Faute de Mieux : J.L. Austin on Normal Sense Nat Hansen Perception et sens commun Austin et la question du realisme, Colloque international a l’Universite de Picardie draft, comments welcome June 2007

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Introduction

In chapter IX of Sense and Sensibilia, Austin criticizes Ayer’s claim that there is reason to think that there are different, “perfectly correct and familiar” senses of words like “perceive” and “see”. Austin argues that there is a single, ordinary sense that those words have in normal circumstances. Ayer provides evidence in favor of thinking that sentences containing the words “perceive” or “see” change their implications in different contexts. Ayer thinks the best way to explain this variation is with the claim that “perceive” and “see” are ambiguous expressions. Austin, and contemporary commentators on Sense and Sensibilia reject that conclusion. In this paper, I aim to explain Austin’s reasons for rejecting Ayer’s conclusion, and to show how contemporary commentators have misunderstood Austin’s reply to Ayer. I will proceed as follows: first, I will explain Ayer’s argument, which relies on certain intuitions about what is implied by different utterances of sentences containing the expressions “perceive” and “see”. I will then consider a variety of different ways of responding to Ayer’s argument. Finally, I will explain what I think is the best way of understanding Austin’s response to Ayer, and I will show how this response can serve as a model for responding to both the contextualist and traditionalist ways of handling related disputes about meaning. 1

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Ayer’s Argument

Ayer aims to show that there are two senses of the word “perceive”: one sense that implies that what one perceives exists, and one sense that does not imply that what one perceives exists. This plays a part in Ayer’s explanation of the introduction of sense-data in the following way: in order to avoid potential confusion, philosophers want to eliminate the ambiguity in “perceive”, and adopt a use of “perceive” according to which what is perceived has to exist. Ayer thinks that it is “in order to avoid [this] ambiguit[y]” that philosophers introduce sense-data, since there are utterances of the sentence “I perceive two pieces of paper” that are true even when, for example, I am suffering from double vision and there aren’t two pieces of paper. In such a case, if we have adopted a uniform sense of “perceive” according to which what is perceived has to exist, I have to be perceiving something that isn’t a “material object”. That something is, according to Ayer, a sense-datum.1 But avoiding ambiguity seems like an odd reason to introduce sense-data—it might be the case that, in order to avoid ambiguity when doing philosophy, we should always stick to the sense of “perceive” that implies that what is perceived exists. But that would just mean that when someone says “I perceive two pieces of paper” in a case of double vision, what he says is incorrect.2 Austin thinks that the resolution of ambiguities really has nothing to do with the introduction of sense data—that the introduction of sense-data is motivated by a “wish to produce a species of statement that will be incorrigible”.3 But Austin’s attack on the real motivation behind the introduction of sense-data isn’t my topic here. Instead, I will be concerned with Austin’s reasons to resist Ayer’s argument that there are different senses of the word “perceive”. How does Ayer try to show that there are different senses of the word “perceive”? Ayer says: “If I say that I am perceiving two pieces of paper, I need not be implying that 1

Ayer 1940, pp. 20-21 Such a person should have “second thoughts about their use of ‘see’ [or ‘perceive’]” (Austin 1962, p. 87). 3 Austin 1962, p. 103 2

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there really are two pieces of paper there”. The case of someone suffering from double vision is supposed to support Ayer’s claim. If I am suffering from double vision, and see one piece of paper as two, then it would still be true to say “I am perceiving two pieces of paper”. One might be tempted to think that this shows that there is a single sense of “perceive”, where “I perceive two pieces of paper” doesn’t imply that “Two pieces of paper exist (where they seem to be)”.4 But Ayer resists this temptation. He says that there is a “correct and familiar” sense of “perceive”, according to which “to say of an object that it is perceived does carry the implication that it exists”.5 So there is some data that needs explaining: sometimes “I am perceiving two pieces of paper” implies that two pieces of paper exist, and sometimes it does not imply that two pieces of paper exist. Ayer explains this fact with the idea that the sentence has two different senses, and he locates the difference in sense in an ambiguity in the word “perceive”. To make Ayer’s argument more explicit, we can think of it as having the following structure: 1. An utterance of “I perceive two pieces of paper” sometimes implies that there are two pieces of paper where they seem to be.6 2. An utterance of “I perceive two pieces of paper” sometimes does not imply that there are two pieces of paper where they seem to be (as in a case of double vision). 3. If utterances of sentences have different implications, then the sentences have different, correct and normal, senses. 4. Therefore, (from 1-3), the sentence “I perceive two pieces of paper” has different, correct and normal, senses. My goal in this paper is to explain how Austin responds to Ayer’s argument, and 4

See §3 below for discussion of this possible response. Ayer 1940, p. 21, cited in Warnock 1989, p. 19. 6 Austin says that “imply” is “a rather wooly word” (Austin 1979b, p. 237). I am assuming that all Austin is committed to in his discussion of Ayer is that if p implies q, then if q is false, then p must also be false. 5

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how his response differs from some responses that have been, or might be, offered on his behalf. The key passage in Austin’s response to Ayer is the following: But more important [for the rejection of the idea that there are two normal, correct and familiar senses of “perceive”] is the fact that double vision is a quite exceptional case, so that we may have to stretch our ordinary usage to accommodate it. Since, in this exceptional situation, though there is only one piece of paper I seem to see two, I may want to say, ‘I am perceiving two pieces of paper’ faute de mieux, knowing quite well that the situation isn’t really that in which these words are perfectly appropriate. But the fact that an exceptional situation may thus induce me to use words primarily appropriate for for a different, normal situation is nothing like enough to establish that there are, in general, two different, normal (‘correct and familiar’) senses of the words I use, or of any one of them. To produce a rather baffling abnormality like double vision could establish only, at most, that ordinary usage sometimes has to be stretched to accommodate exceptional situations.7

What Austin says in this passage might be understood as either rejecting premise (2) or (3) in Ayer’s argument. I will consider each possibility, as well as the possibility of rejecting premise (1), in turn.

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Ways of Rejecting Ayer’s Argument

3.1

Reject Premise #1: Highest Common Factor

As suggested already, one might respond to Ayer’s argument by insisting that there is only one sense of “I perceive two pieces of paper”, where that sense does not imply that what is perceived must exist. This response has the advantage of maintaining a common meaning across different utterances of “I perceive two pieces of paper”, but it has the disadvantage of eliminating the natural connection that exists, in some cases, between a true utterance of the sentence and things being as they are perceived to be. Both Ayer and Austin reject this way of handling the data, and since my goal here is to give the best possible reading of Austin’s response, I will set it aside. But there are two things to say about this option before moving on. First of all, it has at least one adherent. According to Chomsky, the “normal sense” of “see” does not imply that there exists an object (where it seems to be): 7

Austin 1962, pp. 90-91

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The same considerations apply to the study of visual perception along lines pioneered by David Marr, which has been much discussed in this connection. This work is mostly concerned with operations carried out by the retina; loosely put, the mapping of retinal images to the visual cortex. Marr’s famous three levels of analysis—computational, algorithmic, and implementation—have to do with ways of construing such mappings. Again, the theory applies to a brain in a vat exactly as it does to a person seeing an object in motion. The latter case has indeed been studied, in work of Marr’s collaborator Shimon Ullman. His studies of determination of structure from motion used tachistoscopic presentations that caused the subject to see a rotating cube, though there was no such thing in the environment; “see”, here, is used in its normal sense, not as an achievement verb.8

The second thing to say about this response is that it will be relevant to the discussion of the radical contextualist way of handling cases similar to Ayer’s. (A little foreshadowing: there are radical contextualists who take data like Ayer’s to support the idea that the sense (meaning) of a sentence never determines any facts about what is implied by a sentence—only the sense of the sentence in combination with facts about the circumstances of use of the sentence determine such facts. But that seems like a radicalized version of this first way of explaining Ayer’s data: since there is nothing that follows from a sentence in all contexts in which it is uttered, there isn’t anything that follows from the sentence. I will discuss this contextualist response to Ayer’s argument in §3.3.) I will now consider a recent way of understanding Austin’s response to Ayer proposed by Scott Soames.

3.2

Reject Premise #2: Soames

Discussing Ayer’s argument, and Austin’s response, Scott Soames writes: . . . when I remark that I am seeing two images of my finger, what I am really trying to convey is that my finger appears to me to be in two different locations simultaneously. Of course I know that it is not in two different places. . . . So I would say that the claim that I see two images of my finger is literally false, even though I use it to convey something true. . . This involves treating certain things that speakers would ordinarily say in some nottoo-common circumstances as literally false, although conversationally useful in conveying other things that are true.9

Soames here advocates a response to a putative case of ambiguity that relies on distinguishing what is literally said by a sentence from what is conveyed by an utterance of the 8 9

Chomsky 1995, p. 52; see also Chomsky 2000, p. 23. Soames 2003, pp. 184-185

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sentence.10 Soames talks about the sentence “I see two images of my finger”, but what he says applies equally well to the sentence we have been considering all along, “I perceive two pieces of paper”. Soames’s reply gives us the resources to say that utterances of “I perceive two pieces of paper” always imply that there are two pieces of paper where they seem to be. The fact that there are cases that appear to be counterexamples to that claim, as when I utter that sentence when I am knowingly suffering from double vision and appear to say something true, is explained in terms of something I pragmatically implicate. When I utter the sentence in such a case, what my words say is false, though what I convey by uttering those words—something like “I am having an experience that is like perceiving two pieces of paper, but I’m not perceiving two pieces of paper”—is true. In support of his reading, Soames cites Austin’s remark that It is, I suppose, true that, if I know that I am suffering from double vision, I may say ‘I am perceiving two pieces of paper’ and, in saying this, not mean that there really are two pieces of paper there; but for all that, I think, my utterance does imply that there are, in the sense that anyone not apprised of the special circumstances of the case would naturally and properly, in view of my utterance, suppose that I thought there were two pieces of paper . . . 1112

Austin distinguishes what his utterance implies from what he implies (or means) in making the utterance, which seems to be in alignment with Soames’s reading of his reply to Ayer. Soames is trying to defend Austin’s idea that there aren’t “two different, normal (‘correct and familiar’) senses of the words I use” in the normal case and the case of the 10

For the classic statement of this move, see Grice 1989 and Kripke 1997, pp. 394-395. Austin 1962, p. 89, quoted in Soames 2003, p. 186 12 Grice says that a part of the conventional meaning of the word “see” is that the thing seen exists. (Grice 1989, p. 44) But he also says that we can use the word in a “loose or relaxed way”, so that the implication that is part of the conventional meaning is cancelled. (His discussion of the case occurs in the context of a discussion of how cancellability is not a sufficient criterion for implicature, and he thinks that the case of “loose or relaxed” use involves cancellation of part of the conventional meaning (that is, not an implicature) of an expression.) So Grice’s approach is, I think, different from Soames’s, and in accord with Austin’s. (Though, a few pages later (p. 48), he says, “If one makes the further assumption that it is more generally feasible to strengthen one’s meaning by achieving a superimposed implicature, than to make a relaxed use of an expression (and I don’t know how this assumption would be justified), then Modified Ockham’s Razor would bring in its train the principle that one should suppose a word to have a less restrictive rather than a more restrictive meaning, where choice is possible”. That seems to be a move in the direction of treating the meaning of “see” as not implying that the object seen exist.) 11

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speaker suffering from double vision.13 Though his aim is to give a reading of Austin’s response to Ayer, Austin nowhere says or suggests that when a speaker suffering from double vision utters the sentence “I perceive two pieces of paper”, what his utterance says is false. Soames recognizes this, and is slightly wary of attributing this view to Austin—he says at one point that he has “advanced [his] own view, rather than sticking closely to Austin’s text”.14 Soames thinks that the reading of Austin’s argument he has given doesn’t “stick closely” to Austin’s text because it involves a “revision of ordinary language”, since we wouldn’t be inclined to say that the person suffering from double vision says something false when he utters “I am perceiving two pieces of paper”. In the following sections, I will argue that there is a way of accommodating that intuition of ordinary language while still rejecting Ayer’s argument. In the next section, I will discuss an explanation of what happens in the case of the two utterances of “I perceive two pieces of paper” that aims to hold on to the idea that the sense of the sentence remains the same in the two situations by rejecting the idea that if two sentences have different implications, then the sentences have different senses. This approach (which has affinities with claims made by certain “radical contextualists”) manages to save the intuitions of “ordinary language” that Soames couldn’t preserve, but I don’t think it can be offered as a reading of Austin’s argument, since it doesn’t make sense of Austin’s reliance on the idea of normal and exceptional circumstances.15

3.3

Reject Premise #3: Radical Contextualism

Michael Williams, explaining the contextualist view of Charles Travis, claims that even though Travis argues that the meaning of a sentence doesn’t determine its truth condition, he holds on to the idea that meaning determines “those inferential properties of a term that are occasion in-sensitive”.16 But Williams thinks there aren’t any occasion 13

Austin 1962, p. 91 Soames 2003, p. 185 15 Austin 1962, p. 91 16 Williams 2004, pp. 118-119 14

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insensitive inferential properties of terms. He says, for example, that . . . there may be no sets of inferential commitments, associated with the use of any term, that are absolutely context-independent. “Blue”, for example, is a spectral colour. So in a school experiment with prisms, the relevant contrast-class for “blue” will not include brown or black, though those colours will figure prominently if, say, we are discussing what suit you should wear for your interview.. . . Similar points apply even to such apparently fixed points as being red’s implying looking red in standard conditions. The red Ferrari, stolen and hastily repainted, doesn’t even look red.17

Williams would presumably claim that it doesn’t follow, context-independently, from an utterance of the sentence “I perceive two pieces of paper” that two pieces of paper exist. In a context where an eye doctor is using an optical refractor to test the strength of a patient’s vision, he might ask the patient, while flipping through various lenses, “What do you perceive now?” and the patient might reasonably respond “I perceive two pieces of paper”, knowing very well that there is only one piece of paper in front of him. In such a context, the fact that there aren’t two pieces of paper does not make the patient’s utterance false. Now imagine a different context (the radical contextualist might continue). A bureaucrat places two top secret documents on his desk, then is knocked out by a spy who steals one of the documents and administers a drug that makes the bureaucrat see double. The phone rings, and the bureaucrat staggers to his feet to answer it. It’s the president: “How many pieces of paper are on your desk?” the president asks. “I perceive two pieces of paper”, the groggy bureaucrat replies. In such a situation, the bureaucrat’s utterance is false, because there aren’t two pieces of paper. According to the radical contextualist, whether a sentence like “I perceive two pieces of paper” implies that two pieces of paper exist depends on features of the context of utterance. That would then constitute a response to Ayer’s argument, since Ayer assumes that different implications imply different senses (premise (3)). The radical contextualist rejects that idea. The radical contextualist detaches implications from sense.18 17

Williams 2004, pp. 119-120 On this etiolated conception of meaning, meaning is just that with which features of context interact to produce a content. Some contextualists reject the idea that it makes any sense to talk about the the meaning of expressions outside their use in a particular context. See, for example, Crary 2007, p. 50, who claims that Austin wants to give up the idea of literal meaning, which she glosses as the idea that 18

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The contextualist response to Ayer’s argument can capture the putative intuition of “ordinary language” that escaped Soames’s account. That is, the contextualist can account for the intuition that when a speaker suffering from double vision utters “I perceive two pieces of paper”, he is not saying something false. And so long as we are aware of the circumstances, we will not be inclined to think the speaker has said something false. Unfortunately, however, I don’t think the radical contextualist approach can do justice to Austin’s position. Austin’s response relies on the difference between the “normal” sense possessed by an expression in normal situations, and the use of the expression in “exceptional” circumstances. And the contextualist strategy of divorcing sense from implications is conspicuously absent from Austin’s text. So there is reason, I think, to try to work out a response to Ayer’s argument that keeps the connection between sense and implications and makes use of the idea of “normal sense”.19

3.4

Qualify Premise #3: Austin

Consider again the passage where Austin makes use of the idea of a “normal sense” that a sentence has when it is uttered in a “normal situation”: . . . more important [for the rejection of the idea that there are two normal, correct and familiar senses of “perceive”] is the fact that double vision is a quite exceptional case, so that we may have to stretch our ordinary usage to accommodate it. Since, in this exceptional situation, though there is only one piece of paper I seem to see two, I may want to say, ‘I am perceiving two pieces of paper’ faute de mieux, knowing quite well that the situation isn’t really that in which these words are perfectly appropriate. But the fact that an exceptional situation may thus induce me to use words primarily appropriate for for a different, normal situation is nothing like enough to establish that there are, in general, two different, normal (‘correct and familiar’) senses of the words I use, or of any one of them. To produce a rather baffling abnormality like double vision could establish only, at most, that ordinary usage sometimes has to be stretched to accommodate exceptional situations.20 “meanings [sentences] carry with them into different contexts of their use”. Such contextualists in effect end up endorsing Ayer’s conclusion that there are different senses of “I perceive two pieces of paper”, but they don’t locate the difference in sense in the word “perceive” as Ayer does. 19 It’s not obvious whether Charles Travis would accept Williams’s radical conception of the contextdependence of what an utterance of a sentence implies. 20 Austin 1962, pp. 90-91

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By introducing the idea of “normal sense”, Austin has the resources to keep the connection between sense and implications (unlike the contextualists), while rejecting Ayer’s claim that different implications entail different “normal (‘correct and familiar’)” senses, and without needing to say that what is said faute de mieux in an exceptional situation is false (as Soames does). He can do so because it doesn’t follow from the fact that the sentence “I perceive two pieces of paper” has different implications in “exceptional situations” that there are two “different, normal (‘correct and familiar’)” senses for that sentence to have. Normally, “I perceive two pieces of paper” implies that there are two pieces of paper where they seem to be. But not in the exceptional circumstance of a speaker who is suffering from double vision. In such a case, the sense of “I perceive two pieces of paper” is stretched to accommodate the special circumstances. The “stretched” sense doesn’t have all the implications that the normal sense has. That he thinks the sense of the sentence is stretched distinguishes Austin from Ayer, Soames, and the contextualists. To extend the metaphor to the competing views, Ayer holds that the sense of the sentence is broken in the exceptional circumstances, since the sentences come to possess different senses; Soames and the contextualists both hold that the sense of the sentence is not stretched at all in the exceptional circumstances—the sense remains the same. (Though for Soames, the sense is absolutely rigid, since it determines implications in all contexts, while for the contextualists, sense is like a container that is built to hold a range of different features of context—there is no need to stretch the container to do so.) Perhaps it is best to keep in mind Austin’s claim in his paper “The Meaning of a Word” that “if we use the rigid dichotomy same meaning, different meaning . . . we shall simply make hashes of things”.21 The sense of the sentence “I am perceiving two pieces of paper” in exceptional circumstances is like the sense of that sentence in ordinary circumstances in that it is used to say something about one’s visual experience, but it is unlike it in that it doesn’t imply that there are two pieces of paper where they seem to be. 21

Austin 1979a, p. 74

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Ray Jackendoff provides an account of the meaning of “see” that Austin could accept for “perceive”. Jackendoff says that the meaning of “see” is constituted by a set of two “preference conditions”, such that normal seeing satisfies both conditions, while in abnormal situations (cases of double vision, or inattentional blindness), only one condition is satisfied: The two preference conditions for x sees y are roughly that (1) x’s gaze makes contact with y, and (2) x has a visual experience of y. Stereotypical seeing (i.e., veridical seeing) satisfies both these conditions: x makes visual contact with some object and thereby has a visual experience of it. . . . less central cases satisfy only one [preference condition]—but either one.22

Jackendoff’s analysis provides a way of understanding how the sense of “perceive” is “stretched” in abnormal cases. Normally, an utterance of “I perceive two pieces of paper” implies both that there are two pieces of paper where they seem to be, and that I am having a visual experience of two pieces of paper. But in abnormal cases, one or the other of those implications might not hold, and it can still be true that I perceive two pieces of paper. The meaning of “perceive” is therefore still tied to implications, though in a way flexible enough to avoid generating ambiguity. I therefore think Austin is best understood as qualifying premise #3 in Ayer’s argument, rather than rejecting it outright as the contextualists do. On Austin’s view, premise #3 should read: 3’. If two utterances have different implications in normal circumstances, then the uttered sentences have different, correct and normal senses. Sentences that differ in their implications in normal and abnormal circumstances need not have different normal senses—the sense of the sentence might be stretched in the exceptional situation, but not broken. And like Soames and the contextualists, Austin can hold on to the idea that normal sense does not change in exceptional circumstances, though implications, which normally play an important role in the individuation of sense, do. 22

Jackendoff 1999, p. 326.

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Austin’s view provides a way of responding to contextual variation in implications (and, I want to suggest, truth conditions) that steers between the extreme views on offer in contemporary philosophy of language.Traditionalists (like Soames) hold fast to the idea that the sense of a sentence determines the same implications in all contexts. Appearances to the contrary are explained in terms of implicature or speaker meaning. Radical Contextualists, recoiling from the traditionalist picture of the interaction of meaning and truth conditions and implications, claim that meaning never determines implications—only the meaning of a sentence together with an open-ended range of contextual features determines what a sentence implies. But Austin should be read as rejecting both extremes. He sketches a picture according to which sense determines implications in normal situations. In exceptional situations, the sense of a sentence can be stretched in such a way that some of the normal implications don’t hold. But we shouldn’t conclude from that fact that sense has nothing to do with implications.23 Austin’s philosophical method depends on there being “ordinary” senses that our words have.24 The radical contextualist idea that meaning doesn’t determine implications leaves little room for Austin to conduct his particular kind of philosophical investigation. It might be the case that whether or not you shot your neighbor’s donkey by mistake or by accident depends on features of context, and there is nothing to say in general, contextindependently, about the conditions in which those terms apply.25 But that makes a great deal of the detail of Austin’s project look gratuitous. 23 The contextualist argument for divorcing meaning from truth conditions/entailments shares features with the argument from illusion, in that the fact that there are situations in which the entailments do not hold is supposed to give us reason to think that the entailments never hold. But Austin would resist that move. And we should resist it too. 24 See, for example, Austin’s reflections on features of the ordinary use of expressions like “accidentally” and “by mistake” and “knows”. 25 Travis seems equivocal about this issue: he says that there might be general things to say about how words are used: “in any given case—‘voluntarily’, say—it is always conceivable that there is no correct general description of the sorts of facts which might effect the necessary selections for fillings in of complete thoughts. Perhaps there is just an indefinite variety of facts which, on some occasion or other would effect a filing in in one way rather than another—despite which there may still be tendencies to be discerned: where blame is in the air, we generally thereby know our way about with voluntarily, where it is not, we tend not to”. (Travis 1985, p. 219)

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And the traditionalist interpretation of Austin, according to which he holds that the sense of a sentence like “I perceive two pieces of paper” determines the same implications in all contexts reads into him a commitment to the idea of context-invariance that also is not his. The idea that the sense of a sentence can be “stretched” in extraordinary situations enables Austin to avoid the idea that when someone who knows he is suffering from double vision says “I perceive two pieces of paper”, he has said something false. Austin has the ability to say that such a person hasn’t said anything false. There are expressions that are more appropriate to use in that situation: he perceives what appear to be two pieces of paper, or that he perceives two pieces of paper faute de mieux —for want of something better to say.

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References Austin, J.L. (1962). Sense and Sensibilia. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Austin, J.L. (1979a). “The Meaning of a Word”. In Philosophical Papers (3rd ed.)., pp. 55–75. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Austin, J.L. (1979b). “Performative Utterances”. In Philosophical Papers (3rd ed.)., pp. 233–252. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ayer, A.J. (1940). The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge. St. Martin’s Street, London: MacMillan and Co. Chomsky, Noam (1995). “Language and Nature”. Mind 104 (413), 1–61. Chomsky, Noam (2000). “Explaining Language Use”. In New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind, pp. 19–45. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Crary, Alice (2007). Beyond Moral Judgment. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Grice, Paul (1989). Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Jackendoff, Ray (1999). “What Is a Concept, That a Person May Grasp It?”. In E. Margolis and S. Laurence (Eds.), Concepts: Core Readings, pp. 305–333. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. Kripke, Saul A. (1997). “Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference”. In P. Ludlow (Ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Language, pp. 383–414. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. Soames, Scott (2003). Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Volume II. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Travis, Charles (1985). “On What is Strictly Speaking True”. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15, 187–229.

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Warnock, G.J. (1989). J.L. Austin. London: Routledge. Williams, Michael (2004). “Context, Meaning, and Truth”. Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2), 107–129.

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