Environmental Policy and Governance Env. Pol. Gov. 2016 Published online in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/eet.1720

How Does Hybrid Governance Emerge? Role of the elite in building a Green Municipality in the Eastern Brazilian Amazon Cecilia Viana,1* Emilie Coudel,2 Jos Barlow,3 Joice Ferreira,4 Toby Gardner5 and Luke Parry3 1

Universidade de Brasília, Brasília, Brazil CIRAD – EMBRAPA, UnB/CDS, Belém, DF Brazil 3 Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK 4 EMBRAPA, Belém, Brazil 5 Stockholm Environment Institute, Stockholm, Sweden 2

ABSTRACT Decentralized governance can facilitate the participation of non-government actors in natural resource management. Yet efforts to increase participation can also enhance the power of existing elites. Here, we analyse the role of landowning elites in developing and operating a hybrid governance arrangement in response to the decentralization of anti-deforestation policy in the Brazilian Amazon. We employ a framework that permits examination of the role played by different actors, the rationale that promoted collaboration in the first place, and the distribution of power that shapes the still evolving governance arrangement. By engaging state and non-state actors in a hybrid governance partnership, the local landowning elite in Paragominas, a municipality in the Eastern Brazilian Amazon, successfully achieved the specific goals set by federal policies to be removed from a high deforestation ‘Red List’. Yet the local governors, together with the rural elite, transformed the crisis generated by inclusion in the Red List into an opportunity to shift the rural economy on a path towards more legalized large-scale agriculture. By aligning production and conservation objectives, the project attracted medium and large landowners, but also failed to prevent or potentially exacerbated the further marginalization of smallholders. Rural elites can effectively mobilize hybrid government arrangements in pursuit of their own interests while also producing wider benefits such as a more stimulated urban economy and strengthened environmental compliance. However, inclusion of more marginalized populations in this process remains a severe and largely unaddressed challenge. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment Received 13 June 2014; revised 29 February 2016; accepted 2 March 2016 Keywords: decentralized governance; deforestation; Paragominas; stakeholder participation

*Correspondence to: Cecilia Viana, Campus Universitário Darcy Ribeiro, Centro de Desenvolvimento Sustentável, Gleba A – Asa Norte, CEP: 70.904-970, Brasília, DF, Brazil. [email protected]; E-mail: [email protected] Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment

C. Viana et al.

Introduction

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OLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE HAS PAVED THE WAY FOR HYBRID SYSTEMS THAT BRING

market, state and society actors together to address environmental problems through participatory processes (Batterbury and Fernando, 2006; Brannstrom et al., 2012). Yet such hybrid systems have often been accused of being only superficial reforms that perpetuate existing power structures. By bringing more actors into policy-making, hybrid systems may also weaken the power of the state and undermine democratic processes by limiting representation, citizenship and public domain (Ribot, 2007; Lemos and Agrawal, 2009). As hybrid systems gain importance in the environmental arena, there is a clear need to better understand how these new arrangements are shaping democratic policy-making. While increased social participation can help marginalized groups reach leadership positions (Lund and SaitoJensen, 2013), it is also common for elites individuals with disproportionately high social, political or economic power to co-opt decision-making processes in favour of their own interests (Platteau and Gaspart, 2003). The risk of elite capture is increased in situations of decentralized environmental governance, as local leaders are given more access to resources that they can use to favour certain groups (Bardhan, 2002; Persha and Andersson, 2014). However, elite decision-making may also benefit the wider community (Fritzen, 2007; Lund and Saito-Jensen, 2013), signalling the importance of distinguishing ‘elite control’ of decision-making from ‘elite capture’ of benefits (Dasgupta and Beard, 2007). Today, elites are highly connected to national and international networks and ideas and thus can emerge as powerful mediators between local and external actors, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and highly capitalized businesses. In this paper, we analyse the role of rural elites in constructing a ‘Green Municipality’ based on a hybrid governance arrangement that emerged in response to decentralization of environmental governance in the Brazilian Amazon. By listing specific municipalities as disproportionately responsible for deforestation in the Amazon and imposing associated restrictions on land-use activities, the federal government created the conditions for severe political and economic disruption at the local level. The response of Paragominas, a municipality in Eastern Amazon, was led by the mayor along with leaders of the landowning elite, which had close connections to external actors and saw the crisis as an opportunity to promote environmental compliance and boost local agribusiness. Both in Brazil and abroad, Paragominas gained renown for being the first municipality to exit the federal Red List of deforestation in 2010, becoming a model for reconciling conservation and capitalized agricultural production (Guimarães et al., 2011; The Economist, 2013). To understand how hybrid governance emerged in Paragominas and the role played by the elites we analyse the key factors that influence the local decision-making sphere: capacity, incentives, guiding ideologies and power distribution (Larson, 2003). To achieve this, we review how the issues of hybrid governance and elite capture have grown in the literature on environmental decentralization, and present our theoretical framework and the methods we employed for data collection. Following this we show how anti-deforestation policies were decentralized in the Brazilian Amazon and how Paragominas reacted to these federal requirements and promoted the ‘Green Municipality’ initiative. Finally, we use our framework to analyse the conditions, actors and ideas involved in the process of building the ‘Green Municipality’ project. In the sixth section, we discuss the implications of the central role of the elites in building hybrid governance arrangements, highlighting the uneven participation of the rural population in this transition.

Decentralization, Hybrid Governance and Elites Over the past decades, decentralization reforms have been widely adopted in developing countries, frequently under the argument of promoting more democratic decision-making (Crook and Manor, 1998; Ribot, 2004). The transfer of power to actors in lower levels of government is viewed as a way to increase efficiency and responsiveness to local needs, and has been applied widely in service delivery and infrastructure as well as in natural resource management (Larson, 2003). By redistributing power and resources, decentralization can reconfigure relationships between local Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment

Env. Pol. Gov. 2016 DOI: 10.1002/eet

Role of the Elite in Building a Green Municipality government and central authorities, as well as between local government and local actors. Thus, decentralization can have a transformative effect if it promotes changes in existing power relations (Larson and Soto, 2008). Ensuring spaces for minority and historically marginal groups to participate in decision-making does not necessarily result in more equitable policies, nor does the existence of accountability mechanisms imply that local governments are held more accountable for their actions (Blair, 2000). In fact, if decentralized institutions are not carefully designed to attract greater participation of the poor and the more marginalized, they may even exacerbate inequalities in wealth and access to resources (Agrawal and Gupta, 2005). ‘Elite capture’ – the process by which elites can channel benefits from participatory initiatives is seen as a common threat to decentralization processes, as it can enhance inequality and thus be a source of further social and governance problems (Persha and Andersson, 2014). Members of the elite are frequently depicted as rentseekers, free riders and clientelistic actors (Platteau and Gaspart, 2003), although other researchers suggest that project design can be more important than the extent of elite presence for achieving specific objectives (Dasgupta and Beard, 2007; Fritzen, 2007). The presence of external agents can significantly lessen the risk of elite capture in local governance by strengthening the general overall governance as well as transparency and accountability mechanisms in local institutions, e.g. by serving as watchdogs, or by raising awareness (Persha and Andersson, 2014). Decentralization typically opens space for participation of non-government actors into natural resource management (Lemos and Agrawal, 2006; Ribot, 2007; Persha and Andersson, 2014), and weak local governments can increase the potential for greater participation by non-state actors (Laerhoven, 2014). Hybrid governance reflects the role of state and non-state actors in determining policy means and objectives, and seeks to build on the strengths and address the weaknesses of specific actors (Lemos and Agrawal, 2009). Although this suggest a ‘waning confidence’ in governments to solve complex problems such as environmental issues (Delmas and Young, 2009), it is also transforming the role of the state into more of a cross-sector coordination function (Mwangi and Wardell, 2012). Studies on decentralization of natural resource management have looked at the effectiveness, outcomes, processes and risks of such reform processes (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Nygren, 2005; Persha et al., 2011; Persha and Andersson, 2014). To understand hybrid environmental governance researchers have addressed the types and forms it assumes (Hooghe and Marks, 2003; Lemos and Agrawal, 2006; Driessen et al., 2012), its effectiveness (Brannstrom et al., 2012), the level of engagement of different actors (Jordan et al., 2005) and the underlying logics that motivate actor behaviours (Lockwood and Davidson, 2010). However, much less has been said about the role of the elites in constructing hybrid arrangements (see Rausch, 2013). Here, we focus on the emergence of a hybrid governance arrangement in response to the Red List decentralization policy in the Brazilian Amazon. We employ a framework proposed to study the outcomes of decentralization, but our focus on the variables that influence local policy-making allows us to analyse the process of creating a hybrid governance arrangement in more depth, specifically looking at the actors, roles, motivations and power dynamics involved. We build on the framework proposed by Larson (2003), which identifies four variables as decisive for understanding the local decision-making arena and the engagement of local governments in decentralization processes: (1) the capacity to implement change and to interact with other governance arenas; (2) the local incentive structure (including social, economic, political and ecological factors) that encourage local action; (3) the importance of local environmental and social ideologies; and (4) the interaction and distribution of power among diverse actors. Following Pacheco (2004), we adapted Larson’s (2003) framework to better characterize the other actors involved in a hybrid governance arrangement.

Methods To analyse the roles and positions of the different actors engaged in the hybrid governance arrangement in the municipality of Paragominas we conducted 20 open-ended interviews between 2010 and 2014 with researchers, representatives of federal, state and municipal government, representatives of NGOs, and local stakeholders and farmers. Our goal was to gather specific information on Paragominas’ ‘Green Municipality’ project (hereafter Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment

Env. Pol. Gov. 2016 DOI: 10.1002/eet

C. Viana et al. GMP), to address the context in which it emerged and the roles played by the specific actors and institutions. We also attended institutional meetings and events in Paragominas and the state capital, Belém, related to the design and implementation of the GMP. Between 2014 and 2015, the research team attended several events related to the wider state-level Green Municipalities Programme (which emerged from the Paragominas experience) as either participants or observers. The analysis presented was enriched by relevant secondary data from official documents and grey literature about the activities, institutions and processes concerning the trajectory of Paragominas. Most of the information used to contextualize the GMP process in Paragominas was gathered through the continuous presence of the authors in Paragominas during 2010 and the first half of 2011 and ongoing fieldwork since this date. As part of a wider project – the Sustainable Amazon Network1 – in 2011 we conducted 235 socio-economic surveys with landowners throughout the municipality of Paragominas, ranging from traditional communities and agrarian reform settlements to cattle ranches and large agribusiness farms. These interviews revealed personal experiences and perspectives of individual landowners on the GMP process.

Context: Decentralization of Anti-Deforestation Policy and the Response of Paragominas Policies Against Illegal Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon: Making Municipalities Responsible After a long history of promoting deforestation as a means for occupying and developing the Amazon, in the mid-2000s Brazil’s federal government adopted a markedly different path, combining increased enforcement of existing legislation, new regulatory frameworks, market restrictions and incentives into an organized, systematic programme to reduce illegal deforestation (Assunção et al., 2012; Hecht, 2012). In 2004, the federal government launched the Action Plan for Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon (PPCDAm), a set of policies that played an important role in reducing deforestation rates in the Amazon (CEPAL, IPEA, GIZ, 2011; Assunção et al., 2012), although an increase in deforestation rates in 2007 demonstrated that additional efforts were needed. To consolidate the reduction of deforestation, the federal government adopted a new strategy, focusing on the municipalities that most deforested by issuing a ‘Red List’ (Guimarães et al., 2011). In the listed municipalities, all medium and large properties2 were required to re-register their land tenure status. Official authorization for deforestation of any kind was conditional on this registration. The legislation also afforded co-responsibility to any individual or company who bought, transported or sold illegal products, making it compulsory to buy from registered properties. Concomitantly, an independent resolution issued by Brazil’s Central Bank made access by private landowners to credit from public banks conditional on compliance with environmental regulations, including land registration. Municipalities were included on the Red List according to their deforestation history. In December 2007, 36 municipalities were listed, and although they represented only 6% of all municipalities in the Amazon biome, they accounted for more than 50% of the area deforested in 2007 (Casa Civil, 2009). Nearly all are located in the so-called ‘arc of deforestation’, which runs along the eastern and southern edges of the Amazonian biome, predominantly in the states of Mato Grosso and Pará. Since then, the Red List has been published annually, 52 municipalities have been included (Figure 1) and 11 municipalities have exited. To exit the Red List, municipalities must have at least 80% of their area of private lands georeferenced and have their land tenure re-registered, and maintain their total deforestation and annual deforestation rate below a limit defined by the Ministry of the Environment. Paragominas: Consolidation of a Landholding Elite The city and municipality of Paragominas was founded in 1965 along the BR-010, also known as the Belém–Brasilia (Figure 1). It has been favoured by its proximity to Belém and is currently the 10th largest regional economy of Pará in terms of GDP (IBGE, 2012). Fifty years after its foundation, 44% of the municipality’s 19 342-km2 original forest 1

Rede Amazônia Sustentável, RAS, www.redeamazoniasustentavel.org. The legislation specified that all properties above 4 fiscal units must be re-registered. Fiscal units vary by municipality and range from 5 to 110 ha, depending on the size and location of the municipality. In Paragominas, a fiscal unit is 55 ha. 2

Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment

Env. Pol. Gov. 2016 DOI: 10.1002/eet

Role of the Elite in Building a Green Municipality

Figure 1. Map of Red Listed municipalities and localization of Paragominas.

has already been cleared to make way for agricultural activities, a level which is considerably above the average for municipalities in the state of Pará (23%) (PRODES/INPE, 2015). To promote agricultural expansion and settlement in the municipality, in the 1960s the National Institute of Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA) attracted new settlers, mostly from the southern regions of Brazil, with 5000-ha properties on what was then forested land. The municipality quickly developed a cattle-based economy, although productivity declined after a few decades with the degradation of the pasturelands and a shift in emphasis towards timber extraction. In the late 1980s Paragominas was the leading timber-producing centre in Brazil, although after only a decade harvestable timber was already scarce, with most of the forest area having already been subject to at least one cycle of logging activity (Nepstad et al., 1999). Many sawmill employees were left without work, and the municipality became infamous for high levels of urban and rural violence. In the 1990s, Paragominas featured a series of initiatives to modernize its agricultural production. Medium and large landowners started experimentations with soy, plantation forestry and cattle intensification programmes, involving the and state governments and agricultural research and extension institutions (Barros, 2003). This attracted investment and turned Paragominas into a large grain centre and one of the country’s prime cattle herds. In 1996, Vale (a Brazilian mining company, among the biggest in the world) introduced another major economic shift in the region with the establishment of a large bauxite mine. In 2010, a medium-density fibreboard factory was established, supporting another big boost for silviculture. Today, construction, commerce and services are the main economic activities (IBGE, 2012). Based on the Brazilian government census in 2006 the mean property size in Paragominas is 1325 ha, and nearly 90% of the officially declared properties are over 1000 ha (SIDRA/IBGE/Censo Agropecuário, 2006). Many of these large landowners live in the urban centres of Paragominas or Belém. Many of the medium and large landholders3 have additional businesses in town and are responsible for a large part of the local economy. We 3 The legislation defines property size based on fiscal units: medium properties range from 4 to 15 fiscal units, and large properties are all over 15 fiscal units. In Paragominas, 15 fiscal units equals 825 ha.

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Env. Pol. Gov. 2016 DOI: 10.1002/eet

C. Viana et al. characterize these farmers, some of whom belong to families that have been in Paragominas since its foundation, as the local landowning elite. Within this group, heads of the Union of Rural Producers (Sindicato dos Produtores Rurais de Paragominas; hereafter SPRP), which has 260 members and is one of the most influential Unions of the region, bring together many of leaders of the local landowning elite. Parallel to these changes in the agribusiness sector, the workers from the sawmills who had been made unemployed with the decline of the extractive timber industry, as well as small farmers from other regions of Pará, flocked towards abandoned large-scale properties in the late 1990s and were subsequently settled by the Land Institute of Pará or INCRA. Their livelihoods were mostly dependent on slash-and-burn agriculture, small-scale cattle ranching and charcoal production. Today, Paragominas encompasess 15 agrarian reform settlements, with 2500 families officially registered in 2014 (INCRA, 2015). There are another 15 colonies of small farmers outside these settlements, in which nearly 900 additional families live (Pinto et al., 2009). Building a Partnership to Achieve Compliance with Environmental Regulations In January 2008, Paragominas was included in the Red List of the most deforesting Amazonian municipalities. Early that year, the Arc of Fire Operation – a collaboration between the state government, Federal Police, the Brazilian Environmental Agency and the National Army within the PPCDAm – apprehended some 6500 m3 of illegal timber, shut down eight sawmills and embargoed almost 100 rural properties in Paragominas (Fundo Vale, 2012). Later in 2008, another federal-level operation, Black Track (Rastro Negro), targeted illegal charcoal production, transport and trade in the municipality, destroying 200 illegal furnaces, and apprehending over 120 m3 of charcoal (Fundo Vale, 2012). This uncompromising crackdown resulted in social unrest, leading to violent outbreaks including the burning of environmental agency vehicles. Following this open conflict, the mayor of Paragominas negotiated with the Ministry of Environment to facilitate the process required to meet the conditions to exit the Red List. Considering the historical problem of clarifying land tenure, an amendment issued in March 2009 introduced a more pragmatic instrument: the ‘rural environmental registry’ (Cadastro Ambiental Rural, hereafter CAR). Inspired by previous experience in Lucas do Rio Verde (a municipality in the state of Mato Grosso), CAR later became a legally binding document for all rural properties in the country as of 2012. This instrument georeferences property boundaries, areas under permanent protection and legal reserves, as stipulated by the Forest Code, the federal legislation that establishes rules for use and protection of native vegetation. With the shared goal of exiting the Red List, the municipal government in partnership with SPRP initiated a series of meetings with rural landowners. A pact committing to ‘zero deforestation’ was negotiated and signed by the main sectors of Paragominas society (SPRP, Rural Worker’s Union, Association of Soy Producers, Union of the Timber Sector, Chamber of Store Owners, among others, totalling 51 organizations), defining a set of rules and objectives under the name of ‘Município Verde’, or ‘Green Municipality’ Project (Guimarães et al., 2011). The objective was exit the Red List, by complying with the two criteria: reducing deforestation and georeferencing properties under the CAR. Given the technical challenge of registering 80% of the private area, two established NGOs were invited to contribute as partners: Imazon, a national NGO based in Belém, and The Nature Conservacy (TNC), an international NGO with offices in Belém, responsible for coordinating the Lucas do Rio Verde Legal Project (see Brannstrom et al., 2012). In April 2010, after 2 years of coordinated efforts, Paragominas was recognized by the Ministry of Environment as the first municipality to exit the Red List. Only 21 km2 (0.2% of remaining forest) were deforested in 2009 (less than the 40-km2 limit), and nearly 690 properties were registered under CAR, amounting to 94% of the private land area (over the 80% required).

Results: Actors and conditions that enabled the ‘Green Municipality’ process By creating incentives for municipalities to engage in environmental governance, the Red List aimed to strengthen relationships between federal, state and local governments. To overcome technical, political and financial limitations, the strategy taken by the mayor of Paragominas, with support of the landowning elite, was to Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment

Env. Pol. Gov. 2016 DOI: 10.1002/eet

Role of the Elite in Building a Green Municipality partner with internal and external civil society organizations, and transform the crisis into an opportunity for transformation. Building on our framework, we analyse what brought internal and external actors to engage in building the GMP (Table 1).

Developing Capacity and Innovation Studies in decentralization depict capacity as ‘the abilities of local governments to carry out their mandates’ (Larson, 2003: 221). These abilities can refer to internal functions (related to staff characteristics and the running of the activities) or to the relationships that local authorities have and maintain with a wider network of actors (Romeo, 2003). Paragominas’ mayor was able to engage the local population in finding solutions to the problem and connect with partners to fill capacity gaps. SPRP made the bridge between the local government and medium and large landowners. NGOs provided technical assistance, and Fundo Vale, a private fund, provided much of the financial resources needed for the project. At the time of the Red List, Paragominas had strong political leaders as heads of key organizations (mayor’s office and SPRP). The mayor, a landholder himself, was a well-connected lawyer, who had gained strong legitimacy from

Municipal government Actors

Landowning elite

Mayor

SPRP, medium and large landowners Communication and Administrative coordination management and Legitimacy and leadership coordination Mayor with negotiation of SPRP, strong network and management skills, with medium and large landowners as well as strong connections to higher government levels Monetary Political Strong monitoring and Compliance with federal enforcement by federal rules could bring market benefits and attract agencies disrupted investment (credit, Green social unrest Cattle, Green soy)

NGOs and foundations TNC, Imazon, Fundo Vale

Technical and financial Provision by NGOs of information, technical assistance and capacity building in municipal government staff; financing of partner organizations byFundo Vale Social and ecological Incentive Non-governmental structure organizations give backing to innovative initiatives to fulfill their institutional mission and widen their influence Ideology Legalist Productivist Conservationist Ensuring environmental Elites promote productive NGOs bring their compliance to provide models which are global ideas to the greater legal certainty compatible with municipal level for investments conservation, in order to gain scale Accountable to members Accountable to mission Accountable to urban Power and donor and values of SPRP population and distribution Accountability complex Medium and large landowning elite and and diffuse landowners seek to accountability For political success increase productivity and reelection and profitability Capacity

Result of partnership Collaboration under GMP Complementary capacities to achieve the criteria of the Red List

Different incentives combined under a commonly recognized set of shared project goals

Translation at a local level of a new “green paradigm” which aims at reconciling production and conservation objectives No accountability towards smallholders which become marginalized in the partnership

Table 1. Different capacities brought into the hybrid governance arrangement by different groups of actors, the incentive structure that led actors to engage in the partnership, the ideology or underlying logics of their engagement, and the accountability mechanisms that influence the power distribution Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment

Env. Pol. Gov. 2016 DOI: 10.1002/eet

C. Viana et al. following the footsteps of the previous well-respected mayor. The leaders of SPRP had just been elected during the crisis with a programme to promote more environmentally responsible cattle farming (Green Cattle), being themselves among the most productive and respected cattle ranchers in the region. These leaders had the social and political legitimacy and charisma necessary to engage in dialogue with farmers about environmental compliance and encourage them to register their properties under CAR. As was the case for many Amazonian municipalities, Paragominas did not have an Environmental Secretary in the municipal government and decided to create one in 2008, linked to the Health Secretary. Yet, staff allocated to environmental issues remained limited, and with limited technical capacity for addressing a complex issue such as deforestation. Only in 2012, following negotiations with the state, did the Environment Secretary acquire full status and autonomy to license small- and medium-scale land-use activities. Scientific research and NGO-led activities have been common features in Paragominas since the 1990s and have been key factors in providing a foundation for new ideas and partnerships. Local landowning elites were far less wary of environmental NGOs than many other places in the Amazon. The NGO Imazon had been working in the municipality for more than two decades and had well-established connections with landowners, ensuring their involvement in the early stages of the project design. Within the GMP, Imazon became responsible for drafting monthly reports on deforestation that were sent to the mayor, training the environmental technicians in the municipal government, and registering small properties under CAR. TNC had been previously introduced by soy producers to the mayor and was already involved in crafting a project for Paragominas based on the experiences of Lucas do Rio Verde. With the GMP, TNC became responsible for coordinating the efforts for registering CAR with SPRP and for implementing it at a subsidized cost for individual farmers and helping to solve occasional conflicts over property boundaries. To accelerate the amount of land registered under the CAR, larger properties were given priority for processing. Another factor critical to the success of the GMP is the mining giant Vale. The mining taxes paid by Vale to the municipality – approximately US $150 000 per month in 2008 (DNPM, 2015) – became a critically important financial source to support urban infrastructure such as roads, hospitals and schools. In 2009, the Vale Fund for Sustainable Development, a multi-million dollar foundation, was established to invest in sustainable development projects in the Amazon. It funded approximately US $1.5 million for the GMP and Green Cattle programme, but also other activities of SPRP, Imazon and TNC, providing strong incentives for the initiative as a whole.

The Local Incentive Structure Incentives can encourage or discourage local governments to act. They can be political (i.e. perceived possibilities for re-election), social (i.e. potential for recognition and prestige), ecological (i.e. emergence of environmental problems or opportunities), or monetary (i.e. perceived financial gain or loss) (Larson, 2003; Andersson and Ostrom, 2008). We contend that Paragominas’ incentive structure resulted from processes already in place at the time the Red List was established. Local leaders viewed the crisis as an opportunity to open new markets and attract new investments by putting forward ‘good practices’ in agriculture and cattle ranching – in much the similar way as Legal Lucas in the municipality of Lucas do Rio Verde, one of the inspirations for Paragominas’ leaders (Brannstrom et al., 2012; Rausch, 2013). It is likely that their proposition to engage in the GMP received significant support from local landowners not only because credit and markets had been cut, but also because Paragominas was already a consolidated frontier (Celentano et al., 2012). The peak of the logging cycle had already long-passed, and the local economy needed to shift away from timber extraction and traditional extensive cattle ranching. Also emerging of significance were the voluntary supply-chain governance mechanisms, such as the Soy Moratorium (Gibbs et al., 2015) and the Cattle Agreement (Arima et al., 2014). For external actors, the GMP was an opportunity to support local efforts to promote environmental compliance, at a moment when very few municipalities were ready to engage in such a process. The presence of NGOs gave credibility to the project, these being organizations with a positive reputation for conducting environmental projects and policies (Carneiro and Assis, 2015). The GMP was in line with their missions and if it succeeded as the first municipality to exit the Red List, it would bring welcome visibility to their work. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment

Env. Pol. Gov. 2016 DOI: 10.1002/eet

Role of the Elite in Building a Green Municipality Shifting Ideologies from Red to Green Guiding ideologies provide an ethical frame that can strongly influence decision-making processes (Larson, 2003). The GMP resulted from a convergence of different ethics in a unifying ‘Green’ discourse. The municipal government’s ethic could be called ‘legalist’, as it sought to promote compliance with federal-level policies. Medium and large landowners’ ethic could be called ‘productivist’, as their main interest was in continued development of the agricultural sector. NGOs had a ‘conservationist’ ethic, and were crucial in reframing environmental issues in a way that was not necessarily in opposition to production objectives. At the time of the Red List process there was no consensus in Paragominas for pursuing a ‘Green Municipality’ pathway. Many landowners feared that the CAR would shed light on illegal deforestation and illegal land claims, with associated risks of fines and sanctions. The ‘green’ in the GMP was a way for local leaders to convince a large proportion of producers that they could gain from environmental protection. They presented compliance as a necessary cost that would bring greater benefits, such as legal security (avoiding fines and embargoes), higher market valuation of their products, attracting investment to the municipality (more legal certainty for investors), more government support (access to credit and technical assistance) and enhancing the provision of environmental services (carbon credit was cited as a potential source of financial compensation). The leaders of the project knew that for a ‘green’ label to work in the long term, they had to convince a large proportion of producers that they could gain from environmental protection. As put by the former president of the SPRP: ‘[To convince society to adhere] we made several meetings, (…) it became a “wave”. It was also supported by the media: it gave [GMP] a good picture and showed alternatives. (…) Today, you won’t find people saying it is wrong. If there is a problem, someone deforesting, I am sure I can gather fifteen people to go and talk to the guy’ (M. Costa, personal communication, 28 March 2011). Large public events were promoted to put forward the potential of ‘Green Cattle’ (in 2011) and ‘Green Soy’ (2014). As in other flagship Amazonian municipalities such as Lucas do Rio Verde, reframing environmental issues as also being agricultural issues shifted the way environmental policies were seen by farmers from merely imposing restrictions to helping them protect their land, acquire rights and eventually improve production (Rausch, 2013).

Accountability and Distribution of Power Local governments are – at least in theory – accountable to all local actors (Ribot, 2007). Accountability is about power in that it defines relationships among actors and signals who responds to whom (Kilby, 2006). Accountability of actors to their constituencies is what may broaden participation (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). Within a hybrid governance arrangement such as the GMP, however, each partner is in fact accountable to very different actors (Bäckstrand, 2008). If we assume that municipal authorities seek re-election (Andersson et al., 2006), we can argue that the municipal government is mainly accountable to the urban population (the rural population in Paragominas representing only 22%). SPRP is accountable to its members (who elect their representatives) and to its values of increasing the productivity and profitability of rural activities. The accountability of NGOs is diffuse and complex. They can be said to be accountable to their values and mission, their performance, their constituents (the people whose interests they represent), their donors (often international) or to the state (as they have to meet the law) (Kilby, 2006). One of the main shortcomings of the GMP process thus far is that it has largely failed to secure the effective participation of smallholder farmers in the governance of the municipality and the agricultural transition proposed by the GMP. Imazon supported CAR registrations in the 15 traditional colonies, but alternatives to transition out of deforestation-dependent activities remain lacking. In fact, charcoal and slash-and-burn agriculture were made illegal in the early stages of the GMP as strategies for avoiding deforestation and slave labour, yet these were the main economic activities for many smallholders. Most deforestation in the municipality today occurs in the land reform settlements, which are under federal jurisdiction (Piketty et al., 2015). Although the Rural Workers’ Union (STTR) was involved in the pact, the uneven balance of interests among the partners was clearly felt by the president of the Union at that time. He perceived that for the project it was more important ‘to have a tree standing than a family living’ (D.P., personal communication, 1 April 2011). As Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment

Env. Pol. Gov. 2016 DOI: 10.1002/eet

C. Viana et al. smallholders have specific credit lines which were not restricted by the Bank resolution, they were not directly affected by the Red List. Most smallholders do not sell to slaughterhouses so they felt no direct and immediate need to register their land under CAR. By contrast, the crack-down on charcoal and the shutting down of sawmills was far more keenly felt: ‘I am against the way the [federal] government acted with the Arc of Fire [operation], shutting down leaving many families without their livelihoods. They did not come to discuss. It is harder for the small [landholder] to stop deforesting and making charcoal’ (D.P., personal communication, 1 April 2011). The municipal Secretary of Agriculture did endeavour to offer alternatives to small-scale farmers for example by negotiating with a dairy company to collect milk in one of the areas that had been most affected by the clampdown on charcoal. It also organized a ‘mechanized patrol’ of 12 tractors to till land in areas that traditionally relied upon slash-and-burn management. A federal programme to encourage local produce in school meals was very successful in Paragominas, winning a national prize 8 years in a row for the quality of its implementation. However, these alternatives remained limited to very few farmers mainly located close to the main town. The history of conflict in the municipality, including semi-slavery employment conditions on farms and violence related to land disputes, remains in the recent memory of many inhabitants, further exacerbating the difficulties of integrating different social groups. This marginalization, which goes back to the colonization of Paragominas, will not be easily overcome in the short term.

Discussion In this paper we have addressed the role of the elite in promoting a hybrid governance arrangement to achieve a specific policy goal. The framework employed in our analysis allowed for distinction of the role played by different actors, the reasons and the underlying logic that led them to collaborate, as well as the distribution of power that was reshaped by this collaboration. Although we only analyse a single case, the processes observed in one municipality speak to wider concerns over democratic policy-making and hybrid governance. On the one hand, hybrid arrangements are seen by some as neoliberal forms of governance (McCarthy, 2005) while, on the other, increased spaces for participation are seen as central to the concretization of democratic local governance (Blair, 2000). A move towards a more neoliberal governance arrangement is anchored in a decreased role of states (McCarthy and Prudham, 2004) and a shift towards a ‘self-regulated market’, manifest in agriculture as ‘export-orientated farming areas’ driven by ‘global demands and land privatization’, and commonly associated with concerns over equitable distribution of benefits and environmental conservation (McCarthy, 2005; Brannstrom, 2009). The role of agribusiness in policy-making in Brazil is well established following soy development in the Amazon municipality of Santarém (Steward, 2007) and in the Brazilian savanna (Brannstrom, 2009). Importantly, however, the connectivity of export-agriculture to global markets also enhances opportunities for market-driven conservation strategies that, despite their voluntary nature, have made significant contribution to slowing deforestation in the Amazon (Nepstad et al., 2006; Arima et al., 2014; Gibbs et al., 2015). Despite being the result of a participatory processes of policy design (including multiple local organizations) and implementation (involving multiple government levels and non-government actors), in practice the GMP was limited in terms of participation and promoting changes beyond those required by environmental legislation. Indeed, one of the main successes of the GMP was to put together a limited hybrid governance structure to implement a specific policy, and progressively build the conditions for a larger involvement and transformation which could occur in the medium to long term (Figure 2). It is important to emphasize that in practice being ‘green’ under the GMP is limited to zero illegal deforestation and a commitment towards compliance with the Forest Code, and affords little consideration of other environmental concerns that need to be addressed to foster a wider transition towards a more sustainable land-use system (Piketty et al., 2015). The rate of deforestation in Paragominas has slowed, but has not halted, and forest degradation from timber extraction or fire remains a major problem in Paragominas, as elsewhere in the Amazon (Asner et al., 2005; Berenguer et al., 2014). It will take time before a more comprehensive notion of ‘green practices’ can become established and spread from leaders of the elite to the wider productive basis of Paragominas. Elements of the rural population are keenly aware of the need for more effective approaches to protecting forests and water Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment

Env. Pol. Gov. 2016 DOI: 10.1002/eet

Role of the Elite in Building a Green Municipality

Figure 2. The broader the space occupied by each variable, the more actors and time involved for producing change in each of the variables. In building the Green Municipality, four institutions partnered to achieve specific policy goals. The landowning elite had medium-term interests in pursuing further benefits, and together with partner institutions were able to build a commitment to halt deforestation and assert increased monitoring as a beneficial activity for farmers. However, most of the rural population has yet to enjoy any substantive benefits from the project.

courses, although this awareness is likely to fade if market benefits (whether through access, premiums or risk management) are not realized soon, and farmers may go back to seeing environmental protection as imposing too high a cost. Overturning the dominant power dynamics and ongoing exclusion of smallholders from political decisions in multi-actor frontier landscapes such as those in the Brazilian Amazon is an enormous challenge (Gardner et al., 2014). Many of these dynamics have their roots in 500 years of Brazilian history, and over 50 years of colonization in Amazonia. Although the municipal government is attentive to this, discourses from the landholding elite suggest that many view this issue from their personal perspective, aiming to turn smallholders into productive modern farms, including through the adoption of production practices to provide produce to value chains held by larger landholders. Smallholders are often inspired by the agricultural models promoted by the elite, yet adopting such models is rarely realistic. For example, prohibiting the use of fire for agriculture without the means to transition out from such practices (Cammelli and Coudel, 2014) may in fact generate leakage of such activities to other places in the Amazon, and further exacerbate marginalization (Carneiro and Assis, 2015).

Conclusions Most studies on decentralization of natural resource management focus on local governments, as this is the government level to which powers and responsibilities are often devolved. The role of both external and internal actors in ensuring the effective delivery of services by local governments is widely recognized. In our study of the iconic Brazilian Amazon municipality of Paragominas we have shown that the role of non-governmental actors can go beyond pressuring local governments and that their participation can be crucial for achieving policy goals. Moreover, we identify that an important group of actors the landowning elite together with local political leaders can be decisive in ensuring the effective involvement of partner NGOs and negotiating effectively with higher governance levels to achieve necessary political and economic support, as well as successfully conveying the project goals to often skeptical private landowners. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment

Env. Pol. Gov. 2016 DOI: 10.1002/eet

C. Viana et al. Our results support findings elsewhere that the role played by elites can be more complex than the idea of ‘elite capture’. Elites can pursue their own interests, boost capitalized agricultural production, support the development of urban economies and strengthen environmental compliance, all of which can generate wider benefits for the population as a whole. However, as shown by our case, efforts to align conservation and production objectives are often insufficient for adequately including more marginalized rural populations, including majority smallholders, or achieving wider conservation goals. The role of elites can be critical for articulating between different groups that make up a hybrid governance arrangement, as well as for addressing technical and financial shortfalls, and for mobilizing a critical mass of actors in support of a specific policy goal. However, the only party accountable to the entire population of the rural landholders is the government, underlining the importance of local administrators, and capacity building in local government for driving lasting changes in livelihood practices. Finding a territorial model of hybrid governance that can give equal opportunities to all sectors of rural society remains a major challenge, both in Brazil and elsewhere.

Acknowledgements We are grateful to the following for financial support in collecting the socio-economic data under the RAS project: Instituto Nacional de Ciência e Tecnologia – Biodiversidade e Uso da Terra na Amazônia (CNPq 574008/2008-0), Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária – Embrapa (SEG: 02.08.06.005.00), the UK government Darwin Initiative (17-023), The Nature Conservancy, and Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) (NE/F01614X/1 and NE/G000816/1). We also thank the farmers and workers unions of Santarém, Belterra and Paragominas and all collaborating private landowners for their support. This research was carried out as part of the CGIAR Research Programme on Forests, Trees and Agroforestry (CRP-FTA). This is publication number 47 of the Sustainable Amazon Network series.

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