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Ethnic and Racial Studies

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Strategies of equalization, a neglected aspect of the split labour market theory: Jews and Arabs in the split labour market of mandatory Palestine Deborah S. Bernstein

Online publication date: 02 December 2010

To cite this Article Bernstein, Deborah S.(2001) 'Strategies of equalization, a neglected aspect of the split labour market

theory: Jews and Arabs in the split labour market of mandatory Palestine', Ethnic and Racial Studies, 21: 3, 449 — 475 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/014198798329900 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/014198798329900

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Strategies of equalization, a neglected aspect of the split labour market theory: Jews and Arabs in the split labour market of mandatory Palestine Deborah S. Bernstein Abstract It is argued that though strategies of equalization are rare, they are an integral element of the split labour market [SLM] dynamics both in the causes that bring higher-priced labour to adopt these strategies and in the factors that often impede their success. Following Bonacich, three types of equalization strategies are identiŽ ed and studied in the case of mandatory Palestine: 1. Establishing minimum standards as discussed in the Wage Commissions of 1928 and 1943; 2. Inclusion of cheap labour in the labour organizatio ns of the higher-priced labour (the Palestine Labor League [PLL] and the Railroad, Post & Telegraph Workers’ Organizatio n [RPTWO]; 3. Support of the liberation movement to which the group of cheap labour is afŽ liated (the Palestine Communist Party [PCP]). Finally, the SLM theory is discussed in the light of the historical case and a number of elaborations are suggested.

Keyw ords: Jews; Arabs; Palestine; labour market; Bonacich.

Abbreviatio ns HA HLC ISA LA PAWS PCP PLL PR RPTWO SLM

Haganna Archive Haifa Labor Council Israel State Archive Labor Archive Palestine Arabs Workers’ Society Palestine Communist Party Palestine Labor League Palestine Railways Railway, Post & Telegraph Workers Organization Split labour market

Ethnic and Racial Studies Volume 21 Number 3 May 1998 © Routledge 1998 0141-9870

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This article aims to elaborate a neglected, though integral, aspect of split labour market [SLM] theory. The SLM theory, developed by Bonacich, emphasizes strategies of closure, pursued by high priced labour, and only brie y comments on an additional option or alternative. Higher-priced labour does tend to protect itself from the competition of cheap labour by closing off the market. But it can also be seen to follow a different course, that of equalization . It attempts to avoid being substituted or downgraded by raising the value of cheap labour, and thus eliminating, or mitigating, the competition between them. This is a highly problem atic course of action: it entails the loss of relative advantage and, at the same time, is difŽ cult to conclude successfully. Not surprisingly, it is pursued less frequently than the strategies of closure. Nevertheless, it will be argued, equalization strategies are as integral an outcome of the split labour market situation as the more frequent and more often studied strategies. By elaborating the circumstances leading to strategies of equalizatio n and the inherent difŽ culties they are bound to face, we can achieve a better understanding of the dynam ics of the split labour market in general. This can lead to a more complex, historically grounded theory, which can help to avoid the mechanistic analysis to which SLM theory may lead. The strategies of equalization and their overall relation to split labour market dynam ics, will be examined in the context of the relations between Jewish and Arab labour in mandatory Palestine. Numerous studies have discussed the duality of Palestine’s economy (Metzer and Kaplan 1985; 1990), and the competition between Jewish and Arab labour (Shapira 1977). Most relevant, a number of students of Israeli society have applied the split labour market theory to the relations between Jewish and Arab labour (ShaŽ r 1989; Shalev 1992 (1)). This article will contribute to the overall debate by focusing on one of the less studied aspects of these relations, that of the initiatives of Jewish labour to organize Arab workers. A variety of attempts were made. The common denom inator of these initiatives was the desire to raise the standard of Arab labour and thus minimize the disparity between it and Jewish labour. This desire stemmed, in most cases, from the need to moderate the competition between the two groups. It thus served in those cases as an added means by which the organized Jewish workers tried to meet the exigencies of the split labour market of Palestine. Nevertheless, these were not the only grounds on which strategies of equalizatio n were attempted. Ideological commitment and class solidarity were the motivating forces in other cases. In the former case, the attempts at equalization were aimed by their initiators, at supplementing strategies of exclusion. In the latter cases, equalizatio n was seen as a rejection of exclusion and its substitution by an opposing course of action.

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Split labour market theory and the strategy of equalization SLM theory, as developed by Bonacich (1972; 1979; 1981), deals with class relations as they evolve among three actors, two groups of labour, higher-paid and cheaper labour, usually of different ethnic or racial groups, and business. The preference of employers for cheap labour threatens higher-paid labour with displacem ent and substitution, which, it is claimed, is the major, even if unacknowledged, cause of racial hostility. The above threat leads to a variety of strategies by which higherpriced labour attempts to avoid such a predicament. ‘If an expensive labor group is strong enough,’ argues Bonacich (1972, p. 554), ‘they may be able to resist being displaced.’ Both exclusion, that is, closing the market to cheaper labour, and caste formation, that is, securing for itself a monopoly over an advantageou s section of the market, can lead to such a success for higher-paid labour. In a later discussion of the SLM, Bonacich adds an alternative strategy, that of equalization . ‘Instead of trying to prevent displacem ent by restricting capital’s access to cheap labor, high-priced labor can focus its efforts on raising the price of cheap labor groups’ (1979, p. 32). Thus, displacement will be avoided through removing the difference in value between the two groups of labour; in other words, through abolishing the split itself. Considering the advantage of equalization in removing the source of the problem faced by highpriced labour, Bonacich queries why such strategies are so seldom pursued. She rejects explanations which argue that higher-priced labour is not conscious of its true interest in uniting with cheap labour, or that it has been bought off by capital. ‘While there is undoubtedly some truth to these interpretations,’ she goes on to argue, ‘I believe they overem phasize ideological and political factors and downplay underlying material conditions’ (1979, p. 33). The answer lies mainly, she claims, in the difŽ culty of attaining equalizing solutions in split labour market circumstances. She concludes by saying: The failure of equalizing strategies by high-priced labor is not only a product of their own failings (though these may be considerable), but also of the structure and dynam ics of split labor markets which make equalizing solutions difŽ cult to achieve. Protectionism of various sorts is far more simple and direct, providing immediate relief (1979, p. 34). The discussion in this article proceeds from that point. While I agree with Bonacich that exclusionary strategies are far easier to pursue, they, too, are not always successful. Despite the relative strength of higherpriced labour, manifested in their ability to obtain higher wages in the Žrst place, there are limits to their ability to close the market, or even parts of it, before much cheaper labour. This failure, inherent in the SLM dynamics, attracts the attention of higher-priced labour to equalizing

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strategies – if you can’t exclude them, include them. . . . Thus, it is precisely the SLM condition which keeps re-raising the strategies of equalization, while at the same time it makes them very difŽcult to achieve. Equalizing strategies, though rare, are an integral element of the SLM dynam ics, both in the causes that bring higher-priced labour to adopt these strategies and in the factors that often impede their success. The study of such strategies, in concrete historical cases, can highlight an aspect of the SLM model which is often overlooked due to its relative rarity. At the same time it can enhance our understanding of the SLM model in general. In explaining the limitations of equalizing strategies, their weakness and marginality, we may well become aware of interrelations within the split labour market, thus mitigating the more mechanical interpretation this model is apt to take on. While accepting Bonacich’s argument that equalizing strategies often fail because of the difŽ culties embedded in the split labour market situation itself, it might be useful to distinguish between the different possible factors:

1. Relative weakness of higher-priced labour I have argued that it is precisely when higher-priced labour is not strong enough to implement its exclusionary strategies that equalizing strategies will arise. Yet, the implementation of equalizing strategies also demands a high level of in uence and power, both organizational and political, on the part of the higher-priced labour. It is extrem ely difŽ cult to organize all (or most) cheap labour. It also calls for a fair amount of political power to persuade employers to raise the level of their reserve of cheap labour and to persuade the state to support such a step. It often happens that higher-priced labour, even though relatively strong, is unable to get such policies across.

2. Nature of relations between higher- and lower- priced labour The failure of equalizing strategies may also reect the reluctance of higher-priced labour to give up its attempt to secure some form of relative advantage. Even when exclusion/caste strategies are dropped, higher-priced labour might Žnd it difŽ cult to resort to a completely different course of action. The equalizing alternative pursued may continue to be shaped by attempts to maintain some form of advantage, thus losing its potential effectiveness. Furthermore, the lower-priced workers may be highly suspicious of equalizing strategies directed at them by higher-priced labour, due to previous experience of exclusion, and prefer a separate course of action, even if their ability to follow it is highly limited.

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3. Impact of factors ‘external’ to the labour market The limitations of equalization will most probably be affected by factors ‘outside’ the labour market. Such factors have been totally overlooked by Bonacich and have not been included in any way in her theoretical model. As Bonacich claims that racism is a reection of class relations (among three rather than two actors . . .), her attention is focused almost exclusively within this labour market. She thus gives little attention to the historical context within which the labour market exists. This leads to a reductionism which is both unnecessary and unconvincing. It is argued here that no aspect of society can be wholly divorced from other aspects. This, indeed, is one of the major beneŽ ts of a historically grounded analysis. It removes us from the design according to which all factors but one are ‘held constant’ and one factor alone is studied. Complex social relations cannot, and need not, be reduced to one explanatory dimension unrelated to all others. On the contrary, while accepting the centrality of the split labour market for the understand ing of the relations between two groups of workers, the split labour market itself is affected by numerous other factors. Thus political, ideological, organizatio nal and economic factors affect the ability of higher-priced labour to pursue both strategies of exclusion and of equalization . These same factors affect the manner in which cheaper labour will respond to such initiatives. The political relations between the two groups of labour are of special importance. The relations of power and subordination will have an important impact on the relative position of each group in the labour market. It will affect the strategy it follows in relation to the other and the latter’s response. These relations can be further complicated to the extent that the two groups of workers are embroiled in a politicalnational conict. Such a conict can be expected to affect the steps they take in relation to one another quite autonom ously of their relations within the split labour market. A political-national hostility may often take on a zero-sum character. This will reinforce the tendency of higherpriced labour towards exclusionary initiatives and make any form of cooperation both suspect and difŽ cult to achieve. In discussing equalization as a distinct strategy, Bonacich (1979, pp. 32–33) points to three major ways in which high-priced labour can focus its efforts on raising the price of cheap labour groups: 1. Pressure on governm ent to establish and enforce minimum standards for all workers (e.g., minimum wage, maximum hours etc.). 2. Organization of cheap workers to ‘bring them into the unions and political parties of the high-priced group’. 3. Support for ‘the liberation movements of oppressed peoples who are being used as cheap labour’. As part of this support they are helped ‘to withstand the predations of high-priced labour’s own national bourgeoisie’.

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Each of these courses of action can be expected to meet with the difŽ culties discussed above: the weakness of higher-priced labour, its inclination to retain some advantage and thus jeopardize genuine equalization; suspicion on the part of the cheap labour group; and detrimental impact of political, organizational and ideological factors outside the labour market. The demand for minimum standards most commonly takes the form of the establishm ent of a minimum wage. This is probably the most usual form of equalization , and yet it is equalization in only a limited sense. It does attempt to raise the standard of cheap labour rather than exclude it, but it does not imply equality. It primarily refers to a lessening of the gap, so providing some improvement for cheap labour and, at least as important, a safety net for the higher-priced labour. Thus, the relative advantage of higher-priced labour is not forsaken, and probably for that reason minimum wage does not have the ‘pie in the sky’ quality that other equalizing strategies may be perceived to have. While minimum wage might be seen as advantageou s for the higher-priced labour, and to some extent for cheap labour as well, the former might not be able to push through such legislation. Employers are most likely to put up strong opposition to an overall obligatory rise in the wages of their existing labour force, as well as of their potential reserve of cheap labour. The relation of higher-priced labour to the state will, in such cases, be of central importance. The inclusion of cheap labour in the unions of the more advantaged workers can also be expected to meet numerous obstacles. The very conditions which lead to the formation of the SLM, especially the largescale availability of cheap labour, might make their organization unfeasible. Previous attempts of high-priced labour at retaining its advantage through ex clusion would be likely to ‘taint’ the way in which inclusion would be carried out. Furthermore, previous experience might cause cheap labour to decline the offer. In the case of a multi-based conict, political conict interacting with SLM hostility, the dominant labour group might refuse to pursue such a course of action; and even if it were pursued, might be turned down by the group of cheap labour. Support of national liberation might be even more problem atic for the advantaged workers. It is not often that overall class interests supersede national solidarity. It is not often that higher-priced workers can genuinely expect to improve their situation through a cooperation that will alienate them from their own national bourgeoisie . Thus, ideological commitment to class solidarity would be expected to play a major role in this case, far more than in any of the others. The arguments presented above will be exam ined in the case of Palestine during the period of British colonial rule, under the mandate granted by the League of Nations, during the years 1918 –1948.

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The split labour market of mandatory Palestine Jewish Zionist immigration to Palestine from Eastern and then Central Europe began at the end of the nineteenth century, and was geared to establishing a separate and autonom ous Jewish settlement. The Jewish population grew quickly from approxim ately 83,800 in 1922, to 174,600 in 1931, to 549,000 in 1945 and 609,000 in 1947 (Metzer and Kaplan 1990, pp. 104 –105). At the same time the Arab population of Palestine was also increasing rapidly, from 679,800 in 1922, to 858,700 in 1931, to 1,245,400 in 1945 and to 1,333,800 in 1947 (ibid.), the growth being largely due not only to the high birth rate but also to some migration from neighbourin g countries (Gilbar 1988). Thus, we witness the formation of two expanding populations, both consisting of large segments of workers in search of employm ent in a growing economy, but one growing at a pace slower than that of the potential labour force of both national groups. The particular history of each group, Jewish labour and Arab labour, generated great differences in the cost of the labour of each. The Jews emigrated from semi-industrialized areas, had previous experience with wage labour, as well as extensive experience in political and labour organizatio ns. They entertained high expectation s concerning the new Jewish settlement and strove to achieve a standard of living which they deemed suitable for ‘civilized’ individuals and a ‘civilized’ collective. In Palestine the Jewish workers formed a number of political parties and, in 1920, established the General Federation of Jewish Labor, known as the Histadrut. The latter organized approxim ately 70 per cent of Jewish labour. It also supplied a wide range of social services and provided employm ent through the large contracting company owned by the Histadrut – Solel Boneh. The Arab workers were primarily migrants from rural areas, most of whom migrated on a semi-temporary basis. They had little experience of wage labour. Their prior experience was of highly hierarchical labour relations, under the authority of the family or village elder (Taquu 1977). Their standard of living, both in the village and as migrants, was extremely low (Seikally 1983, pp. 362 –63). There was an almost unlimited potential for an additional ‘supply’ of migrants from where these had come (Carmi and Rosenfeld 1974). The Ž rst major workers’ organization, the Palestine Arabs Workers’ Society [PAWS], was established in Haifa in 1925 but was only intermittently active for most of the period. There is abundant evidence of the large disparity in wages between Jewish and Arab workers throughout the mandatory period, 1919 –1948. SufŽ ce for our purpose to quote a number of governm ent reports. The Wage Commission of 1928; 2, memoranda prepared by the Governm ent

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of Palestine for the Palestine Royal Commission (Governm ent of Palestine, Palestine Royal Commission 1937, pp. 140 –46), and the Survey of Palestine, prepared for the Anglo-Am erican Committee of Inquiry (Government of Palestine 1946, pp. 774 –80), all point to a relation of between 1:2 to 1:4 in the level of wages earned by Jewish and Arab workers, especially marked in the case of unskilled workers. Mandatory Palestine provides a complex case of an SLM. Palestine was under British colonial rule, which did not represent either national community or either of the labour groups. The mandate did contain a commitment to support the establishm ent of a Jewish National Home, but the Jewish settlers were not closely linked to the governm ent, as many European settlers were in other colonial settings. While Barbara Smith claims that the government primarily promoted the Jewish interests and the Jewish National Home [JNH], to the detriment of the Arab population (1993), I would argue that its policy was far more complex. It initially supported the promotion of the Jewish National Home, on the assumption that it would beneŽ t the whole population of Palestine, and thus would not create Arab hostility towards British rule. On realizing that that was not to be the case, the mandatory governm ent attempted a precarious balancing of interests, and above all, pursued its own imperial policy (see also Kimmerling 1993). The conict which developed between the Arab and Jewish communities was not only an expression of SLM hostility. It was an overall national conict which concerned all aspects of life. It was a conict over land, over a relative share of the population and over sovereignty, as well as over a share of employm ent (Kimmerling 1983a; 1983b). It was a conict between two national communities and national movem ents. The commitment to the national cause was expressed at the ideological level in both communities, though possibly at different levels of coherence and articulation. But it was also a national commitment which shaped everyday life and practice to the most concrete and minute degree. Who one’s neighbours were, what language one spoke, to which organization one belonged, even what products one bought and in which market, were all national-po litical issues, explicitly recognized as such by all concerned. The Jewish settlement, supported by the World Zionist Organization, developed a wide range of institutions – political, Žnancial, social and economic – which sustained its growth. These provided, among other things, various forms of support for Jewish labour and enabled it to retain its relative advantage, primarily within the Jewish economic sector of Palestine. The dominant strategy pursued by the higher-priced Jewish labour, as demonstrated in detail by both ShaŽ r (1989) and Shalev (1992), was that of exclusion, the closure of the Jewish economic sector to all but Jewish labour. This strategy was deŽ ned as ‘The conquest of labour’ or ‘The struggle for Hebrew labour’, which were two major rallying cries of the

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Jewish settlement in general and of Jewish labour in particular. The strategy of exclusion, common in most cases of SLM, had the added advantage of being highly compatible with the overall orientation of the Jewish Zionist settlement, as it confronted Arab hostility to the goal of establishing a JNH. The primary response of the settlers to such hostility was an attempt at separation, at creating as separate, as consolidated, homogeneous and insulated an entity as possible, a target which shaped all facets of life – spatial, political, social, cultural and, central among these, economic (Shapira 1977, p. 121). ShaŽ r claims that the basic features of Israeli society were shaped early on, even before British rule, as part of the exclusionary strategy of Jewish labour (1989, pp. 187 –98). This compatibility between basic Zionist ends and labour interests meant that Jewish organized labour was able to elicit Žnancial and political help from other components within the community (Shalev 1992). While ShaŽ r and Shalev focus solely on exclusionary strategies and their formative impact, this study deals with the limitations of the exclusionary strategies and the signiŽ cance of the alternative strategies of equalization . The very conditions of a settlers’ community, confronting a hostile majority of local population, under the control of a semi-supportive colonial rule, made the desired separation a goal difŽ cult to achieve in its entirety. The Palestine government and administration, while committed to aiding the JNH, also had to take into account the needs and interests of the Arab majority, as well as those of the British empire and its colonial policy. Jewish labour organizations did not have the aid of state institutions and thus had no means of legislation and law enforcement at their disposal, with which they could consolidate their boundaries and thus reinforce separation and exclusion. Furthermore, the mandatory governm ent was the largest employer in Palestine, with tens of thousands of workers in public works, municipalities, railways, ports and, especially during World War II, in the construction and maintanence of military camps. Jewish labour had no possibility of excluding Arab labour from the government sector of the economy or of monopolizing any section within it. At best, it had to Žnd a way of securing its share of employm ent within the governm ent sector, while facing the competition of cheap Arab labour. Some elements within the Jewish sector had much to gain by more open economic exchange. Land had to be acquired from its owners – the local landowning Arab population. Additional markets were sought, within Palestine itself and in neighbourin g Arab countries, for goods produced by Jewish entrepreneu rs. Jewish employers, most of whom supported the employm ent of better paid Jewish workers, preferred at times to employ much cheaper Arab workers, depending on the kind of industry and the type of work to be done. Thus, complete self isolation by the Jewish community and elimination of competition by Arab labour, was simply not possible.

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One of the responses to the inability of Jewish labour to avoid the threat of displacement by blocking access of cheap Arab labour, was to try and pursue an alternative strategy – that of equalization . The circumstances of the SLM in Palestine made equalization very difŽ cult to achieve. Such attempts were therefore relatively rare and marginal both in terms of the resources allocated to them and the ideological commitment invested in them. Nevertheless, marginal as they were, they were as integral a response to the SLM dynamics of Palestine as was the dominant approach of exclusion. Attempts at equalization As noted above, Bonacich lists three approaches to equalization . These approaches will be exam ined in the historical case of mandatory Palestine.

The establishment and enforcement of minimum standards Organized Jewish labour put forward the demand for minimum standards to the employers in two sectors of the Palestine economy: the Jewish sector and the government sector. The goal and the circumstances of each sector were different. 1. In the case of the Jewish sector, the aim was to protect the basic wage of organized unskilled Jewish labour from the impact of competition by unorganized Jewish labour, and of recurring recession and unemployment. The goal of establishing minimum standards was to secure, through collective bargainin g, an adequate minimum for Jewish labour. The competition of much cheaper unskilled Arab labour was dealt with, in the Jewish sector, solely through attem pts at enclosure and exclusion . Thus, the aim was to establish the minimum standards set by the Histadrut as the standard basic rate and working conditions of all Jewish labour, rather than to equalize between Arab and Jewish labour. The success of organized Jewish labour was partial. The minimum wage was set at 300 mils (one LP was equivalent to a pound sterling and composed of 1,000 mils or 100 piasters) per work day of eight hours. In large work places such as private Jewish industry, large Jewish contractors and, of course, the Histadrut contracting company, Solel Boneh, the minimum wage payable was set out in the collective agreement and enforced. Nevertheless, existing Žgures show that a signiŽ cant percentage of Jewish labour was earning less than the required minimum. This percentage became alarmingly high during periods of recession, when the bargaining power of Jewish labour clearly deteriorated. The impact of the recession of 1925 –1927 was documented by the Wage Commission appointed by the government in 1928 as follows:

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The percentage of Jewish Union labor getting under P.30 a day was 42% in 1925, 64% in 1926 and 83% in 1927. . . . Jewish unorganized labor getting under P.15 a day was 9% in the spring of 1926, 12% in the autumn and 34% in the spring of 1927. 3 2. In the case of the government sector, the aim of establishing minimum standards was to protect the basic wage of Jewish labour from the competition of much cheaper Arab labour. Jewish labour had neither grounds nor means to exclude Arab labour from governm ent works. The best it could do was to enter those works itself. The government was a major employer in Palestine. Zionist leadership kept demanding a ‘fair share’ of employment in governm ent works for Jewish labour. 4 The employm ent of Jewish workers as skilled labour, which was paid higher wages, was not sufŽcient to solve the employment needs of existing Jewish workers and potential new immigrants. One of the ways in which the labour leadership hoped to increase the employment of unskilled workers, while still retaining what was considered the minimal standard of living, was through the establishment of a minimum wage to be paid to all unskilled labour by governm ent departm ents and by contractors working for them. This proposal was formally submitted to two wage commissions, appointed by the Governm ent of Palestine in 1928 and 1943. In both cases Jewish labour proposed the establishment of a minimum wage to be set at the minimum rate paid to organized Jewish labour in the Jewish sector, that is, 30 Piasters. In both cases the proposal was rejected. A closer look is now called for, noting both similarities and changes in the position of Jewish labour. The commission of 1928 was presented with the proposal of the Executive of the General Federation of Jewish Labor – the Histadrut. This proposal called for a ‘fair wages’ clause to be included in every government contract, which would set a minimum wage at the rate paid to organized Jewish workers in the Jewish sector. The Histadrut executive concluded its proposal by stating that ‘The question how to employ workmen of different standards of living will not be solved by lowering the standard of living of Jewish workmen, but by raising the general standard of living of the inhabitants of the country.’ 5 While the Histadrut was suggesting a general minimum wage in governm ent works, its main concern was not with equalizing the income of Jews and Arabs, but with ensuring the share of Jewish workers, whose standard of living was higher than that of Arab workers. This becomes evident in the following clause of the Histadrut’s proposal which established the additional principle of paying workers according to their ‘requirem ents of life’, a principle which enabled the reintroduction of different levels of pay to Jewish and Arab workers, while retaining the framework of an established and ensured minimum. The proposal called for different levels of minimum wage in different areas. In the case of

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homogeneous areas, such as Arab rural areas or towns, or Jewish settlements, there would be no difŽ culty – so it was claimed – in determining the different standards of living characteristic of each area. In the case of a mixed town:

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regard should be paid to the requirem ents of the various categories of workmen who have no income other than that derived from their work and who are domiciled within the boundaries of that area, regard being paid also to their dependents .6 This wording referred to the distinction between urban workers (primarily Jewish) who had no additional income, and migrant workers (primarily Arab) who had retained ties with their own villages and received extra income from seasonal agricultural work. The Histadrut’s proposal was rejected. Neither the British chairman of the commission, Mr J.E.F. Campbell, the District Commissioner of the Southern District, nor the Arab member, Mr George Shiber, an inuential Arab employer, would support any form of minimal wage. So a general minimum wage was rejected, 7 as was a more limited proposal for the establishm ent of a minimum wage in governm ent works and contracts,8 and as was the proposal to establish different accepted minima in different regions. 9 Arab labour was not represented. The report made it perfectly clear that it wished to avoid not only additional expense but also social disorder. The latter could be expected from the introduction of principles of which Arab labour was ‘unaware’, according to the Report, and for which it was ‘unprepared ’, and which would further encourage the migration of villagers to urban centres, that were incapable of absorbing them. Jewish labour had no power to get its proposals across, even though one of the three members of the commission was Yitzhak Ben Zvi, a prominent leader of Jewish labour. A second commission was appointed Žfteen years later, in 1943. Circumstances had changed. Arab labour had undergone rapid proletarianizatio n, especially during the years of World War II (Taqqu 1977, pp. 159 –93). Tens of thousands of Arabs had migrated from the villages to urban centres on an increasingly permanent basis. Arab labour organizations were gaining in importance. The Palestine Arab Workers’ Society [PAWS], which held its Žrst convention in 1930, became far more active and in uential during the early 1940s (Aboud 1988, pp. 112 –18). An additional labour organization, the Federation of Arab Trade Unions and Labour Societies, split off from it and pursued a somewhat more radical course of action (al-Budeiri 1979a, pp. 37–59; Farah 1985, pp. 120 –35). Relations between Jews and Arabs had also polarized what with the consolidation of the Arab national movem ent and the Arab Rebellion of 1936-39 (Porath 1978, pp. 172 –324; Kimmerling and Migdal 1993, pp. 96 –126). The war brought about rapid in ation and a sharp rise in the

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cost of living. All workers demanded a wage increase and a cost-of-living allowance. Jewish workers, affected by both the rise in the cost of living and by the competition of Arab workers, called for a minimum wage. But on this occasion, for the Žrst time, Jewish labour called forcefully for an equal minimum for Jews and Arabs. We would suggest that the Committee should recommend the establishment of a single minimum wage for the whole country. This should not be a lowering of the minimum Jewish wage but rather a raising of the minimum Arab wage. The process of raising Arab standards has gone on steadily since the beginning of Jewish colonisation. The war has hastened this developm ent and now the point has been reached where one might speak of a uniform standard. With regard to the skilled worker, there has been no great difference for a number of years. It is now time for a state enactment to abolish the absurdity of the double standard for unskilled workers (Government of Palestine 1943, p. 44). The emphasis then given to the establishm ent of an overall equal standard was explained by Jewish labour representatives as stemming from the fact that the cost of subsistence of an Arab family and a Jewish family was similar, which it had not been a decade or two before. I would argue that political considerations were at least as important. The issue of the inequality of wages had become a major focus of Arab hostility, especially on the part of Arab labour and its spokesmen (for exam ple, Filastin, 14 January 1930, 3 March 1933, 5 Septem ber 1937; Ha’aretz , 5 April 1943). The Histadrut was attempting at the time to organize Arab labour through its Palestine Labor League (see below) and thus had to take a clear stand in support of equal wages. Once again the proposal was rejected. Once again there was little the Histadrut could do except to add the reservation s of its representative member on the committee, to the committee’s report (Government of Palestine 1943, pp. 41 –56). The government would not formally adopt the Jewish proposal. Even though it expressed its general opinion that ‘the wage differentiation which now exists should be abolished by a steady process of raising the lower level of wages of the Arab workers to the higher level of the Jewish workers’ (ibid, p. 20), it still considered ‘any attempt to determine a standard wage or a minimum wage undesirable’ (ibid). It preferred to leave wage setting to collective negotiation, which clearly left much unorganized casual Arab labour outside the process as a continuing reserve of cheap labour. Arab labour did not remain silent. Though it was the cheaper of the two groups of workers and the less well organized, it was sufŽciently organized and articulate to make its position clear. Its representatives explained and demonstrated the sharp rise in the cost of living of Arab

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workers, especially as many had severed their rural ties, and called for an increase in the basic wage of unskilled labour and the establishm ent of a cost-of-living allowance. They emphatically demanded an end to any disparity in the wages of Arab and Jewish labour. The statement of the Federation of Arab Trade Unions and Labour Societies to the Committee, demanded ‘equality of wages between Arabs and non-Arab workers’. After claiming that inequality by governm ent was taken for granted, and having refuted various justiŽ cations which had been given in the past to such inequality, the statement continued: The biological construction of an Arab worker living in Palestine required the same amount of nutritions to regenerate his energy and sustain his health as that of any other worker in Palestine. We do not acknowled ge any scientiŽ c proof that the Arab workers require lesser foodstuffs than any other worker performing the same job. Justice based on human logical values cannot tolerate discrimination between a human being and his brother. Two workers with the same productive capacity living in one country, enjoying the same climatic conditions and bound by the same sovereign constitution administered by the same Government, have a right to identical pay without differentiation.10 Both higher priced Jewish labour and cheaper Arab labour were demanding an equalization of the wages of unskilled labour. Nevertheless, they did not cooperate. The overall national con ict, the deep Arab hostility towards the Histadrut and its exclusionary labour policy, and the vehem ent opposition to the attempt of the Histadrut to organize Arab labour all prevented any cooperation. This further weakened the ability of Jewish labour to bring about the legislation of equal minimal standards.

The organization of Arab labour by organized Jewish labour The second type of equalizing strategy according to Bonacich – that of the inclusion of cheap workers in the organizations and parties of the higher-priced workers – faced special difŽ culties in the case of the Histadrut and organized Jewish labour. As noted, the Histadrut which organized approxim ately 70 per cent of Jewish workers (Rosenstein 1946, p. 66) played a major role in the Jewish national movement. It was closely linked to the Zionist Organization in numerous ties, and saw itself as the vanguard of Zionist settlement in Palestine, whose major task was to encourage the immigration of Jewish workers to Palestine and to ensure their employment in the Jewish sector. As such, given the national enmity which soon arose, the Histadrut organized Jewish labour, and Jewish labour only. The option of removing the threat of cheap Arab

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labour by incorporating it into the Histadrut, which would then raise its standard as it was doing for Jewish labour, was greatly restricted. Nevertheless, such a course of action was repeatedly suggested. The day-to-day proximity, especially in mixed towns and mixed governm ent employment, the lack of organization among Arab workers, and the hostility towards Jewish labour on the part of Arab labour organizatio ns once they began, led the Histadrut leadership from time to time to try and organize Arab labour. Two such cases can be cited and studied: 1. The Palestine Labor League [PLL], an adjunct organization established by the Histadrut to organize Arab labour; 2. The Palestine Railway, Post & Telegraph Workers’ Organization [RPTWO], an autonom ous organization, under the auspicies of the Histadrut, whose leadership was Jewish and whose members were both Jewish and Arab workers. The Palestine Labor League: The PLL was aimed at organizing Arab workers, under the auspices of the Histadrut, so as to improve their working conditions. This was to be done, according to the guidelines of the Histadrut leadership, without increasing the employment of Arab workers in the Jewish economic sector. In order to minimize the possibility of Arab workers entering Jewish employm ent, the members of the PLL were not incorporated into the Histadrut as full and equal members. Rather, the PLL was established as a separate organization for Arab workers, an adjunct organization to the Histadrut, afŽ liated with it and under its control. Membership of the PLL was restricted to those workers who appeared less likely to be in search of employment in the Jewish sector. Thus, membership was denied to Arab workers who were unemployed or in search of work, or those under the age of twenty, for fear that such workers would expect the PLL to provide them with employment. As a result of these restrictions, the Histadrut, which hoped to organize Arab workers through the PLL, severely curtailed its own ability to do so by limiting membership, a priori. The most appropriate candidates for organization, as far as the Histadrut was concerned, were groups of Arab workers, already employed in the Arab sector of the economy, who approached the PLL on their own initiative, requesting assistance in improving their pay and working conditions in their existing place of work. This took place primarily in Haifa, with its mixed Arab-Jewish population, during periods of prosperity. Thus, for exam ple, in 1925 Arab carpentry workers and tailors asked the Haifa Labor Council [HLC] for help in their struggle to improve their conditions of work and pay (De Vries 1992, pp. 244 –46). With the renewed prosperity of 1932 –35 numerous strikes were held by Arab workers, some of them with the aid of the PLL, among them: the strike of the workers of the Vacuum Oil Co.; of the sailors employed by the contracters Reno and Abu Zeid in the Haifa port; of the workers of the German owned Mintzenmai bakery; of the workers of Shell Co. and of the tobacco company of Salim, Najiah and Khouri.11 In almost all cases

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the strikes, conducted under the auspices of the PLL, failed to achieve their goals. In most cases the PLL proved powerless as it was unable to impose an agreement on the Arab or international employer, and lacked resources to sustain a long drawn-out conict and keep up the spirits of the workers. The separation between the Jewish and Arab sectors, so central to the overall strategy of organized Jewish labour, severely limited the ability of the PLL to effectively lead a strike conducted by Arab workers and bring it to a successful end. Due to the above mentioned separation, the Histadrut did not have the leverage over the Arab employer that it had in the Jewish sector. There were no sanctions it could apply (such as calling for the solidarity of other workers or boycotting the product) and thus was relatively helpless vis-à-vis the employer. Furthermore, the secondary importance attributed to this labour-market strategy, as far as the Histadrut was concerned, meant that the resources allotted to the PLL were always seriously scant. Finally, the exclusion of Arab workers from the Jewish sector of the economy and the inability of the PLL to inuence the Arab sector, meant that there was no possibility of offering alternative employm ent to striking workers in the event that their strike failed and/or they were Žred. These limitations dampened the enthusiasm of the Arab workers and cut short their ability to sustain a drawnout struggle. During approxim ately ten years of intermittent activity the PLL failed, time and again, to organize Arab workers and to win signiŽ cant improvements on their behalf. This was in striking contrast to the achievements made by the Jewish workers through their labour organization. It can be argued that the PLL did not pursue a strategy of equalization, but rather an internally contradictory combination of equalizatio n and exclusion. It was an attempt to improve the conditions of Arab workers by organizing them under the auspices of the Histadrut, while at the same time excluding them from the important beneŽ t of employm ent in the Jewish sector. It was an attempt which got entangled in its own contradictions. Furthermore, the PLL aroused vehem ent opposition on the part of Arab labour spokesmen. The Histadrut itself was a target of Arab hostility, primarily for its policy of ‘Hebrew Labour’ (Mansur 1937). 12 The rejection of the PLL was even more extrem e and total. It was seen as a means by which the Jewish leadership was using Arab workers to advance Zionist goals and at the same time to disrupt Arab national and class interests. This was both unacceptable and unforgivable. While Arab labour activists would, under special circumstances, cooperate with the Histadrut (but not join it), they would have no contact with, and give no recognition to, the PLL. Arabs who did join the PLL, especially those who were active in it, were completely ostracized. 13 One quote will sufŽce. A lea et directed at Arab workers afŽ liated with the PLL declared:

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Arab Worker! Do you know who the Histadrut is and who are its people? The Histadrut is a branch of the political Zionist association, which has colonized the land so as to dominate you and destroy your national existence. It works in secret to suppress you and to take all work away from you and from your brothers. Poor you, Oh Arab Worker! You are a traitor to your people. You bring poverty and hardship onto yourself. You lower your value and the value of your nation! My words are indeed harsh, but that is so that you will not be exploited, so that you will understand that they intend to Žnish off with you and with your future. You can expect the day that you will be expelled from your land if you don’t retreat from participating in the Histadrut as your brothers have retreated (Filastin, 12 July 1933). To conclude, the PLL failed both because it contradicted the in uential, dominant strategy of exclusion and because of the strong opposition it aroused among the more active and organized Arab workers. The Railway, Post & Telegraph Workers’ Organization of Palestine: The Palestine Railways [PR] was one of the large employers of the government sector. Shortly after British rule began, when large developmen t works were taking place in the PR, Jews entered the Railways. During the 1920s Jewish workers accounted for approximately 13 –14 per cent of all workers (Bernstein 1996), a proportion which fell during the 1930s and 1940s to approxim ately 8 per cent (Governm ent of Palestine, Palestine Railways 1932, p. 51; 1937, p. 51; 1941, p. 122; 1948, p. 131). They were concentrated, largely, in the Mechanical Locomotive Department as skilled metal workers (Bernstein 1996). All workers in the PR, both Jews and Arabs, were employed directly by the PR managem ent. The general level of wages, even for skilled workers, was low, especially when compared to the wages of skilled organized labour in the Jewish sector. Jewish workers had little bargaining power, by which they could retain the advantage they enjoyed in the Palestine SLM in general. They could not exclude the cheaper Arab workers, nor could they monopolize all skilled labour in the Railways. These circumstances induced Jewish workers to try and organize the unorganized Arab workers in order to improve the conditions of work for all. The PR was the one place of work where joint action continued intermittently all through the mandatory period. Jewish workers formed their Ž rst union in 1919 – the Organization of Railway Workers of Palestine, to unite soon after with the telegraph and post workers and form the RPTWO.14 With the formation of the Histadrut in 1920, the RPTWO joined it, retaining its autonom y (Lockman 1993). Within a few years the organized Jewish workers realized that as a

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small minority among the workers of the PR, they could achieve very little, and called upon the Arab workers to join their organization. Indeed, many Arab workers, primarily skilled workers, joined. For a few years the RPTWO was a genuinely joint Arab –Jewish organization with a membership of approximately 450 and 450 respectively (Bernstein 1996). Dilemmas were quick to follow. Jewish members of the RPTWO were also members of the Histadrut, whereas Arab members were not. Thus, the former enjoyed the various services with which the Histadrut provided its members, but the latter did not. Nor could Arab members enjoy the same status, since the Histadrut did not organize Arab workers in its ranks. Make-shift solutions were suggested by the Histadrut executive but they could not completely solve the problem . At the same time, many of the Arab workers resented the linkage of the RPTWO with the Histadrut, as the latter was identiŽ ed with the Zionist enterprise to which most Arab workers strongly objected. The issue of the Zionist afŽ liation of the RPTWO had already come to a head at the end of 1924. Arab members demanded a clear statement as to the position of the RPTWO Jewish activists in relation to the Zionist enterprise. The latter evaded their demand, claiming that their position did not concern the RPTWO as an organization. Disappointed and angered, many of the Arab members left the RPTWO (Farah 1985, pp. 19 –20) and established the Arab Railway Workers Union, which was the core of the Palestine Arabs Workers’ Society [PAWS], formed by them in 1925. Nevertheless, despite the split, cooperation did not cease. It continued intermittently but never totally coming to an end. The RPTWO retained some of its Arab members until 1936 –39, the years of the Arab Rebellion against British rule and the Jewish National Home, during which cooperation became all but impossible. It continued publishing its journals and pamphlets in both Hebrew and Arabic. But the RPTWO was no longer the main channel of cooperation. After 1925 two organizations of railway workers existed side by side, and both realized that they could only hope to win improved working conditions through joint action. In 1928 a joint committee was established, composed of an equal number of representatives of both organizations.15 The committee ceased to function with the increase in political tension due to the clashes between Jews and Arabs in the summer of 1929 (Porath 1976, pp. 210 –22), but renewed its activity within two to three years. It managed to obtain some signiŽ cant improvem ents for the railway workers during the prosperity years of 1934 –35, but then once again came to a standstill shortly after the outburst of the Arab Rebellion in April 1936. The years of World War II, with their rapid increase in the cost of living, brought Arab and Jewish workers once again to join ranks. For

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the Žrst time strikes broke out in the PR, joint strikes of Jewish and Arab workers, beginning in all three cases in the Railway Workshops in Haifa, where skilled and organized Arab and Jewish workers had been working together over many years. In the three strikes of 1942, 1944 and 1946 the initiative came from the rank and Žle, with the activists of the RPTWO and the Arab Railways Workers Organization jointly leading the struggle. 16 The actual achievem ents of the strikes were small. Nevertheless, the joint action of Jewish and Arab workers in the PR, intermittent as it was, is one of the very few legacies of cooperation between the workers of the two conicting nationalities in the SLM of mandatory Palestine. Both the PLL and the RPTWO were formed due to the inability of Jewish workers to secure their position through exclusion only. Neither of these organization s obtained its goals. Nevertheless, an important distinction should be made between them. The PLL was clearly imposed from above by the Histadrut leadership. It failed because of the contradiction between its attempt to bring Arab workers under its auspices on the one hand, and exclude them on the other, and because of strong Arab opposition, as discussed above. The RPTWO and the other forms of cooperation in the PR stemmed from below. Despite the meagre improvem ents won by the railway workers, the long-term cooperation between Jewish and Arab workers was a victory in itself. They failed in obtaining signiŽ cant improvements due both to the overall weakness of the workers in relation to managem ent, and to the difŽ culty in welding a more effective and forceful cooperation in the midst of a deepening national conict.

The Palestine Communist Party and Arab labour The Palestine Communist Party [PCP] can be seen as Bonacich’s third type of equalization strategy – support of the liberation movement to which the group of cheap labour is afŽ liated (Bonacich 1979, p. 33). The underlying assumption in this strategy would be that the success of the liberation movement would strengthen its working class, enable it to raise its standards to those enjoyed by workers of the free nations of the world, to the beneŽ t of the various members of the working class at large. In the case of manadatory Palestine, the more advantaged working class was itself part of a national movement, in direct confrontation with the national movem ent of the weaker group of workers. Under these circumstances, the support of the weaker, or cheaper, Arab workers and their national movem ent meant a negation, not only of the Jewish bourgeoisie, as would have been predicted by Bonacich’s model, but of the Jewish national movement as such. The support of the Arab national movement in the midst of an all-encom passing confrontation distinguished the PCP and its orientation towards the Arab workers from any of the other

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ventures discussed above. It was not a complementary course of action to the exclusion of Arab workers, stemming, as did the latter, from the desire of Jewish workers to protect their advantageous position. But rather, it was embedded in a deep ideological commitment to internationally oriented class solidarity. The PCP, established in 1922, grew out of earlier factions of Jewish workers in Palestine who split off from the Zionist labour movement (Dothan 1991, pp. 77–90). While many had immigrated to Palestine as Zionists, the ensuing confrontation with the Arab population transformed them into a vehem ent opposition to the Zionist enterprise. They opposed Jewish immigration as causing increased unemployment to the detriment of both Arab and Jewish workers. They opposed the acquisition of Arab owned land by Jews as causing the expulsion of its native cultivators, and most important for the present purpose, they opposed ‘Hebrew Labor’ and the ‘Conquest of Labor’ by Jewish workers as causing the displacem ent of masses of Arab workers. In a lea et distributed in 1926 on the occasion of the convention of Ahdut Ha-Avoda, the largest Jewish workers party, the PCP wrote: Zionism, not only does it not solve the question of the Jewish masses around the world, it does the contrary, it brings disaster on the Jewish settlement in this country . . . If unemployment has increased – Zionism is to blame. If the government does not support the unemployed – here too Zionism is holding it back. If the workers don’t have strong trade unions, strike funds, independen t associations – they have given them up for the sake of Zionism. The abyss between the Jewish and Arab worker is growing ever larger – this too is due only to Zionism.17 During the 1920s and early 1930s the PCP was composed predom inantly of Jewish members, who made continuous efforts to reach out to Arab workers, support their struggles whenever they took place, and bring at least a few into the party. During the 1930s, according to directives from Moscow, the party leadership was turned over to Arab activists, some of whom had been trained in the USSR, and the number of Arab members increased (Rubenstein 1985, pp. 217 –28; Dothan 1991, pp. 151 –87). Towards the end of the 1930s, under the impact of the Arab Rebellion and the violent clashes between Arabs and Jews, the party was divided into a Jewish section and an Arab section. After a number of years of splintering, re-uniting and further splits, the discussion of which is beyond the scope of this article (al-Budeiri 1979b; Dothan 1991), the PCP split in 1943 along national lines, with the Jewish section continuing under the name of the PCP, and the Arab section uniting with a group of left-wing Arab intellectuals to form an Arab communist-oriented national party – the National Liberation League (Porath 1968). For the purpose of the present discussion of equalizing strategies, the focus will

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be on the 1920s and 1930s, prior to the splintering and splitting which took place in the second half of that decade. The PCP, at times a legal party, at times illegal, totally opposed any exclusionary strategy on the part of Jewish organized labour. It considered such a strategy, by far the dominant orientation of Jewish labour, unjust to the Arab worker, with whom they deeply identiŽ ed on ideological grounds, and detrimental to the Jewish worker, who was being led astray by the Histadrut, in conjunction with the Zionist bourgeoisie . In the case of the PCP the brunt of its attacks was not the Jewish bourgeoisie but the Histadrut and its leadership. The Histadrut was seen as the lackey of the Zionist bourgeoisie and of British imperialism . Its dominant policies, such as the encouragem ent of Jewish immigration and the ensuring of Jewish employm ent in the Jewish sector under the slogans of ‘Hebrew Labor’ and the ‘Conquest of Labor’, were presented by the PCP as a ‘vicious onslaught’ on the Arab worker and, at the same time, as being also extrem ely detrimental to the Jewish worker. The Histadrut leadership was referred to in various lea ets as ‘hooligans’, ‘initiators of pogrom s’, ‘robbers of bread from the mouths of the workers’, ‘class traitors’ and ‘servants of imperialism ’. The Jewish workers were the PCP’s target audience, especially during periods of recurring unemployment. In their numerous lea ets they called on the workers to JOIN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE CONQUEST OF LABOR! The thousands of Jewish immigrants which Zionism has brought here for political and imperialist purposes, as a force to be used by the imperialist governm ent against the masses of Arab workers, against the national liberation movement and the social-anti-imperialist movement, these immigrants, who have been harnassed to the wagon of the Zionist bourgeoisie, have been used by the Histadrut for the war of extinction against the impoverished Arab workers.18 As for the two levels of wages, this was strongly rejected as damaging, once again, both to the cheaper Arab and the more expensive Jewish workers. In response to a strike of eighty Arab workers in a box factory in 1930, the PCP declared in its lea et, published in Hebrew and appealing to the Jewish worker COMRADE, WORKER! As long as there will be two levels of wages, for the Jewish and Arab worker, there is no hope for the success of your struggle for the improvem ent of your conditions of living. The enem ies of the working class make use of the situation of separation between the Jewish and Arab labourer and use all means

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to increase this separation in order to retain the rule of their class and to suck the blood of both labourers. 19 Together with their emphasis on the internationa list unity of the working class, they also expressed their support of the Palestinian Arab national movem ent in its struggle against Zionism. On numerous occasions they published vehem ent repudiation s of the Zionist movement and professed their support and loyalty to the Arab national movement in Palestine. 20 To conclude, the PCP totally rejected all forms of exclusion by organized Jewish labour. In addition to being morally wrong, they considered exclusion to be detrimental rather than beneŽ cial to the Jewish worker. It would keep the Jewish workers closely linked to the interests of the bourgeoisie and the Zionist movement, and divert them from struggling to improve their standard of living. Instead, it called for the formation of a united front of Jewish and Arab workers, against the exploiting bourgeoisie of both nations, and against the Palestine imperialist governm ent. The PCP remained very much on the margins of the Jewish settlement. Its vehem ent rejection of Zionism, by Jewish workers, caused its members to be considered traitors. They were accordingly rejected as emotionally as they themselves rejected the Zionist, Histadrut leadership. Nevertheless, they had enough grassroots support, especially during periods of unemploym ent, to cause much concern among the Histadrut leadership. The PCP was expelled from the Histadrut in 1924 21 though it remained active, under different guises, at places of work and in some of the trade unions. It functioned underground most of the time, since it was declared illegal by the governm ent, and its activists were often arrested, sentenced to severe imprisonment and/or deported (Dothan 1991, pp. 10; 166 –69; 198 –99; 512). It had great difŽ culty making inroads into the Arab working class with its low level of proletarianization, its religious orientation and its suspicion of any joint Arab-Jewish activity. This was to change only in the 1940s after the split between Jews and Arabs mentioned above. Nevertheless, despite these severe difŽ culties, the PCP continued to win a small but steady level of support among Jewish workers. The number of members and supporters at any one time was small, probably between a few hundred and a thousand, but with the rapid turnover of membership due to conditions of underground, arrest and deportation, all in all a much larger number of Jewish workers had at some time been afŽ liated with the PCP.22 It clearly did not achieve its goals of combating Zionism and forming a united Arab –Jewish class solidarity. It presented one of the few alternatives to the dominant course of action. Rather than equalization as complementing exclusion, the PCP called for complete equality, abandoning any form of separatism or advantage of the higher-priced Jewish labour. But this alternative course of action entailed such a vehement hatred and repudiation of the Jewish

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national movement that it inevitably relegated itself to the margins of the public it wanted to affect.

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In conclusion The purpose of this article is twofold. On the one hand, to draw attention to aspects of the labour market relations between Jews and Arabs in Palestine which are little known and little studied. On the other hand, to discuss aspects of the SLM theory, which are integral to it but which have nevertheless been overlooked. Highlighting these aspects, it is argued, sheds light on the dynam ics of the SLM in general. While the issue of the competition between Jewish and Arab labour in the labour market of Palestine is a well recognized phenom enon, it has been discussed almost exclusively in terms of the exclusionar y perspective, that is, the strategy of ‘the conquest of labour’ and the attempt of Jewish labour to monopolize the Jewish sector. This article focuses on other practices which served, in some cases, as alternative ways of dealing with the basic dilemma of the actual and potential undercutting of Jewish labour by cheaper Arab labour. These alternatives never became viable options. Equal minimum wage for Jews and Arabs was never accepted by any group of employers; the PLL was never in uential among either Jews or Arabs; the RPTWO, which in its early years established a new form of labour organization in Palestine, was not able to retain it at its initial level of autonom y and mixed membership; and the PCP was not able to attract Jewish workers away from Zionism or establish an effective and forceful front of Jewish and Arab workers. And yet, the marginality of an alternativ e should not marginalize it in the study of the society and the relations it embodied. While remaining marginal, these courses of action, each of them differing in their own way from the dominant Zionist labour orientation, did not disappear . They continued to serve as at least potential alternatives, to signal that the dominant labour orientation was not the only possible course of action, whether because of its limitations or because of the opposition it aroused. The discussion of these practices as strategies of equalization highlights the common denominator between phenom ena seen so far as completely unrelated, if and when discussed at all. It is then possible to see that they all stemmed from the SLM dynam ics in Palestine, and to a major extent, also failed because of their inability to overcome the contradictions and hostilities of mandatory Palestine in general and of its SLM in particular. The above discussion of strategies of equalization , in addition to developing a neglected aspect of the SLM theory, also highlights some of the limitations of the SLM model in general, and points to necessary elaborations . Two issues are of special importance. The Žrst concerns the

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signiŽ cance of the political context, and the second concerns the reponse of the cheaper and weaker group of workers. Let me begin with the Žrst point, the relevance of the political context for the relations within the split labour market. This has been exam ined, in this article, with reference to the case of the Arab-Jewish conict in Palestine. Time and again steps taken by Jewish workers, which aimed at achieving some level of equalization , failed due to the impact of the national conict. Nationalism , I am arguing, is relevant to the dynam ics of the split labour market, in that it actively intervenes in it. National aspirations and national interests in themselves help to determine the split and the ways in which the different parties react in the split labour market context. Nationalism is not merely a façade for conict between labour market interests, disappearin g, as Bonacich claims, when the latter element is removed. Nor, on the other hand, is nationalism a force that determines all else, so that labour market contradictions are merely playing out national conicts. In historical cases of conicting national groups within a split labour market, we can expect the competition between the two groups of workers to contribute to the sharpening of the national boundaries. In turn, the differing national interests might be expected to affect the strategies pursued within the split labour market. This is most clearly evident when exam ining strategies of equalization . These entail cooperation and the overcoming of hostilities and suspicions, which can be all the more difŽ cult in the context of a wider national conict. The second issue of signiŽ cance for the developm ent of the SLM theory is the response of the group of cheap labour to strategies initiated towards it. In each of the cases discussed it became evident that Arab labour was not merely a mass of cheap, unskilled workers, who passively accepted their status and possibly even enjoyed it, as it enhanced their chance of employm ent. The living exam ple of higher-priced labour both aroused resentment and triggered new demands and new forms of action. Arab labour did not cling to its low wages, nor did it passively ignore the whole issue. As soon as labour began to organize, labour spokesmen protested against low and unequal wages. In addition, strong suspicion was expressed towards the Histadrut, and Arab workers were warned against cooperatin g with it at all. These actions and reactions indicate that the group of cheap labour was in this case, and probably in many others, a far more active actor than the SLM model would assume. It can be learnt from this case-study that SLM relations are far more complex and dynam ic than a mere mechanical application might lead us to accept. Diverse strategies are used, even though at times they compete and contradict each other. Factors which do not stem from the labour market nevertheless have a deep impact on it, and its various actors do not recite a pre-written role but evolve under the impact and as part of the SLM itself and the wider context in which it is embedded.

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Acknowledgements The research on which this article is based was supported by a grant from the Israel Foundation Trustees. I would like to thank my colleague Uri Ram for reading an earlier draft of this article, for commenting and encouraging .

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Notes 1. A closely related study is that of Louis L. Grinberg (1995), who studied the joint strike of Arab and Jewish drivers in 1931. Nevertheless , it is outside the immediate concern of this article as it explicitly deals with the cooperation between self-employed workers rather than with wage labour. 2. Governmen t of Palestine, Wage Commission 1928. Report of Wage Commission, p. 3. ISA, C.O., 733/152. 3. Ibid. Item 9. 4. An additional focus of conict and differing interpretations was the issue of what could be considered a ‘fair share’. Jewish spokesmen argued that Jewish labour should be allocated approximately half of government works due to their large share of government income. It was also added that Jew ish workers composed approximately half of all wage earners in Palestine, as compared to a much smaller proportion if all workers, including fellahin, were taken into account. 5. Histadrut 1928. Memorandum to the Wage Commission submitted by the Executive Committee of the Histadrut, LA, IV208-1-128. 6. Ibid. 7. Wage Commission 1928. Item 19 –20. 8. Ibid. Item 21. 9. Ibid. Item 24. 10. Federation of Arab Trade Unions and Labour Societies. Statement of the Federation of Arab Trade Unions and Labour Societies to the Committee, 31 December 1942. LA, IV208-1-3721. 11. Histadrut. Organization al Activity Among Arab Workers Haifa, 1932 –1933, January, 1934, LA, IV104-143-27 (Hebrew); Histadrut. Activity among the Arabs of Haifa, 30 April, 1935, LA, IV250-27-1-43 5 (Hebrew). 12. PAWS. Report of The Palestine Arab Workers Society on Decisions of London World Trade Union Conference, August 1945, Haganna Archive (HA), 105/110 13. For example, Arab members of the PLL were kidnapped and beaten during the Arab Rebellion, see report of Aba Houshi, Secretary of the HLC, 17 August, 1938, HA, 8b/6; and report of one of the members, 24 October, 1938, HA, 8b/4. Disturbances in Jaffa by activists of the PAWS, see minutes of the Department of Arab Affairs, 18 May, 1944, LA, IV250-27-5-1 32 (All documents in Hebrew). 14. The organization changed its name a number of times, to the National Union of the Railway’s, Post and Telegraph Workers in Palestine in 1930, and to the International Union of Railway, Post and Telegraph Employees in Palestine, 1932. 15. RPTWO. ‘Platform of the Joint Committee of the Railway Workers’, in Towards the Conference of the Railw ay, Post and Telegraph Workers Union in Palestine, 29 February, 1928, LA, IV208-1-143a (Hebrew). 16. The strike of April 1946 turned into a ten-day strike of all employees, Jews and Arabs, of the government service (Taqqu 1977, pp. 269 –275), led jointly by the Histadrut and the PAWS. 17. Lea et of the PCP 1926. LA, IV425-17 (Hebrew). 18. Lea et of the PCP, May, 1934. LA, IV425-16 (Hebrew). 19. Lea et of the PCP, April, 1930. LA, IV426-16 (Hebrew).

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20. A statement issued for the Seventh Arab Convention, 1928. LA, IV425-17; A lea et issued shorty after the outbreak of the Arab Rebellion, 1936, LA, IV250-27-1-4 39 (Documents in Hebrew). 21. Minutes of the Ninth Histadrut Council, April 1924, Item 4, LA, Library (Hebrew). 22. Approximately 5,000 according to Dothan’s estimate (1991, p. 10)

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DEBORAH S. BERNSTEIN is Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Haifa. ADDRESS: Department of Sociology, University of Haifa, Haifa 31905, Israel.