CIVILIAN SUPPORT AND MILITARY UNITY IN THE OUTCOME OF TURKISH AND GREEK MILITARY INTERVENTIONS' YAPRAK GÜRSOY Sabanci University Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 2009, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Sumnier):47-75

This article attempts to explain the divergent domestic roles of the Greek and Turkish militaries after the early 1980s by focusing on the last overt military interventions. The 1967 intervention in Greece and the 1980 coup in Turkey differed from each other in terms of the amount and nature of political autonomy that each military maintained immediately following each country's transition to democracy. Indeed, in each country, the transition process had a significant impact on civil-military relations in the succeeding years. The Greek junta faced civilian and military resistance, and, therefore, the colonels were pressured to completely withdraw from politics. The Turkish coup, on the other hand, was carried out by a cohesive military and was at least implicitly endorsed by a number of influential civilians. This allowed the military to withdraw voluntarily, guide the transition, and maintain political autonomy after 1983. Both Greece and Turkey witnessed military interventions and coups d'état until the 1970s. The first overt military intervention in Greece took place in 1909. This coup was followed by others in the 1920s and 1930s. In the pseudo-democratic post-war period, the military was one of the key institutions responsible for suppressing the growth of communism. This system collapsed in 1967, however, with another coup. This final military intervention lasted seven years and came to an end in 1974. In Turkey, after the demise of the Ottoman Empire in 1923, a single-party regime was established, with the armed forces assuming the duty of safeguarding it. Since the transition to democracy in 1950, there have been three military coups d'état in Turkey—in 1960, 1971, and 1980. Thus, in both countries, militaries have frequently intervened in politics, either overtly or by helping to sustain undemocratic regimes. Despite the seeming historical similarity between the two, Greece and Turkey diverged considerably in their patterns of civil-military relations after 'Some of the arguments that are elaborated and ftarther developed in this article appeared in Gürsoy 2008. An earlier draft of this article was presented at the Biennial International Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, 26-28 October 2007. The author would like to acknowledge the useftil comments of several anonymous reviewers as well as of Kai Michael Kenkel and Neovi Karakatsanis on earlier versions of this article.

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the early 1980s. According to Özkan Duman and Dimitris Tsarouhas (2006), Greece "civilianized" its civil-military relations and experienced "the devolution of responsibility from the military to the civilian leadership at all levels of government" (p. 406). As a result, since the beginning of the 1980s, Greece has not experienced any successful (or even attempted) military interventions. Turkey, on the other hand, has so far only succeeded in "demilitarizing"—as opposed to "civilianizing"—its politics. Therefore, while "the role of the military in public decision making" was gradually decreased in the 1980s (Evin 1994:27) and even though certain important steps have been taken toward "civilianization," the process is not yet complete. While there have been no overt military interventions in Turkey since 1983, the armed forces continue to hold considerable political power, with the military intervening in democratic politics particularly when it believes that the secular Republic is being threatened by political Islam and/or Kurdish activism. The Turkish Armed Forces interfered in politics against political Islamist governments at least twice—in 1997 and 2007. Additionally, there was heavy military involvement and a 15-year state of emergency in the southeast provinces, where the violent activities of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) were primarily focused. What explains the divergent domestic roles of the Greek and Turkish militaries after the early 1980s? This article attempts to answer this question by comparing the last overt interventions in both countries. Certainly the 19671974 regime in Greece and the 1980-1983 coup in Turkey are not the only factors that explain the two neighbors' subsequent divergence. First, a number of external faetors, such as the 1974 Cyprus crisis and Greek accession to the European Community, also have contributed to the civilianization of Greek civil-military relations (Tsingos 1996; Vemey 1990; Vemey and Couloumbis 1991). Second, domestic factors were also significant. Perhaps the most significant domestic variables in Greece were the cooperative relations between post-junta governments and the Greek military. In Greece, unlike Turkey, no major domestic perceptions of threat presented themselves, even after the 1981 electoral victory by the socialist PASOK. Third, the historical legacies of military intervention in both countries were also critically important. In Turkey, after each subsequent military intervention, the armed forces increased their already well-established political autonomy. In Greece, on the other hand, the military never attained comparable levels of power and institutional autonomy. While the Turkish Armed Forces increased their cohesiveness after each military coup, in Greece, the cliques and factions in the military created during the Second World War sustained themselves (Karabelias 2001:216-9, 380-3). Also, in Turkey, rather than damaging the military's image, military interventions contributed to the image of the armed forces as the guardians of the Turkish Republic. Indeed, a significant portion of the Turkish population still regards the armed forces' involvement in politics as legitimate (Demirel 2004:345-81).

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Thus, the current divergence between the two countries' experiences is the result of several interrelated domestic and international factors, as well as events that took place prior to and following the transitions to democracy. This article, however, focuses on one factor in particular, arguing that an important part of the explanation also lies in the last overt military intervention in each country. Scholarly attention has recently begun to focus on this divergence between Greece and Turkey. The work of Karabelias (2001, 2003) and Duman and Tsarouhas (2006), for instance, are path-breaking comparisons of domestic and international developments in both countries prior to and following the 1967 and 1980 coups.'^ While this article acknowledges and draws upon the work of these scholars, it also provides a more in-depth analysis of the last overt interventions. Drawing extensively on the regime transitions literature, I analyze the paths of the 1974 and 1983 transition and their effects as I attempt to delineate the legacies of the 1967-1974 and 1980-1983 coups. The 1967 and 1980 coups in Greece and Turkey, respectively, varied (among other ways) in the amount and nature of political autonomy the armed forces maintained immediately following the subsequent transitions to democracy. This had a significant impact on civil-military relations in succeeding years. One of the main objectives of this article is to show that these transitions from military rule affected the armed forces' political power in the aftermath of intervention. A second aim is to explain the differences in the transition process. The amount of support that each intervention garnered from political elites and the rest of the military officer corps had an important effect on how military rule ended. Since the Greek coup faced widespread resistance, the military was forced to completely withdraw from politics during the transition period. By contrast, the Turkish military intervention was at least implicitly endorsed by influential groups. This allowed the military to be relatively more successflil in retaining power during the 1983 transition period. Thus, this article makes two interrelated arguments. First, it contends that the degree of support that military rule enjoyed in 1967 and 1980 from political elites and within the armed forces conditioned the extent to which the military was able to influence the course of the transition in 1974 and 1983. Second, the capacity of military powerholders to condition the transition influenced the ^In a relatively early comparison, James Brown (1986) argued that the 1980 coup in Turkey and the military's decision to withdraw in three years suggested that the Turkish military intervenes only reluctantly. The involuntary withdrawal of the colonels in 1974, on the other hand, implied that "the Greek officer corps has been cowed into submission, but the principle of civilian supremacy has not been internalized" (186). Writing in the 1980s, Brown concluded that "at some point in the future the Greek officer corps . . . might return to the political arena" (186). While Brovra's comparison has been valuable, his main conclusions have not been supported by subsequent events.

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degree of autonomy each military was able to carry over into democracy. I first outline the theoretical literature that emphasizes the influence of civilian support and military unity on the mode of the transition. I then illustrate how the literature relates the mode of re-democratization to the political power of the military in the post-transition period. Finally, I apply these arguments to the Greek and Turkish cases. THE INFLUENCE OF CIVILIAN SUPPORT AND MILITARY UNITY ON THE MODE OF THE TRANSITION Several paths ñ"om authoritarian to democratic rule exist (Agüero 1995:58-67; Karl 1990:8-12; Mainwaring 1992:294-341; Stepan 1986:64-84). According to Stepan, in transitions from military rule, it is important to distinguish the "military-as-institution" from the "military-as-government" (1986: 75-8). Military-as-government refers to individual rulers of the regime that also hold (or held) professional careers in the armed forées. The military-asinstitution, however, represents the members of the officer corps who do not hold government positions. Instead, the offlcer corps "see [the military] as a permanent part of the state apparatus, with enduring interests and permanent functions that transcend the interests of the government of the day" (Linz and Stepan 1996:67). Thus, even when military officers make up the government, members of the armed forces outside of the ruling circle may have divergent interests than the holders of political power. In Greece and Turkey, transitions to democracy were initiated by either the military-as-government or the military-as-institution. In the Greek case, the military-as-institution threatened to stage a countercoup in 1974 and "insisted that the military-as-government withdraw ñ"om political power" (Stepan 1986:77). The Turkish case exemplifles another path—one in which the military-as-government began the transition and was responsible for the return to civilian rule in 1983 (Nordlinger 1977:138-40; Stepan 1986:75-6). As previous studies on regime transition also suggest, both paths of democratization were influenced by relative military cohesiveness and elite support. In transitions led by the military-as-institution, as was the case in Greece, a marked split among the armed forces usually exists. O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) argue, for instance, that a hardliner versus soft-liner split among the powerholders of an authoritarian regime may facilitate a transition to democracy, as hardliners demand the continuation of authoritarianism, while soft-liners are more open to the idea of liberalization and, in some cases, democratization. Military cohesiveness can be jeopardized in two ways under authoritarian rule. First, as just discussed, there could exist a hardliner versus soft-liner division among incumbents (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). Second, splits may develop between the government and offlcer corps; in other words, the militaryas-institution can come into conflict with the military-as-government. Linz and

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Stepan (1996:67) argue that this usually happens when the officer corps believes the costs of sustaining authoritarianism to be unacceptably high as the result of the regime's failure to perform well economically, when civilian and political opposition to the regime grows and when foreign pressure for regime change develops. A humiliating defeat in external war, as in Greece in 1974, can ñirther accentuate the confiict between the military rulers and the officer corps by increasing the perception of threat of the military-as-institution. As Stepan (1971) argues, when "the military splits into opposing camps," the armed forces "no longer [have the] 'monopoly'" of force (p. 253). As a result, the authoritarian government loses its stability and the military-as-institution considers staging a coup. Empirical evidence shows that intra-military splits can occur during a democratic transition, especially when there are civilian elites with which the military soft-liners can explicitly or implicitly negotiate (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986:37-47). These civilians need soft-line officers as well since, without them, their opposition can be suppressed relatively more easily (Remmer 1989:159). As Stepan (1986:79) and Agüero (1995:126-31) emphasize, when there are infiuential civilian elites who share the preferences of softline officers and the two groups can agree upon the basic rules of the transition, it becomes more difficult for hardliners in the armed forces and the military-asgovernment to resist democratization, as was the case during the Greek 1974 transition. As Eric Nordlinger (1977:140) maintains, however, such intra-military splits are not always conducive to democratization. In fact, most countercoups lead to the continuation of military rule rather than its demise, because officers who have pro-authoritarian preferences can stage countercoups, as in Greece in 1973, thereby jeopardizing a return to democracy, at least in the short-run. Thus, perhaps ironically, when the military-as-govemment decides to guide the transition, military unity can be vital for democratization. In the words of Morris Janowitz (1977), "cohesive military elites are more able to limit their involvement, if such is their intent" (p. 144). As a result, even though military splits can lead to transitions through negotiations with the civilian opposition, a unified military can also be conducive to democratization if the military rulers themselves decide to withdraw voluntarily, as in Turkey in 1983. Under what conditions does the military-as-government decide to initiate democratization? Usually, the option of "voluntary disengagement" is feasible when such disengagement "does not constitute a drastic 'fall' in the stratification pyramid" (Nordlinger 1977:142). That is, when incumbent officers believe that their power and infiuence will not be damaged, they will be more inclined to withdraw from power (Welch 1987:22). Such powerholders usually initiate a return to democracy when it is possible for the armed forces to act as a "moderator," continuing to infiuence politics in ways important to them (Nordlinger 1977:22-4; Stepan 1971:62-6). Similarly, if military rulers believe

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that their withdrawal will not upset and reverse the reforms they instituted during their period of rule, they will be more receptive to the idea of disengagement (Nordlinger 1977:143). The military is more likely to retain powers and receive implicit or explicit guarantees that its reforms will not be reversed when the new political elite also agrees with the transition terms. As Welch (1987) argues, "the decision to return to the barracks . . . is eased by the presence of a potential successor acceptable to the disengaging officers" (p. 23). Thus, not only military unity but also civilian endorsement plays an important role when military rulers themselves choose to return to the barracks. Two conclusions can be drawn from this overview of the theoretical literature. First, in those cases where conflict exists between the military-asinstitution and military-as-government—in other words, when the armed forces are divided—the probability increases that the officer corps outside of the ruling circle will reassert its authority to lead a transition to democracy. However, the likelihood of such a transition increases even further with elite opposition. This is precisely what happened in Greece in 1974. Second, if the military-as-government decides to lead the transition, the presence of collaborative elites is critical. The military must be unified and, in general, supportive of the transition. As Stepan (1986) notes, when there is a group of hardliners in the officer corps, "the redemocratization effort [by the government] may falter because of military institutional resistance, and no actual transfer of power may occur" (p. 75). In short, hardliner groups within the military must be weak and minimal in size for voluntary disengagement to succeed. MILITARY POWER AND AUTONOMY AFTER THE TRANSITION As stated, military cohesiveness, elite concordance, and mode of transition affect the autonomy of the armed forces in a new democracy. Military autonomy is "one aspect of military power" and "refers to the institution's decision-making authority" (Pion-Berlin 1992:84). As David Pion-Berlin argues, there are two different types of autonomy: institutional and political. Institutional autonomy is associated with the armed forces' "professional independence and exclusivity." It is more "defensive" in character and "it is a means by which the military guards its core professional ftinctions against unwanted . .. political meddling" (Pion-Berlin 1992:84-5). Indicators of institutional autonomy include the armed forces' ability to control decisions regarding the military's doctrine, education, and reform, their independence in deciding on junior level personnel decisions, and their freedom in determining the number of personnel in the armed forces (see Pion-Berlin 1992:93). Political autonomy, on the other hand, reflects the "military's aversion toward or even defiance of civilian confrol." In cases where the military has high political autonomy, it "acts as if it were above and beyond the constitutional authority of the government" and challenges civilian prerogatives. Militaries with high levels of political autonomy are not subordinated to civilians. In these

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cases, the military might even enjoy more decision-making power than the civilian government. Pion-Berlin (1992:84-5) argues that political autonomy is "offensive" and potentially more harmflil for the proper functioning of democracy than institutional autonomy. For this reason, I focus on the political autonomy of the Greek and Turkish armed forces after the transitions to democracy rather than on their institutional autonomy. Most studies focus on three factors that explain the increased political autonomy of militaries after transitions: (a) the relative civilian and political support of the outgoing non-democratic regime, (b) the relative coherence of the military, and (c) the mode of the transition (see also Agüero 1995 and Karl 1990). According to Linz and Stepan (1996:67-8, 72), for instance, the path of transition is directly linked to the future of civil-military relations in democracy. Withdrawing leaders are able to retain relatively more political power and autonomy when the transition is led by the military rulers themselves and when the powerholders keep the hierarchy of the military intact, as was the case in Turkey. On the other hand, if the military-as-institution overthrows the nonhierarchical military-as-government, as in Greece, then the armed forces' political power, will be more limited. Similarly, for Latin America, Guillermo O'Donnell (1988:282-6) identifies two different types of transition, each having a distinct implication for future civil-military relations. In one, the authoritarian period is associated with economic crisis and heavy repression, and the transition occurs through the complete collapse of the regime. In this case, military rulers cannot control the transition course and, faced with resistance, are forced to relinquish politieal power. In his study of South American cases, David Pion-Berlin reaches a similar conclusion. When armies cannot govern effectively, they lose the support of the military and, thus, "the capacity to control either the transition or events subsequent to transition," including the armed forces' autonomy (Pion-Berlin 1992:90). The Greek 1974 transition resembles this transition path. In O'Donnell's second type of transition, the return to democracy is controlled by the outgoing rulers. In this transition trajectory, the authoritarian regime is perceived to have performed relatively well and civilian and political groups "harbor a more positive memory of the authoritarian regime" (O'Donnell 1988:283). As a result, military rulers successfully bargain for future positions, which results in a substantially higher level of political autonomy for the armed forces. In the words of Pion-Berlin (1992), "with their relative prestige strengthened . . . the armed forces [are] in a position to guide the transfer of power to civilian hands and to secure important advantages once the new democratic administration is installed" (p. 90). As I will analyze below, these conditions resemble those in Turkey. In subsequent pages, I will first show that civilian elite support and military cohesiveness were greater during Turkish miUtary rule of 1980-1983 than they were during the Greek regime of 1967-1974. Indeed, relative elite

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support and military unity can be traced back to the historical legacies of past military interventions in both countries, the authoritarian regime's economic performance, the degree of repression the regime exercised, foreign reaction to non-democratie rule, and other international and domestic factors. As a nail analysis of these factors falls beyond the scope of this article, I begin by demonstrating that differences in the support these military interventions garnered had important implications for the mode of transition. I then argue that military unity, civilian support, and the demoeratization path of each country influenced the autonomy of their respective militaries in the post-transition period. The concluding section will briefly analyze the impact of this autonomy on subsequent years in Greece and Turkey. MEASURING CIVILIAN SUPPORT AND MILITARY UNITY IN GREECE AND TURKEY In this section, I focus on three distinct phases of military rule to determine the extent to which civilian support and military cohesiveness existed in Greece (1967-1974) and Turkey (1980-1983). I eall these phases the preparation, ruling, and transition periods. PREPARATION PHASE This phase includes both the preparations for the intervention as well as the actual staging of the coup. If the officers who staged the coup were a small group of junior officers, then the military's unity is endangered from the beginning. This was, of course, the case in Greece, where the leaders of the Greek intervention were about 20 mid-career officers Irom the army. They bypassed the generals who had also planned a coup of their own but who, after consulting King Constantine and Prime Minister Kanellopoulos, had decided to postpone action until the results of the May 1967 elections were announced (Athenian 1972:60; Sulzberger 1970:303^). The forced resignation of the Center Union (CU) government in the summer of 1965 and the formation of a new cabinet from CU defectors precipitated a political crisis that spilled into the streets and was marked by growing reports of the possibility of a royal coup (Rizas 2008:395). In the face of public protest, the decision of the monarchy and generals to postpone military intervention until after the elections was an unwelcome development for the colonels, who were expecting a coup against the rise of leftist CU politicians. Convinced that their superiors would remain passive and frustrated by such "inactivity," the colonels decided to seize the initiative (Rizas 2008:420-1). Their insubordination to and dissent from the monarchy, from their superiors in the armed forces, and from right-wing political leaders demonstrate that neither the military hierarchy nor politicians encouraged the military to intervene at the preparation stage of the coup.

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The Turkish coup sharply differs ft-om that in Greece in that the military hierarchy in Turkey unanimously ordered the coup. Speciflcally, several months before the actual coup, the chief of the general staff; the commanders of the army, navy, air force, and gendarmerie; and army officers irom the level of lieutenant general and up agreed on the necessity as well as the nature of the intervention (Evren 1990a:434, 437). This accord continued even after the coup was postponed for several months and new military personnel assignments were made. Despite fears that officers who were not promoted might inform politicians of the impending intervention, no leaks occurred, demonstrating widespread coup support among officers (Evren 1990a:456-61, 505, 519; 2005). In contrast to Greece, where no influential political elites encouraged intervention, in Turkey, frequent meetings occurred between the military chief of staff and politicians during the preparation phase, clearly signaling that, at least for some civilian ehtes, the coup was seen as desirable and legitimate (Stepan 1971:85-121). Indeed, even before the coup had been launched, members of parliament, the government, and the opposition had approached the military (Evren 2005) and "called on the armed forces" (Demirel 2003:270). Ümit Cizre (2002:239^5) identifles two distinct strategies that were used by these pro-military civilians as they encouraged the armed forces to involve themselves in politics: Some criticized and complained about political party leaders and/or the policies of the government to the generals—either in private conversations or in settings that also included representatives of the military. Some had also consulted generals before resigning from government. Indeed, the memoirs of Chief of Staff Kenan Evren are replete with references to government officials and parliamentary deputies who consulted him on political matters and informed him of the activities of other politicians (Evren 1990a:280-l, 285, 342, 345, 356_7^ 411, 427, 446). Evren's own account of these meetings is corroborated by the former leader of the Republican People's Party, Bülent Ecevit, who, in an interview conducted after the coup, argued that there were ministers in his government who had complained about the political situation to the generals rather than raise their grievances in cabinet meetings (Arcayürek 1986:156; also quoted in Cizre 2002:242). Such associations between civilian and military elites convinced military commanders that they would find supportive politicians should they intervene. When one of the deputies reportedly told Evren that, if he were in his shoes, he would have considered intervention, the Chief of the General Staff felt encouraged. He writes, "In this way, I learned that a nonmilitary person and a person that has served a long time in state administration thought like us. This . .. gave me strength" (Evren 1990a:437-8). RULING PHASE The second phase of the intervention begins after the military stages the coup and embarks on ruling the country. Indicators of military disunity during this phase include countercoup attempts by the military-as-institution, large

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scale purges of military personnel by the ruling elite, and hardliner versus softliner splits in the military-as-govemment. In the case of Greece, all three indicators presented themselves in the ruling phase. First, there were several countercoup attempts, the most significant being the December 1967 coup organized by King Constantine and the May 1973 navy mutiny. The King's attempt was significant as it illustrated that the monarchy was not supportive of the colonels. It also demonstrated the extent of opposition within the military and among some of the right-wing politicians who encouraged the countercoup (Diamandouros 1986:146-7; Pattakos 2004; Woodhouse 1985:43-8). The naval mutiny—in which a majority of navy officers participated—also showed the lack of consistent military support for the junta (Karabelias 2001:353; Paloumbis 2004; Woodhouse 1985:116-7). As a result of such military disunity, the colonels were forced to purge about 400 officers, including some in the higher ranks (Xydis 1974:516). In addition to the attempted countercoups, the junta's leaders were split into three factions. One group, represented by the junta's leader, Georgios Papadopoulos, and including Stylianos Pattakos and Nikolaos Makarezos, held power fi-om April 1967 until November 1973 and attempted to liberalize the regime towards the end of its rule. The second group, which was in the minority, was led by Colonel Dimitrios Stamatelopoulos, who was Papadopoulos' opponent even before the coup was launched (Rizas 2008:387-8). In fact, divisions and confiict among the colonels in the preparation phase intensified in subsequent stages (Rizas 2008:422). Stamatelopoulos, for example, argued that the military should have returned to the barracks shortly after intervening. He later resigned fi-om his post in the Revolutionary Council and publicly criticized the colonels in commentaries he wrote for opposition newspapers (Couloumbis 1974:361-2; Woodhouse 1985:77, 79). The third group consisted of hardliners led by the chief of the military police. Lieutenant Colonel Dimitris Ioannides. This group favored a tougher authoritarian regime that would show greater determination in the fight against Greek leftists (Karabelias 2001:350). In contrast to Greece, no dissent within the military occurred in Turkey after the generals seized government (Akar, Bila, and Birand 1999: 185). There were no military purges in either the higher or lower ranks. Instead, the coup was staged by the military wing of the National Security Council (NSC), including the chief of the general staff and the commanders of the army, navy, air force and gendarmerie. Civilian members of the NSC were expelled and it began to function as a legislative body. Information fiowed between the NSC and lower-ranking officers via hierarchical channels (Karpat 1988:151). As William Hale (1994) argues, "The regime thus represented the collective will of the high command, rather than that of particular military groups" (pp. 248-90). The commanders of the NSC agreed on most crucial matters and no visible disputes between them emerged (Evren 1990b:248).

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During the ruling phase of military intervention, the attitudes of civilian elites toward the new government are also critical. Especially important are the reactions of mainstream elites, such as center-right and center-left political leaders, the monarchy (in Greece) and high-ranking civil servants, including members of the bureaucracy, judiciary, as well as university professors. The extent to which such mainstream groups share (or oppose) aspects of the rulers' ideology, face heavy repression (such as lengthy imprisonment, torture or execution), and actively organize opposition to the regime are all important indicators of the degree of their antagonism against an intervention. After the colonels' seizure of power in Greece, the authoritarian regime was not actively supported by any significant civilian political leaders. This is not to say that sustained resistance to the colonels' regime existed. On the contrary, during the first few months, influential civilians kept their silence or seemed supportive and, only in rare instances during the regime's duration, did any of them openly resist the colonels (Karabelias 2001:349). For example, shortly after the intervention. King Constantine appeared with the colonels in a widely publicized photograph that seemed to convey his personal sanction of military rule. Yet, his action did not necessarily imply approval as he later staged a countercoup of his ovm. After his failed coup attempt, the King left for Rome and directed criticisms against the colonels fi'om exile. Demanding the restoration of a democratic regime, he tried to prove his sincerity by accepting a referendum on the question of his return to Greece (Couloumbis 1974:370-1; Sulzberger 1970:308; Xydis 1974:513-4). After the King's countercoup, no influential leader joined the colonels' cabinet, apart from two civilian politicians (Athenian 1972:124-5). Opposition to the junta spanned the political spectrum. The former leader of the right-wing National Radical Union (NRU), Constantine Karamanlis—in self-imposed exile in Paris since 1963—made several declarations against the colonels, warning them that if they did not withdraw willingly, they could be overthrown (Genevoix 1973:191-202). Similarly, another former prime minister and leader of the NRU, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, opposed the colonels from within Greece (Bermeo 1995:441), making several pronouncements against the government (A. Papandreou 1970a:247-8) and assuming the leadership of a group of 170 former parliamentary deputies, sharing this leadership with politicians from other rightist and center political parties (Athenian 1972:10-11; Couloumbis 1974:364-6; Woodhouse 1985:66; Yannopoulos 1972:168-9). The junta was especially heavy-handed in its treatment of communists and socialists, even those of the center-left. Perhaps for this reason, the only influential politician who did not participate in the group of 170 regime opponents was Andreas Papandreou, who chose to resist the regime in his own independent way (Karakatsanis 2001:51-3). After his release from prison, Papandreou went overseas, making numerous declarations and publishing

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several books that opposed the colonels (A. Papandreou 1970a, 1970b, 1972; see, also, M. Papandreou 1970) and, in June 1968, forming a resistance organization, the Pan-Hellenic Liberation Movement (PAK), based in Stockholm. Bureauerats opposed the colonels' regime as well. Interviews with high-level civil servants conducted by Constantine Danopoulos (1984:67-70; 1988) show that the bureaucrats tolerated the rulers but did not wholeheartedly support them. The same was true for the judiciary. The colonels purged thirty opposition judges from their posts in 1968. These judges took the issue to the Council of State, which ruled in their favor. The Council's decision apparently irritated the colonels and, as a result, its president was dismissed. In response, other members of the Council quit their posts in protest (Woodhouse 1985:56, 65). Opposition also came from some university professors who participated in resistance organizations and opposed the regime in publications, the classroom, and in meetings with foreign officials and Greek politicians (Athenian 1972: 134-5; Couloumbis 2004). Some dissident professors and public officers formed the Association for the Study of Greek Problems, headed by Professor Ioannis Pesmazoglou, the former deputy director of the Central Bank (Couloumbis 1974:367-8). In Turkey, the leaders of the largest mainstream parties—the Justice Party (JP) and the Republican People's Party (RPP)—were placed under house arrest following the coup. Similar to their Greek counterparts, both Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit refused to support the intervention and criticized it as often as possible (Demirel 2005; Tachau and Heper 1983:30). Yet, a group of political elites from the JP, RPP, and mainstream minor parties supported the military (Ecevit 2005). A well-known Turkish journalist states "that he had spoken with at least three ministers who said 'thank God the military has finally taken over'" (Demirel 2003:271). In fact, this belief—that infiuential politicians "would support or at least stay neutral to intervention"—was critical to the military's decision to intervene in 1980 (Demirel 2003:272). When commanders were preparing to form a government after the coup, they initially offered the position of prime minister to Turhan Feyzioglu, an ex-RPP politician and the former leader of the Reliance Party. While Feyzioglu agreed, the commanders later decided to give the premiership to an ex-admiral instead (Evren 1990a: 520; Akar et al. 1999: 190-2). This appointment notwithstanding, the government was almost entirely composed of civilian bureaucrats, the most important being Turgut Özal, an ex-bureaucrat and a close aide of the former Justice Party leader. After consulting Demirel, Özal accepted the deputy premiership (Demirel 2005). Ozal's close friend, the former Central Bank official Kaya Erdem, was appointed minister of finance (Ahmad 1993:183; Hale 1994:248). The existence of civilians within the government contrasts strongly with Greece, where the junta had great difficulty in finding respected civilian collaborators.

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TRANSITION PHASE The final phase of military intervention is the liberalization and transition phase. Support for military rulers at the transition stage can be measured by examining how politicians and officers react to the demands of outgoing rulers and to the liberalization scheme of the military-as-government. Military cohesiveness can be assessed by looking for any hardliner conspiracies and cotmtercoup efforts attempting to thwart the transition. In Greece, the colonels led by Papadopoulos attempted to liberalize the regime in 1973. Had this liberalization scheme succeeded, the voluntary withdrawal of the military-as-government would have assured high levels of political autonomy for the armed forces after the transition (Couloumbis 1974:360). However, the plan failed due to a lack of military cohesiveness as well as elite opposition. In fact, when the colonels announced their plan, all of the major politicians—with the exception of one small right-wing party leader, Spyros Markezinis—^refused to collaborate with the military rulers, asking the public not to participate in the forthcoming elections and not to frust the colonels' claims that they would establish a democratic government (Danopoulos and Gerston 1990:540). Later that year, in November, students at the Polytechnic in Athens revolted with support from a number of influential civilians. The university senate and the rector of the university. Professor Constantine Konofagos, refused to allow the police to intervene when the gathering started, defending the principle of academic freedom. Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, the influential leader of the center-right, also appeared on the scene and declared that he backed the student movement. Other elites, such as the politician Ioannis Zigdis and Professors Louros and Pesmazoglou, were also in touch with the students during earher protests (Woodhouse 1985:126-41). Shortly after the student revolt, hardliners within the junta staged a eoup and took over the government. Indeed, the liberalization scheme and Polytechnic revolt intensifled the split within the military-as-government. As the authoritarian regime's liberalization proved unacceptable to some military rulers, the hardliners' coup deeisively shelved any prospect of voluntary disengagement (Woodhouse 1985:142-4). The threat of war with Turkey over Cyprus was the "trigger" for the collapse of the Greek authoritarian regime (Vemey and Couloumbis 1991:111). Specifically, the government of hardliner Colonel Ioannidis ordered a coup against Archbishop Makarios, president of the independent Cypriot government, on July 15, 1974. Five days after the coup, Turkey began its invasion of the island, citing its right to do so as a guarantor of the Cypriot government. The Turkish attack was unforeseen by the colonels, who now faced the prospect of war with Turkey.

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The events of July 1974 quickly led to the authoritarian regime's collapse by strengthening the soft-liners within the military-as-institution. Faced with a severe external crisis, a regime with more widespread support might have been able to strengthen its position by rallying the military and elites in support of a national cause. While this was, in fact, what the colonels intended to do by staging their coup in Cyprus, they failed entirely (Danopoulos 1984:125; Karabelias 2001:355; Veremis 1997:167). Contrary to their expectations, the Cyprus crisis hastened the fall of an already crumbling regime. The prospect of war required a general mobilization as well as the cooperation of the navy and air force, both of which held the army junta in disdain. In addition, the drafting of the reserves as well as the general mobilization were conducted in a highly disorganized, even anarchic, manner, revealing the extent to which the colonels had neglected and, thereby, weakened the Greek military. Moreover, the induction of 230,000 young reserves back into the military increased the strength of the reserve forces, flirther shifting the balance of power away from the colonels (Danopoulos 1984:126-7; Karabelias 2001:356-7; Karakatsanis 2001:45; Veremis 1997:170). Shortly thereafter, on July 22, the Third Army Corps, stationed in Thessaloniki, issued an ultimatum to the colonels, calling for the creation of a Council of National Salvation which would pave the way for a transition. The country's President, General Faedon Gizikis, and the commanders of the three forces accepted these demands and the Council met on July 23, 1974, with the participation of former National Radical Union and Center Union politicians. After some discussion and negotiation, it was decided that Karamanlis would be called back from Paris to head the provisional government. During this meeting, Gizikis demanded that the military hold the ministerial posts of defense, public order, and internal affairs. However, he faced the determined opposition of the politicians (Danopoulos 1984: 127; Diamandouros 1986:157-8; Karakatsanis 2001:56-7; Woodhouse 1985:164-5). Had Gizikis' demand been met, the military would have continued to hold a high degree of political autonomy (Diamandouros 1984: 54). By rejecting his suggestion, however, the politicians ensured that the military's political powers during the transition would be limited. Unlike in Greece—where the 1973 liberalization attempt failed due to civilian resistance and the military's disunity—in Turkey, elite support and military cohesiveness facilitated the disengagement of the military-as-government. Speciflcally, the Turkish armed forces declared their intention to return to democracy shortly after they usurped power and, in 1981, they began to draft a new constitution. Indeed, the involvement of influential civilians and military officers during the process of constitutional change indicates the extent to which the military's liberalization scheme was broadly accepted. First drafted by a commission headed by a university professor, the new constitution was later revised by a 160-member Consultative Assembly which included 31 jurists, 19

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professors, 21 retired military officers, 16 civil servants, and former politicians fi-om the RPP (Dodd 1990:52, 145; Hale 1994:256; Heper 1985:134). Moreover, unlike in Greece, no significant hardliners preferring the continuation of military rule and planning a countercoup existed in Turkey. The commanders of the National Security Council participated in the constitution's revision and set out to establish new democratic rules. During this phase of the transition there is no evidence of any military division or split. In short, while all major mainstream party leaders rejected the colonels' liberalization scheme in Greece, in Turkey, political leaders endorsed the democratization project of the military. Indeed, political parties lrom the pre-1980 period, including both the former RPP and the JP, attempted to participate in the 1983 elections by reorganizing and changing the names of their parties. Two deputies fi-om the former Democrafic Party, Ferruh Bozbeyli and Aydin Yalçin, were also willing to form new parties. Since it appeared that mainstream political parties supported the new constitution and the new terms of democracy, the transition was widely perceived as legitimate. However, the military did not allow all of the new parties to take part in the elections. Instead, the military permitted only two of the new parties that had been established by civilians to participate—for their part, supporting a center-right party founded by a former general, Turgut Sunalp. One of these civilian-founded parties was established by a former governor, Necdet Calp, while the other was founded by Turgut Özal. Receiving about 45% of the vote in the November 1983 elections, Özal's Motherland Party was given the mandate to form the new democratic government (Evren 1990c:151, 1 9 3 ^ ; Gtirsoy 2008:311; Hale 1994:263-7; Sunar and Sayan 1986:185). In this way, Özal was critical to bringing an end to formal military rule, and his party's victory marked the return of the military to the barracks. The transition, however, was, as discussed above, guided by commanders, and the Turkish military was heavily involved in writing the constitution and choosing the parties that would run in Turkey's transitional elections. MEASURING THE PWVILEGES AND POWERS OF THE MILITARY AFTER THE TRANSITION Civilian support, military unity, and the mode of the transition in each state partly determined the armed forces' prerogatives following the transition to democracy. As indicated in the theoretical section above, I utilize David PionBerlin's (1992) distinction between the military's institutional and political autonomy. Further building on his work, I deploy the following indicators to measure the political autonomy that the Greek and Turkish militaries retained after the transition: the fate of the previous military rulers, the functions of the ministry of defense (especially in decisions pertaining to promotions and appointments of higher-ranking officers), defense spending and civilian

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supervision of the military budget, and the internal duties of the armed forces.' I examine each in ttim. The first indicator of military privilege under civilian rule is the fate of the officers responsible for the coup. The armed forces' political autonomy is substantial when coup leaders are not tried and, to an even greater extent, when they continue to hold influential positions within the political system. Conversely, when the coup-makers are fried, imprisoned, and/or purged from the military for their actions during military rule, the military's autonomy can be said to be greatly diminished (Pion-Berlin 1992: 90). In Greece, 15 leaders of the authoritarian regime were tried for treason. While the colonels were sentenced to death, the Karamanlis government, fearful of a possible coup, commuted the sentences to life imprisonment. In addition, most of the higher-ranking officers were dismissed from the military in August 1974. While the government did not immediately carry out furtíier purges, however, as it feared a possible military reaction, an additional 500 officers were dismissed and at least 600 were reassigned to other positions after a military conspiracy against the government was discovered in February 1975 (Danopoulos 1984:133-5; Diamandouros 1984:57-8; Karabelias 1999:69-70, 2001:360-361; Veremis 1997:171-3; Woodhouse 1985:167-8). In confrast, the commanders who staged Turkey's coup retained important powers. Chief of Staff Kenan Evren became president of the republic, and other members of the NSC served on the Presidential Council for six years (Hale 1994:258). A provisional—^that is, temporary—article in the constitution also guaranteed to the generals immunity from prosecution (Duman and Tsarouhas 2006:411). President Evren was given exfraordinary powers by the Constitution. For example, he appointed the prime minister, the chief of the general staff, members of the Constitutional Court and other courts, university presidents, and members of the State Auditing Board (which supervised public bodies, frade unions and associations). He could also summon the Council of Ministers, 'i use all of Pion-Berlin's (1992) indicators with one exception— intelligence gathering. In Turkey, this is a highly confroversial issue. Thus, it is difficult to objectively assess the degree of the military's autonomy and power in conducting intelligence activities. While further research in this area is needed, this lies beyond the scope of this article. My own indicators, such as "the fate of previous military rulers" and the "internal duties of the armed forces" are in conformity with Pion-Berlin's "human rights" and "internal security" variables, respectively. Furthermore, I also collapse Pion-Berlin's "military budget" and "arms production and procurement" into "defense spending and civilian supervision of the budget." His "defense organization" and "senior level personnel decisions" were similarly collapsed under my own "functions of the minisfry of defense."

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parliament, and the National Security Council and declare a state of emergency or martial law. While given the power to restrict other institutions' ability to appeal to legal authorities, the President also had the right to request that the Constitutional Court review parliamentary legislations, cabinet decrees, and internal regulations of the National Assembly. The President could also refuse to sign parliamentary decisions as well as call for national elections and referenda for constitutional changes. Finally, symbolically, he was given the duty to protect the security, independence, and unity of the country, as well as its fundamental principles (Hale 1994:258; Heper 1985:141; Ozbudun 1988:37-40; Sunar and Sayan 1986:184). A second example of a military's political autonomy is the relationship of the armed forces with the ministry of defense. Ideally in democracies, the armed forces are accountable to "a single, civilian-directed defense ministry" (Pion-Berlin 1992:89). In this case, civilians control decisions regarding promotions, retirements, and personnel management of the military (Bruneau and Goetze 2006:71-92). The military's political autonomy is closely correlated with the degree to which they are capable of determining "the standards for promotion patterns, especially at the higher ranks" (Zaverucha 1993:294). When civilian governments and their ministries of defense make such decisions on the promotion and retirement of higher-ranking officers, the military's autonomy is said to be limited (Stepan 1988:96). In contrast, "if the military establishes its own lists of promotions and retirements, subject only to [civilian] ratification, then autonomy is high" (Pion-Berlin 1992:87). During the early years of post-junta democracy in Greece, the Minister of Defense, Evangelos Averoff, was well-respected among the armed forces and had relatively good relations with the military hierarchy. Indeed, in those early stages of the transition, Averoff played the important role of balancing the civilians and military, making certain that extensive purges in the military would not occur (Veremis 1997:172-3). However, as discussed above, the civilian government eventually did dismiss a considerable number of officers. Moreover, approximately 100 officers who had been discharged by the colonels during the junta were called back to service by the democratic government (Karabelias 1999:70, 2001:361). In short, this ability of the democratic government to make military appointments and enforce retirements indicates that, after some hesitafion, important powers that had rested in the hands of the armed forces during the dictatorship were returned to civihans in the early years of the transition. Still later, in 1977, a new law increased the powers of the civilian government and the defense ministry vis-à-vis the armed forces. Establishing the Supreme Council of National Defense, the law brought together the chief of staff, prime minister, deputy prime minister and ministers of defense, finance, foreign affairs, and public order, empowering them to decide on the most important defense matters, including defense policy and the appointment of highranking officers. Moreover, the ministry of defense played a key role in the

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council as its suggestions formed the basis of decision-making. While the 1977 law has been criticized for not curtailing military autonomy completely in Greece, the military still lost considerable political power as a result of it— particularly when compared to the armed forces in Turkey (Karabelias 1999:70, 72; Veremis 1997:174-5). In the post-1983 period, the Turkish military continued to be accountable, not to the minister of defense but, directly to the prime minister—a privilege initially granted in 1961. Defense policy, the purchase of arms and the manufacture of weapons all fell under the purview of the chief of staff The minister of defense had virtually no power in military appointments. Instead, responsibility for promotions and discharges was given to the Supreme Military Council, which was legally exempted from judicial review. In practice, until Ttirgut Özal became president in 1987, candidates proposed by the chief of staff for high-ranking promotion were accepted almost automatically (Cizre Sakalhoglu 1997:161-2; Giirsoy 2008: 312). In short, military autonomy in Turkey, as measured by the military's relationship with the minisfry of defense, was particularly high relative to Greece. The third indicator of a military's political autonomy is the extent to which defense budgets are reviewed, determined, and approved by civilians (Giraldo 2006:178-207; Stepan 1988:95; Zaverucha 1993:290-1). Moreover, military spending as a percentage of GDP is another important indicator of the military's politieal autonomy (Pion-Berlin 1992:88)—the higher the expenditures, the greater the autonomy of the armed forces. Political power also relates to the extent of resources the armed forces have apart from the defense budget. If the military engages in business activities to procure arms, manage the defense indusfry, and/or increase the revenue of the armed forces, its independence from the government will be increased (Pion-Berlin 1992:88-9). In this way, "as entrepreneurs, military officers can gain a level of social and economic influenee within a country that may readily translate into a level of political or policy influence inappropriate for the armed forées in a demoeraey" (Giraldo 2006:196-7). In Greece, military expenditures were at consistently high levels after the transition to democracy. Indeed, no major difference between Greece and Turkey exists with respect to this indicator. High expenditures were due partly to the threat of war with Turkey (Veremis 1997:173-4). In addition to the Cyprus issue, disputes between Greece and Turkey—particularly a number of recurring conflicts in the 1980s and 1990s over the Aegean continental shelf— intensified after the fall of the colonels. The Greek defense budget reflected the outbreak of these conflicts. Between 1970 and 1979, average annual military expenditure as a percentage of GDP was 5.75%. In the 1980s, expenditures increased to 6.32% of GDP (Kollias Manolas, and Paleologouc 2004:191)—a sum substantially higher than those of Greece's European and NATO allies.

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However, Greek military expenditures were lower than those of Turkey. Even though the two countries followed similar trajectories until the 1980s, following the military coup in Turkey, "Turkish defense expenditure increase[d] at a faster rate than Greek defense expenditure" (KoUias 2004:101), accounting on average for 13.9% of the state budget annually between 1984 and 1989 (in current prices). While expenditures decreased to 11.5% of the annual budget in the 1990s (calculated from Günlük-§enesen 2004: 273), in real terms, the military's expenditures increased 97% from 1988 to 2001 (Kollias 2004: 104). Furthermore, the civilian government of Turkey was more restricted in its capacity to oversee and manage the military budget after the transition. In the post-1983 era, the armed forces directed civilians on budgetary matters (rather than vice versa), the parliamentary committee responsible for reviewing the budget failed to review it in any detail, and rarely was the public involved and informed regarding the budget. In 1974, the armed forces had established an endowment with the purpose of developing the arms industry in Turkey and, even earlier, in 1961, the mihtary had established the Armed Forces Pension Fund (OYAK) (Cizre Sakallioglu 1997:159-60). The economic activities of OYAK included investments in flnance, cement, agro-chemicals, insurance, transportation, electronics, and food processing companies. In 1969, cooperating with Renault, the fund actually established a joint-venture company to produce automobiles (Ahmad 1992, 2 7 2 ^ ; Akça 2004:225-69). After the 1983 transition, these and other military business activities remained effectively outside the bounds of legislative scrutiny. The final indicator I use to measure the military's political autonomy is the armed forces' often self-proclaimed duty to safeguard the nation and the state from domestic enemies (Pion-Berlin 1992:89). Often, the military is speciflcally granted the role of internal security by constitutional sanction (Stepan 1988:94). In other instances, the military holds seats in decision-making bodies which give the military a voice in domestic affairs. In Greece, martial law as well as the other legal provisions used by the colonels to maintain their dominance were reversed relatively quickly. The 1975 constitution was written by the democratically elected civilian government, and it provided no role for the military in defending the nation from internal enemies. In practice, of course, the ongoing Cyprus crisis and the threat of war with Turkey kept the armed forces occupied with external threats for several years. By contrast, the Turkish military was explicitly given the duty to protect the nation from external and internal threats by its Internal Service Law (Jenkins 2007:343). While the military has played this role traditionally in Turkish politics, this remains an important distinction vis-à-vis the Greek case. During certain periods of Greek politics, the Hellenic Armed Forces were likewise charged, explicitly or implicitly, with protecting Greece against its internal

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enemies, especially communists. This role reached its peak during the Greek Civil War. Later, in the post-Civil War period, the Greek military was one of several right-wing institutions that followed with concern the rise of left-wing politicians in the Center Union and the votes gamered by the communist United Democratic Left. As Brown (1986) argues, "as a symbol of national unity, the military—especially the army—felt that their main purpose was to protect the nation from communism, both from within and from without" (p. 177). A regularly used tactic, for instance, was to move military units to leftist-oriented provinces. Military officers had the right to vote in national elections, which meant that they could vote for the right-wing and tilt the balance against the left in some districts (Legg 1969:218-9). Intimidation and fraud were also decisive in the elections of 1956, 1961, and 1963 (Brown 1986:177). It is important to note, however, that when the Greek armed forces engaged in such activities, they were never as autonomous as the Turkish military. Ultimately, the Greek military was dependent on the civilian government of the day and, most significantly, on the Greek monarchy. Moreover, it is even more critically important to stress that such political prerogatives enjoyed by the military were completely abolished after the 1974 Greek transition. In Turkey, however, the military continued to exercise its authority in internal security affairs long after the 1983 transition to democracy. In fact, the 1982 Turkish Constitution increased the powers of the National Security Council, thereby ñirther legifimizing the military's involvement in domestic politics. The council continued to bring together the military hierarchy and the civilian government, as had been the practice prior to the 1980 coup. However, the constitution now obliged the cabinet to "give priority considerations" to the decisions of the NSC and, thus, to the military (Özbudun 2007:193). The secretary general of the NSC, who was also a member of the armed forces, was given the power to collect data on other state institutions and to follow up on the implementafion of NSC decisions by the government. Civilians were numerically underrepresented in the General Secretariat of the NSC and members of the Council also held seats on the Radio and Television Supreme Council and the Council of Higher Education (Gtirsoy 2008:312; Jenkins 2007:344). The decisions made by the NSC after 1983 included such wide-ranging issues as on education, television stations, broadcasting, bureaucratic posts, anti-terror and capital punishment laws. With such comprehensive decision-making powers the NSC ñinctioned as a second pillar of executive authority alongside the cabinet (Cizre Sakallioglu 1997:157-8; Karabelias 2003: 64). In short, as I will argue in the concluding section, when Greece and Turkey are compared along the multiple indicators summarized in Table 1, it is evident that the Hellenic Armed Forces retained considerably less political autonomy than the Turkish Armed Forces after each country's respective transition to democracy.

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TABLE 1. MILITARY AUTONOMY IN GREECE AND TURKEY Military rulers are prosecuted Military rules retain official powers Military appointments decided mostly by the general staff High defense expenditure Significant non-defense budgets not supervised by civilians Civilian ministry of defense less powerful vis-à-vis general staff Military is responsible for providing internal security Military has seats in other state institutions

Greece Yes No No Yes No No No No

Turkey No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

CONCLUSION In this article, I have argued that the divergence between the Greek and Turkish militaries' degree of political autonomy following each counfry's transition can be explained by the extent of civilian and military support that had been given to military intervention in each counfry. As argued above, the literature on civil-military relations has emphasized the successful performance of the military during its rule, the cohesiveness of the armed forces, and the transition path to explain the military's degree of political autonomy. The Greek and Turkish cases support these previous findings. In Greece, a major failure of the regime—the Cyprus fiasco—accentuated the growing disunity within the armed forces. As we have seen, the colonels were forced to withdraw from power following a military ultimatum, which resulted in a long-run decrease in political autonomy for the military. By contrast, the Turkish military performed relatively well in office, its officers remained unified and, as a result, the military-asgovernment withdrew from power voluntarily. As the armed forces directed that counfry's transition, they maintained a high degree of power. The second critical factor in both counfries was the degree to which civilian elites opposed military rule. This determined both the mode of transition as well the military's political autonomy. In Greece, when the colonels attempted to withdraw voluntarily in 1973, they faced the resistance of all major political leaders. Moreover, the subsequent Polytechnic uprising was also endorsed by some of these same political elites. In short, a fransition that would have sustained a high level of autonomy to the military was unacceptable to civilian elites. By confrast, the 1980 military coup in Turkey was supported by some political elite groups. Even though the leaders of the two major parties opposed the intervention, a number of influential politicians supported the coup and collaborated with the interim government. Later, during the transition to democracy, the military commanders' plans were again widely supported. To that end, influential university professors assisted the military in preparing a new

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constitution. Not surprisingly, that constitution granted significant privileges to the military and to the officers who staged the 1980 coup. The country's political elites accepted the legitimacy of the constitution, and the generals withdrew voluntarily from power when Turgut Özal won the 1983 elections. While his party was not the first choice of the military, it did give the impression that the military's political autonomy would be protected. Moreover, the new prime minister himself previously had collaborated with the military by assuming a ministerial position in the interim government and had implicitly accepted the military's conditions of democratization. It is important to note, however, that civil-military relations have changed in important ways since 1983 and that some of the political powers of the Turkish military have been reduced. Indeed, as Wendy Hunter (1995:42543) argues for Brazil, the importance of the mode of transition decreases over time and politicians can often find ways to undermine the power of the military in democracy. Such has been the case in Turkey, where just a few years after the military's withdrawal, politicians undermined several of its powers (Barkey 1990:169-92). Since Evren's term ended, for example, Turkey has had only civilian presidents. Similarly, the country has not had a presidential council consisting of military generals since the retirements of Evren's colleagues from that body. Also, beginning in 1987, Turgut Ozal's government began to make the military budget public. Özal even went so far as to suggest that the armed forces should be subordinated to the ministry of defense and he challenged the military's decisions on promotions to higher ranks within its forces. Indeed, in the late 1980s, it seemed that Turkey was taking important steps toward civilianization (Evin 1994:34-9). This process, however, has come to a halt and has even been reversed in the 1990s with the rise of political Islam. A push toward further civilianization was renewed in 1999, after Turkey was declared an official candidate for accession to the European Union. To comply with EU criteria, the composition and functions of the National Security Council were altered, the State Security Courts were abolished, and seats reserved for the military in state institutions were eliminated. However, while reforms decreased some of the military's political powers (Güney and Karatekelioglu 2005), the armed forces still report directly to the prime minister, civilian oversight of the military budget is limited, promotions and retirements of the higher ranks are decided by the general staff, and it still remains the duty of the armed forces—both legally and in practice—to protect the nation fi-om internal threats. In short—particularly when compared with Greece—Turkish civilianization is not yet complete. This arficle has argued that part of this failure is due to the nature of the last overt interventions and transitions to democracy. Turkish democracy was established after a military intervention that garnered fairly widespread support, whereas Greek democracy was preceded by an authoritarian regime that was decisively rejected by the majority of the civilian and military elites. As a result.

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