Mind Association

Evil and Omnipotence Author(s): J. L. Mackie Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 64, No. 254 (Apr., 1955), pp. 200-212 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2251467 Accessed: 13/11/2010 13:10 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=oup. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

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IV.-EVIL

AND OMNIPOTENCE BY J. L. MACKIE

TiE traditionalargumentsforthe existenceof God have been fairlythoroughly criticisedby philosophers. But the theologian can, if he wishes,accept this criticism. He can admit that no rationalproofof God's existenceis possible. And he can still retainall that is essentialto his position,by holdingthat God's existenceis knownin some other,non-rationalway. I think, however,that a moretellingcriticismcan be made by way of the traditionalproblemof evil. Here it can be shown,not that religiousbeliefslack rationalsupport,but thattheyare positively irrational,that the several parts of the essential theological doctrineare inconsistent withone another,so thatthetheologian can maintainhis positionas a whole only by a much more extremerejectionof reason than in the formercase. He must now be preparedto believe,not merelywhat cannotbe proved, but what can be disproved fromotherbeliefsthat he also holds. The problemof evil,in the sensein whichI shall be usingthe phrase,is a problemonlyforsomeonewho believesthat thereis a God who is both omnnipotent and whollygood. And it is a logical problem,the problem of clarifyingand reconcilinga numberof beliefs: it is not a scientific problemthat mightbe solved by furtherobservations,or a practical problem that mightbe solved by a decisionor an action. These points are obvious; I mentionthem only because they are sometimes ignoredby theologians,who sometimesparry a statementof the problemwith such remarksas " Well, can you solve the problem yourself? " or "This is a mysterywhich may be revealed to us later" or "Evil is somethingto be faced and overcome,not to be merelydiscussed" In its simplestformthe problemis this: God is omnipotent; God is whollygood; and yet evil exists. There seems to be some contradiction betweenthese threepropositions, so that if any two of themweretruethe thirdwouldbe false. But at the same time all three are essential parts of most theological positions: the theologian,it seems, at once mustadhere and cannotconsistently adhereto all three. (The problemdoes not arise onlyfortheists,but I shall discussit in the formin which it presentsitselfforordinarytheism.) However, the contradictiondoes not arise immediately; to show it we need some additional premises,or perhaps some 200

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quasi-logicalrules connectingthe terms 'good', 'evil', and 'omnipotent'. These additional principlesare that good is opposed to evil,in such a way that a good thingalways eliminates evil as faras it can, and that thereare no limitsto what an omnipotent thingcan do. Fromtheseit followsthat a good omnipotentthing eliminatesevil completely,and then the propositionsthat a good omnipotentthingexists,and that evil exists,are incompatible. A. AdequateSolutions Now once the problemis fullystatedit is clear that it can be solved,in the sense that the problemwillnot arise if one gives that constituteit. If you are up at least one ofthe propositions preparedto say that God is not whollygood,or not quite omnipotent,or that evil does not exist,or that good is not opposed to the kind of evil that exists,or that thereare limitsto what an omnipotenttling can do, then the problemof evil will not ariseforyou. Thereare, then,quite a numberof adequate solutionsof the problemof evil,and someofthesehave been adopted,or almost adopted, by various thinkers. For example,a few have been and rathermorehave been preparedto denyGod's omnipotence, prepared to keep the term 'omnipotence' but severely to restrictits meaning,recordingquite a numberof thingsthat an omnipotentbeing cannot do. Some have said that evil is an illusion,perhaps because they held that the whole world of temporal,changingthingsis an illusion,and-that what we call evil belongsonly to this world,or perhapsbecause they held that althoughtemporalthingsare muchas we see them,those that we call evil are not reallyevil. Some have said that what we call evil is merelytheprivationofgood,thatevilin a positive sense,evil that wouldreallybe opposedto good, does not exist. Many have agreed with Pope that disorderis harmonynot understood,and that partial evil is universalgood. Whether any of these views is trueis, of course,anotherquestion. But each of themgives an adequate solutionof the problemof evil in the sense that if you accept it this problemdoes not arise for you, though you may, of course,have otherproblemsto face. But oftenenoughthese adequate solutionsare only almost adopted. The thinkerswho restrictGod's power,but keep the term' omnipotence',may reasonablybe suspectedof thinking, in other contexts,that his power is really unlimited. Those

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who say that evil is an illusionmay also be-thinking, inconsistently,that this illusionis itselfan evil. Those who say that " evil " is merelyprivationof good may also be thinking, inconthat privationof good is an evil. (The fallacyhereis sistently,. alkn to some formsof the "naturalistic fallacy" in ethics, where some think,for example, that "good" is just what contributesto evolutionary, progress,and that evoliutionary progressis itselfgood.) If Pope meantwhathe said in the first line of his couplet,that " disorder" is onlyharmonynot understood, the "partial evil " of the second line must,for consistency,mean " that which,taken in isolation,falselyappears to be evil ", but it would more naturallymean " that which,in isolation,really is evil ". The second line, in fact, hesitates betweentwo views,that " partial evil " isn't really evil, since only the universalquality is real, and that " partial evil " is reallyan evil,but onlya littleone. to adequate solutions,we mustrecogIn addition,therefore, nise unsatisfactoryinconsistentsolutions,in which there is only a half-heartedor temporaryrejectionof one of the propositionswhichtogetherconstitutethe problem. In these,one of the constituentpropositionsis explicitlyrejected,but it is or assumedelsewherein the system. covertlyre-asserted B. FallaciousSolutions Besides these half-heartedsolutions,which explicitlyreject but implicitlyassert one of the constituentpropositions, there are definitely fallacioussolutionswhichexplicitlymaintainall the constituentpropositions,but implicitlyreject at least one of themin the courseof the argumentthat explainsaway the problemof evil. Thereare, in fact,manyso-calledsolutionswhichpurportto removethe contradictionwithoutabandoningany of its constituentpropositions. These mustbe fallacious,as we can see fromthe verystatementof the problem,but it is not so easy to see in each case preciselywherethe fallacylies. I suggestthat in all cases the fallacyhas the generalformsuggestedabove: in orderto solve the problemone (or perhapsmore)of its constituentpropositionsis given up, but in such a way that it appears to have been retained,and can thereforebe asserted withoutqualificationin other contexts. Sometimesthere is a further complication: the supposedsolutionmovesto and fro between,say, two of the constituentpropositions, at one point assertingthe firstof these but covertlyabandoningthe second,

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at anotherpoint assertingthe second but covertlyabandoning the first. These fallacious solutions often turn upon some equivocationwiththe words 'good' and 'evil', or upon some vaguenessabout the way in whichgood and evil are opposed to one another,or about how muchis meantby 'omnipotence'. I proposeto examinesome of these so-calledsolutions,and to exhibittheir fallaciesin detail. Incidentally,I shall also be consideringwhetheran adeqiuatesolutioncould be reachedby a minormodificationof one or more of the constituentpropositions,which would, however,still satisfyall the essential of ordinarytheism. requirements 1. " Good cannot exist withoutevil " or " Evil is necessary as a counterpart to good." It is sometimessuggestedthat evil is necessaryas a counterpart to good,that if therewereno evil therecould be no good either,and that this solvesthe problemof evil. It is truethat it pointsto an answerto the question" Why should therebe evil ? " But it does so only by qualifyingsome of the propositionsthat constitutethe problem. First, it sets a limitto what God can do, sayingthat God cannotcreategood withoutsimultaneously creatingevil,and this means eitherthat God is not omnipotentor that thereare some limitsto what an omnipotentthingcan do. It may be replied that theselimitsare always presupposed,that omnipotencehas never meantthe powerto do what is logicallyimpossible,and on the presentviewthe existenceof good withoutevil wouldbe a logicalimpossibility.Thisinterpretation ofomnipotence may, of our originalaccount indeed, be accepted as a modification whichdoes not rejectanythingthat is essentialto theism,and I shall in generalassumeit in the subsequentdiscussion. It is, perhaps,the mostcommontheisticview,but I thinkthat some theistsat leasthave maintainedthatGodscan do whatis logically impossible. Many theists,at any rate, have held that logic itselfis createdor laid down by God, that logic is the way in which God arbitrarilychooses to think. (This is, of course, parallelto the etbicalview that morallyrightactionsare those whichGod arbitrarily choosesto command,and the two views encounter similardifficulties.)Andthisaccountoflogicis clearly inconsistent withthe view that God is bound by logicalnecessities-unless it is possible for an omnipotentbeing to bind himself,an issue whichwe shall considerlater,when we come to the Paradox of Omnipotence. This solutionof the problem

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of evil cannot, therefore, be consistentlyadopted along with the viewthat logicis itselfcreatedby God. But, secondly,this solution denies that evil is opposed to good in our originalsense. If good and evil are counterparts, a good thingwillnot " eliminateevil as faras it can ". Indeed, this view suggeststhat good and evil are not strictlyqualities .ofthingsat all. Perhaps the suggestionis that good and evil are relatedin muchthesame way as greatand small. Certainly, when the term 'great' is used relativelyas a condensationof ' greaterthan so-and-so', and 'small' is used correspondingly, greatness and smallness are counterpartsand cannot exist withouteach other. But in thissensegreatnessis not a quality, not an intrinsicfeatureof anything; and it would be absurd to think of a movementin favour of greatnessand against smallness in this sense. Such a movementwould be selfdefeating,since relative greatnesscan - be promotedonly by a simultaneouspromotionof relative smallness. I feel sure that no theistswould be contentto regardGod's goodnessas analogousto this-as if whathe supportswerenot the goodbut the better, and as if he had the paradoxicalaim that all things shouldbe betterthan otherthings. This pointis obscuredby the fact that ' great' and 'small' seem to have an absoluteas well as a relativesense. I cannot discusshere whetherthereis absolutemagnitudeor not, but if thereis, therecould be an absolutesense for 'great', it could mean of at least a certainsize, and it wouldmakesenseto speak of all thingsgettingbigger,of a universethat was expanding all over,and therefore it wouldmakesenseto speak ofpromoting greatness. But in thissense great and small are not logically necessarycounterparts:eitherquality could exist withoutthe in everything's other. There would be no logical impossibility beingsmall or in everything's beinggreat. Neitherin the absolute nor in the relative sense, then, of great' and 'small' do these termsprovidean analogyof the sortthat would be needed to supportthis solutionof the problem of evil. In neithercase are greatnessand smallnessboth necessarycounterparts and mutuallyopposedforcesor possible objectsforsupportand attack. It may be repliedthat good and evil are necessarycounterparts in the same way as any quality and its logical opposite: rednesscan occur,it is suggested,onlyifnon-redness also occurs. But unless evil is merely'the privationof good, they are not logical opposites,and some furtherargumentwould be needed to showthat theyare counterparts in the same way as genuine

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logical opposites. Let us assume that this could be given. There is still doubt of the correctnessof the metaphysical principlethat a quality must have a real opposite: I suggest should be,-say, that it is not reallyimpossiblethat everything red, that the truthis merelythat if everythingwere red we shouldnotnoticeredness,and so we shouldhave no word'red '; we observeand give names,to qualities only if they have real opposites. If so, the principlethat a term must have an oppositewould belongonlyto our languageor to our thought, and wouldnot be an ontologicalprinciple,and, correspondingly, the rule that good cannot exist withoutevil would not state a logical necessityof a sort that God would just have to put up with. God might have made everythinggood, though we shouldnot have noticedit ifhe had. But, finally,even if we concede that this is an ontological principle,it will providea solutionforthe problemof evil only ifone is preparedto say, " Evil exists,but onlyjust enoughevil to serve as the counterpartof good ". I doubt whetherany theist will accept this. Afterall, the ontologicalrequirement shouldoccurwould be satisfiedeven if all the that non-redness universe,exceptfora minutespeck,werered,and, iftherewere forevil as a counterpartto good, a corresponding requirement a minutedose of evil wouldpresumablydo. But theistsare not usuallywillingto say,in all contexts,that all the evilthat occurs is a minuteand necessarydose. 2. " Evil is necessaryas a meansto good." It is sometimessuggestedthat evil is necessaryforgood not as a counterpartbut as a means. In its simpleformthis has littleplausibilityas a solutionof the problemof evil, since it of God's power. It would obviouslyimpliesa severerestriction be a causal law that you cannothave a certainend withouta certainmeans,so that if God has to introduceevil as a means to good, he mustbe subjectto at least some causal laws. This -meansby omnicertainlyconflictswithwhat a theistnormally pctence. This view of God as limited by causal laws also withthe view thatcausal laws are themselvesmade by confficts view God, which is more widelyheld than the corresponding about the laws oflogic. Thisconflictwould,indeed,be resolved if it werepossibleforan omnipotentbeingto bind himself,and this possibilityhas stillto be considered. Unless a favourable answercan be givento this question,the suggestionthat evil is necessaryas a meansto good solvesthe problemof evil onlyby

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denyingone of its constituentpropositions,, eitherthat God is omnipotentor that 'omnipotent' meanswhat it says. 3. " The universeis betterwithsomeevilin it thanit couldbe iftherewereno evil." Much moreimportantis a solutionwhichat firstseemsto be a merevariantof the previousone, that evil may contributeto the goodnessof a wholein whichit is found,so thatthe universe as a wholeis betteras it is, withsomeevil in it,thanit wouldbe if tlherewereno evil. This solutionmay be developedin either of two ways. It may be supportedby an aestheticanalogy,by the factthat contrastsheightenbeauty,that in a musicalwork, for example,theremay occur discordswhichsomehowadd to the beauty of the work as a whole. Alternatively, it may be workedout in connexionwiththe notionof progress,that the best possibleorganisationof the universewillnot be static,but progressive,that the gradual overcomingof evil by good is really a finerthing than would be the eternal unchallenged supremacyof good. In eithercase, thissolutionusuallystartsfromthe assumption that the evil whoseexistencegivesriseto the problemof evil is primarilywhat is called physicalevil, that is to say, pain. In Hume's ratherhalf-hearted presentationof the problemof evil, the evils that he stressesare pain and disease, and those who replyto himarguethat the existenceof pain and disease makes possiblethe existenceof sympathy,benevolence,heroism,and the graduallysuccessfulstruggleof doctorsand reformers to overcometheseevils. In fact,theistsoftenseizetheopportunity to accuse those who stressthe problemof evil of takinga low, materialistic viewof good and evil,equatingthesewithpleasure and pain, and of ignoringthe more spiritualgoods whichcan arisein the struggleagainstevils. But let us see exactlywhat is being done here. Let us call pain and misery' firstorderevil ' or ' evil (1)'. What contrasts withthis,namely,pleasureand happiness,will be called ' first ordergood ' or ' good (1) '. Distinctfromthisis ' secondorder good' or 'good (2)' which somehow emergesin a complex situationin whichevil (1) is a necessarycomponent-logically, not merely-causally, necessary. (Exactly howit emergesdoes not matter: in the crudestversionof this solutiongood (2) is of happinessby the contrastwithmisery, simplythe heightening in otherversionsit includessympathywith suflering, heroism in facingdanger,and the gradualdecreaseof firstorderevil and increase of firstorder good.) It is also being assumed that

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second ordergood is more importantthan-firstordergood or evil, in particularthat it more than outweighsthe firstorder evil it involves. Now thisis a particularly subtleattemptto solvethe problem of evil. It defendsGod's goodness and omnipotenceon the groundthat (on a sufficiently long view) this.is the best of all logically possible worlds, because it includes the important second ordergoods, and yet it admits that real evils, namely firstorderevils,exist. But does it stillhold that good and evil are opposed? Not, clearly,in the sensethat we set out originally: good does not tendto eliminateevil in general. Instead, we have a modified, a morecomplexpattern. Firstordergood (e.g.happiness)contrasts withfirstorderevil (e.g.misery): these two are opposedin a fairlymechanicalway; somesecondorder goods (e.g. benevolence)try to maximisefirstordergood and minimisefirstorderevil; but God's goodnessis not this,it is rather the will to maximise secondorder good. We might, therefore,call God's goodness an example of a third order goodness,or good (3). Whilethis accountis diflerent fromour originalone,it mightwellbe held to be an improvement on it,to givea moreaccuratedescription ofthewayinwhichgoodis opposed to evil, and to be consistentwith the essentialtheistposition. There might,however,be severalobjectionsto this solution. First,some mightarguethat such qualitiesas benevolenceand a fortiorithe thirdordergoodnesswhichpromotesbenevolence-have a merelyderivativevalue, that they are not highersortsof good, but merelymeans to good (1), that is, to happiness,so that it wouldbe absurdforGod to keep miseryin existencein orderto make possiblethe virtuesof benevolence, heroism,etc. The theistwho adopts the presentsolutionmust, of course,denythis,but he can do so withsome plausibility,so I shouldnot pressthisobjection. Secondly,it followsfromthis solutionthat God is not in our sense benevolentor sympathetic: he is not concernedto minimise evil (1), but onlyto promotegood (2); and this mightbe a disturbingconclusionforsome theists. But, thirdly,the fatal objectionis this. Our analysisshows clearlythe possibilityof the existenceof a secondorderevil,an evil (2) contrastingwith good (2) as evil (1) contrastswith good (1). This wouldincludemalevolence,cruelty,callousness, cowardice,and statesin whichgood (1) is decreasingand evil (1) increasing. And just as good (2) is held to be the important kind of good, the kind that God is concernedto promote,so evil (2) will,by analogy,be the importantkindof evil,the kind

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which God, if he were wholly good and omnipotent,would eliminate. And yet evil (2) plainly exists, and indeed most theists(in othercontexts)stressits existencemorethan that of evil (1). We should, therefore,state the problemof evil in termsof secondorderevil,and againstthisformof the problem the presentsolutionis useless. An attemptmightbe made to use this solutionagain, at a higherlevel, to explain the occurrenceof evil (2): indeed the next mainsolutionthat we shall examinedoes just this,withthe help of some new notions. Withoutany freshnotions,such a solutionwould have littleplausibility: for example,we could hardlysay that the reallyimportantgood was a good (3), such as the increaseof benevolencein proportionto cruelty,which logically required for its occurrencethe occurrenceof some second order evil. But even if evil (2) could be explained in this way,it is fairlyclear that therewould be thirdorderevils contrastingwiththis thirdordergood: and we should be well on the wayto an infinite regress,wherethe solutionofa problem of evil,statedin termsof evil (n), indicatedthe existenceof an evil (n + 1), and a further problemto be solved. 4. " Evil is due to humanfreewill." Perhapsthe mostimportantproposedsolutionof the problem of evil is that evil is not to be ascribedto God at all, but to the independentactions of human beings,supposed to have been endowedby God withfreedomof the will. This solutionmay be combinedwiththe precedingone: firstorderevil (e.g. pain) may be justifiedas a logicallynecessarycomponentin second ordergood (e.g. sympathy)whilesecondorderevil (e.g. cruelty) is not justified,but is so ascribedto human beingsthat God cannotbe held responsibleforit. This combinationevades my thirdcriticismof the precedingsolution. . The freewillsolutionalso involvesthe precedingsolutionat a higherlevel. To explain why a whollygood God gave men freewillalthoughit would lead to some importantevils,it must be argued that it is betteron the whole that men should act freely,and sometimeserr,than that they should be innocent automata,actingrightly in a whollydetermined way. Freedom, that is to say, is now treatedas a thirdordergood,and as being morevaluable than second ordergoods (such as sympathyand heroism)would be if theywere deterministically produced,and it is beingassumedthat secondorderevils,such as cruelty,are of freedom,just as pain is logicallynecessaryaccompaniments a logicallynecessarypre-condition of sympathy.

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I thinkthat this solutionis unsatisfactory primarilybecause of the incoherenceof the notionof freedomof the will: but I cannotdiscussthis topic adequatelyhere,althoughsome of my willtouchupon it. criticisms First I should query the assumptionthat second orderevils are logicallynecessaryaccompanimentsof freedom. I should ask this: if God has made men such that in theirfreechoices theysometimespreferwhatis good and sometimeswhat is evil, why could he not have made men such that they always freelychoose the good ? If thereis no logicalimpossibilityin a man'sfreelychoosingthe good on one,or on several,occasions, therecannotbe a logicalimpossibility in his freelychoosingthe good on everyoccasion. God was not,then,facedwitha choice betweenmakinginnocentautomata and makingbeingswho,in acting freely,would sometimesgo wrong: there was open to himthe obviouslybetterpossibilityofmakingbeingswhowould act freelybut always go right. Clearly,his failureto avail himselfof this possibilityis inconsistentwith his being both omnipotent and whollygood. If it is repliedthatthisobjectionis absurd,thatthe makingof some wrongchoicesis logicallynecessaryfor freedom,it would seem that 'freedom' must here mean completerandomnessor indeterminacy, includingrandomnesswithregardto the alternatives good and evil, in otherwords that men's choices and consequentactions can be " free" only if they are not determinedby theircharacters. Only on this assumptioncan God formen'sactions; forifhe made them escape the responsibility as theyare, but did not determinetheirwrongchoices,thiscan only be because the wrongchoicesare not determinedby men as theyare. But thenif freedomis randomness, how can it be a characteristicof will? And, still more,how can it be the mostimportantgood ? What value or meritwouldtherebe in freechoicesif these wererandomactionswhichwerenot determinedby the natureof the agent? I concludethat to make this solutionplausibletwo different senses of 'freedom' must be confused,one sense which will justifytheviewthatfreedomis a thirdordergood,morevaluable than othergoods would be withoutit, and anothersense,sheer to preventus fromascribingto God a decisionto randomness, make men such that they sometimesgo wrongwhenhe might have made themsuch that theywouldalwaysfreelygo right. to dispose of this solution. But This criticismis sufficient in the notionof an besidesthisthereis a fundamentaldifficulty omnipotentGod creatingmen withfreewill,forif men's wills 14

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are really freethis must mean that even.God cannot control them,that is, that God is no longeromnipotent. It may be objectedthat God's giftof freedomto men does not mean that he cannotcontroltheirwills,but that he always refrainsfrom controllingtheir wills. But why, we may ask, should God refrainfromcontrollingevil wills? Why should he not leave men free to will rightly,but intervenewhen he sees them beginningto willwrongly? If God could do this,but does not, and ifhe is whollygood,the onlyexplanationcouldbe that even a wrongfreeact of will is not reallyevil, that its freedomis a value whichoutweighsits wrongness,so that there-would be a loss of value if God took away the wrongnessand the freedom together. But thisis utterlyopposedto whattheistssay about sin in othercontexts. The presentsolutionof the problemof evil,then,can be maintainedonlyin theformthat God has made menso freethat he cannotcontroltheirwills. This leads us to what I call the Paradox of Omnipotence: can an omnipotentbeing make thingswhichhe cannot subsequently control? Or, what is practicallyequivalent to this, can an omnipotentbeingmake rules whichthen bind himself? (These are practicallyequivalentbecause any such rules could be regardedas settingcertainthingsbeyond his control,and is relevantto the viceversa.) The secondof theseformulations suggestionsthat we have alreadymet,that an omnipotentGod createsthe rules of logic or causal laws, and is then bound by them. It is clear that this is a paradox: the questionscannot be or in the negaeitherin the affirmative answeredsatisfactorily tive. If we answer "Yes ", it followsthat if God actually makes thingswhich he cannot control,or makes rules which bind himself,he is not omnipotentonce he has made them: there are thenthingswhichhe cannot do. But if we answer " No ", we are immediatelyassertingthat there are things which he cannot do, that is to say that he is already not omnipotent. It cannotbe repliedthat the questionwhichsets thisparadox is not a properquestion. It would make perfectlygood sense to say that a human mechanichas made a machinewhichhe about the question cannot control: if there is any difficulty itself. it lies in the notionof omnipotence This, incidentally,shows that althoughwe have approached this paradox fromthe freewill theory,it is equally a problem for a theologicaldeterminist.No one thinks that machines have freewill,yet theymay well be beyondthe controlof their

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makers. The determinist mightreplythat anyone who makes anythingdeterminesits ways of acting,and so determinesits subsequentbehaviour: even the humanmechanicdoes this by his choiceof materialsand structureforhis machine,thoughhe does not kmowall about eitherof these: the mechanicthus determines,thoughhe may not foresee,his machine'sactions. and since his creationof thingsis And since God is omniscient, total, he both determinesand foreseesthe ways in whichhis creatureswillact. We maygrantthis,but it is besidethe point. The question is not whetherGod originallydeterminedthe futureactionsof his creatures,but whetherhe can subsequently controltheir actions, or whetherhe was able in his original creationto put thingsbeyondhis subsequentcontrol. Even on deterministprinciplesthe answers " Yes " and " No " are withGod's omnipotence. equallyirreconcilable Beforesuggestinga solutionof this paradox, I would point out that thereis a parallelParadox of Sovereignty. Can a legal sovereignmake a law restrictingits own future legislative power? For example,could the Britishparliamentmake a law forbidding any futureparliamentto socialisebanking,and also forbiddingthe futurerepeal of this law itself? Or could the Britishparliament,whichwas legallysovereignin Australiain, say, 1899,pass a valid law, or seriesof laws, whichmade it no longersovereignin 1933 ? Again, neitherthe affirmative nor the negative answer is really satisfactory.If we were to answer " Yes ", we should be admittingthe validityof a law which,if it were actually made, would mean that parliament was no longer sovereign. If we were to answer "No ", we should be admittingthat thereis a law, not logicallyabsurd, whichparliamentcannotvalidlymake,that is, that parliament is not now a legal sovereign. This paradox can be solved in the followingway. We should distinguishbetweenfirstorder the actionsofindividualsand bodies laws,thatis laws governing otherthan the legislature,and second orderlaws, that is laws about laws, laws,governingthe actionsof the legislatureitself. we shoulddistinguish twoordersofsovereignty, Correspondingly, first order sovereignty(sovereignty(1)) which is unlimited authorityto make firstorderlaws,and secondordersovereignty (sovereignty(2)) whichis unlimitedauthorityto make second orderlaws. If we say that parliamentis sovereignwe might mean that any parliamentat any time has sovereignty(1), or we mightmean that parliamenthas both sovereignty(1) and sovereignty (2) at present,but we cannotwithoutcontradiction mean both that the presentparliamenthas sovereignty(2) and

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(1), forif that everyparliamentat everytime has soyereignty (2) it may use it to take the presentparliamenthas sovereignty away the sovereignty(1) of laterparliaments. What the parainstitution dox showsis that we cannotascribeto any continuing in an inclusivesense. legal sovereignty showsthat The analogybetweenomnipotence and sovereignty the paradox of omnipotencecan be solved in a similarway. We muistdistinguishbetwee'nfirstorder omnipotence(omnipotence (1)), that is unlimitedpowerto act, and second order omnipotence(omnipotence(2)), that is unlimitedpower to determinewhatpowersto act thingsshallhave. Thenwe could say that God all the timehas omnipotence(1), but consistently of if so no beingsat any timehave powersto act independently God. Or we could say that God at one timehad omnipotence (2), and used it to assignindependentpowersto act to certain things,so that God thereafterdid not have omnipotence(1). But what the paradox shows is that we cannot consistently in an inclusivesense. beingomnipotence ascribeto anycontinuing An alternativesolutionof this paradox would be simplyto deny that God is a continuingbeing,that any times can be assignedto his actions at all. But on this assumption(which also has difficulties of its own) no meaningcan be givento the assertionthat God made menwithwillsso freethathe couldnot controlthem. The paradox of omnipotencecan be avoided by puttingGod outsidetime,but the freewillsolutionof the problem of evil cannotbe saved in this way, and equally it remains impossibleto hold that an omnipotentGod binds himselfby causal or logical laws. Convclusion Ofthe proposedsolutionsoftheproblemofevil whichwe have examined,none has stood up to criticism. Theremay be other solutionswhich require examination,but this study strongly suggeststhatthereis novalidsolutionoftheproblemwhichdoesnot in a waywhich propositions modifyat least oneoftheconstituent wouldseriouslyaffectthe essentialcore of the theisticposition. Quite apart fromthe problemof evil, the paradox of omnipotencehas shownthat God's omnipotencemustin any case be restrictedin one way or another,that unqualifiedomnipotence cannot be ascribedto any beingthat continuesthroughtime. or And if God and his actionsare not in time,can omnipotence, ascribedto him? powerof any sort,be meaningfully ofSydney University