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Do Contributors to Intellect Explain the Moral Judgment Abilities of Gifted Youth? W. Pitt Derryberry and Brian Barger Gifted Child Quarterly 2008; 52; 340 DOI: 10.1177/0016986208321806 The online version of this article can be found at: http://gcq.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/52/4/340

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Do Contributors to Intellect Explain the Moral Judgment Abilities of Gifted Youth?

Gifted Child Quarterly Volume 52 Number 4 Fall 2008 340-352 © 2008 National Association for Gifted Children 10.1177/0016986208321806 http://gcq.sagepub.com hosted at http://online.sagepub.com

W. Pitt Derryberry Western Kentucky University

Brian Barger Elise Middle School Abstract: To assess reaction time and attributional complexity as factors contributing to the relatively high moral judgment of gifted youth, a sample of 30 gifted youth and 30 college students responded to a computerized measure of moral judgment development, which also indexed reaction time. Additionally, participants completed a measurement of attributional complexity and reported American College Test (ACT) scores. Statistically significant differences favored the gifted in moral judgment development, reaction time, and attributional complexity. Regression analysis revealed that attributional complexity explained a significant amount of variance, whereas ACT scores and reaction times accounted for minimal variance. Although reaction time did not predict moral judgment developmental difference, discussion is offered to suggest how gifted youth, such as those in this study, might benefit from using their reaction time when considering moral situations.

Putting the Research to Use: The results of this study support the view that complex information processing and reaction time abilities of gifted youth are transferred to their moral judgment development. In sum, in comparison with a control group of college students, the gifted youth considered in this study appeared to process reasons for moral decisions in a more in-depth manner and were able to do so in a more efficient manner. Currently, it is unknown why and how this occurs, whether obstacles exist that could block this process, and whether practices exist that could help to facilitate these areas. Applications of these findings should therefore expound on these issues so that the utility of research on gifted moral judgment ability is increased. Applied research should also focus on transferring this understanding to general populations in the hopes of affecting the understanding of moral judgment development overall.

Keywords:

A

middle school; age/developmental stage; high school; college or adult

ccording to the National Association for Gifted Children (http://www.nagc.org/index.aspx? id=574), there are a handful of foundational definitions that may be categorized from conservative (related to demonstrated high IQ) to liberal (a broadened conception that includes multiple criteria that might not be measured through an IQ test; para. 3). Research on youth who would be considered gifted according to the conservative definition1 has produced data supporting differences across a variety of abilities from the average child. In addition to documenting more

advanced intellectual and creative abilities, for example, research on gifted youth as defined by conservative considerations has demonstrated higher scores on certain cognitive developmental measures Authors’ Note: Please address correspondence to W. Pitt Derryberry, Department of Psychology, Western Kentucky University, 1906 College Heights Blvd. # 21030, Bowling Green, KY 42101-1030; e-mail: [email protected]. Note: This article was accepted under the editorship of Paula Olszewski-Kubilius.

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(Steiner & Carr, 2003). It is not surprising, then, that moral judgment developmental research has shown similar differences favoring gifted populations because moral judgment development is facilitated by cognitive development (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987; Gibbs, 1995; Walker, 1980). According to the neo-Kohlbergian approach of Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, and Thoma (1999), moral judgment development at the lowest level is at the personal interest schema where judgments are onedimensional and focused on self-serving interests. At the next level, moral judgments are made according to the maintaining norms schema in which moral judgments are based on norms, rules, and laws. Finally, moral judgment development peaks at the postconventional schema. Here, moral judgments are defined by identified universal moral principles of justice and fairness as a result of objective reflection, deliberative inquiry, reasoning, and problem solving. Gifted youth, conservatively defined, have consistently shown strengths in their moral judgment development relative to their peers (Chovan & Freeman, 1993; Foulkes, 2000; Howard-Hamilton, 1994; Narvaez, 1993; Tirri & Pehkonen, 2002). There is some support that the moral judgment development of such populations of gifted youth can even exceed those who are more advanced in age and education (Derryberry, Wilson, Snyder, Norman, & Barger, 2005). Specifically, Derryberry et al. (2005) found that high-ability gifted youth were transitioning from the maintaining norms schema to the postconventional schema, whereas college students were transitioning from the personal interest to the maintaining norms schema. Although high-ability (the conservatively defined gifted youth) populations were more advanced on moral judgment developmental assessments, we are uncertain how these advances translate to instances of moral decision making and behavior. Indeed, this is a limitation of research that focuses on moral reasoning and judgment (Blasi, 1980; Kurtines & Greif, 1974). For example, research illustrates that moral exemplarity often has less to do with moral reasoning and more to do with constructs pertaining to self-understanding (Colby & Damon, 1992; Hart & Fegley, 1995; Monroe & Epperson, 1994). To be sure, the advancement of moral developmental theory has accounted for this. Specifically, Rest et al. (1999) acknowledge that moral judgment is but one of at least four components that are fundamental to moral development and behavior, and the neo-Kohlbergian approach of Rest et al. (1999) readily acknowledges that moral judgment development does not represent moral development in totality.

Even though moral judgment development is not synonymous with moral development and behavior and definitions of moral development continue to become more diversified, evidence exists that moral judgment and reasoning are linked to moral action and behavior (Thoma, Rest, & Davison, 1991). Recently, Derryberry and Thoma (2005a, 2005b) provided empirical illustration of how moral judgment development contributes to important moral behavioral outcomes, including honesty, altruism, and taking a stand for civil liberties. Additionally, support remains strong that the consideration of moral judgment development is an important aspect and direction for moral developmental research (Walker, 2002). In particular, Tirri and Pehkonen (2002) provided instances illustrating how the neo-Kohlbergian approach to moral judgment development in a high-ability gifted youth sample can relate to “logical and elegant” (p. 127) reasoning on a scientific argumentation task. Further investigation into the moral judgment development of high-ability youth is important to enable better understanding of both moral judgment development and high-ability gifted youth. Although research suggests that advances in moral judgment development are the product of advanced intellect (Sanders, Lubinski, & Benbow, 1995), definitive explanations of why high-ability youth are so advanced relative to their peers as well as others in terms of their moral judgment ability have not been provided. Sanders et al. (1995) explored how scores on the Defining Issues Test (DIT), a popular objective measurement of moral judgment development (see Rest et al., 1999), related to groups of cognitive and noncognitive variables. Sanders et al. (1995) used American College Test (ACT) or Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores, grade point average (GPA), and Raven’s Progressive Matrix scores to define their cognitive group of variables. Scores on the Family Environment Scale, Adjective Checklist, Study of Values Scale, and a demographics questionnaire represented noncognitive variables. Once cognitive variables were entered in a regression model, Sanders et al. (1995) found that the DIT did not account for a statistically significant portion of noncognitive group variance. Thus, Sanders et al. (1995) argued that DIT scores were reducible to, or synonymous with, intellect. Given these findings, it might be tempting to presume that moral judgment developmental advances seen among gifted youth are the product of their advanced intellectual and creative capacities. There has been little support for the arguments of Sanders et al. (1995), prior and subsequent to their study. In

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general, research addressing the relationship between moral judgment development and intellect supports that intellect is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for moral judgment development. As Rest (1979) originally noted in developing the DIT, moral judgment development is a cognitive– intellectual process. Citing correlations between DIT scores and various intellectual assessments that ranged from .25 to .50 as support and other DIT validity criteria (see Rest, 1979; Rest et al., 1999), Rest maintained that DIT scores and its indexed construct involve intellectual ability, although additional sources of information are needed to facilitate advanced moral judgment development. Subsequent research has, therefore, focused on demonstrating the role of intellect in advanced moral judgment development. For example, Thoma, Narvaez, Rest, and Derryberry (1999) illustrated that relationships remained among moral judgment developmental indices and relevant criteria, even after aspects of intellectual ability were controlled. They further distinguished the uniqueness of moral judgment as a measurable construct in a structural equation model that verified the independent existence and contributions of constructs of moral judgment and verbal intellectual ability on a criterion of social political ideology (Thoma, Derryberry, Narvaez, & Rest, 2000). Derryberry, Thoma, Narvaez, and Rest (2000) replicated the findings of Thoma et al. (2000) and further noted that these trends continued during moral judgment developmental phases of consolidation and transition. Derryberry, Jones, Grieve, and Barger (2007) relied on structural equation modeling to document the relationship among moral judgment development as defined by the DIT and indices of crystallized and fluid intellect. In addition to supporting the existence of three unique psychological latent constructs, Derryberry et al. (2007) found a large amount of unexplained variance remaining in paths from the crystallized and fluid latent constructs to the moral judgment latent construct. Research involving the moral judgment development of gifted youth also supports these findings. Narvaez (1993) noted that high ability is a necessary but not a sufficient ingredient for the advanced moral judgment ability seen in gifted populations. Similarly, Tirri and Pehkonen (2002) observed that “there are qualitative differences in the moral reasoning of gifted adolescents. High intellectual ability does not predict mature moral judgment” (p. 127). Given the disparate findings of Sanders et al. (1995) and others (e.g., Rest, 1979; Thoma et al., 1999, 2000; Derryberry et al., 2000, 2007), researchers of the

moral judgment development of gifted youth are presented with a perplexing problem. Though advanced moral judgment is documented in the sparse research that has examined the gifted according to conservative definitions in this area (Chovan & Freeman, 1993; Derryberry et al., 2005; Foulkes, 2000; Howard-Hamilton, 1994; Narvaez, 1993; Tirri & Pehknonen, 2002), definitive explanations about why they are advanced relative to their peers in this domain have not been provided. Research considering the relationship among indices of moral judgment development and intellectual ability in general does not instill the confidence needed to presume that the advanced intellectual capacities of conservatively defined gifted youth are sufficient to account for their moral judgment development. Thus, the question, “If moral judgment development is not reducible to or synonymous with intellect, then why is it that those of advanced intellect (defined as gifted according to conservative definitions) are regularly outperforming others where this construct is concerned?” Numerous conditions and rationales that go beyond intellectual ability and aptitude have been offered for advanced moral judgment development of high-ability learners (see Rest, Deemer, Barnett, Spickemier, & Volker, 1986). Factors such as academic orientations, motivations, interests, and social conditions of gifted youth are identified as instrumental contributors to moral judgment development. However, as already noted, moral judgment development is a cognitive– intellectual process (Rest, 1979). It should be expected, then, that factors serving intellectual ability also serve moral judgment development. Hence, efforts to address the role of intellectual ability in moral judgment development are still needed. Rather than attempting to reduce indices of moral judgment development to indices of intellectual ability, a more appropriate approach is one that seeks to account for the shared variance or commonality of these two constructs. In other words, it seems that the aforementioned question cannot be fully answered until the following question is answered: “What is it that intellectual ability and moral judgment development have in common?”

Noted Contributors to Intellect and Their Potential Contributions to Moral Judgment Development A great deal of research has been devoted to identifying and understanding those processes that serve and foster general intellectual ability or g. Two

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important areas identified as pertaining to intelligence include reaction or response time (RT; Deary, 2000; Jensen, 2005) and complex information processing (CIP; Lohman, 2000; Sternberg, 1982). RT refers to mental speed or the speed at which humans process information and is indexed through various indices of mental chronometry (see Jensen, 2005) that record how quickly people respond to choices, items, or other tasks. CIP refers to various mental tasks “that require comprehension, judgment, and reasoning” (Lohman, 2000, p. 288), such as inductive reasoning, deductive reasoning, and problem solving (Sternberg, 1982). Contributions of RT. The study of RT dates back to Galton, who hypothesized “that mental speed is a major aspect of general intelligence” (Jensen, 2005, p. 26). As Jensen notes, “RT can be a highly precise, reliable, and sensitive measure of individual differences” (p. 26). Jensen reports correlations between RT and intelligence quotients (IQ) ranging from −.10 to −.50, and that a curvilinear relationship exists with smaller correlations between IQ and simple and difficult RT tasks and higher correlations with IQ-moderate RT tasks. Studies involving gifted youth and/or other high-ability learners confirm that RT is involved in their intellectual functioning (Beh, Roberts, & Prichard-Levy, 1994; Cohn, Carlson, & Jensen, 1985; Lajoie & Shore, 1986; Yun, Shi, Tang, & Liu, 2004). These studies support the conclusion that RT is an important contributor to IQ (Beh et al., 1994; Lajoie & Shore, 1986) and also provide evidence that high-ability gifted youth respond to various mental tasks and assignments more quickly than their peers (Cohn et al., 1985; Yun et al., 2004). Although the contribution of RT to intelligence may seem nebulous, Jensen (2005) explained its importance in noting that faster RT “allows more operations to be performed on the input per unit of time, thereby increasing the chances of reaching a successful response before the point of overload and breakdown due to loss of information” (p. 45). In addressing differences among those who are at moral judgment phases of consolidation and those who are at moral judgment phases of transition, Derryberry and Thoma (2005b) reported that consolidated phases can facilitate the decision to act honestly when an attractive alternative for behaving dishonestly exists in conjunction with minimal time for figuring out the proper course of action. According to Derryberry and Thoma (2005b), this indicates the importance of being able to react or respond to information quickly

along with the utility of the moral judgment schema for individuals in consolidated phases. Because of these conditions, consolidated individuals—regardless of their developmental moral judgment schema— were able to respond more quickly in determining the proper course of action. Other moral judgment developmental research has also addressed the role of RT. Thoma, Narvaez, Endicott, and Derryberry (2002) noted that consolidated and transitional phases of moral judgment development affect how quickly one considers schemarelevant and irrelevant information. Those who were noted to be in consolidated phases of moral judgment development were observed to take more time in responding to items on the DIT overall than those that were transitional between moral judgment schemata. At the same time, though, when Thoma et al. (2002) accounted for an individual’s modal moral judgment schema, they found that consolidated individuals responded to DIT items that reflected their modal schema more quickly than did transitional individuals. Thus, Thoma et al. found support that individuals more quickly react to schema-related moral judgment information at certain phases of development. Contributions of CIP. CIP has been recognized as an important contributor in a variety of considerations of intellectual functioning. According to Lohman (2000), the importance of this aspect of information processing as a fundamental contributor to intellect dates to the work of Binet and Simon (1916). CIP appears to be acknowledged by Piaget (1963) in his description of intellectual development as following a progressing sequence of thought from simple to complex. According to this conception, CIP tasks such as inductive and deductive reasoning and problem solving are prerequisites for the organization and adaptation of formal operational thought. CIP is also recognized in other accounts relevant to intellectual functioning. For example, Craik and Lockhart’s (1972) levels of processing theory describe the intellectual contribution of CIP with its contention that information that is mentally addressed more “deeply” through analysis, connection, and other forms of elaboration is most likely to be retained and deemed relevant. In addressing CIP tasks including reasoning and problem solving, Sternberg (1982) declared their intellectual contributions in stating that “There seems to be little doubt that reasoning and problem solving play important roles in conceptions of intelligence, almost without regard to the derivation of these conceptions: These roles are important as subsets of

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intelligent behavior” (p. 226). Indeed, it is plausible that the ability and desire to engage in CIP ultimately distinguishes the intellectual capacities of highability gifted youth and nourishes their talents and creative capacities. In distinguishing CIP from simple forms of information processing (see Deary, 2000), Lohman (2000) summarized Snow, Kyllonen, and Marshalek (1984) in noting four chief criteria including a) an increase in the number of component processes involved in task performance; b) an increase in the involvement of one or more particular components (such as inference); c) an increase in demands on working memory or attentional resources; and d) an increase in demands on adaptive functions, including executive or metacognitive controls. (p. 301)

In examining these criteria, the involvement of CIP is apparent in making a moral judgment—particularly moral judgments from the postconventional schema. According to Rest et al. (1999), moral judgment development reflects a process where thinking about moral situations is originally very simplistic at the personal interest and maintaining norms schemata but ultimately requires the kind of tasks involved in CIP at the postconventional schema. Whereas moral judgments according to the first two schemata simply require retrieval of self- or other-based absolutes, moral judgments from the postconventional schema require that the impending judgment has been reasoned on with enough depth so that all aspects and all parties pertaining to the situation are objectively reviewed. Essentially, making a postconventional moral judgment requires the individual to engage in “moral musical chairs . . . (and) . . . reversible role taking” (Kohlberg, 1987, p. 35) and various other deliberations. Given the numerous considerations involved and processes (i.e., inductive reasoning, problem solving, etc.) operating in this kind of task, all four of the criteria for CIP undoubtedly occur when a postconventional moral judgment is made. A recent study of gifted youth found that other indices likely involving CIP predict their moral judgment development. Specifically, Derryberry et al. (2005) noted the importance of attributional complexity, which refers to the depth of thinking one uses in regard to the explication of the behavior of others (Fletcher, Danilovics, Fernandez, Peterson, & Reeder, 1986). According to Follet and Hess (2002), attributional complexity is a useful referent of cognitive complexity because it “refers to the degree to which one considers, for example, multiple determinants and

causal explanations for behavior” (p. 313). Given this characterization, it is warranted to presume that attributional complexity involves CIP. In a stepwise hierarchical linear regression model, Derryberry et al. (2005) found that most important in the prediction of the moral judgment development of the gifted was an aspect of attributional complexity that describes a person’s preference for complex over simple explanations in explaining the behavior of self and others. According to Derryberry et al., their findings on the importance of attributionally complex thinking elucidate the possibility that it is the manner in which intellect is used that is important for the advancement of moral judgment development.

Purpose of the Current Study The reasons for the early advances in moral judgment development that are observed in high-ability or conservatively defined gifted youth populations are not well understood. In considering RT and CIP, it makes sense that groups like high-ability gifted youth that are likely proficient in both might effectively use these abilities in other areas such as moral judgment development. This is especially likely because moral judgment development is regarded as a cognitive– intellectual process (Rest, 1979) and is related to, but not reducible to, intelligence. Hence, the need for a study addressing the contributions of RT and constructs involving CIP to the moral judgment development of high-ability gifted youth is warranted. Although it makes sense that attributionally complex thinking about the behavior of others would be beneficial in facilitating moral judgment development, it is unlikely that attributional complexity is the sole reason for the early advancement of moral thought structures among high-ability gifted youth. As Derryberry et al. (2005) acknowledged, this contribution only accounted for 4% of the variance in moral thought development and, therefore, other relevant predictors need to be considered in understanding the moral judgment development of high-ability gifted youth. Given its noted contributions to intellectual functioning, in general, and gifted populations, RT—particularly where moral information is concerned—might also contribute to moral judgment development. Furthermore, because moral judgment development has been shown to relate to RT (Thoma et al., 2002), it may be that the speed at which one can react to a situation becomes an important facet in ensuring that attributionally complex thinking is

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capitalized on and not lost because of overload and breakdown (see Jensen, 2005) in working memory. For example, if a person is able to react to moral situations quickly while also processing the situation in an attributionally complex manner, then it seems that the likelihood is increased that he or she will be able to effectively consider a variety of possible alternatives regarding a potential course of action. The end result would therefore be more opportunities for disequilibrium about the morality of the situation, and the potential for moral judgment growth would be heightened. The purpose of this study, then, is to compare the moral judgment development and intellectual ability of a group of high-ability or conservatively defined gifted youth with a group of college students. Similar to Derryberry et al. (2005), this study will also address whether there are differences in attributional complexity between the two groups, because attributional complexity appears to involve CIP. Additionally, this study will address whether differences exist between the two groups in their moral information RT. Comparisons of high-ability gifted youth with those who “may be less advanced in terms of intellectual ability yet more advanced in age and socioacademic experiences” (Derryberry et al., 2005, p. 11) are advantageous because such comparisons consider those who are more likely to be similar in terms of their moral judgment development as well as other areas related to moral judgment development. Furthermore, such comparisons are of utility because any advances that might be observed in the highability gifted youth sample would enable a clearer understanding and confirmation of the degree to which they are advanced. After these comparisons have been conducted, this study will merge both samples and conduct linear regression to determine whether advances in RT and attributional complexity increase the likelihood of advanced moral judgment once intellectual ability has been entered.

Method Participants Participants for this study included 30 gifted youth and 30 college students. Gifted youth participants were enrolled in a summer program for gifted youth conducted at a regional university in the Southeast. This program serves students in Grades 7 through 10 who have earned a minimum score of 18 on the ACT math subtest and 25 on the ACT English subtest or a minimum score of 500 on SAT math and verbal

subtests. The gifted sample included 19 females, 10 males, and 1 participant who did not provide information regarding gender. Among those that volunteered information regarding ethnicity, 22 classified themselves as White, 2 as Asian, 1 as Black, 1 as Hispanic, and 3 as Other. Participants ranged in age from 12 to 16 years. The college student sample attended a large regional university in the Southeast. These participants were recruited from psychology classes via the psychology department’s study board and they received extra credit in their courses for participating in the study. Students were eligible to participate in the study regardless of ACT score, GPA, age, class year, intellectual ability, or traditional versus nontraditional college student status. This approach is favorable to restricting the participation of those possessing certain demographic characteristics because it increases the likelihood that the sample obtained is representative of the undergraduate population it represents. Nineteen college-level participants were females and 11 were males. A total of 18 were freshmen, 7 were sophomores, 2 were juniors, and 3 were seniors. In terms of ethnicity, 11 classified themselves as White, 1 as Asian, and 1 as Black. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 27 years.

Instruments Moral judgment. The DIT-2 (Rest, Thoma, Narvaez, & Bebeau, 1997) was used to assess moral judgment development. On the DIT-2, respondents read five different short scenarios in which a character faces a moral dilemma, provide an action choice indicating what the character should do, then rate 12 items reflecting the postconventional, maintaining norms, or personal interest moral judgment schemata in terms of their importance in the participant’s decision. To ensure individuals are not haphazardly rating each item, the DIT-2 also includes several meaningless items as well as items that pertain to antiestablishment attitudes among the 12 associated with each dilemma. After rating each of the 12 items, respondents rank the four items that were most important to them in making their decisions. To ascertain developmental differences between groups, participants’ N2 scores, which assess the degree to which the participant emphasizes postconventional items over other items in making moral judgments (Rest et al., 1997), are calculated. N2 scores range from 0 to 95. High N2 scores are indicative of those that not only emphasize items pertaining to the postconventional schema in their rating and rankings but also minimize the

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importance of items pertaining to the maintaining norms and personal interest schemata. DIT-2 Type scores are also used in the current study. Inclusion of the Type score enables more precision in documenting moral judgment development than the N2 score. Type scores are categorical indices that refer to positioning at a particular moral judgment schema and indicate moral judgment developmental phase criteria. If a person primarily references DIT items pertaining to one moral judgment schema relative to others, he or she is considered in a consolidated phase of moral judgment development. If a person does not strongly emphasize DIT items belonging to a particular moral judgment schema relative to other schemata, he or she is considered in a transitional phase of moral judgment development. Type scores range from 1 to 7. Type 1 reflects a person consolidated at the personal interest schema. At Type 2, the personal interest schema remains modal though the individual is beginning to transition towards the maintaining norms schema. Type 3 also designates a transitional phase, although a modal shift has occurred favoring the maintaining norms schema. Type 4 indicates consolidation at the maintaining norms schema. Type 5 reveals that transition away from the maintaining norms schema though this schema remains modal. Type 6 is a transitional phase where a modal shift from the maintaining norms to the postconventional schema has occurred. Type 7 indicates consolidation at the postconventional schema. Internal consistency of the DIT-2 in the current study was assessed using Cronbach’s alpha computed at the item level for each schema (e.g., consideration of the consistency across DIT rating items specific to particular moral judgment schema), as Crowson, DeBacker, Derryberry, and Thoma (2005) recommended. Internal consistency is acceptable (α = .716 for the postconventional schema, .733 for the maintaining norms schema, and .757 for the personal interest schema). Analysis of DIT-2 scores only includes those with acceptable levels of reliability (see Rest et al., 1999). Reaction time (RT). RT indices were measured by presenting the DIT-2 via Inquisit 1.33 software (Inquisit 1.33, 2003). Response times for all items are reported in milliseconds. Response time indices used in this study include the average RT on all action and rating choice items (AVErt), action choice items (ACrt), postconventional items (PCrt), maintaining norms or conventional level items (MNrt), personal interest or preconventional items (PIrt),

meaningless items (MGLSrt), and antiestablishment items (AErt). In evaluating the internal consistency for these indices, reported RT for each item comprising each index were compared. Internal consistency is low for the ACrt (α = .367), the 5 RTs comprising MGLSrt (α = .148), and the 4 RTs comprising AErt (α =.373); good for the 65 RTs comprising AVErt (α = .886), for the 14 RTs comprising PCrt (α = .801), and for the 20 RTs comprising PIrt (α = .846); and acceptable for the 17 RTs for MNrt (α = .736). Although Cronbach’s alpha indices were found for ACrt, MGLSrt, and AErt, it is important to note that few items comprise these items making it difficult to achieve high levels of internal consistency. Although these indices will be noted in the study, any trends observed will be treated with caution. Attributional complexity. The Attributional Complexity Scale (ACS; Fletcher et al., 1986) was used in making inferences about an individual’s CIP. The ACS is a 28-item 7-point scale designed to assess participants’ complexity of thought in explaining human behavior. The ACS has been successfully employed in previous studies as an inference of aspects pertaining to complex thought (Derryberry et al., 2005; Follett & Hess, 2002). Examples of ACS items include “I don’t usually bother to analyze or explain people’s behavior,” “I think a lot about the influence I have on other people’s behavior,” and “I have found that the causes for people’s behavior are usually complex rather than simple.” The ACS yields a composite ACS score (ACScomp) that ranges from 0 to ±84. The ACS can be indexed into seven different subscales; however, low internal consistency was found for some of these subscales. Thus, only ACScomp scores are considered in the current study where α = .862. Intellectual ability. The ACT achievement test is typically used to assess the level of competence a student should have for successful completion of college-level work. As such, it is considered to be an assessment of achievement than of intellect. At the same time, its scores are inferential of intellectual ability, and various comparisons of moral judgment and intellectual ability have referenced these scores in deducing information regarding general intellectual ability (Derryberry et al., 2000; Rest, 1979; Sanders et al., 1995; Thoma et al., 2000). Hence, ACT scores are considered an inferential reflection of intellectual ability in the current study so that differences

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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics Gifted Youth

College Students

M ACT DIT N2 ACScomp AVErt ACrt PCrt MNrt PIrt MGLSrt AErt

SD

22.12 39.07 39.31 6590.05 8666.29 16035.53 6203.79 6237.31 8106.27 6625.97

M

2.75 12.87 19.68 1858.26 6483.41 7007.27 1763.91 1861.27 4576.02 2539.36

SD

21.63 24.52 23.83 7421.87 7014.84 14640.38 7131.09 7254.44 8068.33 8411.68

3.16 10.16 15.85 1950.64 4469.44 9993.06 1708.34 1938.22 3948.98 2690.34

Note: ACT = American College Test; DIT N2 = Defining Issues Test–version 2; ACScomp = Attributional Complexity Scale comprehensive scores; AVErt = average reaction time; ACrt = average reaction time across action choices; PCrt = average reaction time across postconventional items; MNrt = average reaction time across maintaining norms items; PIrt = average reaction time across personal interest items; MGLSrt = average reaction time across meaningless items; AErt = average reaction time across antiestablishment items; M = mean; SD = standard deviation.

between groups can effectively be considered. ACT scores were obtained through university records via permission from participants. In the current study, only ACT composite scores were considered because 11 gifted youth participants had not taken the ACT (they had taken the SAT). SAT composite scores were converted into ACT composite equivalent scores according to concordance tables published through College Board (see Dorans, 1999). Four gifted youth participants who had not completed either test were not considered in analyses involving ACT scores.

Procedures For both groups, data were collected in a session ranging from 45 min to 1 hr. Informed consent or assent was obtained from both groups at the start of the session. Parental consent was granted and verified prior to the session for the gifted group. Those in the college student group were offered course extra credit for their participation. All materials were coded with a participant number for confidentiality.

Results Descriptive statistics for dependent variables can be found in Table 1. Table 2 documents moral judgment development in terms of modal schema and moral judgment phase as reflected in the frequency of DIT Type scores in each sample. The majority of the gifted youth samples were in consolidated phases of

Table 2 DIT Type Score Frequency Table Gifted Youth Sample Personal interest Type 1 Type 2 Maintaining norms Type 3 Type 4 Type 5 Postconventional Type 6 Type 7

College Student Sample 2 2 4 6 3 4 9

Personal interest Type 1 Type 2 Maintaining norms Type 3 Type 4 Type 5 Postconventional Type 6 Type 7

1 8 8 5 5 3 0

Note: Types 1 and 2 = personal interest schema is mode; Types 3 to 5 = maintaining norms schema is mode; Types 6 to 7 = postconventional schema is mode. Types 1, 4, and 7 are consolidated phases; Types 2, 3, 5, and 6 are transitional phases.

moral judgment development, whereas the majority of the college student samples were in transitional phases of moral judgment development. Furthermore, Table 2 documents that the moral judgment development of most of the gifted youth sample was modal at either the maintaining norms or postconventional schema, whereas the moral judgment development of the majority of the college youth sample was modal at the maintaining norms schema. Analyses of variance (ANOVA) were conducted on DIT N2, ACScomp, ACT, and AVErt scores. Statistically significant differences between groups were reported for N2: F(1, 58) = 23.629, p < .001,

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η2 = .29, d = 1.07, and ACScomp scores: F(1, 58) = 11.101, p < .002, η2 = .163, d = .80. No statistically significant differences between groups for ACT composite scores were seen. A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to assess differences between groups on the ACrt, PCrt, MNrt, PIrt, MGLSrt, and AErt RT indices. Four multivariate tests yielded statistical significance for RT-dependent variables, F(6, 53) = 2.839, p < .018, η2 = .24. Univariate tests of statistical significance between groups were significant on three of these indices: MNrt, F(1, 58) = 4.278, p < .05, η2 = .07, d = .52; PIrt, F(1, 58) = 4.298, p < .05, η2 = .07, d = .52; and AErt, F(1, 58) = 6.990, p < .05, η2 = .11, d = .65. Linear regression analysis was used to assess how the considered variables predicted moral judgment developmental variance overall (Table 3). With N2 scores as dependent variable, three blocks were entered in which the contributions of ACT scores, ACS comprehensive scores, and the average of the RT indices were noted. As Table 4 illustrates, only the second block, ACS scores, was noted to contribute to a significant portion of N2 variance. ACT scores (Block 1) and RT averages (Block 3) were shown to account for a minimal portion of N2 variance. This lack of contribution from the RT averages is not the product of shared variance with ACT and ACS scores. As the correlation matrix illustrated in Table 3 verifies, RT averages were negligibly related to these two variables.

Table 3 Summary of Linear Regression Analyses for Variables Predicting DIT N2 Scores Variable Block 1 ACT Block 2 ACT ACScomp Block 3 ACT ACScomp AVErt

B

SE B

β

t

Significance

.939

.638

.198

1.472

.147

.192 .405

.572 .090

.041 .541

.337 4.484

.738 .000

.167 .409 .001

.575 .091 .001

.035 .547 .087

.290 4.504 .745

.773 .000 .459

Note: ACT = American College Test, ACScomp = ACS Composite Score, AVErt = average reaction time on DIT items. R2 = .039 for Block 1 (p < .147); ΔR2 = .268 for Block 2 (p < .000); ΔR2 = .007 for Block 3 (p < .459).

Table 4 Correlation Matrix N2 N2 ACT ACScomp AVErt

1.00 .152 .552** .051

ACT

ACScomp

AVErt

1.00 .291* .040

1.00 −.088

1.00

Note: N2 = Defining Issues Test (DIT) N2 scores; ACT = American College Test; ACScomp = ACS Composite Score; AVErt = average reaction time on DIT items. *Correlation is significant at the .05 level. **Correlation is significant at the .01 level.

Discussion Given the strong effect size (η2 = .29, d = 1.07) observed for reported DIT N2 scores, there is support that the moral judgment development of the gifted youth sample is distinctly different from the college student sample. As higher N2 scores are indicative of an increased emphasis of the importance of DIT items pertaining to the postconventional schema in conjunction with a decreased emphasis of items pertaining to earlier schemata, the N2 scores reported for both groups suggest a key moral judgment developmental distinction in that the postconventional schema was more likely to be prioritized in making moral decisions by the gifted participants than it was for the college sample. This is further supported in Table 2 which provides a breakdown of the participants in each sample in terms of DIT Type scores. These findings confirm previous studies of advanced moral judgment development of high-ability or conservatively

defined gifted youth (Chovan & Freeman, 1993; Derryberry et al., 2005; Foulkes, 2000; HowardHamilton, 1994; Narvaez, 1993; Tirri & Pehkonen, 2002). An interesting aspect of these findings is that these moral judgment differences exist even though ACT score differences were not significant, refuting those who contend that moral judgment development and intellect are reducible to each other (Sanders et al., 1995) and affirming assertions that such constructs are independent (Derryberry et al., 2000, 2007; Narvaez, 1993; Tirri & Pehkonen, 2002; Thoma et al., 1999; Thoma et al., 2000). Certain aspects relating to intellect can be involved in facilitating the moral judgment development of high-ability gifted youth, however. For example, Derryberry et al. (2005) suggested that processes that underlie and support intellectual ability could still play a role, contributing to our contention that such

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processes could include RT and constructs related to CIP. Findings for ACScomp scores and the RT indices provide initial support for this hypothesis. Specifically, evidence that the gifted youth may be more advanced in terms of CIP was provided through the strong effect favoring the gifted youth sample on ACScomp scores. Furthermore, the gifted youth tended to process moral information more quickly as evidenced by strong effect sizes on the RT indices and the moderate univariate effects observed. Taken together, these findings suggest that the gifted youth preferred to process certain kinds of information in a more complex manner than the college students. Furthermore, they have the ability to do so more quickly than the college students. This does not mean that the gifted youth processed all information with more complexity, nor does it indicate that they processed all information quickly. As noted in Table 3, the gifted youth reacted significantly more quickly to items pertaining to the personal interest and maintaining norms schemata, whereas no statistical differences were seen between groups in reacting to postconventional items. In other words, they were quick to discount the relative importance of moral information that was not congruent with the postconventional moral judgment schema and spent increased time focusing on moral information that paralleled this schema. The findings concerning RT are supportive of previous research on RT during moral judgment development (i.e., Thoma et al., 2002), although there are some new findings. For example, findings concerning the PCrt index parallel previous study. In particular, Thoma et al. (2002) illustrated that those in consolidated phases process moral information more slowly than do those in transitional phases. As noted in Table 2, the number of consolidated individuals in the gifted sample was almost twice that of those in the college sample, with the majority of these individuals being consolidated at the postconventional schema. With this in mind, in conjunction with the dearth of participants modal at the postconventional schema from the college sample, it is not surprising to find that there were no statistically significant RT differences between gifted and college participants on items pertaining to the postconventional schema. Where the findings pertaining to the PIrt and MNrt RT indices are concerned, similar trends have not been reported in previous research. Specifically, Thoma et al. (2002) noted that those that are in consolidated phases of moral judgment development process information pertaining to their modal moral

judgment schema more quickly than do those that are transitioning to or away from the same schema. It is important to note, though, that Thoma et al. (2002) only found evidence for this trend when comparing consolidated and transitional individuals that are modal at the same schema. Hence, though the research of Thoma et al. (2002) found that differences in processing can exist between those of consolidated and transitional phases at the same schema, they did not find evidence that advancements in moral judgment development result in more efficient information processing for moral judgment schema prior to the modal moral judgment schema. In the current study, on the other hand, this is precisely what occurred as significant differences were seen favoring the gifted youth on items pertaining to both the personal interest and maintaining norms moral judgment schema. As these trends therefore support, what separates the gifted youth from the college students in this study appears to be the speed in which they were able to determine the merit of all schema-related items. At the same time gifted participants illustrated a tendency to regulate their RT. In addition to no statistically significant differences on items pertaining to the postconventional schema, no statistically significant differences existed on AVErt, ACrt, and MGLSrt. These findings therefore suggest that when gifted youth are faced with an action choice or an item containing semantically attractive yet meaningless information, they allow themselves increased time for information processing. Even though reported alphas for both indices are low, the lack of statistically significant differences on AVErt supports the hypothesis that the gifted youth regulate their RT while taking the DIT. As the differences on the PIrt, MNrt, and AErt indices between groups attest, once a decision was made, the gifted group was able to more quickly eliminate the reasons that did not pertain to the reasons underlying their action choices. This quick elimination may have consequently led to an increased willingness to allow themselves additional time for thinking about the items pertaining to the postconventional schema. As such, there is support that advances in RT do not affect all factors that are a part of making a moral judgment. Although significant differences were seen between the gifted youth and college student samples in terms of RT and CIP as inferred by ACScomp scores, such analyses do not allow the determination as to whether these abilities predict moral judgment development. As such, it was necessary to conduct the linear regression analysis. In accounting for moral

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judgment developmental variance as noted in N2 scores, only complex processing as seen in ACScomp scores contributed a significant amount of variance. Because ACT scores did not significantly contribute to N2 score variance, it becomes even more difficult to assert that the measurement of moral judgment development is reducible to intellectual ability. At the same time, though, the significant contribution of ACScomp scores supports those who have addressed the relationship of depth of thinking and moral judgment development (Rest et al., 1986). The results further support assertions that certain processes that enable the manifestation of intellectual ability can also contribute to moral judgment development (Derryberry et al., 2005). This support only applies to attributional complexity; the same cannot be said for RT because AVErt was negligible in accounting for N2 score variance.

Limitations First, ACS scores refer to complex information processing as it pertains to the behavior of others and it is unknown how high scores translate to complex information processing in general. Similarly, RT indices to DIT items are not necessarily indicative of RT overall. Hence, additional study is needed involving other indices of CIP and RT among gifted and other populations to ensure confidence in the findings of this study. Another limitation of the study is that the sample of gifted youth comprised of high-ability youth defined as gifted according to conservative definitions that conceptualize giftedness according to intellectual ability or other indices of high ability rather than liberal definitions that incorporate a variety of broad-based criteria in defining giftedness. This study is also limited in its ability to make inferences about the moral development and behavior of gifted youth beyond the neo-Kohlbergian consideration of moral judgment development because moral judgment ability is not synonymous with moral development and behavior overall (Colby & Damon, 1992; Hart & Fegley, 1995; Monroe & Epperson, 1994; Rest et al., 1999). Therefore, it should not be presumed that the advances seen in the gifted youth sample equate to advances in moral development overall nor should it be presumed that the gifted youth in this study are moral exemplars in terms of their behavior. As a result of these latter two limitations, there is a need to consider not just the moral judgment development but also the moral development and behavior overall of

the gifted. Such considerations should continue to involve those who are defined as gifted according to conservative definitions, but—given the composition of moral development overall along with that which comprises giftedness—samples should also include those that possess other aspects of giftedness such as those acknowledged by liberal definitions. Limitations aside, however, we believe that this study has made some important strides in explaining the moral judgment development of the gifted in terms of depth and speed of processing. Specifically, it is apparent that differences noted in this study in terms of complexity of processing as inferred by Attributional Complexity Scale scores is an important reason for the advanced moral judgment development that has been regularly seen in high-ability or conservatively defined gifted youth populations. Thus, just as complexity of thinking may be an important contributor to their intellectual abilities, it is also contributing to their moral judgment ability. RT may be an important reason for the intellect of high-ability learners like conservatively defined gifted youth (Beh et al., 1994; Cohn et al., 1985; Lajoie & Shore, 1986; Yun et al., 2004), but it is not recognized in this study as a reason for or contributor to their advanced growth. However, though RT does not predict advanced moral judgment development, this study supports that it is an intellectual process that highability gifted youth use to their benefit once they make a judgment about the action that should be taken. In particular, RT strengths appear to make identifying the reasons for making a moral judgment an easier and more productive task for the gifted individual. Specifically, it seems that RT may enable the gifted to more effectively discriminate items. In other words, because they are proficient in processing information in a complex manner and because they are also adept in reacting to information quickly, they are able to quickly consider DIT items in identifying the reasons that pertain to their decision about their action choice recommendations. This possibility is further supported by the fact that gifted N2 scores are so strongly distinct from the college students’ N2 scores. To be sure, those who have high N2 scores concurrently rate and rank postconventional DIT items highly and minimize the importance of other schema-related DIT items. Thus, the difference in N2 scores provides additional evidence that the gifted are able to effectively distinguish among reasons that pertain to their moral judgments. This study represents but a small step in making sense of the moral judgment development of the

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gifted. Additional research in this direction is certainly warranted. Though complex processing and RT appear to be promising lines of research in understanding the moral judgment development of the gifted, future steps are necessary. For example, though complex information processing and RT are apparently transferred to the moral functioning of the gifted, it is unknown as to why and how this occurs and whether or not obstacles exist that would block this process. Furthermore, it would be interesting to understand if there are practices that can help to facilitate these areas and their transfer to moral thinking. As such, future research must tackle issues such as this so that the utility of research of gifted moral functioning can be recognized. Once such understanding is garnered, applied research should focus on how to transfer such understanding to general populations in the hopes of affecting the moral judgment development of all, not just the few.

Note 1. The term high ability will be used synonymously with gifted according to the conservative definition throughout this article.

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Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, New Orleans, LA. Thoma, S. J., Narvaez, D., Endicott, L., & Derryberry, W. P. (2002, April). Developmental phase indicators and moral information processing. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, New Orleans, LA. Thoma, S. J., Narvaez, D., Rest, J., & Derryberry, W. P. (1999). Does moral judgment development reduce to political attitudes or verbal ability? Evidence using the Defining Issues Test. Educational Psychology Review, 11, 325-342. Thoma, S. J., Rest, J. R., & Davison, M. L. (1991). Describing and testing a moderator of the moral judgment and action relationship. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61, 659-669. Tirri, K., & Pehkonen, L. (2002). The moral reasoning and scientific argumentation of gifted adolescents. Journal of Secondary Gifted Education, 13, 120-129. Walker, L. J. (1980). Cognitive and perspective-taking prerequisites for moral development. Child Development, 51, 131-139. Walker, L. J. (2002). The model and the measure: An appraisal of the Minnesota approach to moral development. Journal of Moral Education, 31, 353-367. Yun, M., Shi, J., Tang, H., & Liu, Z. (2004). A comparative study on the development of speed of information processing (SIP) of 8- to 12-year old supernormal and normal children. Journal of Psychology in Chinese Societies, 5, 233-248. W. Pitt Derryberry, PhD, is an educational psychologist and associate professor of psychology at Western Kentucky University. His research interests include the moral psychology of adolescents and young adults, moral education, and intellectual abilities and differences. Brian Barger received his MA in experimental psychology from Western Kentucky University. His research interests include cultural influences on the development of moral affect, temperament, and developmental disabilities.

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