The Forum Volume 4, Issue 1

2006

Article 3

M ANAGING NATIONAL S ECURITY

Back to the Future: Transforming the Army Officer Development System Michael Meese∗

∗ †

Samuel Calkins†

United States Military Academy at West Point, [email protected] United States Military Academy at West Point, [email protected]

c Copyright 2006 The Berkeley Electronic Press. All rights reserved.

Back to the Future: Transforming the Army Officer Development System∗ Michael Meese and Samuel Calkins

Abstract As a closed labor force, with limited lateral entry, the military must build officers from within. This means that when significant changes in operating environments occur—such as the end of the Cold War or the aftermath of 9/11—changes in the military personnel system can take significant time to affect the composition of the officer corps. Changes at the end of the Cold War in the Army officer development system created greater specialization of officers in their specific career fields, which is both understandable and supportable when viewed in historical context. As the nation addresses the officer development system today, the Army should consider returning to some practices implemented during the Cold War to enhance flexibility and versatility among its officer corps in the post-9/11 environment. KEYWORDS: officer development, army, personnel management

∗

Colonel Michael J. Meese is a Professor and Major Samuel Calkins is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy at West Point. They can be contacted at [email protected] and [email protected]. The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the Strategic Studies Institute at the Army War College which supported the research for this paper. This paper reflects the views of the authors and not necessarily those of the United States Military Academy, the Army, or any other government organization.

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The officer corps is under significant strain as it strives to accomplish all of the tasks required in support of current operations while simultaneously transforming to meet future needs. This strain is most pronounced in the Army, where the officer corps is facing its most significant challenges since Vietnam. The Army has clearly recognized these problems and has had a series of efforts to revise the Officer Professional Management System (OPMS), which is the major developmental process for Army officers.1 Final decisions on the future of OPMS have not been made and this paper is not intended to be a critique of any particular proposal. The purpose of this paper is to put the current Army officer management discussions in their broader economic and historical context so that outsiders and Army leaders, alike, can understand the reason for the Army’s unique personnel management system and consider the direction which that system should take. Based upon this review, we conclude that, to meet the needs of the Army of the 21st century, the Officer Corps needs to produce officers who are adept in multiple skill sets in a way that is fundamentally different from the current OPMS 3 officer development system. To address this topic, the paper is divided into four sections. First, we address the distinctive nature of the labor market for military officers. Second, we explain the major historical changes in the Army officer development system since Vietnam. Third, we articulate some of the needs for officers in the future. Finally, we make some observations that derive from this study that should be considered as policy is developed. 1. Why is Military Labor Policy Different? Beyond the obvious differences in regulations, conditions, pay, and risk, there are two other critical, but less well understood characteristics of military personnel policies. First, to a greater extent than most other labor forces, the military has a significant ability to affect worker preferences and, in the case of officers, the labor force is managed as a profession rather than considering officers as mere employees. Adjusting Preferences—the Essence of Development A central characteristic of Army personnel management is the U.S. military’s current model of recruiting individuals at roughly the time that they enter the work force and then developing and selectively retaining them. There is very limited lateral entry into the military so that the workers that the military recruits this year will be the base from which it selects its middle grade managers in 12-18 1

For example, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (G-1) has convened a Council of Colonels to recommend changes to the officer development system to be included in “OPMS 3.”

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years and its senior leaders in 25-35 years. While some have proposed increasing lateral entry, most senior officers have spent their entire adult lives with the military.2 To expand on the oft-quoted words of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, "As you know, you go to war with the Army you have. They're not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time."3 The military that goes to war today is a function of the training, education, and development of those individuals recruited over the past twenty years. This closed labor force system provides significant opportunities that can assist policy makers in managing the military labor force. Most economic models assume that individual preferences are fixed and manipulation of incentives affects individual choice. Since military senior leaders have developed over a lifetime, however, the military can explicitly and deliberately adjust and develop their preferences. As George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton explain in their article in the Journal of Economic Perspectives, It has been long accepted in sociology and psychology that people’s notions of how to behave depend on the situation…This concept of utility is a break with traditional economics where utility functions are not situation-dependent, but fixed. In our conception, utility functions can change, because norms of appropriate and inappropriate behavior differ across space and time. Indeed, norms are taught—by parents, teachers, professors, priests, to name a few.4 The way that the military teaches norms and develops preferences within individuals is multifaceted, but it normally is through activities that can be grouped into four general areas: training, education, assignments, and mentoring. The critical issue with respect to these areas is that they have a dual focus. On one hand, their explicit objective is to prepare the service member for his or her current demands. On the other, it is to provide development over a 2

One recent study concerning lateral entry (concerning enlisted soldiers rather than officers) concluded that that “lateral entry for non-prior-service personnel is unlikely to be successful in reducing training costs on a meaningful scale without introducing serious force management risks.” It recommended “a shift in focus to lateral entry of prior-service personnel, both activeduty and reserve component. A strategy emphasizing expansion of prior-service lateral entry would minimize cultural disruption, avoid training costs, and amortize costs already incurred over a longer career length. Dina Levy, et al, Expanded Enlisted Lateral Entry: Options and Feasibility (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2004) xvi. 3 Secretary Rumsfeld’s statement was in a town hall meeting with soldiers at Camp Buehring in Kuwait on 8 December 2004. 4 George A. Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton, “Identity and the Economics of Organizations,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 18 (Fall 2004), 4.

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career that includes cultivating preferences that are conducive to a long term commitment to effective contributions in military service. Frequently what is good in the short term is also good in the long term, but on other occasions the two can be at odds. At times, policy makers must adjust resources from short term requirements to focus on the long term development of the force. The Army as a Profession All of the previous discussion applies to military labor forces in general, irrespective of rank or service. Beyond the military in general, it is important to note that the officer corps is and should be considered to be managed as a profession. In the seminal study on the topic, Don Snider observes, “The Army must be a vocational profession—a calling—rather than just a big government bureaucracy, and it must be recognized as such by its client, the American people.”5 In a bureaucracy or a business, the primary method of interacting with individuals is through rules and incentives that are developed to maximize the efficiency of the organization or the profitability of the business. In a profession, society delegates to the profession responsibilities to develop a specialized expertise and negotiate professional jurisdictions on behalf of the client—in this case, the nation. Part of the challenge, however, is that the military will always have some of the features of both a bureaucracy and a business. As a Pentagon briefing proclaims, “We are America’s oldest company, largest company, busiest company, and most successful company.”6 While that may be true, the operating principles should be primarily those of a profession, not that of a business or a bureaucracy. Don Snider further explains the tension and the resulting problem, which is worth citing at length: Maintaining an appropriate balance between the Army’s two natures is thus ever elusive; at any time, bureaucracy can come to predominate over profession. The result is an Army whose leaders, self-concepts, decisions, and organizational climate for soldiers reflect a high degree of bureaucracy and efficiency rather than military professionalism and effectiveness. In the bureaucratic mode, the self-concept of the Army’s members is likely to become one of “employee,” while in the mode of a calling their selfconcept is one of professional…Historically, militaries that do not resolve this tension in favor of their professional identity can 5

Don M. Snider, “The U.S. Army as Profession,” in The Future of the Army Profession, Second Edition, by Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 4. 6 Department of Defense, “DoD 101,” (accessed 20 June 2005), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/dod101/flash_intro1.html, 2.

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experience the “death” of their professional character. As their bureaucratic nature comes to dominate, they cease to be a profession and become little more than an obedient military bureaucracy, treating their officers and soldiers as bureaucrats. One need only look to the current armies of western European nations, with one or two exceptions, for examples of this phenomenon.7 The recognition that officers are called to serve as members of a profession reinforces the need for military leaders not to accept officer preferences and identities as fixed, but as norms that can be developed and shaped over time to support the long term objectives of the nation. 2. How has Army Officer Development Policy Evolved since Vietnam? Part of the problem of the management of the military labor force is that all of the uniformed decision makers are products of the previous officer management systems that influenced them throughout their careers. Current Army leaders have been shaped by two systems—the dual-track Cold War system and the immediate post-Cold War system—often without recognizing the unique period and context in which those systems were created. After Vietnam: the Dual Track System Following the Vietnam War, the Army underwent a rapid transformation that affected it on many levels, to include officer development and management.8 The original OPMS has its roots in a study completed in 1971 that implemented a centralized command selection process and a system of primary and secondary specialties for officers. A further review completed in 1984 saw the introduction of a formal system of “functional areas” that allowed the Army to address the increasing need for specialization while acknowledging that all officers’ primary duties were in their basic branches. The system required that each officer serve in a basic branch for the first several years of service. Following company command, however, officers received functional area designations with the expectation that they would serve a tour away from their primary branches to meet the institutional needs of the Army. Officers spent the remainder of their careers alternating between operational and functional assignments in accordance with their preferences and 7

Snider, 15. Leonard Wong and Douglas V. Johnson, “Serving the American People: A Historical View of the Army Profession,” The Future of the Army Profession, Second Edition, by Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 101.

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the needs of the Army. This system facilitated specialization outside of the officer’s basic branch and so allowed a large percentage of officers to participate in graduate education or training with industry. The Army attempted to recognize the importance of work and study outside of traditional war-fighting assignments. In practice, however, the officer corps developed a strong preference for the “operational” Army. Those officers that remained in their basic branch and selected “functional” assignments closely related to conventional command positions saw the most success.9 The preferred career progression following company command became a second command, a tour as an observer/controller at the National Training Center, or another operational assignment. Officers who took time away from the operational Army to learn a functional area skill put themselves at risk for promotion. Thus, the Army faced a dilemma: it needed officers to perform duties within their functional areas in order for the institutional army to run properly, but it had created a system in which strictly defined operational assignments were most important for promotion. Ingrained in the officer corps was a culture in which a functional assignment was at best a distraction and at worst a liability. Mandatory officer training—the Army schools required for promotion at each grade—was almost exclusively geared toward operational command in successively larger organizations. Assignments to forward deployed units were the most sought after. Mentoring was informal and typically reinforced the norm that functional area assignments were a necessary evil to be minimized, if not completely avoided. This primary focus on operational assignments and the dominance of the “muddy boots” army was appropriate, especially considering the geo-political climate of the Cold War. The imperative was clear: the nation needed a “trained and ready” Army. The largest national security challenge for the Army was defense of NATO, which depended on the operational and tactical skills of officers who could synchronize all possible combat power in a massive force-onforce land campaign. Appropriately, officers who mastered this most challenging of operational demands were most likely to be promoted. The generation of officers who were commissioned after Vietnam through the end of the Cold War (from about 1974 to 1989) developed this “trained and ready” mindset as their professional identity. For these officers “war” and their identity as Army officers centered around mobilizing massive heavy forces, deploying them overseas in a developed theater, coordinating with allied forces,

9

One of the functional areas, for example, was functional area 54 which was “operational planner.” Officers who were successful in their commands were frequently encouraged to be a functional area 54 officer to maximize their operations time and minimize the distraction that another functional area might have on their career.

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and then fighting a large conventional war against another massive enemy.10 Operation Desert Storm in 1991 validated everything that the Army had done as it defeated the Iraqi Army and liberated Kuwait in just 100 hours. The End of the Cold War: OPMS XXI When the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union began to crumble, Army officers whose professional lives had been dominated by the Cold War had to confront fundamental changes in the security environment. As the Army approached the downsizing of the 1990s, two themes dominated Army thinking. The first was the paramount positive emphasis on being “trained and ready,” which was the lesson from the Cold War aptly validated in Desert Storm. The second was negative: the overriding concern of senior officers was to avoid neglecting defense and to prevent the Army from declining as it had in the era of the “hollow Army” of the post-Vietnam 1970s. These two themes were encapsulated in a five-word slogan that was the mantra of the early 1990s: “No More Task Force Smiths.11” Aside from focusing on this mantra to avoid decline and failure, it was understandably difficult for the Army to assist national leaders in strategic thinking about problems of the post Cold War era. Because the entire focus of the Cold War officer development system had been to develop a trained and ready force at the tactical and operational level, the Army had failed to build a corps of officers who were prepared to think broadly and strategically about the implications of the new geo-political environment. The Army’s focus on being trained and ready and the “No More Task Force Smiths” mantra failed to provide an affirmative strategy for the Army to pursue in the post-Cold War era. At nearly the same time, military deployments to Somalia in 1992, Haiti in 1993, Rwanda in 1995 (logistical support), Bosnia in 1995, and Kosovo in 1999, began to characterize the actual work that the Army was doing, irrespective of the operations for which the Army was prepared or preparing. The generation of officers who developed in the previous OPMS viewed the new challenges of peace-keeping as “lesser included cases” that were auxiliary to preparing the Army to fight and win a major land war. To highlight their subordinate status, these peace-keeping operations were officially named “operations other than war.” The national security requirements of the nation had changed, but emphasis on readiness for the next big war dominated the Army’s thinking. 10

Andy Krepinevich in his book on the Vietnam War describes this self-identity as “the Army Concept,” which focused on a large, conventional land war that relied heavily on firepower. See Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). 11 This slogan referred to the defeat of Task Force Smith at the outset of the Korean War, a defeat that had been widely attributed to the lack of emphasis on the Army after World War II.

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As the Army revised the officer management system, it faced several problems. First, by the mid-1990s “a significant misalignment between the number of authorized positions for field grade officers and the affordable officer inventory [had] created serious management problems.”12 The increasing (and congressionally mandated) requirements from the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and for support of the Army Reserve and National Guard, made an overhaul unavoidable. Second, the paucity of strategic thinkers and specialized functional area experts who could assist the Army to adapt to the new strategic environment was acknowledged by Army leaders. There had to be “paths to the top” for individuals who did not necessarily follow the “muddy boots” operational career pattern. Third, the requirement that the Army be trained and ready continued so that finding a way for individuals to spend more time in operational units was critical to maintaining Army readiness for war. It was in this context that the next officer management system was developed. The vision for the new system was a corps of operators who, unhindered by the distractions of functional areas, would be able to achieve more operational experience and become ever more trained and ready. Correspondingly, a small proportion of the officer corps would specialize in their functional areas and these officers could be promoted to colonel almost exclusively based on performance in their functional area assignments. By creating a system to develop both operational and institutional experts—mostly separately—the Army started to address the need for strategic thinkers, hopefully without degrading the quality of leadership in the operational force. OPMS XXI consisted of a four “cone” system in which officers followed separate career paths in either operations or institutional or operational support functions.13 The bulk of officers, 70% or so, stayed in the operational Army. At about 10 years in service, the remaining 30% were moved into career fields that emphasized expertise in management of the Army as an institution. These officers specialized in technical fields and competed against each other for promotion to higher ranks and, generally not directly against operational career field officers. Training during the early years of an officer’s career was not drastically different. Only at the time of career field designation did changes become significant, and these changes have significant implications for the Army.

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Officer Personnel Management Task Force, 6. For a good description of the OPMS XXI system see “OPMS XXI Final Report,” (9 July 1997), available at https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/active/opfamdd/LDD1.htm.

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How has Army officer policy evolved? End of the Cold War: OPMS XXI „

Four Pyramid System: ‰ ‰ ‰ ‰

„

„

OPMS XXI Concept

Operations Operational Support Information Operations Institutional Support

OPMS XXI

Current PrePre-OPMS System

Opnal Operations Support

Transition

Info Opns

Inst. Support

Colonel Lt. Colonel Major

Selection of Career Field “Non-operators” Company Level Performance Review & Mentoring Assignments Company Command have limited (Captains & Lieutenants) Schooling & Assignments room at the top Current Single Pyramid System Converts to 4 separate “cones” cones” … Leaders for the 21st century Army “No More Task Force Smiths”

‰ ‰

Operators shielded from non-operational assignments Army’s ability to react to changing world was limited

First, opportunities for graduate education dropped drastically among operational officers. Second, the “four different paths to the top” system increasingly formalized preferences against non-operational assignments. When 70% of the officer corps is designated as “operational,” those operators who attempt to broaden their experiences outside of the strict regimen of Army officer education are in a small minority. Thus the Army further solidified a split between the operators and those that would shape the institutional Army at the very time when it needed officers who had both operational experience and broader educational development. In the post-Cold War world, the Army needs officers who are experts in “information war operations, special forces operations, political-military operations, counter-drug/anti-nuclear operations, and combat.”14 To gain the knowledge and experience required for such a diverse range of missions, officers need time to study and work outside of strictly defined operational assignments. And this leads to a final problem, albeit one that planners were not able to foresee at the time they implemented OPMS XXI: the demands imposed on the 14

Donald Vandergriff, “Re: What’s Wrong with the Military? – Part Two,” The Atlantic Unbound, (15 January 2003, accessed 23 June 2005), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/unbound/fallows/jf2003-01-08/vandergriff2.htm, 1.

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Army after 9/11. Because officers are now locked into critical command and staff positions for the duration of train-up and deployment to theaters of operation, the number of branch qualifying positions available to each newly promoted class of officers is dwindling. If these strictly defined positions are required for continued progression and promotion, an increasing queue of unqualified operations career field officers will continue to develop. The current system will likely prove too inflexible to accommodate future needs of the Army. Thus, the current system in which 70% of the officer corps is focused solely on operational combat assignments, and the remaining 30% have little experience with the Army’s central mission after promotion to major is increasingly untenable. In essence, the officer corps is focused on being trained and ready to fight the last war. 3. What is Required for Army Officers Today? Given the constraints of the Army’s labor system and the complications inherent in predicting future requirements, current and future generations of officers need a revised management system. Perhaps surprisingly, we recommend a return to a dual track system similar to the original OPMS. While that original system focused on preparing to fight the Soviets in Western Europe, however, the new system must recognize the less well-defined threat and hence build in flexibility. Drawing on Richard Lacquement’s essay in The Future of the Army Profession, future Army leaders must be equally well-versed in warfighting skills and enterprise management.15 As the current generation of officers is learning daily in Iraq and Afghanistan, successful stability operations are as critical to long term victory as combat operations. Thus, the Army has no choice but to accept risk by encouraging officers to pursue meaningful secondary specialties that are not perceived as subordinate to combat training, but as necessary components of development. Of course fighting and winning the nation’s wars will always be the Army officer’s foremost duty. Thus, every officer must continue to focus, especially early in his career, on a combat or combat support specialty. The early developmental experiences of specializing in a basic branch, gaining rotational experience in line units, and learning the fundamentals of small unit leadership will always be critical. But as officers’ careers progress, we must institutionalize the requirement for building a wider base of experience and capability. Mid- and senior-level officers must develop into strategic and creative thinkers who can not only direct combat operations, but also manage and shape the business side of the Army, understand and work effectively in diverse cultural contexts, and conduct 15

Richard Lacquement, “Mapping Army Professional Expertise and Clarifying Jurisdictions of Practice,” The Future of the Army Profession, Second Edition, by Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 219.

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governance and statesmanship with skill. The types of skills that officers will need has been likened to that of a Pentathlete—one who is not just spectacular at one event but actually has professional expertise at a number of events with several skills. At best, previous systems have not provided incentives that encourage the development of such skills; at worst, they have actually discouraged assignments that fostered the development of expertise in anything other than tactical level war-fighting.

Army Leaders in the 21st Century “The Pentathlete” Multi-skilled Leader Leader Attributes ‰ Decisive, with integrity - Strategic & creative thinker and character - Builder of leaders and teams ‰ Confident and Personifies the - Competent full spectrum competent decisionwarfighter or accomplished Warrior Ethos in all maker in uncertain professional who supports the aspects, from war fighting situations: soldier „ Prudent risk taker to statesmanship to - Effective in managing, „ Innovative enterprise management… leading & changing the „ Adaptive It’s a way of life business side of the Army ‰ Empathetic - Skilled in governance, ‰ Professionally statesmanship, and diplomacy educated, life-long - Understands cultural context, learner and works effectively across ‰ Effective communicator them

There is a conflict between contemporary demands on a young officer and the need to develop knowledge, skills, and attributes that will allow effective long term contributions to the Army. Since there is no way to fit more into already tight career timelines, something must be sacrificed to achieve this goal. Although it is may seem sacrilegious for senior leaders, we recommend the additional time required for non-tactical assignments be created by accepting a slightly less trained and ready force. In the foreseeable future, there may be large scale forceon-force battles, but it is unlikely the United States Army will face a qualitatively superior enemy, especially after such an enemy is degraded by Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force aerial fires. The price of a more flexible, adaptable, and strategically effective Army, is the sacrifice of a small measure of training and readiness. For example, OPMS XXI attempts to lock in a major for two “branch qualifying” assignments, as both an operations officer and as an executive officer, before he or she can become a battalion commander. In the current environment, it may be the case where that major only gets one year in a branch qualifying job

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so that he or she can spend additional time in a functional area. The Army may be technically less trained and less ready in force-on-force warfare, but the additional development in functional areas will better prepare officers for the variety of responsibilities that they will face in the future.16 The challenge is to balance training, education, assignments, and mentoring that create successful small unit combat leaders who also have experiences that cultivate a broader range of skills in the long run. Thus, the management system for the next generation of leaders must combine the best components of previous systems while removing any bias, either explicit or perceived, against intellectual development. What will such an evolutionary system look like? First, as recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan make clear, every officer must be well versed in basic combat operations. In fact, a renewed emphasis on close combat skills is in order. Thus, the development of the most junior officers need not depart drastically from the current system. Every officer must, to be part of the profession, understand the basics of small unit tactics. Initial training in a basic branch followed by assignments to deployable units must continue to be the norm. Second, officers need to be given the opportunity and encouraged to develop expertise in a “secondary” specialty. Note that this diverges from the original OPMS in that the ingrained pressure to stay as close to operations as possible must be removed. The system should change to reflect the changing context of Army operations. As in the original OPMS, officers should be required to specialize and, as they advance in rank, they should be given the opportunity to study their specialties through education and assignments. Programs that provide additional graduate school or other educational opportunities for officers are exactly the kind of personnel policy that accomplishes several different objectives for the Army. They develop human capital for the organization, allow the Army to broaden and channel the development of its future leaders, and provide an incentive for those who have an aptitude for and interest in learning. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the mentorship framework needs to change. Whereas the mentoring received by junior officers in the post-Vietnam Army often encouraged them to stay as close to operations as possible, mentorship in the coming years needs to emphasize broader learning rather than a singular focus on high intensity tactical and operational level combat. Such a new system will have several, non-standard paths to success and the Army must find away for the non-standard, creative, thinking individual to succeed.

16

Reliance on the increasingly well-educated, experienced, and professional noncommissioned officer corps for tactical expertise may mitigate the risk involved in this “sacrifice.”

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What is required today? „ „ „ „ „

Every officer trained for close combat Change the culture to encourage a broad range of study Make “non-traditional” career paths acceptable Build in time for non-operational assignments GEN CSM Career paths mutually determined by the Army and the officer COL CSM

L TICA

n

ACS

Mentoring

AL

TAC

ia Civil

tions pera O m tru Spec Full tions pera O e rpris Ente TWI

GIC ATE STR

ACS

2LT SGT

ry Milita

TWI

ION RAT OPE

MAJ SFC

21st Century Leader

Assignments Education

Training

ACS = Advanced Civil Schooling; TWI = Training with Industry

4. Conclusions Determining exactly what training, education, assignments, and mentoring is necessary for the officer corps for the 21st Century is a critical question for the nation. Such discussion, however, should be informed by two assumptions that link back to the introduction of this paper. First, individual preferences and beliefs can be, and we argue should be, adjusted to support the objectives of the military as an explicit part of the labor management policy. As Akerlof and Kranton observed, If an organization is going to function well, it should not rely solely on monetary compensation schemes. We argue that the ability of organizations to place workers into jobs which they identify and the creation of such identities are central to what makes organizations work.17 It is entirely appropriate—indeed essential—that the military attempt to shape and develop individual’s identities. 17

George A. Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton, “Identity and the Economics of Organizations” Journal of Economic Perspectives 18 (Fall 2004), 3.

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The context in which this shaping takes place, however, is that of Army officers as members of a profession. The American people have placed the responsibility on senior Army leaders to determine the specific expertise that should be the purview of the profession and then to develop Army officers with that expertise. This developmental approach needs to stress both the technical and tactical proficiency of officers as well as the ability to adapt and manage the profession over the long term. This requires training, education, assignments, and mentoring that will develop individuals who have the attributes necessary to carry on the profession. Finally, the historical review of the evolution of the officer professional management system explains why, at any given time, the Army used the particular personnel system that it did. It also highlights the fact that, as the specific expertise that is required of a profession evolves so must the developmental model of the professional. One of the implications is that a developmental system must include the flexibility and lifelong learning required so that senior leaders who were developed by a previous system can recognize and adapt a new system for their successors.

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