The Journal of Value Inquiry (2007) 41:221–243 DOI 10.1007/s10790-007-9088-2


Springer 2007

Aristotle: Founder of the Ethics of Care HOWARD J. CURZER Philosophy Department, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, TX 79409-3092, USA; e-mail: [email protected]

1. Introduction The title of this paper is meant to be provocative. The issue is not whether Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings, who are usually credited with originating the ethics of care, build explicitly upon AristotleÕs work, or even whether Aristotle is a source of inspiration for them.1 Instead, the issue is whether Aristotle is an earlier advocate, perhaps the earliest advocate, of the ethics of care. Aristotle cannot be an ethics of care advocate without a concept of care, but Aristotle does have a concept of care. Although the Greek terms phil esis and its infinitive version to philein are typically translated as ‘‘love,’’ or ‘‘friendly feeling,’’ or ‘‘friendly affection’’ by AristotleÕs translators, Aristotle uses phil esis and to philein to mean approximately what advocates of the ethics of care mean by ‘‘caring’’ and ‘‘care.’’ Aristotle defines to philein in the following way. ‘‘We may describe to philein towards anyone as wishing for him what you believe to be good things, not for your own sake but for his, and being inclined, so far as you can, to bring these things about.’’2 Furthermore, Aristotle contrasts phil esis with mere goodwill. He says that goodwill, ‘‘does not involve intensity or desire, whereas these accompany phil esis; and phil esis implies intimacy while goodwill may arise of a sudden.’’3 Hence, phil esis is no shallow whim, but a deep desire for the wellbeing of another person sought not merely as a means to the wellbeing of the agent, but for the sake of the other person. The interests of the other person are sought because of the character of the person. Moreover, phil esis includes substantial familiarity with the other person gained through meaningful personal interactions with the person. This is compassion and sympathy, core components of care. Aristotle says little about phil esis, per se. Probably it is too general for him. The object of phil esis is need not be a person or even an animal.

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‘‘Phil esis may be felt just as much towards lifeless things’’ just as we might say that we care for a favorite teacup.4 However, Aristotle defines ‘‘friendship’’ or philia as a relationship between people who feel phil esis for each other and know that their feelings are reciprocated.5 Friends are like-minded; they think and feel alike about important things.6 This is empathy, another core component of care. AristotleÕs account of friendship contains much of his discussion of care. Not all mutually caring relationships are friendships. Nevertheless, AristotleÕs notion of friendship is substantially broader than what we usually mean by ‘‘friendship.’’ Families are Aristotelian friendships, for example. Although Aristotle does not list care, or its components such as compassion, sympathy, and empathy, as virtues, he does list liberality which includes generosity with respect to money and monetary goods.7 Liberality is closer to care than it might seem upon first glance. Many caring acts consist in providing people with money or things that can be purchased. As well, within the sphere of monetary goods, liberal people are good at discerning who will benefit from what sort of help. They desire to provide the help, and act effectively upon such desires, not just for their own sake, but for the sake of the other person, and because it is the right thing to do. Finally, since liberality is a virtue, liberal actions and passions are morally required. Aristotle does include significant portions of care within his list of virtues. The absence of care or its components from AristotleÕs list of virtues would not mean that Aristotle ignores these traits, since they are part of his account of friendship and fully one fifth of the Nicomachean Ethics is devoted to his account of mutually caring relationships, which he calls friendships. By itself, this does not make Aristotle an advocate of the ethics of care; he must hold the right doctrines, too. Advocates of the ethics of care have not arrived at a complete doctrinal consensus. They also disagree about the interpretation of seminal figures such as Gilligan and Noddings. A useful simplification is that on each point, some ethics of care advocates hold moderate positions, while others are more extreme. Many advocates of an ethics of care advance moderate positions with respect to some points and extreme positions with respect to others. Yet notwithstanding disagreements, the views of ethics of care advocates, particularly moderate advocates, clearly share a common core. As long as Aristotle espouses the core views, he may plausibly be considered a moderate ethics of care advocate, even if he diverges from most modern thinkers on other points. For example, Aristotle is a eudaemonist perfectionist, while most contemporary ethics of care advocates are not. But this disagreement does not disqualify him from advancing an ethics of care, since it is a disagreement over the

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grounding, not the substance of the ethics of care. The moderate, modern ethics of care has ten core doctrines that Aristotle also advances. Like many movements in the history of ideas, the ethics of care has emerged through contrasts with its predecessors and competitors. Gilligan, Noddings, and their followers rebel against twentieth-century utilitarians, deontologists, social contractarians, Marxists, and many others, which for our purposes may be lumped together as mainstream ethics. The ethics of care diverges in three broad ways from mainstream ethics. Whereas mainstream ethics is concerned with universality, rationality, and impartiality, the ethics of care is particularist, passionate, and partialist.

2. Particular versus Universal Mainstream ethics concerns the formulation, interrelation, and fine-tuning of general moral rules. Hypothetical, bare-bones situation-sketches, abstractly formulated problems, and even generic, interchangeable individuals figure prominently in the exposition of mainstream ethics. Advocates of mainstream ethics acknowledge that different people in different situations have different duties and that correctly applying moral rules requires detailed knowledge of the people affected and their situations. But this is merely a perfunctory proviso. The overwhelming emphasis on general rules sends the twin messages that, getting the general rules right is the central task of ethics, and applying the general rules to particular situations is usually a trivial matter which can safely be left as an exercise. By contrast, ethics of care advocates insist that morality must focus on particular people with particular relationships in particular situations. Each person, relationship, and situation is so different from others that general rules provide little or no guidance. Such rules are often more misleading than helpful. Moderate ethics of care advocates acknowledge that rules have a role, but emphasize the overwhelming importance of the particulars in moral thinking and action.8 Aristotle agrees with moderate ethics of care advocates about all of this. Aristotle cautions: ‘‘We must be content, then, in speaking of [fine and just actions and goods] to indicate the truth roughly and in outline.’’9 Although Aristotle does provide a few rules, they are very general and clearly intended to provide only a start or structure for thinking about certain problems. For example, AristotleÕs rule governing distributive justice comes to no more than: treat equals equally and unequals proportionately unequally.10 AristotleÕs rule governing temperance is that all pleasures are acceptable except pleasures which are unhealthy,

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deconditioning, unaffordable, or ignoble.11 When explaining incontinence and practical syllogisms, he does make it seem as if decision-making is the straightforward application of rules to situations.12 But arguably this explanation is stylized or simplified for the sake of exposition and is out of step with much of what he says elsewhere about decision-making. His discussion of practical syllogisms does not take into account the large roles played by perception and passion upon which Aristotle often insists, for example. Questions about what to do cannot be settled simply by applying rules indiscriminately. Many interpreters take Aristotle to the opposite extreme. Aristotle says of concrete moral evaluations and choices: ‘‘Such things depend upon particular facts, and the decision rests with perception.’’13 Some commentators have attributed to him the extreme view that good people just know somehow through perception what to do once they find themselves in a situation. But he is no situation ethicist. His point is not that we should always use perception rather than reason to distinguish right from wrong. His claim that the happy life is a life of virtuous activity exercising reason, his definition of choice as involving deliberation, and his account of practical wisdom leave no doubt that he takes reason to play a crucial role in virtuous action. Indeed, shortly before his remark on concrete moral evaluations and choices, he says that, ‘‘the good tempered man tends…to be angry in the manner, at the things, and for the length of time, that reason dictates.’’14 In addition to perception to determine the particular facts, we need reason to provide the right rule, not to mention passion to motivate and structure the application of rules to particular situations. The point of AristotleÕs remark on concrete moral evaluations and choices is that in order to act correctly in any situation we need perception in addition to reason and passion. To summarize, along with moderate ethics of care advocates, Aristotle acknowledges that rules have a place within morality, but strongly emphasizes that they are too general to be sufficient for action-guidance. Much of the action-guiding work is done by knowledge of the particular facts of particular situations. ‘‘Nor is practical wisdom concerned with universals only – it must also recognize the particulars; for it is practical, and practice is concerned with particulars.’’15 Furthermore, for Aristotle, some of the most important particulars are facts about our relationships. This is the first of the ten doctrines common to Aristotle and the modern, moderate ethics of care. Mainstream ethics advocates presuppose that people are primordially independent of each other. Metaphorically speaking, we rest alongside each other barely touching, or we crash into each another and careen away like billiard balls on a table. Relationships are contingent properties

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of individuals. A person is basically the same person before and after forming or ending a friendship, a marriage, or any other relationship. Relationships, like other particular facts about a person, merely overlay the basic human nature that forms the foundation of morality. By contrast, people are primordially related, according to advocates of the ethics of care. Not only are people always already in the midst of relationships, but also each addition, subtraction, or alteration of a relationship transforms the participants. Furthermore, our own peculiar identities are morally essential. This is a second way in which the ethics of care values particularity over universality. Extreme ethics of care advocates might maintain that we are nothing more than our relationships. Other ethics of care advocates, such as Gilligan, might take no position on whether our relationships are constituents of our identities. Moderate ethics of care advocates, such as Noddings, say more cautiously that our identities are to a significant extent a function of our relationships. Like ethics of care advocates, Aristotle maintains that human nature is relational: ‘‘Man is a political creature and one whose nature is to live with others.’’16 Human beings have innate tendencies to form certain sorts of relationships. Aristotle defines self-sufficiency, and thus happiness, not ‘‘for one who lives a solitary life, but also for parents, children, wife, and in general for his friends and fellow citizens, since man is sociable by nature.’’17 He takes people to be naturally embedded in a variety of different sorts of relationships. His aim in the Nicomachean Ethics is to give an account of a happy life for a person so embedded. Throughout most of the work, Aristotle describes a happy life as built around the exercise of virtues by people immersed in families, friendships, communities, and states. Even when he endorses a life of contemplation near the end of the Nicomachean Ethics, he acknowledges that he is not interested in isolated individuals.18 Aristotle says forcefully: ‘‘He who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself must be either a beast or a god.’’19 ‘‘But clearly the virtue we must study is human virtue; for the good we were seeking was human good and the happiness human happiness.’’20 City-states are the natural habitats of people. Aristotle understands a city-state as a natural network of various sorts of friendships rather than as a collection of individuals who have made a single, artificial compact with each other.21 People are related to each other qua citizen and in many other ways, too. We are not merely people with natural tendencies to form human relationships, whose happiness requires relationships, and who typically find ourselves already in relationships. Aristotle also maintains that each personÕs identity, his or her character, is a function of his or her relationships in two ways. As he observes: ‘‘The friendship of bad men turns

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out to be an evil thing because…they become evil by becoming like each other, while the friendship of good men is good, being augmented by their companionship…for from each other they take the mould of the characteristics they approve.’’22 Friendship is character-transforming. We come to resemble our friends in character. Since a change in character is a change in a personÕs self, AristotleÕs view is that a personÕs identity is, among other things, a result of his or her friendships.23 Friends affect a personÕs self in a more direct way, too. In addition to changing a personÕs character, friendships themselves are part of a personÕs self in some sense. Aristotle observes that friends share in each otherÕs goals and activities, values and plans, and especially happiness and sorrow.24 A friend ‘‘grieves and rejoices with his friend.’’25 Aristotle describes friendship in a way that is pregnant with meaning, yet enigmatic. He says that, ‘‘the friend is another self’’ or a ‘‘second self.’’26 On the basis of this, Nancy Sherman attributes to Aristotle the view that friends are parts of a personÕs extended self. Thus, acts that look from the outside like one friend sacrificing his or her interests for another, look from the inside like a person acting in the interests of his or her own, extended self. We share happiness with our friends because we literally include our friends.27 ShermanÕs interpretation would bring Aristotle into harmony with more extreme versions of the ethics of care, but textual evidence for an extended self interpretation of Aristotle is lacking. From AristotleÕs observation that we share many things with our friends, particularly happiness and sorrow, it does not follow that we and our friends together form a compound entity, a super-self. Aristotle says that a city-state aims at the common good, yet there is no basis in the text for the further claim that the common good is the good of a single entity over and above, yet somehow including, the separate citizens.28 Similarly, there is no basis in the Nicomachean Ethics for the claim that there is an extended self over and above, yet somehow including, the separate selves of the individual friends. Perhaps Aristotle simply means that a personÕs identity is a function of his or her relationships, as well as his or her character. It is part of Aberforth that he is husband of one person, father of another person and tennis partner of still another person. These relationships are not incidental to him. Each person is partially a node in a web of relationships. But each person is not the node plus adjacent nodes. AberforthÕs friendships with the three people are part of his self; the three people are not. Again, when the more extreme interpretations of Aristotle are rejected, he turns out to espouse a position similar to the modern, moderate ethics of care. The view that a personÕs self is relational is the second of the ten core doctrines.

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A radical, but nevertheless influential claim advanced in several different traditions is that we ought to care for everyone equally and greatly. ‘‘You shall love your neighbor as yourself,’’ and everyone is your neighbor.29 Advocates of mainstream ethics do not go so far, but they do demand that we value people impersonally and uniformly, because of their humanity. Equal concern and respect for the interests of everyone is required, although it is not expressed in identical treatment because of differences in situation and ability. Ethics of care advocates separate themselves from this form of mainstream egalitarianism by maintaining that value is correlated to care. We care, and should care, for particular people to different degrees and in different ways. We are devoted to our families and bosom buddies, fond of our neighbors and acquaintances, and merely open to future caring for strangers. Moreover, the basis or reason for care is different in different cases. We should care for people not because of their humanity, but because of individual facts about their histories, characters, situations, and their relationships with us. We should care for people qua related individuals, not qua persons. This is a third sort of particularity. The idea that people ought to care equally for a very large group of other people, if not everyone, is known to Aristotle. Plato stipulates that the guardians of the Republic should love and treat each other as if they were all members of a single, huge, nuclear family. But Aristotle rejects this demand unequivocally. He criticizes universal love as diluting love.30 A person can have only a limited number of close friends.31 Nor does Aristotle espouse the ideal that all people have equal value. Instead, he believes that people have value only within, and with respect to friendships, and friendships vary, and should vary in degree and in nature because they are based upon particular facts. Indeed, he works out a detailed typology of different types of friendship. For Aristotle, friendships are relationships of mutual cooperation for the sake of gaining and maintaining some goods. Thus, friendships can be classified according to the goals of the friendships. ‘‘There are three kinds of friendship equal in number to the things that are lovable’’ namely pleasure, utility, and nobility or virtuous activity.32 Aristotle first divides friendships into pleasure friendships, utility friendships, and character friendships. The parties in pleasure and utility friendships are friends with each other not because of their common humanity, but because they are pleasant or useful in particular ways. People who share character friendships are friends because they appreciate the particular characters of each other and care for each other as individuals. In pursuing a common goal, decisions must be made. This allows Aristotle to categorize friendships along a second dimension. AristotleÕs

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view is that decisions in a friendship should be made by whoever is most competent. In some friendships, one party is best at everything; in other friendships, all parties are equally competent; and in yet other friendships, different friends are competent with respect to different spheres of human life. Thus, friendships can be classified according to whether the decisionmaking is done exclusively by one of the friends, shared equally, or divided among the friends according to expertise. Aristotle uses stereotypical relationships within households as metaphors for these three arrangements. Children, being approximately equally competent, should share decision-making within their relationship equally. Parents, being more competent than children, should make all of the decisions within the parent-child relationship. Husbands and wives, having different spheres of competence, should divide decision-making within their marriages according to competence.33 Since Aristotle considers the relationship among citizens to be a sort of extended friendship called civic friendship, he also uses different sorts of city-states as illustrations: aristocracy, monarchy, and timarchy. Since pleasure, utility, and character friendships may each be child-child, parent-child, or husband-wife sorts of friendships, AristotleÕs two triple distinctions yield nine basic sorts of friendship. Aristotle also describes deviant versions of each of these nine types of friendship.34 He notes that each friendship may involve either equal or unequal contributions to the friendship, and that each friendship may be equalized or unequalized.35 This yields seventy-two sorts of friendships. Finally, Aristotle adds that parties in a friendship may be confused or deceived about the ends of a friendship.36 He clearly agrees with the advocates of the ethics of care that friendships differ in various ways according to particular facts. He also agrees that the ways in which people care for each other differ in these different sorts of relationships. He says, ‘‘It is not the same [friendship] that exists between parents and children and between rulers and subjects, nor is even that of father to son the same as that of son to father, nor that of husband to wife the same as that of wife to husband….The reasons for which they love [are different]; the love and the friendship are therefore different also.’’37 In sum, a third core doctrine advanced by both Aristotle and advocates of the modern, moderate ethics of care is that there are many different sorts of relationships and many corresponding sorts of care.

3. Passionate versus Rational For several reasons, advocates of mainstream ethics consider passions to be unreliable motivators of good actions. Dispassionate duty is their

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motive of choice. In particular, the passion of care cannot be trusted. We need not and should not be indifferent to the fate of others, but dispassionate benevolence is possible and probably preferable to care. Advocates of the ethics of care reverse this ordering. They take the passion of care to be a better motivator than duty in several ways. Attachment is hardly a necessary condition of caring action. People are often kind to individuals for whom they do not care. Ethics of care advocates insist, however, that acting as if we care is much easier, and much more likely to succeed when we really do care. Care most effectively motivates people to help each other. Aristotle, too, does not think that we should bracket our passions. Instead, we should purge our bad passions, groom our good ones, and then use our groomed, good passions to motivate our actions. Some people have unreliable, prejudiced, selfish, or otherwise problematic passions, but virtuous people are reliably motivated by their passions to do the right thing. Inasmuch as Aristotle is more sanguine than advocates of mainstream ethics about the possibility of virtue, he is free from the temptation to idealize people who are motivated by rational choice alone. He calls the character of such people continence. He contrasts virtuous and continent people in the following passage, using temperance as his example of virtue. ‘‘Both the continent man and the temperate man are such as to do nothing contrary to reason for the sake of bodily pleasures, but the former has and the latter has not bad appetites, and the latter is such as not to feel pleasure contrary to reason, while the former is such as to feel pleasure but not to be led by it.’’38 Unlike virtuous people, continent people are internally conflicted about performing virtuous acts, even when the right thing to do is clear to them. They are typically tempted to act wrongly by bad passions and desires, and they typically feel pain when they act rightly. On AristotleÕs view, although continent people reliably perform good acts without or despite their passions, they are merely second best and in need of moral improvement, because they do not habitually feel virtuous passions. Aristotle says: ‘‘Now it looks as if love were a passion; friendship a state [of character].’’39 Friendship is a relationship on his view, but friends do possess a state of character that is similar to a virtue. Just as courageous people reliably choose, act, feel, desire, perceive, and think in appropriate ways with respect to situations involving risk, so friendship is a relationship among parties who reliably choose, act, feel, desire, perceive, and think in appropriate ways with respect to situations involving each other. In particular, friends are disposed to further each otherÕs interests. Indeed, friends will do all sorts of nice things for each other. ‘‘It is true of the good man too that he does many acts for the sake of his

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friends and his country, and if necessary dies for them; for he will throw away both wealth and honors and in general the goods that are objects of competition, gaining for himself nobility.’’40 Friends are motivated to perform helpful and even self-sacrificial acts for each other by the care that they feel for each other. Thus, Aristotle maintains that good passions are better motivators than reason, alone, and he treats care as a passion in this respect. A fourth core doctrine upon which Aristotle and the advocates of the modern, moderate ethics of care agree is that care rather than dispassionate duty is the preferred motivator of benevolent acts. Advocates of mainstream ethics fear that passions will hinder our moral understanding by distracting and distorting our perceptions and judgments. Passions undermine objectivity, blocking us from gaining knowledge of ourselves and of others. In particular, care generates bias. Love is blind. In contrast, advocates of the ethics of care take the passions, particularly sympathy and empathy which are aspects of care, to be helpful or even necessary to arrive at a proper understanding of situations as well as to how to deal with them. Care helps us to recognize and respond to the needs, interests, and desires of people for whom we care by focusing our attention on salient features of the situation. Perhaps in theory a person could dispassionately come to understand some situation thoroughly, but typically we do not succeed at this or even make much of an effort unless we care about someone embedded in the situation. That passions shape our perceptions and judgments is a well-known aspect of AristotleÕs account of the passions. Passions emphasize some features of situations and de-emphasize others. Aristotle says: ‘‘The emotions are all those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgments, and that are also attended by pain or pleasure.’’41 In particular, care enables us to attend to facts about those for whom we care. Aristotle does acknowledge that care blinds us to the faults of our friends and corrupts our judgment in their favor.42 On the plus side he says, ‘‘We do not fail to perceive the needs of those for whom we care.’’43 Moreover, he argues at length that friendships reduce our biases by helping us see ourselves more clearly.44 Passion also stimulates deliberation about how to respond to situations. Aristotle says for example, ‘‘fear sets us thinking what can be done’’ in situations involving danger.45 Extrapolating, care sets us thinking what can be done in response to situations involving those about whom we care. In general, emotions play an important, positive cognitive and perceptual role for Aristotle. The fifth shared core doctrine is that care is not only the best motivator of helpful acts, but also extremely helpful to our understanding of and response to certain situations.

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4. Partial versus Impartial According to advocates of mainstream ethics, we forge our relationships by making explicit or implicit contracts. The contracts are the bases and origin of the relationships. What makes BathildaÕs daughter her daughter is that Bathilda has assumed responsibility for her, and the responsibilities Bathilda has are the ones that she has explicitly or implicitly accepted. Ethics of care advocates accuse mainstream ethics advocates of reversing the true ordering of relationships and responsibilities. Except for a few unusual cases, our various relationships to our relatives and close friends are neither generated by nor grounded upon contracts specifying responsibilities. Instead, our different responsibilities grow out of our different relationships to other people. Ethics of care advocates do not deny that relationships based upon contracts exist. They are not paradigm relationships, however, but artificial imitations of natural, non-contractual relationships. Aristotle also holds that our responsibilities to family members and close friends are primarily a function of our relationships rather than the other way around. Some relationships do begin with, and depend upon formal contracts, but Aristotle distinguishes such relationships from the central types of friendships, saying: ‘‘One might mark off from [other forms of friendship] both the friendship of kindred and that of comrades. Those of fellow-citizens, fellow-tribesmen, fellow-voyagers, and the like…rest on a sort of compact.’’46 Although contracts spelling out responsibilities generate and ground some friendships such as fellowcitizens, fellow-tribesmen, fellow-voyagers, according to Aristotle as well as advocates of the ethics of care this ordering is reversed in the deepest, most important, paradigmatic sorts of friendships, namely friendships of kindred and comrades. We have significant responsibilities to our relatives and close friends, but it is not the assumption of our responsibilities that creates the families and friendships. Instead, Aristotle gives a detailed account of how friendships come into being through nature and need. Such friendships in turn generate and ground responsibilities.47 The forging of a friendship is not a matter of agreeing to various duties under various contingencies. We are typically surprised by what we find ourselves required to do by our friendships. Parents routinely and rightly warn pregnant women that they do not know what they are getting into, for example. Married people similarly warn engaged people. The sixth of the ten shared core doctrines is that relationships are primordial, both temporally and morally. Duties are derivative. According to mainstream ethics, the interesting tasks of ethics are to ground the duties that each person owes to everyone, to work out the

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nature of the duties, and to adjudicate conflicts among the duties. Mainstream ethics may be extrapolated to the domain of relationships. Since we have special duties only insofar as we explicitly or implicitly assume them, however, advocates of mainstream ethics take the duties of relationships to be derivative, straightforward, and thus uninteresting. In contrast, ethics of care advocates embrace relationships as the locus of the central tasks of ethics. Fundamentally, we are to treat other people differently according to how we are socially and emotionally related to them. Everyone in the relationship network of a person should be treated in the caring manner appropriate to his or her place in the network. Our relationship networks are complex. They differ in extent. Noddings uses the metaphor of concentric circles of caring to express the fact that we care a lot for some people, a little less for others, and even less for yet others. Moreover, two people in the same circle might have different relationships to the person at the center, entailing equally great, though different responsibilities. Along yet another parameter, some relationships show promise of healthy growth and should be nurtured; others are dormant and need not be tended at the moment; yet others are distorted in ominous ways and should be mended, or pruned, or perhaps even ended. Overall, relationships and their responsibilities differ dramatically, forming a fertile field for moral investigation. As we have seen, Aristotle also emphasizes the variety among friendships. He takes our responsibilities toward people to vary according to our relationships with them. ‘‘The duties of parents to children and those of brothers to each other are not the same, nor those of comrades and those of fellow citizens, and so, too, with the other kinds of friendship.’’48 Aristotle goes on to present detailed accounts of the various responsibilities of people to each other as a function of the nature of their different relationships. Like Noddings, he thinks that we owe more to people for whom we care more. He says: ‘‘[I]njustice increases by being exhibited towards those who are friends in a fuller sense; e.g. it is a more terrible thing to defraud a comrade than a fellow citizen, more terrible not to help a brother than a stranger, and more terrible to wound a father than anyone else. And the demands of justice also naturally increase with the friendship.’’49 The first part of this passage has it that duties to our inner circle are more stringent; the last part has it that duties to our inner circle are more numerous. Like Noddings, Aristotle also thinks that even friendships involving the same level of care differ in kind, and thus in responsibility. Different people have different needs and desires. Aristotle gives several examples. To kinfolk we give invitations to lifecycle events; to elders we give various sorts of honor such as rising to receive them and finding seats for them.50

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Distant kinfolk and elders might be at the same level of care. It is not that we owe more to distant kinfolk than to elders, or vice versa, but that we owe different, probably incommensurable things to a distant kinsman and to an elder even though they are on the same circle. Also like Noddings, Aristotle takes a personÕs responsibilities toward his or her friends to vary as the relationship changes. For example, if our friends degenerate in character to the point of incorrigibility, then we should abandon the friendship, since ‘‘one should not be a lover of evil.’’51 However, ‘‘If they are capable of being reformed one should rather come to the assistance of their character or their property.’’52 Similarly, if the characters of our friends improve, and the change is minor, then the friendships may persist. ‘‘But if one friend remained the same while the other became better and far outstripped him in virtue, should the latter treat the former as a friend? Surely he cannot.’’53 The seventh core doctrine shared by Aristotle and the advocates of the modern, moderate ethics of care is that the responsibilities people have to each other vary according to the closeness and nature of their relationships and that as their relationships change, so do their duties. The most important task advocates of mainstream ethics face is to determine the set of general, minimal, uniform duties owed to each person qua person. Within these limiting conditions, advocates of mainstream ethics specify how we are to deal with the relatives and friends to whom we attach ourselves. The obligations we have toward everyone constitute a boundary condition on what we morally can do for some people. By contrast, ethics of care advocates take the duties arising from care within relationships to be primary; responsibilities beyond relationships to be derivative and minimal. At first glance this seems narrow, self-centered, and parochial. Do we really have significant responsibilities only to a few friends and family members? Do we really owe next to nothing to the rest of the world? Our caring and our duties are not restricted to a small group of intimates. We also care, though typically to a lesser degree, for extended family members, business associates, casual acquaintances, and fellow members of many other relationships. Moreover, Noddings observes that we even care for people with whom we have no direct relationship, if they are cared for by people we care for. These chains of caring allow care to govern our interactions with even more people. Although care, and hence duties of care, lessen as chains lengthen, we have responsibilities to numerous people, including many for whom we do not directly care. As for the rest, however, Noddings merely requires that we adopt a stance of being ready to care.54 Moderate ethics of care advocates acknowledge that justice extends more fully, but still maintain that mainstream ethics advocates have overemphasized it.

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Aristotle also takes friendships and their associated duties to extend widely. Aristotelian friendships include relationships among family members as well as close friends. Inasmuch as friendships may be based upon pleasure or utility as well as character, ChoÕs fellow tennis club members and her fellow university employees are her friends in the Aristotelian sense of friendship. Even more dramatically, a city-state is a sort of friendship, a civic friendship. AristotleÕs account of the moral responsibilities of friendship extends broadly, even to fellow citizens. Although Aristotle does think that there are limits to friendship, his account of friendship governs a great deal of human interaction.55 Unreciprocated caring extends even more widely. Anticipating the chains of caring that Noddings considers, Aristotle says that we feel phil esis toward ‘‘our friendsÕ friends, and to those who like or are liked by, those whom we like ourselves.’’56 Dudley cares for his sonÕs girlfriend, for example, even though Dudley has seldom met her, just because she is DudleyÕs sonÕs girlfriend. Since she cares for her parents, Dudley cares for them, too. Like Noddings, Aristotle does not think that we have duties of justice or care to people who are outside of our friendship circles and chains. We certainly do not have duties of care to people for whom we do not care. As for justice, Aristotle says: ‘‘Friendship and justice seem…to be concerned with the same objects and exhibited between the same persons.’’57 He also says: ‘‘To inquire how to behave to a friend is to look for a particular kind of justice, for generally all justice is in relation to a friend.’’58 This is at odds with mainstream ethics. AristotleÕs view is that justice does not concern our treatment of others merely qua persons but that it is always about our treatment of others qua friends. Justice concerns our treatment of others qua parents, children, lovers, coffee-klatch mates, and fellow citizens. We have duties of justice to other people only insofar as they are our friends. We owe it to our colleagues to do our share of the committee work in the department not because they are persons but because they are our colleagues. Thus for Aristotle, not only care-duties, but also justice-duties are partial rather than impartial.59 The eighth shared core doctrine is that our duties of justice and care extend to wide circles of friendship, but not beyond, except along chains of caring.

5. Care and Justice What are the responsibilities of relationships? For advocates of mainstream ethics, the answer is simple. The promises that constitute the relationships also specify the duties of the parties within the relationships. The founding and foundational promises that spell out the duties may

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differ widely from relationship to relationship, but the duties may be easily determined from the promises. For some ethics of care advocates, the answer is also simple. We are to care for the parties within the relationship and nurture the relationship itself. Moderate ethics of care advocates, however, acknowledge that care and nurture are insufficient. Justice also has a role. Parties within a relationship must be fair to each other. Aristotle may seem to approve of the extreme view that justice is sufficient when he says: ‘‘How man and wife and in general friend and friend ought mutually to behave seems to be the same question as how it is just for them to behave.’’60 But this is mere rhetorical exaggeration. He may seem to approve of the extreme view that care and nurturing is sufficient when he says, ‘‘when men are friends they have no need of justice.’’61 But his point here is that the best sort of friends automatically give each other at least as much as they are due. They do not need to be forced by some external agency to act justly toward their friends. AristotleÕs very definition of friendship requires friends to strive to advance the interests of each other for each otherÕs sake. As Aristotle remarks: ‘‘Men think a friend is one who wishes and does what is good, or seems so, for the sake of his friend, or one who wishes his friend to exist and live, for his sake.’’62 Friends want each other to flourish, and they help each other unselfishly. Aristotle makes care essential to friendship. If we ask how relationships are nurtured, AristotleÕs answer is: ‘‘There is nothing so characteristic of friends as living together.’’63 Friendship dwindles when people do not live together. Aristotle notes: ‘‘Distance does not break off the friendship absolutely, but only the activity of it. But if the absence is lasting, it seems actually to make men forget their friendship.’’64 One way in which friendships are nurtured is by people living together. By this, he does not mean mere physical proximity. Living together means sharing values, pleasures, and activities. As he puts it: ‘‘Whatever existence means for each class of men, whatever it is for whose sake they value life, in that they wish to occupy themselves with their friends; and so some drink together, others dice together, others join in athletic exercises and hunting, or in the study of philosophy, each class spending their days together in whatever they love most in life; for since they wish to live with their friends they do and share in those things as far as they can.’’65 The ninth core doctrine shared by Aristotle and advocates of the modern, moderate ethics of care is that friends should not only advance the interests of each other, but should also strive to share time, values, pleasures, and activities to allow the relationship may flourish. Although resources to critique injustice within relationships can be found in mainstream ethics, in practice, injustice within relationships has

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been seriously neglected. Advocates of mainstream ethics tell us how to live in a vast world populated primarily by strangers but leave undone the task of telling us how to get along in our own homes and haunts with our own relatives and close friends. Some feminist theories including the ethics of care have arisen partially in response to this neglect. Feminists of many stripes focus upon the need to describe justice and injustice within relationships. Aristotle devotes considerable attention to working out the duties of justice among friends. He describes three components of justice: reciprocal, rectificatory, and distributive justice. Reciprocal justice requires that things traded be of equal value.66 Rectificatory justice requires that wrongdoers compensate victims completely for losses by restoring to them something of equal value.67 Distributive justice requires that equals should be treated equally, unequals proportionately unequally.68 But all of these rules are vague. We may ask who the equals are and what counts as equal treatment or equal value. The structure of friendship provides an answer. Friendships are relationships of cooperation in which we may strive for pleasure, utility, or nobility. The goal of the friendship determines what is of value within the friendship. Thus, each friendship establishes a set of values. The foundational values determine who and what count as equal. For example, in business partnerships, equal people are people who contribute equal monetary resources to the friendship, and equal shares are measured in monetary terms. Thus, the term ‘‘equal’’ is defined relative to the friendship. Justice and injustice are determined by combining the vague rules of justice with the definitions of the terms ‘‘equal person’’ and ‘‘equal value’’ within the friendship. Friends who contribute equally with respect to the foundational values of the friendship are entitled to gain equal shares of the benefits.69 Friends who contribute unequally are entitled to gain proportionately unequal shares of the benefits. When the benefits that each person receives from the friendship are proportional to his or her contributions to the friendship, Aristotle says that the friendship has been equalized.70 Thus, the term ‘‘justice’’ is defined relative to the friendship. For cases where someone benefits greatly, but cannot contribute enough to match the benefit, Aristotle adds honor as a factor. Justice requires people who gain more than they contribute to try to even things up by giving extra honor to the others.71 In practice, this ranges from simply thanking the large contributors to some public recognition such as a plaque on a building or a dinner in their honor. Aristotle suggests some starting points for thinking about justice in friendships and also offers some tentative general principles of justice. Eventually, he concludes that the problems of determining responsibilities

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within friendships are difficult. ‘‘Yet we must not on that account shrink from the task, but decide the question as best we can.’’72 Aristotle does not allow us to ignore or trivialize the task of working out what is required by justice within friendships. He takes the casuistry of justice within different sorts of friendships seriously. Overall Aristotle, like the advocates of the modern, moderate ethics of care, holds that in addition to caring for friends and nurturing relationships, friends should be fair to each other. The final shared core doctrine is that both care and justice have a role.

6. Care versus Justice Advocates of the ethics of care have criticized mainstream ethics for neglecting the importance of care, particularly within relationships. They have been criticized, in turn, for neglecting the importance of justice, particularly within relationships. It behooves all parties to acknowledge that relationships may be evaluated in two independent, though intertwined ways. Some relationships are unjust; some are uncaring; some are both. Everyone acknowledges that some relationships are just but uncaring. We can treat our business partners fairly even if we do not care for them, for example. Extreme ethics of care advocates might maintain that uncaring families are inevitably exploitive. While accepting the theoretical possibility of just, uncaring families, moderate ethics of care advocates stress that masked or unnoticed exploitation is typically present in uncaring families. Care is terrifically important, especially in families and close friendships. Conversely, moderate ethics of care advocates, like other feminists, must agree that caring relationships, even warm, fuzzy, caring families, can be unjust. To deny this is to miss one of the most obvious and important objections to a host of practices. For example, within traditional, patriarchal families well-intentioned husbands sometimes seek to forward the interests of their wives, yet often end up undercompensating their wives for their contributions to the family. Aristotle develops his account of uncaring relationships with respect to city-states and then applies it to families and other friendships. He uses examples from what we might call the public realm to illuminate the private realm, thus assuming a continuity between the public and private realms. Aristotle says that rulers of good city-states strive to forward the common good. That is what care looks like in civic friendships. By contrast, uncaring rulers strive to advance their own advantage at the expense of their subjects. Aristotle calls a city-state with such rulers

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deviant. ‘‘The deviation from monarchy is tyranny; for both are forms of one-man rule, but there is the greatest difference between them; the tyrant looks to his own advantage, the king to that of his subjects… [Similarly,] Aristocracy passes over into oligarchy by the badness of the rulers, who distribute contrary to merit what belongs to the city – all or most of the good things to themselves.’’73 Next Aristotle observes that friendships, including families, are deviant or uncaring insofar as they resemble tyrannies and oligarchies. In particular, families are deviant when the husband rules or makes decisions in such a way as to forward his own interests rather than the interests of the family as a whole. Aristotle says: ‘‘The association of a man and wife seems to be aristocratic; for the man rules in accordance with merit, and in those matters in which a man should rule, but the matters that befit a woman he hands over to her. If the man rules in everything the relation passes over into oligarchy; for he does this contrary to merit and not qua better.’’74 Here Aristotle is making four points. First, he asserts that families should be miniature aristocracies; the husband and wife should each have authority over their own spheres of expertise. Much depends upon what the matters that befit a woman turn out to be. Aristotle may end up saying nothing more radical than that the husband should condescend to allow his wife control over her own kitchen. But at the level of generality at which it is expressed, AristotleÕs position is reasonable and non-sexist. Gendered distributions of labor are typically, but not inevitably morally problematic. The stipulation that the familial decisionmaker should vary from sphere to sphere implies that families in which the husband has the final say on every issue are flawed. Patriarchy is inefficient because decisions are not made by the best qualified person. However, if this were AristotleÕs only objection, he would have said that patriarchal families are flawed, because they are monarchies rather than aristocracies. Instead, he says that patriarchal families are oligarchies. They are not merely inefficient; they are deviant. Patriarchal families are bad, because the husband seeks his own advantage rather than the common good. Aristotle shows himself to be centuries ahead of his time by criticizing the patriarchal family as exploitive rather than caring. Aristotle can allow that just, uncaring relationships are possible. It is theoretically possible to match contributions and benefits in a deviant relationship. But like advocates of the moderate ethics of care, he does not take that possibility very seriously. He says that the rulers of oligarchies, ‘‘distribute contrary to merit what belongs to the city – all or most of the good things to themselves.’’75 He implies that oligarchies, including patriarchal families, are not only deviant, but also unjust. Conversely, Aristotle explicitly maintains that some caring friendships are

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unjust. He says: ‘‘This then is also the way in which we should associate with unequals; the man who is benefited in respect of wealth or virtue must give honor in return, repaying what he can. For friendship asks a man to do what he can, not what is proportional to the merits of the case; since that cannot always be done, e.g. in honors paid to the gods or to parents; for no one could ever return to them the equivalent of what he gets.’’76 As is plain, he takes the position that a large class of typically caring relationships, namely parent-child friendships, are inherently unjust. The parties cannot possibly receive benefits in proportion to their contribution. Thus, Aristotle sketches two independent standards for the evaluation of relationships: a justice standard and a care standard. Extreme advocates of the ethics of care maintain that care is always a higher priority than justice. Noddings, for example, describes a situation in which care requires someone to support a racist aunt, while justice requires the same person to support the equal-rights protesters. Noddings notoriously goes on to maintain that the person should stand with the aunt.77 Moderate ethics of care advocates demur, acknowledging that justice takes priority in some situations, but maintaining that mainstream ethics has over-emphasized and over-counted such cases. Aristotle also denies that we should always give priority to care. He makes this point by considering an extreme case. He assumes that we care most for our parents. If care always trumped justice, then we would always give preference to our parents, at least in paradigmatic families. We would forward their interests to the exclusion of the interests of everyone else. But as Aristotle says: ‘‘That we should not make the same return to everyone, nor give a father the preference in everything, as one does not sacrifice everything to Zeus, is plain enough.’’78 Thus, like the moderate ethics of care advocates, Aristotle thinks that justice sometime takes precedence over care, even within the bosom of families. Aristotle also exhibits a high-stakes case in which care trumps justice. ‘‘We must for the most part return benefits rather than oblige friends as we must pay back a loan to a creditor rather than make one to a friend. But perhaps even this is not always true; e.g. should a man who has been ransomed out of the hands of brigands ransom his ransomer in return…or should he ransom his father? It would seem that he should ransom his father in preference even to himself.’’79 This passage requires careful consideration. In the first part, Aristotle lays down the general principle that returning benefits has a higher priority than obliging friends. In the second part, Aristotle gives an exception. When a personÕs parent is kidnapped, obliging friends by ransoming the parent has a higher priority than returning benefits by ransoming the person who was his ransomer. At first glance it might seem that Aristotle is saying that ransoming a parent is a

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higher priority justice-duty than ransoming a ransomer. However, this cannot be a case of one justice-duty trumping another. The duty to return benefits is a justice-duty, but the duty to oblige friends is not. Obliging friends is clearly not a matter of rectificatory justice. If it were reciprocal or distributive justice, it would be a matter of returning benefits. Yet Aristotle contrasts obliging friends with returning benefits. We do not oblige friends as a matter of justice. Instead, we oblige friends because we want to forward their interests. We oblige them because we care about them. Ransoming a parent is not a step toward appropriate distribution of benefits, but a way to preserve the wellbeing of the parent. Hence, in the first part of the passage, Aristotle is claiming that the justice-duty to return benefits usually has priority over the care-duty to oblige friends, whereas in the second part of the passage he says that when a personÕs parent is kidnapped, the careduty trumps the justice-duty. This is a situation in which care takes priority over justice. In general, we must distinguish different sorts of conflict of duty situations. Conflicting duties of justice can occur within a single friendship. They also occur when a person is a party to different friendships making conflicting demands. When ElphiasÕs business partner unexpectedly calls with an emergency that Elphias has previously promised to handle, should he stand up his tennis partner in order to handle it? Conflicts between duties of justice and duties of care arise within a friendship when matching benefits to contributions within a friendship does not appropriately advance the interests of some of the friends. When Fleur makes her will, should she distribute her belongings equally among her children who all contributed equally to the family, as justice requires, or should Fleur leave more to the one child who is much needier than the rest, as care requires? As the ransoming case shows, conflicts between justice and care may be mistaken for conflicts between justice and justice. Conversely, conflicts between justice and jutice may seem to be conflicts between justice and care, especially when there is a clash between the comparatively partial, passionate, and particular responsibilities of a close friendship, and the comparatively more general, impartial, dispassionate responsibilities of a distant friendship. If Gellert cannot do both, should he contribute his fair share of child support or pay his taxes? Such a clash looks like a conflict between justice and care, but is really a conflict between justice and justice.

7. Conclusion In a rough way, the ten core doctrines of the modern, moderate ethics of care have been set out. Arguably, Aristotle anticipates all ten doctrines,

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making him, in a sense, the founder of the ethics of care. Aristotle also makes some interesting and important claims about the relationship between care and justice. Both Aristotle and the advocates of the modern, moderate ethics of care emphasize particularity in three ways. They downplay the role of general rules of decision-making in ethics, and instead emphasize the importance of acquiring the details of each particular situation acquired through perception. They insist that the particular relationships of each individual are crucial components of his or her identity. Finally, they maintain that a personÕs relationships determine how he or she should be treated. Both Aristotle and the advocates of the modern, moderate ethics of care consider the passion of care to be an aid rather than an obstacle to moral action in two different ways. They take care to be the best motivator for helpful acts and a crucial lens through which to investigate the morally salient facts of situations. They also maintain that impartiality in ethics is overrated; we are, and should be, partial with respect to our relationships. Our responsibilities grow out of our relationships. Our responsibilities to others are functions of our relationships with them. We have relationships with many people, but our responsibilities do not extend beyond our relationships. Aristotle and the modern, moderate ethics of care advocates distinguish between care-duties and justice-duties. Parties within relationships should aim at the common good and generally cultivate the relationships. As may also be said, relationships should be caring rather than deviant. Exchanges between friends should be of equal value. Wrongdoers should compensate victims with amounts equal to their losses. Finally, the contributions that parties make to relationships should be proportional to their benefits from the relationships. As may also be said, relationships should be just rather than unequalized. Relationships can go wrong by being uncaring or unjust or both. Aristotle and the advocates of the modern, moderate ethics of care agree that care and justice are independent. Some relationships are uncaring but just; others are caring but unjust. Neither care nor justice always has priority. Sometimes care trumps justice; other times justice trumps care.80

Notes 1. See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), and Nel Noddings, Caring (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1984).

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2. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1380b36-1381a2, p. 2200. 3. Ibid. 1166b33-35, p. 1844. 4. Ibid. 1157b29-30, p. 1829. 5. See ibid. 1155b32-34, p. 1826 and 1166a2-8, p. 1843. 6. See ibid. 1241a16-18, p. 1967. 7. See ibid. 1119b23-27, p. 1767. 8. See Margaret Walker, ‘‘Moral Understandings: Alternative ÔEpistemologyÕ for a Feminist Ethics,’’ Hypatia, 4 (1989). 9. Aristotle, op.cit. 1094b19-21, p. 1730, and see 1103b34-1104a10, p. 1743; 1109b1424, p. 1752; 1126a32-b7, p. 1777; 1142a11ff, p. 1803; 1164b22, p. 1840. 10. See ibid. 1134a1-7, 1789. 11. See ibid. 1119a16-20, p. 1766. 12. See Ibid. 1146b35ff, p. 1811. 13. Ibid. 1126b3-4, p. 1777, and see 1109b22-23, p. 1752. 14. Ibid. 1125b33-1126a1, p. 1776. 15. Ibid. 1141b4-16, p. 1802. 16. Ibid. 1169b18-19, p. 1848. 17. Ibid. 1097b8-11, p. 1734. 18. See ibid. 1178b5-6, p. 1862. 19. Ibid. 1253a28-29, p. 1988. 20. Ibid. 1102a13-15, p. 1741. 21. See ibid. 1280b23-1281a2, p. 2032. 22. Ibid. 1172a8-15, p. 1852. 23. See John M. Cooper, ‘‘Aristotle on Friendship,’’ Essays on AristotleÕs Ethics, ed. Amelie Rorty (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1980), p. 317-334; and Richard Kraut, Aristotle on the Human Good (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 142-143. 24. See Aristotle, op. cit. 1172a1-8, p. 1852. 25. Ibid. 1166a7-8, p. 1843. 26. Ibid. 1166a31-32, p. 1843; 1170b6-7, p. 1850. 27. See Nancy Sherman, ‘‘Aristotle on Friendship and the Shared Life,’’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 47 (1987). 28. See Fred Miller, Nature, Justice, and Rights in AristotleÕs Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 53-56, 194-198, 205-210. 29. Leviticus 19:18; Luke 10:27. 30. See Aristotle, op. cit. 1262b15-24, p. 1837. 31. See ibid. 1170b20ff, p. 1852. 32. Ibid. 1156a7-8, p. 1826; 1155b18-19, p. 1826. 33. See ibid. 1160b32-1161a1, p. 1834. 34. See ibid. 1279a17-20, p. 2030, 1160a31-b22, p. 1834. 35. See ibid. 1158b11-14, p. 1831; 1242b1ff, p. 1969; 1163b29-35, p. 1839; 1131b29-31, p. 1786. 36. See ibid. 1164a2ff, p. 1839. 37. Ibid. 1158b15-19, p. 1831. 38. Ibid. 1151b33-1152a2, p. 1819. 39. Ibid. 1157b28-29, p. 1829.

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40. Ibid. 1169a18-22, p. 1848. 41. Ibid. 1378a19-21, p. 2195, and see 1114b1-3, p. 1759. See also Steven R. Leighton, ‘‘Aristotle and the Emotions,’’ Phronesis, 27 (1982). 42. See ibid. 1378a1-3, p. 2194. 43. Ibid. 1379b16-17, p. 2197. 44. See ibid. 1170a14-b19, p. 1849. 45. Ibid. 1383a6-7, p. 2203. 46. Ibid. 1161b12-15, p. 1835. 47. Ibid. 1252b12-1253a1, p. 1987. 48. See ibid. 1159b35-1160a2, p. 1833; 1162a31-33, p. 1836; 1165a16-18, p. 1841; 1169a18-34, p. 1848. 49. Ibid. 1160a4-8, p. 1833. 50. See ibid. 1165a18-33, p. 1841. 51. Ibid. 1165b6, p. 1842. 52. Ibid. 1165b18-20, p. 1842. 53. Ibid. 1165b23-24, p. 1842. 54. See Noddings, op. cit., pp. 46-47. 55. See Aristotle, op. cit. 1170b20-1170b33ff, p. 1850. 56. Ibid. 1381a15-16, p. 2200. 57. Ibid. 1159b25-26, p. 1833. 58. Ibid. 1242a19-21, p. 1968, and see 1160a8, p. 1833; 1161a10-11, p. 1834; 1162a29-33, p. 1836. 59. See Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 293. Cf. Miller, op. cit., pp. 84-86. 60. Aristotle, op. cit. 1162a29-31, p. 1836. 61. Ibid. 1155a26-27, p. 1825. 62. Ibid. 1166a3-5, p. 1843. See also 1155b31, p. 1826. 63. Ibid. 1157b19, p. 1829. 64. Ibid. 1157b10-12, p. 1829. 65. Ibid. 1172a1-8, p. 1852, and see 1165b23-31, p. 1842; 1381a4-6 p. 2200. 66. See ibid. 1133b16-17, p. 1789. 67. See ibid. 1132a6-10, p. 1786. 68. See ibid. 1131a19-24, p. 1785. 69. See ibid. 1156b33-35, p. 1842, and see 1163a1-2, p. 1837. 70. See ibid. 1131b29-31, p. 1786; 1162a36-b2, p. 1837; 1163b29-35, p. 1839. 71. See ibid. 1163a24-b14, p. 1838-9. 72. Ibid. 1165a34-35, p. 1842. 73. Ibid. 1160a36-b14, p. 1834, and see 1279a17-20, p. 2030; 1241b27-32, p. 1968. 74. Ibid. 1160b32-1161a1, p. 1834. 75. Ibid. 1160a36-b14, p. 1834. 76. Ibid. 1163b12-17, p. 1839. 77. See Noddings, op. cit., pp. 109-110. 78. Aristotle, op. cit. 1165a14-16, p. 1841. 79. Ibid. 1164b30-1165a2, p. 1841. 80. I would like to thank an anonymous referee and the Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of Value Inquiry for their comments and help.

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