Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

Are international environmental agreements effective? The case of trade in hazardous chemicals and persistent organic pollutants1 Tha´ıs N´ un ˜ez-Rocha Laboratoire d’Economie d’Orleans Inmaculada Mart´ınez-Zarzoso Georg-August University

April, 2018 1 Are international environmental agreements effective? The case of trade in hazardous chemicals and persistent organic pollutants 1 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

Outline

Motivation Methodology Data Results Conclusions

2 / 49

Figure 1: International Context

Basel Convention

Amendment 1995

Waste

Dangerous waste from developed countries to developing countries

1992

Rotterdam Convention Hazardous Chemicals (HC) Entry in force: 2004 Creation 1999

Stockholm Convention Persistent Organic Pollutants (POP) Entry in force: 2004 Creation 2001

Figure 2: International Context

Basel Convention

Amendment 1995

Waste

Dangerous waste from developed countries to developing countries

1992

PIC BAN

Rotterdam Convention

Stockholm Convention

Hazardous Chemicals (HC)

Persistent Organic Pollutants (POP)

Entry in force: 2004 Creation 1999

Entry in force: 2004 Creation 2001

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

Questions: • Were the Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions effective to stop

the trade (and consequently the use) of HCs and POPs?

5 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

Questions: • Were the Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions effective to stop

the trade (and consequently the use) of HCs and POPs? • Is there a decrease of HCs and POPs shipped from OECD to

non-OECD countries?

5 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

Motivation

6 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

Motivation • Literature

7 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

Motivation • Literature • Contribution

7 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

Motivation • Literature • Contribution • Stylized facts

7 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

Literature Review • Trade - environment and MEAs research • Three effects: scale, technique and composition

([Grossman and Krueger(1991)])

8 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

Literature Review • Trade - environment and MEAs research • Three effects: scale, technique and composition

([Grossman and Krueger(1991)]) • Separation of the composition effect: factor endowments and

environmental regulation differences ([Copeland(2003)])

8 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

Literature Review • Trade - environment and MEAs research • Three effects: scale, technique and composition

([Grossman and Krueger(1991)]) • Separation of the composition effect: factor endowments and

environmental regulation differences ([Copeland(2003)]) • Survey - [Mitchell(2003)]

8 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

Literature Review • Trade - environment and MEAs research • Three effects: scale, technique and composition

([Grossman and Krueger(1991)]) • Separation of the composition effect: factor endowments and

environmental regulation differences ([Copeland(2003)]) • Survey - [Mitchell(2003)] • Effects of a Waste Agreement - [Kellenberg and Levinson(2014)]:

Almost no evidence of less waste being traded

8 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

Contribution • We go a step forward and evaluate the effects on trade: Rotterdam and Stockholm Convention. With aggregated and disaggregated data and Time-effects. • Priored Informed Consent PIC Hazardous chemicals. HCs.

Rotterdam.

9 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

Contribution • We go a step forward and evaluate the effects on trade: Rotterdam and Stockholm Convention. With aggregated and disaggregated data and Time-effects. • Priored Informed Consent PIC Hazardous chemicals. HCs.

Rotterdam. • Ban of trade Persistent organic pollutants. POPs. Stockholm.

9 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

• Hazardous Chemicals (HCs) products are: both toxic and reactive

and have a great potential of damaging health when released. • Cancer, birth defects, genetic damage, miscarriages and even

death from relatively small exposures • Persistent Organic Pollutant (POPs) products related to:

cardiovascular diseases, cancer, obesity, and diabetes. • Hormone disruptors, alter the normal functioning of the endocrine

and reproductive systems in humans and wildlife.2

2 As

classified by the American Occupational Safety and Health administration 10 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

Stylized facts

11 / 49

Figure 3: Total imports in time

2000

Persistent organic pollutants

0

0

Thousands of tonnes 500 1000 1500

Thousands of tonnes 2000 4000 6000

8000

Hazardous chemicals

1995

2000

2005 years

Total Non-oecd from oecd

2010

2015

Non-oecd

1995

2000

2005 years

Total Non-oecd from oecd

point 2008

2010 Non-oecd

2015

Figure 4: Imports from developed to developing countries

Persistent organic pollutants

0

.1

Thousands of tonnes .1 .2 .3

Thousands of tonnes .2 .3 .4 .5

.6

.4

Hazardous chemicals

1995

2000

2005 years

One or both not ratify

2010 Both ratify

2015

1995

2000

2005 years

One or both not ratify

2010 Both ratify

2015

Figure 5: Imports by year of ratification

200

Persistent organic pollutants

0

0

Thousands of tonnes 200 400

Thousands of tonnes 50 100 150

600

Hazardous chemicals

2000

2005

2010 years

Importer ratifies

2015

2000

2005

2010 years

Exporter ratifies

Importer ratifies

Exporter ratifies

2015

Figure 6: Importations before and after ratification

OECD to non-OECD shipments before and after ratification

Hazardous chemicals

Persistent organic pollutants

0

0

Thousands of tonnes .5 1

Thousands of tonnes .1 .2 .3 .4

.5

1.5

OECD to non-OECD shipments before and after ratification

-10

-5

0 years Imp. ratifies

5

10

-10

Exp. ratifies

Ratifiers

-5

0 years Imp. ratifies

What about when both ratify?

5 Exp. ratifies

10

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

Methodology

16 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

Explained variable

Imports of HCs or POPs in quantities! Ln(Mijkt) i: importer, j:exporter, k:product, t: year Products : BACI 1992 nomenclature • Rotterdam harmonized system (HS) 6-digit.

3 These

codes where given by a division of the Chemical American Society. 17 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

Explained variable

Imports of HCs or POPs in quantities! Ln(Mijkt) i: importer, j:exporter, k:product, t: year Products : BACI 1992 nomenclature • Rotterdam harmonized system (HS) 6-digit. • Stockholm CAS3 (international chemical products) codes,

converted into (HS) 6-digit.

3 These

codes where given by a division of the Chemical American Society. 17 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

Rotterdam codes and names of products 1992 290351 290359 290361 290362 290369 291010 291020 291030 291090 291470 380810 380820 380830 380840 380890

Rotterdam HCs Product code HS ”Hexachlorocyclohexane” ”Halogenated cyclanic/cyclenic/cycloterpen hydrocarbon” ”Chlorobenzene, o-dichlorobenzene and p-dichlorobenzen” ”Hexachlorobenzene and DDT” ”Halogenated derivatives of aromatic hydrocarbons, nes” ”Oxirane (ethylene oxide)” ”Methyloxirane (propylene oxide)” ”1-chloro-2,3-epoxypropane(epichlorohy-drin)” ”Epoxides, epoxy-alcohols,-phenols,-ethers nes, derivs” ”Derivatives of ketones and quinones” ”Insecticides, packaged for retail sale” ”Fungicides, packaged for retail sale” ”Herbicides, sprouting and growth regulators” ”Disinfectants, packaged for retail sale” ”Pesticides, rodenticides, nes, for retail sale”

18 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

Stockholm codes and names of products 1992 290359 290362 291619 291819 291890 292520 293090

Stockholm POPs Product code HS ”Halogenated cyclanic/cyclenic/cycloterpen hydrocarbon” ”Hexachlorobenzene and DDT” ”Unsaturated acyclic monocarboxylic acids, derivatives” ”Carboxylic acids (alcohol function only), derivatives” ”Carboxylic acids nes, derivativess” ”Imines, derivatives, salts thereof” ”Organo-sulphur compounds, nes”

19 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

Explanatory variables • Gravity variables

20 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

Explanatory variables • Gravity variables • Dummy variable from OECD to non-OECD

20 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

Explanatory variables • Gravity variables • Dummy variable from OECD to non-OECD • Dummy variable Convention Ratification

20 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

Explanatory variables • Gravity variables • Dummy variable from OECD to non-OECD • Dummy variable Convention Ratification • Interaction from OECD to non-OECD x Convention Ratification

20 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

The reduced form of the model of Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) to control for the MRF

Mijt =

Yit Yjt tijt 1−σ ( ) YtW Pit Pjt

(1)

The empirical specification in log-linear form is given by

lnMijt = lnYit + lnYjt − lnYtW + (1 − σ)lntijt − (1 − σ)lnPit − (1 − σ)lnPjt (2)

ln(Mijkt ) = β0 + β1 lnYit + β2 lnYjt + β3 lnDistij + β4 Contigij + β5 Comlangij + β6 Comcolij + β7 RTAijt + β8 WTOijt + β9 Comcur ijt + β10 IEAijt + β11 Σg Groupij + β12 Σg Groupij ∗ IEAijt + γt + θk + µijkt (3) 21 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

ln(Mijkt ) = β0 + β1 RTAijt + β2 WTOijt + β3 Comcurijt + β4 IEAijt + β11 Σg Groupij + β12 Σg Groupij ∗ IEAijt + Σdiy Iiy + (4) Σdjy Iiy + γt + θk + µijkt Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and Head and Mayer (2014), panel data techniques can be used to avoid endogeneity bias incorporating bilateral effects in a log-levels specification.

ln(Mijkt ) = β0 + β1 FTAijt + β2 WTOijt + β3 Comcurijt + β4 IEAijt + β11 Σg Groupij + β12 Σg Groupij ∗ IEAijt + Σdiy Iiy +

(5)

Σdjy Iiy + θijk + γt + µijkt

22 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

Data

23 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

The multi-dimensional panel data during the period from 1995 to 2012 has four components: 1. The HCs and POPs Trade: • Baci-CEPII

2. Gravity variables • Gravity-CEPII

3. Convention Ratification • InforMEA

4. Developed and developing countries division • OECD

24 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

Results

25 / 49

Main results Rotterdam Convention VARIABLES OECD to non-OECD OECD to OECD Non-OECD to OECD Importer ratifies ROT Exporter ratifies ROT Both ratify ROT

Gravity variables (1) (2) Ln(Imports) Ln(Imports) -1.104*** (0.0436) -1.648*** (0.0560) -1.272*** (0.0599) 0.106** (0.0432) 0.0655* (0.0396) -0.142*** (0.0474)

Imp ratifies ROT x OECD to non-OECD

-1.115*** (0.0487) -1.642*** (0.0561) -1.265*** (0.0599) 0.0109 (0.0511) 0.148*** (0.0470) -0.134** (0.0599) 0.295*** (0.0738)

Country-time5 dummies (3) (4) Ln(Imports) Ln(Imports) 3.674*** (0.506) 7.030*** (0.595) 2.755*** (0.318)

3.682*** (0.508) 6.962*** (0.597) 2.728*** (0.318)

-0.0548 (0.0363)

-0.0447 (0.0424) 0.0426 (0.0681)

Country-time5 dummies & ijk FE (5) (6) Ln(Imports) Ln(Imports)

-0.0542** (0.0218)

-0.0310 (0.0268) -0.00195 (0.0477)

Exp ratifies ROT x OECD to non-OECD

-0.184*** (0.0550)

-0.111** (0.0522)

-0.0730** (0.0359)

Both ratify ROT x OECD to non-OECD

-0.0740 (0.0895)

-0.0440 (0.0825)

-0.0513 (0.0584)

Observations R-squared Time dummies Product dummies Country-and-time dummies Dyadic-sector fixed effects Ratification-country group interaction terms Number of ijk

209,951 0.255 YES YES NO NO NO

209,951 0.255 YES YES NO NO YES

209,951 0.349 YES YES YES NO NO

209,951 0.349 YES YES YES NO YES

209,951 0.067 YES YES YES YES NO 25,9

Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets, ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. In column (1)-(4) other gravity controls, but the coefficients are not shown to save space. The ”importer (or exporter) ratifies” variable is encoded as a dummy variable equal to one if the importer (or exporter) ratifies and zero otherwise. The ”both ratify” dummy takes the value of one when the two trade partners are ratifier countries in a given year.

209,951 0.067 YES YES YES YES YES 25,9

Main results Stockholm Convention VARIABLES OECD to non-OECD OECD to OECD Non-OECD to OECD Importer ratifies STO Exporter ratifies STO Both ratify STO

Gravity variables (1) (2) Ln(Imports) Ln(Imports) -1.188*** (0.0784) -1.427*** (0.0961) -0.405*** (0.109) -0.147* (0.0801) 0.237*** (0.0765) -0.0208 (0.0871)

-1.221*** (0.0838) -1.428*** (0.0961) -0.407*** (0.109) -0.163* (0.0931) 0.254*** (0.0916) -0.0413 (0.109)

Country-time5 dummies (3) (4) Ln(Imports) Ln(Imports) 4.913*** (0.832) 9.344*** (0.989) 4.545*** (0.552)

5.051*** (0.837) 9.469*** (0.992) 4.553*** (0.551)

0.00223 (0.0650)

-0.0436 (0.0732)

Country-time5 dummies & ijk FE (5) (6) Ln(Imports) Ln(Imports)

0.0143 (0.0381)

0.0209 (0.0439)

Imp ratifies STO x OECD to non-OECD

0.0613 (0.113)

-0.253** (0.103)

-0.157** (0.0798)

Exp ratifies STO x OECD to non-OECD

-0.0509 (0.103) 0.0721 (0.149)

0.0286 (0.0877) 0.267** (0.133)

-0.0820 (0.0601) 0.0887 (0.0988)

Both ratify STO x OECD to non-OECD

Observations R-squared Time dummies Product dummies Country-and-time dummies Dyadic-sector fixed effects Ratification-country group interaction terms Number of ijk

91,673 0.219 YES YES NO NO NO

91,673 0.219 YES YES NO NO YES

91,673 0.318 YES YES YES NO NO

91,673 0.318 YES YES YES NO YES

91,673 0.069 YES YES YES YES NO 11,675

Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets, ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. In column (1)-(4) other gravity controls, but the coefficients are not shown to save space. The ”importer (or exporter) ratifies” variable is encoded as a dummy variable equal to one if the importer (or exporter) ratifies and zero otherwise. The ”both ratify” dummy takes the value of one when the two trade partners are ratifier countries in a given year.

91,673 0.069 YES YES YES YES YES 11,675

Figure 7: What about the evolution of imports in time?

Stockholm Time Dummies

−2 −3

coefficients

−4

0.0 −0.5

−5

97−99**, 05−09* 97*, 00−12***

−6

−1.0

coefficients

0.5

−1

0

1.0

Rotterdam Time Dummies

1995

2000

2005

year

2010

1995

2000

2005

year

2010

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

Robustness • The gravity model: 2-digits (Rotterdam)

here and 4-digits (Stockholm) here disaggregation and completely aggregated (mitigate the problem of zero-trade flows) here and here .

29 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

Robustness • The gravity model: 2-digits (Rotterdam)

here and 4-digits (Stockholm) here disaggregation and completely aggregated (mitigate the problem of zero-trade flows) here and here .

• Results show that the effect in case of Rotterdam increases in case

of Stockholm maintains the sign but the significance vanishes.

29 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

Robustness • The gravity model: 2-digits (Rotterdam)

here and 4-digits (Stockholm) here disaggregation and completely aggregated (mitigate the problem of zero-trade flows) here and here .

• Results show that the effect in case of Rotterdam increases in case

of Stockholm maintains the sign but the significance vanishes. • Time-effects are negative and significant, and bigger in size for

both conventions.

here

29 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

Robustness • The gravity model: 2-digits (Rotterdam)

here and 4-digits (Stockholm) here disaggregation and completely aggregated (mitigate the problem of zero-trade flows) here and here .

• Results show that the effect in case of Rotterdam increases in case

of Stockholm maintains the sign but the significance vanishes. • Time-effects are negative and significant, and bigger in size for

both conventions.

here

• Disaggregated estimates by region of developing countries . The

results show an effect only for Rotterdam with the Africa and America regions. here

29 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

Robustness • The gravity model: 2-digits (Rotterdam)

here and 4-digits (Stockholm) here disaggregation and completely aggregated (mitigate the problem of zero-trade flows) here and here .

• Results show that the effect in case of Rotterdam increases in case

of Stockholm maintains the sign but the significance vanishes. • Time-effects are negative and significant, and bigger in size for

both conventions.

here

• Disaggregated estimates by region of developing countries . The

results show an effect only for Rotterdam with the Africa and America regions. here • Probit model, with the inverse Milles ratio to mitigate

zero-problem. Signs remain an coefficient increases for Rotterdam Convention and Stockholm Convention, significance vanishes. here

29 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

Conclusions

30 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

• Both the Stockholm and the Rotterdam Conventions have been

partially effective in reducing trade in HCs and POPs.

31 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

• Both the Stockholm and the Rotterdam Conventions have been

partially effective in reducing trade in HCs and POPs. • Rotterdam Convention the effect is a decrease in imports of about

7%.

31 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

• Both the Stockholm and the Rotterdam Conventions have been

partially effective in reducing trade in HCs and POPs. • Rotterdam Convention the effect is a decrease in imports of about

7%. • Around 16% for Stockholm Convention, which is nearly twice the effect found for the Rotterdam Convention, most probably due to the ban.

31 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

• Both the Stockholm and the Rotterdam Conventions have been

partially effective in reducing trade in HCs and POPs. • Rotterdam Convention the effect is a decrease in imports of about

7%. • Around 16% for Stockholm Convention, which is nearly twice the effect found for the Rotterdam Convention, most probably due to the ban. • These effects are found after controlling for different sources of

unobservable heterogeneity and is robust to changes in the specification.

31 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

• Both the Stockholm and the Rotterdam Conventions have been

partially effective in reducing trade in HCs and POPs. • Rotterdam Convention the effect is a decrease in imports of about

7%. • Around 16% for Stockholm Convention, which is nearly twice the effect found for the Rotterdam Convention, most probably due to the ban. • These effects are found after controlling for different sources of

unobservable heterogeneity and is robust to changes in the specification. • Aggregation effect matters, this could change the results of

previous works.

31 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

• Both the Stockholm and the Rotterdam Conventions have been

partially effective in reducing trade in HCs and POPs. • Rotterdam Convention the effect is a decrease in imports of about

7%. • Around 16% for Stockholm Convention, which is nearly twice the effect found for the Rotterdam Convention, most probably due to the ban. • These effects are found after controlling for different sources of

unobservable heterogeneity and is robust to changes in the specification. • Aggregation effect matters, this could change the results of

previous works. • Further research in single products is suggested.

31 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

• Both the Stockholm and the Rotterdam Conventions have been

partially effective in reducing trade in HCs and POPs. • Rotterdam Convention the effect is a decrease in imports of about

7%. • Around 16% for Stockholm Convention, which is nearly twice the effect found for the Rotterdam Convention, most probably due to the ban. • These effects are found after controlling for different sources of

unobservable heterogeneity and is robust to changes in the specification. • Aggregation effect matters, this could change the results of

previous works. • Further research in single products is suggested. • Further research about ’wrong’ codification of products is

suggested.

31 / 49

Motivation

Methodology

Data

Results

Conclusions

Thank you! Thais and Inma [email protected] [email protected]

32 / 49

Figure 6

Table 1: Information taken from the convention website Rotterdam convention ratification year Algeria NR Hungary 2000 Panama Argentina 2004 Iceland NR Paraguay Australia 2004 India 2005 Peru Austria 2002 Indonesia 2013 Philippines Bangladesh NR Ireland 2005 Poland Belgium 2002 Israel 2011 Portugal Bolivia 2003 Italy 2002 Romania Brazil 2004 Jamaica 2002 Russian Federation Bulgaria 2000 Japan 2004 Senegal Canada 2002 Jordan 2002 Singapore Chile 2005 Kenya 2005 Slovakia China 2005 Korea, Republic of 2003 Slovenia Colombia 2008 Latvia 2003 South Africa Costa Rica 2006 Lithuania 2004 Spain Croatia 2007 Macedonia, Republic of 2010 Sri Lanka Czech Republic 2000 Madagascar 2004 Sweden Denmark 2004 Malawi 2009 Switzerland Dominican Republic 2006 Malaysia 2002 Thailand Ecuador 2004 Malta NR* Trinidad and Tobago Egypt NR Mauritius 2005 Tunisia El Salvador 1999 Mexico 2005 Turkey Estonia 2006 Morocco 2011 Uganda Ethiopia 2003 Mozambique 2010 Ukraine Finland 2004 Netherlands 2000 United Kingdom France 2004 New Zealand 2003 United States of America Germany 2001 Nicaragua 2008 Uruguay Greece 2003 Nigeria 2001 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) Guatemala 2010 Norway 2001 Viet Nam Honduras 2011 Pakistan 2005 Zambia * The EU ratified as a Union in 2002. Zimbabwe Malta join the EU in 2004. But still no information about ratification has been displayed in InforMEA web site

2000 2005 2005 2006 2005 2005 2003 2011 2001 2005 2007 1999 2002 2004 2006 2003 2002 2002 2009 NR NR 2008 2002 2004 NR 2003 2005 2007 2011 2012

Figure 6

Table 2: Information taken from the convention website Stockholm convention ratification year Algeria 2006 Hungary 2008 Panama Argentina 2005 Iceland 2002 Paraguay Australia 2004 India 2006 Peru Austria 2002 Indonesia 2009 Philippines Bangladesh 2007 Ireland 2010 Poland Belgium 2006 Israel NR Portugal Bolivia 2003 Italy NR Romania Brazil 2004 Jamaica 2007 Russian Federation Bulgaria 2004 Japan 2002 Senegal Canada 2001 Jordan 2004 Singapore Chile 2005 Kenya 2004 Slovakia China 2004 Korea, Republic of 2007 Slovenia Colombia 2008 Latvia 2004 South Africa Costa Rica 2007 Lithuania 2006 Spain Croatia 2007 Macedonia, Republic of 2004 Sri Lanka Czech Republic 2002 Madagascar 2005 Sweden Denmark 2003 Malawi 2009 Switzerland Dominican Republic 2007 Malaysia NR Thailand Ecuador 2004 Malta NR* Trinidad and Tobago Egypt 2003 Mauritius 2004 Tunisia El Salvador 2008 Mexico 2003 Turkey Estonia 2013 Morocco 2004 Uganda Ethiopia 2003 Mozambique 2005 Ukraine Finland 2002 Netherlands 2002 United Kingdom France 2004 New Zealand 2004 United States of America Germany 2002 Nicaragua 2005 Uruguay Greece 2006 Nigeria 2004 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) Guatemala 2008 Norway 2002 Viet Nam Honduras 2005 Pakistan 2008 Zambia * The EU ratified as a Union in 2002. Zimbabwe Malta join the EU in 2004. But still no information about ratification has been displayed in InforMEA web site

2003 2004 2005 2004 2008 2004 2004 2011 2003 2005 2002 2004 2002 2004 2005 2002 2003 2005 2002 2004 2009 2004 2007 2005 NR 2004 2005 2002 2006 2012

35 / 49

Figure 3

36 / 49

Figure 8: Imports before and after ratification

OECD to non-OECD shipments before and after ratification

Hazardous chemicals

Persistent organic pollutants

Thousands of tonnes .5 1 0

0

Thousands of tonnes .5 1 1.5

2

1.5

OECD to non-OECD shipments before and after ratification

-10

-5

0 years Imp. ratifies Both ratify

5

10

Exp. ratifies

-10

-5

0 years Imp. ratifies Both ratify

5

10

Exp. ratifies

Figure 6

37 / 49

Rotterdam Main results Rotterdam Convention

VARIABLES Ln(GDP) importer Ln(GDP) exporter Non-OECD from OECD OECD from OECD OECD from non-OECD Ln(distance) Contiguity Common language Colony ties RTA WTO Common currency Importer ratifies ROT Exporter ratifies ROT Both ratify ROT

Gravity variables (1) (2) Ln(Imports) Ln(Imports) 0.450*** (0.0102) 0.615*** (0.0114) -1.104*** (0.0436) -1.648*** (0.0560) -1.272*** (0.0599) -0.478*** (0.0214) 0.537*** (0.0639) 0.238*** (0.0403) 0.149* (0.0835) 0.290*** (0.0388) 0.119*** (0.0334) 0.687*** (0.0742) 0.106** (0.0432) 0.0655* (0.0396) -0.142*** (0.0474)

0.449*** (0.0102) 0.615*** (0.0115) -1.115*** (0.0487) -1.642*** (0.0561) -1.265*** (0.0599) -0.480*** (0.0214) 0.536*** (0.0640) 0.236*** (0.0403) 0.135 (0.0832) 0.290*** (0.0389) 0.114*** (0.0333) 0.685*** (0.0744) 0.0109 (0.0511) 0.148*** (0.0470) -0.134** (0.0599) 0.295*** (0.0738) -0.184*** (0.0550) -0.0740 (0.0895)

209,951 0.255 YES YES NO NO NO

209,951 0.255 YES YES NO NO YES

Imp. ratifies ROT x non-OECD from OECD Exp. ratifies ROT x non-OECD from OECD Both ratify ROT x non-OECD from OECD Observations R-squared Time dummies Product dummies Country-and-time dummies Dyadic-sector fixed effects Ratification-country group interaction terms Number of ijk

Country-time5 dummies (3) (4) Ln(Imports) Ln(Imports)

3.674*** (0.506) 7.030*** (0.595) 2.755*** (0.318) -0.825*** (0.0262) 0.472*** (0.0635) 0.0803* (0.0468) -0.0648 (0.0943) 0.171*** (0.0435) 0.156*** (0.0455) 0.452*** (0.0813)

3.682*** (0.508) 6.962*** (0.597) 2.728*** (0.318) -0.822*** (0.0261) 0.475*** (0.0635) 0.0804* (0.0468) -0.0661 (0.0942) 0.171*** (0.0435) 0.153*** (0.0455) 0.435*** (0.0817)

-0.0548 (0.0363)

209,951 0.349 YES YES YES NO NO

Country-time5 dummies & ijk FE (5) (6) Ln(Imports) Ln(Imports)

0.134*** (0.0333) 0.174*** (0.0429) 0.160** (0.0633)

0.135*** (0.0334) 0.174*** (0.0430) 0.138** (0.0632)

-0.0447 (0.0424) 0.0426 (0.0681) -0.111** (0.0522) -0.0440 (0.0825)

-0.0542** (0.0218)

-0.0310 (0.0268) -0.00195 (0.0477) -0.0730** (0.0359) -0.0513 (0.0584)

209,951 0.349 YES YES YES NO YES

209,951 0.067 YES YES YES YES NO 25,9

209,951 0.067 YES YES YES YES YES 25,9

Stockholm Main results Stockholm Convention

VARIABLES Ln(GDP) importer Ln(GDP) exporter Non-OECD from OECD OECD from OECD OECD from non-OECD Ln(distance) Contiguity Common language Colony ties RTA WTO Common currency Importer ratifies STO Exporter ratifies STO Both ratify STO

Gravity variables (1) (2) Ln(Imports) Ln(Imports) 0.603*** (0.0181) 0.812*** (0.0195) -1.188*** (0.0784) -1.427*** (0.0961) -0.405*** (0.109) -0.362*** (0.0368) 0.399*** (0.0933) 0.166** (0.0686) 0.376*** (0.141) 0.0237 (0.0703) 0.0701 (0.0595) 0.795*** (0.0969) -0.147* (0.0801) 0.237*** (0.0765) -0.0208 (0.0871)

0.602*** (0.0181) 0.812*** (0.0196) -1.221*** (0.0838) -1.428*** (0.0961) -0.407*** (0.109) -0.363*** (0.0369) 0.399*** (0.0933) 0.166** (0.0686) 0.372*** (0.141) 0.0187 (0.0705) 0.0688 (0.0594) 0.799*** (0.0973) -0.163* (0.0931) 0.254*** (0.0916) -0.0413 (0.109) 0.0613 (0.113) -0.0509 (0.103) 0.0721 (0.149)

91,673 0.219 YES YES NO NO NO

91,673 0.219 YES YES NO NO YES

Imp ratifies STO x non-OECD from OECD Exp ratifies STO x non-OECD from OECD Both ratify STO x non-OECD from OECD Observations R-squared Time dummies Product dummies Country-and-time dummies Dyadic-sector fixed effects Ratification-country group interaction terms Number of ijk

Country-time5 dummies (3) (4) Ln(Imports) Ln(Imports)

4.913*** (0.832) 9.344*** (0.989) 4.545*** (0.552) -0.647*** (0.0437) 0.599*** (0.0918) 0.0167 (0.0814) -0.0762 (0.173) -0.0542 (0.0799) 0.359*** (0.0852) 0.163 (0.114)

5.051*** (0.837) 9.469*** (0.992) 4.553*** (0.551) -0.651*** (0.0438) 0.598*** (0.0918) 0.0155 (0.0813) -0.0644 (0.173) -0.0517 (0.0799) 0.361*** (0.0852) 0.167 (0.114)

0.00223 (0.0650)

91,673 0.318 YES YES YES NO NO

Country-time5 dummies & ijk FE (5) (6) Ln(Imports) Ln(Imports)

0.00556 (0.0567) 0.457*** (0.0754) 0.226** (0.0960)

0.00658 (0.0567) 0.458*** (0.0754) 0.215** (0.0960)

-0.0436 (0.0732) -0.253** (0.103) 0.0286 (0.0877) 0.267** (0.133)

0.0143 (0.0381)

0.0209 (0.0439) -0.157** (0.0798) -0.0820 (0.0601) 0.0887 (0.0988)

91,673 0.318 YES YES YES NO YES

91,673 0.069 YES NO YES YES NO 11,675

91,673 0.069 YES NO YES YES YES 11,675

Robustness Rotterdam OLS (two-digit disaggregation)

VARIABLES Ln(GDP) importer Ln(GDP) exporter Non-OECD from OECD OECD from OECD OECD from non-OECD Ln(distance) Contiguity Common language Colony ties RTA WTO Common currency Importer ratifies ROT Exporter ratifies ROT Both ratify ROT

Gravity variables (1) (2) Ln(Imports) Ln(Imports) 0.610*** (0.0189) 0.921*** (0.0200) -1.247*** (0.0811) -1.935*** (0.108) -1.699*** (0.105) -0.732*** (0.0405) 0.769*** (0.132) 0.476*** (0.0762) 0.328** (0.154) 0.314*** (0.0745) 0.146** (0.0613) 0.869*** (0.158) 0.199*** (0.0770) 0.233*** (0.0716) -0.238*** (0.0844)

0.609*** (0.0189) 0.921*** (0.0200) -1.209*** (0.0880) -1.932*** (0.108) -1.689*** (0.106) -0.734*** (0.0405) 0.768*** (0.132) 0.474*** (0.0762) 0.311** (0.153) 0.319*** (0.0746) 0.140** (0.0612) 0.863*** (0.158) 0.126 (0.0874) 0.384*** (0.0839) -0.303*** (0.104) 0.256* (0.138) -0.346*** (0.0972) 0.0740 (0.166)

72,176 0.311 YES YES NO NO NO

72,176 0.312 YES YES NO NO YES

Imp. ratifies ROT x non-OECD from OECD Exp. ratifies ROT x non-OECD from OECD Both ratify ROT x non-OECD from OECD Observations R-squared Time dummies Product dummies Country-and-time dummies Dyadic-sector fixed effects Ratification-country group interaction terms Number of ijhs6

Country-time5 dummies (3) (4) Ln(Imports) Ln(Imports)

5.159*** (0.869) 10.48*** (1.015) 4.510*** (0.527) -1.234*** (0.0473) 0.510*** (0.128) 0.179** (0.0794) 0.0220 (0.171) 0.184** (0.0784) 0.230*** (0.0737) 0.573*** (0.146)

5.223*** (0.874) 10.38*** (1.018) 4.459*** (0.526) -1.230*** (0.0472) 0.513*** (0.128) 0.179** (0.0795) 0.0181 (0.171) 0.185** (0.0786) 0.225*** (0.0738) 0.542*** (0.146)

-0.143** (0.0611)

72,176 0.480 YES YES YES NO NO

Country-time5 dummies & ijk FE (5) (6) Ln(Imports) Ln(Imports)

0.0816 (0.0524) 0.245*** (0.0675) 0.180 (0.111)

0.0825 (0.0525) 0.244*** (0.0676) 0.132 (0.111)

-0.129* (0.0698) -0.00420 (0.118) -0.216** (0.0856) -0.0212 (0.142)

-0.134*** (0.0364)

-0.0778* (0.0449) -0.0300 (0.0759) -0.102* (0.0591) -0.117 (0.0943)

72,176 0.480 YES YES YES NO YES

72,176 0.101 YES YES YES YES NO 7,254

72,176 0.102 YES YES YES YES YES 7,254

Robustness Stockholm OLS (four-digit disaggregation)

VARIABLES Ln(GDP) importer Ln(GDP) exporter Non-OECD from OECD OECD from OECD OECD from Non-OECD Ln(distance) Contiguity Common language Colony ties RTA WTO Common currency Importer ratifies STO Exporter ratifies STO Both ratify STO

Gravity variables (1) (2) Ln(Imports) Ln(Imports) 0.591*** (0.0203) 0.766*** (0.0225) -1.099*** (0.0887) -1.364*** (0.108) -0.486*** (0.122) -0.309*** (0.0412) 0.374*** (0.111) 0.123 (0.0801) 0.421*** (0.143) 0.0350 (0.0784) 0.134** (0.0670) 0.821*** (0.112) -0.138 (0.0903) 0.265*** (0.0853) -0.0148 (0.0975)

0.590*** (0.0202) 0.766*** (0.0226) -1.115*** (0.0946) -1.363*** (0.108) -0.488*** (0.122) -0.310*** (0.0412) 0.374*** (0.111) 0.122 (0.0801) 0.416*** (0.143) 0.0309 (0.0787) 0.131** (0.0668) 0.823*** (0.112) -0.156 (0.105) 0.302*** (0.102) -0.0382 (0.122) 0.0731 (0.129) -0.103 (0.113) 0.0804 (0.167)

80,720 0.181 YES YES NO NO NO

80,720 0.181 YES YES NO NO YES

Imp ratifies STO x non-OECD from OECD Exp ratifies STO x non-OECD from OECD Both ratify STO x non-OECD from OECD Observations R-squared Time dummies Product dummies Country-and-time dummies Dyadic-sector fixed effects Ratification-country group interaction terms Number of ijhs6

Country-time5 dummies (3) (4) Ln(Imports) Ln(Imports)

5.295*** (0.776) 9.727*** (1.032) 4.521*** (0.683) -0.604*** (0.0507) 0.548*** (0.111) -0.000910 (0.0967) -0.0679 (0.180) -0.0401 (0.0895) 0.409*** (0.0876) 0.155 (0.134)

5.470*** (0.784) 9.858*** (1.038) 4.523*** (0.683) -0.607*** (0.0507) 0.548*** (0.111) -0.00224 (0.0966) -0.0559 (0.180) -0.0370 (0.0896) 0.413*** (0.0876) 0.158 (0.134)

-0.00893 (0.0713)

80,720 0.284 YES YES YES NO NO

Country-time5 dummies & ijk FE (5) (6) Ln(Imports) Ln(Imports)

-0.0160 (0.0595) 0.493*** (0.0787) 0.206** (0.102)

-0.0147 (0.0596) 0.497*** (0.0787) 0.192* (0.102)

-0.0451 (0.0809) -0.280** (0.115) 0.0142 (0.0963) 0.253* (0.150)

-0.00331 (0.0398)

0.0223 (0.0458) -0.195** (0.0828) -0.0412 (0.0624) 0.0420 (0.102)

80,720 0.284 YES YES YES NO YES

80,720 0.075 YES NO YES YES NO 9,862

80,720 0.075 YES NO YES YES YES 9,862

Robustness Rotterdam OLS (aggregated)

VARIABLES Ln(GDP) importer Ln(GDP) exporter Non-OECD from OECD OECD from OECD OECD from non-OECD Ln(distance) Contiguity Common language Colony ties RTA WTO Common currency Importer ratifies ROT Exporter ratifies ROT Both ratify ROT

Gravity variables (1) (2) Ln(Imports) Ln(Imports) 0.586*** (0.0204) 0.980*** (0.0215) -1.230*** (0.0879) -2.047*** (0.117) -1.916*** (0.113) -0.832*** (0.0421) 0.883*** (0.134) 0.616*** (0.0815) 0.298* (0.176) 0.413*** (0.0775) 0.231*** (0.0662) 0.564*** (0.167) 0.177** (0.0820) 0.205*** (0.0777) -0.133 (0.0890)

0.585*** (0.0204) 0.980*** (0.0215) -1.243*** (0.0967) -2.045*** (0.117) -1.906*** (0.114) -0.835*** (0.0421) 0.880*** (0.134) 0.613*** (0.0815) 0.276 (0.175) 0.417*** (0.0777) 0.225*** (0.0662) 0.563*** (0.166) 0.0575 (0.0930) 0.323*** (0.0896) -0.144 (0.109) 0.412*** (0.148) -0.261** (0.105) -0.101 (0.176)

53,268 0.353 YES NO NO NO

53,268 0.354 YES NO NO YES

Imp. ratifies ROT x non-OECD from OECD Exp. ratifies ROT x non-OECD from OECD Both ratify ROT x non-OECD from OECD Observations R-squared Time dummies Country-and-time dummies Dyadic-sector fixed effects Ratification-country group interaction terms Number of ij

Country-time5 dummies (3) (4) Ln(Imports) Ln(Imports)

5.721*** (0.878) 11.04*** (1.015) 4.412*** (0.511) -1.366*** (0.0473) 0.520*** (0.131) 0.216*** (0.0782) 0.106 (0.190) 0.300*** (0.0779) 0.284*** (0.0824) 0.283** (0.133)

5.773*** (0.884) 10.93*** (1.019) 4.374*** (0.512) -1.362*** (0.0473) 0.522*** (0.131) 0.217*** (0.0782) 0.0996 (0.191) 0.301*** (0.0782) 0.281*** (0.0825) 0.243* (0.134)

-0.137** (0.0572)

53,268 0.582 YES YES NO NO

Country-time5 dummies & ijk FE (5) (6) Ln(Imports) Ln(Imports)

0.102* (0.0542) 0.272*** (0.0768) 0.212* (0.110)

0.105* (0.0542) 0.273*** (0.0769) 0.142 (0.110)

-0.0869 (0.0653) 0.0545 (0.116) -0.218*** (0.0823) -0.150 (0.136)

-0.119*** (0.0362)

-0.0602 (0.0451) -0.102 (0.0752) -0.171*** (0.0601) -0.0646 (0.0923)

53,268 0.582 YES YES NO YES

53,268 0.139 YES YES YES NO 4,888

53,268 0.140 YES YES YES YES 4,888

Robustness Stockholm OLS (aggregated)

VARIABLES Ln(GDP) importer Ln(GDP) exporter Non-OECD from OECD OECD from OECD OECD from non-OECD Ln(distance) Contiguity Common language Colony ties RTA WTO Common currency Importer ratifies STO Exporter ratifies STO Both ratify STO

Gravity variables (1) (2) Ln(Imports) Ln(Imports) 0.801*** (0.0284) 1.174*** (0.0300) -0.995*** (0.133) -1.165*** (0.159) -1.062*** (0.183) -0.477*** (0.0562) 0.597*** (0.155) 0.393*** (0.113) 0.788*** (0.213) 0.215** (0.106) 0.0602 (0.0983) 0.602*** (0.181) -0.260** (0.126) 0.0893 (0.117) 0.171 (0.136)

0.801*** (0.0284) 1.174*** (0.0300) -1.003*** (0.141) -1.166*** (0.159) -1.063*** (0.182) -0.478*** (0.0561) 0.597*** (0.155) 0.392*** (0.113) 0.785*** (0.213) 0.213** (0.106) 0.0590 (0.0980) 0.603*** (0.181) -0.268* (0.144) 0.126 (0.140) 0.141 (0.168) 0.0404 (0.184) -0.0935 (0.159) 0.0859 (0.234)

32,562 0.349 YES NO NO NO

32,562 0.349 YES NO NO YES

Imp ratifies STO x non-OECD from OECD Exp ratifies STO x non-OECD from OECD Both ratify STO x non-OECD from OECD Observations R-squared Time dummies Country-and-time dummies Dyadic-sector fixed effects Ratification-country group interaction terms Number of ij

Country-time5 dummies (3) (4) Ln(Imports) Ln(Imports)

8.622*** (1.255) 15.53*** (1.733) 6.458*** (1.194) -0.908*** (0.0611) 0.696*** (0.141) 0.253** (0.109) 0.0663 (0.271) 0.0648 (0.107) 0.393*** (0.130) 0.0750 (0.161)

8.943*** (1.265) 15.72*** (1.743) 6.451*** (1.199) -0.910*** (0.0611) 0.699*** (0.140) 0.252** (0.109) 0.0817 (0.270) 0.0706 (0.107) 0.398*** (0.130) 0.0712 (0.161)

0.0108 (0.0852)

32,562 0.537 YES YES NO NO

Country-time5 dummies & ijk FE (5) (6) Ln(Imports) Ln(Imports)

-0.0573 (0.0830) 0.370*** (0.117) 0.162 (0.161)

-0.0537 (0.0832) 0.377*** (0.117) 0.125 (0.161)

-0.00547 (0.0961) -0.407*** (0.150) -0.0708 (0.119) 0.275 (0.188)

-0.0294 (0.0573)

0.0740 (0.0661) -0.172 (0.108) -0.0912 (0.0844) -0.159 (0.134)

32,562 0.537 YES YES NO YES

32,562 0.111 YES YES YES NO 3,346

32,562 0.112 YES YES YES YES 3,346

Robustness

Figure 9: Imports before and after ratification

0.0

coefficients

−0.5

0.2 −0.2

Exp. Imp.

Exp. Imp.

−1.0

Both Both

−0.6

coefficients

0.5

1.0

Stockholm time effects

0.6

Rotterdam time effects

NtoS

2000

2004

2008

2012

NtoS

2002

2006

year

Rotterdam

year

Rot. table

et Stockholm

Sto. table

2010

Robustness

Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Both Rat. (1) Ln(Imports) -0.0131 (0.193) -0.111 (0.113) 0.0693 (0.0554) -0.0962* (0.0499) -0.170*** (0.0396) 0.0101 (0.0521) -0.0403 (0.0527) 0.0234 (0.0543) -0.0123 (0.0571) 0.00772 (0.0579) -0.0540 (0.0698) -0.0616 (0.0820) -0.0164 (0.0853)

Country-time5 dummies & ijk FE Imp. Rat. NS Exp. Rat. NS Both Rat. NS (2) (3) (4) Ln(Imports) Ln(Imports) Ln(Imports) -0.121 0.0176 0.543 (0.116) (0.0896) (0.385) 0.0741 0.105* -0.0611 (0.107) (0.0620) (0.258) -0.0225 0.0262 -0.133 (0.0640) (0.0498) (0.122) 0.0606 -0.0272 0.000720 (0.0600) (0.0520) (0.110) 0.0673 -0.104** 0.0633 (0.0764) (0.0473) (0.103) 0.124 -0.123 -0.0946 (0.0923) (0.0797) (0.117) 0.0717 -0.218*** 0.0284 (0.0947) (0.0824) (0.122) -0.00190 -0.121 0.000283 (0.0986) (0.0859) (0.130) -0.0966 -0.245*** 0.167 (0.0973) (0.0933) (0.135) -0.179* -0.298*** 0.220 (0.0987) (0.0974) (0.140) -0.0911 -0.357*** 0.144 (0.115) (0.116) (0.158) -0.0736 -0.486*** 0.269 (0.126) (0.138) (0.183) -0.137 -0.400*** 0.196 (0.132) (0.145) (0.194)

Robustness

Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Country-time5 dummies & ijk FE Both Rat. Imp. Rat. NS Exp. Rat. NS (6) (6) (6) Ln(Imports) Ln(Imports) Ln(Imports) 0.188* 0.0117 -0.158* (0.108) (0.198) (0.0811) -0.0381 -0.105 -0.104 (0.0810) (0.175) (0.0744) -0.0718 -0.166 -0.0648 (0.0654) (0.114) (0.0905) 0.0239 0.0381 -0.107 (0.0746) (0.132) (0.151) 0.0765 -0.0512 0.140 (0.0757) (0.140) (0.143) 0.0838 -0.0710 0.222 (0.0803) (0.135) (0.178) 0.0201 -0.229 0.110 (0.0832) (0.142) (0.213) 0.190** -0.0955 -0.000255 (0.0893) (0.145) (0.288) 0.0274 -0.212 -0.109 (0.191) (0.177) (0.311) 0.0976 -0.459** 0.642 (0.198) (0.188) (0.461) 0.205 -0.143 0.987* (0.202) (0.191) (0.561)

Both Rat. NS (6) Ln(Imports) 0.119 (0.364) 0.112 (0.262) 0.0474 (0.174) 0.0588 (0.200) -0.0535 (0.199) -0.228 (0.226) 0.0875 (0.259) -0.0367 (0.329) 0.194 (0.358) -0.429 (0.493) -1.202** (0.591)

Robustness

Developing countries by regions (5) Rotterdam Convention Dep. Variable:ln Imports Regions Both ratify ROT

(6) (5) (6) (5) Country-time5 dummies & ijk FE Africa

Stockholm Convention Both ratify STO

-0.0189 (0.0300) -0.192** (0.0915) -0.131** (0.0637) -0.000189 (0.104)

-0.0392 (0.0280)

-0.0389 (0.0302) 0.0796 (0.102) -0.0914 (0.0613) -0.0468 (0.113)

-0.0392 (0.0280)

0.0119 (0.0313) 0.00473 (0.0887) -0.0642 (0.0588) -0.194** (0.0984)

111,849 0.088 14,370

111,849 0.088 14,370

111,849 0.088 14,37

111,849 0.088 14,37

111,849 0.088 14,370

111,849 0.088 14,370

(5)

(6)

(5)

(6)

(5)

(6)

-0.0456 (0.0544)

-0.0428 (0.0583) -0.0292 (0.135) -0.206 (0.180) 0.161 (0.220)

-0.0456 (0.0544)

-0.0332 (0.0592) -0.0679 (0.154) -0.128 (0.104) 4.50e-06 (0.174)

-0.0456 (0.0544)

-0.0475 (0.0587) 0.234 (0.180) 0.0639 (0.0991) -0.193 (0.197)

42,011 0.087 YES YES YES YES NO 6,113

42,011 0.087 YES YES YES YES YES 6,113

42,011 0.087 YES YES YES YES NO 6,113

42,011 0.088 YES YES YES YES YES 6,113

42,011 0.087 YES NO YES YES NO 6,113

42,011 0.088 YES NO YES YES YES 6,113

Imp ratifies STO x non-OECD from OECD Exp ratifies STO x non-OECD from OECD Both ratify STO x non-OECD from OECD Observations R-squared Time dummies Product dummies Country-and-time dummies Dyadic-sector fixed effects Ratification-country group interaction terms Number of ijk

America

-0.0392 (0.0280)

Imp. ratifies ROT x non-OECD from OECD Exp. ratifies ROT x non-OECD from OECD Both ratify ROT x non-OECD from OECD Observations R-squared Number of ijk

Asia

(6)

Robustness

Probit model Rotterdam (4) Ln(Imports)

Stockholm (4) Ln(Imports)

Imp. ratifies ROT x non-OECD from OECD Exp. ratifies ROT x non-OECD from OECD Both ratify ROT x non-OECD from OECD

-0.167 (0.176) -0.374** (0.175) 0.394** (0.179)

0.400 (0.353) 0.300 (0.399) -0.0672 (0.404)

Observations R-squared Time dummies Product dummies Country-and-time dummies Dyadic-sector fixed effects Ratification-country group interaction terms Number of ijk

112,230 0.603 YES YES YES NO YES

53,592 0.505 YES YES YES NO YES

VARIABLES

M. Copeland, B.and Taylor. Trade and the Environment. Princeton University Press Princeton, 2003. G. Grossman and A. Krueger. Environmental impacts of a north american free trade agreement. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1991. D. Kellenberg and A. Levinson. Waste of effort? international environmental agreements. Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, 1(1/2):pp. 135–169, 2014. ISSN 23335955. R. Mitchell. International environmental agreements: a survey of their features, formation, and effects. Annual Review of Environment and Resources, 28(1):429–461, 2003.

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