Terrorism and Political Violence, 20:234–256, 2008 Copyright  Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 0954-6553 print=1556-1836 online DOI: 10.1080/09546550801920758

How did Europe’s Global Jihadis Obtain Training for their Militant Causes? PETTER NESSER

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FFI’s (Norwegian Defence Research Establishment’s) Terrorism Research Group, Kjeller, Norway This article examines, compares, and contrasts the ways in which ‘‘global jihadis’’ have trained for terrorism in Western Europe. Before the invasion of Afghanistan, the terrorists received training in Al Qaeda paramilitary camps. After invasion, they had to find alternative training methods and arenas. It is widely assumed that the Internet has taken over the role of the Afghan camps. The current survey suggests that the Internet’s role as a ‘‘virtual training camp’’ might be overstated. Although the Net has become an important tool for terrorists on many levels, they maintain an urge to obtain real-life, military-style training in jihadi combat zones. Despite difficulties and risks, many of today’s terrorists attend terrorist training facilities in Pakistan or other places. The main characteristic of training practices after the invasion of Afghanistan seems to be that, from an organizational perspective, the push for training and preparation comes from ‘‘below’’ rather than from ‘‘above.’’ Keywords Europe, Jihadism, terrorism, training

Introduction Over the past few years, European countries have faced the threat from so-called ‘‘home-grown’’ jihadi terrorist cells consisting of Muslim immigrants born and raised in Europe (and also some European converts).1 The terrorists call themselves ‘‘mujahidin’’ or ‘‘jihadis,’’ and investigations reveal that they are inspired by Al Qaeda global jihad ideology.2 However, in most cases, direct and tangible organizational ties to Al Qaeda have proved hard to identify.3 It has been assumed that the ‘‘home-grown’’ global jihad cells, for the most part, are relatively autonomous: self-recruited, self-radicalized, and self-trained, inside European countries, utilizing the jihadi Internet as a ‘‘virtual training camp.’’4 Petter Nesser is a research fellow at FFI’s Terrorism and Political Violence Project. He is trained in the areas of social science, Middle Eastern Studies, and Arabic, and has conducted extensive research on jihadi terrorism in Western Europe for nearly five years. Nesser has focused mainly on motivational factors, recruitment, and radicalization processes. His work includes research reports and articles such as ‘‘Jihad in Europe’’ and y The Slaying of the Dutch Filmmaker,’’ and ‘‘Jihadism in Western Europe after the invasion of Iraq.’’ Nesser has communicated his research results through academic institutions and conferences in Norway and internationally, and through the public media. The author would like to thank his colleagues at FFI’s Terrorism Research Group and Al Qaeda specialist Peter Bergen for inspiration and for sharing sources with him. Address correspondence to Petter Nesser, Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt, Postboks 25, 2027 Kjeller, Norway. E-mail: [email protected]

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There is a gap in our knowledge about the training and preparation of jihadi terrorists after the invasion of Afghanistan and the destruction of Al Qaeda training camps. Based on the narratives of global jihadis who have operated inside European countries from the end of the 1990s until the present, this article examines, compares, and contrasts the various ways in which they have obtained terrorist capabilities.5 The analysis distinguishes between two generations of global jihadi terrorist networks within the European context: . The 1st generation networks that were closely associated with Al Qaeda and received terrorist training in Al Qaeda run camps in Afghanistan. These networks utilized Europe as an attack arena from around 1998 (when Al Qaeda initiated the global offensive), until 2003=2004—a couple of years after the invasion of Afghanistan and the destruction of the training camps, i.e., the time it took to disrupt and weaken the Al Qaeda-controlled terrorist networks in Europe and internationally. . The 2nd generation networks that have weaker or more indirect ties to Al Qaeda and presumably have found alternative ways to obtain necessary training after Al Qaeda camps were destroyed.6 The 2nd generation terrorist networks emerged as a threat to Europe around 2003=2004, and are principally motivated by European nations’ military support for the invasion of Iraq. Because the training of Europe’s 1st generation of global jihadis is relatively well documented, I will focus mostly on the training of the 2nd generation.7 The main findings of the empirical survey are that differences in the ways and means through which the two generations of fighters obtained terrorist skills are somewhat less than expected. Under protection of the Taliban, Al Qaeda was able to train terrorists for operations in Europe (and other regions) within paramilitary, hierarchical organizational structures, and through ‘‘top-down’’ processes of recruitment, radicalization, and training. Europe’s 2nd generation of global jihadis has maintained a strong desire for real-life ‘‘military style’’ training and face-to-face encounters with experienced mujahidin. However, because of the invasion of Afghanistan and the demolition of Al Qaeda camps, it has been more difficult for them to fulfill the desire for such real-life training. Yet, despite difficulties and risks, many of them have managed to attend terrorist training facilities in Pakistan or other places. Typically, the 2nd generation of activists initiates preliminary, improvised terrorist training inside Europe, but then goes to other regions in order to obtain more advanced training. As for the assumptions about the importance of the Internet as a means to develop terrorist skills, my survey confirms that the Net has become a more important tool for the terrorists on many levels. As we shall see, there are several examples of Internet communication and the downloading of training manuals and explosives recipes during operational planning. However, it appears to be misleading, or at least premature, to refer to the Internet as a ‘‘virtual training camp.’’8 With one possible exception, I have not been able to find examples of terrorist cells that can be characterized as ‘‘virtual-only’’ in terms of developing operational capabilities. Perhaps the most important factor distinguishing the 2nd generation from the 1st concerns their preparation for terrorism. For the 2nd generation, from an organizational perspective, the push for training and preparation comes from below, rather than ‘‘above.’’ Whereas Al Qaeda recruited fighters and trained them within a hierarchical

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organization, the new generation of inspired youngsters organizes improvised training, and calls upon experienced fighters through the Internet and in the jihadi underworld for supplementary advice on the skills that they are unable to develop by themselves.

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Note on Terminology and the Empirical Evidence Presented When I talk about ‘‘terrorist training’’ in this article it should be understood as: developing the technical, physical, and psychological capabilities (skills and conditions) needed to conduct terrorist operations.9 Such skills, especially the former two, can be obtained, preserved, and improved effectively through paramilitary and terrorist training, which resembles the military training within a state’s military organization.10 Psychological skills differ from the physical and technical ones, partly because they depend upon social background and biological inheritance, and partly because they can be gained through non-military social interaction. For example, studies of recruitment and radicalization processes within Islamist networks have illustrated that recruiters tend to focus on social gains and ideology, instead of the conduct of violence, in the early phases of enlisting and socializing new recruits. By focusing on social aspects, such as companionship and brotherhood, and on ideology, they try to facilitate so-called ‘‘cognitive openings’’ (convincing potential recruits about the religious-ideological and political legitimacy of violent jihad) and to prepare the recruits for moving on to military-style rehearsals of the actual conduct of violence at a later stage.11 However, when introduced, technical and physical preparations, such as going to training camps or reading military and terrorist manuals on the Internet, go hand-in-hand with mental preparation, and it appears that they mutually reinforce one another. Recruits empowered with military and terrorist skills feel that they become important actors in the ideological narrative presented by the recruiters; they become ‘‘real mujahidin.’’ Because of the close connections and blurred borders between the technical, physical, and psychological aspects of the preparation, when surveying Islamist terrorist groups and networks it is often difficult (if not impossible) to make a clear distinction between them. The empirical narratives below reflect this analytical problem. Although the research focus is on the technical and physical aspects, they cannot be studied in isolation from the broader processes of recruiting and socializing jihadi recruits. The empirical evidence presented below has been collected mainly from newspapers, judicial documents, and existing research on Islamist extremism and jihadism in Europe. I have also discussed my interpretations of the empirical data with European counter-terrorism officials informed about the region’s jihadi networks and concrete investigations. The empirical section about the training of the 2nd generation of Europe’s global jihadis features four case studies. The cases were selected because they involve people who might be characterized as 2nd generation fighters, according to criteria outlined below, and because they have been portrayed (in the international press and research) as typical examples of the current threat: homegrown and Internet based. They are amongst a small number of quite recent terrorism cases that have been sufficiently documented through open sources to enable us meaningfully to survey patterns of training and preparation. I cannot (and do not) claim they are representative (in a scientific sense) of today’s threat to Europe. But, based on my prior analysis of post-millennium jihadi terror plots throughout Europe, I do believe them to be.12

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Background on Jihadism in Europe

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During the 1970s, 80s, and early 90s, European countries functioned mainly as sanctuaries, support bases, and transit areas for Islamist militants involved in local or international jihad.13 Europe’s exposure to jihadi terrorism (in the form of attempted and executed attacks) is a quite recent phenomenon, which can be divided into three periods according to its organizational, ideological, and motivational origins and drivers: . From December 1994 until 1996, Europe became an arena for local jihad, when followers of the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) attacked France for its involvement in the Algerian civil war. A bombing campaign left approximately 10 people dead, and injured more than 200.14 In 1997, the GIA became marginalized because the group became too extreme and started to assassinate and massacre fellow Algerian Muslims who were not adequately pious in the eyes of its followers. The fall of the GIA, and the breaking up of its European support networks (through counter-terrorism and loss of support from other Islamists), left a sort of ‘‘vacuum’’ inside Europe’s militant Islamist communities ready to be exploited by Al Qaeda and likeminded terrorist groups.15 . From 1998 until 2003=2004, Europe became an arena for global jihad, when several terrorist networks associated with and trained by Al Qaeda planned and prepared mass casualty attacks against the interests and citizens of the U.S., Israel, and to a minor extent, France. However, because of the vigilance of European security services and international counterparts, combined with a good portion of luck, none of these attack plans materialized.16 . From 2003=2004 until the present, European nations became targets in their own right for Al Qaeda inspired global jihadis who had been recruited and radicalized in Europe’s jihadi underworld, and who were principally motivated by European participation in the invasion of Iraq. So-called ‘‘home-grown’’ terrorist cells, consisting of young Muslims, executed terror attacks in Madrid and London, and carried out the assassination of a filmmaker on the streets of Amsterdam, Holland. All in all, the latest current of terrorism by globally oriented mujahidin has caused 244 deaths, and more than 2700 injuries. Thus, ‘‘fully-fledged’’ global jihadis did not become ‘‘operational’’ inside Europe until 1998 (coinciding with the launch of Al Qaeda’s global offensive with the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania). Activists pursuing global jihad have remained the main jihadi threat to Europe ever since. What I define as the 1st generation of Europe’s global jihadis constituted the threat between 1998 and 2003=2004, whereas the 2nd generation emerged as a threat around 2003=2004, and constitute today’s jihadi threat to Europe. Why were there shifts in the organization and sociology of, and the motivational drivers for, global jihadism inside the region around 2003=2004? The shifts might be explained as the combined effects of the ‘‘War on Terror’’ in the wake of 9=11, and successful propaganda and recruitment efforts by the global jihadis, spurred by the increasingly sophisticated jihadi Internet. Al Qaeda became weakened as an organization and a network, at least temporarily, but became strengthened as an ideological community. The destruction of the Afghan camps, and the intensified counter-terrorism inside Europe following 9=11, gradually disrupted the most central Al Qaeda linked networks inside Europe, and reduced Al Qaeda abilities to run

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operations inside Europe ‘‘hands-on.’’ However, the process of uprooting the networks originating in Al Qaeda camps took a while (proven by the fact that terrorists that had received training by Al Qaeda were being arrested inside Europe up until 2003=2004). At the same time, while the European security services and their international counterparts hunted down Al Qaeda agents worldwide, a new generation of global terrorists erupted from Europe’s militant Islamist underground. Young Muslims1, most of whom were European citizens, inspired by Al Qaeda and charismatic jihadi preachers within Europe’s growing extremist communities, utilized the invasion of Iraq and European states’ participation as a mobilizing cause, and portrayed it as an aggression against Muslims that legitimized counter-attacks against the U.S.’s European allies. The new generation benefited from using the Internet as a source of inspiration and as a propaganda tool. Moreover, its activists operated to a greater extent than their predecessors beneath the radar of the intelligence services. ‘‘Homegrown’’ terrorist cells managed very effectively to execute lethal attacks inside Europe, something the classical Al Qaeda networks had failed to do. In the following, I will present the origins and main characteristics of the two generations in more detail, and provide empirical examples of their training practices, before I conclude about their similarities and differences, and how they affect today’s terror threat to Europe.

Europe’s 1st Generation of Global Jihadis The 1st generation of Europe’s global jihadis came into existence and operated within the nexus between Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, North African terrorist groups such as the GIA=GSPC, Libyan and Tunisian Islamic Fighting Groups, and a growing presence of supporters and propagandists for these groups in Europe (particularly in London). Most of the operatives belonging to the 1st generation went through paramilitary and terrorist training in Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan before the U.S.-led invasion, and apparently some of them were controlled directly by the Al Qaeda leadership. The 1st generation mainly planned and prepared attacks against U.S. and Israeli targets, reflecting their close connections with Al Qaeda. However, they also targeted French interests, reflecting their North African origins and affiliations (because North African Islamists consider the former colonial power in the Maghreb their arch enemy in Europe). The epicenter of all militant activities in Europe was (and still is) a community of extremists and militants in London, featuring many different but interconnected groups that in turn maintained contacts and cooperation with their like-minded counterparts in other European countries, as well as in the Muslim world. As the boundaries between jihadi groups have always been fluid, diffuse, and everchanging, so are the boundaries between what I define as Europe’s 1st and 2nd generations of global jihadis. Several parallel developments contributed to the triangular affiliations of the 1st generation. First, after France cracked down on supporters of the GIA following the 1995 bombing campaign, those who escaped arrest regrouped and relocated to France’s neighboring countries. Important GIA figures gathered in London where they mixed with militant expatriates from Egypt, Libya, Jordan, etc., and made London the major scene for Islamist militancy in Europe, a process dubbed 1

Mainly immigrants, but also some ethnic European converts.

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‘‘Londonistan’’ by European security officials.17 Many of the Islamist expatriates faced prosecution in their home countries for Islamist extremism, militancy, and opposition activism. Second, after bin Laden returned to Afghanistan from Sudan in 1996, Al Qaeda started to become prominent amongst the many militant factions from the Muslim world that maintained training facilities in Afghanistan and supported the newly established rule of the Taliban.18 Protected by Mullah Omar, Al Qaeda and its closest associate, Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad, started preparing fighters for a global battle that was to be initiated with the East Africa bombings in August 1998.19 Third, by 1997, three militant preachers had set themselves up as the patrons of London’s radical circles: the Al Qaeda associate Palestinian Abu Qatada, the Egyptian Abu Hamza, and the Syrian Omar Bakri Mohammed. Each of them would come to play vital roles in recruiting, socializing, and training the two generations of Europe’s global jihadis. The 1st generation of fighters belonged to the circle of Qatada, whose base was the Four Feathers Centre off Baker Street, London. Qatada, who maintained relations with, and was well respected by, the Al Qaeda leadership, came to be reckoned as Al Qaeda main spiritual leader and ‘‘ambassador’’ in Europe.20 He was also considered as a spiritual guide for several North African militias and al-Zarqawi’s al-Tawhid organization, which recruited jihadis from the Levant.21 Two networks intimate with Qatada attempted to launch terror operations against U.S. and Israeli targets in Europe during the first years of the new millennium, the Abu Doha network and al-Zarqawi’s al-Tawhid network.22 Most of the members of these networks were 1st generation immigrants to Europe (from North Africa and the Levant), who were enlisted by charismatic recruiters in Europe and dispatched to Al Qaeda associated training facilities in Qandahar, Khowst, and Jalalabad, Afghanistan.23 One might say that the 1st generation constituted a hand-picked few, elite soldiers so to speak, who operated very secretively and professionally, and who were poised to participate in prestigious Al Qaeda operations on European soil. However, due to coincidences and increased vigilance by European security services, they failed to land a successful attack inside Europe. It seems that these activists were required to go through substantial periods of religious studies, political indoctrination, and military (paramilitary) training before they were assigned to missions. The processes through which they were recruited, trained, and otherwise prepared, appeared to be well organized and structured ‘‘top-down,’’ resembling training in military organizations within states. In fact, several of the instructors in Afghanistan had military backgrounds from armies in the Muslim world, and there was at least one instructor who had served in the U.S. Army.24 Training and Training Camps A considerable amount is now known about the training of Europe’s 1st generation of global jihadis in Afghanistan. The training they received (by and large) fits NATO definitions of military training concepts, involving general education on military theories and doctrines, individual and collective training, distinguishing between basic and advanced training, and refining and preserving skills through drills.25 The interrogation of the al-Tawhid member Shadi Abdullah, who trained in the Al Qaeda-run training complex al-Farooq in Qandahar from March 2000 until

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March=June 2001, provides an extensive, accurate, and, in my view credible, overview of training procedures at the camps.26 According to Abdullah, al-Farooq training camp was an oval area consisting of buildings of light construction materials (except for the officers’ buildings and the kitchen which were made of stone, sanitary facilities made of tin, and the mosque which was made of straw). Afghans were hired to construct the buildings, and camp administrators bought food, other necessities, and weapons from them as well. Most weapons were Soviet-produced, such as rifles and small arms, but Abdullah also noticed weapons of different origins, such as German-produced submachine guns. No uniforms were used, and recruits came from all over the world (quite a few came from European countries).27 Western recruits were particularly welcome in the camps because of their ability to operate inside Western countries. There were training sites scattered around the central camp for each training component. The camp also had a special area for visits by bin Laden. According to Abdullah, ‘‘Al Qaeda financed everything.’’ When new recruits arrived they were interviewed by a senior Al Qaeda officer about their commitment and ambitions (in Abdullah’s case, Abu Hafs al-Masri). Based on the interview and references, leaders and instructors set up an individualized training program. Abdullah claims he received special treatment because of his ‘‘references’’ (from members of al-Zarqawi’s al-Tawhid group). New recruits had to go through basic training that involved a three-week course in the use of firearms, moving around and orientating in various terrains alone and in formations, camouflage and deception of the enemy, and handling explosives. Recruits trained in small units, and each unit had a designated leader. All recruits were exposed to anti-American and anti-Western propaganda at the camps, by way of films and speeches by instructors and leaders. Abdullah noticed maps showing U.S., French, and UK military presence in the Muslim world. Activists who were members of jihadi organizations could break off training at any time, but individuals with no jihadi background could suffer punishments (such as beatings and torture) if they wanted to back out (according to Abdullah–I have seen no other narratives supporting this claim). The recruits deemed capable by their instructors moved on to one-week specialized courses in separate camps. These courses included tactical training in mountainous and urban areas, and desert warfare, training in the use of anti-aircraft missiles and rocket grenade launchers, tactical training in fighting against armored vehicles (tanks), special training in terrorist attacks and assassinations, and special courses in the manufacturing and use of poisons as weapons (a course given by Abu Khabbab). Another operative who trained in the Derunta training camp in Jalalabad in 2000 and 2001 has testified about special courses in the use of sniper rifles and sniper tactics.28 It seems that recruits also practiced constructing a variety of different types of bomb devices. Members of a terrorist cell that planned a bomb attack in Strasbourg in December 2000 claimed that they were instructed on how to make remote control bomb devices out of pressure cookers and radios.29 The 1st generation of Europe’s global jihadi terrorists operated at a time when the Internet was not as widely used as it is today. True enough, Islamist activists (moderate and radical) did start to utilize the Net for propaganda purposes already back in the mid-1990s, but there were disputes among them as to whether Internet activism was compatible with their tenets and doctrines. Some ideologues even condemned the Net as a ‘‘Jewish conspiracy.’’30 The so-called ‘‘Strasbourg plotters,’’ who planned and prepared a bomb attack against revelers at the Christmas

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marketplace in Strasbourg, France, in 2000, and who qualify as a prototype example of a 1st generation terrorist cell, did not use the Internet for communication and preparation. They communicated mainly by telephone and mobile phone, and they smuggled with them handwritten notes on operational advice and bomb-making taken during training sessions in Afghanistan.31 Whether they did so out of pragmatism (because other means of communication did the trick), or out of skepticism (for ideological or security reasons) is unknown to the author, but the terrorist cell is a case in point indicating some ‘‘generational’’ differences concerning use of the Internet. However, there is evidence that activists of the 1st generation also adopted the Internet as a tool as soon as it became sufficiently accepted and available. For example, a cell planning to attack U.S. targets in Europe in mid-2001 had an IT specialist who secured the operatives’ communications on the Internet.32

Europe’s 2nd Generation of Global Jihadis After 9=11 and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, European nations were exposed to terrorism by militants whom I define as Europe’s 2nd generation of global jihadis. Most of these terrorists were young second-generation Muslim immigrants born and bred in Europe.33 The post-9=11 global security climate made it difficult for the new generation of activists to obtain the same levels of military training and religious-political culturing as that of the 1st generation. Investigations of terrorist operations in Europe have revealed that the 2nd generation activists, the ‘‘home-grown’’ terrorists, operated quite autonomously from the organized militant groups by which they were inspired. Some of the recent terrorist cells uncovered in Europe have been described by investigators as being mainly self-recruited, selfradicalized, and self-trained, by the use of the jihadi Internet. These terrorists accessed and utilized propaganda, ideological doctrines, strategic and operational advice downloaded from the Internet. However, while they had obscure and sometimes non-existent ties to organized jihadi groups, they communicated and acted in a way which showed that they surely idolized Al Qaeda and its allies. Restricted by the ‘‘War on Terror,’’ but empowered by the Internet, the new generation of global jihadis has adapted operational tactics, training principles, and training procedures to the post-9=11 operational environment and security situation. However, as we shall see, while the Internet revolution created new windows of opportunity for the terrorists, they still maintain an urge for real-life training. Europe’s 2nd generation of global fighters in Europe grew out of the circle of young Islamist activists surrounding two charismatic militant preachers, who together with Abu Qatada, personify ‘‘Londonistan.’’ Each of them headed their own distinct groups (which are now banned), but they also attracted a broader following throughout London, the UK, and the rest of Europe. The Egyptian Abu Hamza ran his Supporters of Shariah group (SoS) out of the Finsbury Park Mosque in Central London, whereas the Syrian Omar Bakri Mohammed controlled his al-Muhajirun organization from Edmonton in North London. From these localities they preached and disseminated fierce anti-Americanism, anti-Judaism, antiWesternism, and general intolerance. SoS and al-Muhajirun also had an extensive network of supporters and sympathizers in other European countries. In Scandinavia in particular they seem to have had a substantial following, with sympathetic activists who ran propaganda websites and otherwise disseminated the radical message of the groups’ leaders. Since 2005, Scandinavia has also seen the arrival of amateurish terror cells emerging from extremist underground communities.34

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Hamza and his group pursued a direct, blunt style of spreading militant messages, while Bakri’s style was more subtle, based on step-by-step socializing of radicals, and focusing less on violent activism.35 Whereas Abu Qatada attracted mainly grown-up Arabic-speaking first-generation male immigrants in their 30s, Hamza and Bakri’s followers were mainly second-generation immigrant youths.36 SoS was dominated by people of North African origin, whereas Bakri’s organization attracted most of its followers from the Pakistani community. However, as the radical doctrines preached were similar and compatible, apart from Hamza’s group being more militant, there were porous boundaries between the groups, and activists drifted back and forth. In addition, there were sometimes joint meetings and rallies which gathered followers of Hamza, Bakri, and also people from Qatada’s circle of ‘‘elite activists.’’ Hamza and Bakri preached overtly, vigorously, and extensively, and they traveled throughout Britain together with their entourages in order to preach and recruit new followers. The broader community surrounding Hamza and Bakri is believed to have fostered several militants who took part in terrorism inside and outside Europe, such as: Omar Sheikh who took part in the abduction and killing of Daniel Pearl, the shoe bombers Richard Reid and Sajjid Badat who planned to bomb trans-Atlantic flights for Al Qaeda, the Pakistanis Asif Mohammed Hanif and Omar Khan Sharif who bombed a night club in Tel Aviv in April 2003, the so-called Ricin cell uncovered in January 2003, and several planned operations involving Britons of Pakistani descent in the UK during 2004 and 2005, including the London bombers, Khan, Tanweer, Lindsay, and Hussain. Investigations of recently uncovered terrorist networks originating in Holland and Scandinavia in 2004, 2005, and 2006 also suggest that followers of Abu Hamza were implicated, or at least provided guidance and inspiration.37 Training and Training Camps Both Supporters of Shariah and al-Muhajirun appear to have made substantial efforts to culture and train the 2nd generation of global jihadis. Abu Hamza, in particular, preached fiercely on the duty and necessity for Muslims to train and prepare themselves for jihad against Islam’s enemies, and to commit martyrdom if necessary. He also disseminated propaganda materials, such as audiotapes and videos, as well as training manuals, in order to radicalize and boost the morale of the activists.38 Supporters of Shariah organized trips for young radicals in Wales (Brecon Beacons) and other parts of the UK that included general survival training and elements of military training, e.g., physical training, martial arts training, parachuting, paintball games, whitewater rafting, scuba diving, surveillance and map reading, and escape and evasion tactics. SoS reportedly also organized weapons training, hiring the services of former soldiers of the UK’s Special Forces.39 In 1997, SoS hired a monastery in Scotland where activists were instructed on how to handle AK-47 assault rifles, and trained with fake rocket launchers. However, Hamza believed that training legally in the UK was inadequate for molding ‘‘real Mujahidin.’’ From 1998 onwards, he also advised and facilitated training in Yemen, and in 1999 he sent emissaries to assess the possibility of establishing a jihad training camp in Bly, Oregon. In 1998 some of his followers, including his stepson, trained in Yemen and were poised to take part in terrorist attacks against the British consulate and five other targets in Aden.

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They were taught rifle-handling, the handling of explosives, and horse-riding. The men from the UK were arrested by Yemeni authorities because they were clumsy and attracted attention. Yemeni militants staged a fatal kidnapping of Western tourists in order to secure the release of the SoS men. Five tourists died as a result. In 1999 two of Hamza’s trusted men, Swedish–Lebanese Oussama Kassir, and Hamza’s prote´ge´ Harun Rashid Aswat, were sent to Oregon to check out a proposition by the American militant James Ujaama to establish an Afghanistan-style training camp in the U.S. The camp would offer training in archery, combat, martial arts, and handling of rifles and handguns. SoS immediately began to advertise a two-week training course in the States on a UK-based website claiming that due to U.S. firearms law, activists could gain ‘‘serious firearms training’’ and training in tactical ambushes, cover and concealment, and night and dim-light shooting exercises.40 Hamza’s training initiatives were not the only organized efforts inside Europe associated with people we might define as the 2nd generation of global jihadis in Europe. In 2003, the French and international press reported about SoS-style training centers and activities in Paris’s Fontainebleau Forrest, in the coastal city of Marseilles, and in the French Alps.41 Recently, American media has written about an American jihadi training recruits in Germany in the use of explosives.42 A picture that allegedly shows mujahidin training in Germany has also circulated on radical websites.43 Films have surfaced on the Internet in connection with an attack by Iraqi–Kurdish jihadis on a polling station in Sweden during the Iraqi elections, claiming to be of car-bombing training in Ska˚ne, Sweden, showing test-explosions in a ‘‘Scandinavian-looking’’ forest.44 According to the first Terrorism Situation and Trend report by Europol, eight people were arrested for training activities inside Europe in 2006. The report claimed that, in general, most training activities took place outside Europe, but it specified the existence of training centers in the South of the UK where trainees were taught explosives handling and the setting up of terrorist cells. The report asserts that most training camps are located in the Middle or Near East, or in South-East Asia, but that training facilities in North Africa (run by the Al Qaeda organization in the Islamic Maghreb) are becoming more important.45 Activists emerging from Europe’s 2nd generation have been implicated in several attempted and implemented attacks in European countries over the last few years. The following provides an overview of the relatively sparse public information concerning the training and preparation for terrorism by these militants. It reinforces the impression that the new generation is bent on pursuing global jihad and suicide terrorism in the name of Al Qaeda, and that they, in a pragmatic fashion, try to evade counter-terrorism measures in order to obtain the necessary training. Some of them have managed to train with experienced militants in Pakistan=Afghanistan nistan and other places, whereas others have trained and prepared inside Europe. Some of the activists appear to have obtained very limited levels of training, whereas others show substantial levels of professionalism. The Madrid Cell The terrorists who executed the Madrid attacks on 11 March 2004 (M-11) appear to have been situated somewhere in between the 1st and 2nd generations in terms of their contacts and influences. The cell grew out of a multi-layered militant Islamist network inside Spain consisting primarily of Islamists from the Levant and North

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Africa, but the terrorists also had some level of international contacts throughout Europe and North African countries.2 Persons linked to the actual perpetrators of the attacks interacted regularly with the ‘‘Londonistan’’ crowd, and evidence found on computers has proved that the bombers were inspired by Abu Qatada, amongst other militant preachers.46 Inside Spain, members of the terrorist cell interacted with an Al Qaeda financing cell (the Abu Dahdah cell) situated in Madrid, and with a network of North African militants that were affiliated with several terrorist groups, but most importantly, the so-called Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM).47 According to the M-11 indictment, GICM was founded in Peshawar in 1993. The group’s primary goal was to overthrow the Moroccan Monarchy and create an Islamist state. The indictment claims that GICM was influenced by, and received financial and logistical support, as well as training, from Al Qaeda. Since the invasion of Iraq, GICM has focused much on supporting the jihadi insurgency (headed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi until his death). Members of the group have reportedly been involved both in international recruitment efforts, and actual fighting inside Iraq.48 Extensive investigations into M-11 and the trial failed to document that the perpetrators of the Madrid attacks trained with and received direct support, or orders from, Al Qaeda. The cell can probably best be characterized as ‘‘home-grown’’ and Al Qaeda inspired, but with indirect links to Al Qaeda and close affiliations to Moroccan terrorist groups. The main ‘‘entrepreneur’’ of the cell and the operation was the charismatic activist Serhane Ben Abdelmajid al-Fakhet, ‘‘The Tunisian,’’ who exploited his contacts amongst Spain’s Islamist networks to form, train, and prepare an operation unit composed of mujahidin recruited mainly within Spain. Funding for the attacks was obtained locally in Spain, mainly through selling narcotics such as hashish and ecstasy, as well as through selling stolen cars. The operation’s timing and target selection, statements by the terrorists, surveillance, and evidence retrieved from witnesses and computers, suggest Spain’s contribution to the invasion of Iraq was the main motivational driver behind the attacks.49 Another factor quoted as a possible additional motivation is the prosecution of multiple militant Islamist activists inside Spain in the aftermath of 9=11.50 M-11 constitutes a particularly interesting case in terms of assessing the value of the Internet for the training and preparation of Europe’s jihadis. The Madrid bombers downloaded large amounts of ideological, strategic and tactical texts, as well as audio-visual material from the Internet. Moreover, they actually pursued strategies and tactics advised in strategic texts and terrorist manuals. For example, they timed the attacks with the Spanish elections, as prescribed by a strategic document issued by the Global Islamic Media Front.51 The terrorists carefully observed security precautions described and recommended in well-known manuals such as the ‘‘Series of Preparation for Struggle,’’ published by the Global Islamic Media Centre, and 2

I define the terror cell that launched the operation narrowly, as the actual perpetrators of the attacks, the people that placed the bombs on board the trains, and the people that directly supported them in so doing. The definition includes the activists who killed themselves and one police officer when they were surrounded by the police in the town of Leganes one month after the attacks (Fakhet, Kounjaa, Ahmidan, Lamari, Akcha brothers, and Anouar), the activists who were convicted of direct support (Zougam, El Gnaoui, and Trashorras), and those who escaped prosecution in Spain (Azizi, Ouhnane, Alfalahto, Berraj and Belhadj, and others).

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‘‘Al-Battar Camp,’’ published by Al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula.52 They also downloaded bomb recipes circulating on the Internet. However, I did not manage to find sources specifying the extent to which the recipes were used when constructing the bombs. The terrorists prepared the bomb-devices (made out of dynamite and electrical detonators), and carried out test explosions of the detonators at a farm they rented in Chinch
on outside Madrid. In Chinch
on, the terrorists also prepared themselves physically for the operation. Witnesses made frequent observations of people engaging in sports activities on the farm’s premises. Inside one of the huts on the farm, investigators confiscated an exercise machine used by the plotters. If the Madrid bombers succeeded in pulling off the operation based only on Internet recipes and improvised, amateurish training at the farm in Chinch
on, this should raise serious concerns. However, although the investigations did not prove that Fakhet and his cadre trained in Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, given his group’s contacts with experienced and trained mujahidin in Dahdah’s network and the North African networks, one cannot rule out the possibility that the M-11 bombers received training by professionals, be it in Spain, Morocco, or other places.53 According to a European counter-terrorism official, an explosive device detected on the tracks of the high-speed railway between Madrid and Seville on 2 April 2004 in an attempted follow-up attack to M-11, was set up in a way that strongly indicated the terrorists had undergone specialist training in bomb making.54 The Operation Crevice Group In March 2004, UK authorities uncovered a terrorist cell consisting of young, second-generation Pakistani immigrants to the UK, the U.S., and Canada, that planned and prepared fertilizer bomb attacks in central London.55 The cell grew out of the broader community of followers of Omar Bakri=al-Muhajirun, and Abu Hamza=SoS.56 The terrorists allegedly forged ties with Kashmiri separatists and Al Qaeda in order to obtain training and guidance. The cell used the Internet extensively during the recruitment and radicalization processes, and also during operational planning, training, and preparation.57 The leader of the cell, Omar Khyam, trained with the Kashmiri separatist group Laskhar-e-Toiba, from January to March 2000. According to himself, he was taught everything he ‘‘needed for guerrilla warfare in Kashmir: AK-47s, pistols, RPGs [rocket-propelled grenades], sniper rifles, climbing and crawling techniques, reconnaissance and light machine guns.’’ During 2001, he travelled to Afghanistan and paid visits to the Taliban.58 Subsequently, while travelling back and forth between the UK and Pakistan, he was further radicalized by the Kashmir issue, the jihadi Internet, 9=11, and eventually the U.S. invasion of Iraq.59 During 2003, he organized a cell and set up a provisional training camp (which in fact was the backyard of a house) in Malakand, Pakistan. During May and June 2003, members of the cell learnt to use weapons and explosives, and staged test explosions of two small fertilizer bombs. Back in the UK, members of the group assembled and stored 600 kgs of fertilizer meant for the attacks. The ringleader, Khyam, told his comrades that he took orders from a high-level Al Qaeda commander, going by the name of Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi.60 Al-Iraqi is a former Iraqi Army officer who became prominent in Al Qaeda in the late 1990s, and acted as a liaison between the organization and the Taliban, and later between Al Qaeda and al-Zarqawi’s al-Tawhid wa’l Jihad group inside Iraq. His

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name came up in the investigations of several terrorist plots by British-Pakistanis in the UK in 2004–2006, and he has been referred to as a possible ‘‘mastermind’’ behind the 7 July bombings. In December 2006, international media reported that he facilitated the training of Europeans in Waziristan, who were to be dispatched to their home countries and establish sleeper cells.61 In a video published by Al Qaeda’s media company, al-Sahab, in August 2005, Abdul Hadi appears while talking to a group of trainees including Britons, a Frenchman (with a North African accent, probably an immigrant raised in France), and an Australian. The video shows training in the manufacturing of bombs and firing of missiles, and also refers to a ‘‘chemical crew.’’62 The cell that executed the attacks on the London subway on 7 July 2005 appears to have emerged from the same milieu as the cell headed by Omar Khyam. Indeed, a transcript of a bugged conversation has been publicized in which Khyam, and the leader of the 7 July cell, Mohammed Siddique Khan, appear, in a friendly tone, to be discussing logistics, finances, and training of cadre.63 The official reports of the London bombings suggest that the London bombers obtained training following a similar pattern as the Operation Crevice group, but offer no details on what kind of training they received.64 The Hofstad Group In November 2004, an Al Qaeda inspired militant Islamist (radicalized mainly by 9=11 and the invasion of Iraq, but also by the Dutch treatment of its Muslim communities), murdered the filmmaker Theo Van Gogh on the streets of Amsterdam, shooting him repeatedly with an automatic gun, stabbing him repeatedly with a kitchen knife, and trying to decapitate him. The militant pinned a letter to the corpse threatening a Dutch-Somali politician, Ayan Hirsi Ali, who had participated in a controversial movie about the abuse of Muslim women. The letter also contained specific references to Al Qaeda global jihad doctrine. It turned out that the murderer was the leader of a terrorist cell, referred to as the Hofstad Group, which planned assassinations of politicians and bomb attacks inside the Netherlands.3 The cell has been described as autonomous and mainly ‘‘home-grown.’’ However, it maintained some level of contacts and cooperation with militants in Europe and North Africa, and it was inspired by the ‘‘Londonistan’’ preachers and their followers.65 A film posted by the Hofstad Group which contained death threats against the Dutch rightwing politician Geert Wilders, also contained images of SoS rallies in London, and the writings of the cell leader Bouyeri and other cell members, contained multiple references to Abu Hamza’s writings and propaganda material.66 The Hofstad Group and the Dutch-based radical community to which it belonged, very actively spread propaganda and threats on the Internet. On the Web, members and associates of the group tried to recruit new followers, disseminate radical ideology, and advise on how to obtain military and terrorist skills. One associate of the group, Bilal L. aka Aboe Qataadah, referred to a document retrieved from the Afghanistan jihad training camps and posted on the Web by jihadi media outlets entitled ‘‘How can I train myself for Jihad?,’’ and advised 3

‘‘Hofstad’’ referes to The Hague, which was the center of tthe activities of the group.

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Dutch Muslims to obtain weapons training legally in shooting clubs. He also posted a list of flying schools and shooting clubs for jihadis to seek out. One of his postings read: Try to keep these kind of activities a secret, so that you may depart from a pure niyya (intention). At the shooting range, keep your opinions and convictions to yourself, and don’t go in conclave with the others that are present. Don’t talk about Islam and perform your salaat in secret. You are going to the shooting range as a preparation for the Jihad and not to invite people to Islam . . . Don’t do this if you cannot control your aggression, or if you have problems in your personal life. Respect the Dutch legislation and avoid buying illegal firearms. There are ample opportunities to train legally, so don’t ruin your reputation by turning the illegal way. Learn most what you can learn in your own society and learn the rest when you actually arrive in a country of the Jihad.67 Several members of the Hofstad Group kept weapons and appeared to know how to use them. Members of the group were also inspired by self-appointed radical preachers inside the Netherlands. One was a Syrian who preached in asylum centres, in a phone centre, and in private homes, and who escaped after the Van Gogh murder.68 Another was a Dutch convert and radical ‘‘Internet Imam’’ in his 20s named Jilles van de Ven aka Abdul-Jabbar. Internet chats by members of the group suggest that Abdul Jabbar told them attacks against Dutch authorities were legitimate. He also gave advice on training, urging Dutch jihadis to be more patient and secretive about their training activities. He advised preparing at home first, before going to jihad zones to train and fight with the ‘‘real mujahidin’’: Talk to other mujaheddin and listen to their stories, or watch the numerous videotapes about Bosnia and Chechenia. Read as much as possible about the area you are heading for, and prepare yourself here by fasting a lot, eating very modestly, by sleeping without your duvet on the hard cold floor, training outside come rain or shine and most of all, by preparing mentally by extra prayer, doing da’wah, fasting, reading the quran, etc. It is ludicrous that you never see people with the biggest mouths collect money for good causes, do the da’wah, organise lectures or be famous for their hikma [wisdom] and taqwa [piety]. Try to live for Islam first, before talking about dying for Islam. I am not saying that you should study first for ten years, for that is a bid’ah many lost persons proclaim to keep youngsters away from the Jihad. But do realise what you are doing. Look before you leap.69 It seems that, for several of the members of the Hofstad Group, such a patient approach was not an option. A very young associate of the cell tried to go to Chechnya to wage jihad together with a friend in January 2003, but was stopped at the Ukraine border by customs and had to return to the Netherlands. Also in 2003, two core members of the cell, Jason Walters and Ismail Aknikh, and one accomplice, Zakaria Taybi, traveled to Pakistan to obtain training. Walters later indicated that he had trained in a camp run by the Jaish-e-Mohammad, a Kashmiri separatist group, headed by the cleric Maulana Masood Azhar. He said he returned

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to the Netherlands only because he had problems with the visa. He boasted about having learnt to use weapons and build bombs at the camp, adding that he could take apart a Kalashnikov blindfolded and fire a pistol while doing a somersault. In a tapped phone conversation he said he had been sent back to the Netherlands by the ‘‘emir’’ ‘‘to play a game.’’70

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‘‘The New Al Qaeda’’ Several terrorist networks uncovered in Europe during 2005 and 2006 have been discussed as examples that the Internet has become a ‘‘virtual training camp’’ for the new generation of jihadis. However, looking more closely at the cases, one will find that (with one possible exception), in terms of operational training and preparation, the activists interacted face-to-face with organized mujahidin, and traveled in order to obtain real-life training and develop necessary skills. One network uncovered in the fall of 2005 involved contacts, coordination, and corporation between jihadis situated in Denmark, in the UK, the U.S., Canada, and Bangladesh. The network stood out because more than any other network uncovered in the past, the Internet appears to have been the most important platform of interaction between network members.71 A key node of the network was an IT savvy militant operating out of ‘‘Londonistan,’’ Younis Tsouli, calling himself Irabi007 [Terrorist007] on the Web. Another important figure was the Swedish– Bosnian Mirsad Bektasevic, going by the alias Maximus on the Internet. Bektasevic and a Danish–Turk, Abdulkader Cesur, had gathered substantial amounts of explosives and weapons in the Bosnian capital Sarajevo by the time they were captured.72 The indictment of Maximus and Cesur suggests that the purpose of going to Bosnia was to train and prepare for a terrorist attack in an unspecified European country. The two terrorists recorded a so-called ‘‘martyrdom video’’ in which they threatened attacks. The tape also showed the two of them making homemade bomb devices, which included one inserted inside a lemon, and another inserted into a tennis ball.73 Reportedly, at least one other member of the network planned and prepared a journey to Pakistan in order to obtain terrorist training.74 So, it seems that even these virtual wizards appear to have needed some ‘‘real-life’’ training and preparation before they went ‘‘operational.’’ The August 2006 plot to blow up airliners en route from the UK to the U.S. involved young British–Pakistanis from London’s extremist communities. According to international press reports, the terrorist suspects made extensive use of the Internet during operational planning and preparation (e.g., for communications and fundraising).75 However, although the Net was an important platform for the activists, at the same time, several of them are alleged to have trained with Kashmiri militants, and possibly Al Qaeda associates in Pakistan.76 The terrorist plot that appears to be closest to the Internet functioning as a ‘‘virtual training camp’’ in the European context is the failed train bombing in Germany during the Israeli war against Hizbullah and Lebanon in July 2006.Two Lebanese students placed suitcase bombs onboard regional trains. Fortunately, the bombs failed to go off. Reportedly, the terrorists constructed the bomb devices (made out of gas canisters) following instructions downloaded from the Internet. One of the bombers claimed that the attack was a spontaneous act motivated by the Mohammed cartoons published by a Danish newspaper and the killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. According to German press reports, investigators now believe

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that the operation was ordered by a ‘‘man with links to Al Qaeda’’ as an initiation test before joining the ranks of the mujahidin in Iraq.77 The press coverage of the investigations suggests that the terrorists had several accomplices in Lebanon and Germany helping them with the logistics, and downloading bomb recipes on the Internet.78 The brother of one of them was a leading figure of the Fatah al-Islam group which fought fiercely against the Lebanese forces out of the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp in 2007. It is alleged that Fatah al-Islam is inspired and supported by Al Qaeda, and that it has recruited some of its fighters from the Iraqi theater of war.79 Furthermore the bombers mixed with a community of militant Islamist activists inside Germany, and were in touch with a member of the al-Tawhid group (a group formerly headed by al-Zarqawi).80 Although more and more evidence points to some level of affiliation with, and support by, organized jihadis, at the time of writing, I managed to find no sources indicating that the bombers had spent time in jihadi training camps. Lack of training might thus be one of the reasons why the operation failed (e.g., the terrorists utilized the wrong gas when assembling the bomb devices).81

Conclusion My empirical survey indicates that Europe’s 2nd generation of global jihadis is more eager to obtain real-life military-style training in jihadi combat zones than is usually assumed. They want to learn basic military skills, how to assemble and set off bombs, and terrorism tactics such as reconnaissance, counter-intelligence, and so forth. The 2nd generation fighters are younger, more impatient, and more reckless than their ‘‘professional’’ predecessors. Yet, they appear to be well-informed of the virtues and advantages of training. Inspired by the 1st generation fighters, they are prepared to expose themselves to security risks by going overseas to be with experienced mujahidin. For the 1st generation of Europe’s global jihadis, training seems to have been obligatory. Recruits were dispatched to Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan for fullspectrum training in guerilla warfare and terrorism. A secret network of recruiters oversaw and facilitated the channeling of new recruits to the camps. Training was part socialization and culturing in the religious political doctrines of Al Qaeda and its associates, and part practical, technical, and military. The training process was hierarchical, organized, and structured. It was step-by-step, moving from the basic to the advanced and from joint to individualized forms of training. Recruits had to prove themselves before gaining positions within the groups present in the camps, and before they could be assigned to military or terror missions. The training process thus functioned as a socialization process, and a test of the recruits’ commitment to the cause. The whole process of recruitment, radicalization, socialization, and training was ‘‘top-down’’ and overseen by people at the top of the hierarchy, such as the Al Qaeda leadership. For the 1st generation, training was more than just learning to assemble bombs and fire rockets, it was an important part of the molding of complete and committed Holy Warriors, brutalized and ready to sacrifice at all costs. Activists of the 1st generation were secretive about their training, and in the time before 9=11, accessing the camps was quite easy. Europe’s 2nd generation of global fighters grew out of a community of extremists in London that engaged in overt activism headed by preachers who staged public rallies and expressed their anti-Western sentiments to the press. These extremists

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were not sufficiently scrutinized by security services because they were seen as ‘‘loudmouths’’ who probably would not translate rhetoric into violence. Terrorist conspiracies uncovered over the last couple of years suggest that this was a fatal mistake. Well-known terrorists who launched attacks in Europe did indeed emerge from the 2nd generation community of Islamist militants centered in London. The preachers influencing these activists talked at length about the duty for Muslims to prepare and train themselves for jihad. They also facilitated improvised training through legal means inside Europe, and advised activists to go abroad for advanced training. Apparently, many followed their advice by going to Yemen, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Caucasus to train with experienced fighters. Leaders and entrepreneurs of recent terror cells in particular appear to have gone through organized training in paramilitary camps. One of the main differences between the training of the 1st and 2nd generations is that the ‘‘direction’’ of training processes has shifted. With the 2nd generation, initiatives come from below rather than above. Recruits establish terror cells, initiate training, and reach out to militant organizations to supplement their training. In terms of where activists go to obtain training, there seems to be a geographical shift from Afghanistan to Pakistan’s tribal areas in Waziristan and the North Western Frontier Province. The new generation is youthful, and its activists grew up in a time during which the Internet became an everyday instrument for public information, work, social interaction, and entertainment. Jihadis were fast to adopt the Internet as a propaganda tool and arena for disseminating ideology, strategic literature, and tactical advice. The survey of so-called home-grown cells in Europe suggests that the Internet indeed functioned as a practical tool for terrorists, both for recruitment and radicalization, and tactical-operational purposes. However, it also suggests that the role of the Internet as a ‘‘training camp’’ might be overstated. It looks like, until now, the jihadi Internet is more important as a meeting place, and an arena for socialization and radicalization, than as a place for interactive training. The terrorist cell that appeared to be most independent and ‘‘virtual’’ was also the one that came across as most amateurish, using the wrong type of gas when assembling the bomb devices. The urge for real-life training and the limitation of the Internet as a tool for training constitute a dilemma and a weak spot for Europe’s 2nd generation of global jihadis. From a counter-terrorism perspective, this dilemma might help explain why only a few, albeit very effective, operations inside Europe were successful. The activists who reached out to well-known militant networks inside Europe, and traveled overseas to obtain training, exposed themselves to security risks, and many were captured. The cells that ‘‘came out of nowhere,’’ and used the Internet as their main platform for training, failed due to their low level of professionalism. Looking into the future, the technological developments of the Internet and its potential for more advanced forms of interactive training than are available today, call for concern. If the 2nd generation of jihadis, or ‘‘The New Al Qaeda,’’ overcomes the problem of ‘‘self-training’’ through the use of the Internet, and fulfills training ‘‘on the spot’’ inside Europe, then it will become harder to detect and more likely to succeed.

Notes 1. In this article Europe refers to Western Europe, not including Turkey and former Soviet states.

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2. In this article, the expression jihadi terrorists refers to militant activists of the Sunni strand of Islamism (so-called salafi-jihadis), who see terrorism as a legitimate and necessary means of struggle in a campaign aiming to: 1. Re-Islamize the Muslim world by toppling local regimes they accuse of having become too secular and too dependent on the West, and, 2. Rid Muslim lands of Western (and especially U.S. and Israeli) influences (social, political, economic, and especially military). In research on militant Islamism, the term jihadi is most often used about Islamist militants pursuing international or global aims and strategies (such as Al Qaeda) and not about militants predominantly involved in local, nationalist separatist conflicts (such as the Palestinian HAMAS). For a thorough and critical review of the terminology used in studies of Islamism and jihadism, consult Thomas Hegghammer, Islamist Violence in Saudi Arabia, 1979–2006: The Power and Perils of Pan-Islamic Nationalism (Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris, 2007) – doctoral thesis. 3. In this article I utilize a narrow definition of Al Qaeda. The term is used to refer to the core group dominated by ethnic Arabs who became members of bin Laden’s organization by swearing an oath to him, and people who belonged to his immediate circle of activists for shorter or longer periods of time. My use of the word corresponds to Jason Burke’s expression ‘‘Al Qaeda hardcore’’; consult Jason Burke, Al Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror (London: I. B. Tauris, 2003), 7 ff. 4. Consult, e.g., Sebastian Rotella, ‘‘A World Wide Web of Terrorist Plotting,’’ Los Angeles Times, 16 April 2007. For a well-informed outline of the structure of online jihadism, consult Brynjar Lia, ‘‘Al Qaeda Online: Understanding Jihadist Internet Infrastructure,’’ Jane’s Intelligence Review 18, no. 1 (2006). 5. In addition to analyzing concrete terror cells I have also consulted updated secondary literature on the broader activities of Islamist militants in European urban centers, and in London in particular, e.g., Sean O’Neill and Daniel McGrory, The Suicide Factory, Abu Hamza and the Finsbury Park Mosque (London: Harper Perennial, 2006). 6. When I talk about Europe’s 1st and 2nd generations of global jihadis, I refer to those activists operating inside Europe who were clearly associated with Al Qaeda and the global jihad ideology. Sunni Islamist militants (mujahidin or jihadis) have utilized Europe as a sanctuary and support base, as well as an attack arena, before Al Qaeda extended its campaign to European territory. However, the main drivers of Sunni Islamist militancy inside Europe during the 1980s and most of the 90s were local conflicts between Islamists and regimes in the Muslim world (local jihad – e.g., Egypt and Algeria) and international conflicts involving Muslims (International or ‘‘classic’’ jihad – e.g., Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya). Militants pursuing global aims and strategies did not start to prepare terror inside Europe before the late 1990s. What I define as the 1st generation of global jihadis dominated the picture until a couple of years after the invasion of Afghanistan, whereas the 2nd generation constitutes today’s threat to Europe. 7. Consult, e.g., Peter L. Bergen, The Osama Bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of Al Qaeda Leader (New York: Free Press, 2006), 261–266. 8. Anes Alic, ‘‘A Younger, Savvier Global Terror Cell,’’ ISN Security Watch, 6 July 2006. 9. Capabilities can be subdivided into three main categories, the first being technical skills and conditions (e.g., technical expertise on terror tactics, how to conduct secret operations, how to conduct reconnaissance, how to construct bombs, and so forth), the second being the physical skills and conditions (physical strength and endurance), and the third being the psychological skills and conditions (lowering thresholds against inflicting harm on people, e.g., by dehumanizing the enemy, willingness to take risks and sacrifice, and so forth). 10. NATO defines military training as: ‘‘the permanent process of preserving and improving the skills (capabilities) of military individuals, staffs and forces to sound military operations. It encompasses education (as disseminating knowledge through formal or informal study), individual and collective training as well as exercises.’’ The definition distinguishes between basic training which is ‘‘Training to achieve and maintain a fundamental level of knowledge and skills needed to fulfill a limited spectrum of assigned tasks=missions,’’ and advanced training which is ‘‘Training to achieve and maintain a higher level of knowledge needed to the same end;’’ consult NATO, ‘‘Nato Training Policy – Mc 458=1’’ and ‘‘Nato Training Doctrine Bi-Sc 75-2.’’

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11. For good analyses of the broader recruitment processes consult Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), Michael Taarnby, ‘‘Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe’’ (Aarhus: Danish Ministry of Justice, 2005), Olivier Roy, Globalised Islam, The Search for a New Ummah (London: Hurst, 2004). By analogy, Quintan Wiktorowicz’s study of recruitment for the extreme, but mainly non-violent, Sunni-Islamist activist organization al-Muhajiroun gives valuable insights into the techniques used by recruiters to facilitate ‘‘cognitive openings’’ amongst potential recruits; consult Quintan Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005). 12. The relatively limited number of cases of clear-cut jihadi terrorism in Europe, and the varying levels of reliable open source information which is available about thwarted terrorist plots, make prospects for making scientific generalizations about them poor at this stage. My previous publications on the subject include Petter Nesser, ‘‘Jihad in Europe,’’ (Kjeller: FFI, 2004), Petter Nesser, ‘‘The Slaying of the Dutch Filmmaker: Religiously Motivated Violence or Islamist Terrorism in the Name of Global Jihad?,’’ (Kjeller: FFI, 2005), Petter Nesser, ‘‘Jihadism in Western Europe after the Invasion of Iraq: Tracing Motivational Influences from the Iraq War on Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe,’’ Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 4 (2006), and Petter Nesser, ‘‘Profiles of Jihadist Terrorists in Europe,’’ in A Future for the Young, Options for Helping Middle Eastern Youth Escape the Trap of Radicalization, ed. Cheryl Bernard (Washington D.C.: RAND, 2006). 13. By local jihad I refer to violent Islamist activism aiming to topple, reform, and re-Islamize Muslim states the Islamists accuse of being too secular and too dependent on the West, in addition to persecuting and to failing to fulfill the basic needs of their populations. Typical examples of local jihads are the Islamist=socio-revolutionary insurgencies and terrorism campaigns by Islamists in Algeria and Egypt. By International jihad I refer to violent Islamist activism in support of Muslims who came under attack by non-Muslims. The most important scenes of international jihad are: Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir, and other places where Muslims came under attack by non-Muslims, such as the Soviets=Russians, the Serbs, and the Indians, respectively. 14. On Christmas Eve 1994 GIA activists hijacked an Air France flight carrying 180 passengers and planned to crash it into the Eiffel tower. The operation was intercepted by French Special Forces after the aircraft was directed to Marseilles airport to refuel. Three hostages and one policeman were killed as a result of the operation. During 1995, members and supporters of the GIA executed a series of bombings inside France (against the Metro, outdoor markets, a Jewish school, a high-speed train, and the Arc de Triomphe). Approximately 10 people ˚ shild Kjøk, died and 200 were injured during GIA’s campaign. Consult Brynjar Lia and A ‘‘Islamist Insurgencies, Diasporic Support Networks, and Their Host States: The Case of the Algerian GIA in Europe 1993–2000’’ (Kjeller: FFI, 2001). 15. In 1998, another group formed on the remnants of GIA, The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which eventually became the leading force within Algerian jihadism. GSPC gradually forged closer ties with Al Qaeda and recently joined the network, adopting the name ‘‘the Al Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb’’ [Tanzim Al Qaeda bi Bilad al-Maghrib al-Islami]. It has been widely assumed that the GSPC ‘‘replaced,’’ or ‘‘took over’’ GIA’s infrastructure in Europe; consult, e.g., Lorenzo Vidino and Steven Emerson, Al Qaeda in Europe: the New Battleground of International Jihad (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2005). I made a similar interpretation in Nesser, ‘‘Jihad in Europe’’ (see note 12 above). A well-informed European government official I talked to in October 2007 said this was not exactly the case. According to the source, the GSPC focused nearly all of its capacities on the internal battle in Algeria, and maintained little or no organizational control over networks in Europe. Rather, the Algerian networks in Europe were mainly run by former GIA activists and Al Qaeda associates (who had denounced GIA under Antar Zuwabri) and ran their own networks out of Afghanistan [my interpretation of the source’s statements]. 16. For an overview of this period, consult Nesser, ‘‘Jihad in Europe’’ (see note 12 above). 17. London was referred to, sarcastically, by French counter-terrorism officials as ‘‘Londonistan,’’ because the British capital functioned as a springboard for jihadis who wanted to go to Afghanistan to train. Consult, e.g., O’Neill and McGrory, The Suicide Factory; Omar Nasiri, Inside the Jihad: My Life with Al Qaeda: A Spy’s Story (New York: Basic Books, 2006);

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Mohamed Sifaoui, Inside Al Qaeda, How I Infiltrated the World’s Deadliest Terrorist Organization (London: Granta Books, 2003). 18. Bin Laden participated in the Jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980s. After the Soviets pulled out, he returned to his native Saudi Arabia and offered the House of Saud military expertise and fighters to confront an emerging threat from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. The Saudi royal family rejected the offer and rather relied on U.S. military support. Angry about the rejection, the Saudi alliance with the U.S., and especially the placing of American troops in the Kingdom, bin Laden fell out with the Saudi Kings, lost his Saudi citizenship, and went into exile in Sudan. He stayed there until 1996, doing business, supporting local and international jihad, and consolidating the Al Qaeda organization, before he returned to Afghanistan when the Taliban gained power. Consult, e.g., Peter L. Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden (New York: Free Press, 2001). 19. Consult, e.g., Bergen, Holy War, Inc. (see note 18 above). 20. Mark Honigsbaum and Alan Travis, ‘‘Al Qaeda’s ‘Spiritual Ambassador’ Faces Return to Jordan,’’ Guardian, 12 August 2005. 21. Consult, e.g., Verdict in the criminal case against Shadi Mohammed Mustafa Abdalla (2003), and Indictment of the Jordanian Citizen of Palestinian Origin Mohamed Ghassan Ali Saud Abu Dhess et al. (in German) (2003). 22. Consult, e.g., Verdict in the Criminal Case against Mr Djilali Benali (‘‘Aeurobui Beandali’’) et al. (in German) (2003); and The High Court of Paris against Daoudi, Beghal, Bounour et al., verdict of 15 Mars 2005 (in French - with Author) (2005). 23. Al-Zarqawi’s al-Tawhid group ran its own training camp in Herat near the Iranian border where it trained recruits from the Levant. For a good description of the establishment of the camp, consult Saif al-’ Adel, ‘‘The Jihad Biography of the Leader of Slaugther Abu Mus’ab Al-Zarqawi (in Arabic)’’ (Global Islamic Media Front, October 2005 [downloaded October 2005]). 24. Consult the trail of the former Egyptian Army officer Ali Mohamed, who was recruited to the U.S. Special Forces and later became an instructor and agent for Al Qaeda, e.g., in Bergen, Holy War, Inc. (see note 18 above). U.S. military training manuals were used extensively in the camps. 25. See endnote no. 10. 26. Translated Excerpts of Interrogations of Shadi Abdullah, May through October 2002, translated by Steven Arons, courtesy Peter Bergen. The source has been corroborated with the verdict of the so-called Strasbourg plotters, and the verdicts against members of the so-called Beghal Network, and the biography of Omar Nasiri, the spy who infiltrated camps in Afghanistan shortly before Al Qaeda came to dominate the camps. Investigators have voiced concerns that Abdullah might be lying about some aspects of his stay in Afghanistan. However, the concerns seem to be mainly that he has overplayed his own role in relation to Al Qaeda leaders, not about the overall description of the training camps and procedures. Consult also Verdict in the Criminal Case against Mr Djilali Benali (‘‘Aeurobui Beandali’’) et al. (in German) (see note 23 above) and Nasiri, Inside the Jihad (see note 17 above). 27. Translated Excerpts of Interrogations of Shadi Abdullah. Abdullah specifies recruits from the UK, France, Belgium, Spain, and Sweden. 28. Anonymous author, ‘‘Al-Qa’ida Trained Snipers, Trabelsi Says,’’ De Standaard, 19 October 2002. 29. Verdict in the Criminal Case against Mr Djilali Benali (‘‘Aeurobui Beandali’’) et al. (in German) (see note 23 above). 30. Consult Lia, ‘‘Al Qaeda Online: Understanding Jihadist Internet Infrastructure’’ (see note 4 above). 31. Verdict in the Criminal Case against Mr Djilali Benali (‘‘Aeurobui Beandali’’) et al. (in German) (see note 23 above). 32. The High Court of Paris against Daoudi, Beghal, Bounour et al., verdict of 15 Mars 2005 (in French – with Author). 33. It has also been observed that an increasing number of European converts have been implicated, and women or girls took on a more active role in terrorism-related activities, such as issuing of propaganda and threats and hiding weaponry. 34. Scandinavia, and especially Sweden and Denmark, appears to have been a center for propagandists and fundraisers for various jihadi groups and factions with a presence in

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Europe (Manzour, Hizb al-Tahrir, al-Muhajiroun, Kavkaz, Tawhid, Mullah Krekar, etc.) consult, e.g., Lorenzo Vidino, ‘‘The Danger of Homegrown Terrorism to Scandinavia,’’ Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor 4, no. 20 (2006). 35. For excellent overviews and analyses of the two organizations and the relations between them, consult O’Neill and McGrory, The Suicide Factory (see note 5 above) and Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising (see note 11 above). 36. Whereas Qatada preached and wrote in Arabic, Hamza and Bakri mainly communicated with their followers (many of whom were non-Arabic speakers) in English. 37. Consult, e.g., ‘‘Ex-Spy Chief Links Suspects in Denmark to U.K. Radical,’’ International Herald Tribune Europe, 27 August 2006, on the so-called ‘‘Glostrup Cell’’ in Denmark, and Albert Benschop, ‘‘Chronicle of a Political Murder Foretold: Jihad in the Netherlands’’ (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 2005), on the so-called ‘‘Hofstad Group’’ in the Netherlands. 38. In the car of an Islamic activist in Oregon, police found an Abu Hamza video entitled ‘‘The Importance of Training,’’ consult O’Neill and McGrory, The Suicide Factory (see note 5 above), 189. 39. In 1998 an SoS training team were stopped by the police after a firearms training session, but the weapons allegedly had been transported by the former Special Forces soldiers, consult O’Neill and McGrory, The Suicide Factory (see note 5 above), 84, and ‘‘Hamza Set up Terror Camps with British Ex-Soldiers,’’ Guardian, 12 February 2006. 40. O’Neill and McGrory, The Suicide Factory (see note 5 above). 41. ‘‘Meet the French Terror Connection,’’ WorldNetDaily, 2 November 2003. 42. Kevin Sullivan and Mary Jordan, ‘‘English Woods a Suspected Cover for Terror,’’ Washington Post, 13 September 2006. 43. A picture of camouflaged men carrying weapons at the bottom of a steep hill, entitled ‘‘Mujahidin Training in Germany,’’ downloaded from the Internet, courtesy Brynjar Lia. 44. Movie downloaded from jihadi Internet site, courtesy Truls Hallberg Tønnessen. 45. Europol, ‘‘EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2007’’ (2007). 46. For example, the al-Mallah brothers, portrayed as recruiters and facilitators within Spain’s militant networks and as inciters of the M-11 attacks, were in regular contact with Abu Qatada and his followers in London. According to the investigative journalist Lawrence Wright, core members of the cell tried to contact Qatada by telephone while they were surrounded by the police in Leganes in order to obtain a religious justification for committing collective suicide, consult Lawrence Wright, ‘‘The Terror Web,’’ The New Yorker, 2 August 2004. 47. Consult, e.g., Javier Jordan and Robert Wesley, ‘‘The Madrid Attacks: Result of Investigation Two Years After,’’ Terrorism Monitor 4, no. 5 (2006). The M-11 indictment lists several North African groups as being ‘‘connected to the prosecuted,’’ e.g., al-Takfir wa’l Hijra, al-Harakat al-Salafiyya al-Jihadiyya, Jama’at al-Sirat al-Mustaqim, but it focuses mainly on the links to the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, consult Proceedings 20=2004, Indictment of April 10 2006, Court of First Instance Number 6 of the Audencia National (translation of the Indictment of the Madrid Bombers with author), (2006). 48. Proceedings 20=2004, Indictment of April 10 2006, Court of First Instance Number 6 of the Audencia National (translation of the Indictment of the Madrid Bombers with author). 49. Consult Nesser, ‘‘Jihadism in Western Europe after the Invasion of Iraq: Tracing Motivational Influences from the Iraq War on Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe,’’ and Proceedings 20=2004, Indictment of April 10 2006, Court of First Instance Number 6 of the Audencia National (translation of the Indictment of the Madrid Bombers with author). 50. Consult, e.g., Javier Jordan and Nicola Horsburgh, ‘‘Mapping Jihadist Terrorism in Spain,’’ Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28, no. 3 (2005). 51. Consult Brynjar Lia and Thomas Hegghammer, ‘‘Jihadi Strategic Studies: The Alleged Al Qaeda Policy Study Preceding the Madrid Bombings,’’ Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 27, no. 5 (2004). 52. Proceedings 20=2004, Indictment of April 10 2006, Court of First Instance Number 6 of the Audencia National (translation of the Indictment of the Madrid Bombers with author). 53. Several persons referred to in the indictment as ‘‘connected to the prosecuted’’ are believed to have been to training camps in Afghanistan and other places, e.g., Amer Azizi, Salaheddin Benyaich, Lachen Ikassrien, Fouad Charouali.

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54. Interview with European counter-terrorism official, September 2004, name withheld on request. 55. The terrorists reportedly planned and prepared attacks against a nightclub, a shopping center, the public underground, gas pipes, and UK synagogues. Allegedly, they also scouted the possibility of utilizing a crude nuke device; consult Duncan Gardham, ‘‘The Crawley Targets,’’ Daily Telegraph, 30 April 2007. 56. Members of the cell have been characterized as ‘‘former members’’ of al-Muhajiroun, who were amongst a 40-member group dubbed the ‘‘Crawley Group,’’ that disassociated itself from al-Muhajiroun on the grounds it was not ‘‘radical enough,’’ consult Rosie Cowan, Richard Norton-Taylor, and Audrey Gillian, ‘‘Police Search Emails for Trail to Pakistan Canadian Accused of Aiding UK Suspects,’’ Guardian, 1 April 2004. 57. Consult Regina Vs Omar Khyam Et Al – Opening Note, (2006), Crown’s opening statement, indictment of Crevice group published in ‘‘Momin Khawaja constitutes the Canadian end of the conspiracy,’’ Ottawa Citizen, 23 March 2006. Members of the network communicated extensively via Internet cafe´s and personal computers. They exchanged ideological and tactical information, and one of them maintained a radical blog, etc. 58. ‘‘Profile: Omar Khyam,’’ BBC News, 30 April 2007. 59. I did not manage to find specific information on what kind of propaganda material Khyam accessed on the Web, but a European security official told me he was a very active user of the jihadi web and might be characterized as a ‘‘reader’’ with an intellectual, analytical approach to jihadism. Interview with European counter-terrorism official, April 2006, name withheld on request. 60. ‘‘UK Seven ‘Were Ready to Start Bombing,’’’ Guardian, 21 March 2006. 61. Sami Yousafzai, Ron Moreau, and Mark Hosenball, ‘‘The Regathering Storm (Original Title: Al Qaeda British Recruits),’’ Newsweek, 25 December 2006. 62. Harb Al-Mustada’fin=Qahr Al-Salib [War of the Oppressed=the Subjugation of the Cross] – Downloaded from Shibkat Sawt Al-Fajr (al-Sahab Media Production, 2005). 63. ‘‘Revealed: Bomber Transcript,’’ BBC News, 1 May 2007. 64. UK Government, ‘‘Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005’’ (London: UK Government, 11 May 2006). In a video tape published in July 2006, produced by Al Qaeda’s media production company al-Sahab, and featuring the testament of one of the bombers, Shehzad Tanweer, the organization took credit for the attacks, and boasted that they had supported and trained core operatives of the cell. However, the tape does not show the London bombers together with known Al Qaeda members, and although one cannot rule out that Al Qaeda was involved, it might very well have been a propaganda stunt by the organization trying to convince the world that it maintains an operational capacity; consult ‘‘Wasiya Fursan Ghaswat London [Testaments of the Knights of the London Attacks],’’ (al-Sahab Media Production, June 2006). 65. For overviews and analyses of the Hofstad Group, consult Nesser, ‘‘The Slaying of the Dutch Filmmaker: Religiously Motivated Violence or Islamist Terrorism in the Name of Global Jihad?’’ (see note 12 above) and Benschop, ‘‘Chronicle of a Political Murder Foretold’’ (see note 66 below). 66. The film is entitled: Een Cadeautje Voor Geert Wilders [a Christmas Present for Geert Wilders] (Leeuwen Van Tawheed, 2004) and can be downloaded from Benschop, ‘‘Chronicle of a Political Murder Foretold’’ on http://www.sociosite.org/jihad_nl_en.php. 67. With reference to the manual ‘‘How Can I train myself for Jihad?’’ which was posted on the radical website azzam.com in 2001, the Dutch-Moroccan Internet jihadi and Hofstad Group associate Bilal L. aka Aboe Qataadah advised Muslims in Holland to obtain weapons training in shooting clubs in Holland. Bilal L. belonged to the circle of activists surrounding Mohammed Bouyeri, the assassin of Theo Van Gogh, and the leader of the so-called Hofstad group that planned terrorism in Holland, consult Benschop, ‘‘Chronicle of a Political Murder Foretold’’ (see note 66 above). 68. I have not managed to find sources illuminating exactly what he told his followers about training and preparation for jihadism. 69. Benschop, ‘‘Chronicle of a Political Murder Foretold’’ (see note 66 above). 70. Ibid. 71. Consult, e.g., Alic, ‘‘A Younger, Savvier Global Terror Cell’’ (see note 8 above) and Colin Freeze, ‘‘First ‘Homegrown’ Terrorists Convicted, Swede Gets 15 Years; Related Hearings to Start Monday in Canada, UK,’’ Globe and Mail, 11 January 2007.

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72. Bektasevic and Cesur were convicted of plotting suicide terrorist attacks by a Bosnian court in January 2007, consult Colin, ‘‘First ‘Homegrown’ Terrorists Convicted’’ (see note 71 above). 73. Indictment against Mirsad Bektasevic, Abdulkadir Cesur et al., (2006). 74. Rotella, ‘‘A World Wide Web of Terrorist Plotting’’ (see note 4 above). 75. Consult, e.g., ‘‘London Airplane Bomb Plotters Used Ebay to Raise Funds, Built Detonators inside AA Batteries,’’ ABC News, 12 October 2006. 76. Consult, e.g., Don Van Natta Jr., Elaine Sciolino, and Stephen Grey, ‘‘Details Emerge in British Terror Case,’’ The New York Times, 28 August 2006, and Jason Bennetto, ‘‘Airline Bomb Plot Suspects May Be Linked to 7=7 Attacks,’’ The Independent, 18 August 2006. 77. Andreas Ulrich, ‘‘Failed Bomb Plot Seen as Al Qaeda Initiation Test,’’ Spiegel Online International, 9 April 2007. 78. A Syrian activist allegedly helped them to download the bomb recipes from the Internet, consult ‘‘3rd Suspect in Failed German Train Plot a Syrian,’’ Associated Press, 26 August 2006. 79. Tine Gade, ‘‘Fatah Al-Islam in Lebanon: Between Regional Nationalism and Global Jihadism?’’ (Kjeller: FFI, 2007). 80. Consult, e.g., Gunther Latsch et al., ‘‘Every Investigator’s Nightmare’’ [translated by Christopher Sultan], Spiegel, 28 August 2007. Members of al-Zarqawi’s al-Tawhid group were arrested in Germany in April 2002, and later convicted of preparing terrorist bomb attacks against Jewish targets inside Germany. Al-Zarqawi and al-Tawhid ran their own training camp in Herat, Afghanistan, before the invasion, which maintained close relations with the Al Qaeda leadership based in Qandahar at the time. Later, al-Tawhid members constituted core personnel in what was to become Al Qaeda in Iraq. Consult, e.g., al-’Adel, ‘‘Jihad Biography of the Leader of Slaughter.’’ 81. Consult, e.g., Mark Handler, ‘‘2nd Suspect Captured in German Bomb Plot,’’ International Herald Tribune, 24 August 2006, and Roger Boyes, ‘‘Train Bomb Plot Brings Fear of Terrorism to Germany,’’ The Times, 21 August 2006.