FAO International Workshop on “Food Security in Complex Emergencies: building policy frameworks to address longer-term programming challenges” Tivoli, 23-25 September 2003

Policy Options For Socioeconomic Vulnerability Analysis: conflict analysis and long-term development programmes and strategies Umberto Triulzi, Institute for Relations Between Italy and Africa, Latin America and the Middle East (IPALMO) Massimo Tommasoli, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorate General for Development Co-operation (DGCS) Pierluigi Montalbano (IPALMO)

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Contents Executive summary

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1.

Introduction

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2.

The many faces of vulnerability analysis

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3. What's missing? Best practice and limitations of current vulnerability assessments

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4. The missing link: recommendations for socio-economic vulnerability analysis in conflict prevention strategies 10 Appendix A. Different vulnerability assessment methodologies Bibliography

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Executive summary Over the past decade, political instability, crisis and protracted conflicts have been on the rise. The number of intra-state conflicts, in particular, has risen dramatically in the last few decades, now constituting 90 percent of all violent conflict. This shift in the nature of conflict is posing an immense challenge for the international donor community and international development organizations as their traditional cooperation strategies, approaches and instruments are proving to be ill-suited to effectively address the diverse causes and needs of fragile states. The international community, poorly equipped to handle this new conflict scenario, has largely failed to foresee, prevent and manage violent conflicts in the last. The

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This paper is based on the findings of a research project carried out in the context of the work of the DAC informal Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation. The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors only and do not represent the official positions of the OECD, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs or IPALMO.

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result is a lack of coherent and coordinated policies and programmes that effectively address the range of social and economic roots of both conflict and development issues. Socio-economic vulnerability analysis is one of the tools to "measure" the socio-economic aspects of conflict and to establish a more effective and coordinated approach to preventing violent conflict. Exploring vulnerability more in-depth could shed light on the internal processes that determine, in medium- to long-term scenarios, social and political crises and their links to negative outcomes in terms of well-being. Our aim is to equip practitioners with a more complete conflict prevention "toolbox" more effectively to prevent and reduce the incidence of violent conflict. The analysis of vulnerability, however, cannot be easily pinned to one definition or conceptual idea. There are numerous definitions of vulnerability in relation to the equally numerous negative outcomes that are possible. To compound this diversity, vulnerability also changes according to the different sectors from which it is derived. As a result, there is no objective or holistic definition as of yet. In the context of vulnerability to conflict, socioeconomic vulnerability should be understood, first, as a group of characteristics and tools that a particular unit (e.g. household, community, region, or country) possesses. Socioeconomic vulnerability is the endogenous inability of the unit to face shocks. This endogenous inability is a function of risk exposure and other socio-economic factors. It could potentially lead, together with other contextual aspects, to a situation of violent conflict. Recognizing the failure of current approaches to the many aspects of poverty reduction, and the utility and relevance of the vulnerability approach, different academic disciplines and international organizations have begun to explore the nature, definition and consequences of vulnerability. There are a number of efforts to develop methodologies to reduce insecurity in terms of food, poverty, livelihoods, etc. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the UN World Food Programme (WFP) have been the key initiators of a vulnerability analysis specifically in the area of food security. While their individual work has been enlightening and informative, these approaches are not well integrated into a single method that addresses both the socio-economic characteristics of the unit of analysis as well as the exogenous risks, including macroeconomic risks, which the unit faces. The World Bank and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) have developed a more detailed methodology and operational instrument with which to identify and measure vulnerability. Together, they have shed new light on vulnerability analyses, particularly at the micro level. One of the main challenges now is to widen the field of analysis to the macro level, where the role of economic openness, the globalization process and their effects on equity and well-being are given due consideration. The DAC also has been one of the key actors in conceptualizing the role of vulnerability. In its recently published DAC Guidelines on Poverty Reduction, there is an understanding that “vulnerability and social exclusion hamper human and political capabilities, reducing income and assets” and that any strategy for the effective and sustainable reduction of poverty has to include vulnerability analysis. In the area of conflict prevention, vulnerability to conflict is a relatively new subject. However, there is an overwhelming amount of literature on ‘conflict assessments’, which involve an assessment of the risk factors that lead to a situation of violent conflict. It is clear that a key element, namely socio-economic vulnerability, based on not only risks but also the socioeconomic characteristics of a unit, needs to be properly integrated in the analysis. The UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) approach represents a step in the right direction of continuing to link conflict with development. It assesses the impact of conflict on development policy and programmes as well as the impact of development interventions on dynamics of conflict and peace, thereby taking both perspectives into account. The recent proliferation of methodologies, terminology and approaches to vulnerability has been important for the advancement and improvement of current poverty reduction strategies

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and conflict assessments. But these approaches remain singular and separated, each sector applying a different definition, methodology and measurement to vulnerability. As a result there is not a universally accepted and shared understanding and analysis of vulnerability which can be compared across space and time and used for more effective action in conflict prevention. The scattered and disconnected traces of vulnerability analysis need to be consolidated, taking the best from all worlds, and making them coherent and coordinated, bringing them into the core of development cooperation and conflict prevention strategies at the international level. Incorporating socio-economic vulnerability analysis into traditional assessments of conflict would not only provide a more accurate and prevention-oriented analysis of fragile states, but it could also improve coordination between development cooperation and conflict prevention. Socio-economic vulnerability analysis addresses the long-term objectives of development cooperation and, at the same time, promotes a forwardlooking and preventive outlook consistent with conflict prevention strategies. It also provides a common and shared methodological platform for development cooperation policy-makers and acts as a direct link to conflict prevention strategies. The recommendations in this report are intended to raise awareness among policy makers and strategists about the role and the potential of socio-economic vulnerability analysis in conflict prevention assessments and strategies. The goal is also to help put practitioners on the right path of preventative and forward-looking analyses of the causes of crisis and underdevelopment. The recommendations fall into three broad aims to support policy makers to: ● Underline the elements related to violent conflict that should be considered in food

security and socio-economic vulnerability assessments. Efforts should be targeted at international organizations, practitioners and experts with the specific aim of increasing their awareness of the potential negative outcome, namely rising violence and conflict. ● Explore ways to integrate the socio-economic dimension more squarely into

conflict prevention strategies. Efforts in this area should be targeted in particular at experts and organizations involved in conflict prevention and vulnerability assessments. ● Build a more comprehensive vulnerability assessment methodology in conflict

prevention strategies and development cooperation policy aimed towards properly assessing socio-economic vulnerability as a “missing link” between conflict prevention and development cooperation.

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1.

Introduction

While in the past conflicts were generally marked by international political struggles between superpowers, today we are witnessing the proliferation of struggles over local, internal social and economic dynamics, primarily in low-income developing countries. The fact that 24 of the 40 poorest countries in the world are either in the midst of armed conflict or have only recently emerged from it (DFID, 2000) is evidence of this. Traditional definitions of security based on military and political threat to a nation's borders are no longer useful for analysing today's conflicts; there is a need to broaden that definition to include issues pertaining to the socio-economic causes. Studies have shown, in fact, that the majority of violent conflicts today is not, as commonly believed, only the result of religious or political grievances; rather, the determining risk factors are largely of an economic nature (Collier, 2001). Hence, we have to consider also new sources of risks such as income distribution, unequal distribution of assets, differentiated rates of growth, differences in coping strategies, the role of social and economic structures. The UN's Economic and Social Council recently published a discussion paper on the role of economic factors in conflicts in Europe, underscoring the growing consensus that economic inequalities, conflict over access to employment, credit, land, and natural resources, economic decline and social marginalization and exclusion all fuelled conflict in Europe during the 1990s (UN Staff College, 2001). This shift in the nature of conflict is posing an immense challenge for the international donor community and international development organizations as their traditional cooperation strategies, approaches and instruments are proving to be ill-suited to effectively address the diverse causes and needs of fragile states. In addition, while much attention has been paid to issues of conflict management and resolution, few academic or policy-making efforts have been made towards the understanding of the causes for war and the development of plausible preventive strategies. It is no surprise, then, that the international community, poorly equipped to handle this new conflict scenario, has largely failed to foresee, prevent and manage violent conflicts in the last decade. The result is a lack of coherent and coordinated policies and programmes that effectively address the social and economic root of both conflict and development issues. Nevertheless, there have been recent encouraging advancements from the international community. In particular, the DAC’s recently published guidelines Helping Prevent Violent Conflict has helped to further understanding in the area of conflict prevention and development. It promotes the idea that "addressing the potential root causes of conflict with coherent responses early on is more likely to help prevent violent outcomes" (OECD, 2001a). It also refers to the idea that certain areas or countries are vulnerable to conflict, and that this can stem from particular “endogenous” conditions, such as sharp patterns of stratification at the social and political levels. In this way, the DAC recognizes that there are certain factors that render people more “vulnerable” to conflict. We can affirm that these factors have a strong, undeniable socio-economic link. Developing a sound methodology to understand the nexuses, dynamics and effects of conflict on development and vice versa has proved difficult. This has been partly due to the methodological differences between conflict prevention strategists and development cooperation practitioners, but largely due to an incomplete analysis of the socio-economic factors that both impact on and are impacted by conflict. Main goals of the analysis It is to bridge this gap that we propose the employment of socio-economic vulnerability analysis as a tool to "measure" the socio-economic aspect of conflict and, together with other tools from a conflict prevention "toolbox" (e.g. military measures, preventive diplomacy,

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economic financial measures), establish a more effective and coordinated approach to preventing violent conflict. Exploring vulnerability more in-depth could shed light on the internal processes that determine, in medium- to long-term scenarios, social and political crises and their links to negative outcomes in terms of well-being. The aim will be to equip practitioners with a more complete conflict prevention "toolbox" able more effectively to prevent and reduce the incidence of violent conflict. Incorporating a socio-economic vulnerability analysis, which addresses vulnerability in terms of well-being and livelihoods, into traditional assessments of conflict would not only provide a more accurate and prevention-oriented analysis of fragile states, but it could also improve coordination between development cooperation and conflict prevention. This is because it addresses the long-term objectives of development cooperation and, at the same time, promotes a forward-looking and preventive outlook consistent with conflict prevention strategies. It could provide a common and shared methodological platform for development cooperation policy-makers and act as a direct link towards conflict prevention strategies. At the same time, it could strengthen monitoring and evaluation mechanisms as it promotes exante analyses, more preventive measures and a continuous process of assessment to measure dynamic changes in development. In addition, a socio-economic vulnerability assessment [i.e. a measurement of the ex-ante probability of change in well-being given environmental and social conditions (risk), and risk managing ability of the household (risk response)], provides a more appropriate and indicative analysis than traditional analyses of poverty2 by nature of its intrinsically dynamic and forward-looking characteristics that render it more apt for prevention and early-warning purposes. Division of the review The first section of this desk review will be dedicated to outlining the main issues of the analysis of vulnerability. The focus will be on vulnerability in general, but will also provide a synthesis of the socio-economic vulnerability methodologies carried out by multilateral or bilateral organization(s) involved in particular facets of vulnerability. Particular attention will be paid to approaches specifically aimed towards conflict-prone developing countries. A more thorough analysis of the various definitions, methodologies and instruments used in vulnerability analyses can be found in the Appendix. The Appendix is divided into three different sections, which correspond to food, socio-economic and conflict vulnerability analysis. The rationale behind this selection is the existence of a logical chain that links these different aspects of vulnerability. The socio-economic vulnerability approach follows directly from food vulnerability and could eventually serve as a “missing link” to better integrate socio-economic factors into conflict vulnerability analysis. To do this, however, we still need a well-articulated methodology. Then, in the second section, we will synthesize the various approaches to vulnerability, focusing on the best practices and limitations of current vulnerability methodologies. Once again, the vulnerability assessments that focus on fragile developing countries will be analysed particularly in-depth. Finally, the last section will feature a number of recommendations concerning socioeconomic vulnerability as a “missing link” between conflict prevention and development cooperation. More specifically, suggestions will focus on the possible integration of socioeconomic vulnerability analysis and conflict analyses, strategies and policies.

2. It is important to clarify that vulnerability and poverty are two different aspects of the multidimensional condition of "underdevelopment". However, while poverty is the ex-post income/consumption-based status, vulnerability is the ex-ante condition of being at risk to a loss of well-being.

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2.

The many faces of vulnerability analysis

The analysis of vulnerability cannot be easily pinned to one definition or conceptual idea. There are numerous definitions of vulnerability in relation to the equally numerous negative outcomes that are possible. To compound this diversity, vulnerability changes also according to the different sectors it is derived from. As a result, there is no objective or holistic definition of the phenomenon as of yet. In the context of vulnerability to conflict, socio-economic vulnerability should be understood, first, as a group of characteristics and tools that a particular unit (e.g. household, community, region, country, etc.) possesses. In this sense, we can call socio-economic vulnerability the endogenous inability of the unit to face shocks. This endogenous inability is a function of risk exposure and other socio-economic factors. It could potentially lead, together with other contextual aspects, to a situation of violent conflict. The following schema can be useful in understanding this relationship: Socio-economic Vulnerability + (endogenous characteristics)

Other contextual factors

=

Violent Conflict (negative outcome)

The analysis of vulnerability can be said to comprise the description of the characteristics of an area or anthropological group and the causes that determine the probability that a risk will translate into a concrete event. The degree of vulnerability can be divided into two main elements: on the one hand, the degree of exposure to a risk and, on the other, the ability to adequately respond to and face "shocks". It is necessary to complete this framework, however, with an assessment of the various socio-economic characteristics of the unit of the analysis, which have a fundamental role in determining the degree of the risk hazard (Triulzi, Montalbano, 2001). Socio-economic vulnerability, more specifically, is the result of the risk exposure of the unit of analysis (e.g. households, individuals or communities), coupled with the unit's socioeconomic characteristics and its ability to adequately respond to shocks so as to avoid declines below a certain benchmark of well-being. The following schema better illustrates this: Risk Exposure + Response Tools + Unit's SE Characteristics = Socio-economic Vulnerability (exogenous factors) (endogenous factors) (negative outcome) It can be said more specifically that vulnerability is the forward-looking probability of experiencing a loss in the future relative to some benchmark of welfare due to uncertain events. In other words, vulnerability is the "continuous forward-looking state of expected outcomes" (Alwang et al, 2001). More concretely, households are vulnerable to suffering an undesirable outcome, and this vulnerability comes from exposure to risk. The following schema, based on the World Bank approach, illustrates in a more comprehensive way the point.

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RISK

+

RESPONSES

NEGATIVE OUTCOME

=

Loss of well-being below a certain benchmark

risk management tools

endogenous characteristics of the unit ƒ ƒ ƒ TO

VULNERABILITY HAZARD

ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ

Poverty Underdevelopment Damage from natural disasters Loss of livelihood Loss of income Malnutrition, illness, death Etc.

These definitions imply, then, that experiencing an ex-post welfare loss is neither necessary nor sufficient to be classified as vulnerable. Feelings of uncertainty themselves are crucial for peoples’ perception of vulnerability and their responses to it (Dercon, 2001). It is necessary to underline again that well-being and poverty are ex-post outcomes, while vulnerability is the ex-ante condition or situation which could potentially lead to a negative outcome. The focus of vulnerability analyses, therefore, should theoretically be on the ex-ante condition rather than the ex-post outcome. Recognizing the failure of current approaches to the many aspects of poverty reduction and the utility and relevance of the vulnerability approach, different academic disciplines and international organizations have begun to explore the nature, definition and consequences of vulnerability, and to translate these into methodologies to reduce insecurity in terms of food, poverty, livelihoods, etc. With regards to poverty and poverty reduction, the DAC has been one of the key actors in conceptualizing the role of vulnerability. In its recently published Poverty Guidelines, vulnerability, along with related issues of risk and insecurity, is seen as a crucial dimension of “poverty”. Specifically, there is an understanding that “vulnerability and social exclusion hamper human and political capabilities, reducing income and assets” and that any strategy for the effective and sustainable reduction of poverty has to include vulnerability analysis (OECD, 2001b). Concerning the implementation of an instrument to identify potential vulnerable areas, early warning systems are viewed as the key instrument. The DAC itself points out, however, that “international efforts to create and use early warning systems have had limited effectiveness” (OECD, 2001a). While many international organizations and agencies have made significant strides in improving our understanding of vulnerability, vulnerability tends to be very loosely defined and have different meanings in different contexts. These differences can be attributed to the fact that each discipline focuses on different components of risk, household risk responses and risk outcomes, with most either concentrating on the evaluation of ex-ante risks or expost outcomes (Alwang, et al, 2001). As we can see, vulnerability is a complex subject, and can appropriately be compared to the quality of a newspaper picture. If looked at from a distance, the picture appears clear and sharp, but viewed up close it loses its sharpness, becoming blurred and grainy. Likewise, the analysis of vulnerability at the broader level appears as a clear, distinct and objective phenomenon. In this way, we are able to reach a vast consensus on the concept in general terms; but, as soon as we try to analyse it on a deeper level, the concept tends to blur in the

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haze of the multifarious situations of vulnerability, resulting in context-specific interpretations of vulnerability. In sum, each vein of research on vulnerability demonstrates clearly and in detail a specific aspect of the problem, but together they impede a full and complete understanding of the overall significance of the phenomenon. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), USAID, and the World Food Programme (WFP) have been the key initiators of a vulnerability analysis, specifically in the area of food security. While their individual work has been enlightening and informative, these approaches are not well integrated into a singular method that includes an analysis of both the socio-economic characteristics of the unit of analysis as well as the exogenous risks, including macroeconomic risks, which the unit faces. The World Bank elaborated a more detailed methodology and operational instrument with which to identify and measure vulnerability. It promotes many innovations in the field, particularly at the micro level. One of the main challenges is now to widen the field of the analysis to the macro level considering also the role of economic openness, the globalisation process and their effects on equity and well-being. In the area of conflict prevention, vulnerability to conflict is a relatively new subject. However, there is an overwhelming amount of literature on ‘conflict assessments’, which involve an assessment of the risk factors that lead to a situation of violent conflict. To focus on one example, the DAC’s methodology of identifying underlying factors of conflict is based on a framework of structural and triggering factors. Structural conditions are those long-term factors that create a potential climate for violent conflict, though they do not necessarily make it inevitable. Emphasis is placed on unfavourable socio-economic conditions as structural factors leading to conflict. Accelerating or triggering factors are those short-term events, actions and decisions, which result in the escalation of disputes into violent conflict (OECD, 2001a). It is clear that a key element, namely socio-economic vulnerability, based on not only risks but also the socio-economic characteristics of a unit (e.g. household, community, country, region) has to be considered in the analysis. Another key problem with most conflict assessments is that not only do they have different analyses of the causal factors of conflict, but they also employ different instruments, ranging from Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) tools, to early warning systems, to checklists. The UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) approach represents a step in the right direction of linking conflict with development. It assesses the impact of conflict on development policy and programmes as well as the impact of development interventions on dynamics of conflict and peace, thereby taking both perspectives into account. With this conflict vulnerability analysis foundation, implementing a socio-economic vulnerability methodology could only add value to efforts better to understand the links between conflict prevention and development.

3.

What's missing? Best practice and limitations of current vulnerability assessments

There has been a recent proliferation of multiple methodologies, terminology and approaches to vulnerability, in a variety of areas of interest (such as food security, socio-economic and conflict vulnerability) and by a number of multilateral and bilateral organizations and agencies (e.g. the World Bank, UNDP, USAID, Canada, UK DFID, etc.). Although each has been important for the advancement and improvement of current poverty reduction strategies, these approaches remain singular and separated, each sector applying a different definition, methodology and measurement to vulnerability. The result is that we are left without a universally accepted and shared understanding and analysis of vulnerability able to be compared across space and time. Despite existing differences in definitions, methodologies and measurement tools, however, it is nevertheless possible to derive some best practices and common trends. By taking the “best of all worlds” and viewing them together, these commonalties could be useful in eventually articulating a shared vision of vulnerability. 5

With regards to the actual definition of vulnerability, though there are slight variations in terminology (e.g. the USAID approach to food security vulnerability3), the core definition of vulnerability tends to converge around the idea that vulnerability is an ex-ante condition of uncertainty caused by exogenous and endogenous risk factors. More specifically, it is the combination of level of risk exposure and the risk itself (exogenous) with the unit's ability to mitigate the risk or cope with the shock, which depends both on the available tools as well as the unit's socio-economic characteristics (endogenous) that determines its degree of vulnerability. It should be noted, however, that not all definitions include each of these factors. The food security approach to vulnerability assessment, for instance, takes into consideration risk exposure and household coping mechanisms, but overlooks in large part the characteristics of the risk itself (e.g. frequency and magnitude). These limitations reflect a more general incompatibility between the completeness of the definition and its ability to be empirical valid. The various vulnerability approaches are either: a) conceptually strong and empirically weak (e.g. sustainable livelihoods), which means that they provide in-depth multifactorial analyses of the causes of vulnerability, but are unable to formulate a benchmark and a single, common metric with which to measure and compare degrees of vulnerability, or b) conceptually weak, but empirically strong (e.g. food security), insofar as sound methodologies have been used to formulate an instrument to measure and compare vulnerability, but important factors that cause it have been ignored (Alwang et al, 2001). Recently, an attempt to overcome this gap has been to develop a new approach, widely known as Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA), which argued that since those who experience poverty are the poor, to develop good theories, strategies and policies we have to start from a better understanding of their “voices”. In this context analysts and policymakers have to be considered as mere facilitators. This is of course an extreme view but precisely underlines the point. With regards to the tools used to measure vulnerability, the various instruments in existence generally have the same goal in mind: to identify the vulnerable and be able to better target policies so that it benefits those groups that are currently excluded from traditional development cooperation strategies. Being all in the vein of Early Warning System mechanisms, they also share similar problems in terms of choosing variables, the proper time dimension, finding an appropriate metric and benchmark to make comparisons of vulnerability across groups and over time. This has resulted in differences in the types of indicators used by each organization, which has in turn caused conceptual and methodological disagreements about the causes of war. As far as methodology is concerned, most approaches place particular emphasis on the elaborate classification of risks, risk response strategies and the livelihood characteristics of households, individuals and communities. It is widely agreed that risks are derived from a variety of sources - natural, political, social, economic, etc. Some methodologies (e.g. the World Bank) also distinguish between the characteristics of the risk, such as frequency, magnitude, intensity and correlation. This depth of risk classification, however, is not widespread. Some experts prefer to use the term “life event” instead of “shocks” or “stress” in order to allow for the inclusion of an active component, in contrast to the traditional analysis of vulnerability, which wrongly focuses on the perception of the poor as passive social actors. Risk management tools are also analysed and grouped into specific categories in the majority of vulnerability approaches. These instruments are generally divided into reduction, 3. What USAID FEWS NET calls risk, is generally known as vulnerability to an undesired outcome; what they deem vulnerability, on the other hand, others call an analysis of household characteristics and risk response mechanisms. Vulnerability, according to USAID, is a condition that may lead to a risk of food shortage (depending on the hazard), rather than the result of risk exposure and risk response mechanisms. Risk of food shortage, similarly, is not an ex-ante condition; instead it is the outcome of the hazard (risky event) and an individual or household's vulnerability to that hazard. It is important to note, however, that these nuances are more a question of semantics rather than actual differences in conceptual meaning.

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mitigation and coping mechanisms, though different approaches attribute different terms to them. The sustainable livelihoods approach, for example, focuses on short-term coping strategies and long-term adaptive behavioural changes. In any case, it is safe to say that risk management tools play an important role in every vulnerability assessment methodology. Household or individual livelihood characteristics also play an essential part in determining vulnerability according to most approaches. Some approaches call it a livelihood analysis (e.g. USAID FEWS NET), while others study the asset endowment and insurance mechanisms of households (e.g. the World Bank’s Social Risk Management - SRM). It should be noted, however, that the primary focus of most methodologies, with regards to endogenous risk factors, is either on household risk response tools (e.g. the World Bank SRM) or on the analysis of their livelihood and assets (e.g. UNDP’s Sustainable Livelihoods and food security vulnerability in general). Another important distinguishing characteristic between vulnerability methodologies is the level of analysis. Whereas most approaches focus on the micro, household level, the sustainable livelihoods approach and conflict vulnerability assessments look at vulnerability from a larger macro, country-wide level. However, the increasingly recognized need to look at “vulnerability to underdevelopment” in relation to economic openness and the globalisation process (a specification of the current literature on macroeconomic and financial crises and poverty) represents a step forward in terms of macro analyses of vulnerability. Differences arise also about the sources of vulnerability that are analysed. Whereas the FAO and USAID focus on important aspects of food insecurity to greater vulnerability, they miss equally relevant socio-economic factors and others that heavily influence one's probability of suffering a negative outcome from a crisis. Likewise, while USAID and DFID have homed in on an important aspect of vulnerability, i.e. vulnerability to conflict, they also lack a solid methodology and largely ignore the socio-economic aspects that could lead to the outbreak of violent conflict. In particular, USAID's Conflict Vulnerability Assessments are strictly based on the political and social factors that lead to conflict. These methodological differences have resulted in the lack of a holistic and shared view and implementation of vulnerability in all facets of development. This is true also in the area of conflict analysis and assessment approaches. Frameworks for conflict analysis rely on assumptions about the nature, causes and dynamics of conflict. They attempt to systematize and present these assumptions in an accessible form, which can assist non-specialists in understanding a complex situation. Yet the quality of assumptions determines to a large extent the validity of the tool. It appears that many framework and indicator systems are still too general to be of real use in the field. There is an urgent need to expand the present research basis and develop multidisciplinary approaches to conflict analysis. This has resulted in differences in the types of indicators used by each organization,4 which has in turn caused conceptual and methodological disagreements about the causes of vulnerability (Sambanis, 2002). FAO, for example, studies food supply and demand, variations in prices on food and grain exchanges, global production and trade of food, etc., while USAID FEWS NET uses socio-economic household analyses provided by Save the Children (UK). The WFP engages in both food security classifications as well as those based 4. Regarding this last point, it should be mentioned that there is currently a rather vast debate on qualitative versus quantitative indicators concerning which best reflect vulnerability. Although this is not the place to expand on this undoubtedly important issue, the essential thing to remember is that, even though there are advantages to discussing vulnerability using contextual or qualitative approaches, introducing risk and vulnerability in policy discussions via quantitative means may help to put it higher on the policy agenda. More importantly, while contextual, qualitative approaches could play an important role in accurately measuring vulnerability, more systematic ways of integrating this information into quantitative work is required in order to establish statistically reliable patterns by geographic entities, ethnic or social groups, gender, age, wealth, season or other dimensions and groups. In sum, quantitative studies linked to qualitative, contextual work could be fruitful in the measurement of vulnerability (Dercon, 2001).

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on socio-economic insecurity. These differences are largely due to the fact that vulnerability to poverty, food insecurity, loss of livelihood, etc. is not determined by one, easily measurable factor. There are many sources of risk that interact with each other. Similarly, there are many different types of risk management strategies that households use in conjunction with each other depending on the risk. We can say, then, that there are no general rules that can determine a priori which risk management strategies are preferable over others. Likewise, there are no rules that determine which level of formality is more desirable over another. In sum, there is no “once and for all” optimal choice. However, the important thing to keep in mind is that different types of risk management tools (e.g. public arrangements) are better equipped to deal with certain types of shocks (e.g. covariate). Moreover, risk management instruments need to be aimed at not only preventing risks, but more importantly at encouraging individuals to take risks in a more conscious, beneficial and profitable manner with a long-term outlook. This portfolio of risks and corresponding portfolio of risk responses that individuals and households employ determines aggregate vulnerability. It is this multi-causal definition of vulnerability that has led to difficulties in finding a single metric, or even a common framework. The range of conflict assessment approaches has also led to a lack of a common and shared tool. This has been compounded by the overall lack of “baseline” conflict data against which comparative changes can be measured. Difficulties in creating a single instrument of vulnerability have translated into difficulties in the actual measurement of the phenomenon. The principal problem in measuring the determinants of vulnerability is that vulnerability analysis has to make statements about future poverty. What really matters, consequently, is not precisely the current values of the analysed variables, but the ability to understand their future dynamics and make interventions only if needed (Dercon, 2001). The assessment of vulnerability, in this context, becomes quite a difficult task. In theory, vulnerability assessment "should measure the ex-ante probability of change in well-being given environmental and social conditions (risk), and risk managing ability of the household (risk response). Following the realization of events, we can only assess ex-post the impact of the event on poverty or other outcomes and the resulting change on current vulnerability to future events". (Alwang et al, 2001) In practice, however, what some disciplines call vulnerability is really an assessment of exogenous risks (e.g. conflict vulnerability assessments), whereas what others call vulnerability is really similar to ex-post poverty outcome assessments (food security and sustainable livelihood approaches). Assessing vulnerability, on the other hand, requires the ex-ante analysis of both exogenous risk factors and endogenous socio-economic characteristics and risk management tools, with a view to analysing the “continuous forward-looking state of expected outcomes” (ibid). This is in essence vulnerability. Limitations of current vulnerability approaches concern not only the direct methodological or empirical problems, but also more indirect problems of coordination that impede the effective implementation of vulnerability analysis in poverty reduction strategies. Effective peacebuilding requires coherence across the full range of external policy instruments. Unfortunately, there is still a wide divergence among donors as regards their progress on development and conflict issues. There is also variety in the interpretation of the major issues which inform policy (International Alert et al, 2001). This is not surprising if we consider that conflict prevention, up until recently, had always been considered a distinct and separate discipline from development cooperation. On the one hand, authorities on conflict prevention rarely understand socio-economic vulnerability as their focus lies largely in the political shocks that cause conflict, rather than the dynamic and long-term economic risk factors; on the other hand, development cooperation policymakers are overly concerned with the physical realization and outcome of individual development cooperation projects, without enough consideration of their effects in security terms. It is this division between disciplines and within international bodies that constrains interdisciplinary and interdepartmental collaboration (Mack, 2002) needed for the implementation of a multidisciplinary approach

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such as socio-economic vulnerability. There is a need for improved coordination between donors as this weakness has been a major factor in the failure to develop appropriate development assistance. Incoherent policies have, on occasion, resulted in donor engagement undermining efforts specifically targeted to address the underlying causes of conflict (International Alert et al, 2001). Not surprisingly, these differences in background reflect differences in the analytical methodologies of each respective group. While conflict prevention analysis employs the early warning system methodology to assess the impact of risk factors on political crises, development cooperation policy continues to rely almost exclusively on traditional long-term economic analysis. Though both are integral to the understanding of conflict and development, respectively, neither is sufficient to understand the link between the two. To compound this lack of coordination, development cooperation seems to be subject to a particular type of "time inconsistency" (Triulzi, Montalbano, 2001), in which its long-term objectives (e.g. economic growth and equality, poverty reduction, supply of basic needs, etc.) do not correspond to the instruments employed in development programmes, which tend to privilege primarily short- to medium-term tools and be used to resolve emergency situations. This nature of development cooperation instruments corresponds to inconsistencies in the conflict management strategies implemented by international security and development bodies. These organizations are under pressure to supply quick and immediate responses to conflicts, and are consequently unable to implement solid policies consistent with their longterm objectives. If our goal is to establish more prevention-oriented measures, it is evident that we need strategies and tools that are forward-looking and preventative. The proliferation of various approaches to vulnerability has been paralleled by an equally vast number of conflict assessments. This range of extant tools and frameworks, from Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) tools to early warning and early response mechanisms to post-conflict reconstruction programmes and the development of conflict prevention networks, points to an overall lack of consensus as to the proper method of assessing conflict. Nevertheless, like the various vulnerability approaches, there are strengths and weaknesses that we can draw from each type of conflict assessment. Indicator-based analytical tools, like the one developed by the German government, can provide a simple and easily accessible approach. Through the use of checklists and rating or scoring systems of pre-defined indicators, sectoral “risk” scores are calculated before arriving at an overall assessment of the potential for conflict. However, while the tool provides some useful indicators for monitoring trends, the indicator model is largely prescriptive and does not allow for systematic identification of strategies or options for engagement. Nevertheless, the versatility of indicator-based and ranking-based approaches lends itself to greater mainstreaming into all sectors of policy-making. In addition, they seek to identify a wide range of conflict risks and propose policy options that can have greater relevance in programme and project planning. Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) tools can be equally useful in analysing conflict. However, “there is very little to suggest that there has been widespread or effective implementation of methodologies, or that the use of tools has had an impact on conflict prevention”. This is due largely to the fact that tools are still embryonic in nature and have yet to be rigorously tested (International Alert et al, 2001). In general, it can be said that a more sophisticated and comprehensive methodology is called for in the long-term. There is now a trend away from developing a single tool for conflict analysis towards a range of tools, which can be used at different stages of programme development and implementation processes (International Alert et al, 2001). These “tool boxes” contain modules for identifying stages of conflict, establishing time lines, mapping the root causes of conflict, undertaking stakeholder analysis and identifying peace constituencies. Conflict assessments, in fact, seem to converge around the analysis of different stages of conflict and corresponding types of factors, i.e. root/structural, proximate/accelerating and triggering factors. What is missing from this toolbox, though, is the employment of a commonly shared approach to socio-economic vulnerability in the

9

assessment and prevention of conflict. Across the board, conflict assessment tools fail to recognize the utility and necessity of assessing conflict in truly forward-looking and ex-ante terms, but more importantly fail to recognize that only a socio-economic vulnerability analysis could provide the elements for an economic foundation in the conflict prevention toolbox. This is because socio-economic vulnerability analysis is the only socio-economic analysis that uses a forward looking and dynamic approach, a fundamental feature in an early warning system framework and in establishing a real “culture of prevention”.

4.

The missing link: recommendations for socio-economic vulnerability analysis in conflict prevention strategies

There is, therefore, a strong need to design different optimal strategies in relation to different combinations of risks, available tools and political, social and economic contexts. But this has to be done using a shared theoretical background and common empirical methodologies. We need to create a common and shared methodological platform for economic analysts, development policy-makers and conflict prevention strategists alike. This new framework based on a socio-economic vulnerability approach could not only allow us to better identify the dynamics of economic underdevelopment in relation to the root causes of social strife and communal violence, but it could also be key in understanding the challenges imposed by the new rules of global governance. As we have seen, important vulnerability methodologies and instruments exist. What needs to be done, however, is to consolidate the scattered and disconnected traces of vulnerability analysis, taking the best from all worlds, and making them coherent and coordinated and bringing them into the core of development cooperation at the international level. We also lack a proper measurement of vulnerability, or rather we have a plethora of appropriate sectoral measures of vulnerability without a common methodological framework able to make comparisons across space and time. Hence, we need deeper analysis and a shared common methodology in order to be able to detect concrete manifestations of the phenomenon in different socio-economic contexts, carefully analysing the diverse nature of international shocks, as well as the vast range of peoples' reaction strategies. A fundamental step in this analysis is the assessment of the dynamics of certain variables that could signal countries heading towards a negative economic situation – which could be called underdevelopment - according to different types of risk and different socio-economic characteristics and management tools. It is important, first of all, to reach a better understanding of risks and the interactions between them (including covariances), using contextual as well as non-contextual survey techniques and quantitative as well as qualitative data. We need to separate the role of the magnitude and frequency of macroeconomic shocks from the role of the socio-economic characteristics of nations and the robustness of their macroeconomic strategies and institutions. Establishing a set of both qualitative and quantitative indicators of socio-economic vulnerability could enable policy-makers and analysts in the field of conflict prevention and development cooperation to better identify and anticipate fragile/vulnerable situations on the verge of or immediately following violent conflict or severe economic decline. What is the solution, then? How can we reach a common, shared vision of vulnerability that can be implemented to resolve current inconsistencies between conflict prevention and development cooperation, and thereby bridge the gap that has impeded the complete fulfilment of overall poverty reduction goals? The following is a set of recommendations intended to raise awareness among policy-makers and strategists about the role and the potential of the socio-economic vulnerability analysis in conflict prevention assessments and strategies and to put practitioners on the right path of truly preventative and forward-looking analyses of the causes of crisis and underdevelopment. These recommendations could provide us with a new way of looking at, understanding and acting (instead of re-acting) to prevent crisis through a socio-economic vulnerability lens.

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The policy recommendations are divided into three broad areas to support policy makers to: ● Underline the elements related to violent conflict that should be considered in food

security and socio-economic vulnerability assessments. Efforts should be targeted at international organizations, practitioners and experts with the specific aim of increasing their awareness of the potential negative outcome, namely rising violence and conflict. ● Explore ways to integrate the socio-economic dimension more squarely into

conflict prevention strategies. Efforts in this area should be targeted in particular at experts and organizations involved in conflict prevention and vulnerability assessments. ● Build a more comprehensive vulnerability assessment methodology in conflict

prevention strategies and development cooperation policy aimed towards properly assessing socio-economic vulnerability as a “missing link” between conflict prevention and development cooperation. Underlining the conflict dimensions in food security and socio-economic vulnerability approaches We need, first of all, to improve the level of coordination with conflict prevention analysis and, secondly, to resolve time inconsistencies between objectives and instruments. Regarding the first aspect, we need to establish institutional mechanisms that promote reciprocal consultation. In this respect a wider participation of development cooperation experts in the conflict prevention and development cooperation groups, together with a deeper integration of food security and socio-economic analysis with conflict prevention strategies is needed. Differences in culture and background of experts in these two fields have rendered it difficult for conflict prevention analysts and development cooperation policy-makers to find common ground. This is not surprising if we consider that, prior to the creation of the DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation, conflict prevention had always been considered a distinct and separate discipline from development cooperation. Though both are integral to the understanding of conflict and development, respectively, neither is sufficient to understand the link between the two. Development cooperation policy-makers are overly concerned with the physical realization and outcome of individual development cooperation projects, without enough consideration of their effects in a broader context. Not surprisingly, these differences in background reflect differences in the analytical methodologies of each respective group. Development cooperation policy continues to rely almost exclusively on traditional long-term economic analysis. Regarding the second aspect we need to reduce time inconsistencies through the use of a methodology that satisfies both short-term needs as well as long-term objectives. The only way to achieve this is to act at the multilateral level, thereby limiting the negative effects of partial national interests. This alone, though, is not enough. We also need to foster a more participatory development approach. In this way, we can guarantee a more complete representation of civil society, which can ensure time horizons more consistent with long-term development objectives. Build a more pervasive “culture of prevention” and not just a "culture of monitoring and evaluation", which often focuses on singular development projects. We need to move away from the limited point of view provided by the various sectoral analyses of vulnerability (food security, livelihood vulnerability, trade vulnerability, poverty vulnerability, etc.) to reach a wider comprehension of the general phenomenon of vulnerability, taking into account the pervasive role of the social and political superstructures, the role of the institutions, together with the role of “greed and grievances” and other important factors of the conflict prevention analysis. In addition, the socio-economic literature still considers vulnerability as a phenomenon that is largely monetary, using indicators such as income and per capita consumption in relation to a standard poverty line5. In order to evaluate the dynamics of 5. Economists generally analyse the standard deviation of the change of the variables over time.

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poverty in the short-term, the economic approach primarily uses panel studies and focuses on households (Alwang, Siegel, Jorgensen, 2001). In general, it is agreed that vulnerability represents the combination of the probabilities that negative effects will occur, along with a measurement of their severity based on a certain function of well-being. (Glewwe and Hall, 1998). Apart from a few theories, however - for example, the likely relationship between temporary shocks and long-term vulnerability (Suryahad A, Sumarto S., Pritchett L., 2001) there is still much debate over the meaning and reasons underlying the dynamics of vulnerability and shifts in poverty levels. Current economic studies have largely ignored a number of relevant issues, for instance, those related to a lack of policy credibility, or the inconsistency between short-term strategies and incoherence of long-term commitments (Triulzi, Montalbano, 2001), or even those derived from exclusion from vulnerability reduction policies (Dercon, 2001), and in general everything which is not measurable by a monetary metric. It is undeniable that there is room for improving vulnerability analysis and to work together towards a deeper conflict vulnerability assessment (that combines food security, livelihood, trade and poverty issues). Integrating socio-economic vulnerability analysis into conflict prevention strategies On the other hand, we need to reinforce the socio-economic background of conflict analysis. Authorities on conflict prevention rarely understand socio-economic vulnerability as their focus lies in the political shocks that cause conflict, rather than the dynamic and long-term economic risk factors. It is clear that the range of analytical tools, frameworks and approaches to peace and conflict-sensitive development practice can make an important contribution to the prevention of violence when developed and applied appropriately. However, it is vital that tools are seen as one part of a comprehensive approach and not as a panacea or a substitute for political action. There is a need to bring currently disparate initiatives together and to share understanding and practice and learn from experience. Moreover, present frameworks and indicator systems for assessing conflict are too general to be of real use. Developing more multidisciplinary and inclusive approaches, and more importantly, reinforcing the socio-economic foundation of conflict assessments could provide a more comprehensive platform from which to implement more coherent, efficient and effective policies and strategies. We need to move towards a comprehensive “culture of prevention”. We are currently working in a "culture of reaction", in which the focus is on the management and resolution of conflict, rather than its prevention. A pervasive culture of prevention requires, however, the preexistence of an adequate “culture of monitoring and evaluation”. By this, we mean a proper system, able to provide significant statistical data (monitoring) and undergo ex-ante (before), in itinere (during) and ex-post (after) analyses (evaluations), that can ensure adequate levels of continuity and efficacy as well as identify beforehand any potential glitches and possible measures to avoid them. A monitoring and evaluation system in the particular area of conflict and development would have to be able to correctly measure and interpret the dynamics of changes over time, selecting the most accurate and indicative socio-economic and political indicators that could provide the necessary data to understand dynamic phenomena and ensure more coherent policies. In this respect, we need a more adequate methodology able to select the most relevant socio-economic and political variables to monitor and evaluate the specific macro situation of conflict-prone countries in different socio-economic contexts. Building a comprehensive methodology in conflict prevention and development cooperation policy Reach consensus on a definition, methodology and measurement of socio-economic vulnerability. One primary focus of vulnerability analysis of economic development should be to reach consensus on a multidimensional, space-time and “socio-economic context” definition of the phenomenon. More specifically, we have to improve our understanding of: the dynamics of developing countries: the type, magnitude and frequency of the shocks they

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have to face; their socio-economic characteristics, and ability to cope with these shocks; and their likelihood of heading towards underdevelopment. To do this, we have to know more about the size, frequency and the relative importance of the different risks faced by developing countries. We also have to take into consideration that the current increasing level of macroeconomic interaction is forcing people and communities to rapidly change their behaviour and ability to cope with risks. People are experiencing difficulties in managing an entirely new set of shocks and incentives. Although it is important to reach consensus on a definition, methodology and indicators of vulnerability among all disciplines and establish a more holistic approach to the analysis of the phenomenon, we have to consider at the same time that a socio-economic vulnerability approach must be applied to local situations. A socio-economic vulnerability lens should act as an overarching framework, in which risk management tools and programmes need to be adapted to reach context focused goals. Build this shared socio-economic vulnerability approach into a conflict prevention "toolbox". Employing a socio-economic vulnerability analysis as a tool to "measure" and better analyse the socio-economic aspect of conflict could establish a more effective and coordinated approach to the prevention of violent outcomes. Since it addresses vulnerability in terms of underdevelopment of well-being and livelihoods, socio-economic vulnerability in the area of conflict analysis would provide a more accurate and prevention-oriented analysis of fragile states than current traditional analyses generally do. Current conflict vulnerability assessments lack a continuous, forward-looking analysis of socio-economic causes of violent conflict. Introducing socio-economic vulnerability analysis could bridge this theoretical and methodological gap. Furthermore, it could provide a common and shared methodological platform for development cooperation policy-makers and act as a direct link towards conflict prevention strategies. At the same time, it could strengthen monitoring and evaluation mechanisms as it promotes ex-ante analyses, more preventive measures and a continuous process of assessment to measure dynamic changes in development.

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Appendix A. Different vulnerability assessment methodologies This appendix is divided into three different sections: food security, socio-economic vulnerability analysis and conflict vulnerability analysis. A.1

Food security vulnerability analysis

This approach is based on the belief that food security, production and consumption are the most important aspects of a livelihood. Vulnerability, therefore, is understood in terms of being "food insecure", which means a lack of physical and economic access to sufficient food to meet a person's dietary needs for a productive and healthy life. More specifically, it is defined as the combined effects of "risk and of the ability of an individual or household to cope with those risks and to recover from a shock or deterioration of current status" (Maxwell et al, 2000). Although the analysis distinguishes between the concept of food insecurity as an ex-ante forward-looking concept and hunger, undernutrition, etc. as ex-post outcomes of food insecurity, the focus is nevertheless on outcome probability rather than actual vulnerability related to the risks and responses. In terms of methodology, food insecurity analysts have focused primarily on the search for identifying indicators that could signal food insecure areas. There is, however, no single variable that can measure food insecurity; thus, no specific variable exists to which the indicators can be compared. Without indicators and variables, then, there can be no benchmark of food insecurity either. FAO – FIVIMS and GIEWS Definition According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), food security is when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. Contrarily, food insecurity is the condition in which a person is undernourished due to the physical unavailability of food, their lack of social or economic access and/or inadequate calorie requirements. The definition adds also anyone who exhibits physical symptoms caused by energy and nutrient deficiencies resulting from an inadequate or unbalanced diet, or from inability of the body to use food effectively because of infection or disease. Those in need are divided between the food insecure and those who are vulnerable to becoming food insecure (FAO, 1998). Vulnerability, in this context, is the full range of factors that place people at risk of becoming food insecure. Methodology The degree of vulnerability is determined by the unit's exposure to risk and its ability to cope with or withstand stressful situations (FAO, 1998). More specifically, the factors that determine a condition of vulnerability can be grouped into two types: ● External factors: transitory, seasonal or chronic shocks and changes. These factors

essentially constitute factors of risk. ● Internal factors: factors tied to the characteristics of the household or individual, their

general living conditions and the internal dynamics of the household that limit its ability to avoid becoming "food insecure" and influence its ability to be resilient against the above external factors. Such factors described here can be classified as the household's characteristics. The relationship between the two can be better understood if we consider that households make use of these internal factors, i.e. a their assets (human, social, natural, physical and financial capital), in order to survive, and that these assets can be influenced by external

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factors, such as structural (policies, legislation, cultural norms, market conditions) or transitory "shocks" (seasonal changes, shocks). Instrument To measure and map food security vulnerability, FAO has established a Food Insecurity and Vulnerability Information and Mapping System (FIVIMS) that assembles, analyses and disseminates information about people who are food insecure or at risk, i.e. who they are, where they are located, and why they are food insecure or vulnerable. The idea behind FIVIMS is that improved information can be actively used to produce better results in efforts to reduce the number of undernourished and achieve food security for all. The purpose is to provide focused and precise information about the nature and extent of food insecurity and vulnerability and the underlying causes and changes that occur over time. The overall goal is to be able to reduce the incidence of food insecurity as well as prevent current vulnerability to food security from becoming a reality (FAO, 1998). FAO has also established the Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture (GIEWS). Whereas FIVIMS is the overall information network between FAO and other early warning systems in food insecure areas, GIEWS is FAO's own food security information system. Although the goal of GIEWS is similar to that of FIVIMS - namely to provide policy-makers and analysts with the most up-to-date and accurate information available on all aspects of food supply and demand - its more specific aim is to warn of imminent food crises so that timely interventions can be planned and suffering avoided (FAO, GIEWS Brochure). GIEWS conducts field assessments, which provide qualitative indications of agricultural emergency and rehabilitation requirements in affected countries. These assessments, however, are used for policy/programme work in post-disaster situations, rather than for food insecurity prediction and prevention purposes. USAID - FEWS NET Definition The USAID approach employs a slightly different terminology "set" than the other food security approaches. Vulnerability is understood as the dimension of the impact of events on the ability of populations to satisfy their basic food needs in a certain period of time. The measurement of the capacity of the population to guarantee food security depends on the access, availability and use of the nourishment. Vulnerability is determined by looking at how people survive, how they obtain their food, cash and income, and how they spend their money. The risk itself is called hazard and can be thought of as an external cause or catalyst that results in specific economic consequences within a particular geographic area. Risk to a negative outcome, then, is the result of the combination of the exogenous "hazard" and the endogenous "vulnerability" of the household or individual to that hazard (FEWS NET, 2000). The terms and their relation to one another can be better illustrated through the following schema: Vulnerability to hazard (internal cause)

+

hazard = (external cause)

risk of food shortage (outcome)

Methodology Using the above framework, the USAID methodology can be broken down as follows: Vulnerability to Hazard: Those who are vulnerable are grouped according to geographic area and economic structure. Geographic zoning identifies groups that have similar food economies (i.e. with similar food resources and sources of income, usually based on topography, climate, ecology and agriculture), while economic differentiation distinguishes

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between similar levels of assets. These two classifications are further clustered into those groups that have similar production options and exchange options, not only qualitatively (meaning that they own the same kind of livestock, or produce the same kinds of foods), but also quantitatively (meaning they produce or buy the same amount of grain, have the same number of livestock, etc.). Production options comprise the set of alternatives employed to produce food for the household's own consumption purposes, while exchange options consist of the range of options for obtaining food that require an exchange of cash, labour or goods. Analysis of the hazard provides information on the nature and magnitude of the problem facing particular communities. Typical hazards might include wars, droughts/floods or even policy reform. The FEWS analysis makes a distinct differentiation between hazard, the initial external cause, and shock, the economic consequences that result from a hazard. Typical shocks might be changes in production levels, markets or transfers (through government entitlement programmes). The analysis emphasizes the need to look at the economic food consequences of hazards, rather than just the hazard itself. For instance, it is not enough to know that there is a drought in Southern Africa; we need to know how this drought affects access to food and income, consumption patterns, etc. (FEWS NET, 2000). The analysis of risk and outcome is conducted in order to understand what effect the problem (hazard) will have on households' access to food (vulnerability). Combining the information about the hazard and its characteristics with the information on the household's livelihood behaviour, it is possible to predict a certain outcome/risk to food insecurity (FEWS NET, 2000). Instrument The framework used to "measure" and predict food insecurity is the Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET), which investigates rural economies and their links to the wider macro-context. The aim is to help practitioners better anticipate the potential and plausible effects of different shocks (e.g. market closures, conflict, etc.), as well as point to the likely food security consequences of various resource allocation or policy decisions (USAID, 2000). The primary tool used for the FEWS NET is the Current Vulnerability Assessment (CVA), which provides a profile of the characteristics present in the area or group in question. These assessments classify food insecurity into “moderate”, “high” and “extreme” levels of insecurity. “Moderate” food insecurity indicates that the population in question is able to satisfy its basic food needs, taking recourse in adaptive strategies. “High” food insecurity is when the population is not able to meet its basic food requirements. Consumption is consequently reduced and assets are sold off. Moreover, future food insecurity is compromised. “Extreme” food insecurity signals a population that is not only unable to satisfy its basic food needs, but is also forced to resort to detrimental, adaptive strategies. In its assessment of food security vulnerability, the FEWS NET tool avails itself of the Household Economy Approach (HEA), a method developed by Save the Children (UK). The HEA identifies homogenous households, analyses the distribution of wealth within them, describes their access to food and income, and studies their relationship to the surrounding economic conditions, including markets. In this way, the FEWS approach provides a more complete analysis of the socio-economic factors that may lead to food insecurity. WFP - VAM Definition According to the World Food Programme, vulnerability is the probability that there will be a consistent decline in levels of access to and consumption of food below the minimum

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threshold of subsistence. This is determined by the degree of exposure to risk and the inability to react and adapt to the risk. Methodology The methodology is based on the analysis of diverse risks, such as drought, floods, insect invasions and epidemics, as well as conflict and civil wars. These risks are in turn analysed according to the economic and food-related consequences they may lead to, such as variations in domestic production of food, variation in prices and variation in income. In this way, the WFP’s approach is similar to that of USAID’s insofar as it focuses on not merely the risk/hazard, but more importantly on the resulting economic consequences/shock. The analysis of endogenous factors centres around households and how they respond to crisis and insecurity. Strategies include selling assets, using remittances, reducing food consumption, increasing consumption of secondary foods, taking advantage of local group solidarity, and taking advantage of government assistance and entitlements. Considering that the same risk can have diverse effects on individuals and households depending on their ability to respond to the risk and their access to management tools and assets, the WFP methodology takes into account that there are naturally different levels of vulnerability. Administrative zones are classified as: high risk of drought, but good adaptive strategies; poor but food secure; high socio-economic insecurity; exposure to market risks and high socio-economic insecurity; high risk and relatively high socio-economic insecurity; or, not vulnerable. Instrument The above described methodology is applied to an early warning mapping instrument, Vulnerability Assessment Mapping (VAM). The aim of the system is to improve the efficiency of food aid by means of a process of monitoring and evaluation of the multiple factors that influence food insecurity and vulnerability. This instrument not only distinguishes between at risk areas within a certain geographical region, but it also provides for the ex-ante identification of so-called vulnerable groups. By classifying risk and vulnerability by physical area as well as individual household groups, the WFP VAM approach distinguishes itself from other methodologies, providing an added value to the understanding of food security vulnerability. Centre Regionale Agrhymet - AP3A Definition According to the Centre Regionale Agrhymet, whose primary technical assistance comes from CeSIA Centro per le Scienze Informatiche per l’Agricoltura (Center for Computer Sciences in Agriculture), vulnerability is defined as a characteristic of a region or area that considerably increases the chances that a risk will turn into a negative concrete event. Vulnerability is understood in terms of food production; risk thus refers to risk to the production system. Methodology The analysis of vulnerability is comprised of two possible dimensions of the phenomenon: the structural dimension, which describes the characteristics of the production system over the long-run, and the short-term dimension, which is concerned with the changes and events in the short-run, and events of a structural nature that impact the contingent situation. The scope of the methodological approach is to identify the geographical context of vulnerability by studying the characteristics and factors that have the most significant impact on the area. Three common principles guide the methodology: the distinction of area by production system; the adoption of a regional dimension of analysis; and the consideration of 17

the evolutionary aspect of the area in question. The approach begins by examining and classifying production systems. Then, the supply and demand of food is analysed to evaluate vulnerability in a specific region. Finally, agricultural pressures and dynamics are taken into consideration in order to understand the degree of exploitation and the potential agricultural resources present in the area. Agricultural pressures paint a picture of the current exploitation of the land, while agricultural dynamics indicate the ways in which this exploitation arises. Instrument The instrument employed is an early warning and monitoring system called AP3A (Alerte Précoce et Prévisions des Productions Agricoles), which aims to analyse vulnerability of productive systems in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Senegal. Since production systems in this area are primarily agricultural, the analysis of vulnerability naturally focuses on the production of primary agricultural goods. The objective of the AP3A vulnerability measuring tool is to provide useful and timely information to national and international decision-makers involved in the field of food security. The more specific objectives are to conduct a detailed classification of the area based on production systems; describe the food needs of the people in the area of concern and if these needs are satisfied; evaluate the potential of these systems to satisfy the food requirements; evaluate the potential of the agricultural zones and the pressure put on them from human activity; allow for the classification of areas based on productive, bio-physical, and economic vulnerability; and, provide a regional framework for further study of vulnerability analysis. A.2

Socio-economic vulnerability

Sustainable livelihoods vulnerability analysis The concept of sustainable livelihoods (SL), first introduced in 1992 at the World Summit on Environment and Development and originally inspired by the food security approach, is based on the belief that in order to fully understand the degree of sustainability of poor peoples' livelihoods it is no longer sufficient to simply evaluate disposable assets, both at the micro and macro level. Instead, we must analyse the dynamics and characteristics of the population's reaction strategies in various political and socio-economic contexts. In this light, peoples’ activities, assets and "entitlements", their ability to make important decisions, their actual access to the opportunities and resources and, more importantly, their ability to use the resources in a sustainable manner need to be considered. Vulnerability, in the context of sustainable livelihoods, is understood to be an endemic condition among the poor that severely constrains their livelihood choices and, therefore, limits their opportunities (ODI, 2000). Another fundamental idea on which the SL approach is founded is that development does not occur in a vacuum; rather, it is determined by the socio-political, cultural, ecological and economic contexts within which individuals and communities live (UNDP, 2000b). It follows, then, that peoples’ assets, activities and entitlements that form their livelihoods are equally diverse. For analytical purposes, the SL approach classifies assets as natural/biological, social (community, social networks), economic (jobs, savings), political (participation, empowerment), human (health, labour, education), and physical (roads, markets, schools). UNDP Approach Definition According to the UNDP, vulnerability is the factor that determines a condition of human development opposite from the ideal one, namely sustainability. At the macro level, this

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includes economic efficiency, environmental integrity, and human well-being. At the micro level, vulnerability is the lack of sustainable livelihood, meaning a lack of local knowledge, science and technology and policy structures. Sustainable livelihoods themselves "are derived from peoples’ capacities to exercise choice, and to access opportunities and resources, and use them for their livelihoods in ways that do not foreclose options for others to make their living, either now, or in the future" (UNDP, 2000a). In this way, the UNDP recognizes that it is not only a lack (in terms of quantity and quality) of resources that indicates a situation of vulnerability, but more importantly a “lack of access” to and “capacity” to use these resources efficiently (Sen, 1973). Methodology Vulnerability, in this context, is the probability that stress will occur on one or more "assets", and that greater stress or a higher probability of stress implies increased vulnerability. This literature incorporates into its evaluation of vulnerability both exposure to risks and shocks (livelihood sensitivity) as well as endogenous risk response tools (livelihood resilience). In weighing the sustainability of livelihood systems, the SL approach places considerable emphasis on analysing a household's adaptive and coping strategies to understand its livelihood system. Coping strategies are defined as short-term responses to specific shocks such as drought. Adaptive strategies, on the other hand, are those that entail a longer-term change in behaviour patterns as a result of a shock or stress. However, distinctions are not made between "good" and "bad" short-term adaptability in relation to the long run (e.g. removing children from school is an adaptation method, however, over time this will be more detrimental than the economic loss from one less source of income). The outcome is related to loss of livelihood and/or continued vulnerability. Measuring a "loss" in livelihood, however, is not clear, as there is no specific minimum level of livelihood. Despite flaws and weaknesses, the SL approach does bring an added value to understanding the dynamics and processes of poverty and underdevelopment. While traditional top-down poverty reduction measures have been conceived and implemented with little regard for the specific behaviours and assets of individual households, participatory bottom-up development approaches have managed to understand the dynamics of poor livelihoods, but overlook how macro level changes affect them. The missing link that the SL approach provides is the examination of how macro and sectoral policies affect the livelihood options available to a particular community or individual (UNDP, 2000b). Instrument The SL approach technically does not make use of a specific instrument. This is primarily due to the fact that, even through there is a specific approach behind Sustainable Livelihoods, it remains more a process than a strict methodology (UNDP, 2000b). The World Bank approach to socio-economic vulnerability Vulnerability to social and economic loss is largely the fruit of the poverty dynamics literature on vulnerability, which is defined as being vulnerable to risky events that could move the household to a state where it is below the poverty line and needs to reduce consumption in order to survive. This literature recognizes vulnerability as poverty being the outcome of a dynamic process of risks and responses (though they are not well defined yet). Poverty status is therefore not necessarily static, but contains a time reference. In fact, poverty is classified as chronic or transient depending on the time reference used. If a household remains poor over the whole time period, it is referred to as chronically poor. If movements in and out of poverty are seen during the time period, the household is deemed transient in terms of poverty (Alwang et al, 2001). The focus of vulnerability to poverty is primarily on the negative outcome of poverty, focusing on the ex-post outcome of movements in and out of poverty, rather that ex-ante changes in

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vulnerability. In this way, the literature on poverty dynamics overlooks the fact that it does not take an ex-post outcome to determine if someone is vulnerable or not; rather, it is the ex-ante probability which is of concern (Alwang et al, 2001). Recent developments in the search of better definitions of vulnerability have led experts to adopt the definition of vulnerability as the probability of falling below a certain threshold within a time period, and weighting the probability by time spent below the line, severity of poverty and shortfall below the line (Alwang et al, 2001). The World Bank has been the primary exponent of this search for a better understanding of vulnerability to poverty through social and economic-based analyses. The World Bank HDSP Unit - SRM Definition According to the World Bank, vulnerability is defined as the probability of a decline in wellbeing below a specific benchmark. The degree of vulnerability is determined by a situation of insecurity caused by (i) exposure to risk, (ii) and the unit's ability to face the shock through risk management instruments and strategies. Risk, in particular, is understood as any uncertain event that can damage well-being. This uncertainty is determined by the timing and/or magnitude of the event (even predictable events, e.g. seasonal changes in weather, can be uncertain as to their potential severity). In addition to the characteristics of the risk and risk exposure, the likelihood that a shock will result in a decline in well-being is also said to be a function of the household's asset endowment and insurance mechanisms (World Bank, 2001). Methodology World Bank experts are gradually converging towards a schema that considers vulnerability to be the result of the aggregation of three distinct components: risk factor, the probability that the distribution of events can cause a reduction in well-being; risk management, the group of actions that are undertaken ex-ante or ex-post in response to the negative manifestations of risks; and risk hazard, the negative manifestation of the phenomenon that derives from the combination of the negative component of the risk factor with the management strategies (Heitzmann, Sudharshan, Canagarajah, Siegel, 2001). Risk Factor (external probability)

+

Risk Management = (ex-ante and ex-post tools)

Risk Hazard (negative outcome)

This schema is based on a basic understanding of dynamics between risk, vulnerability and poverty. It begins with the fact that, in general terms, everyone is exposed to multiple risks from different sources, both natural and man-made. The poor, being the most exposed to a wider array of risks, however, "are often among the most vulnerable in society. Their low income means they are less able to save and accumulate assets. That in turn restricts their ability to deal with a crisis when it strikes" 6(World Bank, 2001). It is evident then that there is a strong link between macroeconomic downturns and rising income poverty. Poverty-sensitive policies, therefore, need to be aimed at not only those who

6. The poor are said to be especially devastated by economic crises, as they are covariant and generally catastrophic in nature. Not only are they great sources of vulnerability and insecurity for this generation, but for the next as well, as they wreak irreversible and unrecoverable damage and loss on human capital through a chain of events, beginning with an economic crisis and ending with loss of income and the selling off of assets at depressed prices. The upshot is that there is a general slowdown in the accumulation of human, financial and physical capital, making escaping poverty that much more out of reach.

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are already poor, but also those who could become poor as a result of a crisis (World Bank, 2001). Currently, however, governments generally implement adjustment policies and employ fiscal austerity to combat the effects after a macroeconomic crisis hits, instead of putting safety nets and social assistance programmes in place. Another looming problems is that the impact of these economic crises is not easily measured or captured in existing inequality and income data, the reason being that economic crises are characterized by extensive mobility between those who are poor and those who are not (World Bank, 2001). One of the primary objectives of socio-economic vulnerability analyses, therefore, is to find a metric that is comparable across outcomes. For convenience of measurement, money, in the form of income or consumption, is generally used. However, poverty is the result of various non-monetary factors, pointing to the need for alternative or supplementary measures to capture the missing aspects. Despite its faults, however, the use of a common, comparable metric is admirable in its own right and "improves the [overall] empirical tractability" of this type of analysis (Alwang et al, 2001). Instrument The World Bank's "instrument" to analyse vulnerability is largely incorporated and centred around strategies at the Bank's social protection sector, whose main tool is the Social Risk Management Framework (SRM). The aim of SRM is to embed social protection programmes into an integrated approach to poverty reduction. To this extent, the SRM framework sees itself as not only a safety net in times of crisis and hardship, but more importantly as a springboard to assist the poor to escape poverty and vulnerability prior to the occurrence of a shock (World Bank, 2001b). According to the SRM, vulnerability is the expected loss of well-being below a socially accepted norm, which is caused by the occurrence of uncertain risks/events and the lack of appropriate risk management instruments (Holzmann, 2001). The negative occurrence, namely “hazard”, depends on the interaction of risk exposure and the actual availability of appropriate risk management tools, both related also to the specific "characteristics” of the unit of analysis. To better understand the complex interactions between risks, responses and vulnerability, the World Bank has developed an elaborate classification system. Risks are classified according to the level at which they take place (micro, meso or macro; idiosyncratic or covariant); the nature of the risk itself (political, economic, social, environmental, etc.); the frequency (repeated over time or bunched with other risks); and, the intensity with which they hit (catastrophic or non-catastrophic) (World Bank, 2001). Likewise, risk management strategies are grouped according to their aim (to reduce, mitigate or cope) and the stage at which one utilises them (ex-ante or ex-post). Risk reduction strategies, for instance, are employed ex-ante and aimed at reducing the probability of a shock or negative fluctuation; risk mitigation mechanisms, while still ex-ante, are not aimed at preventing the shock, but reducing the impact of it once it occurs; finally, people turn to risk coping responses ex-post to relieve the impact of a shock after it occurs. Many coping mechanisms have a high long-term cost on the household for a short-term benefit (World Bank, ch. 8,2000). Risk management tools are also divided by the level of formality of the arrangement (informal, market-based or public/government arrangements).

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Type/Nature of Risk

Micro (individual/household)

Natural

Meso (group of households or a community) Rains, Volcanic eruption

Macro (Regions or countries) Earthquake, Flood, Drought, Cyclone

Health

Illness, accident, hospitalisation, death

Epidemics

Social

Crime, domestic violence

Terrorism, armed groups

Civil conflict, war, social revolt

Economic

Migration, bad crops/harvest, change of price on food stuffs

Change in price of food stuffs, increase in growth, hyper-inflation, large budget deficit, technological shock, etc

Political

Insurrectional movements

Coup d’etat

Environmental

Pollution, deforestation, nuclear disaster

Source: World Bank, 2000

A.3

Conflict vulnerability analysis

The recent failures of international bodies to prevent, manage and resolve conflict, combined with the increasing realization that violent conflict and development are intertwined, have led international donor agencies, governmental authorities and organizations to re-evaluate their policies through a conflict prevention lens. This has taken the form largely of methods to assess the conflict vulnerability of fragile countries and regions. However, as it will be underlined below, there is still a significant gap between the common analysis of vulnerability and these conflict prevention assessments. These methodologies and approaches, even if they could potentially be considered a relatively new area of vulnerability research, generally utilise concepts, definitions and terms related to a dynamic and forward-looking analysis without a common framework and with very poor links with the economic and social aspects of the phenomena analysed. The socio-economic vulnerability analysis is, in this respect, a sort of “missing link” with the social and economic aspects of the problems, which could help these analyses to build a more holistic approach in the conflict prevention strategies and to reinforce their socio-economic foundation. Only after this necessary transformation could we consider this plethora of Conflict Prevention Assessments as a new and distinct evolution in the chain of vulnerability analysis. The review of the Conflict Prevention Assessments presented below will distinguish among national, supranational and international approaches in order to give a better idea of the different goals and methodologies carried out by different actors acting in the field and give to the readers a comprehensive framework. USAID - CVA Definition Case in point, the USAID approach to vulnerability to conflict has no definition of what it means to be vulnerable. Instead, the causes of conflict, it is implied, are the shortcomings of state capacity and social frustration.

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Methodology Focusing largely on the political factors of conflict, USAID's efforts to prevent conflict have logically been channelled through its democracy and governance programmes in the USAID Office of Democracy and Governance. In addressing the economic conditions associated with violent conflict, USAID claims that economic growth will follow improvements in political conditions (USAID, 2001). Addressing the economic factors of violent conflict, therefore, is considered secondary to addressing the political ones. However, USAID does recognize that internal violent conflict emerges only after a long period of deteriorating social, economic and political conditions. Implicit in this is also the knowledge that there are many factors that increase a country's conflict vulnerability. USAID responds to this complexity by encouraging the use of a conflict prevention lens for each sector (USAID, 2001). USAID's Office of Democracy and Governance is currently developing a conceptual framework that will help identify causes of deadly conflict in particular country settings so that missions can make strategic use of their programmes to break into the chain of events that leads to widespread violence (USAID, 2001). The framework identifies several structural root causes of conflict: ● grievance: ethnic or religious divisions, population pressures, poverty, unemployment,

environmental scarcity ● greed: political gain from violence, e.g. narco-trafficking, sales of diamonds, etc. ● the ability of the government to cope with pressures/demands

Instrument The main instrument used by USAID to evaluate vulnerability is the Country Vulnerability Assessment (CVA). The Assessments outline the sources of conflict - be they political, historical, economic, ethnic, natural or religious - and the USAID projects or policies aimed at eliminating or remedying those areas of instability. One of USAID's key instruments to this extent is democracy programmes. Although it is realized that democracy programmes alone cannot altogether abate the spread of violence, the overarching goal is to understand how improvements in democracy can address the other underlying causes of conflict (USAID, 2001). CIDA Definition Under the Canadian Peace-building Initiative, founded in October of 1996 by the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, peace-building means intensifying efforts to establish lasting peace and to resolve conflicts peacefully. Peace-building, more specifically, refers to conflict prevention, resolution and post-conflict reconciliation activities. The focus is on the political and socio-economic context of the conflict rather than on military or humanitarian aspects. Methodology The Peacebuilding Fund, in operation since April 1997, is one of the main components of this ministerial initiative. The idea behind it is to provide a rapid response mechanism in high-risk environments. The overriding purpose of the Fund is to tilt the social and political balance towards sustainable peace. This mechanism has been put in place to finance emergency conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding activities in countries entering, experiencing or emerging from conflict. It aims to fill urgent gaps in programming as a result of rapidly changing circumstances; strengthen the transition from emergency relief to postconflict reconstruction; and act as a catalyst to new and more innovative approaches to peacebuilding. 23

Instrument The Peacebuilding Fund is based on the Strategic Framework, which reflects a common understanding by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) of the aims and approaches to peacebuilding that will be undertaken within the framework of the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative. It responds quickly to urgent peacebuilding situations in ODA countries by supporting targeted, short-term (maximum 18 months), one-time interventions at a critical juncture in the peace consolidation process. A main part of the Fund is risk assessment. The thematic programming areas for the Fund include, but are not limited to: small arms control, gender initiatives and peacebuilding, war affected children, emergency civilian response, support to multilateral and regional peacebuilding initiatives, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants, support to free media and communications, civil society partnerships, and educational initiatives as tools for peace. UK DFID CHAD – SCA Definition The Department for International Development (DFID) approach has not articulated a particular definition of vulnerability in relation to conflict. Conflict prevention, however, is defined as "activities undertaken by internal or external actors over the short-term to reduce manifest tensions and/or prevent the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict" and conflict reduction as "activities undertaken to reduce the incidence, duration and destructiveness of violent conflict" (DFID, 2002). Methodology The UK's Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department within DFID has developed a methodology that consists of three distinct stages: analysis of the conflict, analysis of international responses to the conflict, and the development of strategies and alternatives. The approach makes use of a number of analytical 'lenses', such as the political economy approach, which distinguishes between greed and grievance as motives for violent conflict; the structural-institutional approach, focusing on institutions which may predispose an area to conflict; and a dynamic approach, which recognizes that rarely is there a clear distinction between the beginning and end of conflict situations (DFID, 2002a). Recent research (DFID, 2002b) has also encouraged the use of an environmental stress lens, which could be useful in determining which regions may be particularly vulnerable to conflict and where environment may play a significant role. First stage: the aim of conflict analysis, in particular, is "to better understand the historical and structural antecedents of violent conflict and to better understand what converts latent conflict into open conflict or intensifies existing conflict." This is done through the examination of (i) the structures, meaning the long-term factors and key sources of tension that have led to, or are likely to lead to, conflict; (ii) the actors involved in conflict; (iii) and, the dynamics themselves of conflict, specifically long-term trends and potential triggers of violent conflict, and likely future scenarios (DFID, 2002a). Second stage: the analysis of specific international responses to conflict entails examining the international and development actors involved, as well as the interactions between development interventions and conflict. The latter signifies assessing both the impact of conflict on development policy and programmes as well as the impact of development interventions on dynamics of conflict and peace. In this way, the DFID approach takes into account the dynamics between conflict and development from the perspective of both. This assessment is carried out through an analysis of macro level changes in aid (e.g. from development to humanitarian aid), changes in aid delivery (e.g. from reliance on

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governments to NGOs), and changes in programming (e.g. from full participation to scaling down operations, or complete withdrawal from a country or region) (DFID, 2002a). Third stage: the development of strategies and alternatives is based on the results from the first two phases of analysis. Two different sets of strategies are defined: the first comprises the ways in which development and other actors can develop a more coordinated and effective response to conflict, while the second focuses on individual donor agencies' own strategies for working "in" or "on" conflict. Instrument The primary tool to which this methodology is applied is the Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA), whose objective is to analyse conflict, better assess conflict related risks associated with development and humanitarian assistance, and develop options for more conflict sensitive policies and programmes. The Conflict Assessments aim to assess, in particular, the risks of negative effects of conflict on programmes, the risks of programmes or policies exacerbating conflict and opportunities to improve the effectiveness of development interventions in contributing to conflict prevention and reduction (DFID, 2002a). The following diagram illustrates how the methodology applies to the Strategic Conflict Assessments: Strategic Conflict Assessments

Conflict Analysis

Structures

Actors

Dynamics

Response Analysis

International Development Development & conflict

Alternatives/options

External

Internal

GTZ/BMZ – Indicator model Definition Although vulnerability per se is not defined or even used in the German government’s conflict prevention strategies, there are nevertheless clear definitions of conflict and crisis related terms. Differentiating between structural violence, i.e. permanent or periodically recurring crises, and crisis, prolonged economic, ecological, social and/or political stress, the GTZ adopts a wider concept of conflict that can more accurately reflect a variety of more ambiguous situations which are seemingly less conflict-prone. Conflict prevention is defined as “early, planned, systematic and coherent action at various levels of government and society to prevent violent conflicts. Crisis-prevention measures aim to (1) reduce the potential for a violent conflict (2) encourage the establishment of institutions to resolve conflicts peacefully, before, during and after violent conflict” (GTZ, 2001).This adjustment to standard definitions of conflict, conflict management and prevention provide a more structural understanding of conflict dynamics where the time frames are of a longer-term nature.

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Methodology The Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) has developed an indicator model to act as an additional instrument for planning and analysis in development cooperation. This method is used to facilitate recognition of any escalation in the potential for conflict at the earliest time possible. It is premised on the identification of structural conflict factors, accelerating factors and triggering factors. To facilitate the analysis, conflict development is divided into four stages of escalation: Stage 1:

the transition from a relatively stable and violence-free situation with latent potential for conflict

Stage 2:

tensions which are already present in a latent fashion in the first stage develop into manifest conflicts of interest between definable groups and are also articulated publicly

Stage 3:

in a further stage of escalation, the conflicting parties translate their disputes into concrete collective action or they prepare the way for it

Stage 4:

outbreaks involving the extensive use of violence or civil war.

The methodology is based on various hypotheses regarding the causes of conflict, including structural disparities, the legitimacy of state institutions, external influences such as neighbouring conflict, collectively perceived threats, social polarisation, high demands of conflicting parties, and the increasing use of force and violence as a means to an end. In the specific case of a study on Malawi (GTZ, 2001), the causes of conflict were analysed in terms of considerable household insecurity, the high rate of male adolescence unemployment, absolute poverty, and land tenure conflicts. Though not explicitly, the concept of insecurity in the leading reasons for conflict outbreak is recognized. Instrument The applied methodology takes the form of a series of multiple choice questions based on hypotheses regarding the causality between the phenomena to be observed and the probability of a further escalation. The central function of the indicators that are built into the questionnaire is not merely to draw attention to the existence of conflicts; rather it is to highlight any escalation which may occur (BMZ, 1998). By using certain developments as indicators, it is possible to assess the probability of the social situation moving on to the next stage of escalation at each stage of conflict. IGAD - CEWARN Definition The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), composed of the Heads of State and various Ministers from the Horn of Africa, have come together to respond to the growing concern over violent conflict between and among African states. To this extent, this intergovernmental body has been promoting a prevention approach to violent conflict, based on early warning concepts. Early warning is defined as the "ability to collect and analyze information in the interests of providing strategic options for preventive action or, as may be required, informed response" (Rusu,1997). In differentiating between early warning and risk assessment, IGAD points out that whereas risk assessments predict probabilities through static and quantitative analyses, early warning mechanisms anticipate possible outcomes, are dynamic, and employ a mostly qualitative analysis.

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Methodology The methodology is based on a four-step process: (i) the collection and verification of information relevant to the mitigation and prevention of conflict; (ii) the analysis of that information; (iii) scenario building and optional resources; (iv) and, communicating the above results to the appropriate policy-makers. The foundations of the methodology give significant consideration to the distinction between causality and correlation factors of conflict. Economic factors leading to violent conflict can be seen as a condition, a trigger or a complication of violent conflict, depending on the point of view. If we assume greed, for instance, is the cause of a conflict, we have to be sure that that greed was not merely correlated to violence as a product of a pre-existing source, such as socio-economic inequality or political grievance. Understanding that violent conflict can be due to multiple and interrelated factors that are complex and complicated, the IGAD approach warns against singling out one factor (e.g. economic conditions) as the absolute cause. The methodology takes its inspiration from the "facilitative" model, which encourages context-specific, bottom-up approaches to the analysis of anticipating conflict. Instrument The Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) is based on the collection and analysis of relevant information, with the ultimate goal of anticipating actions, preparing to respond, alerting governments and the public of impending problems and allowing the government and the people to take preventative action. This early warning tool is meant to be implemented and embedded within the context of conflict prevention. UNOCHA - HRA Definition Focusing more on the exogenous aspect of conflict-prone areas, the UNOCHA (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) approach has not developed an official definition of what it means to be vulnerable. Methodology Instead, the approach looks at the historical, political, economic and sanitary aspects of each area in order to assess the potential risks that could lead to a negative outcome. Particular attention is generally given to the identification of specific vulnerable groups at risk. Instrument This is carried out through Humanitarian Risk Analyses (HRA), which are conducted based on geographical area and pertinent current issue (e.g. internally displace peoples, water/sanitation, impact of international sanctions, etc.). The purpose of the HRA is to examine the humanitarian situations of conflict-prone or conflict-ridden societies, with a view to better understanding their vulnerable status. The reports generally collect and consolidate information on humanitarian assistance and services, and then attempt to identify gaps as well as highlight issues of particular concern. The HRA No. 18 focused specifically on the vulnerable group of Internally Displaced People in Serbia and Montenegro. The report analysed IDPs' access to services, legal rights, information services provided, international assistance and issues particular only to these IDPs.

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WB - CPR Network Definition The Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction (CPR) and Peacebuilding Network has developed working definitions for Conflict Analysis and Risk Assessment, Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA), and Early Response and Preventive Assistance Measures. The first is defined as a “means of developing a multi-dimensional understanding of the causes and dynamics of conflict as well as the capacities for peace. PCIAs are “methodologies or actions which may be taken by internal or external actors in an integrated and comprehensive fashion to reduce or prevent violent conflict. Preventive development refers to development strategies, Programmes and projects that are specifically geared to the prevention of violent conflict” (CPR, 2000). Methodology The CPR is an informal network of bilateral donor countries and multilateral (UN) agencies involved in responding to complex emergencies and conflict situations. The focus of the Network is on the practical, operational issues involved in responding to emerging or current conflicts. It was founded in October 1997. Members include USAID, the World Bank, UNDP/UNRISD, CIDA, UNICEF, DFID, UNOPS and others. The overall methodology rests on three principles: early responses to signs of trouble, a comprehensive, forward-looking approach to counteract the risk factors that trigger conflict, and an extended effort to resolve the underlying causes of violence. The primary areas of focus for the CPR are conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction, rehabilitation, reintegration, etc. and addressing extended or protracted crisis environments. Instrument The CPR Network draws on the early warning instruments and approaches of all its members. It does not seem to have a single tool itself that it promotes and employs. Nevertheless, it does promote the idea that preventive assistance approaches should be broad, encompassing political, economic, military, social and psychological factors, and should consist not only of avoiding escalation in a crisis, but also of creating a durable basis for peaceful alternatives. Furthermore, conflict prevention tools must include the operational prevention of incipient crises as well as structural prevention dealing with long-term, underlying factors. EU CPN - CIAS Methodology The Conflict Prevention Network (CPN) is a network of academic institutions, NGOs and independent experts. It forms part of the European Union Analysis and Evaluation Centre (EUAEC). Approaches to conflict prevention in the CPN are based on the methodology and definitions set out in the European Commission’s Practical Guide on Peace-Building and Conflict Prevention. Instrument The Conflict Impact Assessment Tool (CIAS) has been devised within this framework and understanding of peace-building and conflict prevention. Moreover, the CIAS has been designed to assist practitioners to identify significant problem areas that have the potential to lead to violent conflict in a given country. It can be applied in particular, though not exclusively, to countries where tensions are apparent, but where major crisis has not yet occurred. Although the tool includes a ranking system, it aims to highlight macro-level conflict risks and to trigger appropriate action (International Alert et al, 2001).

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The tool follows a two-step process beginning with the identification of significant problemareas based on a selection from 16 problem area charts, followed by the assessment of the significance of the remaining problem areas, using specific questions organised in provided tables. Step One, more specifically, identifies key problem areas by analysing all possible problem areas and discarding those that are most obviously irrelevant for the country in question. The range of possible problem areas is based on the root causes of violent conflict laid out in the Commission’s Guide in which specific definitions and characterisations of each problem area are provided. Step Two then breaks down each relevant problem area into 4 components, corresponding to four critical questions or issues. These four issues are then translated into possible manifestations of the problem area which may exacerbate conflict. Each concrete manifestation is then quantified for ease of analysis. Finally, trends and local perceptions regarding the significance of the problems and predictions for future circumstances are made. Each stage of the assessment process (step 2) is ranked on a point-based system. An overall problem area of 12 or more is considered significant. Any component of a problem area that scores 3 or more is also to be considered significant (SWP-CPN, 1999). Although the tool includes a ranking system, it aims to highlight macro-level conflict risks and to trigger appropriate action. The tool is broad enough to encompass the political, economic and social conditions which could underlie conflict, but is less rigorously focused regarding security issues. While it was designed to be comprehensive, this in effect led it to be somewhat unwieldy. Nevertheless, it views conflict preventions not as an approach to sectoral policy, but as one which needs to be mainstreamed into all policies in order to complement the EU’s other initiatives (International Alert et al, 2001). UN Staff College – Early Warning Analysis Definition The UN Staff College’s approach to conflict is not based on the concept of assessing vulnerability to conflict. Thus, there is no definition per se of vulnerability. Surprisingly, there is neither a detailed definition of what conflict and conflict prevention entail. A better understanding of the approach’s terms and perspective on conflict can be drawn from its early warning methodology. Methodology The Early Warning and Conflict Prevention methodology is based on a 5-step process. To begin, the situation profile of a country is analysed. Using a range of publicly available information, a “snapshot” of the current situation or a more general profile is captured. Then, the specific causes of conflict are surveyed. Here, the concepts of structural and proximate causes are introduced. Categories include, but are not limited to: governance and political security, human rights and person security, social and communal security, economic factors, military and arms, and other miscellaneous external factors. The distinction between proximate and structural factors can be illustrated through the analogy of an iceberg: the proximate causes are naturally the tip of the iceberg, while the structural causes are those that are deeper, larger and generally not immediately visible. Instrument Following the analysis of conflict causes, the dynamic interaction of potential conflict causes must be examined using an early warning analysis. Next, scenarios are built using the output of the composite analysis. A “trigger” event, i.e. some event that could ignite the combination of potential causes and set in motion a series of events, is hypothesized. Two scenarios are developed: a worst case and a most likely case scenario. The scenarios illustrate the potential consequences of not taking action at an early stage. Finally, recommendations for preventive measures are made. These recommendations take into consideration 5 factors, or

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A4T as it is called: actors, targets, tools, timing and triage (i.e. assessing the widest, deepest and most long-term impact on the situation in question). SPF – FAST Definition The term vulnerability is not used or defined explicitly; instead, emphasis is placed on the identification of short- and long-term crises potentials, i.e. risk factors that can either increase or decrease the likelihood of armed conflict. Methodology The methodology is based on the distinction between root causes and proximate causes of violent conflict. Root causes are defined as those background factors that enhance armed conflict, though they are not necessarily sufficient to cause it. These factors are generally static and therefore change slowly over time, due largely to the fact that they are embedded in a historical context. Ethnic diversity, colonial history and economic conditions are some indicative examples of such root causes of conflict. Proximate causes, on the other hand, include factors such as the type of government in power and how much power it has, and a sudden increase in poverty level. Contrary to the root causes, these factors are time-wise closer to the outbreak of violent conflict and have a tendency to change quickly over time. The methodology takes into consideration not only short- and long-term risk factors, but also external conflict-decreasing or conflict-increasing influences that can impact the nature of the outcome. The examination of these diverse crises “potentials” is based on qualitative and quantitative analyses. The tools used to perform the qualitative analyses include a constant monitoring of events and developments in the specific context in question; information-gathering from the local information networks in which local analysts track and report information on a specific set of indicators that feeds into graphs called Tension Barometers; drawing on expertise from a network of external experts to provide analytical insight, case scenarios and response options; and, carrying out fact-finding missions to obtain hands-on knowledge, assess the situation on the ground and make contacts with local analysts. This latter tool allows for a better formulation of targeted response options. Quantitative analyses, on the other hand, make use of event data, provided by an automated coding method developed by Virtual Research Associates (VRA), a Harvard-based group of academic analysts. This event data analysis allows for a speedy tracking of specific violent or co-operative incidences over time and supports qualitative assessments. It is also able to provide a basis for cross-country comparisons and the forecasting of conflict trends. Since it quickly digests a large amount of information in a very short period of time, automated event data is supplemented with information collected by the local information networks. Instrument In 1998, the Swiss Peace Foundation (SPF) developed a political early warning instrument called FAST (Early Recognition of Tension and Fact Finding), which is currently funded by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC). Like many other early warning devices, the objective of FAST is the early recognition of impending or potential crisis situations for the purpose of early action and conflict prevention. Employing the above described methodology, FAST produces specific early warning tools, namely Country Risk Profiles and FAST Updates, which are aimed at enhancing the political decision-makers’ ability to identify critical developments in a timely manner in order to formulate coherent political strategies to prevent or limit the destructive effects of violent conflicts. The Country Risk Profiles present an in-depth baseline assessment of the situation in the target countries. In these profiles, the formulation of case scenario and detailed policy

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options represent a distinguishing feature of this conflict prevention tool. FAST Updates, the second product of the FAST methodology, are aimed at providing quarterly updates of the situation on the ground reporting only the essential supportive information. These brief updates focus primarily on factors that could exacerbate or mitigate the likelihood of armed conflict. FEWER – PCIA Definition The Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) is an independent, global network of organizations committed to preventing conflict by providing early warning and informing peacebuilding efforts. FEWER does not employ a vulnerability framework and terminology per se, rather an assessment of risk factors that could lead to conflict and the resulting appropriate entry points for action. This assessment is framed in a more general early warning approach, where early warning is defined as “the collection and analysis of information about potential and actual conflict situations and the provision of policy options to influential actors at the national, regional and international levels that may promote sustainable peace” (FEWER, 2000a). Methodology The methodology of early warning follows a logical process: the identification and assessment of the most salient conflict indicators; the assessment of likely trends and scenarios; the formulation of conclusions based on the interaction of conflict dynamics; and, the translation of these conclusions into policy recommendations for local, regional and international actors (FEWER, 2000a). In this context, the risk assessment provides the analytical and action framework needed to plan preliminary responses to early warning. It does this through the analysis of responses to conflict and peace-inducing developments, as well as stakeholder actions and incentives. More generally, the assumption on which the methodology is based is the following: Conflict trends – peace trends +/- stakeholder trends = overall conflict trends Conflict indicators are divided into root causes (the structural or underlying causes of conflict, such as poverty and weak governance); proximate causes (factors that accentuate and make the underlying causes of conflict, such as personal security, availability of weapons, more severe); and triggers (events that lead or may lead to violent escalation of the conflict, e.g. the arrest of a key political figure). Indicators are also classified into political, economic, socio-cultural and institutional factors of conflict. The FEWER approach not only examines the factors that lead to conflict, but also those that help sustain peace, namely peace indicators. These peace trends can be broken down into systemic indicators that uphold peace in a society, such as governing relations between groups, a culture of tolerance; processes that are in place to deal with conflict and that sustain peace, such as inter-village meetings and general democratic systems; and, tools that are available to deal with conflict, such as courts, truth commissions, etc. By looking at not only risk factors, but also processes and tools that can respond to conflict, this approach represents one of the more sophisticated of the conflict assessments in practice today. Instrument This methodology is applied to the Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA), a planning and management tool that aims to assist development and humanitarian organizations in analysing situations of potential conflict and identifying strategic opportunities for conflict prevention and peace-building. The PCIA tool produces a Project

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Management Cycle, an overall framework that incorporates the various stages and steps of the FEWER methodology into a single framework for policy and action. This framework contains three broad stages: analysis, strategy and implementation. The ‘Analysis’ stage aims to define the characteristics of the current conflict and identify the possible windows of opportunity for peace. With regards to the economic aspects of conflict, key indicators are largely at the macro-level and include unemployment and social insecurity, prevalence of poverty, income disparities and land distribution, and environmental degradation. ‘Strategy’ seeks to examine what strategic choices have to be made and what objectives the programme should adopt. Strategic analyses consist of identifying possible key events or processes that would promote peace, the key actors in this process, and possible options and agenda items to be considered in bringing about a just and lasting peace. These analyses are largely based on the short- and long-term governance, economic, socio-cultural and security aspects from the first stage. ‘Implementation’ concerns the key assumptions made in relation to the operating environment and the potential risks to the operation. In this phase, risk and sustainability assessments are performed in order to understand if the objective of the programme is sufficiently specific and targeted, if there is consistency between the objectives and the capacity of bodies and agencies to carry out those objectives, if there is local ownership of the programme and if the programme is context- and time-specific. The findings from these stages and their corresponding actions and analyses are summarised in a Project Management Cycle framework of action. The following chart better depicts the stages of this methodology:

Analysis

1. Conflict and Peace analysis 2. Stakeholder analysis

Strategy

3. Strategic issues 4. Strategic choices and objectives

5. Programming 6. Risk assessment and sustainability

Implementation

Project Management Cycle Source: FEWER et al, 2001

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