EXTRAORDINARY GOVERNANCE & NON-TRADITIONAL LEADERS: A STUDY OF THREE URBAN SCHOOL SYSTEMS

A Group Research Paper by Sarah Alvord (Harvard Graduate School of Education, M.Ed ‟11), Erica Harrison (Harvard Law School & Harvard Kennedy School, JD/MPP ‟12), Elizabeth Press (Harvard Graduate School of Education, M.Ed ‟11), Jessica Tucker (Harvard Law School, JD ‟11)

Presented to Professor Jal Mehta As a course assignment for Introduction to Education Policy Harvard Graduate School of Education

(DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION)

1 HISTORY & CONTEXT—EXTRAORDINARY REFORM IN URBAN SCHOOL DISTRICTS Urban school district reform is a complex work in progress. Local, state and federal leaders long have looked to city schools to be places where the concentrated challenges of cities—poverty, racism, high unemployment, and crime—can be addressed. Strong urban schools at the beginning of the twenty first century are just as essential a resource for cities as they were at the turn of the twentieth century. From each major district reform movement, reformers seek successful strategies, look for recurring weaknesses and breaking points, and assess how issues of scale and sustainability fare. Our research looks at full system reform efforts rather than smaller policy experiments or pilot efforts within segments of a system. From this standpoint, we examine three districts—Chicago, Philadelphia and New Orleans—which underwent extraordinary reforms in the past two decades. The historical context for our analysis of the strengths and sustaining factors of urban reforms can best be organized around five themes—civic capacity, business involvement, governance structures, resource management, and organizational leadership capacity for improving learning for all students. The importance of our five organizing themes has been well documented (e.g., Cuban & Usdan, 2003; Boyd, Kerchner & Blyth, 2008 ). However, the work of Clarence Stone and his colleagues (2001) provides a deeper framing of how stakeholders who represent various positions across the five issues areas interact within the context of educational reform. In a “comparative study of urban school reform, Stone and his colleagues found that cities with high levels of civic capacity were far more successful in designing, implementing, and sustaining meaningful reform than cities that lacked coordinated civic involvement” (Gold et al, 2007). Stone (2001) asserts that “in education especially, civic capacity is about mobilizing various segments of the community to become engaged in considering and acting upon a problem in a way that is out of the ordinary” and “to be lasting, civic capacity needs an institutional foundation for interaction among elites and a "grass roots" base through which ordinary citizens are engaged.” Stone (ibid.) goes on to say: In many ways, civic cooperation is inherently unstable, especially when it operates out of the ordinary. Unlike the conventional social capital described by Putnam, civic capacity may not be self-replenishing. The public nature of civic capacity and its connection to

2 issues that are potentially controversial mean that a spirit of cooperation can be speedily eroded. To the extent that civic capacity rests on a narrow foundation of elite cooperation, it is vulnerable to quick collapse. Though representatives of institutional interests and group leaders may develop good interpersonal relationships, they are never simply individuals learning to cooperate with one another. The public stage on which they perform is centrally important. Below, we provide brief historical context for educational reform in each of the three places--Chicago, Philadelphia and New Orleans—weaving together themes of community engagement, business involvement, governance, resources and leadership. Chicago. After U.S. Secretary of Education Bill Bennett‟s 1987 declaration of Chicago as the worst school system in the nation, the Chicago Tribune began a long series highlighting what was going on in the district to bring the public‟s attention to the urgency of the problem (Schwartz, 2010). While the newspaper began to highlight the disastrous circumstances on the ground, major efforts had already been underway in both the business community and in the neighborhoods. 

Community engagement: Two strong advocacy research organizations, one with deep links to grassroots organizing efforts in the city, Design for Change, and one focused on school financing, Chicago Panel on School Policy and Finance, had been documenting the failures of the system and building the case for radical reform (Schwartz, 2010). While the 1988 legislation was a joint bottom up/top down effort, the 1995 legislation providing mayoral control was not—business groups worked closely with the Mayor and left most of the “community” out (Schwartz, 2010). The one “community representation” construct that remained in the 1995 law was Local School Councils (“LSCs”), but they became subject to the oversight of the CEO (Shipps, 2003).



Business involvement: Chicago United, “a business group concerned about social issues in the city” had undertaken a major study of the school system in 1981 and “made 253 recommendations for change, addressing everything from audio-visual repairs to student absenteeism” (Moore, 2003). Six years later, none of their recommendations had been addressed. Chicago‟s business community remained politically strong and worked carefully with Mayor Daley in 1995 to put into place a “corporate structure” for CPS.



Governance: Soon after a 1987 month-long teacher‟s union strike, Mayor Harold Washington, the first African-American mayor of Chicago, convened an Education Summit, where business and grassroots groups came together to focus on radical decentralization which led to the 1988 state legislation. Five years later, a “Republican legislature and Republican governor, thoroughly

3 disappointed with both the cost and performance of CPS, put Mayor Richard M. Daley, in charge of the school system (Shipps, 2003). 

Resources: The city struggled with financial mismanagement and resource scarcity for years. Neither the 1988 nor 1995 legislation provided any new financial resources for the city‟s schools. At the same time, the „90s was a decade of significant investment by philanthropic organizations into Chicago school reform.



Leadership: Between 1988 and 1995, the interim school board appoints two superintendents—Ted Kimbrough, an outsider from California, and Argie Johnson, a veteran of the New York City school system, but neither could make changes to central office necessary for the scale of change needed. Strongly backed by the business community, Daley chose Paul Vallas, a “non-traditional, business savvy leader,” renaming the superintendent‟s title as CEO and built a senior team of non-educators (Shipps, 2003).

Philadelphia. The history leading up to legislative action in 2000 (which threatened a state takeover of Philadelphia‟s schools) is one of a district leader, a mayor, a city council, and major foundation efforts to put a cutting edge standards-based reform effort in place. Philadelphia‟s difficulty in maintaining reform momentum can be traced to the “ongoing challenges to civic capacity around education” (Boyd & Christman, 2003). 

Community engagement: When Superintendent David Hornebeck arrived with his ambitious plan for standards-based reform, he was supported by many community groups, having credibility as a civil rights activist and minister by training (Schwartz, 2010). He arrived however to a community of civic leaders that were “disengaged” and “confined their civic duties to the level of good works” (Whiting & Proscio, 1999). There was not strong community momentum for reform, nor were there strong large coalitions to take up the charge.



Business community: Unlike the business supporters in Chicago, Philadelphia‟s business leaders did not take a serious role in education reform and were seen as “fragmented and unwilling or unable to take real leadership in confronting the fundamental challenges to the city” (Whiting & Proscio, 1999).



Governance structure: During his eight-year tenure, Mayor Ed Rendell was a “silent partner” of education reform in the city (Boyd & Christman, 2003). The school board was deeply divided down racial lines, and Rendell worked hard to move forward in collaboration with Hornebeck given these tensions. However, in 1998, Hornebeck “threatened to adopt an unbalanced budget if the state does not provide needed funds” and this conflict sets off a major battle between the Governor, state

4 legislature and the city which result[ed] in the 2000 Education Empowerment Act, laying the groundwork for state takeover and prompting Philadelphia‟s school board to adopt a “corporate style of district management” (Boyd & Christman, 2003). 

Resources: While the business community remained relatively unengaged, there was some support for Hornebeck‟s reforms from “Greater Philadelphia First,” a group of business leaders. During the late 1980s and 1990s, Pew Charitable Trusts invested heavily in the school system, starting first with small schools effort. The William Penn Foundation then took the lead as Pew stepped back (Useem, 2010).



Leadership: In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Superintendent Connie Clayton, a well-respected African-American woman who had grown up through the system, had overseen a period of relative calm even though student achievement was poor. When David Hornebeck, a primary architect of the Kentucky Education Reform Act (KERA), arrived in 1994, he enthusiastically rolled out a major reform initiative—“Children Achieving” (Christman, 2003). While solid from an educational perspective, he could not overcome significant political barriers nor could he garner the substantial funding necessary to implement the “ambitious plan” (ibid.). He also was unable to engage support for the reforms from the old industrial style union with a long history of striking, and battled with union leadership around issues of increasing teacher accountability. After losing support of the board and Mayor Street, Hornebeck resigned in June 2000 (Christman, 2003).

New Orleans. In a report reviewing the issues and challenges of New Orleans school system pre-Katrina, a leading scholar “characterizes the system as one of aggressive neglect”—it was likely the worst in the country with only a quarter of eighth grade students proficient in reading and 15% proficient in math” (Simmons & Raynor, 2006). The cities‟ 115 antiquated buildings were almost all in disrepair. 

Community Engagement: New Orleans was a community rich in its community and cultural history, but deeply divided along racial and socioeconomic lines. Prior to the storm, parents and community groups felt disenfranchised from the schools, were overwhelmed with failure and didn‟t have models of success to motivate change efforts (Simmons & Raynor, 2006).



Business Involvement: The New Orleans School District (referred to as OPSB) had a long, entrenched history of corruption and few business or foundations were interested in providing support when there were no good systems of accountability for such investments.



Governance: During a regular 2003 legislative session, the LA legislature created the Recovery School District (“RSD”), which would be administered by the state and take over failing schools. Just after Hurricane Katrina, the legislature made it easier for failing schools to be included. The

5 State Superintendent and Board of Secondary and Elementary Education (“BESE”) select the leadership of the RSD, who reports to these state officials, not a city board or mayor (Cowen Institute for Public Education Initiatives, 2010). 

Resources: The system was in constant financial crisis. In 2005, just prior to the hurricane, external consultants were hired to help the district address a $30 million budget deficit (Simmons & Raynor, 2006). In addition, investment of outside funds increased dramatically after the Hurricane.



Leadership: Pre-Katrina, “over a three-year span, four different superintendents led the district” (Simmons & Raynor, 2006). The OPSB was widely seen as a corrupt, highly politicized school district that crushed even capable leaders.

Conclusion. The history of urban education reform in the last two decades of the twentieth century, especially in those districts in desperate need of reform like the three we investigate, highlights several different challenges that reformists attempt to address: the depth of dysfunction and corruption of old style governance structures, the mismanagement and misdirection of financial resources, the mismatch of leaders brought up through educational systems without the business skills needed to run multi-million dollar organizations, and lack of community voice and parent groups who were rarely organized enough to influence change in large bureaucratic systems. What is different today in comparison to these past debates is that reformists now understand that the most successful efforts are not just looking at the sustainable “components” in a system—like civic capacity—but that the most essential goal of any reform is student achievement, and to increase student achievement, we must be focused on improving teaching and learning. After more than a decade of researching improvement efforts in Chicago, Tony Bryk and his colleagues agree that improvement efforts which look only at how individual schools impact teaching and learning will not get us the scale of change needed—we must focus on system-level leaders (Bryk, 2010). The progress made in the 1980s and 1990s helped lay the foundation for reform approaches where governance, leadership, resources, and community engagement are all focused in service of student learning.

6 THE POLICY OF RADICAL REFORM IN LARGE URBAN SCHOOL DISTRICTS Large urban school districts are notoriously difficult to reform. Whereas some districts choose an incremental approach to district reform, other districts like Chicago Public Schools (“CPS”), School District of Philadelphia (“SDP”), and the Recovery School District (“RSD”) in New Orleans make sweeping, rapid, and extraordinary changes in the pursuit of reform. In each of these cities there was a pivotal event that changed the face of the district and its operations. In Chicago it was the School Reform Act of 1988. In Philadelphia, it was the Declaration of Distress in 2001, and in New Orleans it was a combination of the formation of RSD in 2003 and Hurricane Katrina in 2005. All three events dramatically changed the operations of their respective school districts. Each of these cities responded to an educational emergency in their respective districts with a dramatic shift in governance structure, supported by the state containing each districts. In Chicago, the School Reform Act almost totally decentralized CPS district. In Philadelphia, the state wrested control of the school board and replaced it with a jointly appointed state and district School Reform Commission (“SRC”) and in New Orleans the RSD, which was originally intended to take control of the few worst performing schools in Orleans Parish Schools (OPS), was given control of the vast majority of public schools left intact after Katrina. In order to manage their new governance structure, all three districts adopted a business model approach to operational reform. They also appointed a results-oriented CEO to run the district efficiently. Paul Vallas, in particular, has been Chief Executive Officer CEO in each of these cities. His “take no prisoners” management style was a stabilizing force for the tumultuous climate present in each of these districts after their governance shifts. The policy research throughout this essay contextualizes Vallas‟ tenure by documenting the policies that came before, during and after his term as CEO. Chicago Public Schools (CPS) Reform Phase One

(1988-1995)

In 1988, the School Reform Act radically shifted the governance structure of CPS. The legislation called for a dissembling of the board, end to principal tenure, end to teacher seniority rights, and the formation

7 of Local School Councils (“LSCs”). The LSCs wrested some powers from central office by having certain powers: -

Hire and fire principals Approve and influence school budgets using state and federal funds Make curricular decisions

The LSCs were formed in hopes of reducing the corruption evident at central, empower communities, increase accountability of principals, teachers and students, and improve efficiency by targeting resources based on school needs. The results of the reform were mixed. About half of the district‟s 181 failing schools made dramatic improvement while the other half of failing schools languished (Herir, 2010). Tom Herir, who was assistant superintendent from 1990-1993 explains that these failing LSCs had the same problems with corruption, ineptitude, and inefficiency that central office had (2010). The continued failure of these schools led to Phase Two of CPS reform (Simmons, 2005). Phase Two (1995-2001) In 1995, CPS shifted its governance from superintendency to mayoral control with the addition of a CEO position. Vallas‟ theory of action was that if CPS got the lowest performing schools to improve that the district would be more attractive to white middle class families, which were leaving the system in drove in the 1990‟s (Simmons, 2005). Mayor Daley also brought Paul Vallas on to improve the schools that continue to fail under the LSC model. He decided that CPS was overly decentralized, so he reclaimed control of various functions for central including authority over construction and renovation efforts. His administration also negotiated a four year contract with the union, pushed for the 1996 Illinois Charter Law, and implemented test-based accountability for schools (Simmons, 2005). All of these reforms were relatively successful in improving efficiency, but had mixed effects on student achievement (Simmons, 2005). Steve Tozer (2010), professor of education at the University of Illinois Chicago, cited lack of capacity building as the source of Vallas‟ failure to dramatically improve performance on the standardized tests. Tozer also noted that Vallas lacked understanding of the human capital problem endemic in CPS. If Vallas had better addressed the human capital issue by offering instructional supports, Tozer claims, he would have been far more successful at improving student incomes (2010).

8 The mixed results may also be attributable to Vallas‟ other reform efforts. Vallas put 147 elementary schools on probation in 1996 due to poor academic performance, pressured schools to improve performance on high-stakes tests, and instituted a new retention policy based on student‟s IOWA scores (Simmons, 2005). These initiatives did not significantly improve student outcomes. In 2001, Mayor Daley decided that due to insufficient progress, he fired Vallas and hired Arne Duncan, ushering in Phase Three of reform. Phase Three (2001-2010) Arne Duncan came to the CEO office with specific reforms in mind to improve district performance on test scores. His arrival coincided with the passage of NCLB, which made his emphasis on test scores much more palatable to schools and teachers. Steve Tozer noted that Duncan succeeded in raising test scores where Vallas failed because he acknowledged and addressed the human capital problem in CPS with professional development for teachers, a more selective hiring process, and funds for instructional materials (2010). Yet under Duncan, the gap between low-performing schools and high performing schools narrowed while the worst performing schools continued to get worse. Duncan has been widely criticized for his lack of attention to CPS‟s worst schools, but his successes with other schools can be attributed to district wide reforms created to improve student achievement (Simmons, 2005): -

Professional development for teachers, especially in reading and math Increased funding for early childhood education Reduced class size in grades 1-3 Created “contract schools” which operate similarly to charter schools (Herir, 2010) to get around the charter school cap of the Illinois Charter Law (1996) Placed 40% of schools on probation Renaissance 2010 Plan

This last reform, Renaissance 2010, was Duncan‟s attempt to implement a pilot portfolio district within CPS. The Renaissance schools were born of 60 school closings and 100 school openings on the south side of Chicago. Most of the new schools were charter or contract schools (Hill, 2009). Contract schools are schools that are operated and staffed by a non-profit, but have a LSC-like structure in place for parents and community members to participate in school governance. Results of the program were mixed; only 45

9 schools made improvements and 44 schools showed declines in test scores (Hill et al, 2009). The current CEO, Ron Huberman, has continued the Renaissance 2010 program and has shown interest in expanding the model district-wide (CPS website, 2010). School District of Philadelphia (SDP) Due to chronic system failure in the 1990s, the state used the Declaration of Distress to transfer control of governance from the school board in the district to the School Reform Commission (SRC). The Declaration of Distress gave the state control over: -

Hiring of a CEO Hiring of non-certified staff Reconstitution of failing schools and the ability to fire staff Hiring of for-profit firms to take over select schools Converting some district schools to charter schools Reallocation of resources Turning over control of certain schools to local universities

Once the governance shift had taken place, the district hired Paul Vallas as CEO. Kyle Wedberg, former Deputy Chief Financial Officer of Philadelphia, noted that this was the first of its kind in the nation, so the board was looking for someone with experience in a large district and that had experience with sweeping change. This made Vallas an attractive candidate (Wedberg, 2010). Vallas implemented a variety of reforms as part of a comprehensive five-year plan for SDP (Philadelphia School Notebook, 2010): -

Mandatory extended day programs for non-proficient children Mandatory summer school for non-proficient students Magnet programs with AP and IB courses available Middle schools converted to K-8 schools Introduction of “Quality Review Teams” that consisted of central office administrators, regional staff, and school based staff to support struggling schools

Vallas experienced mixed success yet again, mostly because there was significant in-fighting at the School Reform Commission which made implementation difficult (Hess et al, 2010, p.105). One factor that helped him to be successful was an initially stable funding stream provided by the state (Kahn, 2010). Prior to the SRC, lack of funding was an endemic problem within SDP. Despite the funding stream, however, there remained a human capital hindrance to improvement. There were many teacher vacancies

10 in the district, so Teach For America (“TFA”) was contracted to fill positions. There were also few highquality teachers working in the district and SDP had significant difficulty recruiting teachers from other districts (Hess et al, 2010, p106). Thus, even if Vallas was interested in capacity building for teachers, human resource deficits made instructional reform difficult, if not impossible. In 2005 Vallas moved on to New Orleans. New Orleans and the Recovery School District After Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans was devastated in every way. The school facilities were decimated, the teachers union was disbanded, and not one school in the district retained its entire staff (Hill et al, 2009). Although this devastation negatively impacted communities, it also created a unique opportunity to apply innovation to what was previously a failing school system. Vallas was hired to take over as head of the Recovery School District in 2005. The RSD was established prior to the storm in 2003-- intended to intervene in the state‟s lowest performing schools-but after the storm, the RSD was given control of most Orleans Parish schools (Hill, 2009). Initially, Vallas attempted reform with similar policy tools to those he used in Chicago and Philadelphia with a few additions that were only possible because of relative freedom Vallas was given to try any potential reform he liked. As CEO of the RSD, Vallas implemented the following reforms: -

Recruited hard-working and intelligent teachers from outside the district Fired teachers within the district that failed to improved Opened alternative schools, like Booker T. Washington, to accommodate students that were years behind in their academic skills level (Merrow & Vallas, 2008) Brought in national CMOs (Charter Management Organizations) that are consistently successful

Vallas was motivated to invite these unconventional schooling providers because the district schools were underperforming relative to charter schools within OPS. In fact, he found that according to testing data, the best performing schools in the district were charter schools. Consequently, according to Penny Dastugue (President of the Lousiana State Board of Education), Vallas agreed to charter out as many district schools as possible (2010). Currently, 65% of schools in New Orleans proper are charter schools (Dastugue, 2010). Vallas orchestrated contracts with established charter and alternative certification organizations. KIPP (Knowledge is Power Program) and New Teachers for New Schools, have been

11 especially influential. The result was that Vallas transformed the role of the district from the provider of schooling to the broker of schooling (Hill et al, 2009). Since the formation of a charter-based district, the New Orleans School District has improved dramatically. Parents are more satisfied with their children‟s schooling and they appreciate the school choices available to them. The stakes are high for charter schools in New Orleans. Schools that do not demonstrate high student achievement have a short time frame to improve before they face closure. The result of which is an obsession with immediate results and proof of success (Hill, 2009). Many argue that the sense of urgency in New Orleans is the root cause of the district‟s success (Dastugue, 2010). Policy Conclusion Chicago, Philadelphia, and New Orleans have all undergone dramatic shifts of governance in response to systemic educational failure in each city. After these dramatic shifts—School Reform Act (1988), Declaration of Distress (2001) and Hurricane Katrina (2005)—a strong leader was required to stabilize the system. These districts sought stabilization by appointing a CEO to run the district, a position formerly relegated to business. Paul Vallas has filled that position in all three cities. Vallas‟ bold approach to urban reform had mixed success in each city, much like the reform strategies that preceded and succeeded him. The results of these policy shifts indicate two things about urban school reform: 1.)

Some low-performing large urban districts require sweeping changes in governance and

strong unconventional leaders to enable real change to happen—which appeared to be the case for Chicago, Philadelphia and New Orleans 2.)

Changes in governance and strong leadership are not enough to accomplish the goal of

radical reform—improved student achievement—without capacity building that changes the daily experiences of children in classrooms. Although these cities have been successful at improving public schooling (to varying degrees), they still have work to do in order to realize the vision of high-performing urban public schooling. These cities still need to address issues of instructional capacity, but hopefully these districts are working toward building capacity of teachers and administrators to improve conditions within schools.

12 CONTEMPORARY POLITICS OF URBAN REFORM In each of these cities, the same reform advocates and opponents served as political influencers. Such repetition makes it reasonable to conclude that these influencers may participate in contemporary reforms. Thus, it is wise for current and future reformers to analyze the influencers‟ roles and respective power in order to guide future decision-making and coalition-building. Because many of these influencers flip-flopped between advocate and opponent depending on the city, it is particularly important to consider the differentiated circumstances. Opportunities for change and key takeaways are identified throughout. Business Communities - Advocates Because Paul Vallas used a business-like strategy for these systemic reforms, it is not surprising that each city‟s business community helped implement and fund education reform. Typically, the business community assists in two ways: (1) it helps address the high financial needs of systemic turnaround and (2) it influences the responses of both politicians and the media. Business leaders acted as financial supporters in Chicago where they helped finance the construction and renovation of hundreds of schools (Cuban & Usdan, 2003). The Chicago business community‟s support also positively influenced Chicago Public School‟s achievement of five successive bond rating increases. New Orleans reform reveals the business community‟s capacity to influence constituencies. New Orleans Business Council members are heavily involved by donating significant money to pro-reform candidates, serving on charter school boards, and, as one New Orleans education insider described, exerting direct pressure over education leaders and media thereby serving as a “shadow government” (Anonymous, 2010). Coalitions of Teach For America Alumni Non-Profits - Advocates During and after the initial transformation period, each city actively recruited new talent. The primary new talent sources were non-traditional teaching programs like Teach For America, Inc. (“TFA”). Chicago first accepted TFA teachers in 2000 and Philadelphia welcomed TFA in 2003 (both during Vallas‟ tenure) (Teach For America, 2010). Though New Orleans welcomed TFA long before

13 Vallas‟ arrival, the New Orleans corps grew rapidly during his tenure (Read, 2008). The three cities are also home to The New Teacher Project (“TNTP”) programs which helps certify non-traditional teachers through both TFA and Teaching Fellow programs (The New Teacher Project, 2010). TNTP was founded by Michelle Rhee, a TFA alumna and the recent Chancellor of D.C. Public Schools (Ripley, 2008). Similarly, New Leaders for New Schools (a training program for future urban principals) is currently incubating school principals in both Chicago and New Orleans. Many of these principals are recruited directly from the TFA ranks (Teach For America, n.d.). Foundations - Advocates Business-like systemic overhauls are expensive, so foundations and philanthropic organizations are often heavily involved. During Vallas‟ Chicago tenure and Hornebeck‟s Philadelphia tenure, the Annenberg Foundation donated $50 million challenge grants, and both cities were able match for $100 million investments in the school systems (Tozer, 2010; Useem, 2010). Yet even a philanthropic investment of this scale was unable to produce capacity in either of the systems. As a result, in Chicago, foundations became wary of general donations and instead began to pick pet areas (Tozer, 2010). PostKatrina, New Orleans has received millions of foundation dollars for reform and many of these funds support specific initiatives including the coalition of TFA-related organizations (Maxwell, 2007). Time will reveal whether this money is better spent than it was in Chicago or Philadelphia. However, at a minimum, the foundation support of New Orleans draws attention to the city and highlights continued reform post-Katrina. Opportunity for Change: It is important to remember that large influxes of money give cities the opportunity to cover expensive reform start-up costs and to garner national media attention, but grants are not always aligned with district goals and money is not always used wisely. Therefore, foundation involvement and donations need to be actively “managed” (Useem, 2010). Also, because foundations seem smitten with the TFA coalition, foundation funding may be sacrificed in anti-TFA districts.

Teacher Unions – Advocates and Opponents

14 As with any school reform, teacher unions were important influencers in the cities‟ reform efforts. Though our highlighted cities illustrate that unions are somewhat willing to work with receptive reformers, they also demonstrate a trend toward eventual clashing objectives. In Chicago, Vallas was able to secure two successive four-year contracts with the union (Cuban & Usdan, 2003) which included “significant” union concessions regarding the previously “sacrosanct” issues of seniority and transfer (Schwartz, 2010). However, toward the end of the Vallas era, the union elected Debbie Lynch, the “antiVallas” candidate, as president (Russo, 2003). Similarly, Vallas successfully courted the union and secured a “better” contract for Philadelphia in 2004 (Useem, 2010). Yet, the end of his tenure was marred by union anger over pay for performance and school choice efforts (Wedberg, 2010). In New Orleans, the local union was effectively wiped out by Hurricane Katrina. Louisiana state unions (LAE and LFT) have openly opposed the reforms pre- and post-Vallas, but they have had little success combating the strong political pro-reform coalitions in Louisiana state government (Whittinghill, 2010). Key Takeaway: Based on the limited scope of this study, it is unclear whether large urban teacher unions can ever be successfully courted by reformers for long periods of time. The seemingly inevitable clashes may, in fact, be avoidable if certain concessions are made. However, systemic reformers like Vallas are often unwilling to make amends. Therefore, the takeaway lesson seems to be – work fast. The courting period is short and unions are formidable opponents. Play nice while you can and then implement reforms which anticipate a union re-grab of power. Politicians – Advocates and Opponents Because these systemic reforms require a governance change, politicians are required to build coalitions around, draft, and pass the necessary legislative changes. Some politicians are opposed to systemic school reform because of privatization fears or union pressure, yet there are also strong political advocates of extraordinary reforms (Anonymous, 2010). These reform politicians are from both parties and multiple levels of government. In Chicago, the pre-Vallas stage-setting reforms were largely led by Mayor Daley and other Democrats (Herir, 2010); in both Philadelphia and New Orleans, Republicans initiated reform efforts, but bi-partisan political support was strong (Kahn, 2010; Anonymous, 2010).

15 High-positioned political leaders also supported reform. In New Orleans, Senator Mary Landrieu has played a key role by (1) helping to recruit Paul Vallas (Martin, 2010) and (2) by exerting behind-thescenes pressure on key Democratic legislators to vote for pro-reform legislation (Anonymous, 2010). Additionally, Governor Bobby Jindal, the State Board of Education, and the State Superintendent of Education all act as a coalition of key advocates for continued efforts in New Orleans (Dastugue, 2010). Similarly, Philadelphia and Chicago have both seen significant involvement by their governors, mayors, state legislators, and state-created education boards (Kahn, 2010; Herir, 2010). Key Takeaway: Though pro-business, free market ideas are typically associated with conservative politicians, it is not safe to assume that business-like education reform advocates will all be conservatives or even from within a given district. Systemic reformers should actively court and engage both parties and all high-level officials that show interest in order to maximize effectiveness. Community Groups – Advocates and Opponents Like unions, community groups are inevitable players in school reform. However, it is often difficult to clearly determine whether they are pro- or anti-reform. In Chicago, community groups played both roles. They helped to advocate for increased services (e.g., special education) and offered early reforms support (Herir, 2010), but they became increasingly critical of the “lack of transparency” (Cuban & Usdan, 2003). Philadelphia community groups were initially quite eager for the Vallas-created stability (Kahn, 2010), but they did not want to follow Edison School‟s suggestions regarding privately-run schools (Greenblatt, 2005). Because of his efforts to know the community groups and operate collaboratively (Useem, 2010), Vallas responded to these desires (e.g., cancelling an $18 million Edison, Inc. contract) (Travers, 2003). In New Orleans, it is hard to determine where the community as a whole stands on the reform efforts because community groups “are not engaged at the system level” (Martin, 2010). However, New Orleans is a “liberated, but oppressed place at the exact same time” so much of the community is suspicious about the state‟s takeover of schools (Martin, 2010). Opportunity for Change: Community groups seem to have as much power as they are granted. Therefore, the level of community engagement is largely decided by the openness of reformers and key

16 strategy decisions must be made. Involving the community may build civic capacity, prevent bad press, and lessen political pushback, but appeasing all parties is ultimately impossible and attempts may slow overall progress. The power and sophistication of the groups seems likely to influence this balancing of interests. If they are less powerful, like in New Orleans, reformers should worry less about pushback and, instead, only consider the moral implications of excluding communities from the reforms. Political Barriers As discussed in previous sections, outdated laws and traditional governance structures often serve as politically-created barriers to systemic reform. However, each of the three cities successfully changed governance structures (often with state-level assistance). In turn, they were able to try radically different operational structures with far less constraints on their ability to innovate or adapt. Sustainable funding is an additional political barrier and may exist initially or surface as reforms are implemented. Though reformers like Vallas are often able to secure foundation funding and performance contracts, the money can still run out as occurred in Philadelphia where Vallas‟ tenure ended with a $73 million deficit (Mezzacappa, 2008). Similarly, New Orleans‟ inundation of recovery funds has slowed and education leaders disagree about whether the current reforms are sustainable on a regular budget. The State Board‟s President believes that the Recovery School District (“RSD”) has planned well for future sustainability (Dastugue, 2010). Others believe that the current practice of giving RSD schools thousands more per-pupil is sure to go “bust” resulting in massive systemic failures in the near future (Anonymous, 2010). Opportunity for Change: When extraordinary reforms are first beginning, district leaders must create a long-term plan for financial sustainability. If district leaders choose to accept short-term funds (from foundations and business leaders), then they should acknowledge how the one-time funds are used for start-up costs and explain how the district will operate on a traditional budget moving forward. This explanation will garner more faith in the reasonableness of the plan and may quiet some critics.

17 ANALYSIS OF URBAN EDUCATION REFORM & THE CEO-CAO MODEL SOLUTION Urban policies are challenged by how to create new solutions that strive for excellence, incorporate equity, respond to the needs and desires of the local community, and also meet state and federal expectations (Simmons & Raynor, 2006). Our analysis of Chicago, Philadelphia, and New Orleans adds to education reform discussions1 in distinct and meaningful ways: we focus on urban reform choices after extraordinary, change-enabling events; we trace influences of non-traditional education actors; and, we make recommendations from a connected experience of a single implementer, Paul Vallas. Our solution is framed for other non-traditional leaders in similar, opportunity-laden environments.2 We extract lessons to achieve true reform success: a model that can sustain initial achievement gains to produce continual student outcome improvements. Because seven million children attend schools in the 120 largest school districts plagued by failing systems (Haberman, 2003), we argue emphatically that now is the right time to tailor Vallas‟ approaches to a different kind of leadership. Part I Part II-IV Part V Part VI I.

Theory of Change: Creating the CEO-CAO Model Governance, Distribution, and Market Considerations An Alternative Solution to the CEO-CAO Model Final Plea for CEO-CAO Model

Theory of Change: Creating the CEO-CAO Model. Influenced by the seminal work of Tony

Bryk and his colleagues at the Consortium on Chicago School Research (2010), our theory of change is if there is a radical change in governance within an urban district led by individuals focused on (a) operational change and accountability in the short term and (b) instructional capacity to support sustainability in the long term, then the district will be able to turn around low performing schools. To move districts like Chicago, Philadelphia, and New Orleans from operations-based reform to sustainable, high-performing school systems, robust structures of professional development need to be created.3 We recommend districts recruit a unified, two-headed change agent—a strong, savvy CEO accompanied by 1

We are not the first to explicitly compare Chicago, Philadelphia, and New Orleans (see Hess et al, 2010) and we note the different approaches to urban education reform in the above sections. 2 The CEO-CAO Model may benefit comparable districts (see Battersby and Fischel‟s analysis of 70 “competitive” large urban areas by school district concentration and student attendance (2006)). 3 In a personal interview with Steve Tozer, he shares that Vallas may have reached the limits of re-centralization because of Vallas did not commit to professional development for adults (2010).

18 an instruction-oriented chief academic officer (“CAO”). A CEO-CAO Team should replace traditional school boards. Vallas-style reform was pivotal in cities of changed governance because students at highand low-performing schools were targeted and the market for schooling became more efficient. However, the not-so-secret ingredient to truly successful reform depends on improving the existing capacity for onthe-ground actors (Travers, 2003). Thus, a CEO should work closely with an instructional expert to inform strategy and guide implementation of all teaching and learning functions in the system. The CEOCAO Model might succeed where Vallas-style reform failed. II.

Governance and the CEO-CAO Model. The CEO-CAO Model requires a new structure but

contrasts with Chicago, Philadelphia, and New Orleans because it does not charge the CEO to be solely responsible for improving educators while also overhauling the system. We argue that districts need leaders to focus on building instructional capacity if meaningful change is going to happen in the classroom for all kids and districts need operational capacity (Bryk, 2010). Our CEO role is well-suited for non-traditional leaders, just as the three cities benefitted from Vallas. Non-traditional leaders bring advantages: “they are more likely to have the sufficient backgrounds of dealing with organizational performance and change than career educators” (Hill et al., 2009, p. 35). Vallas was hired from Chicago for his “hard-hitting but efficient management approach” (Travers, 2003) which was his reputation (Kahn, 2010). Thus, a CEO-CAO Team can reap political benefits from pairing an attractive leader with a highperforming practitioner. Synchronizing implementation plans can lessen possible school leader confusion about balancing district reform with their professional judgment (Travers, 2003). III.

The CEO-CAO Model’s Distributional Impacts. Any successful systemic reform should reach

all children regardless of their schools‟ ranking on district performance distributions. A CAO accountable for deploying supports and evaluating needs district-wide shows a commitment to improving outcomes even for marginalized students. But reformers must be sensitive to public discomfort in a traditionally insiders-only field. The CEO-CAO Model could benefit from recruiting former principals and experienced leaders into its ranks. With this input, the Team could sensibly make difficult decisions like closing or rebuilding failing schools (Hill et al., 2009). As the overall quality of schools improves, the

19 Model also has the potential to attract middle-class families back into public education. It advances a reverberant social message-- education is and should be an important public good (Kahn, 2010). Vallas-style reform like in New Orleans is worth noting separately because it demonstrates a capacity where so many other styles have failed, to break through deeply dysfunctional systems (Schwartz, 2010) and its charter environment is criticized for not meeting poor students‟ needs—it has been called a hidden “voucher system” (Smith, 2007). Market mechanisms can make even reform advocates worry about further marginalizing students. Because school choice is likely to be a part of CEO-CAO Team strategy,4 reformers will need to delicately navigate how to prevent the district from adopting charter policies wholesale, as charters in the aggregate do not meet the needs of all student populations any better than traditional settings (CREDO, 2009, p. 1).5 CEO-CAO Teams should also create plans to prevent mechanisms of choice from devolving into racial and economic segregation. A final word on charter schools—states‟ charter policies matter.6 The CEO-CAO Team should find creative ways to make markets efficient, like in Chicago where “independent contracts for school management not labeled as charters” were created (Hill et al., 2009, p. 39). IV.

CEO-CAO Model Assessments of Market Efficiencies and Failures. The CEO-CAO Model

fundamentally changes how districts might serve the community. A CEO can negotiate directly, as Vallas did to bring “peace” with unions (Travers, 2003) and extract “good will” (Wedberg, 2010). The CEO can also remove education barriers in the market, like revamping middle schools as Vallas did in Philadelphia (Greenblatt, 2005) with little protest from the community (Kahn, 2010). It also has the ability to address sparse fiscal resources and poor funding conditions. In our three cities, addressing financial troubles and managing budgets were paramount to reform. CEO-CAO Teams should be preemptive: Vallas remarked 4

“Practically every successful attempt at education reform” involves choice and accountability (Greene, 2003). Some charters benefit marginalized populations like black and Hispanic students. In Louisiana, black students in charter schools do better in math and reading than their peers in traditional public schools, while Hispanic students in charter schools do better in math than their peers in traditional public schools (CREDO, 2009, p. 26). In a national sample (that did not include Philadelphia), there was a statistically significant difference in student performance for students in poverty and ELL students (CREDO, 2009, p. 7). 6 States that put a “cap” or have limits on the number of charter schools permitted to operate” along with states where multiple entities are allowed to act as charter authorizers both have students with lower academic growth than states without caps or high monitoring in charter school operators (CREDO 2009, p. 4). 5

20 that he would have lobbied the Philadelphia city council earlier and for more funding (Haines & Templeton, 2007).7 In regards to long-term fiscal resources, the CEO-CAO Team will need to consider whether pure portfolio models are sustainable after initial monies subside (Hill et al., 2009). Finally, the CEO-CAO Model addresses persistent district problems because the CAO is tasked to identify education services missing from the market. Problems include school disorder (teacher assaults in Philadelphia), student dropouts and graduation (in both Philadelphia and Chicago), and continued student failure “to meet proficiency levels in reading and math” (Snyder, 2007). Vallas‟ efforts suggest academic failure is not necessarily the result of reform policy, but instead of low expectations (Haines & Templeton, 2007). A CAO can create cultures of high expectation and expected achievement through targeted instructional practices which supplement other professional development work. V.

Corralling an Incrementalist Superintendent: An Alternative to the CEO-CAO Team. Some

vested actors may not prefer the CEO-CAO Model—even if they are willing to consider reform. An alternative might be to corral a high-performing superintendent into the district without dramatically changing leadership structure or the market for education services. This consensus-builder might innovate from within the profession and still make incremental forward progress. Examples of such leaders are Tom Payzant of Boston Public Schools and Beverly Hall of Atlanta Public Schools. Both are politically savvy and were able to appease many stakeholders during their superintendencies. Payzant took strong and visible stands for change (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars) and Hall was able to increase instructional capacity using “teacher training and data-driven decisions” (Banchero, 2010). Comparing leaders like Payzant and Hall with Vallas illustrates divisions between past and current efforts to change schools. Approaches can be divided by these two preferences: support for incremental changes aimed “end the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of existing structures and cultures of schooling” (Cuban, Apr 3, 2010) versus support for fundamental changes aimed as transforming and permanently altering the very structures and cultures of the system (Cuban, Apr 6, 2010).

7

Vallas‟ departing budget deficit remains contentious in Philadelphia though he lobbied the state legislature and got money (Greenblatt, 2005) and balanced Chicago‟s school budget for the first time in years (Travers, 2003).

21 We reject incremental approaches because they have yet to alter the overall condition of urban districts even though Payzant, Hall, and similar superintendents have made some progress. There is still a disheartening trend: “greater size correlates positively with greater failure” for cities serving students (Haberman, 2003). For the most part, the past‟s approaches to urban school reform have only shown district improvement on an individual basis despite charter movements, infusion of public and private monies, and more rigorous curriculum standards (Kelly, 2010). Moreover, leaders like Payzant and Hall, despite their professional popularity and achievements, do not make changes quickly enough to appease public irritation with public education as a perpetual, low-performing sector. Traditional approaches continue to do the same things and get similar results. They do not problem solve in ways that are likely to change districts‟ trajectories (Hill et al., 2009). The advantage of the CEO-CAO Model is that it swiftly addresses systemic needs by creating mechanisms for direct intervention and continual improvement. VI.

Final Plea for the CEO-CAO Model: The Urgency of a Two-Headed Change Agent. Implicit

in our Model is a fundamental aspiration to structure public education in the best interests of all students. Though reform advocates may push a non-traditional CEO to reorganize the district quickly, prolonged public support likely requires simultaneous academic systems planning. Extraordinary education reform models must be complimented by a district willingness to build instructional capacity. The CEO-CAO Model is cognizant of the aforementioned political actors as well as the students, teachers, and administrators being asked to transition. It creates a collaborative, sustainable arrangement likely to produce many benefits. It is also not purely centralized or decentralized and balances that “funny tension” between the two categories (Tozer, 2010). In unsettled urban districts, an extraordinary, experimental model like the CEO-CAO Team deserves to be taken seriously. Over 40 percent of the nation‟s minority students and 30 percent of the economically disadvantaged students are being served by urban school districts (Snipes et al., 2002). These and all students deserve immediate solutions that go beyond tinkering with past approaches. Our CEO-CAO Model embraces opportunity where there is “crisis” (Dastugue, 2010) and offers a bold, extraordinary solution to stabilize districts and raise student achievement.

22 Sources (inclusive of Interviews) Anonymous. (2010). New Orleans Education Insider. Personal communication. Interview: November 2010. Banchero, S. (2010, May 20). “Literacy Scores Stall in Inner Cities.” Wall Street Journal.com. Battersby S. and Fischel, W.A. (2006). “The Competitive Structure of Urban School Districts in the United States.” http://www.dartmouth.edu/~wfischel/Papers/SSRN-Battersby22dec06.pdf. Boyd, W.L., Kerchner, C.T., & Blyth, M. (Eds.) (2008) The Transformation of Great American School Districts: How Big Cities are Reshaping Public Education. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Education Press. Boyd, W. L. & Christman, J. B. (2003) A Tall Order for Philadelphia‟s New Approach to School Governance: Heal the Political Rifts, Close the Budget Gap, and Improve the Schools. In L. Cuban & M. Usdan (Eds.) Powerful Reforms with Shallow Roots: Improving America’s Urbvan Schools. (pp. 96-124) New York, NY: Teachers College Press. Bryk, T, Sebring, P.B., Allensworth, E., Luppescu, S., and Easton, J.Q. (2010) Organizing Schools for Improvement. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Capps, K. (2010). “A Charter For Superman.” NBC Philadelphia.com. http://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/localbeat/A-Charter-for-Superman-104241758.html. Christman, J. B. (2003) A Philadelphia Story: Civic Engagement and Ambitious Systemwide Reform. The Phi Delta Kappan, 85 (3), 215-224. Cowen Institute for Public Education Initiatives. (2010) “The Recovery School District of Louisiana,” section of The 2010 State of Public Education in Louisiana Report, pp 15-18. New Orleans, LA: Tulane University. http://www.coweninstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/SPELA-RSD.pdf. CREDO (2009). “Multiple Choice: Charter School Performance in 16 States.” Stanford University. http://credo.stanford.edu/reports/MULTIPLE_CHOICE_CREDO.pdf. Cuban, L. & Usdan, M. (Eds.) (2003) Powerful Reforms with Shallow Roots: Improving America’s Urban Schools. New York, NY: Teachers College Press. Dastugue, P. (2010). Louisiana State Board of Elementary & Secondary Education President. Personal communication. Interview: November 2010. Gold, E.S., Simon, E. Cucchiara, M. Mitchell, C.A. et al. (2007) Philadelphia Story: Building Civic Capacity for School Reform in a Privatizing System. Philadelphia, PA: Research for Action. http://pdf.researchforaction.org/rfapdf/publication/pdf_file/368/Gold_E_Building_Civic_Capacity_for_Sch ool_Reform.pdf. Greene, J. P. (2003). “This Works: Improving Urban Education.” Civic Bulletin: Issue 34. http://www.manhattaninstitute.org/html/cb_34.htm. Greenblatt, A. (2005). The Impatience of Paul Vallas. http://www.governing.com/topics/finance/Impatience-PaulVallas.html. Haberman, M. (2003). “Who Benefits From Failing Urban School Districts?” EducationNews.org. http://ednews.org/articles/who-benefits-from-failing-urban-school-districts---an-essay-on-equity-andjustice-for-diverse-children-in-urban-poverty.html.

23 Haines, J. and Templeton, S. (2007). “Paul Vallas‟ Last Day.” The Philadelphia Inquirer: video. http://www.philly.com/inquirer/multimedia/8022192.html. Herir, T. (2010). Assistant Superintendent of Chicago Public Schools, 1990-93. Professor of Practice, Harvard Graduate School of Education, current. Personal communication. Interview: November 2010. Hess, F., Palmieri, S., Scull, J. (2010). America’s best and worst cities for school reform: Attracting entrepreneurs and change agents. Washington DC: Thomas B. Fordham Institute. Hill, P., Campbell, C., Menefee-Libey, D., Dusseault, B., DeArmond, M., Gross, B. (2009). Portfolio school districts for big cities: An interim report. Center on Reinventing Public Education. Seattle: University of Washington Press. http://www.crpe.org/cs/crpe/view/csr_pubs/295. Kahn, D. (2010). Philadelphia Secretary of Education in Mayor John F. Street‟s Administration from 2000-2005. Personal communication. Interview: November 2010. Kelly, B. (2010, January 7). “The Challenge of School Reform.” U.S. News.com. Martin, R. (2010). Former Recovery School District Chief of Staff. Personal communication. Interview: November 2010. Maxwell, L. (2007). Foundations Donate Millions to Help New Orleans Schools‟ Recovery. Education Week. http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2007/12/13/16nola.h27.html. Merrow, J. & Vallas, P. (2008). Mixed results for school reform efforts in New Orleans. Interview transcript PBS Newshour. July 24, 2010 http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/education/july-dec08/nolaupdate_07-24.htmlhe. Mezzacappa, D. (2008). The Vallas Effect. Education Next. http://educationnext.org/the-vallas-effect. Moore, D. (2001) “Changing the Ground Rules.” Shelterforce website. http://www.nhi.org/online/issues/sf118.html. The New Teacher Project. (2010). http://www.tntp.org/index.php/clients/. Philadelphia Public School Notebook. (2010). Highlights of Vallas‟s five-year academic, financial plans. The Notebook. http://thenotebook.org/print/1482?page=show. Quinn, T. (n.d.) “An Introduction to CPS.” AREA Chicago.org. http://www.areachicago.org/p/issues/city-aslab/introduction-cps/. Read, M. (2008). Sold on Kira Orange-Jones. http://www.gse.harvard.edu/news_events/ed/2008/winter/features/orange_jones.html. Ripley, A. (2008, Nov. 26). Rhee Tackles Classroom Challenge. Time. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1862444,00.html. Russo, A. (2003). Political Educator. Education Next. http://educationnext.org/politicaleducator/. Schwartz, R. (2010). Academic Dean. Harvard Graduate School of Education. Personal communication. Interview: November, 2010. Shipps, D. (2003) The Businessman‟s Educator: Mayoral Takeover and Nontraditional Leadership in Chicago. In L. Cuban & M. Usdan (Eds.) Powerful Reforms with Shallow Roots: Improving America’s Urban Schools. (pp. 16-37) New York, NY: Teachers College Press.

24 Simmons, J. (2005). Breaking through: Transforming urban school districts. New York: Teachers College Press. Simmons , W. & Raynor, A.F. (2006) K-12 Public Education Reform in New Orleans. Louisiana Disaster Recovery Foundation’s Commemorative Event: Hurricane’s Rita and Katrina, One Year Later: Remembrance, Recognition and Recovery. Conference proceedings. New Orleans: LA. http://policy.rutgers.edu/IRCT/publications/W.%20Simmons%20K12%20Education%20reform.pdf. Snipes, J., Doolittle, F., Herlihy, C. (2002). “Foundations for Success: Case Studies of How Urban School Systems Improve Student Achievement.” MDRC.org. http://www.mdrc.org/publications/47/execsum.html. Snyder, S. (2007, April 12). “Vallas to Leave City Schools Post.” Philadelphia Inquirer. Stone, C. N., Henig, J. R., Jones, B.D. & Pierannuzi, C. (2001) Building Civic Capacity: The Politics of Reforming Urban Schools. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas. Stone, C.N. (2001) Civic Capacity and Urban Education. Urban Affairs Review, 36 (5), 595-619. http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/stone/prolo.htm. Teach For America. (2010). http://www.teachforamerica.org/about-us/regions. Teach For America. (n.d.). http://www.teachforamerica.org/assets/documents/NLNS.pdf. Tozer, S. (2010). Professor, Educational Policy Studies, University of Illinois at Chicago. Personal communication. Interview: November, 2010. Travers, E. (2003). “Philadelphia School Reform: Historical Roots and Reflections on the 2002-2003 School Year Under State Takeover.” University of Pennsylvania Graduate School of Education. http://urbanedjournal.org/archive/Issue4/commentaries/comment0007.html. Travers, E. (2003). Learning from Philadelphia‟s School Reform. Research for Action. http://pdf.researchforaction.org/rfapdf/publication/pdf_file/201/Travers_E_State_Takeover_in_Philadelphi a.pdf. United Teachers of New Orleans, Louisiana Federation of Teachers, & American Federation of Teachers. (2006) National Model or Failed Approach? The Post-Katrina New Orleans Public Schools. http://www.coweninstitute.com/wpcontent/uploads/2010/03/AFTNationalModelorFlawedApproach.pdf. Useem, E. (2010). Senior Research Consultant, Research for Action, Philadelphia, 2004 - 2010. Personal communication. Interview: November, 2010. Wedberg, K. (2010). Deputy Chief Financial Officer for the School District of Philadelphia from 2002-2004. Personal communication. Interview: November 2010. Whiting, B.J. & Proscio, T. (2007) Philadelphia 2007: Prospects and Challenges. Philadelphia, PA: Pew Charitable Trusts. http://www.pewtrusts.org/our_work_report_detail.aspx?id=30319. Whittinghill, D. (2010). Louisiana School Board Association Staff. Personal communication. Interview: November 2010. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (n.d.). “External Actors and the Boston Public Schools.” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/ACF19F.pdf.