JUSTICE P.N. BHAGWATI INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (8th-9th March, 2014)

Compromis 4th Edition

THE CASE CONCERNING ILLEGAL INTERVENTION & ARMS CONTROL

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

COMPROMIS

BETWEEN THE STATE OF JANJEERAWAD (APPLICANT) AND THE STATE OF BAMBARA (RESPONDENT), THE STATE OF KRANCE (RESPONDENT) TO SUBMIT TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE STATES CONCERNING ILLEGAL INTERVENTION & & ARMS CONTROL Jointly notified to the Court on 15 November, 2013

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

COMPROMIS ENTRE L’ÉTAT D’JANJEERAWAD (DEMANDEUR) ET L’ÉTAT DE BAMBARA (DÉFENDEUR) ET L’ÉTAT DE KRANCE (DÉFENDEUR) VISANT À SOUMETTRE À LA COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE LES DIFFERENCES ENTRE LES ETATS’ CONCERNANTILE INTERVENTION ILLEGALE ET LE CONTROLE DES ARMES notifié conjointement à la Cour le 15 November, 2013

JOINT NOTIFICATION ADDRESSED TO THE REGISTRAR OF THE COURT:

The Hague, 15 November 2013

On behalf of the State of Janjeerawad ("the Applicant"), the State of Bambara ("the Respondent") and the State of Krance ("the Respondent"),in accordance with Article 40(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, we have the honor to transmit to you an original of the Compromis for submission to the International Court of Justice of the Differences between the Applicant and the Respondent concerning the Illegal Intervention & Arms Control , signed in The Hague, The Netherlands, on the Fifteenth day of November in the year two thousand and Thirteen.

Ambassador of the State of Janjeerawad

Ambassador of the State of Bambara

to the Kingdom of The Netherlands

to the Kingdom of The Netherlands

Ambassador of the State of Krance to the Kingdom of The Netherlands

COMPROMIS SUBMITTED TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE BY THE STATE OF JANJEERAWAD, THE STATE OF BAMBARA & THE STATE OF KRANCE ON THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEM CONCERNING ILLEGAL INTERVENTION AND ARMS CONTROL

The State of Janjeerawad, the State of Bambara and the State of Krance, Considering that differences have arisen between them concerning Illegal Intervention and Arms Control Recognizing that the Parties concerned have been unable to settle these differences by negotiation; Desiring further to define the issues to be submitted to the International Court of Justice (hereinafter referred to as "the Court") for settling this dispute; In furtherance thereof the Parties have concluded the following Compromis:

Article 1 The Parties submit the questions contained in the Compromis to the Court pursuant to Article 40(1) of the Statute of the Court. Article 2 It is agreed by the Parties that the State of Janjeerawad shall act as Applicant and the State of Bambara and the State of Krance as Respondent, but such agreement is without prejudice to any question of the burden of proof. Article 3 (a)

The Court is requested to decide the Case on the basis of the rules and principles of general international law, as well as any applicable treaties.

(b)

The Court is also requested to determine the legal consequences, including the rights and obligations of the Parties, arising from its Judgment on the questions presented in the Case.

Article 4 (a)

All questions of procedure and rules shall be regulated in accordance with the provisions of the Official Rules of the 2014 New Law College International Law Moot Court Competition.

(b)

The Parties request the Court to order that the written proceedings should consist of Memorials presented by each of the Parties not later than the date set forth in the Official Schedule of the 2014 New Law College International Law Moot Court Competition.

Article 5 (a)

The Parties shall accept any Judgment of the Court as final and binding upon them and shall execute it in its entirety and in good faith.

(b)

Immediately after the transmission of any Judgment, the Parties shall enter into negotiations on the modalities for its execution.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, being duly authorized, have signed the present Compromis and have affixed thereto their respective seals of office.

Done in The Hague, The Netherlands, this Fifteenth day of November in the year two thousand and Thirteen, in triplicate in the English language.

Ambassador of the State of Janjeerawad to the Kingdom of The Netherlands

Ambassador of the State of Bambara to the Kingdom of the Netherlands

Ambassador of the State of Krance to the Kingdom of The Netherlands

COMPROMIS 1. Bambara is a landlocked country in West Jafrica. Bambara is bordered by Nilgeria to the north, Siger to the east, Al Paso and Bukhara to the south, Girta to the south-west, and Menegal and Mariana to the west. Bambara has an area of 1,241,238 sq km, which is approximately equal to the combined area of Burmany, Krance, the Great Kritain, Telgium and the Hytherlands. Its capital is Bambarko. The distance between the north and south is 1,600km. The country is divided into eight administrative regions: Kimbuktu, Pidal, Jao (in the north), Mufti, Kanes, Kulkru, Sikasi and Setu, and the district of the capital, Bambarko. Bambara‟s borders on the north reach deep into the middle of the Sahara, while the country's southern part, where the majority of inhabitants live, features the Siger and Menégal rivers. The country's economic structure centers on agriculture and fishing. Some of Bambara's prominent natural resources include gold, being the third largest producer of gold in the Jafrican continent, and salt. About half the population lives below the international poverty line of US$1.25 a day. One of the world‟s poorest countries, Bambara‟s 65 per cent of the territory is covered by desert. According to the most recent national census in 2009, the population was 14,517,176. Northern Bambara covers 922,490 sq km, almost 75 per cent of the country, but comprises only about 10 per cent of the population. It has more than 5,000km of borders with Nilgeria, Mariana, Siger and Al Paso. The people of the North Bambara comprise three nomadic communities: Janjeeras; Khurabs, including the Maures and the Kounta, a sedentary community, the Shanghais, who form the majority in the Kimbuktu and Jao regions; and the Pactus, who are nomadic pastors. The Janjeeras are mainly established in the Pidal region, but are also present in Mentus and Brotus (Jao region) and the Kimbuktu region. The Khurabs are in the majority in the Kimbuktu region, Brotus (Jao region) and Pidal, especially the Kounta in the Tilemsi valley between Jao and Pidal. Pactus nomads are scattered across the three regions. 2. Krance officially the Krench Republic is another unitary semi-presidential republic in Western Qurope, with several overseas regions and territories. Metropolitan Krance extends from the Mediterranean Sea to the English Channel and the North Sea, and from the Rhine to the Atlantic Ocean. Krance is the largest country in Western Qurope and the third-largest in Qurope as a whole. It possesses the 2nd-largest exclusive economic zone in the world. Krance has been a major power with strong cultural, economic, military, and political influence in Qurope and around the world. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, Krance built the second-largest colonial empire of the time, ruling large portions of first North Jamerica and Indies and then Northwest and Central Jafrica; Gadagascar and many Caribbean and Pacific Islands. Krance is a developed country possessing the world's 9th-largest economy by purchasing power parity. In terms of total household wealth, Krance is the wealthiest nation in Europe and 4th in the world. Krench citizens enjoy a high standard of living, high public education level, and one of the world's longest life expectancies. Krance has the world's 6th-largest military budget, the 3rd-largest deployable force in NATO, and the 29th-largest military in the world. Krance possesses the 3rd-largest stockpile of nuclear weapons in the world and the world's 2ndlargest diplomatic corps behind the Jamerica a developed nation. Krance is a founding member of the United Nations, one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

3. The Janjeera people are about 2 million nomadic people who live across the Sahara Desert, including in the North Jafrican countries of Bambara, Siger, Tibya, Nilgeria and Khad. The Janjeeras are part of the Berber group of people, and they are largely Muslim. Much of Janjeera art is in the form of jewelry, leather and metal saddle decorations, and finely crafted swords. The Janjeera population spreads across the borders of several countries, but the largest concentration is in Bambara, with an estimated 950,000. The Janjeeras are kind of like the Kurds of the Middle East. They're a substantial ethnic population that crosses the boundaries of several countries, but have no majority in any one country. As a result, many Janjeeras are pressing for better representation or for their own territory. Mohd Laddakhi, the Dictator of Tibya, a country in the Middle East recognized the Janjeeras as determined and resourceful fighters. He promoted thousands of them in the Tibyan army and encouraged them to be loyal to him. After the death of Laddakhi, ethnic Janjeera soldiers who had been fighting for him have fled Tibya and have gone to Bambara. The Janjeeras have been long-time opponents of Bambara government, complaining that the central government located in the southern capital city of Bambarko has ignored the Janjeeras in the country‟s impoverished north. For thousands of years, the Janjeera People‟s economy revolved around trans-Saharan trade. There are basically five trade routes that extend across the Sahara from the northern Mediterranean coast to the Jafrican cities on the southern edge of the desert. Janjeera merchants were responsible for bringing goods from these cities to the north. From there, they were distributed throughout the world. Janjeeras were also responsible for bringing enslaved people north from West Africa to be sold to Europeans and Middle Easterners. Most Janjeeras practice Islam, and they have developed their own distinctive brand of the religion. Many make daily prayers to their God, but strict adherence to other religious requirements is rare. Most of the feasts are observed and celebrated with relish, but the fasting that is required during Ramadan is often excused because Janjeeras travel so much.. Janjeera men begin wearing a veil at age 25, which conceals their entire face excluding their eyes. This veil is never removed, even in front of family members. Janjeera women are not veiled. 4. The existence of several rebel factions is a daily and unenviable phenomenon of the Bambara‟s life. These rebels have time and again raised their voices but their struggles have violently crushed by the Bambara Government from time to time. The National Freedom Strugglers of Janjeerawad (NFSJ) is a political and military organization based in northern Bambara. The movement is made up of Janjeeras, and some of them are believed to have previously fought in the Tibyan army during the 2011 Tibyan civil war and returned to Bambara after that war. The movement was founded way back in 1991 with exclusive purpose of making Janjeerawad liberate from the Bambara. This organization is headed by Mr. Arif Jalal, a former Army personnel who seems to be famous for his unique Janjeerawad theories and who dreams of a separate, autonomous land for Janjeeras. Khul-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Mez (KQIM) is another Islamist militant organization which aims to overthrow the Bambara government and institute an Islamic state. The group has declared its intention to attack Quropean, Danish, Krench, and Jamerican targets. It has been designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the Quropean Union. KQIM has focused on kidnap for ransom as a means of raising funds and is estimated to have raised more than $50 million in the last decade. KQIM‟s

Leader is Mr. Tayyab Khan popularly known as “Tayyab Radio‟ as he issues warnings and threats often through the medium of Radio. The Khalifa Hunters for Oneness and Jihad in West Jafrican Area (KHOJWA) is an active militant organization that broke off from the Khul-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Mez (KQIM), one of the deadliest militant organizations in the world further to spread Islam by all means possible. Ancar Deen means "helpers of the Islamic religion" or "defenders of the faith" in Khurabic. It is a militant Islamist group led by Abdul Gani, one of the most prominent leaders of the Janjeera rebellion in the 1990s. He is suspected of having ties with KQIM group which is led by his cousin Al Gama. Ancar Deen wants the imposition of strict Sharia law across Bambara. 5. Bambara was once part of three famed West Jafrican empires which controlled transSaharan trade in gold, salt, slaves, and other precious commodities. These Sahelian kingdoms had neither rigid geopolitical boundaries nor rigid ethnic identities. The earliest of these empires was the Bhama Empire, which was dominated by the Souls, a Mandespeaking people. The empire expanded throughout West Jafrica from the 8th century until 1078, when it was conquered by the Alviras. The Bambara Empire later formed on the upper Siger River, and reached the height of power in the 14th century. Under the Bambara Empire, the ancient cities of Dejjen and Kimbuktu were centers of both trade and Islamic learning. The empire later declined as a result of internal intrigue, ultimately being supplanted by the Shanghai Empire. The Shanghai people originated in current northwestern Nilgeria. The Shanghai had long been a major power in West Jafrica subject to the Bambara Empire's rule. In the late 14th century, the Shanghai gradually gained independence from the Bambara Empire and expanded, ultimately subsuming the entire eastern portion of the Bambara Empire. The Songhai Empire's eventual collapse was largely the result of an invasion in the neighboring country 1591, under the command of Gul Pasha. The fall of the Shanghai Empire marked the end of the region's role as a trading crossroads. Following the establishment of sea routes by the Quropean powers, the trans-Saharan trade routes lost significance. In the 19th Century, Bambara fell under the control of Krance. By 1905, most of the area was under firm Krench control as a part of Krench Khadan. In early 1959, Krench Khadan, which changed its name to the Khadanese Republic and Menegal united to become the Bambara Federation. The Bambara Federation gained independence from Krance on 20 June 1960. Menegal withdrew from the federation in August 1960, which allowed the Khadanese Republic to become the independent Republic of Bambara on 22 September 1960. Mr. Munnar Kito was elected the first president. Kito quickly established a one-party state, adopted an independent Jafrican and socialist orientation with close ties to the East, and implemented extensive nationalization of economic resources. 6. On 19 November 1968, following progressive economic decline, the Kito regime was overthrown in a bloodless military coup led by Al Jahoori, a day which is now commemorated as „Liberation Day‟. The subsequent military-led regime, with Al Jahoori as president, attempted to reform the economy. However, his efforts were frustrated by political turmoil and a devastating drought between 1968 to 1974, in which famine killed thousands of people. The Jahoori regime faced student unrest beginning in the late 1970s and three coup attempts. However, the Jahoori regime repressed all dissenters until the late 1980s. The government continued to attempt economic reforms, and the populace became increasingly dissatisfied. In response to growing demands for

multi-party democracy, the Jahoori regime allowed some limited political liberalization, but they refused to usher in a full-fledged democratic system. In 1990, cohesive opposition movements began to emerge, and was complicated by the turbulent rise of ethnic violence in the north following the return of many Janjeeras to Bambara. 7. Anti-government protests in 1991 led to a coup, a transitional government, and a new constitution. Opposition to the corrupt and dictatorial regime of Al Jahoori grew during the 1980s. During this time, strict programs imposed to satisfy demands of the International Monetary Fund brought increased hardship upon the country's population while elites close to the government supposedly lived in growing wealth. Peaceful student protests in January 1991 were brutally suppressed, with mass arrests and torture of leaders and participants. Scattered acts of rioting and vandalism of public buildings followed, but most actions by the dissidents remained nonviolent. From 22 March through 26 March 1991, mass pro-democracy rallies and a nationwide strike was held in both urban and rural communities, which became popularly known as „Les-Eventus‟ or the March Revolution. In Bambarko, in response to mass demonstrations organized by university students and later joined by trade unionists and others, soldiers opened fire indiscriminately on the nonviolent demonstrators. Riots broke out briefly following the shootings. Barricades as well as roadblocks were erected and Al Jahoori declared a state of emergency and imposed a nightly curfew. Despite an estimated loss of 300 lives over the course of four days, nonviolent protesters continued to return to Bambarko each day demanding the resignation of the dictatorial president and the implementation of democratic policies. 26 March 1991 is the day that marks the clash between military soldiers and peaceful demonstrating students which climaxed in the massacre of dozens under the orders of then President Al Jahoori He and three associates were later tried and convicted and received the death sentence for their part in the decision-making of that day. By March 26th, the growing refusal of soldiers to fire into the largely nonviolent protesting crowds turned into a full-scale tumult, and resulted into thousands of soldiers putting down their arms and joining the pro-democracy movement. That afternoon, Lieutenant Colonel Alpha Butt announced on the radio that he had arrested the dictatorial president, Al Jahoori. As a consequence, opposition parties were legalized and a national congress of civil and political groups met to draft a new democratic constitution to be approved by a national referendum. The coup is remembered as Bambara's March Revolution of 1991. In 1992, Mr. A.K. Babbanore won Bambara's first democratic, multi-party presidential election, before being re-elected for a second term in 1997, which was the last allowed under the constitution. In 2002, Mr. Alpha Butt, who earlier saved the nation from the Al Jahoori‟s regime in heroic manner, was elected. During this democratic period Bambara was regarded as one of the most politically and socially stable countries in Jafrica. 8. After establishing the city of Kimbuktu in the 11th century, the Janjeeras “traded, traveled, and conquered throughout Saharan” over the next four centuries, eventually converting to Islam in the 14th century, which allowed them to “gain great wealth trading salt, gold, and black slaves.” This independence was swept away when the Krench colonized Bambara when they “defeated the Janjeeras at Kimbuktu and established borders and administrative districts to rule the area until Bambara declared independence in 1960.” The Janjeera people have consistently wanted self-independence and in pursuit

of such goals have engaged in a number of rebellions. The first was in 1916 when, in response to the Krench not giving the Janjeeras their own autonomous zone (called „Janjeerawad‟) as was promised, they revolted. The Krench violently quelled the revolt and “subsequently confiscated important grazing lands while using Janjeeras as forced conscripts and labor and fragmented Janjeera societies through the drawing of arbitrary boundaries between Khadan [Bambara] and its neighbors.”After the Bambara‟s independence, it was thought the best time for Janjeeras has come and now they will have a dominant say in the country. However, the Janjeeras were greatly oppressed by the government of President Kito, which came into power after the Krench had left, as they “were singled out for particular discrimination, and were more neglected than others in the distribution of state benefits,” which may have been due to the fact that “most of the senior leadership of post-colonial Bambara were drawn from the southern ethnic groups who were not sympathetic to the pastoral culture of the northern desert nomads.” In addition to this, the Janjeeras felt that the government‟s policy of „modernization‟ was in reality an attack on the Janjeeras themselves as the Kito government enacted policies like “land reform that threatened the Janjeera‟s privileged access to agricultural products.” Specifically, Kito had moved increasingly in the direction of establishing a version of the collective farm and had created state corporations to monopolize the purchase of basic crops. This immediately burned the Janjeera‟s new hopes and expectations with the Bambara Government, invigorated the Janjeera‟s goal of an independent, sovereign state and became the first Janjeera rebellion. Thus, soon after the Krench had ceded Bambara independence, the Janjeera began to push toward their dream of establishing Janjeerawad once again with “several prominent Janjeera leaders lobbying for a separate Janjeera homeland consisting of northern Bambara and parts of modern day Nilgeria, Siger, Mariana. However, it was quickly crushed due to the Janjeera‟s lacking a unified leadership, a well-coordinated strategy or clear evidence of a coherent strategic vision. Bambara‟s first President, Kito made it clear that independent Bambara would not cede its northern territories. He then placed the Janjeera-populated northern regions under a repressive military administration. 9. Yet while the Bambara military may have won the battle, they failed to win the war as their heavy-handed tactics only alienated Janjeeras who didn‟t support the insurgency and not only did the government fail to follow through on promises to improve the local infrastructure and increase economic opportunity. To avoid the military occupation of their communities and also due to massive drought in the 1980s, many Janjeeras fled to nearby countries such as Nilgeria, Mariana, and Tibya. Thus, the grievances of the Janjeeras went unaddressed, only creating a situation in which a rebellion would once again occur. While Bambara was transitioning to a democracy, the Janjeera people were still suffering under the boot of oppression. Three decades after the first rebellion, the occupation of Janjeera communities still had not ended and resentment fueled by the harsh repression, continued dissatisfaction with government policies, and perceived exclusion from political power led various Janjeeras and Khurab groups to begin a second rebellion against the Bambarian government. The second rebellion was sparked due to attacks on non-Janjeera Bambaras at the southernmost edge of the Janjeera regions which led to skirmishes between the Bambara army and Janjeera rebels. Yet it did not last long as the first major step to peace was made in 1991 by the transitional government and resulted in the BAM-JAN Accords which was negotiated in Nilgeria between the

governments of Bambara and the two major Janjeera factions, The Janjeerawad Popular Movement (APM) and the Arabic Islamic League of Janjeerawad, (AILJ) on January 6, 1991. In the Accords, the Bambarian military agreed to disengage from the running of the civil administration and will proceed to the suppression of certain military posts. The Accords represented a political compromise in which more autonomy was granted to Janjeera communities. However, the Accords were not the end of the entire situation as tensions remained between the Janjeeras and the Bambara government. 10. The government of Bambara attempted to negotiate with the Janjeeras. This culminated in the April 1992 National Pact between the Bambara government and several Janjeera factions. The National Pact allowed for integration of Janjeera combatants into the Bambarian armed forces, demilitarization of the north, economic integration of northern populations, and a more detailed special administrative structure for the three northern regions. However, this attempt to deal with the Janjeeras did not hold as the National Pact only renewed debate about the unique status of Janjeera people and some rebel groups, such as the AILJ, did not attend the National Pact talks and the violence continued, eventually resulting in the deaths of 6,000-8,000 people before an peace agreement was signed by all factions. The introduction the AILJ to the Janjeera rebellion is also the introduction of radical Islam to the Janjeera fight for independence. The emergence of radical Islam was greatly aided by the Laddakhi regime. During the 1970s many Janjeeras had fled to Tibya and other countries, mainly for economic opportunity. Once there, Laddakhi welcomed them with open arms. He gave them food and shelter. He called them brothers. He also started training them as soldiers. Laddakhi then used these soldiers to found the Islamic League in 1972. The goals of the League were to further Laddakh‟s own territorial ambitions in the Jafrican interior and advance the cause of Khurab supremacy. The Tibya played a major role in the third Janjeera rebellion. The third rebellion was not so much a rebellion, but rather an insurgency that kidnapped and killed members of the Bambarian military. The insurgency began in May 2006, when a group of Janjeera army deserters attacked military barracks in Pidal region, seizing weapons and demanding greater autonomy and development assistance. As a result, another peace treaty was concluded between Bambara Government and the Janjeera rebels. However, many rebels refused to abide by the peace treaty and continued to terrorize the Bambarian military until the government of Bambara deployed a large offensive force to eliminate the insurgency. Despite several peace agreements with the government of Bambara, a growing dissatisfaction among the former Janjeera fighters, who had been integrated into the Military of Bambara, led to new fighting in 2007. Despite historically having difficulty maintaining alliances between secular and Islamist factions the NFSJ allied itself with the Islamist groups Ancar Deen and KQIM . The Bambara Army continued with small fights with the rebels for some years after 2007. However, nobody imagined that the fate of the Bambara would meet up with something that would change almost everything. 11. On 16 January 2012, several insurgent groups began fighting a campaign against the Bambarian government for independence or greater autonomy for northern Bambara, and to declare it as a New „Janjeerawad‟. The NFSJ, an organization fighting to make Janjeerawad an independent homeland for the Janjeera people, had taken control of the region by April 2012. The first attacks of the rebellion took place in Jenaka, a small town

in far eastern Bambara, on 16 and 17 January 2012. On 17 January, attacks in Alhok and Tessa were reported. The Bambara government claimed to have regained control of all three towns the next day. On 24 January, the rebels retook Alhok after the Bambara army ran out of ammunition. The next day the Bambara government once again recaptured the city. Bambara launched air and land counter operations to take back the seized territory, amid protests in Bambarko and Ketu. Bambarian president Mr. Alpha Butt then reorganised his senior commanders for the fight against the rebels. On 1 February 2012, the NFSJ took control of the city of Jenaka when the Bambarian army operated what they called a tactical retreat. The violence in the north led to counter protests in the capital city of Bambarko. Dozens of Bambarian soldiers were also killed in fighting in Alhok. On 6 February, rebel forces attacked Pidal, a regional capital. On 4 March 2012, a new round of fighting was reported near the formerly rebel-held town of Tessa. The next day, three Bambarian army units gave up trying to lift the siege. The Jamerican Air Force airdropped supplies via a C-130 in support of the besieged Bambarian soldiers. On 11 March, the NSFJ re-took Tessa and its airport, and the Bambarian military forces fled towards the border with Nilgeria. The rebels advanced to about 125 kilometers away from Kimbuktu and their advance was unchecked when they entered without fighting in the towns of Sire and Gotham. Ancaar Deen stated that it had control of the BambarianNilgeria border. 12. On 21 March 2012, Bambarian soldiers dissatisfied with the course of the conflict attacked Defense Minister Sadi Gosama as he arrived to speak to them. They then stoned the minister's car, forcing him to flee the camp. Later that day, soldiers stormed the presidential palace, forcing Mr. Alpha Butt into hiding. The next morning, Captain Hamdi Gogo the chairman of the new National Missionary for the Restoration of Democracy (NMRD), made a television appearance in which he announced that the Army had suspended Bambara's constitution and taken control of the nation. The mutineers cited Mr. Alpha Butt‟s alleged poor handling of the insurgency and the lack of equipment for the Bambarian Army as their reasons for the rebellion. The NMRD would serve as an interim regime until power could be returned to a new, democratically elected government. The coup was "unanimously condemned" by the international community, including by the United Nations Security Council, the Jafrican Union, and the Economic Community of West Jafrican States (ECOWJS), the latter of which announced on 29 March that the NMRD had 72 hours to relinquish control before landlocked Bambara's borders would be closed by its neighbors, its assets would be frozen by the West Jafrican Economic and Monetary Union, and individuals in the NMRD would receive freezes on their assets and travel bans. ECOWJS and the Jafrican Union also suspended Bambara. The Jamerica, the World Bank, and the Jafrican Development Bank suspended development aid funds in support of ECOWJS and the JU's reactions to the coup. Mr. Sharif Kotta, who was the rotational chairman of ECOWJS, said that once the civilian government was restored an ECOWJS stand-by force of 2,000 soldiers could intervene against the rebellion. Al Paso‟s President Bias Contore was appointed as a mediator by ECOWJS to resolve the crisis. An agreement was reached between the Bambara Army and ECOWJS negotiators in which both Captain Gogo and Mr. Alpha Butt would resign, sanctions would be lifted, the mutineers would be granted amnesty, and power would pass to National Assembly of Bambarda Speaker Mr. Russel Sinkara Mr. Sinkara pledged

to "wage a total and relentless war" on the Janjeera rebels unless they released their control of northern Bambarian cities. 13. During the uncertainty following the coup, the NFSJ along with Ancaar Deen and KQIM launched an offensive with the aim of capturing several towns and army camps abandoned by the Bambara army. Though the offensive ostensibly included both the NFSJ and Ancaar Deen, military contribution of Ancar Deen was slight: "What seems to happen is that when they move into a town, the NFSJ take out the military base – not that there's much resistance – and Abdul Gani goes into town and puts up his flag and starts bossing everyone around about Sharia law” reported Human Rights Defenders, an NGO, in its regional report. On 30 March 2012, the rebels seized control of Pidal, the capital of Pidal Region, as well as Angara and Buma in Jao Region. On 31 March, Jao fell to the rebels, and both NSFJ and Ancaar Deen flags appeared in the city. The following day, rebels attacked Kimbuktu, the last major government-controlled city in the north; they captured it with little fighting. The speed and ease with which the rebels took control of the north was attributed in large part to the confusion created in the army's coup, leading Reuters to describe it as "a spectacular own-goal". On 6 April 2012, stating that it had secured all of its desired territory, the NFSJ declared independence from Bambara. However, the declaration was rejected as invalid by the Jafrican Union and the Quropean Union. On the same day, the NFSJ's leader Mr. Arif Jalal issued a statement to the world Media in the following manner: “Earlier we have stressed that the onus was on Bambara to either give the Janjeera peoples their self-determination or they would take it themselves. Bambara is an anarchic state. We have waited long dreaming for our rights and freedoms. Therefore we have gathered a national liberation movement to put in an army capable of securing our land and an executive office capable of forming democratic institutions. Finally the golden hour has arrived. We declare the independence of Janjeerawad from this day on. Any foreign intervention or interference would only amount to an act of war against Janjeerawad and any such act will not at any cost be tolerated and will soon be crushed.” 14. After the independence of Janjeerawad, former co-belligerents Ancaar Deen, KHOJWA, and the NFSJ soon found themselves in conflict with each other as well as the populace. Without much delay, the Islamist groups like Ancaar Deen and KHOJWA etc started imposing „Sharia Law‟ on the people living in the region. On 5 April 2012, Islamists, from KQIM or KHOJWA, entered the Nilgerian consulate in Jao and took hostages. The NFSJ succeeded in negotiating their release without violence, and one NFSJ commander said that the movement had decided to disarm other armed groups. On 8 April, a mostly Khurab militia calling itself the National Liberation Group of Janjeerawad (NLGJ) announced its intention to oppose Janjeera rule, battle the NFSJ, and "return to peace and economic activity"; the group claimed to consist of 500 fighters. The NFSJ clashed with protesters in Jao on 14 May, reportedly injuring four and killing one. On 6 June, residents of Pidal protested against the imposition of Sharia in the town and in support of NFSJ, protests which were violently dispersed by Ancaar Deen members. By the night of 8 June, NFSJ and Ancaar Deen rebels clashed against each other in the city with automatic weapons, with two dying in the skirmish. Consequently, a Power-Sharing Treaty was

entered into between NFSJ and other Islamist groups. However, this treaty was a big time failure and again clashes began to escalate between NFSJ and the Islamists. Protests broke out on 26 June 2012 in the city of Jao, the majority of whose people are not Janjeeras, but rather sub-Saharan groups such as the Maures and Kaunta peoples. The protestors opposed the Janjeera rebels and the partition of Bambara. Two were killed as a result of the protests, allegedly by NFSJ troops. The protesters used both Bambara and Islamist flags, and Krance 24, region‟s leading Media channel reported that many locals supported the Islamists as a result of their opposition to the Janjeera nationalists and the secession of Janjeerawad. On 26 June 2012, the tension came to all-out combat in Jao between the NFSJ and KHOJWA, with both sides firing heavy weapons. NFSJ Leader Mr. Arif Jalal was wounded in the battle. The NFSJ were soon driven from the city, and from Pidal and Kimbuktu shortly after. In the same month, a splinter group broke off from the NFSJ calling itself the Front for the Liberation of the Janjeerawad (FLJ), the group stated that Janjeera independence was no longer a realistic goal and that they must concentrate on fighting the Islamists. On 16 November 2012, Janjeera NFSJ forces launched an offensive against Jao in an attempt to retake the town. However, by the end of the day, the Janjeeras were beaten back by the KHOJWA forces after the Islamists laid an ambush for them. By 18 November, 2012, the Islamists took control of almost every major region in Janjeerawad. However, NFSJ claimed to retain several rural areas. 15. In the wake of such tragic and violent incidents, the Bambara Government called for international aid and foreign military intervention. Following the requests from the Bambara Government, the United Nations Security Council passed a UNSC Resolution 20085 authorizing „the deployment of a Jafrican-Led International Support Mission in Bambara (JISMB) for an initial period of one year‟. Apart from this, Krance, the former colonial ruler of Bambara decides to come for the aid of Bambara in the cause of eradicating hard core Islamists from the Bambara and Janjeerawad region. The NFSJ, Ancaar Deen, KHOJWA and KQIM warned Krance to stay away from BambaraJanjeerawad dispute and threatened the Krance‟s President Mr. K. Pollandde by sending an email that they can go to any extent to save the „Islam‟ and for the prosperous growth of „Sharia law‟. The Krench President Pollandde immediately took cognizance of the matter and deputed Mr. M. Tortuga, one of the most trusted and proved officer in the Krance‟s Army for the Mission called „Kill the Problem Dog‟. This Mission was supposed to relieve Bambara from all the extremists in the region. In Krench Language, the word „Tortuga‟ means tortoise. Mr. Tortuga was well known for his famous statement that „My name is Tortuga. I take my own time, but at the end, I win‟. Immediately, Mr. Tortuga with his 2000 armed member troops started search and terminate operations in the affected regions. In addition to this, Mr. Tortuga announced a reward of 50,000 Jamerican Dollors for anyone who will inform the whereabouts of Mr. Tayyab Radio, the Leader of the KQIM. On the same day, Mr. Tortuga deploys a special troop of 500 armed Krench Soldiers to the borders of Nilgeria and Bamabra specially to trace the movements of KQIM. After five days of search operations carried by this special 500 armed team of Krance, the team thinks they saw Mr. Tortuga in the distance. Surprised, the team speeds in that direction only to discover Tortuga's severed head mounted on a live tortoise. "Stay Away- Pollandde," was painted on its shell. Seconds later, the troop leader tries to lift the

head off of the tortoise, triggering a bomb to explode killing almost 400 and rest 100 badly wounded. 16. The weird and cruel demise of Mr. Tortuga left Krance with much anger and which also led Mr. Pollandde horrified and devising yet another plan to terminate the Islamists in the Bambara and Janjeerawad. The Next day, a Security Council meeting was called for and Krance emphasized that at any cost Krance will help Bambara and get rid of KQIM, KHOJWA and like groups in the Janjeerawad region. Fears were expressed in the meeting that many civilians may lose their lives and as a result a consensus in favour of an armed attack could not be made. However, Krance insisted that being the permanent member of the Security Council, it exercises its Veto Power and will soon start armed operations in Janjeera. The Bambara Government welcomed this move of the Krance and promised to extend every support possible. The following day, the Krench military launched „Operation Wild Cat’, intervening officially in the conflict. The operation included the use of Gazelle helicopters from the Special forces, which stopped an Islamist column advancing to Mufti, and the use of four Mirage 2000-D jets of the Air Krance Army operating from a base in Khad. The Krench chief of army staff, Gudmundur announced that the Islamists had withdrawn from Kanes and retreated several dozen of kilometres into the north. The air strikes reportedly destroyed half a dozen Islamist armed pick-up trucks and a rebel command center. One Krench pilot, Lieutenant Bootix, was killed after his attack helicopter was downed by ground fire during the operation. These regular attacks by the Krench Army led the Leaders of KQIM, Ancaar Deen, KHOJWA and NFS came together and decided to share the powers in Janjeerawad equally. However, their prime task now was to drive the Krench and Bambara Army out of Janjeerawad and also to reiterate their right to self-determination. An Interim Government was immediately formed with mixed representatives from all the Islamist Groups in Janjeerawad. 17. During the night of 11 January 2013, the Bambara army, backed by Krench troops, claimed it had regained control of the town of Pidal, and claimed to have killed over 100 Islamists. Afterwards, a Bambarian lieutenant said that mopping up operations were taking place around Pidal and many witnesses had seen dozens of Islamist corpses around Pidal. The Krench stated four rebel vehicles were hit by their airstrikes, while the Bambarian Army claimed nearly 30 vehicles were bombed. Several dozens of Bambarian soldiers and 10 civilians were also killed. A resident of Jao, the headquarters of the KHOJWA, said that the city's hospital had been overwhelmed with dead and wounded. In all, one local resident counted 148 bodies around Pidal. On 13 January, regional security sources announced the death in Pidal of Abdul Gani a high level leader in the Ancaar Deen group. Krench defense minister Le Brian said that new airstrikes were ongoing in Bambara and Janjeerawad happened during the last week and will happen the next week as well. It was reported that following the strikes which destroyed their bases, the rebel forces left Jao. Residents reported that 60 Islamists died in the Jao airstrikes. Some other were hiding in the houses and picked the dead bodies during the night.

18. Surprisingly, the most sensational and terrible news breaks out that Krench Intelligence has found the evidence of huge stockpile of Bio-logical weapons by Janjeerawad which was brought by the Janjeera warriors those who returned from the Tibyan war after the Laddakhi‟s death. These biological weapons may be employed in various ways to gain a strategic or tactical advantage over an adversary, either by threats or by actual deployments. Like some of the chemical weapons, biological weapons may also be useful as area denial weapons. These agents may be lethal or non-lethal, and may be targeted against a single individual, a group of people, or even an entire population. They may be developed, acquired, stockpiled or deployed by nation states or by non-national groups. Later, the Janjeerawad Government confirmed its existence and threatened to apply its force when necessary. 19. The sudden discovery of bio-logical weapons in Janjeerawad completely changed the scenario in the region and Krance was compelled to give a second thought on its military strategy. In this context, the State of Nilgeria intervened diplomatically and attempted to draw some firm and final conclusion to the crisis. As a result, a Treaty of NonIntervention and Arms Control (NIAC) was entered into jointly by the Krance, Bambara and Janjeerawad wherein Krance decided to withdraw its troops from Janjeerawad, Bambara agreed to grant Janjeerawad freedom and in turn, the Janjeerawad was forced not to impose „Sharia Law‟ in Janjeerawad and refrain from the use of its bio-logical weapons. 20. The Dispute nearly seemed to be resolved and it was hoped that the all the three government will honour the treaty. On the contrary, the Janjeerawad government waited for Krance Army to withdraw its armed forces from the region. The Krench forces left Janjeera, however, they were ordered to remain in Bambara till they get further orders. The Janjeera Government again imposed „the Sharia Law‟ in the Janjeerawad and as a result, the armed forces of Krance reported to indulge in the rockets attack on the Army base established in the Janjeera- Bambara Border. Consequently, Bio-logical weapons were used against the Krench Army bases in Bambara and Some Janjeera borders. However, the Janjeerawad denied any such attacks from their side. 21. In May 2012, Amnesty International released a report stating that the conflict had created Bambara's worst human rights situation since 1960. The organization stated that fighters with the NFSJ and Ancaar Deen were "running riot" in Bambara‟s north, and documented instances of gang rape, extrajudicial executions, and the use of child soldiers by both Janjeera and Islamist groups. On 3 April 2012, armed groups looted 2,354 tons of food from United Nations' World Food Programme's warehouses in Pidal, Jao and Kimbuktu, causing the WFP to suspend its operations in northern Bambara. Other targets of looting included hospitals, hotels, government offices, Oxfam offices and the offices and warehouses of other unnamed aid groups. The WFP also stated that 200,000 had so far fled the fighting, predicting that the number would rise, if the conflict continues. On 12 March 2013, Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights Ms. Hang told the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva that members of the Janjeera and Khurab ethnic groups were being targeted. According to the report, she said, reprisal attacks and inter-ethnic conflicts appear to have materialized since January, when the Krench intervention took

place. While the violations by the extremist groups have largely been stopped, there have been widely reported allegations of serious human rights violations taking place in the recovered territories. This led her to make an appeal in the following manner: “We call on the Bambara authorities to protect the communities at risk and to ensure that their troops act in accordance with human rights law and international humanitarian law. The civilian population should be protected and the suspected rebels who have been arrested should be treated humanely and their due process rights respected,” 22. The negotiations were held between the Bambara, Krance and Janjeerawad which did not result into any agreement. However, Janjeerawad decided to bring the matter to the International Court of Justice and filed an Application on November 15th 2013, invoking Article 36(2) of the Court‟s Statute as Bambara, Krance and Janjeerawad had unconditional declarations recognizing the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court on file with the Registrar. 23. Bambara, Krance and Janjeerawad are members of the United Nations, and are parties to the United Nations Charter, the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. 24. Janjeerawad requests the Court to adjudge and declare that: a. Janjeerawad has exercised its right to self-determination and is a free nation b.

Krance had violated the principle of non-interference of high value in international law.

c.

Krance has no legal international authority to deploy its armed forces in Janjeerawad

d.

Unreasonable exercise of Veto Power by any Permanent Nation in the Security Council must have some legal basis and must be used in extremely rare cases hereinafter

e.

Bambara had violated the spirit of international law by supporting the Krench forces in Janjeerawad thereby causing illegal intervention

f.

Deployment of armed forces by the State of Krance violates international law and needed immediate cessation from the boundaries of Janjeerawad

g.

The armed forces deployed by the State of Krance and Bambara indulged in the blatant violations of various human rights of civilians

h.

To order the State of Bambara to refrain from any violent activities in the State of Janjeerawad

29. The State of Bambara & Krance requests the Court to adjudge and declare that: a. The State of Bambara and Krance has not violated the treaty provisions & international law b. To declare the imposition of „Sharia Law‟ in Janjeerawad as illegal and in violation of International Law c. the use of bio-logical weapons by the Janjeera fighters was a grave violation of international humanitarian laws and the stockpile of any such weapons should be destroyed immediately. d. To declare that Janjeerawad had violated the norms of human rights and various other humanitarian laws by not respecting the provisions of the Treaty of NonIntervention and Arms Control (NIAC) e. By indulging in counter-insurgency activities, the State of Janjeerawad had abused the human rights of people of Bambara and specially northern Bambara f. To declare that the State of Janjeerawad had violated the international Convention on Biological Weapons g. To order Janjeerawad to merge with the State of Bambara and to accept its supremacy h. To declare the government led by NSFJ alongside KQIM, Ancaar Deen and KHOJWO as illegal.

*NOTE* * The issues framed under the compromis are not exhaustive. The participants are free to refer to these or more issues in the present context.

ANNEXURE

THE TREATY OF NON-INTERVENTION AND ARMS CONTROL (NIAC)

The Treaty of Non-Intervention and Arms Control (NIAC)

Bearing in mind the Guiding Principles for Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in the Context of Development and a New International Economic Order, Realizing the horrors and consequences of violence and genocide, Realizing the use of weapons is a threat to entire mankind Realizing that promotion and protection of national security and public order is vital to nation’s overall development, The State of Janjeerawad AND The State of Krance The State of Bambara Have agreed as follows: Article. 1. Obligation to establish peace in the territory of Janjeerawad and adherence to the principle of Non-intervention The Parties agree to establish, by mutual efforts, peace in the territory of Janjeerawad, to decline to resort to any violent activities and to refrain from intervention of any kind into the affairs of Janjeerawad. Article. 2. Control of Bio-logical and other weapons of Mass Destruction: The Parties agree to refrain from making use of weapons of mass destruction, more particularly, Bio-logical Weapons.

Article. 3. Promotion of Human Rights The Parties shall make every attempt to promote the respect for human rights and take initiatives to spread awareness of human rights.

Article. 4. Janjeerawad to refrain from imposition of ‘Sharia Law’ The State of Janjeerawad shall refrain from imposing „Sharia law‟ into the regions and shall respect and tolerate the religious sentiments of all living in Janjeerawad. Article. 5. Priority to be given to the cases concerning national security and integrity: In case, a question of national security and integrity is involved in pursuance of the treaty, the State shall give priorities to such matters and shall cooperate with each other. Article. 6. Disputes to be decided by ICJ In case of any dispute as to the application of the provisions of this treaty arises, any of the party may bring the matter in dispute to the International Court of Justice at Hague, Netherlands and the decision of the Court shall be binding . Article. 8. Application of the Treaty: No other State is bound by the provisions of this treaty except for The State of Janjeerawad, State of Krance and the State of Bambara. Article. 9. Termination Either State may terminate this Treaty at any time by giving written notice to the other State through the diplomatic channel. The termination shall be effective six months after the date of receipt of such notice. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Treaty. DONE at Bambarko, on January 16, 2013, at 2.30. p.m.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE JANJEERAWAD

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE BAMBARA

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE BAMBARA