NELS 47, UMass Amherst
October 14-16, 2016
Epistemic Narrowing from Maximize Presupposition Vincent Rouillard and Bernhard Schwarz McGill University
1 Introduction • Exploring a structural definition of alternatives (Katzir 2007) for Maximize Presupposition (Heim 1991), we observe that an antipresuppositions can arise in deletion cases, i.e. from competition with a less complex alternative. • We also observe that in such cases, the antipresupposition undergoes (what we call) epistemic narrowing: it is strengthened into an inference about the speaker’s beliefs. • Refining Chemla’s (2008) analysis of epistemic narrowing, we present an argument that in the interpretation of deletion cases, the hearer reasons about the speaker’s inclination toward communicative efficiency.
2 Maximize Presupposition and antipresuppositions Building on Heim (1991), Percus (2006) and Sauerland (2008) formulate a Maximize Presupposition principle like (1). (1)
Maximize Presupposition (MP) A speaker s addressing hearer h will not use S if there is an S’ such that: i. formal condition: alt(S’,S) S’ is an alternative to S
ii.
semantic condition: S’ S S’ is presuppositionally stronger than, but otherwise equivalent (i.e. Strawson equivalent) to S
iii. pragmatic condition: cbs,h (p(S’)) the presupposition of S’ is common belief of s and h: bels (p(S’)) & belh (p(S’)) & bels (belh (p(S’))) & belh (bels (p(S’))) & . . .
Given (1), s’s use of S instead of an S’ that meets the formal and semantic condition is predicted to lead h to infer that the pragmatic condition does not hold. (2)
Antipresupposition (AP) ¬cbs,h (p(S’))
(3)
a.
A German student in my seminar will bring cannoli.
b.
The German student in my seminar will bring cannoli.
antipresupposes that s’s seminar has exactly one German student presupposes that s’s seminar has exactly one German student
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b a
NELS 47, UMass Amherst
October 14-16, 2016
Assuming alt(b,a), s’s use of (a) is correctly predicted to support h’s inference that it is not common belief that s’s seminar has exactly one German student.
3 Antipresupposition and structurally defined alternatives (4)
Structural definition of alternatives (SDA, Katzir 2007) alt(S’,S) iff S’ can be derived from S through a finite series of (a) substitutions from the same lexical category and (b) deletions
Katzir applies this complexity based SDA to quantity implicature, where it replaces Horn scales (Horn 1972). Here we explore its application to antipresupposition.
3.1
Structurally defined alternatives for antipresuppositions
As expected under SDA, the alternative relation for MP can be shown to be constrained by complexity.1 (5)
a.
The guests left.
b.
The two guests left.
does not antipresuppose that there were exactly two guests
b a, ¬alt(b,a)
presupposes that there were exactly two guests
We can show that SDA also applies correctly to MP in that deletion derives alternatives that support antipresuppositions.2 Case 1: deletion of a modifier disjunct in the scope of trigger the. (6)
a.
The two or three points John scored impressed Sue.
b.
(i)
antipresupposes that John scored exactly two/three points
The two points John scored impressed Sue.
b(i) a, alt(b(i),a)
presupposes that John scored exactly two points
(ii)
The three points John scored impressed Sue.
b(ii) a, alt(b(ii),a)
presupposes that John scored exactly three points
Case 2: deletion of a relative clause that serves to filter (Karttunen 1973) a presupposition triggered in the main clause. (Thanks to Raj Singh for suggesting this type of case.) (7)
a.
Every student who lied to the teacher regretted lying to the teacher. antipresupposes that every student lied to the teacher
b.
Every student regretted lying to the teacher.
b a, alt(b,a)
presupposes that every student lied to the teacher 1 Bale
and Khanjian (2014) employ the SDA to MP in analyzing Armenian number morphology, arguing that complexity also constrains the alternative relation there. 2 The findings in (6) and (7) are inconsistent with a proposal by Percus (2006), who suggests that the competition in MP is not between alternative assertions, but between alternative lexical items on the same Horn scale.
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NELS 47, UMass Amherst
3.2
October 14-16, 2016
Epistemic narrowing
Surprisingly, however, the attested inferences attested for (6a) and (7a) do not merely impose limits on common belief, but more specifically about the speaker’s belief. (8)
The two or three points John scored impressed Sue. predicted: ¬cbs,h (that John scored exactly two/three points) attested: ¬bels (that John scored exactly two/three points)
(9)
every student who lied to the teacher regretted it. predicted: ¬cbs,h (that every student lied to the teacher) attested: ¬bels (that every student lied to the teacher)
(10)
Epistemic narrowing (EN) predicted attested ⇒ ¬cbs,h (p(S’)) ¬bels (p(S’))
Such cases contrast with our baseline example (3a), where no epistemic narrowing is attested. (11)
A German student in my seminar will bring cannoli. not attested: ¬bels (that s’s seminar has exactly one German student)
4 Epistemic narrowing and ease of accommodation 4.1
Narrowing and presupposition accommodation (Chemla 2008)
The term epistemic narrowing is ours, but the phenomenon was first described and analyzed by Chemla (2008) . Chemla illustrates it with a believe/know substitution example: (12)
a.
John believes that I have a sister.
EN
attested: ¬bels (that s has a sister)
b.
b a, alt(b,a)
John knows that I have a sister. presupposes that s has a sister
Epistemic narrowing can also arise in a/the substitution cases (thanks to Michael Wagner (p.c.)): (13)
a.
A bathroom in my apartment is flooded.
EN
attested: ¬bels (that s’s apartment has exactly one bathroom)
b.
The bathroom in my apartment is flooded.
b a, alt(b,a)
presupposes that s’s apartment has exactly one bathroom
Central to Chemla’s account of epistemic narrowing is a weakening of the pragmatic condition in MP. (14)
Maximize Presupposition (MP, cf. Chemla 2008:156) A speaker s addressing hearer h will not use S if there is an S’ such that: i. formal condition: as in (1) ii. semantic condition: as in (1) iii. pragmatic condition: bels (p(S’)) & bels (auths,h,S (S’)) 3
NELS 47, UMass Amherst
(15)
October 14-16, 2016
Authority condition (AC, cf. Chemla 2008:152) auths,h,S (S’) iff s’s uttering S’ would cause h to accommodate and believe p(S’)
This weakening of the pragmatic condition leads to a strengthening of the content of antipresuppositions: (16)
Antipresupposition (AP) ¬bels (p(S’)) ∨ ¬bels (auths,h,S (S’))
Barring disagreement, the (b) sentence in (12)/(13) will lead h to accommodate that s has a sister/that s’s apartment has exactly one bathroom. That is, the authority assumption in (17) holds. (17)
Authority assumption (AA) h assumes bels (auths,h,S (S’))
Assuming the authority assumption, epistemic narrowing is then derived from the conjunction of the antipresupposition with the authority assumption. (18)
Epistemic narrowing derived ¬bels (p(S’)) ∨ ¬bels (auths,h (S’)) bels (auths,h,S (S’))
antipresupposition (AP) authority assumption (AA)
¬bels (p(S’))
4.2
Unexpected absence of narrowing
But, as noted, in contrast to (13a) epistemic narrowing is absent in (19a); likewise, in contrast to (12a), epistemic narrowing is not required for (21a). (19)
a.
A German student in my seminar will bring cannoli.
EN
not attested: ¬bels (that s’s seminar has exactly one German student)
b.
The German student in my seminar will bring cannoli.
b a, alt(b,a)
presupposes that s’s seminar has exactly one German student
(20)
A: A German student in my seminar will bring cannoli. B: Not good! Is she the only German in the class? There should be at least one German dessert.
(21)
a.
John believes that Mary has a sister.
EN
not attested: ¬bels (that Mary has a sister)
b.
b a, alt(b,a)
John knows that Mary has a sister. presupposes that Mary has a sister
(22)
A: John believes that Mary has a sister. B: What do you think? Does she have a sister?
This non-narrowing is unexpected under Chemla’s account, as the AA seems to hold: barring disagreement, (b) in (19) and (21) will lead h to accommodate the respective presuppsition.
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4.3
October 14-16, 2016
Ease of accommodation
To capture the observed conditions on narrowing, we propose that strengthened authority condition, so that the authority assumption is more stringent and less likely to be made by h. (23)
Authority condition (AC, revised) auths,h,S (S’) iff h’s accommodation of p(S’) based on s’s utterance of S’ is easy
(24)
Ease of acommodation Ease of accommodation of p(S’) by h is correlated with degree of the reliability of s as a source of p(S’).
(25)
a.
John knows that I have a sister.
AA, EN
s more reliable: s has a sister
b.
John knows that Mary has a sister.
AA, EN
s less reliable: Mary has a sister
(26)
Ease of acommodation Ease of accommodation by h is inversely correlated with degree of surprisal associated with p(S’) (in the information theoretic sense).
(27)
a.
The bathroom in my apartment is flooded.
AA, EN
less suprisal: s’s apartment has exactly one bathroom
b.
The German student in my seminar will bring cannoli.
AA, EN
more suprisal: s’s seminar has exactly one German student
5 Epistemic narrowing and communicative efficiency Is the strengthened authority condition in (23) weak enough to predict epistemic narrowing in the deletion cases? (28)
a.
The two or three points John scored impressed Sue.
EN
attested: ¬bels (that John scored exactly two/three points)
b.
The two/three points John scored impressed Sue. presupposes that John scored exactly two/three points
(29)
a.
Every student who lied to the teacher regretted lying to the teacher.
EN
attested: ¬bels (that every student lied to the teacher)
b.
Every student regretted lying to the teacher. presupposes that every student lied to the teacher
We believe not, as the presuppositions in questions do not seem easy to accommodate. The absence of epistemic narrowing in corresponding believe/know substitution cases supports this assessment. (30)
a.
Mary believes that John scored (exactly) two/three points. not attested: ¬bels (that John scored exactly two/three points)
b.
Mary knows that John scored (exactly) two/three points. presupposes that John scored exactly two/three points
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EN
NELS 47, UMass Amherst
(31)
a.
October 14-16, 2016
Mary believes that every student lied to the teacher.
EN
not attested: ¬bels (that every student lied to the teacher)
b.
Mary knows that every student lied to the teacher. presupposes that every student lied to the teacher
We are led to propose that in addition to hearer-centered ease of accommodation, the authority condition refers to speaker-centred communicative efficiency.3 (32)
Authority condition (AC, final) auths,h,S (S’) iff accommodation of p(S’) based on s’s utterance of S’ is easy for h, or s’s using S’ and forcing h to accommodate instead of using S is efficient for s.
In this account, epistemic narrowing obtains in deletion cases because h expects s to prefer the less complex alternative for the sake of s’s own communicative efficiency, regardless of ease of accommodation for h.
6 Summary • To capture the unexpected cases of non-narrowing, we first strengthened Chemla’s (2008) authority condition in the pragmatic condition for MP, with reference to ease of accommodation. • The strengthened authority condition turned out to be too strong to predict epistemic narrowing in deletion cases, so we weakened it, with reference to communicative efficiency.
References Bale, Alan, and Hrayr Khanjian. 2014. Syntactic complexity and competition: the singular-plural distinction in western armenian. Linguistic Inquiry 45:1–26. Chemla, Emmanuel. 2008. An epistemic step for anti-presuppositions. Journal of Semantics 25:141–173. Heim, Irene. 1991. Artikel und Definitheit. In Semantik: ein internationales Handbuch der Zeitgen¨ossischen Forschung, ed. Arnim von Stechow and Dieter Wunderlich, 487–535. Berlin: de Gruyter. Horn, Laurence. 1972. On the semantic properties of logical operators in english. Doctoral Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles. Horn, Laurence. 1984. Toward a new taxonomy for pragmatic inference: Q-based and R-based implicature. In Meaning, form and use in context, ed. Deborah Schiffrin, 11–42. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Karttunen, Lauri. 1973. Presuppositions of compound sentences. Linguistic Inquiry 169–193. Katzir, Roni. 2007. Structurally-defined alternatives. Linguistics and Philosophy 30:669–690. Percus, Orin. 2006. Antipresuppositions. In Theoretical and Empirical Studies of Reference and Anaphora: Toward the Establishment of Generative Grammar as an Empirical Science, ed. Ayumi Uyema, Report of the Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B), Project No. 15320052, 52–73. Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. Sauerland, Uli. 2008. Implicated presuppositions. In The discourse potential of underspecified structures, ed. Anita Steube. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
3 This
notion seems aligned with Horn’s (1984) R Principle “Say no more than you must!”
6
