Humanitarianism Transformed Author(s): Michael Barnett Source: Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Dec., 2005), pp. 723-740 Published by: American Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3688176 Accessed: 21/04/2009 19:07 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=apsa. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

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Articles

Transformed Humanitarianism Michael Barnett

The scale,scope,and significanceof humanitarianactionhaveexpandedsignificantlysince the late 1980s.This articlereflectson two ways in which humanitarianism has been transformed.First,its purposehas been politicized.Whereasonce humanitarian actorsattemptedto insulatethemselvesfromthe worldof politics,they now workcloselywith statesandattemptto eliminatethe root causesof conflictthat placeindividualsat risk.Second,a field of humanitarianism has becomeinstitutionalized; duringthe andrationalized.Drawingon variousstrandsof organizational 1990sthefieldandits agenciesbecamemoreprofessionalized theory, I examinethe forcesthat havecontributedto thesetransformations. I then explorehow thesetransformations havechangedthe natureof whathumanitarianorganizationsareandwhattheydo. In the conclusionI considerhow the transformation of humanitarianismlinksto therelationshipbetweeninternationalnongovernmental and world the order, organizations including purposeof humanitarianactionand its distinctivefunctionin globalpolitics.

global responseto the devastationcaused by the tsunami of December 26, 2004, was an extraordinary display of humanitarianaction. Within hours of the disaster scores of nongovernmentalorganizations (NGOs) wereprovidinglife-savingmedicalattention,shelter,andwater.Soon thereafter,though, compassionbecame a statuscategory.Bristlingfrom accusationsthat they were not doing enough, states began to outbid one another in orderto avoid censureand gain stature.In addition to an unprecedentedoutpouringof financialsupport,statestemporarily gave their militaries humanitarianassignments. The United States dispatched the U.S.S. Lincoln to the coastof the IndonesianprovinceofAceh to performsearchand-rescue missions and deliver relief. Businesses gave in-kind and financialcontributions,and establishedlinks on their Web sites where customerscould, with a click of a button, join the relief effort. The

MichaelBarnettis HaroldStassenChairof International Relationsat the HumphreyInstituteof PublicAffairsand professorofpolitical scienceat the UniversityofMinnesota (mbarnett@hhh. umn.edu).In 2004-5 he was a visiting associateat the Centeron InternationalCooperationat the Centeron InternationalCooperation.Theauthorthanks Bud Duvall, KevinHartigan,Martha Finnemore,Abby Stoddard,Ron Kassimir,CraigCalhoun,Jack Snyder, AdeleHarmer,theparticipantsof the MinnesotaInternationalRelationsColloquium,and threeanonymous reviewersforPerspectiveson Politicsfor their comments and corrections.Specialthanksto the SocialSciencesResearchCounciland theparticipantsin its serieson "The Transformation of HumanitarianAction."

This globalmobilizationwas made possibleby the great expansionof the humanitariansystemsince the end of the cold war.1Many stateshavedevelopedhumanitarianunits within theirforeignand defenseministriesand haveincreasingly accepted the legitimacy of humanitarianintervention. Official assistance skyrocketedfrom $2 billion in 1990 to $6 billion in 2000. A growing number of international organizations,including the World Bank, provide some form of assistance.There has been an explosion of nongovernmentalorganizationsdedicatedto some aspect of humanitarianaction.Perhapsmoreimpressivethan their proliferationis their growing sophistication.NGOs once operatedwith a relativelyslow-movingmachineryand were staffedby individualswho were expected to learn on the job. Now, however,most prominent agencies have a system of global positioning and deliverythat allows trained professionalsto get assistancequickly where it is needed. Medecins sans frontieres(MSF), for example,grewfrom a two-room office in the 1970s into an internationalnetwork of 19 semi-independentbranches,with a combined annual budget of $500 million, running programsin over 70 countries,with 2,000 internationaland 15,000 national staff. Finally, the very meaning of humanitarianismhas expanded. Humanitarianaction was formerlyrecognized as a separatesphere of activity, defined by the impartial relief to victims of manmade and natural disasters;now the term,accordingto many,includeshuman rights,access to medicine, economic development, democracypromotion, and even building responsiblestates. This articlereflectson two definingfeaturesof this transformationof humanitarianism:the purposeof humanitarianism is becoming politicized, and the organizationof humanitarianismis becominginstitutionalized.Once upon a time humanitarianagencies used to define themselves December 2005 [ Vol. 3/No. 4 723

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largelyin opposition to "politics."2Certainly they recognized that humanitarianismwas the offspringof politics, that their activities had political consequences, and that they were inextricablypart of the political world. Yet the widelyaccepteddefinitionof humanitarianism-the impartial, independent, and neutralprovision of relief to those in immediate dangerof harm-emerged in opposition to a particularmeaning of politics and helped to depoliticize relief-orientedactivities.3 Many activities might alleviate suffering and improve life circumstances,including protection of human rights and economic development;but any actions that aspireto restructureunderlyingsocial relationsareinherentlypolitical. Humanitarianismprovidesrelief;it offersto saveindividuals, but not to eliminate the underlying causes that placed them at risk.Viewed in this way, humanitarianism playsa distinctiverole in the internationalsacrificialorder.4 All internationalordershave winners and losers and thus require their quota of victims. Humanitarianism interrupts this selection process by saving lives, thus reducing the number of sacrifices.However, it does not aspire to alter that order;that is the job of politics. Humanitarianism'soriginal principleswere also a reaction to politics and designed to obstruct this "moralpollutant."5The principleof humanity commands attention to all humankindand inspirescosmopolitanism.The principle of impartialitydemands that assistancebe based on need and not discriminateon the basisof nationality,race, religious belief, gender, political opinions, or other considerations.6The principles of neutrality and independence also inoculatehumanitarianismfrom politics. Relief agenciesarebest able to performtheir life-savingactivities only if they are untouched by state interestsand partisan agendas.7Neutrality involves refrainingfrom taking part in hostilities or from any action that benefits or disadvantages either party to a conflict. Neutrality is both an end and a means to an end becauseit helps reliefagenciesgain accessto populations at risk. Independencedemands that assistanceshould not be connected to any of the parties directlyinvolved in the conflict or who have a stake in the outcome. Accordingly, many agencies either refused or limited their relianceon governmentfunding if the donors had a stake in the outcome. The principles of humanity, impartiality,neutrality,and independence thus served to depoliticizehumanitarianaction and createa "humanitarian space"insulated from politics. Yet these Maginot line principles defending humanitarianism from politics crumbled during the 1990s as humanitarianism'sagendaventuredbeyond reliefand into the political world, and agencies began working alongside, and with, states. During the 1990s humanitarian agencies began to accept the idea that they might try to eliminate the root causes of conflicts that place individuals at risk; this vision swept them up into a process of transformationand into the world of politics. Humani724

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tarian agencies and states began to share agendas. States became more willing to act in the name of humanitarianism, fund reliefoperations,use their diplomatic and political power to advance humanitarian causes, authorize military troops to deliver relief, and consider the legitimacy of humanitarianintervention and the protection of civilianpopulations.Humanitarianorganizationsweretorn by the growing presence of states, acknowledging their potential contribution but worrying about the costs to theirprinciples.Because,in theirview, thereareno humanitariansolutions to humanitarianemergencies,many lobbied states to apply military and political muscle to stop the bloodletting. Relief agenciesworking in war zones had to confront warlordsand militias that demanded a king's ransomfor the assistancethat was made necessaryby their conflict and their intentional targetingof civilians;agencies occasionally sought outside intervention to provide armed protection and to help deliver relief.Yet the growing willingness of humanitarian organizations to work alongside states potentially undermined their neutrality and independence. Humanitarian principles were completely shatteredin places like Kosovo, Afghanistan,and Iraq,where many agencies were funded by the very governments that were combatantsand thus partly responsible for the emergency.The ever-presentfearthat fraternizing between politics and humanitarianismwould corruptthis sacred idea and undermine agencies' ability to provide

reliefwas becoming a daily reality.Reflectingthe anxieties unleashed by this mixing of politics and principle, commentatorsspokeof humanitarianismin "crisis"andwarned of the dangersof "suppingwith the devil,""drinkingfrom the poisoned chalice,"and "sleepingwith the enemy."8 Institutionalization represents another aspect of the transformationof humanitarianism.Beforethe 1990s there were relativelyfew agencies that providedrelief;they had few sustained interactions; and they hardly considered establishing,revising,or maintainingprinciplesof action, codes of conduct, or professional standardsthat would define the boundariesof the field. In the field they operated accordingto very few standardproceduresand drew very little from scientific knowledge as they set up, often quite literally,soup kitchens. Their operations were frequently staffedby individualswith little or no experience, who jumped into the fray believing that all they needed was a can-do attitude and good intentions. Over the 1990s humanitarianismbecame more recognized as a field, with more donors, deliverers,and regulators of a growing sphere of action. Variousdevelopments and pressurespropelledthis institutionalization.The influx of new agencies, marching to their own drums, created confusion on the ground. Donors, who were providing more funds, expected recipients to be accountable and demonstrateeffectiveness.Rwandawas a turning point.9 A flood of agencies-many theresimply to fly the flag and impress prospectivedonors-were feeding the architects of the genocide in camps in Zaire, fueling their rearmament, and potentiallycausingmore harm than good. The Rwandantragedyand other events causedthe entire community to undergopainful introspectionthat raisedtroubling questions regardingthe legitimacyand effectiveness of humanitarian action. States raised similar questions, leavingaid organizationsworriedabout theirfunding base. In response,the field began to institutionalize.It became increasinglyrationalized,standardizingbasiccodes of conduct for intervention, developing accountabilitymechanisms, and calculating the consequences of actions. It became bureaucratized,developing precise rules that ideally could be applied acrossdifferentsituations.It became professionalized,developingdoctrines,specializedareasof training, and careerpaths. The humanitarian sector welcomed elements of this institutionalization because they helped to standardize expectations,ease coordination in the field, enhance efficiency, and improve the quality of care to more populations. Yet other features were distressing, potentially changing not simply the organization of humanitarian action, but its very character.Many organizationswere now demonstrating commonplace interests in selfpreservationand survival, at times allowing these interests to overshadow their principled commitments. The development of standardized templates and guidelines made them less able to recognize and respond to local

needs. Rising concerns with efficiency in getting "deliverables"to "clients"hinted of a growing corporate culture; participantsincreasinglyworried about protecting their "brand"and referringto the field as an "industry,"a "business,"a "sector,"and an "enterprise."There were palpable fears that material and discursive borders that distinguished humanitarian agencies from commercial firms and even militaryunits were disintegrating.If commercial firms were really more efficient at saving lives, and if nonprofitswere acting like corporateentities, then exactly what distinguished the two? Politicization and institutionalization,each in its own way, called into question the very marksof distinction of humanitarianaction. Drawing from variousstrandsof organizationaltheory, I consider the causes behind the expansion and politicization of the purposeof humanitarianismand the institutionalizationof the field. Variousglobalforcescreatednew opportunitystructuresfor humanitarianaction:statesgave more generouslybecauseit furtheredtheir foreign policy interests; there was a surge of emergencies in the early 1990s; and a change in the sovereigntyregime reduced the barriersto intervention. Although the general trend was toward expansion and politicization, humanitarian organizationsdid not respond uniformly to these opportunities. To understandthis variationin responserequires a considerationof, first, the organization'sidentity and its initial understandingof the relationshipbetweenhumanitarianismand politics, and, second, its dependence on othersfor symbolicand materialresources.Although there were pockets of resistanceto this politicization, arguably most existingand newly establishedorganizationsaccepted these changes because they operatedwith a definition of humanitarianaction that interfaced easily with politics and were dependent on states for their financing. The field's institutionalizationwas largely triggered by challenges to its legitimacyand effectiveness,challengesfrom donorsand participants,challengesthat threatenedits bottom line, and challengesthat were addressedby making the field more rational,bureaucratic,and professional. I then examine some of the effects of this transformation on humanitarianaction. Much of the discussion of the effectsfocuseson politicization,that is, how the growing involvement by states is potentiallycompromisingor distorting the essence of humanitarianaction, whether these changeshave been generallydesirable,pragmatic,or self-destructive,and whether it is possible or even desirable to put the politicalgenie back in the bottle.10But the possible effects extend beyond what humanitarianagencies do to include what they are.Any discussionof effects, of course,turnson some baselineunderstandingof humanitarianaction. Such an analysisdoes not need to essentialize humanitarianism,to suggestthat therewas a settled or fixed meaning that existed for decades until disruptedby the post-cold war period. Nor does such an analysisprovide an evaluativejudgment as to whether these changes December 2005 1 Vol. 3/No. 4

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Transformed Articles I Humanitarianism are necessarilygood, reasonableunder the circumstances, or reckless.Instead, such an analysismerely needs to ask what was the generalunderstandingof humanitarianaction prior to the 1990s, consider how politicization and institutionalizationhas shaken that understanding,and, most importantly, explore whether such changes have potentially undermined the cornerstoneprinciple of impartial relief. Although humanitarianismis now firmlyon the global agenda, the same cannot be said for academic research. Most researchdirectly related to humanitarianaction is produced by specialized agencies such as the Overseas Development Institute'sHumanitarianPolicy Group;it is almost always directed at the policy community. Some social science researchis related to humanitarianaction, including the literatureson humanitarian intervention, civil wars,democracybuilding, refugeestudies,and peacekeeping. However, there has been remarkablylittle consideration of humanitarianismas an object of research. The body of the essay points to various lines of inquiry, and in the conclusion I link my account of the transformation of humanitarianismto a broaderresearchagenda that concernsthe relationshipbetween internationalnongovernmental organizations and world order, including the purpose of humanitarianaction and its functions in global politics.

Causes of Transformation Environmentalforces played a central role in transforming humanitarianism. Several important developments encouraged humanitarian agencies to move away from relief alone and towardthe transformationof local structures, and to become more willing to work alongside and with states. Such developments led to its politicization. Yet not all agencies respondeduniformly to these opportunities;consequently,I examine featuresof the organization and its relationship to the environment to help to explain this variation. Environmentaldevelopments also played an important role in shaping the institutionalization of humanitarianism.Similarly,although those in the sectorhad theirown reasonsfor rationalizing,bureaucratizing, and professionalizingtheir organizations, pressures from donors and new international standardsof legitimacyalsoplayeda criticalrolein institutionalizinghumanitarianism.Yet not all agencies respondeduniformly,and we need to understandwhy. Expansion and politicization Four global processescreatednew opportunity structures that foregroundedthe "civilian"as an object of concern.11 Geopoliticalshifts associatedwith the end of the cold war and the demise of the Soviet Union increasedthe demand for humanitarianaction in severalways.12There appeared to be morehumanitariancrisesthan everbefore.13Whether 726

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in fact therewere more crisesor whethergreatpowerswere now willing to recognizepopulationsat risk becausetheir policieswere no longerthe immediatecause,the emergencieswereon the internationalagenda.14As statespaid more attention to them, they linked these populationsat riskto an expandingdiscourseof security.During the cold warthe UN SecurityCouncil definedthreatsto peaceand security asdisputesbetweenstatesthathadbecomeor mightbecome militarized,conflicts involving the greatpowers,and general threatsto global stability.15After the cold war, and in reactionto the growing perceptionthat domestic conflict and civil warswere leavinghundredsof thousandsof people at risk, creating mass flight, and destabilizing entire regions, the SecurityCouncil authorizedinterventionson thegroundsthattheseconflictschallengedregionalandinternational security.Responding to both the post-cold war humanitarianemergenciesand the growingprominenceof the SecurityCouncil in this domain, the GeneralAssembly passeda watershedresolutionin 1992 that made the UN the new coordinatingbody for humanitarianaction.16 Statesalso warmed to the idea of humanitarianaction. They were increasinglygenerous. Even more impressive was their increasing willingness to support operations whose stated function was to protect civiliansat risk, and even to considerthe legitimacyof humanitarianintervention.17 States also began to treat humanitarianaction as an instrument of their strategicand foreign policy goals. Since 9/11 many states, including the United States,have viewed counterterrorismand humanitarianismas crimefighting partners.In 2001 formerSecretaryof State Colin Powell told a gathering of NGOs that "just as surely as our diplomats and military, American NGOs are out there [in Afghanistan]servingand sacrificingon the frontlines of freedom. NGOs are such a force multiplier for us, such an importantpart of our combat team."'8 States also discoveredthat humanitarianaction could help them avoid more costly interventions. For instance, the major powers authorized the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) to deliver humanitarian reliefin Bosnia in part becausethey wanted to relievethe growing pressurefor a military intervention. Regardless of their motives, states were providing new opportunities for humanitarianaction. The second development that propelledthe encounter between politics and humanitarianismwas the emergence of"complexhumanitarianemergencies,"thatis, a "conflictrelatedhumanitariandisasterinvolving a high degree of breakdownand social dislocation and, reflectingthis condition, requiringa system-wideaid responsefromthe internationalcommunity."19These emergencies,which seemed to be proliferatingaroundthe world, arecharacterizedby a combustible mixture of state failure, refugee flight, militias, warriorrefugees, and populations at risk from violence,disease,andhunger.Suchsituationscreateda demand fornewsortsof interventionsandconflictmanagementtools.

Relief agencieswere attempting to distributefood, water, and medicine in war zones and were frequentlyforced to bargainwith militias,warlords,and hoodlums for accessto populationsin need. In situationsof extremeviolence and lawlessnesstheylobbiedforeigngovernmentsandthe United Nationsto considerauthorizinga protectionforcethatcould double asbodyguardand reliefdistributor.These emergencies also attracteda rangeof NGOs.20 Relief agenciesthat were deliveringemergencyassistance,human rights organizationsaspiringto protect rightsand createa rule of law, and development organizationskeen to sponsor sustainable growthbeganto interactand to takeresponsibilityfor the samepopulations.The growinginteractionbetweendifferent kinds of agencies that hailed from differentsectors encouraged a relief-rights-developmentlinkage within a humanitariandiscoursethat became tied to the construction of modern, legitimate, democraticstates.21As international actors began to think about the causes of and solutions to these emergencies, "humanitarian"came to include a wider rangeof practicesand goals. A third factor contributing to politicization was the political economy of funding. Although privatecontributions increased,they paled in comparisonto officialassistance. Between 1990 and 2000, aid levels rose from 2.1 to $5.9 billion. Moreover,as a percentageof officialdevelopment assistance,humanitarianaid rose from an averageof 5.8 percent between 1989 and 1993 to 10.5 percent in 2000.22 A few donors were responsiblefor much of this increase, and they also now comprise an oligopoly. The United States is the lead donor by a factor of three. In 1999, for instance,its outlaysexceededthe total assistance of twelve largeWesterndonors. Between 1995 and 1997 it provided20 percent of total assistance;in the following threeyearsits contributionrose to 30 percent.The second largestdonor is the EuropeanCommunity Humanitarian Organization (ECHO), followed by the United Kingdom, several European countries, Canada, and Japan. Although various motives fueled this increase in giving, many states expected either something in return or evidence that their money was being well spent. Finally, a change in the normative and legal environment also coaxedhumanitarianisminto the politicalworld. State sovereigntywas no longer sacrosanct;rather,it was becoming conditionalon statesbehavingaccordingto particular codes of conduct, honoring a "responsibilityto protect"their societies, and having attributessuch as the rule of law, markets, and democratic principles.23Their legitimacy became tied to their having the rule of law, markets,and democraticprinciples.These developments created a normative space for external intervention and encourageda growingrangeof actorsto expandtheirassistance activities.In some cases aid agencieswere supposed to provideimmediatereliefduringconflictsituations,while in others, to eliminate the root causesof conflict and create legitimate states. Regardlessof the pretext, the new

normativeenvironment greasedthe tracksformorewideranginginterventions.24

A flourishinghumanrightsagendaalso left its mark. The logicof reliefandthe logicof rightsshareimportant elements:theyplacethe humancitizenandhumanityat the fore; they use the languageof empowermentin attemptingto help the weak;and they rejectpower.25 Thatsaid,theyalsodemonstrate divisions;the reliefcomwill munity nearlyalwaysprivilegesurvivalover freedom, while the rightscommunityis sometimeswilling to use reliefas an instrumentof rights,that is, make of humanrights-a reliefconditionalon the observance movemanyreliefagenciesviewas nearlyincomprehensihumanrightsmoveble.26In anyevent,the fast-growing from ment pulledhumanitarianism the marginstoward the centerof the international policyagenda,and many reliefagencies,increasingly adoptingthelanguageof rights, weregladto rideits coattails.27 wasalsoatransformative facGrowingcosmopolitanism tor,for it underpinshumanitarianism. Cosmopolitanism maintainsthateachpersonisof equalmoralworthandthat in the "justification of choicesone'schoicesone musttake theprospectsof everyoneaffectedequallyintoaccount."28 The principleof impartialitypresumesthat all those at of theiridentity,deserveequalattention risk,regardless andconsideration. Thedesireto helpthosewhoaresufferof ing regardless placemeansthat bordersdo not define the limitsof obligations.This cosmopolitanethos,however,leadsto differentschoolsof thoughtin humanitarianSomehumanitarians ism,schoolsthatcanbe in tension.29 believeaidshouldberestricted to thevictimsof man-made and naturaldisasters;this branchemergedin the midnineteenthcenturyandis mostcloselyassociated withthe International fortheRedCross(ICRC).Another Committee branchof humanitarianism extendsassistance to all those at riskand imagineseliminatingthe conditionsthat are to renderpopulations Asoneaid vulnerable.30 hypothesized workerwrote,"[I]ntermsof thedestruction of humanlife, whatdifference is therebetweenthewartimebombingof a civilianpopulationandthedistribution of ineffective medicinesduringa pandemicthat is killingmillionsof peoIfindividuals areatriskbecauseofauthoritarian and ple?"31 then humanitarian must repressive policies, organizations be preparedto fight for humanrightsand democratic reforms.If individualsareat riskbecauseof povertyand thentheymustbeprepared to promotedeveldeprivation, opment.Ifregionalanddomesticconflictsarethesourceof violenceagainstindividuals, thentheymusttrytheirhand at conflictresolutionandattemptto eliminatethe underlyingcausesof conflict. Variation in response

Althoughthesechangesin globalpoliticscreatednewopenings for an expanded meaning of humanitarianism,aid December 2005 t Vol. 3/No. 4 727

Transformed Articles I Humanitarianism agencies were not uniformly receptive. Many, including the IRC and Oxfam, were ready,willing, and able to capitalize on new openings. They saw virtue in expanding theiroperationsto help the powerless,and insteadof being satisfiedto help the "well-feddead,"they could eliminate the root causes of conflict. Other organizationsmade a pragmaticdecision to become more political, though they were cautious about every step and mindful of possible consequences. Still others clung to their principles and resisted what they viewed as the siren of politics. The ICRC and MSF fought the international currents and stuck to their "firstprinciples."32 Two factors account for much of this variance. One was the congruence between the organizationalculture and these new openings. Humanitarianorganizationscan be sorted into two types-Dunantist and Wilsonianaccording to their understanding of the relationship between politics and humanitarianism.33 Named after Henry Dunant, the patriarchof modern Dunantistorganizationsdefinehumanhumanitarianism,34 itarianismas the neutral,independent, and impartialprovision of relief to victims of conflict and believe that humanitarianismand politics must be segregated.In general, Dunantist organizations,which are often accused of seeing themselves as the "high priests"of humanitarianism, fear that the relaxationof their founding principles or expansionof their mandatewill open the floodgatesto politics and endangerhumanitarianism. Wilsonian organizations,so named becausethey follow in the footstepsofWoodrow Wilson'sbelief that is was possible and desirableto transformpolitical, economic, and culturalstructuresso thattheyliberatedindividualsandproduced peace and progress,desireto attackthe root causes that leave populationsat risk.Although many of the most famous members of this camp, including Save the Children, Oxfam, and Word Vision International,originated in wartimeand thus concentratedon rescuingpopulations at risk, they expandedinto developmentand other activities designedto assistmarginalizedpopulations.Over time they also undertook advocacy-like a growing number of human rightsorganizationsthat also belong to this camp. Agenciesinvolvedin restoringand fosteringeconomic livelihoodsalsoexpressaWilsonianorientation.Wilsonianorganizations are certainly political, at least according to the Dunantist perspective;however,even those who have subscribedto a transformationalagendapresentthemselvesas apoliticalto the extent that they claim to act accordingto universalvalues and avoid partisanpolitics. Organizations' understandings of the relationship betweenhumanitarianismand politicshelp to explaintheir responseto the transformationsof the 1990s. The greater the discrepancybetween organizationalculture and environmental pressures,the more an organizationwill resist change for fearof political contamination;the greaterthe congruence,the more it will conformbecausesuch confor728

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mity will not threatenthe organization'sidentity.MSF and ICRC, the two best known Dunantist organizations,spent much of the 1990s unsuccessfullyattemptingto police the bordersbetween humanitarianismand politics. Wilsonian organizationsnot only capitalizedon these openings, they frequently lobbied for them. Many humanitarianinternationalorganizationssuch as United Nations High Committee for Reform (UNHCR) exploited these changes in sovereigntyto venturecarefullyinto domestic spacewhile claiming that they were not being political because they shunned any involvement in partisan politics. In fact, UNHCR activelylobbied for these changes by encouraging states to embrace the humanitarian agenda on the groundsthat this principledposition would furtherinternationalpeace and security.35 The gap between the moral and organizationalmandate also may have contributedto the expandingpurpose of humanitarianaction. Organizationsmay have felt the need to expand in order to resolve the contradiction between their broad aspirationalgoals and the more narrowlycircumscribedrulesthat limit theiraction.36Humanitarian organizationsare empowered by moral claims or aspirations. Limited organizational structures make it impossible to fulfill these mandates,creatinga reasonfor expansion into new areas.In attempting to relievesuffering, it is natural to aim for more than temporaryrelief, that is, for eliminating the conditions that produce a demand for humanitarianservices.37For instance, before the 1980s UNHCR leaped into action only afterpopulations crossedan internationalborder.Yet many UNHCR staff bristled at these restrictions,wanting to take on a preventive role. In the 1980s UNHCR began trying to preventrefugeeflows-to get at their "rootcauses"-and to lobby for "stateresponsibility."38From there it was a small step for UNHCR to become involved in eliminating the causes of flight and ensuring that repatriatedrefugeesstayedat home; towardthat end, it beganpromoting human rights,the rule of law,and economic development. Finally,resourcedependencehelps to explain organizations'differentresponsesto a broaderdefinitionof humanitarianaction.39Humanitarianorganizationsdo not survive by good intentions alone. They also need resources to fund their staff and programs;these resourcesare controlled by others. The willingness of others to fund organizations' humanitarianactivities is contingent, in part, on their perceivedlegitimacyand whetherthey areviewed as acting according to the supporting community's values.40 Existing organizations,especially those that were culturallyinclined to expand, thus had every incentive to move in directions that were directly rewardedby states. Development organizationsare exemplary here. By the end of the 1980s, development as a project had become increasinglydiscredited. Humanitarianismhanded these agenciesa new function and senseof purpose;they became necessaryfor post-conflict reconstructionand structural

prevention-central to humanitarian action and international and human security.41Newly establishedorganizations, some humanitarianand some less so, found it advantageousto present themselvesand their activitiesas quintessentiallyhumanitarian.Existingagenciesalso were rewardedby expanding their activities. For instance, by becoming the lead humanitarianagency,UNHCR was in a position not only to expand its responsibilities,but also to demonstrate its relevanceto the very states who paid the bills.42

Expansion and institutionalization Until the 1990s, humanitarianismbarelyexistedas a field. There were only a handfulof majorreliefagencies,including the ICRC, InternationalFederationof the Red Cross, MSF,and variousorganizationssuch as Savethe Children and Oxfam that beganas reliefagencies,moved into development, and then developedan emergencyresponsecapacity (though generally not adopting the discourse of humanitarianism).Although these agencies sharedbroad principles,such as humanity, impartiality,neutrality,and independence, there was no concerted effort to establish codes of conduct and standardsof behaviorto regulatethe field and define membership.Those who participatedin relief work treated it more as a craft than as a profession because, in the main, they did not claim that their qualificationsderivedfrom specializedknowledge,doctrine, or training, and did not see this as their life'swork. Yet in the 1990s humanitarianismbecame a field, with regularinteractions among the members, an increase in the informationand knowledgethat membershad to consider, a greaterreliance on specializedknowledge, and a collectiveawarenessthat they were involved in a common enterprise.The field was becoming rationalized,aspiring to develop:methodologies for calculatingresults,abstract rules to guide standardizedresponses,and proceduresto improve efficiencyand identify the best means to achieve specified ends. Humanitarian organizations were also becoming bureaucratized,developing spheres of competence, and rules to standardizeresponses and to drive means-ends calculations. Professionalismfollowed, with demands for actors who had specific knowledge, vocational qualificationsthat derived from specialized training, and the ability to follow fixed doctrine.43 Sociological institutionalism helps to explain why humanitarianismdeveloped in this manner.This branch of organizationaltheoryemphasizesthe "sociallyconstructed normative worlds in which organizationsexist and how the social rules, standardsof appropriateness,and models of legitimacywill constitutethe organization."44 The environment in which an organizationis embedded is defined by a culturethat contains acceptablemodels, standardsof action, goals, and logics of appropriateness.Organizations are constituted by, and will be compelled to adopt, this

culturefor a varietyof reasons-though resourcerequirementsfigurecentrally.As ScottandMeyerobserve,thisnormative environmentcontains the "rulesand requirements to which individual organizationsmust conform if they are to receive support and legitimacy from the environment."45In short, becauseorganizationsare rewardedfor conformingto rulesandlegitimizationprinciples,andpunished if they do not, they tend to model themselvesafter organizationalforms that have legitimacy. The environmentalso helps to explaininstitutionalisomorphism, that is, why particularmodels spread.46There are three mechanisms:coercive,mimetic, and normative. The first two are most relevant here. Coercive isomorphism occurswhen powerfulorganizations,such as states, imposerulesand standardson otherorganizations.Mimetic isomorphism largely occurs in situations of uncertainty, encouragingorganizationsto model themselvesafterothers that they believe are successful. Normative isomorphism largely originates from professionalization-the attempt by membersof an occupation "todefine the conditions and methods of theirwork, to control the production of producers,"47and to establishthe epistemic basis for their authority and the claim to occupational autonomy. In general, sociological institutionalismemphasizes how organizations, desirous of symbolic and material resourcesand exposed to the same environment,will tend to adopt the same organizationalforms. The institutionalizationof humanitarianismwas largely drivenby challengesto the emergingfield'slegitimacyand effectiveness-challenges that emanatedfrom donors that paid the bills and memberswho were experiencinga crisis of confidencein reactionto new circumstancesand shortcomings. These challenges were answeredby rationalizing, bureaucratizing,and professionalizing. A major feature of the field's rationalizationwas the attempt to standardizerelief activities.48In response to the influx of relief agenciesthat were operatingaccording to varyingstandards-a situation made doubly dangerous for agencies in the context of providing relief during conflict-and the growing evidence that differentpopulationswerebeing differentiallytreated,humanitarianorganizationsattemptedto establishprofessionalstandardsand codes of conduct. Severalsuch initiatives stand out. In 1992 the ICRC, the InternationalFederationof the Red Cross, and the Red CrescentSociety (in consultationwith the SteeringCommitteefor HumanitarianResponse)began work on a ten-point code of conduct. Originally conceived as providing guidance during natural disasters,it was extended to cover conflict situationsas well. The first four articlesreaffirmthe basicprinciplesof the ICRC, and the last six identify "goodpractices"and methodology for relief operations.This document is used by variousagencies guide their actions in warzones.49VariousNGOs also assembledwhat came to be known as the ProvidencePrinciples, which also aimed to introduce standardizedrules December 2005 I Vol, 3/No. 4

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Transformed Articles I Humanitarianism for deliveringrelief.The same desireled variousNGOs to launch the SPHERE project to establish minimal standards in the areasof water, sanitation, nutrition, shelter, site planning, and health.50This development, in turn, led to the Humanitarian Charter, which endeavors to "achievedefined levels of service for people affected by calamity or armed conflict, and to promote the observance of Dunantist humanitarianprinciples."The sheer proliferationof principlesand exercisesto establishcodes of conduct representedan attempt to standardizethe rules governinghumanitarianaction.51 Another featureof rationalizationwas the introduction of systems of accountability.52This development was pushed by donors, who began to apply "newpublic management"principlesas they expected humanitarianorganizations to provide evidence that their money was being well spent. These principlesoriginatedwith the neoliberal orthodoxy of the 1980s. One of neoliberalism'sgoals was to reduce the state'srole in the deliveryof public services and, instead, to rely on commercial and voluntary organizations, which were viewed as more efficient. Because governmentagenciesjustifiedthe shift from the public to the privateand voluntarysectorson the grounds that the latter were more efficient, they introduced monitoring mechanisms to reduce the possibility of either slack or shirking.53Until the 1990s, humanitarianorganizations largelyescapedthis public managementideology. Because humanitarianassistancewas a minor part of the foreign aid budget, statesdid not view humanitarianismas central to theirforeignpolicy goals, and statestrustedthat humanitarianagencieswere efficientand effective;therewas little reasonfor statesto absorbthe monitoring costs. However, once funding increased, humanitarianismbecame more centralto securitygoals, and states began to question the effectivenessof humanitarianorganizations,they werewilling to do so.54 Toward that end, states introduced new reporting requirements, developed new kinds of contracts,and demanded greaterevidence of results. The drive toward accountability was not completely donor-driven, for those within the sector increasingly sought greater accountability-to recipients. It was not enough to be accountableto donors for how their money was spent; it shows it also was important to be accountable to the supposed beneficiaries of their activities. Accountability,therefore, increasinglymeant identifying ways to improve agencies' policies. These developments led to varioussystem-wideinitiatives,including the Active LearningNetwork for Accountabilityand Performancein HumanitarianAction (ALNAP).55In addition, in 1999 variousNGOs initiated the Ombudsman for Humanitarian Assistanceto addresstheir accountabilityto "clients." Emblematic of bureaucratization was the effort by humanitarianorganizationsto develop technologies and methodologies to calculate the effects of their policies in order to demonstrate effectivenessand identify optimal 730

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strategies.Priorto the 1990s few humanitarianorganizations even thought to measurethe consequencesof their actions, assuming that the mere provision of assistance was evidenceof theirgood results.Two developmentsshatteredthis blissfulassumption.The firstwas mounting evidence that some humanitarian interventions might be causingmoreharmthan good. Rwanda,in particular,burst the confidenceof the humanitariancommunity.56In addition, donors began demanding results-basedevaluations. Measuringimpact and demonstratingthat humanitarian organizationsareresponsiblefor success(or failure)is a demandingmethodologicaltask. Humanitarianorganizations must define "impact,"specify their goals and translate them into measurableindicators,gatherdata in highly fluid emergencysettings,establishbaselinedatain orderto generatea "beforeand after"snapshot,control for alternative explanationsand variables,and construct reasonable counterfactualscenarios.57Nevertheless,they made considerableheadway.Humanitarianorganizationsbegan to drawon epidemiologicalmodels in the healthsciencesand program evaluation tools of the development field. The United Statespushedfor creationof the StandardizedMonitoringand Assessmentof Reliefand Nutrition (SMART). Care International'sBenefits-Harmsanalysis,which borrows methodologies developed in the human rights field, helps relief and development organizationsmeasure the impact of their programson people'shuman rights.58 Humanitarianorganizationsalso moved to professionalize. Although relief workersstill learn on the job, organizations increasinglydraw on the health sciences and engineering,extant manuals,and specializedtrainingprograms run by privatefirms, NGOs, states, and academic institutions. Agencies increasinglyrecruit relief workers who have training in specialized fields. Although relief workersstill have a high burnout rate, and most organizations have an impressivedegree of staff turnover,many agencies now have full-time staff, who draw salarieswith benefits packagesand treat the field as a career.In addition, many premieragenciesunderwenta majorchangein their bureaucraticstructure.Although operational divisions still carry tremendous prestige and influence, they increasinglycompete with newly establishedoffices dedicated to fund-raisingand donor relations,staffedby those whose primaryfield experiencederives not from refugee camps, but from marketingcampaignsand pledge drives.

Consequences of Transformation The transformationof humanitarianismhas left its mark, and humanitarianorganizationshotly debatewhetherit is a mark of Cain. At times this debate appearsto devolve into two equally stylized camps: one waxing sentimental about some quasi-mythicalgolden age of humanitarian action in which relief agencies enjoyed a space of infinite expanse, and another suggesting that the golden age is

around the corner because humanitarianagencies have neverbeen betterfunded or betterpositioned to help more people at risk. Without getting pulled into this debate, I want to explore how the politicization and institutionalization of humanitarianismhas left organizationsmore vulnerableto externalcontrol. States are now able to use directand indirectmeansto constrainand guide the actions of humanitarian agencies in ways that agencies believe potentially violate their principles.The externalenvironment more generallyaffects the organizationalculture of humanitarianagencies-their identity, internal organization, practices, principles, and calculations.The discussion of the transformationof humanitarianism,in other words, forces us to consider the effects of power in terms of what humanitarianorganizationsdo and what they are. Power over humanitarian action States and international institutions can now compel humanitarianagenciesto act in wayscounterto theirinterests and principles.Although states have historicallyvacillated in their desire to use humanitarianaction to serve theirinterests,the 1990s were unprecedentedto the extent that states attempted to impose their agendas on agencies.59Towardthat end, states began introducing mechanisms that were intended to control their "implementing partners."Although such controlmechanismsdid not necessarilycompel agencies to act in ways that they believed were antagonistic to their interests or principles, frequently they did. The most important control mechanism came from the power of the purse. Sometimesdonors make transparent threats.In 2003 U.S. AID administratorAndrewNatsios told humanitarianorganizationsoperatingin Iraqthat they were obliged to show the Americanflag if they took U.S. funding. If not, he warned,they could be replaced.60 One NGO official capturedthe U.S. messagein the following terms:"playthe tune or 'they'lltakeyou out of the band.' ,61 Sometimes donors use more subtle, indirect, methods, for example, by insisting that agencies submit to coordination mechanisms. Coordination can appear to be a technical exercisewhose function is to improve the division of labor, increase specialization, and heighten efficiencies.Yetthis coordination,like all governanceactivities, is a highly political exercise,defined by power.The power behind coordination has not been lost on humanitarian organizations,especiallywhen the donors are parties to the conflict or have a vested interest in the outcome.62 Most famously,NATO in Kosovo and the United States in Afghanistan insisted on coordinating humanitarian action.63Although they justifiedtheir role on the grounds that it would improve the relief effort, they had more self-interestedreasons:in order to sell the war at home, the combatantswanted the favorablepublicity that came

with being televiseddeliveringfood to, and building shelters for, displaced populations. It also would help them win the "hearts and minds" campaign, integral to the war effort.64Humanitarianorganizations,though, were now being coordinatedby one of the parties to the conflict, compromisingtheir neutralityand independence.65 The bilateralizationof aid and the earmarkingof funds also potentially steers individual agencies, and has produced disturbingtrendsin the allocationof aid. Multilateral aid is technicallydefined as aid given to multilateral organizations and not earmarked;these organizations, therefore,have complete discretionoverhow the money is spent. Bilateralaid can mean the state either dictates to the multilateralorganizationhow the money is spent or gives the money to a nonmultilateralorganizationsuch as an NGO. Earmarkingmeansthat the donor dictateswhere and how the assistancewill be used, frequentlyidentifying regions,countries,operations,or even projects;this is especially useful if governmentshave geopolitical interestsor pet projects. Since the 1980s there has been a dramatic shift away from multilateralaid and toward bilateralaid and earmarking.In 1988 states directed roughly 45 percent of humanitarianassistance to UN agencies in the form of multilateralassistance.After 1994, however,the averagedropped to 25 percent (and even lower in 1999 because of Kosovo).66Accordingly,state interests, rather than the humanitarianprinciple of relief based on need, increasinglydrivesfunding decisions. For instance, of the top 50 recipientsof bilateralassistancebetween 1996 and 1999, the statesof the formerYugoslavia,Israel/Palestine, and Iraqreceived50 percent of the availableassistance.67 In 2002 nearly half of all funds given by donor governments to the UN's 25 appealsfor assistancewent to Afghanistan.68If funding decisions were based solely on need, then places like Sudan, Congo, northern Uganda, and Angola would leapfrogto the top of the list.69In general, while thereis more aid than everbefore,it is controlledby fewer donors, who are more inclined to impose conditions and direct aid toward their priorities,undermining the principle of impartiality.Funding is now a severaltiered system, with the least fortunate getting the least attention.70 Humanitarian organizationsbristled at these control mechanisms. Any organizationwill object to encroachments on its autonomy. Yet humanitarianorganizations fearednot only less autonomy,but also havingto compromise their humanitarian principles. The language of principal-agenttheory helps explainwhy. Statessee themselves as principals that provide a temporarytransferof authorityto their agents, humanitarianorganizations.Yet humanitarianorganizationsdo not see themselvesas agents of states or operating with delegated authority;they see themselvesas agents of humanity that operatewith moral authority.The veryassociationwith statesand its presumption of delegatedauthority,then, potentially undermines December 2005 I Vol. 3/No, 4 731

Articles I Humanitarianism Transformed the moralauthoritycherishedby most humanitarianorganization. Indeed, if states fund humanitarian organizations in order to further their foreign policy goals, then humanitarianorganizationsarejustifiablyconcerned.States' attempt to monitor and regulatehumanitarianorganizations almost by definition compromises their guiding principles. Humanitarian action redefined The new environmentand the transformationof humanitarianismis also leaving its imprint on the organizational cultureof humanitarianagencies,producingchangesthat potentiallyunderminethe coreprincipleof impartialrelief. The transformationof humanitarianism,as alreadynoted, includes an expansionof the practicesand goals associated with humanitarianaction. This logicallymeans that many humanitarianorganizationsare, in other words, articulating an expandingset of goals. Goal expansionhas several possibleconsequences.It can lead to traditionalgoalsbeing displaced. Relief was formerlyan end in itself, but agencies are increasinglyconsidering its relationshipto other goals. For instance, rights-based agencies have demonstrateda greaterwillingness to use relief in order to promote basic human rights. Not only does need cease to be unconditional, but aid organizationsmight now also be attemptingto determinewho is worthy of aid, thus acting much like the nineteenth-century relief workers interested in helping the "deservingpoor."71There is growing anecdotalevidence, moreover,that as many agencieshave increasinglyemphasizedadvocacy,rights,and peacebuilding, they have not maintained their capacity for emergency relief,harmingtheir responsecapacityto situations like Darfur.72 Bureaucratizationis associatedwith the growing priority of base organizationalinterests such as survival and funding.73Reflectingon the emergenceof the "HumanitarianInternational,"Alex de Waalarguesthat in the competition between "softinterests"such as performingrelief well and "hardinterests"such as organizationalsurvival and prosperity,noble ideals increasinglylose.74Ideals are particularlythreatenedwhen agenciesneed to interactwith new donor environments to fund their activities. States' new contract mechanisms, including short-term contracts,competitivebidding,and reportingrules,haveintroduced perverse incentives for agencies that care about funding as much as they do about protectingpopulations at risk. Humanitarian organizationsmight doctor their performanceindicatorsin order to transformfailureinto success, compete in areas in which they do not have a comparativeadvantagein order to securefunding, or fail to reportshortcomingsor the misuse of funds by subcontractorsin order to avoid jeopardizingtheir contracts.75 Furthermore,becausevisibilitycan be a prerequisitefor getting funding, many organizationsprefer publicity to 732

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critical but very unglamourouswork.76In the camps in Zaire following the Rwandan genocide, humanitarian groups rushed to the scene in order to show the flag and impress funders back home. Working in an orphanage photographswell and bringsin revenue,but buildingclean latrinesand sanitation systems does not-even though it is equally if not more essentialfor saving lives. Such a set of incentivesmight createmarketfailures.De Waalposits a Gresham'sLaw for humanitarianism:bad humanitarian action can crowd out good action because humanitarian organizationsare rewardedfor being seen ratherthan for saving lives.77 Evidencealso points to agencies'shiftingwhat they consider to be appropriateaction, thus redefiningtheir principlesand practices.Relaxationor redefinitionof neutrality and independencecan introducenew rule-governedbehavior that can compromise impartiality.For example, one former Oxfam official reflectedthat his organizationhad become so supportive of NATO intervention in Kosovo that it forgot that genuine impartiality demanded that Oxfam and other relieforganizationsshould have been on both sides of the border-helping Kosovarrefugees and Serbianvictimsof NATO bombing.78Humanitarianorganizations also might develop new rules that potentially undermine the safety of populations. As it attempted to navigate state pressures,UNHCR altered its underlying rules and principlesof action in a way that increasedits propensityto put the lives of refugeesat risk.79 This transformationalso can subtly alter the ethical principles and calculations used by agencies to guide their policies. Humanitarianagenciesaredemonstratinga shift from deontological, or duty-based, ethics to consequentialistethics. This development is driven partly by a growingconcernwith the negativeconsequencesof humanitarianaction and the relateddesire to measureeffectiveness and impact.80Previouslyhumanitarianorganizations were instinctively guided by deontological ethics: some actions are simply good in and of themselves regardless of their consequences.Ethical action consists of identifying these intrinsicallygood actions and then performing one's moral duty. The growing concern with unintended consequences, however, has contributed to an ethic of consequentialism: whether or not an action is ethical dependson the outcome.The issuefor humanitarianorganizations is becoming not whether aid has negative and unintended consequences-for it almost always doesbut whether,on balance, it does more harm than good.81 Consequentialist reasoning requiresagencies to identify the outcomes of concern-and as their goals expand, the outcome variablesthat must be considered expand, too. Accordingly,agencies have an incentive to consider how relief might affect development, human rights, and peace building-potentially erodingthe ideathat agenciesshould give on the basis of need and not on the basis of other goals.

The desireto measureimpact and effectivenessalso can abradea centralelement of the humanitarianethic:a desire to demonstratesolidaritywith victims and to restoretheir dignity. Relief workers,in Rony Brauman'swords, aspire to "remainclose to people in distressand to try and relieve their suffering."82They do so by providingnot only relief, but also compassion and caring.The ethic of humanitarianism, in this respect,includes both consequentialistand duty-basedethics-it seeksto providelife-savingreliefand holds that the motives matter for assuring benevolence. Yetcan such nonquantifiablevaluesas compassionbe operationalized when attempting to determine the effectiveness of humanitarianaction?Is it possible to quantify,for instance, the reuniting of families, the provisionof burial shrouds, or the reductionof fear and anxiety among people in desperatesituations?83If they are omitted from the model, the model might redefinehow humanitarianagencies think about impact,downgradingbasicethicalmotives in favor of measurableoutcomes. If the measurablevariables are no longer dependent on the subjectiveneeds of the "beneficiaries,"will they even be consulted? Measuresof effectiveness,then, and the growing reliance of agencies on rational-legalprinciples to generate their legitimacy,might undermine the moral authorityof humanitarianorganizations.If the legitimacyand value of humanitarianaction is based strictly on deliverablesand producingmeasurableoutcomes-saving livesat the cheapest price-then why not hire a private agency, if available?84After all, the victim probablydoes not care if the blanketsaredeliveredby a commercialfirm or a nonprofit agency. If aid agencies are increasingly drifting toward rational-legalprinciplesas a way of defending their legitimacy,they might not only have difficultycompetingwith commercial firms but also might undermine their moral authority. The presumed difference between the WalMarts and the World Visions is that the former does not have moralauthoritywhile the latterdoes. What happens, though,when humanitarianagenciesincreasinglybasetheir legitimacy on their ability to measureup to standardsset by modern, commercialfirms?Such a developmentmight very well undermine what makes humanitarian action distinctive.

Conclusion: Humanitarianismand WorldOrder Humanitarianismcan only be understoodin relationship to the worldorderthatconstitutesit. Althoughmuch scholarshiphas focused on how principledactorshave changed world politics by pressuringstates to take the high road and redefine their interests, I have inverted this claim in examining how global politics has reshapedthe natureof humanitarianaction.85The environmentthat surrounded humanitarianismchanged in profound ways during the 1990s. The expanding scope and scale of humanitarian

action creatednew opportunitiesfor agenciesto help more people than everbefore.A practicethat was once restricted to reliefand emergencyassistancehas become-like communism, nationalism,liberalism-an ism,not part of this world but a projectdesignedto transformit. These changesin humanitarianaction suggestthat it has a new function in internationalpolitics. Originallyits distinctive function in the internationalsacrificialorderwas to interruptthe selection processby savingthose at immediate risk. It did not pretendto be anythingbut palliative. Yet this temperancemovement also served an ideological function,helpingto reproducethe geopoliticalorderbecause it reduced pressuresthat might have demanded its transformation.Considermodernhumanitarianism's origins.By the mid-nineteenth century,changes in military technology weremakingwarmore brutal;therewas little tradition of medicalrelief;and the emergingprofessionof warreporting wastransmittinggruesomepicturesand accountsofsoldiersleft to languishand die on the battlefield.Publicswere beginningto rebelat thesesightsand to expresspacifistsentiments.In response,stateandmilitaryelitesco-optedDunant'splatform,removedits moreradicalproposals,accepted new rulesgoverninghow to tend wounded soldierson the battlefield,andthusdemonstratedto theirpublicstheircommitment to humanize war. Humanitarianism, in other words, helped to rescuethose on the battlefield-and the system of war. In fact, decadesafter founding the ICRC, Dunantconcludedthathumanitarianism hadbeenco-opted the he from walked reformismand by states-system; away embracedpacifism.86Recentdevelopmentsin international humanitarianlawcanbe interpretedasservinga similarfunction for the warmachineastheylessenthe demandfor more radicalchange in the global-militaryorder. The drift of humanitarianaction from relief to root causes indicatesa shift in its role in the internationalsacrificial order.No longer satisfiedwith saving individuals today so that they can be at risk tomorrow,humanitarianism now aspiresto transformthe structuralconditions that make populations vulnerable.Towardthat end, aid agencies desire to spread development, democracy,and human rights, and to join a peace-buildingagenda that aspiresto createstable,effective,and legitimatestates.They arecarriersof liberalvaluesas they help spin into existence a globalliberalorder.87Although theirtranscendental,universal, and cosmopolitan commitments might appearto threaten an international society organized around the nation-state, in fact most of their activities do not challenge the states-system,but instead are designed to create a more stable,legitimatestateorganizedaroundthese supposedly universal principles.88Humanitarian organizations may or may not be part of a neoliberalagenda,and they may or may not resemble the missionariesof the nineteenthcentury.But by their own admission,they view their social purposeas promoting liberalvaluesin orderto make the world safer,more humane, and more just. December 2005 1 Vol. 3/No, 4

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Articles I Humanitarianism Transformed Humanitarianismis now more firmly part of politics. Certainly it alwayswas part of politics to the extent that its actionshad politicaleffectsand reliefworkerssaw themselves as standing with the weak and against the mighty. Yethumanitarianagenciesrestrictedtheir ambition to saving lives at immediateriskin partto keep statesat bay and preservetheir goal for relief.They are now firmly,and in many ways self-consciously,part of politics. Humanitarianism no longer clings to principles of neutrality,independence, and impartialityas method of depoliticization, but increasingly views the former two principles as a (unnecessary)luxury. Humanitarianismand politics are no longer discursivelyconstructedin binary,oppositional terms; instead, their points of intersectionare many, and humanitarianism'smeanings increasinglyare defined by the sort of politics once viewed as its bete noire. Humanitarianism,in short, is self-consciouslypartof politics. It is increasinglyan ismthat is no longer satisfiedwith reforming the world, but now has ambitions about its very transformation. This transformationis forcing humanitarianorganizations to criticallyreexaminetwo defining self-images.One is the beliefthat they operatestrictlyon behalfof others,are devoid of power,89and areas weak as the individualsthey weretryingto save.Manyhumanitarianorganizationsnow have annual budgets that rivalthose of the states that are the objectsof theirintervention,and theyareno longercontent to stand outside of politics but areincreasinglypartof governancestructuresthat areintended to transformstates and societies. Humanitarianorganizationscan no longer pretendthat they lack power-including poweroverthose with whom they stand in solidarity.90 These developments also challenge their self-image as representativesof humanity.As a recent report regarding the currentand futurechallengesto humanitarianismputs it, "Many in the South do not recognizewhat the international community calls the universalityof humanitarian values as such.... Humanitarianaction is viewed as the latest in a series of imposition of alien values, practices, and lifestyles.Northern incursionsinto the Southfrom the Crusades to colonialism and beyond-have historicallybeen perceivedvery differentlydepending on the vantagepoint."91Indeed, if humanitarianismincreasingly reflectsglobalizationand Westernization,then there are good reasonswhy those in the Southern hemisphere view these agenciesas the "mendicantordersof Empire."92 Although such observations are nearly as speculative as the claims to universalitythey are meant to replace,there has been little researchinto how the recipientsview Western alms and whetherother traditionsof reliefand charity also sharevalues associatedwith the Western tradition of humanitarianaction. Humanitarianismis now balanced on the knife'sedge of varioustensions, tensions that have become more pronounced as it has become (more self-consciously)part of 734

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politics. Humanitarianism is now precariouslysituated between the politics of solidarityand the politics of governance. Humanitarianworkers traditionallysaw themselves as apolitical as they defied systems of power and were in solidaritywith the victims of a sacrificialorder.As they become increasinglyimplicatedin governancestructures, they find themselvesin growing collaborationwith those whom they once resisted.Whether they will be successfulat this more ambitious agendaremainsto be seen. Whether they are or not, though, humanitarianaction might very well be an effect of the very circuits of power that they once viewed as part of the internationalsacrificial order.

Notes 1 On the recent expansionof the humanitariansystem, see Blondel 2000; de Waal 1997, 68-72; Macrae 2002; Minear 2002, chap. 1; Roberts 1999. For an account of the growth of humanitarianorganizations that focuses on externalforces, see Lindenberg and Bryant2001. 2 In this way, humanitarianismis a logocentric,which JacquesDerridaobservesis in play whenever "one privilegedterm (logos) providesthe orientation for interpretingthe meaning of the subordinateterm" (Nyers 1999, 21). See also Cutts 1998, 3; Malkki 1995; Warner1999; Minear 2002, 76 This definition drawsfrom Stockton 2004a, 15. 3 4 Bradol2004. 5 Douglas 2002. 6 Pictet 1979. 7 The ICRC'sprinciplesare largelythe industrystandard, though there are debates about the prioritiesof these principles,their operationalmeaning, and even their relevance.Forsythe2005; Terry2002; Weiss 1999; Duffield 2001a; Minear 2002; Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1996, 14-18. 8 Rieff2002; Minear 2002; Donini 2004; Duffield 2001a, Slim 2004a, Leader2000. 9 Terry2002. 10 De Torrente2004, Anderson 2004. 11 Slim 2004a. 12 De Waal 1997, 133-34. 13 On the epistemologyof "humanitariancrisis,"see Stockton 2004a. 14 Slim 2004a, 155-56. 15 White 1993, 34-38; Howard 1993, 69-70. 16 GeneralAssembly ResolutionAIRES/46/182, 19 December 1991, Strengtheningof the Coordination of HumanitarianEmergencyAssistanceof the United Nations. 17 Lang 2003; InternationalCommission on Intervention and State Sovereignty2001; Holzgrefe and Keohane 2003; Wheeler 2000; Slim 2002c.

18 Secretaryof State Colin Powell, remarksto the National ForeignPolicy Conferencefor Leadersof NongovernmentalOrganizations,October 26, 2001. 19 Duffield 2001a, 12; also see Edkins 1996; Weiss 1999, 20; White 2000. 20 Kelly 1998, 174-75. 21 Duffield 2001 a. 22 Macraeet al. 2002, 15. For a good overview,see Randel and German 2002. 23 InternationalCommission on Interventionand State Sovereignty2001. 24 Macrae 1999, 6-7. 25 Chandler2002, chap. 1. 26 See Bouchet-Saulnier2000. See also Leaderand Macrae2000; Chandler2002; Minear2002, chap. 3. 27 Chandler2002, 21. 28 Beitz 1994, 124. See also Linklater1998, chap. 2. 29 Calhoun 2004. 30 Cosmopolitanism and the discourseof humanity have not alwaysled to impartialityas understood today, because those who claimed to be "humanitarian"and act in the name of humanity also could reflecta discoursein which some peoples were more human than others and thus more deservingof assistance.See Finnemore 1996. 31 Bradol2004, 9. 32 Sommaruga1999; Tanguy and Terry 1999; Rieff 1999. 33 This classificationderivesfrom other taxonomies, including Minear 2002, 78; Stoddard2002; Weiss 1999; Donini 2005. Feinstein InternationalFamine Center 2004, 54, arguesthat how agenciesposition themselvesaround these categoriesis determinedby variousfactors,such as managementand leadership, institutional culture, networks,and geographicaland programmaticscope. Solidaristorganizationsare another branch;they openly identify with one party to a conflict and thus do not care about neutrality. Although I (and others) focus largelyon international nongovernmentalorganizations,there are various internationalorganizationswhose principal mandate is humanitarian(and ICRC, the patriarch of the humanitariancommunity, is neither a nongovernmentalor a internationalorganization).Beginning afterWorld War I and then increasingafter World WarTwo, states establishedvariousinternational organizations,including the UNHCR and the World Food Program,to help them carryout their humanitarianobligations. State sovereignty, though, significantlyshaped their working definition of humanitarianismand its relationshipto politics. At the beginning of the last century states cautiously evoked the languageof humanitarianismfor fear that such transcendentalconcerns might swamp their core interestsand undermine their sovereignty;

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consequently,they used sovereigntyto fence in what these internationalorganizationscould do and these organizations,in turn, cleavedto the principlesof consent, neutrality,and impartialityin order to signal to states that they knew their place. The changing meaning of sovereignty,particularlynoticeable after the Cold War,though, opened up space for many internationalorganizationsto use a more expansiveunderstandingof humanitarianism as they became more deeply involved in domestic space. See Barnett2001 for a discussion. Appalled by the carnagewrought by a fiercebattle between Frenchand Austrianforces in Solferino, Italy,in June 1859, Dunant, a Swiss citizen, appealed to the local population to tend to the thousands of sufferingsoldiers. Based on his personal experiences,Dunant wrote an account that became a bestsellerin Europe and stirredEuropeanelites to consider his proposalsfor regulatingwar and administering to the wounded. These discussionsproduced both the Geneva Conventions, which established internationalhumanitarianlaw, and the ICRC, which was to be an impartial,neutraland independent organizationwhose exclusivehumanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war. UNHCR 1990. Barnettand Finnemore2004, chap. 6. Another factor potentiallyinfluencing this expansion is psychological,derivingfrom personalstrainof reliefwork. Relief workersmigratefrom one nightmare to another,comforted only by the fact that, at best, they provide temporaryrelief.This sort of existence takes a very high emotional toll. Wanting to believe that they are helping to build a better world, reliefworkersbegan to treathuman rights, conflict resolution, and nation building as extensions of humanitarianism.See Rieff 2002. Chimni 1993, 444; Coles 1989, 203. The heart of the resourcedependence approachis that "organizationssurviveto the extent that they are effective.Their effectivenessderivesfrom the managementof demands, particularlydemands of interestgroups upon which the organizationsdepend for resourcesand support.... There are a varietyof ways of managingdemands, including the obvious one of giving in to them" (Pfefferand Salancik2003, 2). Meyer and Scott 1983, 140. Duffield 2001a; Donini 2004; Duffield, Macrae, and Curtis 2001. Loescher2001. For definitions of rationalization,see Weber 1947; for bureaucratization,see Beetham 1985, 69; for professionalization,see Ritzer 1975. December 2005 1Vol. 3/No. 4 735

Articles I Humanitarianism Transformed 44 Orru, Biggart,and Hamilton 1991, 361. See also Scott 1987; Scott 1995; DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Meyer and Rowan 1977. 45 DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 140. 46 Ibid., 150-54. 47 Larson 1977, 49-52; cited from DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 152. 48 Leader 1999. 49 InternationalConference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent 1995. 50 Gostelow 1999. 51 Another innovation was the ConsolidatedAppeals Process,establishedin 1991 by the UN General Assembly in responseto the growing perception that there were too many agencies appealingto too many donors for too many differentsectors in too many situations. In order to improvejoint planning and quickly mobilize funds and targetthem for high priority areas,the UN decided to act as a coordinating mechanism. By 2002 there had been 165 different appeals.See Porter2002 for a review. 52 Smillie and Minear 2004, 215-24; Slim 2002a; Mitchell, 2003. 53 Macraeet al. 2002, 18-21. 54 De Waal 1997, 78-79. 55 Slim 2002a. 56 Anderson 1996; Terry2002; Slim 1997; Vaux 2001, chap. 3. 57 HumanitarianPolicy Group 2004; Fearon2004; Darcy 2005. 58 O'Brien 2002. 59 Feinstein InternationalFamine Center 2004; Donini 2005. Smillie and Minear 2004, chap. 9. These claims are consistent with principal-agentanalysis. See Bendor, Glazer,and Hammond 2001, 20. For applicationsto internationalrelations,see Thatcher and Sweet 2002; Nielson and Tierney 2003; Hawkins et al. 2005. 60 Natsios 2003. 61 Quoted in Smillie and Minear 2004, 143. 62 Minear 2002, chap. 2; Macraeet al. 2002, chap. 3; Donini 2004. 63 Rieff 2002, chap. 6. 64 States also wanted to see for themselveswhat was occurringin the field. Towardthat end, they began sending representativesto relayfirsthandaccounts of assistanceactivitiesand began developing the capacity for independent needs assessmentsand strategic analyses.An immediate consequencewas that humanitarianorganizationsno longer benefited from having privilegedand highly authoritativeinformation. Becausethe authorityof NGOs comes from their practicalexperiencefrom "thefield" (Slim 2002b, 4), this development might undermine their discretion. 736

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65 A major controversyin this regardconcernswhether the willingness of aid agenciesto align themselves with the United Statesin Afghanistanand Iraqis one cause behind the growing perception that aid workersare no longer given immunity during war. 66 Randel and German 2002, 21. 67 Ibid. 68 Smillie and Minear 2004, 145. See also Macrae et al. 2002, Jeffreys2002, Porter2002. 69 Many in the humanitariansector agreethat while the global responseto the tsunami was impressive,it was disproportionatein relationshipto need. In fact, becauseMSF believed that it had more than enough, it asked donors to unrestrictthe funds so that they could be channeled to another region in greaterneed; if they refused,MSF attempted to returnthe donations. 70 In responseto the politicization of priorities,humanitarianorganizationsentered into a dialogue with the principaldonors to try to establishmore impartialstandards.The resultwas the Good Donorship Initiative.See Harmer,Cotterrell,and Stoddard2004. 71 Rieff 2002. 72 Interviewwith official from the UN Office for the Coordinatorof HumanitarianAssistance,New York, March 8, 2005. 73 Harrell-Bond2002; Barnettand Finnemore2004. 74 De Waal 1997, 65-66. 75 Cooley and Ron 2002; Darcy 2005. 76 Smillie and Minear 2004, 143. 77 De Waal 1997, 138-39. 78 Vaux 2001. 79 Barnettand Finnemore2004, chap. 4. 80 There also were growing calls to measure"need"-to replacesubjectiveand emotional assessmentswith more objective criteriaas a way to reinforcethe impartialityprinciple and bring more attention to forgotten emergencies.In short, objective indicators are the best way to reestablishvalues and principles. See Oxley 2001. 81 Slim 1997; Duffield 2001a, 90-95; Gasper 1999. Becauseit is nearlyimpossible,if not slightlymacabre, to try to calculatewhether aid savesmore lives than it takes,some organizationshavereassertedthe importance of the principlesof independence,neutrality, and impartialityfor determiningwhether they should provideaid. See Weissman2004. 82 Brauman2004, 400. 83 Darcy 2005, 8. 84 Hopgood (forthcoming). 85 Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999. 86 Hutchinson 1996. 87 Boli and Thomas 1999.

88 89 90 91 92

Duffield 2001 a. See also Fox 2001. Fisher 1997. Kennedy 2004; Duffield 200 la. Feinstein InternationalFamine Center 2004, 55. Hardt and Negri 200, cited in Donini 2005, 2.

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