Ethical Relativism Allen Wood 12/03/2003 Many dierent ideas have been given the name

guide us did not sometimes have exceptions. If

`relativism', and the term has been used to attack

`relativism' is the doctrine that commonly valid

all sorts of views (sometimes for good reasons,

ethical rules admit of exceptions (that they apply

sometimes for bad ones). It is mere posturing to

`relative to circumstances') then `relativism' in

say that you are for or against  relativism unless

that sense is clearly a true and even an important

you say what you mean by the term. Relativism,

doctrine. Someone who denied relativism in this

in all its meanings, is most often (though not al-

sense could be rightly accused of being inexible

ways) applied to ethical matters, and my topic

and even irrational in their ethical judgments.

today will be what is called `ethical relativism'

Or again, in making ethical judgments about

(or `cultural relativism'). What I have said about

others, and especially in acting on them, we

the varied meaning of the term `relativism' is cer-

sometimes we need to take into account the fact

tainly true about ethical relativism and cultural

that the others may disagree with us in ethical

relativism too.

matters.

We ought to be reluctant to impose

The discussions of relativism in which I have

our views on others, even sometimes when we

participated so far have always taken place al-

think their ethical views and even their actions

most entirely among people who are, and con-

are wrong. Especially, we should not try to force

sider themselves, representatives and products of

our ethical views on others in matters where their

Western culture  that is, people living in North

behavior falls within their rights and is not re-

America or Western Europe, and nearly always

ally any of our business.

people who were raised and socialized in these

exhibit the important virtue of tolerance. Some-

cultures. In taking about topics to an audience

times tolerance is justied by an awareness of our

that is non-Western, yet also (like much of the

own fallibility  by the recognition that the others

world today) distinctly inuenced by Western Eu-

might be right and we are wrong. But we ought

ropean and especially American culture, I cannot

to be tolerant even when we are sure we are right.

be so condent that what I am saying relates to

In fact, I think that tolerance, properly speaking,

the experience of the people to whom I am speak-

consists in allowing others to do what we know

ing. So I am even more than usually interested in

is wrong. Such tolerance cannot in principle be

what my audience's reaction is both to my own

unlimited, but it is an important virtue to have.

To do this is only to

thoughts and to those of the philosophers and

The views that lie behind recognizing tolerance

anthropologists I will be criticizing. For this rea-

as a virtue could be called relativist, in that they

son I hope to nd the discussion following this

recognize that the way we act on our ethical con-

talk more than usually informative to me.

victions regarding others ought to take into ac-

It is quite common for people to claim that

count, and in that sense be considered relative to,

either the truth of ethical claims or the validity

the possibly diering ethical views of others. The

of ethical rules is conditional upon, and in that

relativism that lies behind tolerance is not the

sense, relative to, something or other.

Even a

same thing as the relativism that lies behind ex-

valid moral rule may sometimes have exceptions.

ibility in applying moral rules, but in both cases

Indeed, the complexity of human life and our need

`relativism' is used to designate a view that is

for tolerably simple rules are both such that it

both true and morally important.

would be surprising if any rules simple enough to

Yet a third possible view is that which moral

1

rules are valid, and which kinds of conduct count

values, such as human dignity, happiness or com-

as right and wrong, might dier with circum-

munity, is simply an unjustiable attempt to im-

stances. This is not the claim that we ought to

pose the values of one culture (the culture of the

be tolerant of the diering views of others (even

asserter) on others. The only thing we can say,

if they are wrong), or the claim that the right

therefore, is that what each culture believes is

principles need to be adapted to diering circum-

right is right for it. In other words, if you want

stances. It is rather the claim that diering cir-

to know whether an action is ethically right, you

cumstances make dierent moral principles, and

have to know to what culture the agent belongs,

perhaps widely dierent modes of moral conduct,

and you have to know what that agent's culture

right or appropriate.

believes about the rightness of the act.

`Relativism' in this sense

If they

seems to me harder to evaluate, since the spe-

believe it is right, then it is right, and if they be-

cic claims that fall under it may be larger and

lieve it is wrong, then it is wrong.

more varied. But I think anyone ought to allow

doctrine I want to discuss under the names  eth-

that there is probably some truth in it.

ical relativism and  cultural relativism .

Basic

moral values, such as the value of human happi-

Sumner's view, as I have just presented it,

ness or the dignity of the human person or the

seems to me to combine some quite distinct

value of human community, might apply very dif-

claims that need to be clearly distinguished, and

ferently to widely diering circumstances, and re-

even threaten to contradict each other. On the

quire dierent patterns of conduct. Whether or

one hand, he proposes to justify the values of dif-

not they do would depend on the empirical de-

ferent cultures relative to their situation by claim-

tails, and it might be dicult for anyone to be

ing that in that situation those values make life

in a position to make judgments about this with any condence.

go better.

But some `relativist' claims of

values on the basis of which such a justication could be presented.

This last sense of `relativism' sometimes slides

I think he has to make up

his mind about this. If the talk about life going

over into quite a dierent doctrine, which is prob-

better cannot be substantiated, then Sumner has

ably the principal one given the name `ethical

given us no reason to accept the claim that what

relativism' or `cultural relativism', and which is

a given culture says is right is really right for its

the main doctrine I want to discuss today un-

members. If such talk can be substantiated, then

der those names. The American anthropologist

it must be substantiated by appeal to some uni-

William Graham Sumner, who thought of him-

versal values, such as human happiness or our-

self as an ethical relativist, maintained that every

ishing. In that case, however, Sumner must also

people ought to live in the way that makes life

allow for the possibility that the folkways of some

go best for it, and that these ways dier relative

people are such that life would go better for them

to geography, economics and historical tradition.

if they changed those folkways. But in that case

The marriage customs that are best for one peo-

he cannot consistently say that all values what-

ple, for instance, might be very dierent from

ever are culturally relative and lay it down as a

And conduct

dogma that whatever a given culture says is right

the rst people think is immoral might be allowable or even required by the other.

On the other hand, he denies that

there could be any universal or culturally neutral

this kind are probably true, and importantly so.

those that are best for another.

This is the

has to be right for its members.

From this

Sumner concluded that all moral standards are

Fullblown cultural relativism, therefore, if it is

fundamentally culturally relative, that the moral

to be self-consistent, must deny itself the most

standards that apply to one people do not apply

natural kind of justication someone might try

to another, and that there is no such thing as

to provide for it  and the justication that Sum-

a moral standard that might apply universally or

ner in fact tries to provide for it.

across cultures. There are not even any universal

or ethical relativism still appeals to some people

moral values, such as human dignity or happiness

who realize they have to deny themselves that

or community.

But cultural

Every such value comes from a

justication. So it is worth looking at the doc-

determinate culture and hence has validity only

trine itself, at its strengths and weaknesses, even

relative to it.

apart from this possible justication of it.

Any attempt to assert universal

2

And

that is what I propose to do in the rest of my

tion the Protagorean relativist is trying to get rid

remarks today.

of.

bly get rid of that notion.

Ethical or cultural relativism in this sense might

Protagorean relativism is either self-refuting or

truth, or what I will call `Protagorean relativism',

Theaetetus,

utterly nonsensical.

some-

Protagorean

thing like it was held by the Greek philosopher Protagoras of Abdera.

might

not

be

self-

only to certain classes of beliefs or assertions.

No

That is, some subclass of beliefs or assertions

belief or assertion is true simply or absolutely,

might be true only relatively or for those who

but anything anyone believes or asserts is true for

believe and assert them, but it would not be self-

the believer or the asserter. As Plato noted, how-

refuting to assert this about them, because this

ever, Protagorean relativism is either self-refuting or nonsensical.

relativism

refuting in this way, however, if it were restricted

Protagorean relativism

holds that there is no such thing as truth.

The assertions that

try to get rid of it directly refute themselves. So

be viewed as a species of general relativism about because according to Plato's

What this shows is that you can't intelligi-

last assertion might not be among the beliefs and

The reason derives simply from

assertions that are true only relatively. It might

the fundamental nature of belief and assertion

be true absolutely. Ethical or cultural relativism

themselves. For to assert a proposition is to as-

might be viewed as such a restricted form of Pro-

sert that it is true (true simply or absolutely).

tagorean relativism. It says: There is no absolute

To believe a proposition is to believe it simply or

truth about ethics, but only relative truth. What

absolutely. The assertion that there is no truth

I believe is morally right (or wrong) is right (or

(or no absolute truth) therefore directly refutes

wrong) for me, and what you believe is right is

itself, since it asserts it to be true absolutely that

right for you. If I think abortion is wrong, then

nothing is true absolutely.

it is true for me that abortion is wrong; if you

Protagorean relativism also can make no good

think abortion is OK, then it is true for you that

sense of its own key idea of `true for someone'.

abortion is OK.

For to say that a proposition is true for me if I

A natural question is: Why pick on ethical be-

believe or assert it is to say that it is true for

liefs in this way? The answers most often given

me if I believe or assert it to be true absolutely.

are these two:

If relativists try to say that for them, at least, to believe or assert p does not mean this, but means

A. People never agree on ethical ques-

only that they believe or assert it to be true for

tions.

them, then they are using the terms `believe' and `assert' and also phrase `true for. . .  with new

B. There is no way of knowing any ab-

and mysterious senses that have no connection

solute truth about ethics.

at all with the meanings of `believe' `assert' and `true' as we use these words, and therefore can-

Critics of ethical relativism often point out that

not succeed in denying what we mean when we

there is more agreement on ethical questions than

assert or say we believe that p is true. In ordi-

(A) admits: for instance, when you take account

nary speech, to say that p is true for a person

of the diering circumstances and factual beliefs

means either that it is true in that person's opin-

of dierent cultures, it is not so hard to account

ion, or that it is true in that person's case. In the

for their diering ethical customs and opinions on

rst sense, `It is true for me that dot-com invest-

the basis of a common set of fundamental ethical

ments were protable' if it is true (absolutely)

principles. There is also a very practical reason

that I believe it is true (absolutely) that dot-com

for assuming that eventual agreement on ethical

investments were protable (for some unnamed

questions is possible: namely, that if people are to

investors, maybe for most dot-com investors). In

treat one another with mutual respect and seek

the second sense, this assertion is true for me if

rational agreement on disputed questions, they

it is true (absolutely) that I made a prot from

have to proceed on the provisional assumption

dot-com investments.

No matter how you look

that the agreement they seek is at least possible.

at it, the meaning of `true for me' is parasitic

The critics also claim that (B) is a wild exag-

on the notion of true (absolutely) the very no-

geration: For some ethical truths seem virtually

3

impossible for anyone to doubt.

Who, outside

why we should regard it as any more true than

the articial atmosphere of a philosophical dis-

these views.

cussion, could seriously claim to doubt that it

Even if these objections are waived, ethical rel-

would be wrong to torture a child to death be-

ativism still inherits some of the serious problems

fore its parents' eyes just for the fun of it?

of unqualied Protagorean relativism. Ethical rel-

But let us grant both (A) and (B), at least for the sake of argument.

ativists still haven't explained what (if anything)

The problem for ethical

they mean by "true for me". Since an ethical rel-

true

relativism is that they don't entail ethical rela-

ativist doesn't believe that it's

tivism. Further, ethical relativism isn't the only

that killing is wrong, then the ethical relativist

(or even the best) way of accounting for them.

doesn't

(B) seems to assert ethical

skepticism,

(absolutely)

believe that killing is wrong, and so it can't be true for the ethical relativist that killing

which

would provide a natural explanation for (A) as

is wrong.

well, since if no one knows anything about a sub-

Thus ethical relativists can't consis-

tently have any ethical beliefs of their own.

ject, then that explains why people have widely

So far I have been using the terms `ethical

diering opinions about it.

relativism' and `cultural relativism' interchange-

When we limit relativism to ethical beliefs, rel-

ably. But if `ethical relativism' is used to mean

ativism itself no longer has to count as only rel-

the qualied or restricted form of Protagorean

atively true, so it looks as if it has been rescued

relativism we have just been examining, then it

from the threat of self-refutation. But the rescue

will be useful to distinguish it from `cultural rel-

will be successful only if:

ativism', the view we were looking at earlier that has been espoused by William Graham Sumner

(i) Ethical relativism itself is not an eth-

and a number of other anthropologists, which

ical belief; and

says that dierent cultures have dierent ethical

(ii) Ethical relativism does not share

standards and the standards by which the con-

with ethical beliefs the features which

duct of any individual should be measured are

make them only relatively and not ab-

the mores of the community to which that indi-

solutely true.

vidual belongs. For cultural relativism, taken in this sense, is not really a form of Protagorean

But both (i) and (ii) are doubtful, or at least

relativism at all.

For it does not deny absolute

very dicult for ethical relativists to hold consis-

truth to ethical beliefs, assertions or judgments.

tently with their relativism. The relativist's main

Instead, it is a view about which ones are abso-

reason for thinking that ethical beliefs can't be

lutely true and why they are absolutely true.

absolutely true is that they are endlessly contro-

The anthropologists who subscribe to cultural

versial. Ethical relativism shares this feature with

relativism about ethics are often trying to make a

ethical beliefs: people don't agree about ethical

point that is both correct and important. Ethics

relativism either. Moreover, ethical relativists of-

or morality itself can, in a certain sense, be seen

ten want to treat ethical relativism as if it were

as a social or cultural phenomenon. The ethical

an ethical belief, or as if it implied certain ethical

beliefs by which most people guide their lives and

beliefs. For instance, they think ethical relativism

measure themselves tend to come in systems that

implies that we should be tolerant of people with

are conjoined with cultural practices and acquired

ethical beliefs dierent from our own (however,

by individuals as part of their socialization. Sys-

see Ÿ 6 below.) If either (i) or (ii) is false, then

tems of ethical belief dier from culture to cul-

ethical relativism must regard itself as only rela-

ture in signicant ways that anthropologists may

tively true, and so it would be self-refuting after

study with prot. When we deal with people in

all.

So if ethical relativism is to avoid selfrefu-

or from cultures dierent from our own, not only

tation, ethical relativists cannot treat ethical rel-

prudence but also moral decency requires that

ativism as if it were itself a substantive ethical

we attend to these dierences and consider them

view (supporting tolerance, for instance). And as

with care and sensitivity in light of the respect

long as ethical relativism remains as controversial

we owe the members of other cultures simply as

as many ethical views are, they have to explain

human beings. If that were what `cultural rela-

4

tivism' or `ethical relativism' meant, then it would

siders it right (or wrong).

be an (objectively, absolutely) true doctrine relat-

tivists often want to insist, that there are dier-

ing to the sociology and anthropology of moral

ent judgments among dierent appraisers (or dif-

beliefs, and to some of the practical implications

ferent cultures), then appraiser relativism would

of those studies. It also would have nothing to

immediately yield inconsistent judgments about

do with the `relativism' discussed in the preceding

an actions rightness or wrongness.

pages.

might want to express these by speaking of the even of dierent ethical judgments being  true

the truths just stated think those truths have the

for dierent appraisers.

substantive normative implication that whatever

As Lyons is quick to

point out, this would only lead us back into the

any culture believes is right is right for members

quagmire of incoherence we found in relativism

of that culture. This is the position I have just

earlier in this paper. It is not unusual for cultur-

named `cultural relativism'. In eect, cultural rel-

ally relativistic anthropologists at this point to

ativism holds that there is a single, absolute, ob-

fall into saying that when someone says an ac-

jectively right answer to any moral question about

tion is right, all they mean is that the act satises

the rightness or wrongness of a given action: If

their own culture's standards of rightness. How-

you want to know whether an action is right or

ever, this is quite clearly not all that most people

wrong, simply nd out what the agent's culture

mean by calling an act `right', since they believe

believes about it. If they think it is right, then it

that because it meets certain standards, the act

is right; if they think it is wrong then it is wrong.

also deserves some sort of approval which they

Anybody who holds that there are (absolute)

know it would not get from someone who knew

ethical truths must admit that the rightness or

it met those standards but did not endorse the

wrongness of an act is relative to the circum-

standards.

Because peo-

So cultural relativism, if it is to avoid these

ple's circumstances dier, what is (absolutely, ob-

problems, must be understood as agent rela-

jectively) right for one person, might be dierent

tivism. According to it, a moral judgment such

from what is (absolutely, objectively) right for an-

as "Joe's killing Sam was wrong" would be like

other. For instance, even the most extreme moral

the judgment "It is raining" in that both have

absolutist might very well hold that it is right for

implicit reference to a context determining their

Joe to have sex with Joe's wife but wrong for

objective truth. "It is raining" always means that

Sam to have sex with Joe's wife. Such cases of

it is raining at a certain time and place (e.g. in

"right for you, wrong for me" obviously do not

Fresno at 6 pm on September 12, 2002). "Joe's

support any form of ethical relativism. Cultural

killing Sam was wrong" means that Joe's killing

relativism, as we are now considering it, could be

of Sam was wrong in a certain culture at a cer-

understood in a similar way, as simply a special

tain time (e.g. in North American culture early

view about how moral right and wrong vary with the agent's circumstances.

A relativist

act being  right for me and  wrong for you or

But sometimes the people who rightly insist on

stances in which it is performed.

If we allow, as rela-

in the 21st century, where acts like Joe's act

It holds that (abso-

of killing are widely disapproved).

lute, objective) moral rightness and wrongness

Cultural rel-

ativism then holds that what a culture believes

depend on the prevailing culture's beliefs about a

about an act determines the truth about its ob-

given action. If you want to know the objectively

jective rightness or wrongness in something like

right answer to the question whether a given act

the way that spatio-temporal location determines

is right or wrong, just nd out what the agent's

the truth about the weather conditions obtaining

culture believes on that question: their belief de-

then and there.

termines what is objectively true. This assumes what my former Cornell colleague David Lyons

Much of the appeal of cultural relativism has

has called  agent relativism Alternatively, one

come from the perception by people in West-

could propose a very dierent doctrine   ap-

ern cultures that dierent cultures have dierent

praiser relativism which says that an act is right

moral standards and moral practices from ours,

(or wrong) if the appraiser (the person judging

but nevertheless get along at least as well with

the act, or perhaps the appraiser's culture) con-

their standards and practices as we do with ours.

5

This perception is often conjoined with the idea

culture whose ethical beliefs happen to be incom-

that it is wrong for Western culture to be intol-

patible with cultural relativism). It follows from

erant of other cultures and impose its ways on

this that cultural relativism is totally incapable of

them. But this last idea does not imply cultural

combating any form of culturally entrenched im-

relativism, and is probably even inconsistent with

perialism, racism or ethnocentrism. For whenever

it. Perhaps the intended connection between cul-

we nd these ugly things built into a culture's be-

tural relativism and cultural tolerance is based on

liefs, cultural relativism is committed to endorsing

an argument of the following kind:

them; and if cultural relativism is interpreted in such a way as to conict with these beliefs, then

1. We shouldn't blame, or interfere

it becomes self-refuting in that culture.

with, actions that are objectively right. 2.

In practice, cultural relativism is sometimes

The actions generally approved

used as a pretext for following whatever ethi-

in other cultures are objectively right just

because

they

are

generally

cal beliefs one nds convenient.

ap-

For instance,

a Western-based multinational corporation oper-

proved there. (Cultural relativism)

ating in other parts of the world comes from a

3. Therefore, we should not blame

culture that believes that it is all right to seek the

or interfere with the actions of people in

highest prot you can within the law; cultural rel-

other cultures when they are generally

ativism therefore says they may do that (even if it

approved in those cultures.

means disrupting the traditions of that culture). But cultural relativism also says that they need

But can a cultural relativist consistently put for-

not blame or interfere with practices within that

ward such an argument? Cultural relativists often

culture which might be considered wrong in their

charge that among the ethical beliefs of Western

Western Supremacy : Western Supremacy : Western

own culture: practices such as police-state ter-

culture is

ror directed against workers who protest the bru-

values should

tally low wage scales and miserable working con-

be imposed on other cultures, and members of

ditions through which the corporations reap their

Western culture should blame and interfere with

prots. So interpreted, cultural relativism allows

the actions of people in other cultures whenever

these corporations to do whatever they like.

these actions violate Western values. If the cultural relativists are right that West-

The above results suggest that cultural rela-

ern Supremacy is a belief of Western culture, then

tivism doesn't do justice to the actual views of

what cultural relativism tells me, if I am a mem-

those who really want to promote cross-cultural

ber of Western culture, is that it is absolutely,

tolerance or oppose Western imperialism. It looks

objectively right for me to impose our Western

like those views really consist in holding to cer-

ways on others and objectively right for us to

tain (absolute, objective, trans-cultural) ethical

blame and interfere with the actions of people

principles about how the members of dierent

in other cultures whenever our values condemn

cultures should act toward each other, such as

them. That means that cultural relativism sup-

that people should be open-minded and toler-

ports not (3) but its contradictory.

ant to all human beings, always treating them

Further, what account can a cultural relativist

with dignity and respect.

Perhaps the anti-

consistently give of the ethical principle stated in

imperialists are embarrassed to avow such princi-

(1)? If the principle is supposed to have absolute

ples because they obviously come from the mod-

or trans-cultural validity, how can this be con-

ern, Western Enlightenment tradition, and avow-

sistent with cultural relativism?

ing them will immediately expose you to the

If the principle

is valid merely because it is one of our culture's

dreaded charge of ethnocentrism.

ethical beliefs, then it deserves no priority over

cultural relativism's principled stance of absolute

Western Supremacy. And then it looks as if (1)

cross-cultural neutrality seems to buy us immu-

and Western Supremacy taken together imply the

nity from this charge. But of course cultural rel-

falsity of (2) (that is, of cultural relativism). In

ativism is a modern Western idea every bit as

that case, cultural relativism is self-refuting for us

much as Enlightenment moral principles are; the

Westerners (and, indeed, for the members of any

only dierence is that, as we have seen, cultural

6

By contrast,

relativism is actually

hostile

to cross-cultural tol-

cultural limitations in general without ever hav-

erance and mutual respect, whereas certain other

ing to overcome any of them in particular (as we

Western Enlightenment principles do favor them.

have seen, it even provides an endorsement for them, when that is needed). But perhaps what

Very likely we end up in this paradoxical posi-

we have really wanted all along is a license to

tion because we start from the correct perception

behave like brutal, arrogant imperialists while at

that everyone's standpoint is limited by their cul-

the same time thinking of ourselves as tolerant,

tural perspective, and then (directly contradict-

humane cosmopolitans who have transcended all

ing this insight) we try immediately to occupy a

their cultural prejudices. This makes it unsurpris-

sublimely neutral standpoint which is above all such limitations.

ing that cultural relativism has had widespread

We would be wiser to align

appeal among the more sophisticated members

ourselves with some standpoint situated within a

of Western imperialist culture.

denite culture, which, despite its inevitable limitations, at least makes an eort to be critical of

Even if it lived up to its billing, cultural rel-

itself and tolerant of other cultural standpoints.

ativism would still be extremely implausible.

We are reluctant to take this wise course because

commits you to the objective rightness (in the

we know that it is hard to identify such a stand-

context of the culture in question) of all the moral

point; we realize that the biases from which we

beliefs and practices that have ever existed. Slav-

start will doubtless lead us into mistakes, proba-

ery was objectively right in ancient Greece and

bly culpable ones; and we are aware that by this

Rome, and even in our own country not so long

route we can never hope altogether to escape the

ago. Human sacrices were objectively right for

accusation of ethnocentrism, but will just have

the Aztecs; so was the Indian custom of

to learn to live with it (to be ethnocentric, in the

requiring a widow to burn herself to death on

sense of starting from the values of your own cul-

her husband's funeral pyre; and also the

ture and tradition, is just part of our human con-

 the periodic indiscriminate slaughter of Jews 

dition). There is no way to avoid ethnocentrism

which has long been part of the folkways of Chris-

in this sense, but there are ways of criticizing the

tian peoples in Europe. Also objectively right is

values from which you start by seeking a univer-

the genital mutilation of women, which is still

sal rational or cosmopolitan standpoint to which

practiced in a variety of cultures. Cultural rela-

all people, regardless of their ethnic background,

tivists sometimes refuse to back down even when

can and should aspire. No one should think that

presented with the most outrageous and grisly

they as yet occupy that standpoint, and in that

cases; but I can't help thinking that if they hadn't

sense, all people have to see themselves as irre-

been backed into this position by the stance they

deemably ethnocentric.

But to the extent that

hastily chose in a philosophical discussion, these

they are moving toward such a standpoint, they

same people would be the rst to condemn these

may be genuine citizens of the world who are tol-

practices as strongly as anyone.

erant of others and do not seek to impose their

It

suttee,

pogrom

The moral problems cultural relativism is try-

ideas on others, or at least do not impose them

ing to address are certainly real ones.

on others in ways that are unjust or imperialistic.

In some

cases it is simply not obvious what we should do

However, no one can ever be sure how far they

(or even think) when confronted by practices of

have reached such a cosmpolitan standpoint, or

another culture that oend our moral sense and

even how far they are moving toward it. So the

contradict our deepest convictions. Some things

search for it will always leave us in a position

that people do to one another in dierent cultures

of self-doubt and self-questioning. We are never

are quite evidently the results of wretched super-

entitled to be self-satised or complacent.

stitions and the brutally unjust distributions of

Confronted with this unsettling condition, we

power and authority that are traditional in those

nd cultural relativism far more appealing be-

societies. On the other hand, we can often see

cause its empty gestures enable us to announce

that in other cultures certain actions have a dif-

our good intentions and repudiate our cultural

ferent meaning, and we are quite aware that we

biases in the abstract, with a mere wave of the

lack the capacity to understand and evaluate the

hand. It enables us to absolve ourselves all of our

practices of alien societies. If we do nothing in the

7

face of evident moral evil, we completely forfeit

ativism will be to support the dominant view

our integrity; but if we act on the basis of con-

within the culture and to de-legitimize all dis-

victions held from our admittedly incomplete per-

senting views without giving them so much as a

spective, then we run the risk of arrogantly set-

hearing. Cultural relativism implies that on any

ting ourselves up as infallible moral judges of peo-

moral question within a culture an opinion is al-

ple who may know more than we do about what

ways necessarily wrong whenever it goes against

is being judged.

If traditional cultures in other

traditional beliefs in the culture which are still

parts of the world are changing so that they be-

very widely held. That means not only that those

come more like modern Western culture in ways

individuals who raise moral questions about ac-

we approve, should we applaud and support this

cepted practices are always in the wrong, but also

process as the victory of moral progress, or should

that any movement for moral reform within a cul-

we deplore, regret and oppose these changes be-

ture, even if it eventually succeeds, must have

cause they amount to the violent extinction of

been in the wrong at the time it got started, and

that culture's priceless heritage? What is objec-

therefore that it must always be absolutely wrong

tionable about cultural relativism is that it pre-

to try to reform any culture's accepted moral be-

tends to have found a simple, general, tidy and

liefs and practices.

unambiguous answer to questions where any an-

Cultural relativism seems to give plausible an-

swer of that description is almost certainly wrong.

swers to ethical questions only in a culture that

Another problem with cultural relativism is

is utterly unlike those in which cultural relativism

that the general criterion of right and wrong

itself arises.

which it proposes is actually very unhelpful be-

that is homogeneous, unreective, unchangeable

cause it is inherently unclear and impossible to

and free of serious moral disagreements.

apply in the real world. Cultural relativism tells

ically, the very social complexities, mutabilities

us that the rightness of an act depends on what

and controversies that make relativism attractive

the agent's culture believes about it. But most

also render it useless, unclear and implausible as

societies today are a complex network of cultures

an account of ethical truth. But perhaps this last

and subcultures, sometimes having widely diver-

observation dismisses some important anthropo-

gent moral beliefs about controversial issues. For

logical ideas a bit too quickly. The anthropolo-

a given person in a given situation, how are we

gists who embrace some sort of cultural relativism

supposed to decide which culture or subculture

(such as Cliord Geertz), tend to be those for

the person belongs to? How many dierent cul-

whom the idea of a determinate culture plays an

tures, for instance, are represented among the

important explanatory role in their theories. They

students in this course?

How many of us can

are committed to the idea that people's folkways

be entirely sure what culture we ourselves belong

and beliefs dier systematically according to cul-

to? Can people set up a new culture whenever

ture, and that the concept of the specic culture

they want to? How few people would it take to

to which a person belongs is vital to explaining

do this?

that person's value and belief system.

This would have to be a culture Iron-

In most cultures (in present-day American cul-

If such anthropologists are right, then even

ture, for instance), many ethical questions are

in developed societies, with considerable hetero-

the subject of endless disagreement and debate

geneity of beliefs and practices, a well-constituted

(this, after all, was what got ethical relativism

anthropological theory of the society will indeed

started in the rst place).

How are we to de-

identify which culture or subculture a person be-

termine what the ethical beliefs of the prevailing

longs to, and this culture will explain the per-

culture are? Does this require an overwhelming

son's beliefs, values and behavior. It is of course

consensus among the culture's members, or is it a

controversial among anthropologists whether the

matter of simple majority vote? Or does cultural

idea of a culture does play such a crucial role in

relativism imply that the most old-fashioned and

understanding social behavior. But even if those

ethnically traditional moral opinion is always the

anthropologists who espouse this idea are right,

right one?

Wherever there is any intra-cultural

it is an entirely separate question whether the be-

disagreement at all, the eect of cultural rel-

liefs and values a person derives from their culture

8

count as the correct ones for that person. The

toward one's own culture, and to distinguish the

correct explanation for someone's beliefs and val-

ethical truths it has taught us from the ethical

ues need not count as a justication for those

falsehoods with which it has indoctrinated us.

beliefs and values.

The truth of this anthropo-

logical approach therefore does not in the least entail the truth of cultural relativism as a view about which ethical judgments are valid or correct.

It is entirely possible that some cultures

systematically miseducate their members on ethical matters. Indeed, my own view is that probably all cultures to one degree or another ll their members' heads with false, superstitious, unenlightened and wrong ideas about what is good and bad and how to live. Anthropological theories might help you understand better what your culture teaches you and why. But it will always be a separate question whether what it teaches you is true or false.

So even if we could determine

clearly what culture a person belongs to, that would not entail that cultural relativism gives a correct account of moral rightness. Perhaps it makes us feel more at home with ourselves and with the world to be able to say that we feel pride and respect in our own culture, and to convince ourselves that we cannot be doing wrong if we follow what it has taught us is right. To question our culture, we may think, to entertain the possibility that its ways are wrong, is to become self-alienated and rootless in a way that can only make us unhappy within ourselves and maladjusted to the world around us.

I see

the attractions of this attitude, but I think that in the culturally complex and irretrievably global world we now live in, the self-complacency it encourages in people is one of the most dangerous and immoral cultural forces that exist. We should not be afraid to attack our own culture and to be ashamed of it when what it stands for is wrong. We should not even be afraid of rootlessness or self-alienation, because we are not only capable of dealing with it but should recognize it as simply our fate as mature rational beings. I am even tempted to say that it is the duty of every human being in a world like ours to be rootless and self-alienated, to be more ready to feel shame at their cultural heritage than pride in it, and to be a citizen of the world before being a citizen of any limited people or nation. It is the essential task of every one of us, whatever our cultural background, is to take a critical stance

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