Kini Cosma 5146 ½ Bristol Avenue Klamath Falls, OR 97603 (541) 880-4534 In Propria Persona THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

Kini Cosma,

) ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) ) STATE OF OREGON, KLAMATH ) COUNTY, ROXANNE OSBORNE, ) RICHARD RAMBO, ED CALEB, ) EVELYN OLDENKAMP, COLE CHASE, ) KLAMATH COUNTY SHERIFF'S ) DEPARTMENT, TIM EVINGER, ) KLAMATH COUNTY CODE ) ENFORCEMENT, DOES 1-100 ) ) Defendants ) )

Case No.: Circuit Ct. Associated Cases: 0803782CV; 0803718CV; 0804232CV COMPLAINT Hearing Date: Time:

Plaintiff's Concise Statement of Material Facts 1. It is pertinent that Plaintiff describe briefly the foundation for which the subsequent matters follow. The evidence will point to a system of consistent psychological torture and ill-treatment, accompanied by physical abuse being central to the case at issue. 2. The State of California maintains detention facilities in California at which Plaintiff was in custody and tortured or otherwise abused by State of California personnel and others acting under the direction of or with the authorization of the State Page 1 of 42

of California, pursuant to a policy, pattern or practice of misconduct. 3. Most critically, Defendant State of California violated the United States Constitution, the law of nations, and our fundamental moral values as a nation authorizing an abandonment of our nation’s inviolable and deep-rooted prohibition against torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment of Plaintiff in U.S. custody by forcing Plaintiff to accept an illegal plea-bargain, enhanced with a sex offender condition. Consequently, Plaintiff was put in an untenable situation that insinuate negative judgments, actions, and to impugn her character1. 4.

Implied in the context of her conviction as a sex offender2 is the threat of

other, more abusive violations, sexual and physical whereas Plaintiff has been inflicted by pain by being routinely trussed up, heaped up by scorn tactics mixed of menace and humor. 5.

Bringing claims of widespread discrimination, the trial courts erred in failing to

merge her conviction appeals. As a result, the taint of a consistent pattern of unlawful seizures and of the use of psychological torture has been the key element applied in combination in order to amplify and heighten the effect so that Plaintiff would carry a stigma forever. 6.

Official reports are documented, and officials have acknowledged the many

horrific abuses inflicted on Plaintiff while under the control and in U.S. custody. All claims3 being brought by virtue of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, et al; 1 Sexual abuse, whatever form it takes, is an extremely damaging form of torture. It is meant explicitly to humiliate the victim and to make her feel weak and used to destroy her sense of identity and autonomy 2 The stigma, “sex offender” fueled prejudices and stereotypes that inflamed and incited public opinion that aroused suspicions and yielded to very forthcoming responses through vigilante justice. 3 43 page detailed report at:http://judiciary.zoomshare.com/files/International_Petition.pdf

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1. The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 2. Human Trafficking 3. Eighth Amendment violations of the United States Constitution: Excessive Prison Sentences-Punishment, Excessive Fines Clause 4. Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 5. Federal Fair Housing Act of 1968 6. Violence Against Women Act 7. Equal Justice For Women in the Courts Act 8. All Writs Act 9. Convention on Imprescriptibility of Crimes of War and Against Humanity 10. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 11. International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination 12. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 13. International Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman Or Degrading Treatment And Punishment LEGAL FRAMEWORK Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, (TVPA) L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1487, and Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, of 2003, (TVPRA) Pub. L. No. 108-193, 117 Stat. 2879 7. Trafficking in women4 is a crime that is constantly changing in its patterns and profiles. It is a hidden crime of unknown prevalence with slavery-like or exploitative conditions. The fluid dynamics and the special nature of trafficking in this case and its consequences proves Plaintiff is a victim of trafficking with slave-like and exploitative conditions using her performance in a pattern of constant continuous comprehensive literature. 8. In 1991, Plaintiff was promised employment earning extensive wages, reasonable working hours and work responsibilities, days off, opportunities to attend social functions and religious services, and exercise her right to fair and equal access to 4

Human Trafficking 18 USC §1584

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justice in the legal industry. She went to college to study law on student loans and financial aide while pregnant twice. 9.

Instead, Plaintiff was condemned in darkness as a “sex offender“ depicting

her as a sexual object in 1995. Since then, as a wrongfully convicted female “sex offender,” she spends most of her time trying to keep from getting arrested on bogus charges while law enforcement and the judiciary deceptively exploit Plaintiff’s future and career on wrongful conviction(s) without compensation. 10. Evidence will also show, Plaintiff is being deprived of her liberty consistently through routine and repetitive vindictive prosecutions; US personnel directed sexual humiliation toward Plaintiff because they knew she was vulnerable and sought to exploit that vulnerability to make her feel extremely exposed and humiliated. 11. There has been no accountability for the practice of the psychological torture among officials responsible for putting the practices into place. 12. Plaintiff continues to suffer thinking about what happened to her during all ordeals and has been unable to work as a result of the continuing effects of the torture she endured. In each case, the mental effects are being compounded years after the infliction of the predicate acts and Plaintiff finds it impossible to return to work to pay a student loan that has cost the calibration of harm. These effects directly impact and interfere with her ability to work while Defendants continue to experiment on her threshold of inflicted pain. 13.

She has been a vulnerable unprotected woman subjected to vigilante

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justice with constant arbitrary arrests, violence, outrages upon personal dignity, torture, and cruel, humiliating, and degrading treatment by the communities she has had to reside in while Prosecutors use the criminal justice system to file pleadings with the courts that is presented for improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, and needlessly increase the cost of litigation 14. Plaintiff contends that the statute of limitations period is tolled, as a result of the sex offender charge and extraordinary circumstances beyond her control and seeks, inter alia,back wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 USC §201, et seq and parallel state laws. 15. McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe, Co., 486 U.S. 128 (1988); Martin v. ,985 F.2d 129 (4th. 1993). The statute of limitations period is tolled when the plaintiff is prevented from asserting a claim by the defendant’s wrongful conduct, or when the plaintiff is faced with extraordinary circumstances beyond her control. See Stoll v. Runyon,165 F.3d 1238 (9Cir. 1999); Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450, 1463 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that because immigrant garment workers were alleged to have been falsely imprisoned at their place of work, all statutes of limitations, including the FLSA’s statute of limitations, were tolled). Statutes of limitations may also be tolled where an employer fails to post required information about minimum wage and overtime laws. See, e.g., Henchy v. City of Absecon, 148 F. Supp. 2d 435, 439 (D. N.J. 2001). State law may provide more generous statutes of limitations for statutory wage claims. For example, California law provides a three-year statute of limitations for such claims. CAL. CODE

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OF CIV. PROC. §338(a); Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co., 23 Cal. 4th163 (2000) (noting that § 338(a) would normally apply in an action to recover unpaid wages). 16.

Moreover, under the FLSA, workers are entitled to compensation for all

hours they are suffered or permitted to work. Thus, unless their time is truly free, they must be compensated. 17. The United States Supreme Court has stated that for purposes of federal criminal prosecution under §1584 "involuntary servitude necessarily means a condition of servitude in which the victim is forced to work for the [d]efendant by the use or threat of physical restraint or physical injury, or by the use or threat of coercion through law or the legal process." United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988) 18.

The Thirteenth Amendment and federal statutes prohibit slavery and

involuntary servitude... State constitutions also prohibit slavery and involuntary servitude. A person commits the offense of holding another in involuntary servitude when he or she "knowingly and willfully holds to involuntary servitude... 19.

With the passage of the TVPA and the TVPRA, the federal law now

recognizes expanded definitions of forced labor and coercion. The definition of coercion now includes "any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a person to believe that, if the person did not enter into or continue in such condition, that person or another would suffer serious harm or physical restraint." 22 USC sec 7102(2). "Forced labor" occurs under the TVPA when a defendant "obtains the labor or services of a person...(by threats of serious harm to, or physical restraint against, that person or another person;

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(2) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the person to believe that, if the person did not perform such labor or services, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint; or (3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or the legal process." 18 USC sec 1589. 20.

"Severe forms of trafficking" includes "the recruitment, harboring,

transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery." 22 USC §7102(8)(B). 21. 22.

Torture Torture is defined as "any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether

physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from her or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act she or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing her or a third person..when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity." 23. Most fundamentally, the prohibitions against torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment are absolute, non-discretionary and subject to no exception. They are designed not only to safeguard the security and dignity of every human being in times of apprehension and arrest but also to ensure the humane treatment of U.S. civilians when they are apprehended and arrested.

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24. § 2340. Definitions. As used in this chapter― (1) “torture” means an act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical control; (2) “severe mental pain or suffering” means the prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from―(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; (B) the administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; (C) the threat of imminent death; or (D) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality; and (3) “United States” means the several States of the United States, the District of Columbia, and the commonwealths, territories, and possessions of the United States. 25.

Human Subject Research

26. Many types of legitimate human subject research constitute human experimentation, including observational studies, such as survival, evasion, resistance, and escape studies, which evaluate the effects of various interrogation techniques on U.S. subjects, and for which human subject protections apply and informed consent was required and obtained. 27. Human subject means a living individual about whom an investigator (whether professional or student) conducting research obtains data through intervention Page 8 of 42

or interaction with the individual, or identifiable private information. Human research, therefore, involves the systematic collection of data for the purpose of drawing generalizable inferences. Activities that constitute human subject research and experimentation do not require a particular research study design, the testing of hypotheses, or the use of control groups. 28. Human subject research is defined under federal regulations as follows: systematic collection of personalized information from any human subjects, whether patients, volunteers, soldier-subjects, prisoners, or any other group, for purposes other than their direct benefit and requires human subject protections, such as informed consent, and prospective review of and approval by an institutional review board (IRB), regardless of the information-gathering methods used or the stated purpose of the inquiry. 29.

Further, 18 USC §2441(d)(1)(C)(2006) prohibits the act of a person who

subjects, or conspires or attempts to subject, one or more persons within his custody or physical control to biological experiments without a legitimate medical or dental purpose and in so doing endangers the body or health of such person or persons. 30.

The Meaning Of "Severe."

31. Because the statute does not define "severe," "we construe [the] term in accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning." FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994). 32.

"Severe" (often conjoined with "pain") is defined as "extremely violent or

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intense: severe pain." American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language1653 (3d ed. 1992); see also XV Oxford English Dictionary101 (2d ed. 1989) ("Of pain, suffering, loss, or the like: Grievous, extreme" and "Of circumstances . . . : Hard to sustain or endure"). The United States5 understands that, in order to constitute torture, an act must be specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering and that mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from: 1. the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; 2. the administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; 3. the threat of imminent death; or the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality. 33.

The prohibition against torture is a peremptory jus cogens norm from

which no derogation is allowed. It is universally recognized and is binding on all persons under all circumstances. As U.S. Courts have recognized, the torturer, "like the pirate and slave trader before him," is "hostis humanis generis, an enemy of all mankind." Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F. 2d. 876, 890 (2d. Cir. 1980). 34.

The U.S. Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that torture is among the

5 Under the language adopted by Congress in sections 2340-2340A, to constitute “torture,” the conduct in question must have been “specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering.”

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gravest violations of the law of nations. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2763 (2004); id. at 2783 (Breyer, J., concurring): "the use of physical or mental torture or any coercion to compel prisoners to provide information [,]" and provides that "[n]o form of physical torture or moral coercion will be exercised against the [civilian internee]” 35.

The Meaning Of "Severe Physical Pain Or Suffering."

36.

The inclusion of the words "or suffering" in the phrase "severe physical

pain or suffering" suggests that the statutory category of physical torture is not limited to "severe physical pain.."Physical suffering" may be of sufficient intensity and duration to meet the statutory definition of torture even if it does not involve "severe physical pain." To constitute such torture, "severe physical suffering" would have to be a condition of some extended duration or persistence as well as intensity. 37.

The Meaning Of "Severe Mental Pain Or Suffering."

38. §2340 defines “severe mental pain or suffering” to mean: the prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from--(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; (B) the administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; the threat of imminent death; or (D) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mindaltering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality[.]

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39.

The Meaning Of “Specifically Intended.”

40. The traditional view is that a person who acts . . . intends a result of his act . . . under two quite different circumstances: 1) when he consciously desires that result, whatever the likelihood of that result happening from his conduct; and 2) when he knows that that result is practically certain to follow from his conduct, whatever his desire may be as to that result. 41. The Court in United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980) wrote: “ [A] person who causes a particular result is said to act purposefully, if he consciously desires that result, whatever the likelihood of that result happening from his conduct.’”Id. at 404 (internal quotation marks omitted). 42.

For the purpose of this application, “Know” and “knowingly” shall be

construed accordingly. “Knowledge” means awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events. In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in that consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events. 43.

A person "is said to act knowingly," in contrast, "if he is aware 'that that

result is practically certain to follow from his conduct, whatever his desire may be as to that result.'" Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court stated: "In a general sense, 'purpose' corresponds loosely with the common-law concept of specific intent, while 'knowledge' corresponds loosely with the concept of general intent." Id. at 405.

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44. Proving specific intent is enough that the defendant simply had "knowledge or notice" that his act "would have likely resulted in" the proscribed outcome. "Notice," the court held, "is provided by the reasonable foreseeability of the natural and probable consequences of one's acts." Id. 45. It is clear that the specific intent element of §2340 would be met if Defendants performed an act and "consciously desire[d]" that act to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering. 46. 47.

Specific Intent Must Be Distinguished From Motive There is no exception under the statute permitting torture to be used for a

“good reason.” Second, specific intent to take a given action can be found even if the defendant will take the action only conditionally. Cf., e.g., Holloway v. United States,U.S. 1, 11 (1999) (”[A] defendant may not negate a proscribed intent by requiring the victim to comply with a condition the defendant has no right to impose.”). See also id. At 10-11 & nn. 9-12; Model Penal Code § 2.02(6). 48.

Specific intent is “the intent to accomplish the precise criminal act that one

is later charged with.” General intent usually “takes the form of recklessness (involving actual awareness of a risk and the culpable taking of that risk) or negligence (involving blameworthy inadvertence).” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 813-814 (7th ed. 1999). 49.

The Court in United States v. Neiswender, 590 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir. 1979)

suggest that to prove specific intent it is enough that the defendant simply have “knowledge or notice” that his act “would have likely resulted in” the proscribed outcome.

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id. at 1273. “Notice,” the court held, “is provided by the reasonable foreseeability of the natural and probable consequences of one's acts.” id. 50. 51.

The Meaning of “Coercion” The term “coercion” means (A) threats of serious harm to or physical

restraint against any person; (B) any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a person to believe that failure to perform an act would result in serious harm to or physical restraint against any person; or (C) the abuse or threatened abuse of the legal process pursuant to 22 USC §7102(8). 52. 53.

The Meaning of “Involuntary Servitude” The term “involuntary servitude” includes a condition of servitude induced

by means of (A) any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a person to believe that, if the person did not enter into or continue in such condition, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint; or (B) the abuse or threatened abuse of the legal process pursuant to 22 USC§7102(5) 54. 55.

False Imprisonment The tort of false imprisonment is “the unlawful violation of the personal

liberty of another” and consists of “nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, without lawful privilege, for an appreciable length of time, however short.” See, e.g., Fermino v. Fedco, Inc., 7 Cal. 4th 701, 715 (1994). Restraint may be effectuated by means of physical force, threat of force or of arrest, confinement by physical barriers, any unreasonable duress, or fraud or deceit, e.g., Scofield v. Critical Air Medicine, Inc.,

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45 Cal. App. 4th 990, 1000-02 (1996). 56.

The only mental state required to prove false imprisonment is “the intent to

confine, or to create a similar intrusion.” The intent element of false imprisonment “does not entail an intent or motive to cause harm.” Fermino, 7 Cal. 4th at 716. 57.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

58. Paragraphs 1 through 57 are incorporated as if set forth fully herein.

59.

Plaintiff describes briefly the various steps she had engaged in to avoid being arbitrarily displaced by an unlawful residential eviction (“FED“), Klamath County Circuit Court Case no. 0804232CV sometime during the latter part of June 2008 causing harm, loss of economic resources based on the grounds of a substantial lease agreement. 60. She argues she acted reasonably to defend herself and another person’s property, which was essential for her survival and an estate against an imminent and unlawful use of force in a manner proportionate to the degree of danger. Defendant Klamath County Circuit Court Judge Richard Rambo did not consider the merits pointed out by Plaintiff and that case was arbitrarily dismissed. 61.

At the same time, the conduct alleged in a restraining order by Plaintiff

(Cosma v. Richardson, Klamath County Circuit Case No. 0803782CV (“Richardsons“), constituted activities whereas Plaintiff acted necessarily and reasonably to avoid imminent and serious bodily injury and/or death, the threat of bodily harm and/or death by antagonizing and menacing Plaintiff, her two dangerous wild horses; one domestic; her dog at issue; And, by asserting Defendant's were harboring tenants in an illegal structure. A reasonable person would foresee that the intentions by the Page 15 of 42

Richardson’s would be interpreted by those to whom it was addressed as a serious threat. Defendant Klamath County Circuit Court Judge Roxanne Osborne did not consider the merits pointed out by Plaintiff and that case was arbitrarily dismissed advising Plaintiff to attend “mental health.” 62. Plaintiff describes several encounters with Defendants Klamath County Sheriff's Department and Defendant Klamath County Code Enforcement during the course of said events. The first encounter with Code Enforcement arose when the Richardson's demanded that Plaintiff clean up their garbage6 scattered in Plaintiff's yard. When she refused, Richardson's, in retaliation, called Code Enforcement who cited Plaintiff for not having the alloted horses allowed per parcels of property. Citation #0950; Case #CE08-0358 was dismissed in Plaintiff's favor. 63. There was no doubt of the continuing position, and in Plaintiff’s circumstances, she was under compulsion to make once last, futile, formal objection against the Richardson's in order to vacate the property safely with her horses. Plaintiff expressed hostility to the Klamath County Circuit Court. Such “threats” were made by constituting other circumstances beyond Plaintiff’s control providing that Plaintiff did not intend to cause a greater harm than the one sought to be avoided. 64.

Defendants evoked drastic reactions from their target while draining

substantial resources causing massive and costly reactions. 65.

Plaintiff was in the midst of transporting her horses on a public street when

6 Plaintiff repeatedly contacted police to assist with the situation and at one point was told she would be arrested if she continued to call. Police refused to cite Richardson's under ORS 609-095-095 Public nuisance d. Scatters garbage. The police were actually encouraging the Richardson's behavior.

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Defendant Klamath County Sheriff Officer Madden drove up and asked Plaintiff if she needed help. He proceeded to advise Plaintiff that she was holding up traffic which Plaintiff denies. Further, Plaintiff contends, a county sign, “Horses Prohibited On Sidewalk“ was posted on the same street which implied to Plaintiff horses are than allowed on the street. 66.

Plaintiff reached her destination and was apprehended and taken into

custody by Madden for a “mental health evaluation” because of the “threatening phone calls” to the Klamath County Circuit Court. Plaintiff’s back pain was in its extremity and she was unable to focus on anything but loosing her property. 67.

Plaintiff asserts she contained no such specific intent as to her making

threatening language other than her being prevented from evacuating under circumstances that could be reasonably understood as dangerous. 68.

Plaintiff argues that she was unlawfully stopped and that the illegal seizure

of her person occurred while transporting her horses during the course of an eviction was unconstitutional in violation of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution under the totality of the circumstances. 69. On January 27, 2009, at approximately 3 pm, Plaintiff was stopped for a light violation (Citation 19358; Case #09-326). Officer Madden, who conducted the traffic stop, asked the driver, Plaintiff for her identification. As a result of being displaced, homeless, and living in her van she had only her California identification at that time. Madden then returned to his patrol car to run a check. The check revealed that Plaintiff had a suspended license out of California, but apparently no warrants; consequently, Page 17 of 42

Madden decided to impound the car after she proved to him she had an assigned Oregon driver's license number, motor vehicle insurance, tags, transfer fees and paid and cleared all other fines from the City, County, and State of Oregon. Plaintiff contends Madden should have cited her for “suspension” and to appear in court and that he abused his discretion by seizing her vehicle. Citation Case #09-326; Citation 19358 was dismissed in Plaintiff's favor by Klamath County Justice Court. 70. Madden radioed for a cover officer and another officer responded. Madden asked Plaintiff to step out of the car and remove any belongings Plaintiff wanted, because the car was being towed. While Plaintiff was removing the inventory from her residential van car and piling it in the parking lot of the Klamath County Fairgrounds, Plaintiff’s dog became agitated and broke off the leash attempting to attack the responding officer7. 71. On March 11, 2009, Plaintiff received Citation No. 7186 by Klamath County Animal Control when Plaintiff's dog broke8 away injuring a man for what appeared to be a scratch to his foot. The alleged victim told Plaintiff he had no intentions of creating a legal dispute and Plaintiff promised to immediately relinquish the dog to animal control which she did. 72. During April, Plaintiff found a job taking care of an elderly woman whose family exchanged temporary trailer space at 5131 Bristol Avenue. Code Enforcement immediately pursued Plaintiff to cite her for “illegal camping.” Citation #1211, Case 7 Officers subdued dog with taser and was brought back under under control by Plaintiff. 8 Plaintiff lost strength, poise, and balance, from walking all over Klamath Falls during the freeze to seek housing, she stopped at the Seniors to briefly use the restroom. Plaintiff leashed her dog at the far side of the building to avoid people. Immediately upon returning, Plaintiff was untying her dog when the alleged victim approached Plaintiff.

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#CE09-0097 was dismissed in Plaintiff's favor. 73. Plaintiff relocated across the street at 5146 Bristol Ave and Code Enforcement issued her another citation for “illegally camping.” Citation #1331, Case #CE09-0209 was dismissed in Plaintiff's favor. 74. 75.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE The federal diversity jurisdiction statute provides that a corporation shall be

deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business. 28 U. S. C. §1332(c)(1) (emphasis added). 28 U. S. C. §1257; federal issue on exclusively federal-law grounds9. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 USC §1391(b)(1)-(2) and (e); 42 USC §14141 76.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

77. Paragraphs 1 through 76 are incorporated as if set forth fully herein. Plaintiff brings action against Defendants: Oregon State and Klamath County personnel sued under their individual and official capacities, whose policies, patterns, practices, derelictions of duty and command failures caused Plaintiffs’ abuse. 78. Defendants Tim Evinger, violated his obligations as Klamath County Sheriff and acted with deliberate indifference and conscious disregard of the high risk of injuries inflicted on this Plaintiff and the violations of law committed by his subordinates, et. al. Madden. These actions and omissions caused the torture and abuses to continue and to spread. Plaintiff, was injured as a proximate result of Defendant’s conduct. Rather, the 9 See also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U. S. ___ (2010) (reviewing state postconviction decision raising Sixth Amendment question).

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abuses were continually reinforced by policies, patterns or practices deliberately formulated to injure Plaintiff over time10. 79. Defendant Ed Caleb violated his obligations as a Klamath County District Attorney and acted with deliberate indifference and conscious disregard of the high risk of injuries inflicted on this Plaintiff and the violations of law committed by his subordinate, Deputy District Attorney Cole Chase. 80. These actions and omissions reflect a bent toward cruelty on the part of Defendants being sufficiently extreme and outrageous as to constitute torture within the meaning of the TVPA. As a result, Plaintiff was injured as a proximate result of Defendant's conduct. 81. Defendant Chase cannot defend11 or rationalize the torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of Plaintiff on the grounds that such techniques were deployed against this carefully selected individual who possess' critical cases pending preliminary investigation at the United Nations.

10 The critical issue is the degree of pain and suffering that the alleged torturer intended to, and actually did, inflict upon the victim. The more intense, lasting, or heinous the agony, the more likely it is to be torture. 11 Rather, the abuses were continually reinforced by policies, patterns or practices deliberately formulated to injure Plaintiff over a long period of time.

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1. 82.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION Violations Of Fifth Amendment; Sixth Amendment; Due Process Clause A.

The Presumption of Vindictiveness

83.

Paragraphs 1 through 82 are incorporated as if set forth fully herein.

84.

The Plaintiff in this case asks this Court to apply the presumption of

vindictiveness. Prosecutor, Defendant Chase sought to dissuade Plaintiff from exercising her Sixth Amendment jury trial right, and that the superseding action, the "mental health evaluation," came in retaliation for forcing the government to prove its case at trial. His conduct stretched the limits of propriety and it cannot be condoned because Plaintiff exercised her procedural rights. 85.

Chase goaded the court by intruding into the unfettered exercise of a

constitutional guarantee; the right to a Speedy Trial; His intentional misconduct included compelling Plaintiff to be a witness against herself, threatening to deprive Plaintiff of life, liberty, and property, without due process of law without just compensation. 86.

It was Plaintiff's right not to testify and Plaintiff contends that Defendant

intended to use the goal of psychological torture to induce psychological regression in this Plaintiff by bringing a superior outside force to bear on her will to resist. (Regression is basically a loss of autonomy, a reversion to an earlier behavioral level. As the subject regresses, her learned personality traits fall away in reverse chronological order. She begins to lose the capacity to carry out the highest creative activities, to deal with Page 21 of 42

complex situations, or to cope with stressful interpersonal relationships or repeated frustrations). 87.

Defendants knowingly intended to expose Plaintiff to psychological torture

to destroy Plaintiff’s sense of privacy, intimacy, trust of others and security, as well as her sense of self and how she relates to her surroundings resulting in a physiological condition involving impairment of brain function knowing that in this state, Plaintiff would be capable of only simple activities, and as it progresses her anxiety would increase forcing her to become restless, talkative and delirious. 88. Plaintiff contends she was threatened and subjected by Defendants to ___________________ who are in the power of an adverse party to medical or scientific experiments which are neither justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment of the person concerned nor carried out in her interest, and which could cause death to or seriously endanger the health of Plaintiff. 89.

Further, Plaintiff contends this method of psychological coercion is meant

to assert complete control over Plaintiff breaking down any will she might have to resist Defendant’s demands. 90.

Evidence proves that Defendants were bent on making Plaintiff

feel that

she should feel responsible for the criminal action when, in fact, Plaintiff acted reasonably to prevent, protect, and defend herself and another person which was essential for her survival and another person (and his property) against an imminent and unlawful use of force in a manner proportionate to the degree of danger. 91.

Plaintiff argues that the conduct which was alleged to constitute a crime Page 22 of 42

within the jurisdiction of the Court has been caused by duress resulting from a threat of imminent death or of continuing or imminent serious bodily harm against Plaintiff, and Plaintiff acted necessarily and reasonably to avoid that threat made by other persons and other circumstances beyond her control. 92.

Defendants knowingly intended to make Plaintiff feel she had a choice, and

that she shared in the responsibility of what was done to her, when in reality she was powerless. 93.

Defendants knowingly intended to convince Plaintiff that all the pain and

suffering she is experiencing is her fault including induced feelings of intense humiliation leading to feelings of worthlessness. 94.

Defendants applied coercion when they realized improper admissions,

exclusion of evidence, and faulty legal rulings would affect the outcome in violation of Plaintiff's constitutional protections. He acted with the purpose to, "so multiply the proceedings...unreasonably and vexatiously," 29 USC §1927, and has acted recklessly and in bad faith. See B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep't, 276 F.3d 1091, 1107 (9th Cir. 2002) to intentionally and severely deprive Plaintiff of her fundamental rights contrary to U.S. and Oregon law. 95.

Defendant Chase used the criminal justice system to file pleadings with the

court that is presented for improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, and needlessly increase the cost of litigation. The evidence will prove Plaintiff sustained substantial prejudice to her right to a fair trial and that delay was used as an intentional device to gain tactical advantage over the Plaintiff that resulted in further Page 23 of 42

harm subjecting her to continuing anxiety and suspicion created by a criminal charge. 96.

Beyond doubt, the prosecution pursued its case in bad faith, was frivolous

and vexatious and Plaintiff seeks a direct remedy in the criminal prosecution and the grave breaches including the willful torture or inhuman treatment, and the causing of great suffering and serious injury to the body and health of Plaintiff by Defendants' claims, defenses, and other legal contentions in pleadings filed with the court that are not warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous arguments for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law. 97. 98.

B.

The Right To A Speedy Trial

Paragraphs 1 through 97 are incorporated as if set forth fully herein. The

prophylactic approach to prosecutorial vindictiveness became even more clear to Plaintiff sometime in June 2009, when Animal Control Officer, Mike Horton, delivered medical statements of costs from the the Klamath County District Attorney's Office12 who told Plaintiff she would have to make arrangements to pay the debt or the District Attorney would resort to more serious actions. 99.

On September 1, 2009, Plaintiff was charged with “Recklessly

Endangering” (Case No. 0901352R) and appeared at an arraignment hearing at the Klamath County Circuit Court where Plaintiff was appointed a public defender, Attorney Della Rose. 100.

On October 5, 2009, Plaintiff appeared at a 2nd hearing where testimony

was given from one animal control officer. Rose failed to cross-examine the officer and 12 The costs were accrued by alleged victim who sustained the superficial dog bite from Plaintiff’s dog.

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Rose seemed rather aloof to Plaintiff. She contends that Rose did not hire experts, had not investigated, had not reviewed discovery, and had not objected to arguments. It appeared to Plaintiff, Rose did not understand the basic facts that Plaintiff was at the Senior's Center during the occurrence when she lost her strength, balance, and poise and was unable to hold on to the dog's leash. Rose made no other contact with Plaintiff with the exception at the hall of justice for a brief moment. 101.

On January 27, 2010, Prosecutors disqualified Rose as Plaintiff's defense

counsel blaming it on Plaintiff's “lack of cooperation.” 102.

Plaintiff had not specifically and explicitly waived her statutory or

constitutional speedy trial rights and contends she had not requested a continuance nor consented to any delay, and so no period of the delay was attributable to her. 103. On May 11, 20190, Defendant Chase made extrajudicial comments regarding Plaintiff's mental state13 then demanded that she be taken into custody for a “mental health evaluation”. This predicate act rose above the threshold to the level of a constitutional violation which prejudiced the presiding Judge against Plaintiff therefore extending unwarranted continuances. 104.

Plaintiff contends the objective evidence14 shows the government's

unreasonable motivation by establishing a direct link between the retaliatory response and barring Plaintiffs' exercise of a right15 and that the prosecutor harbored an improper 13 Plaintiff declared a conflict of interest and requested that Judge Rambo recuse himself from further proceedings in the recklessly endangering case. Plaintiff also asked Judge Wogan to secure a witness, Michael Dougherty, whose index fingers were severely lacerated from a pit bull and whose owner's, Michael and Lisa Lunt, were never charged. 14 Transcripts of May 11, 2010 15 Plaintiff contends she asserted her protected rights for sufficient reason.

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motive. (An example of the type of evidence that might establish actual vindictiveness in the pre-trial context can be found in State v. Halling, 672 P.2d 1386 (Or. Ct. App. 1983). In Halling, the Oregon Court of Appeals found a prosecutor's statement to defense counsel, after the collapse of plea negotiations, that “I have a brilliant idea. I have just thought of a way to cause further evil to poor Mr. Halling” constituted objective evidence of actual prosecutorial vindictiveness. See id at 1388.) 105.

Further, Plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in not dismissing the case

under ORS 135.747. That statute allows dismissal of criminal proceedings when a defendant is not brought to trial within a reasonable period of time. (Two-step analysis for considering a motion to dismiss on statutory speedy trial grounds. Johnson, 339 Or at 87-91; State v. Davids, 339 Or 96, 101, 116 P3d 894 (2005). ) As the Court explained in State v. Garcia/Jackson, 207 Or App 438, 444, 142 P3d 501 (2006), in applying ORS 135.747 as the first step, "[t]he court must determine the total amount of delay and subtract from that total any periods of delay that the defendant requested or consented to. [Davids, 339 Or at 101.] Then, if the state has taken longer than ordinarily expected to bring the defendant to trial, and again applying ORS 135.747, the court must determine if the length of the remaining delay was unreasonable by examining 'all the attendant circumstances.' Johnson, 339 Or at 88. The attendant circumstances include '[c]ircumstances that cause delay (that is, the reasons for delay),' and an assessment of those circumstances generally will drive the determination of whether the delay was reasonable. Id." 106.

The manner is further refined in which ORS 135.747 is applied in State v.

Bayer, 229 Or App 267, 277-78, 211 P3d 327 (2009), the delay period is calculated under ORS 135.747 from the time the defendant is "charged with a crime." That means the period during which "the prosecutor has the power tomove the case forward."

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Johnson, 339 Or at 93. 107.

Under the statute, the delays that a defendant did not apply for or consent

to are attributable to the state16. According to State v. Allen, 234 Or App 243, 254, 227 P3d 219 (2010). "A defendant's consent to a delay must be express; her implicit consent or failure to object to a postponement by the state or by the trial court to accommodate other judicial priorities is not enough." Id. (citation omitted); State v. Adams, 339 Or 104, 109, 116 P3d 898 (2005) ("consent" under ORS 135.747 means "express consent"). For purposes of ORS 135.747, "'the state' is a unitary political entity that includes the courts as well as the executive and legislative branches, and, thus, court-related delays are attributable to the state." State v. Myers, 225 Or App 666, 671 n 3, 202 P3d 338 (2009) (citation omitted). 108.

Assessed under those principles, the period of delay under ORS 135.747

for this case is 315+ days, approximately 11 months. The entire period of delay, from the date of the initial information on September 9, 2009, to the delayed initial setting of a trial date17. 109.

Once the net delay is calculated under ORS 135.747, that delay is

evaluated to determine if it is "longer than ordinarily expected to bring the defendant to trial." Garcia/Jackson, 207 Or App at 444. That expectation can be shown by evidence of practice or custom, as well as by judicial policies or rules, including the Standards of 16 "Attributable to the state" in this sense merely means the unconsented portion of the delay, the part of the delay period included in the statutory calculation of reasonableness. The phrase "is simply a shorthand way of saying that the delay was not one for which the defendant applied or to which the defendant consented" and implies no causative role on behalf of the state. State v. Spicer, 222 Or App 215, 221, 193 P3d 62 (2008). 17 See also Bayer, 229 Or App at 278 (speedy trial delay period under ORS 135.747 calculated from date of subsequently filed information after initial citation dismissed).

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Timely Disposition adopted by the Oregon Judicial Department in 1990. The Standards of Timely Disposition "do not in any way define the scope of a speedy trial under the statute or the constitution," but instead are "informative in determining the length of time that is 'reasonable' in which to bring a case to trial." State v. Emery, 318 Or 460, 471 n 17, 869 P2d 859 (1994). Those standards recommend that "90% of all misdemeanors, infractions and other nonfelony cases should be adjudicated or otherwise concluded within 90 days from the date of arraignment, 98% within 180 days and 100% within one year, except for exceptional cases in which continuing review should occur." Id. 110.

The determination of whether a delay is reasonable18 in light of the

attendant circumstances "requires courts to weigh several factors, including the reasons for the delay, the length of the total delay attributable to the state, and the length of any portion of the delay that was unjustified." Myers, 225 Or App at 674. 111.

We conclude, Plaintiff objected to the delays in bringing her to trial on both

statutory and constitutional grounds under Oregon Constitution, Article I, section 10, then, under ORS 135.750, by determining whether the court properly exercised its discretion under that statute to deny defendant her right to a speedy trial19.

18 . State v. Adams, 339 Or 104, 111-12, 116 P3d 898 (2005) (total delay attributable to state of 23 months unreasonable even though caused by lack of judicial resources). 19 As we have noted, the "relationship between [ORS 135.747] and ORS 135.750 remains uncertain and, perhaps, inscrutable." Id. At 257. Both statutes require an assessment of the reasons for the delay attributed to the state. Nonetheless, "sufficient reason" under ORS 135.750 "refers to conditions or circumstances that are distinct from those commonly associated with delays triggering the docketregulating protections of ORS 135.747," id. at 257, and "that has some relevance to, and does not essentially undermine, the overall purpose of [the speedy trial] statutes," Johnson, 339 Or at 90, where "some specific circumstance or policy * * * outweighs the general determination of unreasonableness made under ORS 135.747," Spicer, 222 Or App at 220. Here, the state does not identify any specific circumstance or policy that would outweigh the determination of unreasonable delay under ORS 135.747.

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112.

C.

Ineffective Counsel

113.

Paragraphs 1 through 112 are incorporated as if set forth fully herein.

114.

On or about _______ the court appointed public defender, Eveylyn

Oldenkamp to assist Plaintiff in the recklessly endangering case. Oldenkamp failed to detect and object to the Prosecution's progression of manipulative tactics designed to coerce20 false confessions. 115.

This inadequate representation21 rose to the level of a constitutional

violation because the deficiency so infected the adversarial process as to raise doubts about the reliability of the proceeding’s outcome; (1) that Plaintiff's counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) that she suffered prejudice22 as a result. 116.

Let us assess [the] probability [of a different outcome under Strickland], we

consider the totality of the available mitigation evidence provided by Plaintiff to her Counsel, Oldenkamp—both that if adduced at trial would have been a reasonable likelihood the outcome would have been different and a court might have provided strong support for Plaintiff's claim of innocence. 117.

Instead, the cursory nature of counsel’s referral to a limited one day

“mental health examination” selected by Counsel—was on its face be an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, constitutionally inadequate and fell below 20 On June 14, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Motion To Disqualify said public defender. (Not to be construed as a waiver of her statutory speedy trial right) 21 The clearly established federal law that applies in this case is the framework articulated for analyzing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See Williams, 529 U.S. at 390 (applying Strickland as the “clearly established federal law” that governed petitioner’s ineffective-assistance claim). 22 Porter v. McCollum, 558 U. S. ___, ___ (2009) (per curiam) (slip op., at 3), where counsel at trial had attempted to blame his client’s bad acts on his drunkenness...

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an objective standard of reasonableness and facially prejudiced Plaintiff. 118.

The quantum of evidence already known to Counsel and her decision to

forgo a particular line of defense was unreasonable simply because it was based on some information obtained in a limited investigation 119.

Plaintiff concludes that in applying the prejudice inquiry for ineffective-

assistance-of-counsel claims, Plaintiff was prejudiced by that deficiency, meaning for the reasonable probability that, absent [counsel’s] errors, the counsel’s exclusive reliance on a psychological evaluation was unreasonable when investigation uncovered copious evidence that made a difference. (See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); Hart, 174 F.3d at 1070 (“A lawyer who fails adequately to [i]ntroduce into evidence, records that demonstrate his client’s factual innocence, or that raise sufficient doubt as to that question to undermine confidence in the verdict, renders deficient performance.”); Gomez v. Beto, 462 F.2d 596, 597 (5th Cir. 1972) (“When a defense counsel fails to investigate his client’s only possible defense, although requested to do so by him; and fails to subpoena witnesses in support of the defense, it can hardly be said that the defendant has had the effective assistance of counsel.”). Thomas v. Lockhart, 738 F.2d 304, 308 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by relying exclusively on the prosecution’s investigative file even though his client provided him with information casting doubt on the prosecution’s evidence). 120.

D.

False Imprisonment And Unlawful Seizure

121.

Paragraphs 1 through 120 are incorporated as if set forth fully herein. In his

conduct set forth in this Complaint, Defendant acted under color of federal law. Page 30 of 42

122.

The determination of whether a person has been seized under Article I,

section 9, and at what point in the encounter, requires a fact-specific inquiry into the totality of the circumstances of the particular case. State v. Hall, 339 Or 7, 18, 115 P3d 908 (2005). 123.

The State of California purposely and deliberately confiscated and

concealed the actual true status of Plaintiff's driver's license then arbitrarily arrested her without an administration hearing in furtherance of trafficking, peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, and forced labor as per 18 USC §1592. 124.

Those with control over Plaintiff knew that the sex offender enhancement

was deliberately inflicted on Plaintiff so she would have to suffer conditions of life calculated to bring about her physical destruction in whole or in part, including acts committed by persons acting under the color of law specifically intending to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering within Defendants custody or physical control. 125.

Defendants knew that Plaintiff was extremely disadvantaged socially and

economically . Regardless, they continued to intimidate and punish her physically by confiscating her residential vehicle, making her uncertain about her legal travel status, threatening confinement, penalizing her financially with bogus fines for “illegal camping” or “too many horses” and discouraged contact with others. 126.

Defendants understood the risks, ethical considerations, and the practical

realities of Plaintiff's state. They understood the dangers Plaintiff faces; what she perceives as her options, and what her hope and expectations are from any assistance. 127.

Complicit with traffickers, authorities used arrest as an opportunity to cheat Page 31 of 42

Plaintiff of her profits and resell or re-traffick her by forcing her to provide defense mechanisms when knowing it was necessary for Plaintiff to be mobile, transient, moving from city to city to avoid serious harm from vigilantes. 128.

Defendants had knowledge that Plaintiff had limited personal freedoms

when being forced to face vigilante abuse and it's threats therein. They knew that Plaintiff was trapped with no safe way out while being forced to work in an informal illicit and covert sector. Regardless, they continued to exercise control over Plaintiff’s movement directing her where to be traded from one establishment to another. 129.

In Kozminski, the Supreme Court identified the victim's special

vulnerabilities as a factor in determining liability for involuntary servitude and concluded that evidence of other means of coercion, or of poor working conditions, or the victim's special vulnerabilities is relevant and that “the vulnerabilities of the victim are relevant in determining whether the physical or legal coercion or threats thereof could plausibly have compelled the victim to serve.” Id. 130.

According to State v. Holmes, 311 Or 400, 409-10, 813 P2d 28 (1991), a

seizure occurs "(a) if a law enforcement officer intentionally and significantly restricts, interferes with, or otherwise deprives an individual of that individual's liberty or freedom of movement; or (b) whenever an individual believes that (a), above, has occurred and such belief is objectively reasonable in the circumstances." 131.

Additionally, the TVPRA provides a federal civil cause of action for forced

labor and trafficking, which incorporates the expanded definitions of forced labor and coercion discussed above. See 18 U.S.C. § 1595. This cause of action can be used to Page 32 of 42

attack the more subtle forms of coercion that are often present in domestic worker trafficking cases. 132.

A belief is "objectively reasonable" if a "reasonable person in [the]

defendant's position could have believed that the officers significantly had restricted his [or her] liberty or freedom of movement." State v. Toevs, 327 Or 525, 536, 964 P2d 1007 (1998) (emphasis in original), accord State v. Parker, 227 Or App 231, 236, 205 P3d 65 (2009); State v. Ashbaugh, 225 Or App 16, 25, 200 P3d 149 (2008), rev allowed, 346 Or 257 (2009). 133.

Applying that principle to the present case and considering the totality of

the circumstances, we must conclude that a reasonable person in Plaintiff' position could have believed that her freedom of movement was significantly restricted when she was charged with reckless endangering. 134.

Plaintiff was forced to expend financial resources and endure costs

invoked by Defendants to intentionally cause starvation and deprive her of other objects indispensable to her survival by willfully impeding relief while the power imbalance was in the hands of Defendants who were abusing and exploiting her. 135.

Consequently, Plaintiff suffered systematic dependency while Defendant's

tolerated and ignored the unique nature of her experiences and appeals. See United States v. Krezdorn, 718 F.2d 1360, 1371 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (“[E]ven in the face of a factual finding, supported by the record, of no actual vindictiveness, a ‘presumption of vindictiveness’ would still establish a due process violation. Page 33 of 42

2. 136. 137.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION Violation Of The Fifth And Eighth Amendment Prohibition On Cruel And Unusual Punishment A.

Torture

138.

Paragraphs 1 through 137 are incorporated as if set forth fully herein.

139.

Defendant’s actions described herein violate the prohibition on cruel and

unusual punishment in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. Those amendments prohibit any person under color of U.S. law from engaging in or allowing torture, or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment or other treatment that constitutes deprivation of basic human needs such as food and reasonable safety, and the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain on any person in U.S. custody or control. The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment give rise to a cause of action for damages directly under the Constitution pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 140.

Defendant Ed Caleb and his subordinate, namely Cole Chase, authorized,

ratified, and failed to stop and prevent the torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of Plaintiff in custody, which occurred as a form of summary punishment for perceived or alleged wrongdoing and constituted imposition of sentence on Plaintiff without an adjudication of guilt. 141.

Defendants had power to formulate policies relating to the treatment and

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interrogation of Plaintiff, and exercised that power to generate illegal practices that Plaintiff did not consent to. 142.

Caleb was responsible for the command and supervision of individuals

who subjected Plaintiff to torture or other cruel, inhuman or treatment. Defendant knew that his subordinates had engaged in such unlawful activity, including actions undertaken maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing unnecessary pain and harm to further unlawfully the interrogation, punishment, intimidation or coercion of Plaintiff. 143.

Defendant also knew that it was highly likely that his subordinates would

continue to engage in such unlawful torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Yet Defendant acted with deliberate indifference and conscious disregard of the high likelihood of injury, and failed to take steps to prevent his subordinates from engaging in such conduct. 144.

In addition, Defendant is liable because his subordinates deliberately and

intentionally engaged in the torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of Plaintiff while acting under his effective command and control, and Defendant knew and should have known of his subordinates’ actions but failed to prevent or punish them. 145.

Defendant had effective command and control of Plaintiff who intentionally

and knowingly subjected her to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, which is prohibited by the law of nations. 146.

Defendant had actual and constructive knowledge of his subordinates’

torture of Plaintiff, but did not fulfill his duty as a commander to punish the perpetrators

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or otherwise to prevent further acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 147.

Despite the clear legal foundation of torture, Defendant's used Plaintiff's

body as an object to be compromised calibrating levels of pain and suffering, including subjecting Plaintiff to human experimentation, to be effectively employed as one criminal act to protect against liability for another. 148.

AFFIDAVIT UNDER SEAL -FURNISHED UPON REQUEST

149.

Under U.S. Jurisprudence, most or all of the following activities are likely to

be considered to be of such severity as to constitute torture and that Defendants intentionally caused a specific result. This includes knowledge to facilitate the practice and purpose of causing pain and injury, interrogating, intimidating, degrading and abusing Plaintiff while she was under the custody, care and control of Defendants. 150. 151.

A.

Negligent Supervision

1 through 150 are incorporated as if set forth fully herein. Plaintiff brings an

action for negligent supervision established on the fact that the Defendant, Klamath County Sheriff Tim Evinger, Sheriff Madden, et al 1) were acting as agents of each other or in an associated enterprise; 2) were negligent and knew of each other’s negligence; and 3) the Defendants’ negligence was a cause of injury, damage, loss, or harm to Plaintiff. 152.

Defendant’s subordinates maliciously and sadistically inflicted unnecessary

pain and harm on Plaintiffs. Defendant Evinger could foresee these actions by his subordinates because he had notice that the State of California had engaged in torture

Page 36 of 42

or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment before Plaintiff suffered her injuries. Evinger thus acted with conscious disregard of the excessive risk of harm to Plaintiff. 153.

Defendant Evinger knew and should have known that his subordinates

were engaging in such unlawful conduct, yet he failed to ensure that those subordinate personnel acted lawfully. As a result, Plaintiff was subjected to unlawful detention. 154.

Defendants' actions and omissions were the proximate cause of the torture

or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of Plaintiffs in their control and in custody and were the proximate cause of injuries suffered by Plaintiffs. In that conduct, Defendant acted under color of law beyond the scope of his lawful and delegated authority. 155.

Thus, by his acts, omissions and derelictions, Evinger is liable for the

injuries that Plaintiff suffered as a victim of the widespread policy, pattern or practice of unlawful detention. He at all times had authority and control over Plaintiff. He had effective control over all personnel within those detention facilities who carried out, authorized or allowed the detention of Plaintiff. 156.

Plaintiffs was detained under the complete and exclusive jurisdiction and

control of police, or other individuals or agents under the direction and control of Evinger. In carrying out his unlawful policies, patterns, practices and procedures, and in his other actions and omissions described above, Defendant violated clearly established constitutional rights and other domestic and international laws, and knew that he was doing so. 157.

Defendant’s actions, orders, authorizations, approvals and omissions

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caused the torture and abuse of Plaintiff in violation of the Fifth Amendment and gives rise to a cause of action for damages directly under the Constitution pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 158. Defendants had actual and constructive knowledge that his subordinates were violating the constitutional rights of Plaintiff, and had actual and constructive knowledge that it was highly likely that these constitutional violations would occur as a result of their actions, orders, policies, practices and omissions. Despite this knowledge, Defendants acted with reckless and deliberate indifference to their subordinates’ unconstitutional actions. Through their actions and failures to act, Defendant expressly and tacitly authorized his subordinates’ unlawful conduct. 159.

California courts have consistently held that a Defendant can be held liable

for negligence, even when the injury was caused by the intentional acts of another. In Chaney v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. App. 4th 152 (1995), the Plaintiff, a guest in the home, brought an action for negligent supervision against a homeowner, whose husband sexually assaulted her. The court held that the wife would be liable so long as she had knowledge of her husband’s dangerous propensities and failed to exercise reasonable care towards the Plaintiff. Id. at 157-58. 160. 161.

B.

Invasion Of Privacy

Paragraphs 1 through 160 are incorporated as if set forth fully herein. This

Plaintiff asserts a cause of action for invasion of privacy. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B provides that “[o]ne who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise,

Page 38 of 42

upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.” Invasions of privacy such as violations of personal privacy based on effective disallowance of it may also be applicable. 162.

Absent judicial action, Plaintiff has no meaningful avenue for obtaining

adequate redress for her injuries, including a declaration of her rights against Defendants. 163.

Plaintiff has no effective means to prevent the policy, pattern, or practice at

issue in this suit except through an action against Defendants. 164.

As a result of these unlawful and unconstitutional actions, and

constitutionally impermissible experiences, Plaintiff has pulpified fears of being at risk of continued injury and abuse in violation of law. 165.

On information and belief, Defendant Chase has not rescinded his

authorizations for interrogation and detention policies that continues to implicate torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment against Plaintiff. 166.

Defendant Chase’s policy, pattern, or practice that is causing Plaintiff’

injuries continues in effect and Plaintiff seeks a judicial declaration that Defendant’s conduct deprived her of her rights under the law of nations, provisions of the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. 167.

The Court therefore should grant declaratory relief and any further

necessary and proper relief as set forth below, pursuant to the Torture Victims Protection Act, 28 USC §1350 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202. Page 39 of 42

168.

JURY DEMAND

169. Plaintiff request a trial by jury in this action on each and every count alleged herein. PRAYER FOR RELIEF Plaintiff therefore respectfully request that the Court enter a judgment including but not limited to: a. A declaration that the acts alleged herein are unlawful and violate the Constitution, treaty provisions including provisions of the Geneva Conventions, military rules and guidelines, and the law of nations; b. A declaration that the policy, pattern, or practice of the Defendant alleged herein is unlawful and violates the Constitution, treaty provisions including provisions of the Geneva Conventions, military rules and guidelines, and the law of nations; c. A declaration that assigns responsibility for Plaintiff’ injuries to Defendants for their failure to take necessary and adequate measures to prevent persons under their effective command from engaging in the torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of Plaintiff and his failure to punish persons under his effective command for engaging in such conduct; d. Compensatory damages for violation of the law of nations and the Constitution in an amount that is fair, just and reasonable; e. Attorneys’ fees and costs; and Page 40 of 42

f. All other appropriate relief as may be just and proper. Respectfully submitted,

Dated: This ______ of ________, 2010 _____________________________ Kini Cosma, Plaintiff

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Kini Cosma 5146 ½ Bristol Avenue Klamath Falls, OR 97603 (541) 880-4534 In Propria Persona THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON Kini Cosma, Plaintiff, vs. STATE OF OREGON, KLAMATH COUNTY, ET AL, DOES 1-100 Defendants

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

Case No.: Circuit Ct. Associated Cases: 0803782CV; 0803718CV; 0804232CV

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am the plaintiff and a party to this action. That on _____________, I SERVED a true and correct copy of the attached COMPLAINT by placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to this court hereinafter listed, by depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, located a delivery postal service authorized to do business in Klamath Falls, Oregon. The U.S. District Court For Attorney For Respondent U.S. Department of Justice the District of Oregon Mary Williams, Solicitor Gen'l Civil Rights Division Attn: Clerk of the Court Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Ave, N.W. James A Redden 1162 Court Street NE Criminal Section, PHB US Courthouse Salem, OR 97301 Washington, D.C. 20530 310 West Sixth St. Attn: Human Trafficking Unit Medford, OR 97501 U.S. Department of Justice Physicians For Human Rights PHRCivil Rights Division: 2 Arrow Street, Suite 301 1156 15th St. 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Cambridge, MA 02138 N.W, Suite 1001 Complaint Adjudication Office Washington, DC 20005 Washington, D.C. 20530 Office For Human Research Protections Attn: Mark Gross 1101 Wootton Parkway, Suite 200 Rockville, MD 20852 Dated: July 14, 2010 _____________Kini Cosma http://judiciary.zoomshare.com Page 42 of 42