Asymmetric Auctions with Resale Isa Hafalir and Vijay Krishna (2008)

American Economic Review 98, 87-112.

(A brief summary. Presenter: Kohei Shiozawa)

Introduction (1/4) When do resale possibilities matter? •

An auction with inefficient allocations

(e.g., first-price with asymmetric bidders)

Why do resale possibilities matter? •

Virtually we can not prevent resale

(e.g., spectrum auction in UK in 2000)



Post auction resale results in efficiency?

(i.e., is an inefficient auction just as good?) 2 /18

Introduction (2/4) This paper •

Auctions with two asymmetric bidders



Only the winning bid is announced



Post auction trade (resale) is possible



Resale takes place via monopoly pricing

3 /18

Introduction (3/4) Main results •

Characterization of equilibrium of

the first-price auction with resale



Derivation of an equilibrium of

the second-price auction with resale



General Revenue ranking:

first-price second-price

4 /18

Introduction (4/4) Contributions •

Characterization of equilibrium of

the first-price auction with resale

Under asymmetry, characterization and

revenue results are few and far between. •

General Revenue ranking:

first-price second-price

Under asymmetry, it is well known that there

is no general revenue ranking without resale. 5 /18

First-price auction with resale (FPAR) Main assumptions •

Two asymmetric bidders



Assume that

and (FOSD)

The model 1. Bidders participate in a first-price auction. 2. The winning bid is publicly announced. 3. The winner can offer a resale price. 4. The looser can choose to accept it or not. 6 /18

First-price auction with resale (FPAR)

7 /18

First-price auction with resale (FPAR) A. Resale stage •

Suppose that bidder Bidder



If

wins with a bid of

would infer that bidder

offers a price

that solves



Let

denote the solution. 8 /18

First-price auction with resale (FPAR) B. Biding stage (1/4) •

Let

be equilibrium strategies.



Take any



Then, FOCs imply the following ODEs:

and let

be a bidder s.t.

9 /18

First-price auction with resale (FPAR) B. Biding stage (2/4)

Proposition 1. In equilibrium, the bid distributions

must be identical: Corollary 1. In equilibrium, bidder aggressively than bidder : 10 /18

bids more

First-price auction with resale (FPAR) B. Biding stage (3/4)

Observation: the FOC for the symmetric first-price

auction with some distribution is

11 /18

First-price auction with resale (FPAR) B. Biding stage (4/4) •

Let

be a distribution such that



Take the symmetric equilibrium a symmetric FPA with .



Define strategies as

of

constitute an equilibrium of FPAR. 12 /18

First-price auction with resale (FPAR)

Theorem 1. FPAR has an equilibrium in which

the bidding strategies are

Note that Expected revenues of FPAR and the symmetric FPA with are the same. 13 /18

Second-price auction with resale (SPAR) The model 1. Bidders participate in a second-price auction. 2. The winning bid is publicly announced. 3. The winner can offer a resale price. 4. The looser can choose to accept it or not. Remark The winner knows loser’s bid and hence value.

14 /18

Second-price auction with resale (SPAR) Proposition 2. SPAR has an equilibrium in which bidders bid their true value:

Resale Stage Winner is

believes that ’s type

offeres

iff

Bidding Stage If a bidder loses, his payoff is 0 truth-telling in SPA is never a bad action. 15 /18

General Revenue Ranking Theorem 1

Revenue equivalence principle

Proposition 2

With some technique of real analysis, we have

16 /18

General Revenue Ranking

Theorem 2. The revenue from the auction in FPAR

is at least as great as that of SPAR:

17 /18

Summary •

Auctions with two asymmetric bidders



Post auction trade (resale) is possible



Characterization of equilibrium of

the first-price auction with resale



Derivation of an equilibrium of

the second-price auction with resale



General Revenue ranking:

first-price second-price 18 /18

Asymmetric Auctions with Resale

Auctions with two asymmetric bidders. • Only the winning bid is ... revenue results are few and far between. ... Observation: the FOC for the symmetric first-price.

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