ENDOGENOUS FLUCTUATIONS IN THE BARRO-BECKER THEORY OF FERTILITY Jess Benhabib*, New York University and Kazuo Nishimura*, Kyoto Institute of Economic Research New York/USA and KyotO/JAPAN ABSTRACT: One of the recent interesting hypotheses of population growth is due to EASTERLIN (1973) (see also BECKER (1981) chapter 7) who suggests the possibility of self-generating fluctuations in population growth. A large population will face stiffer economic competition, lower incomes, congestions and crowding if other means of production as well as the social infrastructure do not expand simultaneously. The result may be a decline in fertility as parents try to maintain an adequate standard of living for themselves. But why should capital and other means of production or the social infrastructure not expand with population size at a uniform rate? Are fluctuations a necessary or even possible outcome of this analysis? Using the BARRO-BECKER framework (1985) and relaxing some of their assumptions, we will answer this question. Our results show that under a broad class of preferences, fertility and per capita incomes not only move together but endogenously oscillate. I.

The Model and Theorems

BARRO and BECKER consider a model where parents derive utility from their own consumption as well as from the utility of their children. Starting with a given stock of capital k o ' they maximize their utility, assuming that their children will do the same: t

(1)

Max [U(c o ) + E IT a(n )n U(C t ») co,nO,k l t=l w=l w w S.T.

where c t is the consumption of generation t, n t is one plus the endogenous population growth rate, B is the cost of raising children and is constant over time, k t is the per capita stock, F(k) is the production function, U(C O) is the utility derived from consumption and g is the depreciation rate. a(n) can be taken as a parameter of altruism towards children l )2). BARRO and BECKER assume a(n) . n to be concave. In dynamic 1) We will assume that a(n) . n is small enough, possibly bounded by 1 so that the sum converges. 2) In a competitive market and under constant returns, wages plus profit income will be a function of the given capital stock per worker and will equal f(k). To save space we simply specify income to be equal to output.

*

We thank Sadao Kanaya for calling our attention to Barro and Becker's work on the fertility choice problem. We are grateful to Gary Becker for valuable comments and corrections. Studies in Contemporary Economics A. Wenig, K. F. Zimmermann (Eds.) Demographic Change and Economic Development

30

programming form we can write the problem as (2 )

Max [U(c O ) + a(nO)V(k l )] co,no,k S.T.

where (dna) . no = a(n O ) and f(k) = F(K) + (l-g)k. Here a(n O) is increasing and concave, which reflects that the utility of the parents is increasing at a diminishing rate with the number of children, for a given level of well-being V(k l ) per child. We assume that there is a maximum sustainable level of capital stock k such that f(k) < k for all k

>

k.

Substituting the budget constraint into the problem, we obtain 3 )

(3)

The above problem, after choosing nO optimally as a function of (kO,k l ) can also be written as (4 )

3W/3k O. Let k * be a

- * ,k l ). Let E be the steady state satisfying V(k * ) = -W(k * ,k * ) = maxW(k kl set of steady states. We will use the following lemma to prove our main result.

(i} If WI (k O' k l ) is strictly increasing in k l , then an optimal path {k t } from any kO > 0, kO ~ E, is strictly monotone, i. e. Lemma I: A

"

.....

'"

(kt_I-kt)(kt-kt+l)

>

o.

(ii) If WI(kO,k l ) is independent of k l , then the capital stock jumps to its steady state value in one period, i.e. k2 = k'* .

(iii) If WI(kO,k l ) is strictly decreasing in k l , then an optimal path from any kO ( k t - kt+ I) 3)

<

>

0, kO

~

E, fluctuates, i. e.,

(kt_I-kt )

o.

BARRO and BECKER limit a(n O ) to be of the constant relative risk aversion class. We will allow a broader class of functions a(n).

31

Note that at a steady state in Lemma 1 above we may have k * > 0

or k * = O. Note also that we do not need to use the differentiability of the value function V(k) to prove this lemma. This lemma may be rigorously proved in the manner given in BENHABIB, MAJUMDAR and NISHIMURA (1985). A short proof using the differentiability of V(k l ) is given in the Appendix of the present paper. In the rest of the paper, we shall give the interpretation of the conditions imposed on Wl(kO,k l ). To do so, we assume the differentiability of V(k l ). We can now apply the above Lemma 1 to our problem given by (1). Let e be the elasticity of (a/a') with respect to n; that is, (5 )

e = (na'/a) . d(a/a' )/dn, where a'

da(n)/dn

Theorem 1: If e < 1 (>1), the capital stock oscillates (is monotonic). If e = 1 (the BARRO-BECKER case), the capital stock jumps to its steady state value in the first period. Proof: The theorem follows from Lemma 1 if we can establish that the sign of W12 is the same as that of e-l. We set (6 )

Maximizing W(kO,kl,n O) with respect to nand kl yields

(7)

o

W n

and

o.

(8 )

Using (7), we can obtain the optimal value of nO as n(kO,k l ) with the derivatives

(9 )

(10 )

dn dk O

>

-U' (cO)-a' (nO)V' (k l ) -

0

(kl+B)nOU"(c O)

a"(nO)V(k l ) + (k l +B)2 UII (c O)

32

Using (6) and (7), we can evaluate

W12

as follows:

(11)

substituting into (11) and cancelling, we obtain f' (k O )U" (co)

-----~--=-=-2---

a"(nO)V(k1)+(kl+B) U"(c O)

[(kl+B) (a' (nO)V' (k l )

Solving for V(k l ) and V'(k l ) from (7) and (8) and substituting, we obtain

[

(12 )

f' (k )U"(c ) nOa' (n)U' (c) 0 0 2 ] [(k l +B) (-=-.--:(-.,-)- a nO a"(nO)V(kl)+(kl+B) V"(c O)

[

f'(k )U"(c )(k +B)U' nOa'(n O) n a"(n) 0 0 1 ][ _ 1 _ 0 0] 2 a(n ) a' a"(nO)V(kl)+(kl+B) V"(c O) 0

The first square bracket on the right is positive by concavity. The second can be further simplified so that it equals

(13)

n a'

(a' (n

»2

-a(n )a"(n )

[(_0_) _ _-=O_ _ _-;:O~-_O=-- a (a' (n

o »2

1]

n a' (_O_)d(a/a' ) -1 a dn

e-l

33 Therefore the sign of W12 is the same as that of e-l, as was to be proved. Q.E.D. Theorem 1 gives conditions under which the capital stock is oscillatory or monotonic. We now turn to the analysis of how the fertility rate n changes with the capital stock. Theorem 2 below gives a result for the oscillatory case:

Theorem 2: If e

n a'

= (__0__ a

)d(a/a') dnO

<

1, the fertility rate n oscillates

in phase with the per capita stock k. Proof: We have dnO(dk O = ano/ako + (anO/akl)dkl/dk O. From the proof of Lemma 1, we know that e < 1 implies dkl/dk O < O. Also from (9) in the proof of Theorem 1 we have anO/akO > O. From (8) and (10) in the proof of Theorem 1 we can compute how the optimal value of nO changes with

kl :

(14)

noa' U'(cO)(l--a-) -

(kl+B)nOU"(c O )

a"(nO)V(k l ) + (k l +B)2 U"(C O ) However, we also have

(15 )

n a' nOr (a,)2 - aa"J 1 - __ 0 __ > 1 a aa' 1 - e

>

O.

Thus, under our concavity assumptions anO/3kl < 0 and dnO/dk O > o. Since under e < 1 the capital stock oscillates, so does n. Q.E.D. Theorem 2 therefore lends support to the hypothesis that under some reasonable conditions on preferences, the fertility rate nO will tend to be high (low) when the per capita stock kO and per capita income f(k O ) are high (low). Remark 1: It should be noted that in the oscillatory case the optimal trajectory can converge to the steady state or to a period-two cycle. These possibilities may be studied by the formal methods presented

34

in BENHABIB and NISHIMURA (1985). If e-l changes sign, the dynamic behavior of trajectories can become more complicated and even chaotic.

II.

Examples

In this section we give several examples which illustrate the monotonic and oscillatory cases discussed above. We also show that the special case considered by BARRO and BECKER, who use a constant relative risk aversion function for a(n), corresponds to a parameter configuration on the borderline of the monotonic and oscillatory behavior in the class of Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA) functions. The general example which contains the monotonic, oscillatory as well as the BARRO-BECKER case is illustrated by a HARA function

=

for (a(n) given by o(n+Z)A. In this case, e Z

>

0 (e

<

n/(n+Z). Therefore if

1), the capital stock oscillates (Theorem 1) and nand k

move in phase with each other (Theorem 2). Since k is bounded by k and f(k) ~ c + n(k+B), we have n ~ f(k)/(B+k) = ~. Since a = o(n+z)A, we can choose 0 (for any given A and Z) such that a ~ o(~+Z)A

<

1. There-

fore the utility sums in (1) will converge. Note that the case Z = 0 corresponds exactly to the BARRO-BECKER case with e

1. The monotonic case with e

Z

~

~

0, with Z

>

1 will correspond to

-n along the optimal path.

Figure 1 below illustrates the relation between the initial stock A

" . . .

A

ko and the optimal choice k l , where kl = h(k O) and h(k) is the policy

function for the monoton~c case. Intersections of h(k O) with the 45 0 line are steady states. Note that we may have multiple steady states,

with stable ones alternating with unstable ones. Figure 2 illustrates the BARRO-BECKER case and Figure 3 the oscillating case which converges to the steady state. If the steady state becomes unstable, the trajectories may converge to a periodic cycle and can also become chaotic .• Remark 2: Differentiating (2) along an optimal path, we have V'(ct)f'(k t ). Using (7), we obtain

At a steady state, this becomes

35

a(n * )

n

*

f' (k * )

Thus if the steady state is efficient in the usual sense, that is, if f'(k * ) > n * , then there is positive discounting of the future. On the other hand, at the steady state V = U/(l-a), so that U/U' = (k+B)(l-a)/a'. If U/U' is increasing in c and (l-a) > 0, then an increase in costs of child rearing will increase consumption provided we ignore the effect of B on the steady state values of n * ,k * and F'(k * ). This is discussed by BARRO and BECKER (1985). Also, changing the steady state interest rate via a perturbation of the production function will affect U/U' as well as the steady state consumption levels only via its impact on steady state values k * and n * . The steady state value of n can be either bigger or smaller than one and will, among other things, depend on B, the cost of raising children. The following numerical example demonstrates this point. Let U = 20'5, f(k) = k' 333 + 0.75 k and a = 0.5(n+1)·667. For B = 0.3385, steady state values are n * = 0.9995, k * = 0.5291, a = 0.7936. For B = 0.3383, we have n * = 1.0003, k * = 0.5280, a = 0.7938. The effects of increasing 0 on steady state values are ambiguous, since a higher marginal valuation of the future may lead to a higher steady state k (see equation (9» and since n = a'f'(k), n may either increase or decrease.

36

APPENDIX (i)

If W12

0, then an optimal path is strictly monotone.

Consider optimal paths (kt ),

Proof: where

>

kb

>

(k

t)

~

from k O'

kb

respectively,

k O' Then

Hence

(19 )

kb ~

Since W12 > 0 and optimal paths,

~

>

~

k O' ki

~

kl must hold. We note that along the

o.

(20 )

W12

0 implies

>

o

(21 )

for

kb ~

~

~

Wl(kO,kl ) > Wl(kb,kl ) ~

>

k O' Hence (kb,kl , ... ) cannot be an optimal path: ki must differ

~

from k l . We have shown that kO (:) kl implies

kt

kb ~

(:) kt+l'

>

kO implies ki Q.E.D.

>

k l . This also means that

37 0, every optimal path from any kO

>

0 jumps to

a_steady

state in one step. Proof:

Let k * be a steady state. It satisfies

o.

(22 ) Since W12

=

0, W2 is independent of the value of k O.

Henc~

*

(kO,k ) for A

any kO > 0 satisfies

(23)

* *

Therefore (kO,k ,k , ... ) is an optimal path from any kO h

(iii) Over the domain where Proof: A

A

W12 (k O,k l

)

<

>

o.

Q.E.D.

0 holds, optimal paths oscillate.

The inequality (19) and W12 are used to get

kb ...

A

>

kO

....

->-

'"

ki ;;; k l •

h

ki = kl is excluded by the same argument as in the proof of (i). Q.E.D.

38

References BARRO, R., and BECKER, G., "Fertility choice in a Model of Economic Growth", Working paper from University of Rochester, October, 1984. BECKER, G., A Treatise on the Family Harvard University Press, 1981. BENHABIB, J., and NISHIMURA, K., "Competitive Equilibrium Cycles", Journal of Economic Theory 35 (1985), 284-307. BENHABIB, J., MAJUMDAR, M., and NISHIMURA, K., "Global Equilibrium Dynamics with Stationary Recursive Preferences", presented at the Workshop on the Advances in the Analysis of Economic Dynamic Systems, Venice, January 1986. EASTERLIN, R., "Relative Economic Status and the American Fertility Swing", in E. B. SHELDON, ed., Family Economic Behavior: Problems and Prospects Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1973. KEMP, M., and KONDO, H. "Overlapping Generations, Competitive Efficiency and Optimal Population", Working paper from University of New South Wales, 1985.

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