltie is more importantthan control over dower property.Finally, the stories told by women, particularly those in the ruralareas,show thatwomen increasinglyareregardedas unproductivewhile husbandsareregardedas providers. Although in this respect the differentsources reinforceeach other, therealso are ambiguitiesand contradictions,not only among,but also within the sources.The law considershusbandsas providers,yet also entitles women to a dower and gives them full capacity to act with regardto property.Legal reformnot only emphasizesconjugality,but also gives women greater potential access to dower property, as options for tafrlqhave increasedandwomen have acquiredadditional material rights in the case of repudiation.At the same time, legal reform promotinggreaterequality between the spouses occasionally has workedto women's detriment. In the contracts, the greater centrality of the male provider is in this modifiedby the increasinglycommonregistrationof "addenda"; of the manner, a bride's disinterestin the material side marriageis balanced, to some extent, by her receiving certain legal guarantees (even if only in the form of household goods). At the same time, beginningin the mid-1980s,therehas been no furtherincreasein token dower registrations,and lower-class and ruralwomen, in particular, continue to register a regular amount as prompt dower, indicating some distrustin theirhusbands'futuresuccess as provider. Women's narrativesindicate, inversely, that even if the deferred dower has become dominantin the contracts,in social practice the prompt dower is considerably more importantfor women to gain access to property.It is true that brides receive the prompt dower increasinglyin the form of gifts ratherthan as a legal obligation,and that these gifts have become of a more consumptivenature,signalling

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the greateremphasison conjugality.Yet, kinshiphas remained Not onlydoeswomen'sabilityto claimthedeferreddower important. a to extenton kin support,butfathers'contribudepend considerable tions to the gifts women receive at marriagehave become more important. Althoughincreasingemphasison the husbandas provideris closely relatedto womenlosing access to, and controlover, their dowerproperty,the trendtowardconjugalityandfemaledependency is neithercompletenornecessarilyimposedon womenby men.The sourcesindicatethevariouswaysin whichthisprocessis modifiedor subverted,pointingto the differentpositionsvariouscategoriesof womentakeup, andprovidinginsightintothepossibleadvantagesof "givingupproperty."

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