Introduction The Model Estimation Method Estimation Results Dynamic Simulations Summary

Equilibrium wage dispersion with worker and employer heterogeneity Fabien Postel-Vinay and Jean-Marc Robin (Econometrica, 2002)

Esther Arenas-Arroyo

F.POSTEL-VINAY and J.-M.ROBIN

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion

Introduction The Model Estimation Method Estimation Results Dynamic Simulations Summary

Outline 1

Introduction

2

The Model Setup Wage Contracts Wage Dynamics and Job Mobility Steady-State Equilibrum Implications for the Decomposition of Log-wage Variance

3

Estimation Method

4

Estimation Results

5

Dynamic Simulations

F.POSTEL-VINAY and J.-M.ROBIN

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion

Introduction The Model Estimation Method Estimation Results Dynamic Simulations Summary

Introduction

Why do wages dier across identical workers? Why do rm characteristics matter? What is the source of the wage dispersion that rm and worker characteristics cannot explain?

F.POSTEL-VINAY and J.-M.ROBIN

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion

Introduction The Model Estimation Method Estimation Results Dynamic Simulations Summary

Introduction

An equilibrium model of the labor market with worker-and rm-heterogenous match productivities and on-the-job search The main prediction of the model is about the cross-sectional distribution of earnings.(worker and rm components) Descomposition of the variance of earnings into three separate components The principal novelty is the estimation of a structural equilibrium search model to quantify the contribution of market frictions to the wage variance.

F.POSTEL-VINAY and J.-M.ROBIN

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion

Introduction The Model Estimation Method Estimation Results Dynamic Simulations Summary

Introduction

Flexible matching technology: rm size data to come up with a measure of the rms' recruting eort The Econometric model is only parametric when the theory requires specic parameters and is nonparametric as far as the distributions of rm and worker heterogeneities, exogenous to the model, are concerned.

F.POSTEL-VINAY and J.-M.ROBIN

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion

Introduction The Model Estimation Method Estimation Results Dynamic Simulations Summary

Previous Work

Postel-Vinay and Robin (1999) and Dey and Flinn (2000) Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and Burdett and Judd (1983) Roy (1951) and Moscarini (2000) Eckstein and Wolpin (1990), Van den Berg and Ridder (1998) and Bontemps, Robin, and Van den Berg (1999,2000)

F.POSTEL-VINAY and J.-M.ROBIN

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion

Introduction The Model Estimation Method Estimation Results Dynamic Simulations Summary

Setup Wage Contracts Wage Dynamics and Job Mobility Steady-State Equilibrum Implications for the Decomposition of Log-wage Variance

Outline 1

Introduction

2

The Model Setup Wage Contracts Wage Dynamics and Job Mobility Steady-State Equilibrum Implications for the Decomposition of Log-wage Variance

3

Estimation Method

4

Estimation Results

5

Dynamic Simulations

F.POSTEL-VINAY and J.-M.ROBIN

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion

Introduction The Model Estimation Method Estimation Results Dynamic Simulations Summary

Setup Wage Contracts Wage Dynamics and Job Mobility Steady-State Equilibrum Implications for the Decomposition of Log-wage Variance

Setup

Workers

Workers:

Face a constant birth/death rate; µ. Homogeneous with respect to the set of observable characteristics dening their occupation. Heterogenous (not observable) E

: Eciency units of labor she/he supplies per unit of time.

Newborn workers begin their working life as unemployed and to draw their values of E randomly from a distribution with cdf H over the interval [ε ε ] min,

F.POSTEL-VINAY and J.-M.ROBIN

max

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion

Introduction The Model Estimation Method Estimation Results Dynamic Simulations Summary

Setup Wage Contracts Wage Dynamics and Job Mobility Steady-State Equilibrum Implications for the Decomposition of Log-wage Variance

Setup

Workers

M: measure of atomistic workers which face a continuum of competitive rms

u

(unemployment rate): Layos (d) and constant ow of

newborn workers (µM).

E-unemployed

worker has an income ow of

F.POSTEL-VINAY and J.-M.ROBIN

E*b.

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion

Introduction The Model Estimation Method Estimation Results Dynamic Simulations Summary

Setup Wage Contracts Wage Dynamics and Job Mobility Steady-State Equilibrum Implications for the Decomposition of Log-wage Variance

Setup

Workers

Discount the future at an exogenous and constant rate

r>0

Maximize the expected discounted sum of future utility ows.

l0

Poisson rate which unemployed workers sample job oeres

l1 Arrival

rate of oers to on-the-job search.

F.POSTEL-VINAY and J.-M.ROBIN

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion

Introduction The Model Estimation Method Estimation Results Dynamic Simulations Summary

Setup Wage Contracts Wage Dynamics and Job Mobility Steady-State Equilibrum Implications for the Decomposition of Log-wage Variance

Setup

Firms

Firms:

Live forever Heterogeneous :they dier by an exogenous technological parameter p, with cdf Γ across rms over the support [p ,p ] min.

max

The type is randomly selected according to a sampling distribution with cdf F (and ≡ 1 − ) and density p

F

F

Firms seek to minimize wage costs Mass normalized to 1 Produce a unique multi-purpose good F.POSTEL-VINAY and J.-M.ROBIN

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion

f

Introduction The Model Estimation Method Estimation Results Dynamic Simulations Summary

Setup Wage Contracts Wage Dynamics and Job Mobility Steady-State Equilibrum Implications for the Decomposition of Log-wage Variance

Setup

p

The marginal productivity of the match (E, ) is

E*p.

Complete information: - All heterogenous agent types are perfectly observable. - All wages and job oers are observable and vericable.

F.POSTEL-VINAY and J.-M.ROBIN

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion

Introduction The Model Estimation Method Estimation Results Dynamic Simulations Summary

Setup Wage Contracts Wage Dynamics and Job Mobility Steady-State Equilibrum Implications for the Decomposition of Log-wage Variance

Setup

Matching Matching tecnology: Between the two extreme (random matching and balanced matching)

Assumption: no a priori connection between the probability density of sampling a rm of given type of such rms in the population of rms,

p,f(p),

and the density

g(p).

The workers take the oers posted by the highest

p

rms.

f(p)/g(p): average ows of ads posted by rms of productivity

p

per unit of time (Hiring Eort)

F.POSTEL-VINAY and J.-M.ROBIN

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion

Introduction The Model Estimation Method Estimation Results Dynamic Simulations Summary

Setup Wage Contracts Wage Dynamics and Job Mobility Steady-State Equilibrum Implications for the Decomposition of Log-wage Variance

Setup

Wage Setting Assumptions on wage strategies

Firms can vary their wage oers according to the characteristics of the worker. Firms can counter oers that employes received from competing rms. Firms makes take it-or-leave-it wage oers to workers. (workers have no bargaining power) Long-term contracts that can be renegotiated by mutual agreement only

F.POSTEL-VINAY and J.-M.ROBIN

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion

Introduction The Model Estimation Method Estimation Results Dynamic Simulations Summary

Setup Wage Contracts Wage Dynamics and Job Mobility Steady-State Equilibrum Implications for the Decomposition of Log-wage Variance

Outline 1

Introduction

2

The Model Setup Wage Contracts Wage Dynamics and Job Mobility Steady-State Equilibrum Implications for the Decomposition of Log-wage Variance

3

Estimation Method

4

Estimation Results

5

Dynamic Simulations

F.POSTEL-VINAY and J.-M.ROBIN

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion

Introduction The Model Estimation Method Estimation Results Dynamic Simulations Summary

Setup Wage Contracts Wage Dynamics and Job Mobility Steady-State Equilibrum Implications for the Decomposition of Log-wage Variance

Wage Contracts

V0 (ε) V(ε,

:

w , p) :

Lifetime utility of an unemployed worked of type Lifetime utility of an employed at a rm of a wage

w

p

ε

and paid

Unemployed worker:

Firm is able to employ a type-E unemployed if : ε p ≥ ε b V (ε, φ (ε, p ), p ) = V (ε) 0

0

Where φ (ε, p )is the wage that the type-p rm optimally oers to the type-ε unemployed worker 0

F.POSTEL-VINAY and J.-M.ROBIN

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion

Introduction The Model Estimation Method Estimation Results Dynamic Simulations Summary

Setup Wage Contracts Wage Dynamics and Job Mobility Steady-State Equilibrum Implications for the Decomposition of Log-wage Variance

Wage Contracts

Employed worker:

Bertrand Competition

:

p'>p

p'
V

(ε, ε p , p ) = V (ε, φ (ε, p , p 0 ), p 0 ) φ (ε, p , p 0 ) ≥ ε p 0

Equilibrium wage: U (φ (ε, p , p 0 )) = U (ε p ) −

F.POSTEL-VINAY and J.-M.ROBIN

p λ1 F (x )U 0 (ε x )dx ρ +δ +µ p

Z

0

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion

Introduction The Model Estimation Method Estimation Results Dynamic Simulations Summary

Setup Wage Contracts Wage Dynamics and Job Mobility Steady-State Equilibrum Implications for the Decomposition of Log-wage Variance

Wage Contracts If the utility function is Constant Relative Risk Averse (CRRA) then,

ln(ε, p , p 0 ) = lnε + lnφ (1, p , p 0 ) = If

a≥0, a6=1:

λ (1 − α) ln[p 1−α − 1 = lnε + 1−α ρ +δ +µ 1

Zp

0

F (x )x −α dx ]

p

If

a=1:

= lnε + lnp − F.POSTEL-VINAY and J.-M.ROBIN

λ1 ρ +δ +µ

Z

p

p

0

F (x )

dx x

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion

Introduction The Model Estimation Method Estimation Results Dynamic Simulations Summary

Setup Wage Contracts Wage Dynamics and Job Mobility Steady-State Equilibrum Implications for the Decomposition of Log-wage Variance

Outline 1

Introduction

2

The Model Setup Wage Contracts Wage Dynamics and Job Mobility Steady-State Equilibrum Implications for the Decomposition of Log-wage Variance

3

Estimation Method

4

Estimation Results

5

Dynamic Simulations

F.POSTEL-VINAY and J.-M.ROBIN

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion

Introduction The Model Estimation Method Estimation Results Dynamic Simulations Summary

Setup Wage Contracts Wage Dynamics and Job Mobility Steady-State Equilibrum Implications for the Decomposition of Log-wage Variance

Wage Dynamics and Job Mobility

q(ε, p0 , p)

:

minimal mpl

between rm above

w

p

and rm

p' such that the Bertrand competition p' for worker e raises the worker's wage

The following three cases can happen: 1

2

3

p 0 ≤ q (ε, w , p ), p ) p ≥ p 0 > q (ε, w , p ),and the worker obtain a wage raise φ (ε, p 0 , p ) − w > 0 from his/her current employer. p0 > p

F.POSTEL-VINAY and J.-M.ROBIN

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion

Introduction The Model Estimation Method Estimation Results Dynamic Simulations Summary

Setup Wage Contracts Wage Dynamics and Job Mobility Steady-State Equilibrum Implications for the Decomposition of Log-wage Variance

Wage Dynamics and Job Mobility

Earnings prole:

Individual within-rm wage-tenure proles are nondecreasing in expectation terms. There is rm-to-rm worker movements with wage cuts.

F.POSTEL-VINAY and J.-M.ROBIN

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion

Introduction The Model Estimation Method Estimation Results Dynamic Simulations Summary

Setup Wage Contracts Wage Dynamics and Job Mobility Steady-State Equilibrum Implications for the Decomposition of Log-wage Variance

Outline 1

Introduction

2

The Model Setup Wage Contracts Wage Dynamics and Job Mobility Steady-State Equilibrum Implications for the Decomposition of Log-wage Variance

3

Estimation Method

4

Estimation Results

5

Dynamic Simulations

F.POSTEL-VINAY and J.-M.ROBIN

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion

Introduction The Model Estimation Method Estimation Results Dynamic Simulations Summary

Setup Wage Contracts Wage Dynamics and Job Mobility Steady-State Equilibrum Implications for the Decomposition of Log-wage Variance

Steady-state Equilibrium

Objective The equilibrium distribution of wages Cross-Sectional distribution of wages: A worker xed eect (e)

p

An employer xed eect ( )

q

A random eect ( )

F.POSTEL-VINAY and J.-M.ROBIN

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion

Introduction The Model Estimation Method Estimation Results Dynamic Simulations Summary

Setup Wage Contracts Wage Dynamics and Job Mobility Steady-State Equilibrum Implications for the Decomposition of Log-wage Variance

Steady-state Equilibrium

Density of employees working at type-p rms:

l (p ) =

εZmax

l (ε, p )d ε

εmin Unemployment rate:

u=

F.POSTEL-VINAY and J.-M.ROBIN

δ +µ δ + µ + λ0

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion

Introduction The Model Estimation Method Estimation Results Dynamic Simulations Summary

Setup Wage Contracts Wage Dynamics and Job Mobility Steady-State Equilibrum Implications for the Decomposition of Log-wage Variance

Steady-State Equilibrium Distribution of rm types across employed workers:

L(p ) =

F (p ) k F P)

1 + 1 ¯(

Density of workers in rms of type

l (p ) =

p:

k

1+ 1

f (p ) [1 + k1 F¯ (p )]2 k1 =

λ1 δ +µ

Within-rm distribution of worker types:

l (ε, p ) = h(ε)l (p ) F.POSTEL-VINAY and J.-M.ROBIN

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion

Introduction The Model Estimation Method Estimation Results Dynamic Simulations Summary

Setup Wage Contracts Wage Dynamics and Job Mobility Steady-State Equilibrum Implications for the Decomposition of Log-wage Variance

Steady-State Equilibrium

Within-rm distribution of wages

G (w | ε, p ) = (

k F p) 1 + k1 L[q (ε, w , p )] 2 ) )2 = ( ¯ 1 + k1 L(p ) 1 + k1 F [q (ε, w , p )] 1 + 1 ¯(

A random draw from the steady-state equilibrium distribution of wages is a value

φ (ε, q , p )

Where (ε, p , q ) are three random variables. Previous equation implies:

Ml (p ) M (1 + k1 ) f (p ) = × 2 γ(p ) γ(p ) [1 + k1 F¯ (p )] F.POSTEL-VINAY and J.-M.ROBIN

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion

Introduction The Model Estimation Method Estimation Results Dynamic Simulations Summary

Setup Wage Contracts Wage Dynamics and Job Mobility Steady-State Equilibrum Implications for the Decomposition of Log-wage Variance

Outline 1

Introduction

2

The Model Setup Wage Contracts Wage Dynamics and Job Mobility Steady-State Equilibrum Implications for the Decomposition of Log-wage Variance

3

Estimation Method

4

Estimation Results

5

Dynamic Simulations

F.POSTEL-VINAY and J.-M.ROBIN

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion

Introduction The Model Estimation Method Estimation Results Dynamic Simulations Summary

Setup Wage Contracts Wage Dynamics and Job Mobility Steady-State Equilibrum Implications for the Decomposition of Log-wage Variance

Implications for the Decomposition of Log-wage Variance

E (lnw | p ) = Elnε + E [lnφ (1, q , p ) | p ] V (lnw | p ) = Vlnε + V [lnφ (1, q , p ) | p ] = Vlnε + VE (lnw | p ) + (EV (lnw | p ) − Vlnε) = Vlnε + VE (lnφ (1, q , p ) | p ] + EV [lnφ (1, q , p ) | p ]

F.POSTEL-VINAY and J.-M.ROBIN

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion

Introduction The Model Estimation Method Estimation Results Dynamic Simulations Summary

Setup Wage Contracts Wage Dynamics and Job Mobility Steady-State Equilibrum Implications for the Decomposition of Log-wage Variance

The DADS Panel

Dataset is a large collection of matched employer-employee informations collected by the French Statistical Institute INSEE. The data are based on obligatory employer reports of the earnings of each salaried employee of the private sector subject to French payroll taxes over one given year. There are seven dierent occupational categories.

F.POSTEL-VINAY and J.-M.ROBIN

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion

Introduction The Model Estimation Method Estimation Results Dynamic Simulations Summary

Estimation Method

The estimation procedure separates

The parameters that can be estimated from a cross-section of wages ( the heterogeneity distribution) The parameters requiring transition data for identication Multi-step estimation procedure based on Bontemps, Robin, and Van den Berg's (2000) contribution to estimate the BM model.

F.POSTEL-VINAY and J.-M.ROBIN

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion

Introduction The Model Estimation Method Estimation Results Dynamic Simulations Summary

Identifying Assumptions

The set {w , i = 1, ..., N }is a set of N independent draws from the steady-state equilibrium wage distribution

Assumption 1:

i

t the theorical steady-state, the conditional mean earnings utility y (p ) ≡ E [U (w ) | p ]is stricly increasing function of the rm's mpl p.

Assumption 2: A

There are no sampling erros in the computation of within-rm mean earnings utilities y .

Assumption 3:

j

F.POSTEL-VINAY and J.-M.ROBIN

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion

Introduction The Model Estimation Method Estimation Results Dynamic Simulations Summary

Estimation Results

F.POSTEL-VINAY and J.-M.ROBIN

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion

Introduction The Model Estimation Method Estimation Results Dynamic Simulations Summary

Estimation Results

F.POSTEL-VINAY and J.-M.ROBIN

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion

Introduction The Model Estimation Method Estimation Results Dynamic Simulations Summary

Estimation Resuts

F.POSTEL-VINAY and J.-M.ROBIN

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion

Introduction The Model Estimation Method Estimation Results Dynamic Simulations Summary

Dynamic Simulations

F.POSTEL-VINAY and J.-M.ROBIN

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion

Introduction The Model Estimation Method Estimation Results Dynamic Simulations Summary

Dynamic Simulation

F.POSTEL-VINAY and J.-M.ROBIN

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion

Summary

Main contribution: State of the wages distribution in an equilibrium job search model with on-the-job search, using matched employer and employee data. Heterogeneous productivity for both rms and workers, and original wage setting mechanism.

Descomposition of log-wage variance into three components: a rm eect, a person eect, and a eect of labor market frictions.

F.POSTEL-VINAY and J.-M.ROBIN

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion

Equilibrium wage dispersion with worker and employer heterogeneity

firm-heterogenous match productivities and on-the-job search. The main prediction of the model is about the cross-sectional distribution of earnings.(worker and ...

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