Cartesian Linguistics: A Chapter in the History of Rationalist Thought Noam Chomsky ２０１６年３月１９日 慶應言語学コロキアム 阿部潤
Introduction “Cartesian linguistics” -> the tradition of “universal” or “philosophical grammar”, which develops from the Port-Royal Grammar <-> “empiricist linguistics”, illustrated by modern structural and taxonomic linguistics - Humboldt, whose work is the culmination as well as the terminal point of the developments of Cartesian linguistics
Creative aspect of language use − １９５０年代の「認知革命」： 言語行動とその産出物の研究から内在的メカニズムの研究へ “The cognitive perspective regards behavior and its products not as the object of inquiry, but as data that may provide evidence about the inner mechanisms of mind…”
(NH, p. 5)
デカルトの二元論 (dualism)：人間の身体や他の動物などはその機能特性を機械 論的に捉えることが可能なのに対して、人間の「精神」はその創造的な思 考の働き故に機械論的把握を越えている。 → 自由な思考を表現する言語使用が「精神」の存在を証明する → 人間の言語能力が真に種固有のものであること - the “creative aspect” of ordinary language use: i) unbounded in scope; (ii) stimulus-free or free of internal physiological states (iii) appropriate to situations <-> animal communication
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− 「自覚」の存在：デカルトの精神の第二のテスト 「かかる機械は自覚によって動くのではなく、単にその器官の装置にした がって動く …」
（デカルト『方法序説』７０ページ）
“Human reason, in fact, ‘is a universal instrument which can serve for all contingencies,” whereas the organs of an animal or a machine ‘have need of some special adaptation for any particular action.’ ”
(p. 60)
− 思考の反映としての言語と発声器官との区別： “ ‘All human beings use it [= speech], however stupid and insane they may be, even though they have no tongue and organs of voice; no animals do.’ ”
(p. 61)
“ ‘men born deaf and dumb, and thus deprived of speech-organs as much as the beasts, or even more so, normally invent their own signs to make themselves understood …’ (DM)”
(p. 60)
- Cordemoy: the study of other minds − 反論： “a more complex organization of the body is sufficient to account for human abilities, …”
(p. 63)
La Mettrie: “man is simply the most complex of machines” “ ‘I believe thought to be so little incompatible with organised matter, that it seems to be one of its properties, …’ ”
(ibid.)
“There should, furthermore, be no obstacle in principle to teaching an ape to speak. It is only ‘a defect in the speech organs’ that stands in the way, and this can be overcome by proper training.”
(ibid.)
“neither La Mettrie nor Bougeant comes to grips with the problem raised by Descartes, … by the fact that human language, being free from control by identifiable external stimuli or internal physiological states, can serve as a general instrument of thought and self-expression rather than merely as a communicative device of report, request, or command.” - Ryle’s “Descartes’ myth”: ‘the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine” 2
(p. 64)
“The belief that there is a polar opposition between Mind and Matter is the belief that they are terms of the same logical type.”
(Ryle 1949, p. 12)
è a category mistake - Bloomfield: “the observer cannot hope to list them [= speech-forms], since the possibilities of combination are practically infinite. … A grammatical pattern (sentence-type, construction, or substitution) is often called an analogy. A regular analogy permits a speaker to utter speech-forms which he has not heard; we say that he utters them on the analogy of similar forms which he has heard.”
(Bloomfield 1933, p. 275)
“Human speech differs from the signal-like actions of animals, even of those which use the voice by its great differentiation.”
(ibid., p. 27)
− 本能と理性の関係：デカルトの精神の第二のテスト Herder: “human language as a consequence of the weakness of human instinct” “nature does not provide man with an instinctive language, or an instinctive faculty of language, or a faculty of reason of which language is a ‘reflection.’ ”
(p. 66)
“Free to reflect and contemplate, man is able to observe, compare, distinguish essential properties, identify, and name (pp. 23f.). It is in this sense that language (and the discovery of language) is natural to man (p. 23), that ‘the human being is formed to be a creature of language’ (p. 43). … ”
(ibid.)
è “reason” as the freedom from instinct rather than as a faculty with fixed properties 「明瞭な意識のしるしとしての言葉の内的・必然的な発生」 （『言語起源論』５１ページ） - A. W. Schlegel: from the creative aspect of language use to true artistic creativity: “poetry has a unique status among the arts in this respect; it, in a sense, underlies all the others and stands as the fundamental and typical art form. … Poetry is unique in that its very medium is unbounded and free; that is, its medium, language, is a system with unbounded innovative potentialities for the formation and expression of ideas.”
(p. 68) 3
- Humboldt: the “Form” of language; “the infinite use of finite means” 「言語そのものは、出来上がった作品（エルゴン）ではなくて、活動性（エ ネルゲイア）である。それ故、言語の本当の定義は、生成に即した定義し かあり得ないことになる。すなわち、言語とは、分節音声を思考の表現た り得るものとするための、永劫に反復される精神の働きなのである。 」 （『言語と精神』第１２節） 「精神は分節化した音声を思考の表現にまで高めてゆく役割を果たすわけ であるが、精神のこういう仕事の中にみられる恒常的なもの、同じような 形態を取り続けているものを、できるだけ完全にその関連性において把握 し、できるだけ体系的に表現したもの、それが言語の形式ということにな る。 」 （『言語と精神』第１２節） “the fundamental property of a language must be its capacity to use its finitely specifiable mechanisms for an unbounded and unpredictable set of contingencies.” (p. 70) - language as a medium of thought: 「言語なくしては、概念は存在し得ないのであるが、同じように、言語なくし ては、心にとっても対象は存在し得ないのである。何となれば、外的な対象は どんなものでも、概念に媒介されてはじめて、心にとって、まとまったそれな りの実在性を得るものだからである。… 人間の個性というものはすべて、世界 の見方の何らかの独自の立場であると見做すことができる。しかし、個性が世 界を見る一定の立場であるということは、実は言語に基づいている点が多大な のである。… 同一民族においては、同じような主観性が常に働きかけているの であるから、どの言語にも、それぞれ特有の見方が潜んでいることになる。」 （『言語と精神』第１４節） è “Humboldt does remain within the Cartesian framework, however, in so far as he regards language primarily as a means of thought and self-expression rather than as an animal-like functional communication system”
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(p. 71)
「言語の起源という問題を考えるに当って、自由で人間的な社会性を目差すと いう根源的な使命に基づいて言語が成立したとは考えずに、主として相互的な 助け合いという卑近な欲求から言語が生じたとし、… 言語の起源が貧弱で少数 の語であるという考え方も、言語が人間同士の助け合いから生れたという見方 も、両者ともに、人が言語に対して懐き得る最も甚だしく間違った考え方なの である。… 助け合うだけのためならば、分節化しない音声でも、十分事足りた であろう。… 言語が発生した当時の人間の自然状態に近いものと普通思われて いる、いわゆる野蛮人の言語も、実は、日常生活に必要であるという程度を遥 かに超えた、豊かで多様な表現が随所に見られるのである。」 （『言語と精神』第１４節） - Humboldt’s notion of “organic form” of language: “mechanical” vs. “organic” form “a language is not to be regarded as a mass of isolated phenomena – words, sounds, individual speech productions, etc. – but rather as an ‘organism’ in which all parts are interconnected and the role of each element is determined by its relation to the generative processes that constitute the underlying form. ”
(p. 74)
cf. how individual works of genius are constrained by rule and law A.W. Schlegel: “ ‘Form is mechanical when, through external force, it is imparted to any material merely as an accidental addition without reference to its quality; … Organical form, again, is innate; it unfolds itself from within, acquires its determination contemporaneously with the perfect development of the germ.’ ”
(p. 72)
- Goethe’s “Urform” in biology: “the Urform is a kind of generative principle that determines the class of physically possible organisms; … principles of coherence and unity which characterize this class and which can be identified as a constant and unvarying factor beneath all the superficial modifications determined by variation in environmental conditions.” (pp. 72-73)
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- Anti-Humboldtian linguistics: W.D. Whitney: “ ‘the infinite diversity of human speech ought alone to be a sufficient bar to the assertion that an understanding of the powers of the soul involves the explanation of speech’… language is strictly a ‘historical product,’ nothing other than ‘the sum of words and phrases by which any man expresses his thought’ ”
(p. 129)
M. Joos: “ ‘languages could differ from each other without limit and in unpredictable ways’ ”
(ibid.)
- The form vs. “character” of a language: “the character of a language is determined by the manner in which it is used, in particular, in poetry and philosophy”
(p. 74)
“it is the character of a language rather than its form that reflects true ‘creativity’ in a higher sense”
(p. 75)
- “Humboldt does not go on to face the substantive question: what is the precise character of ‘organic form’ in language.”
(ibid.)
“in his discussion of generative processes in language, it is often unclear whether what he has in mind is underlying competence or performance”
(ibid.)
- “the failure to formulate rules of sentence construction in a precise way was not simply an oversight of Cartesian linguistics.”
(ibid.)
è “it was a consequence of the express assumption that the sequence of words in a sentence corresponds directly to the flow of thought, at least in a ‘well-designed’ language, and is therefore not properly studied as part of grammar.”
(ibid.)
- “At the opposite pole from the belief in ‘natural order’ is the view that each language contains an arbitrary collection of ‘patterns’ learned through constant repetition (and ‘generalization’) and forming a set of ‘verbal habits’ or ‘dispositions.’”
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(p. 76)
è “it has helped foster a neglect of the problem of specifying the ‘grammatical form’ of particular languages or the general abstract schema to which each language conform.”
(ibid.)
Deep and surface structure - The virtual identity of linguistic and mental processes: cf. The Port-Royal Grammar: “From the manner in which concepts are combined in judgments, the Grammar deduces what it takes to be the general form of any possible grammar, and it proceeds to elaborate this universal underlying structure from a consideration of ‘the natural manner in which we express our thoughts’ (p. 30)”
(p. 78)
- The characteristics of Cartesian linguistics: (I) two aspects of language, correlating with the distinction between mind and body: sounds vs. “signification” = “the manner in which men use them for signifying their thoughts” (Port-Royal Grammar) (II) “The underlying organization of a sentence relevant to semantic interpretation is not necessarily revealed by the actual arrangement and phrasing of its given components.”
(p. 79)
è the distinction between deep and surface structures - The Port-Royal Grammar: the principal form of thought = judgment è its linguistic expression = proposition è proposition = subject + predicate ex. “Invisible God created the visible world” includes three judgments: (1) God is invisible; (2) He created the world; (3) The world is visible. The deep structure “constitutes an underlying mental reality – a mental accompaniment to the utterance – whether or not the surface form of the utterance that is produced corresponds to it in a simple, point-by-point manner.”
(p. 80)
“The deep structure that expresses the meaning is common to all language, so it is claimed, being a simple reflection of the forms of thought. The transformational rules that convert deep to surface structure may differ from language to language.” (p. 81) 7
Ex. an analysis of explicative (nonrestrictive or appositive) and determinative (restrictive) relative clauses in terms of the “comprehension” and “extension” of “universal ideas” è the theory of transformational generative grammar as “essentially a modern and more explicit version of the Port-Royal theory.”
(p. 83)
Ex. a transitive verb and its object expressing a complex proposition “Brutus killed a tyrant” DS: Brutus killed someone who was a tyrant è a negation test - the identity of deep structure underlying a variety of surface forms in different languages: (Q) how the significant semantic connections among the elements of speech are expressed? -> case systems vs. fixed word orders -> the correlation between freedom to transpose and wealth of inflection - A criticism by structural linguistics “it indicates lack of respect for the ‘real language’ (i.e., the surface form) and lack of concern for ‘linguistic fact.’”
(p. 92)
è a restriction of the domain of “linguistic fact” to physically identifiable subparts of actual utterances and their formally marked relations
Description and explanation in linguistics - General vs. particular grammar; cf. Du Marsais, Beauzée General grammar: “ ‘being immutably true and universally applicable, derive from the nature of thought itself’ ” Particular grammar: “ ‘only hypothetically true and depend on conventions which, being accidental, arbitrary and changeable, …’ ” the science of grammar vs. the art of grammar
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(p. 93)
- Explanation in linguistics: “explanatory” = “philosophical” “The discovery of universal principles would provide a partial explanation for the facts of particular languages, … Beyond this, the universal features themselves might be explained on the basis of general assumptions about human mental processes or the contingencies of language use (for example, the utility of elliptical transformations).”
(p. 94)
è “a theory of grammar that is not only ‘general’ but also ‘explanatory’ [raisonée]” - Cartesian linguistics as developed in reaction against pure descriptivism: cf. Vaugelas è Vaugelas’s work foreshadows many of the defects of structural linguistics Ex. failure to recognize the creative aspect of language use “normal language use as constructed of phrases and sentences that are ‘authorized by usage,’ although new words … can be correctly formed by analogy.”
(p. 95)
- An illustration of the difference between descriptive and explanatory grammar: Vaugelas’s rule regarding relative clauses: “a relative clause may not be added to a noun that has no articles or only the ‘article indefini’ de.”
(pp. 95-96)
è the Port-Royal Grammar: noun’s classification as indeterminate vs. determinate è accommodating apparent counter-examples that “are ‘determined’ by some feature other than the article” - Defects of “philosophical grammar”: (I) “its excessive rationality and a priorism and its disregard for linguistic fact” (p. 96) è For Chomsky, “too limited to mere description of fact” “What is missing is a theory of linguistic structure that is articulated with sufficient precision and is sufficiently rich to bear the burden of justification.”
(p. 97)
(II) “a deep structure is nothing other than an arrangement of simple sentences” è Cartesian postulate: “quite generally, the principles that determine the nature of thought and perception must be accessible to introspection and can be brought to consciousness, with care and attention.” 9
(ibid.)
Acquisition and use of language - 17c rationalist psychology: Herbert of Cherbury “there are certain ‘principles or notions implanted in the mind’ that ‘we bring to objects from ourselves … [as] … a direct gift of Nature, a precept of natural instinct.’”
(p. 98)
è this system of common notions not to be identified with “reason” “It simply forms ‘that part of knowledge with which we were endowed in the primeval plan of Nature,’ … ‘reason’ is the process of applying Common Notions as far as it can.’”
(p. 100)
- Leibniz: 「我々の精神はそういうことをすべて潜勢的に知っているので、真理を知 るには注意を必要とするだけであり、従って、我々の精神は少なくとも「こ れらの真理が依存している観念」を持っているということがわかる。」 （『形而上学叙説』第２６節） - General presupposition of Cartesian linguistics: (I) “the principles of language and natural logic are known unconsciously” cf. Beauzée, “ ‘general grammar is simply the rational exposition of the procedures of this natural logic.’ ”
(fn. 112)
(II) “they are in large measure a precondition for language acquisition rather than a matter of ‘institution’ or ‘training’” Cordemoy: “language learning presupposes possession of ‘wholly developed reason’” (p. 101) - A.W. Schlegel: “ ‘human reason may be compared to a substance which is infinitely combustible but does not burst into flame on its own; a spark must be thrown into the soul.’ ” (p. 101) “Communication with an already formed intellect is necessary for reason to awaken. … ‘this acquisition [of language] through communication already presupposes the ability to invent language.’”
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(ibid.)
- Humboldt: “a language ‘cannot properly be taught but only awakened in the mind’; … thus languages are, in a sense, ‘self-creations’ of individuals”
(ibid.)
- No sharp distinction between a theory of perception and a theory of learning under the rationalistic philosophy of mind: “a store of latent principles is brought to the interpretation of the data of sense. There is, to be sure, a difference between the initial ‘activation’ of latent structure and the use of it …”
(p. 102)
cf. the distinction between a theory of interpretation and a theory of learning in language - Descartes – Cudworth
参考文献 Chomsky, Noam (2000) New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. デカルト『方法序説』岩波文庫 フンボルト『言語と精神』法政大学出版局 ヘルダー『言語起源論』法政大学出版局 ライプニツ『形而上学叙説』岩波文庫
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