Work in progress, usual disclaimers apply

Ismael Al-Amoudi

Ismael Al-Amoudi, University of Reading

Lancaster University, IAS Research Cluster, Foucault and Critical Realism, 18 June 2008

A realist reading of Foucault: what implications for critical realists?

5,185 words

Abstract This paper attempts to explore further the consequences of a realist reading of Foucault for critical realist (CR) scholars in social studies. After summarizing an argument in favour of a CR interpretation of the later Foucault, it identifies some of the potential contributions and inflexions that such a reading may bring to CR studies of organization and society. It is suggested that Foucault’s analytical framework does not necessarily contradict CR meta-theory but raises novel questions for both meta-theory and substantive research. Special attention is drawn to two central CR themes: the transitive dimension of knowledge and the occupation of social positions.

Keywords Critical realism, Foucault, identity, interpretation, methodology, ontology, social roles

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NB: This conference paper is still very exploratory. I would be particularly grateful if the audience could indicate complementary readings or if they could point out dubious arguments.

Introduction: a Lancaster story…

When I was offered to present a paper at this seminar, I felt it was an opportunity to revisit the paper I had started writing in this university almost a decade ago (1998-99), although it only got published in July 2007. In 1998-99, I was an MA student in Organizational Analysis and Behaviour in Lancaster University Management School. As I was very much under the influence of my undergraduate studies in France, I used to spend quite some time in the university library reading Foucault: Madness and Civilization 1 , Order of Things 2 , Archaeology of Knowledge 3 , Discipline and Punish(Foucault 1977), History of Sexuality 4 (I must confess though that I never read tome 3!) Also, Dreyfus and Rabinow’s Michel Foucault, Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics 5 , together with some of Foucault’s lectures at College de France and a few interviews compiled by Rabinow 6 proved useful in understanding Foucault’s project.

It is under the inspiration of Steve Fleetwood, however, that I started drawing links between Foucault and critical realism (hereafter CR). Steve had joined the department in the middle of the year and it had been decided that he would supervise my summer dissertation. Incidentally enough, Steve had published a book in which he suggested that the later Hayek was assuming an

1

Foucault, M. (1965). Madness and civilization; a history of insanity in the age of reason. New York,, Pantheon Books. 2 Foucault, M. (1971). The Order of Things: an Archaeology of the Human Sciences. New York,, Pantheon Books. 3 Foucault, M. (1972). The archaeology of knowledge. London,, Tavistock Publications. 4 Foucault, M. (1978). The history of sexuality. New York, Pantheon. Foucault, M. (1985). The use of pleasure / Uniform Title: Usage des plaisirs. English. New York, Pantheon Books, Foucault, M. (1986). The care of the self / Uniform Title: Souci de soi. English. New York, Pantheon Books. 5 Dreyfus, H. L. and P. Rabinow (1982). Michel Foucault: Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics. Brighton, Harvester. 6 Foucault, M. and P. Rabinow (1986). The Foucault reader. Harmondsworth, Penguin.

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ontology quite close to CR 7 . When reading it, it struck me that a similar project for Foucault seemed prima facie possible and, perhaps, fruitful. In that paper, I attempted to make explicit what I perceived to be Foucault’s implicit social ontology. In turn, this allowed attempting three movements: first, protecting Foucaultian analysis against accusations of constructivism, determinism, reductionism, localism and nominalism. Secondly, it allowed to suggest a slightly different way of doing Foucaultian study of organizations. To this end, I revisited a rather influential paper by Grey on Career as a Project of the Self. Thirdly - and this touched without really tackling the theme of today’s paper - I hinted at some of the consequences of a realist reading of Foucault for his CR critics. I tried to argue, especially, that while Foucault is still potentially open to any criticism levelled at the level of his theories, he is probably less vulnerable at the level of his meta-theory i than it had been thought. I also hinted at a significant difference of emphasis distinguishing Foucaultians (sic) from CR students of organization and society: while CRs acknowledge the existence of mediating concepts that link structure and agency, they mainly express interest in studying social structures. Conversely, while Foucault appears to have an implicit notion of social structure, he is mainly interested in studying the points of intersection of social structure and agency, namely, institutions, apparatuses and modes of subjection (more about this below).

Building on the 2007 paper, I would like to push the reflection a little bit further and ask what are the implications of a realist reading of Foucault for all CRs, including both those who are sympathetic to Foucault as well as those who are more reserved or critical? To repeat, granting that Foucault’s meta-theory is compatible with CR certainly does not mean that every CRist should accept his more substantial theories. However, this means that the latter are, in principle, worthy of consideration unless proven otherwise. Thus, if we take both CR and Foucault’s programmes seriously, the question arises of what, if anything, are the consequences for a CR of being sympathetic to Foucault? In other words, once we take Foucault’s warnings and injunctions seriously, how is our scholarly practice as CRists affected?

7

Fleetwood, S. (1996). "Order without equilibrium: A critical realist interpretation of Hayek's notion of spontaneous order." Cambridge Journal of Economics 20(6): 729-747.

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In order to address this question, I first return briefly to the argument for a realist reading of Foucault as outlined in the first Lancaster paper 8 (section 1) before examining the contributions of such reading for the critical realist project (section 2).

I/ A (condensed) realist reading of Foucault I now summarize the fundamental features of Foucault’s implicit social ontology that legitimize a CR reading. Because of the focus and constraints of the present paper, this section is reduced to a minimum. For a fuller account, please refer to the 2007 paper 9 .

1) Truth and meaning: Foucault’s transitive dimension Before examining Foucault’s rapport to truth and meaning, it can be useful to clarify the CR position on these themes. The latter is both ontologically realist and epistemologically relativist. In order to maintain, develop and build on this distinction, Bhaskar coined the expressions transitive and intransitive dimensions of knowledge (hereafter TD and ID). The TD of knowledge refers to the ensemble of references (words, concepts, schemas, statements, discourse, etc.) that are used to refer to (describe, analyse, explain, predict, etc.) the world ii . Conversely, the ID of knowledge refers to the world, to the extent that it is the referent to which reference is made. Notably, whereas the ID is absolute and includes the TD, the TD is observer-relative and does not include the ID. The ID is absolute since any group of observers, however different their points of view, necessarily refer to one and the same world. In contrast, the boundaries of the TD are relative to the person or community who does the referencing. Indeed, two observers may use very different systems of references to refer to one and the same referent. So while a reference belongs to the TD of one observer, it does not necessarily belong to the TD of another observer. The observer-relativity of the TD allows to state without contradiction that the TD of one observer can constitute the ID of another. A significant consequence of the observer-relativity of the TD is that, contrary to a common conception, realism is not antithetical with nominalism - understood as the view that ‘any form of interpretation or explanation is necessarily relative to and constrained by the discursive

8 9

Al-Amoudi, I. (2007). "Redrawing Foucault’s social ontology." Organization 14(4): 543-563. Ibid.

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framework and context in which it originates and becomes reproduced as knowledge.’ 10 Instead, a realist stance accommodates nominalism by granting that, although the truth of a statement depends in part on the state of its referent, the meaningfulness of the statement depends on the discursive framework and social context of enunciation.

I now examine whether Foucault considers that truth is a mere social product, since he affirms that knowledge and power are intimately linked and that knowledge produces ‘truths’ (with quotation marks) to which we submit? I attempt to make this point by analysing Foucault’s study of scientific activity. When he studies the process of (say) medicine, the nature of the objects of enquiry are quite different: The medical scientist studies the body as the locus of disease whereas Foucault studies the activities of the medical scientist and is therefore interested in the body as an object for scientific investigation. If we keep to the distinction between transitive and intransitive dimensions, we could say that the intransitive objects studied by the medical scientist comprise such things as bodies and the natural mechanisms that help explain their (dys)functioning. However, the intransitive objects that Foucault studies comprise instead such things as the activities of the medical scientist, the discourses she re/produces, the network of relations in which she acts 11 . Moreover, the transitive dimension of the medical scientist comprises the medical discourse on biological mechanisms, health, illness and so on. It is different from Foucault’s transitive dimension that comprises his own theories about medical scientist activities but not those of the medical scientist he studies. (Cf figure 1).

10

Reed, M. (2000). "The limits of discourse analysis in organizational analysis." Ibid. 7(3): 524-530. Dreyfus, H. L. and P. Rabinow (1982). Michel Foucault: Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics. Brighton, Harvester. P.6

11

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Figure 1: Foucault’s transitive dimension Transitive dimension

Intransitive dimension

Body and illness Medical scientist

Theory of medical scientist on body and illness

Foucault

Theory of Foucault on medical scientist’s activities and theories

(social forms and activities exist without being studied)

Activities and theories of medical scientist (body and illness exist without being studied)

Moreover, the very knowledge generated by Foucault has itself a well-defined referent in the intransitive dimension: that of the relationship between power relations and scientific practice. Since “dubious” science can have as much social consequence as legitimate science, and since the social consequences are not necessarily good or liberating ones, it follows that, though not a relativist (about the intransitive dimension), Foucault is also not “scientistic” in the sense of having an unquestioned optimism about science. Indeed, the existence of an intransitive dimension for science is maintained though not studied and Foucault’s study of science is not doomed to relativism.

b. Foucault’s methodology: studying an open social world In this section, I contend that the methodology of Foucault’s project is highly consistent with the critical realist methodological premises for the study of society as an open system without possible closure. Accordingly I will tackle the issues of Foucault’s fields of investigation, as well as the way he uses history. One of the things Foucault is often reproached for is that, by studying prisons and asylums, he blinded himself to many other forms of power relations and, hence, incorrectly deduced a

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carceral vision of society 12 . Such comment implies that a mechanism isolated in a certain field would not exist outside of it or, in other words, that society is a juxtaposition of isolated systems. Yet, if we look at the reasons why Foucault has been interested in carceral power it appears that his objective is to obtain knowledge about society, not about the prison or the asylum. Thus Foucault makes it clear that he studies prisons “ as a chemical catalyst so as to bring to light power relations, locate their position, find out their point of application and the methods used ” 13 . Therefore if Foucault focuses on prisons it is precisely because he wanted to isolate a transphenomenal mechanism (that is, disciplinary power) that is actualised but less visible in other organizational settings such as factories and court-houses. In short, by focusing on prisons, Foucault not only admits the openness of the social world, but he also presupposes it and adapts his methods of investigation to it. It can also be asked why Foucault bothered himself with the burden of historical accounts, sometimes over periods going back to the middle ages while he was concerned with present social mechanisms. The answer is, I think, to be found in Foucault’s genealogical use of history. that can perhaps be understood by referring to his statement that ‘[he] would like to write the history of the prison, with all the political investment on the body it gathers together in its closed architecture. Why? Simply because [he is] interested in the past? No, if one means by that writing a history of the past in terms of the present. Yes, if one means writing the history of the present.’ 14

By affirming that he tries to write a history of the present Foucault aims neither to give a “totalising” picture of the past, nor does he try to write a history of the past by referring to present meanings (and thus ignoring the shifting nature of social mechanisms). Instead, what Foucault aims at doing is to begin with a rough diagnosis of the current situation. In the The History of Sexuality vol.1, for example, he diagnoses the importance of the mechanism of confession. He

12

Boyne, R. (1990). Power-Knowledge and Social Theory: the Systematic Misinterpretation of Contemporary French Social Theory in the Work of Anthony Giddens. Giddens' theory of structuration : a critical appreciation. C. G. A. Bryant and D. Jary. London, Routledge: 252. 13 Dreyfus, H. L. and P. Rabinow (1982). Michel Foucault: Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics. Brighton, Harvester. P. 211. 14 Foucault, M. (1977). Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison. New York, Pantheon Books. p. 31.

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then isolates the particular components of this relation of power 15 . These components form an apparatus, a “grid of intelligibility” or system of relations that can be established between (ontologically heterogeneous) elements such as ‘Discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions - in short, the said as much as the unsaid.’ 16 However, whereas archaeology is preoccupied with the reconstitution of the apparatus, genealogy is interested in taking each of its components literally, and following the web of social relations which supports them (and which they support and modify). Hence the objective of Foucault’s genealogy is to study the effects of the elements of the apparatus and not their meaning. Finally, Foucault follows through history initially isolated components of the apparatus and then studies their current convergence.

c. Foucault’s social ontology: a stratified and transformational conception of social reality The detractors of Foucaultian analysis often accuse it of being incapable of distinguishing ontologically and analytically between human agency and social constraint. As Reed puts it ‘By denying any ontological and/or analytical differentiation between creative agency and structural constraint, Foucaultian discourse analysis ends up with an explanatory logic which is unable to distinguish between ‘open doors’ and ‘brick walls’ 17

I would now like to show that Foucault works with an (implicit) ontology that shares the crucial characteristics of the critical realist ontology as it assumes a relational conception of society and considers structures as both enabling and constraining for agency. Moreover, I argue that Foucault’s ontology is stratified and differentiates between biological, individual and social

15

A critical realist could argue that relations of power are social mechanisms to the extent that they make a difference to the field of possible actions between two persons. 16 Foucault, M. and C. Gordon (1980). Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings, 1972-1977. Brighton, Harvester. P. 194. 17 Reed, M. (1998). Organizational Analysis as Discourse Analysis. Discourse and organization. D. Grant, T. Keenoy and C. Oswick. London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif., Sage Publications: viii, 248 p. P.209.

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realms. There is, however, a difficulty concerning the fact that Foucault uses a vocabulary that is different from critical realist vocabulary. Thus, our excavation of the ontological presuppositions of Foucault must be augmented by a work of translation of the elements that may be interpreted as sharing identical referents but different references in each framework. For instance Foucault does not use the words ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ but refers to ‘strategies’ (processes located at the level of social relations that may not be attributed to any specific people) and to ‘tactics’ (processes consciously initiated by people). He does not consider power as a (rare) substance to be seized but rather as a relation between people in which one person’s actions modifies the range of actions of another person. Hence, any social relation between persons entails power relations and any power relation supposes a social relation.

By studying society through power, Foucault is therefore adopting a relational conception of society. Moreover, he does not consider power as mere restriction as do the authors who write about structural constraint without mentioning as a corollary that it enables action. Rather his point is that power has at once a negative and a positive role, that it constrains as well as it enables. Hence, power relations do not only prohibit actions or limit the field of possible actions, they also enable fields of action and permit the constitution of knowledge. However taking as a given that power is at the same time restrictive (negative) and enabling (positive), to what extent do power relations sustain/rely on social reality? Foucault’s point about this is that: “people know what they do, they sometime know why they do it, but what they don’t know is what they do does.” 18 . This amounts to saying that the use of power leads to deliberate tactics (of which the person may or may not be aware), but at the same time it leads also to unintended strategies of power. Hence, ‘The rationality of power is characterised by tactics which are often quite explicit at the restricted level where they are inscribed (the local cynicism of power), tactics which, becoming connected to one another, attracting and propagating one another, but finding their base of support and their condition elsewhere, end by forming comprehensive systems: the logic is perfectly clear, the aims decipherable, and yet it is often the case that no one is there to have invented them, and few who can be said to have formulated them: an implicit characteristic of the great anonymous, almost unspoken strategies which

18

Foucault, personal communication with Dreyfus and Rabinow, cited in Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982: 187

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coordinate the loquacious tactics whose “inventors” or decision makers are often without hypocrisy’ 19 Two conclusions can be drawn from Foucault’s conception of power. Firstly, by distinguishing between strategies and tactics, Foucault is clearly working with a stratified and differentiated social reality in which the mechanisms governing strategies (relative to social relations) are not the same as those governing tactics (relative to people). Secondly, we can recognise here crucial elements of Bhaskar’s ontology: Thus, not only does Foucault have a relational conception of society but also he recognises that people’s actions and social relations exist in virtue of two groups of mechanisms that are ontologically distinct. In addition to the strata of tactics/individuals and strategies/society, Foucault also takes account of the more basic stratum of biology. This is particularly noticeable in his use of “biopower” as an instance of power preoccupied with the government as humans to the extent that they constitute a biological specie. Hence, according to him, one cannot understand modern society without studying the web of power-knowledge relations that traverses it from the strata of strategies to the very biological strata of human beings as a population 20 (Foucault 1978: 143). Furthermore, strategies and tactics (Foucault’s designation) have the same influences on people’s practice as the strata of individuals and society (Bhaskar’s designation): strategies both limit and enable tactics, while tactics both reproduce (sustain) and produce (modify) existing strategies. Foucault refers to the influence of strategies over tactics as “technologies of power”, while he refers to the influence of tactics on strategies as “tactics of power” (Cf figure 2)

19 20

Foucault, M. (1978). The history of sexuality. New York, Pantheon.. P.95 Ibid. p78.

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Figure 2: Foucault’s model of stratification of social reality

terminology

terminology

Society

Domain of the political/ strategy

Individual

Biology

Tactics of power

Foucault’s

Technologies of power

Bhaskar’s

Domain of tactics

Species & body

I hope that my interpretation of Foucault’s stratification of reality is now clearer and the different strata of his ontology have been identified. The question, however, of how Foucault manages to link structure and agency is not yet evident. My thesis is that, although Foucault did not pose the problem of the links between strata in the same terms as Bhaskar, it is nonetheless possible to locate in his work similar concepts that constitute a point of contact between human agency and social structures. I will argue that these concepts endure although, contrary to what I defended in the 2007 paper, I am not sure any more that they are immediately occupied by individuals (Cf. section 2.1) For Foucault, institutions; apparatuses and, finally, subjects are examples of such mediating concepts. (Cf figure 2.4)

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Figure 3: Foucault’s transformational model of social activity

Bhaskar’s

Foucault’s

System of mediating concepts

terminology

terminology

Society

Strategy Tactics of power

Technologies of power

Individual

Political/

Biology Institutions Apparatuses Modes of subjection

Tactics

Species & body

Foucault affirms that it is legitimate to study power through “carefully defined” institutions, but that this is not sufficient to grasp all the range of relevant power relations. Nonetheless, institutions provide the analyst with a useful (though approximate) range of ‘slots’ occupied by the individual in the more general structure of power. In institutions, the positions (places, rules, functions, tasks, duties, rights, etc.) and practices that individuals occupy appear easily. However institutions alone might mislead the observer since she runs the risk of interpreting all the relations of power by referring exclusively to the particularity of the institution. Hence, in order to study institutions, Foucault uses another, deeper, mediating concept, that of apparatuses. The apparatus has a double role for Foucault. First, it is a “grid of analysis” for his historical investigation and second, it refers to a range of heterogeneous elements at play. These elements have two particularities. The first one is that they act directly on the individual’s actions (and sometimes on her body), the second one is that they are invested by the “deep” mechanism of power Foucault the genealogist is seeking to excavate. Hence, they constitute privileged links between the biological, the tactical and the strategic strata. Finally I would put among Foucault’s mediating concepts the very mode of subjectification of the individual, with the double meaning of tied to oneself and of subject to someone else.

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II/ Contributions and inflexions to CR meta-theory The existence of points of convergence between the CR programme and Foucault’s implicit social ontology suggest that Foucault’s themes and concepts can and perhaps should be articulated by CR studies of society, either as themes (explicandum) or as resources (explicans). Whereas the 2007 paper relied on the meta-theory of CR to explain Foucault’s meta-theory, the present paper attempts a reverse movement that consists in suggesting how Foucault’s meta-theory (now explicans) can help us refining CR meta-theory (now explicandum). Therefore, I do not attempt to dress a list of Foucaultian concepts that I find interesting for their own sakes (although there would be quite a number of them). Neither do I merely suggest that specific insights from Foucault can be articulated within CR empirical studies, which is, for instance, what Richard Marsden does in The Nature of Capital 21 when he proposes that while Marx studies the ‘why?’ of capital, Foucault studies its ‘how?’ Instead, I focus on two themes central to CR’s meta-theory and attempt to show how Foucault’s analyses and perspectives can offer contributions to the CR programme that are valued from its own perspective. The CR themes I now examine are, in turn, the ‘transitive dimension of knowledge’ 22 , and the mediating concepts linking structure and agency (positions and practices). These themes are in no way exhaustive of Foucault’s potential contribution to CR’s meta-theory, and indeed their centrality suggests that there are arguably many other CR themes that can perhaps benefit from Foucault’s legacy.

1) Exploring the transitive dimension of knowledge As we have seen in the previous section, nominalism and realism are not incompatible and, indeed, the transitive dimension of knowledge (TD) of a certain community of observers can constitute the intransitive dimension of knowledge of another (ID). Moreover, if we agree with Bhaskar’s claim that one of the key differences between social and natural forms is that the former ‘do not exist independently of agents’ conceptions of what they are doing in their activity’ 23 then

21

Marsden, R. (1999). The nature of capital: Marx after Foucault. London ; New York, Routledge. Bhaskar, R. (1978). A realist theory of science. Hassocks, Sussex Atlantic Highlands, N.J., Harvester Press ; Humanities Press. 23 Bhaskar, R. (1998). The possibility of naturalism: A philosophical critique of the contemporary human sciences. London ; New York, Routledge.p. 38 22

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studying agents’ conceptions is a necessary aspect of studying the social structures re/produced by these conceptions. Yet, apart from the notable contribution of critical discourse analysis 24 (CDA) first in linguistics and, more recently, in organization studies, most CR inspired projects dispense with studying the constitution, reproduction and social effects of the discourses employed by those agents they study. As an aside, this omission is particularly salient in management and organization studies 25 and I would be interested to hear from you if you have noticed a similar tendency in your own field of academic study. As a consequences of ignoring discourse, the categories employed by agents (eg. lecturers, administrators, students, reference letters, timetables, departments and so on) are naturalized and what was intended to be a CR project falls back into structuralist forms of analysis, hence suffering from the shortcomings of structuralism that were identified by Foucault in the Archaeology of Knowledge. Indeed, a basic assumption of structuralism is that conceptual elements can and should be identified independently of the situation under scrutiny 26 . It is, however, necessary to pay more than lip service to the understanding that the discourse used to refer to objects of study is not neutral. An interaction that is understood as taking place between, say, a “lecturer” and a “student” (discourse of the University) may alternatively be interpreted, or performed, as an interaction between, say, a “woman” and a “man” (feminist discourse), etc. Although appeals to “the lecturer” or “the woman” may be directed to the same person, the meanings they convey or perform, and the associated conceptual frameworks that are mobilized differ significantly. It is for this reason that the constructs used by participants should not be invoked simply as available (categorical) resources used in realist analysis. Instead, constructs become topics of de-naturalized analysis that incorporates a critical interrogation 27 . So, such analysis might, for example, incorporate examination of the practices that sustain basic systems of

24

Fairclough, N. (2005). "Discourse Analysis in Organization Studies: The Case for Critical Realism." Organization Studies (01708406) 26(6): 915-939. 25 Cf. the ‘substantial contributions’ gathered in Ackroyd, S. and S. Fleetwood, Eds. (2000). Realist perspectives on management and organisations. Critical realism--interventions. London ; New York, Routledge, Fleetwood, S. and S. Ackroyd, Eds. (2004). Critical realist applications in organisation and management studies. London ; New York, Routledge. 26 Dreyfus, H. L. and P. Rabinow (1982). Michel Foucault: Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics. Brighton, Harvester.pp.54-6 27 See for instance: Pollner, M. and D. H. Zimmerman (1971). The Everyday World as a Phenomenon. Understanding everyday life: Toward the reconstruction of sociological knowledge. J. D. Douglas. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul: xii, 358 p.

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opposition at play in a university (e.g. admin staff vs academics, academic decisions vs administrative decisions, etc.). Foucault’s interpretive analytics may prove particularly useful and interesting for such endeavours. Concretely, this involves paying attention to three aspects. First, the system of differentiations through which (transitive) objects of knowledge are constituted and which permit some people to act upon the actions of others (eg. lecturer/student but not clergyman/layman in a contemporary British University). Second, the enunciative modalities that describe and determine ‘who can make what claim?’ (For instance, who can attribute a mark? Who can decide on extenuating circumstances? But also, which students are entitled to comment on lecturers’ research in progress?). Third, the apparatus (dispositif) constituted by the related discursive practices and their relations to non-discursive practices and entities. Amongst practices directly involved in and constitutive of a student/lecturer relationship: lecturing, examination, academic advice, pastoral advice, professional recommendation. Amongst non-discursive practices and entities iii : lecture theatres, lecturer’s office, antiplagiarism software, email systems, and so on. This list is, as you can imagine, far from being exhaustive, its purpose is, however, to illustrate with specific examples how Foucaultian analytics can help studying the TD of agents and its wider social effects.

2) Questioning the acquisition of social positions and practices A notable difference between Foucault’s project and that of Bhaskar is that, while Bhaskar assumes in the Possibility of Naturalism 28 that social positions and practices are immediately occupied by individuals, Foucault problematizes and studies their occupation. The assumption that positions and practices are occupied not immediately but through (sometimes complex) processes is certainly not at odds with the overall CR project though. And indeed Archer spends the last chapter of Being Human sketching a general theory of how social roles are occupied 29 . I now follow briefly her analysis before contrasting it with a Foucaultian study of the constitution of subjectivity.

28

Bhaskar, R. (1998). The possibility of naturalism: A philosophical critique of the contemporary human sciences. London ; New York, Routledge. Pp.40-1 29 See chapter ‘Actors and commitment’, pp.283-305 in Archer, M. S. (2000). Being human: the problem of agency. Cambridge, U.K. ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

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Archer distinguishes between ‘I’, ‘me’, ‘we’ and ‘you’. ‘I’ is the self (eg. a child) and, although it is ultimately influenced by social roles, its existence is independent of them. A number of preexisting social roles are available to ‘I’ who has to make choices as to the ones s/he wishes to adopt. This choice presupposes and indicates that ‘I’ can reflect on itself as a ‘me’ (primary agent, eg. schoolboy/girl) and reflect on ‘my life chances’ (eg. what happens if I refuse to go to school) or compare them with those of others. Once the ‘I’ is positioned as a ‘me’, s/he can start actions of a collective nature and thus become a ‘we’ (corporate agent, eg. play at games with other children). The actions of ‘we’ lead him/her to acquire, accept and personify a position and, thus, become fully an actor, or a ‘you’ (eg. a fully recognised schoolboy/girl). This process is iterative and ‘I’ is in turn transformed in her identity, both by occupying roles as a ‘you’ and by reflecting on these roles and their congruence with ‘I’’s own sense of identity. Thus, through this continuous dialectical iteration, ‘I’ acquires new roles: from schoolboy/girl, s/he can become an undergraduate student, then a postgraduate, then a lecturer and so on.

Figure 4: Archer’s theory of social identity

‘You’ Actor Eg. Identifying with role of active schoolboy/girl

‘We’ Corporate agency Eg. Participating in class

‘Me’ ‘I’ Primary agency Self Eg. registering at school

In spite of the infamous last paragraph of the Order of things (that Foucault himself regretted in a later interview), Archer’s assumption of a personal human identity is not what separates her from Foucault. Indeed, she recognizes that: ‘in his own writings, Foucault appears to have bitten the bullet […] by accepting an anthropological entity, a real subject, which confronts culture as a

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‘knowing subject’, capable of agential resistance. In a late essay on ‘The subject and power’, he conceded that ‘power’ is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free.’ 30 Yet, even if we admit that Foucault and Archer share a similar social ontology, the questions he raises and the way he attempts to answer them are quite different from hers. Whereas Archer takes for granted that there exists a (seemingly natural) desire for self-discovery and development, Foucault questions and problematizes this desire. Thus, in the History of Sexuality, Foucault asks: i) what is historically specific about the particular form of our desire for self (sexual) discovery and development? ii) For what reasons, through what techniques and by acting on what aspects of herself does the self constitute herself as a specific subject? And iii) what are the social consequences of this desire? What strategies of power (in Foucault’s terms), what social structures are thus actualized and reproduced?

Back to the illustrative example of the child becoming a schoolboy/girl, then a student and then a lecturer, it can be conjectured that a Foucaultian answer to the questions above would be sketched along the following lines: i) However intense and seemingly natural, the contemporary modalities of our desire for selfdiscovery and development are relatively recent. For instance, if self-development is thought of in terms of ‘skills’, ‘career’ and ‘success’, then it might be illuminating to perform a rigorous genealogy of these notions (which I am not attempting in the present paper!) ii) The second set of questions mobilise the notions of ethical substance (the material that’s worked over by ethics); mode of subjection (reasons why people come to recognize obligations); and self-forming activities (techniques through which one becomes oneself). For instance, in 20th Century UK, measurable examined results are paramount in the acquisition of professional identities, though the question of what aspects of the self these examinations measure is contingent on these positions. The discourse of success and autonomy may perhaps account to an extent, together with more idiosyncratic reasons, for the choice of a lecturer’s position (and all the obligations that come with it). Finally, the self-forming activities include, amongst others, the writing of a thesis, attendance to conferences, pub-discussions, extensive readings, supervisions (both given and received) and so on and so forth.

30

Ibid., p.33.

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iii) Although most people are probably not aware of it, the particular ways in which they strive to develop themselves re/produce in turn the wider social structure. In Foucault’s terms, tactics of power contribute to reproducing strategies of power. For instance, a PhD student undergoing supervisions with his supervisor may be principally preoccupied by the advancement of her thesis. Yet s/he also contribute to the re/production of ‘pastoral power’, that is, the typically Christian form of power that is exercised through benevolent motives of help and salvation of the individual. For instance, most PhD supervisors in most universities probably wish the best success to their PhD students and usually influence the actions and thoughts of these students with this academic success in mind. The corollary is that the same benevolent power can also lead PhD students who do not manage to get an academic job to interpret their situation as one of failuredespite-the-kind-help-of-my-supervisor instead of one of failure-because-PhD-programmes-aredesigned-to-engage-more-students-than-there-are-jobs. In sum, although Foucaultian analysis does not necessarily contradict Archer’s theory of the morphogenesis of social identity, it can nonetheless help refining and extending the analysis of their historical modalities, their structural points of contact and their broader social and political implications.

Concluding remarks After summarizing my argument in favour of a CR reading of Foucault, I have attempted to explore the potential contribution of Foucault’s legacy to two central CR themes. I have thus argued that the transitive dimension of knowledge was under-studied by CRists and that Foucault’s conceptual framework opened the possibility of studying the formation of agents’ concepts as well as the non-discursive social features that both condition and are conditioned by agents’ modes of representations and understanding (their TD). I have also proposed that Foucault’s later studies of self-constitution were compatible with Archer’s theory of the morphogenesis of social identity and could extend it by providing specific themes and objects for such study: a historization of modes of self-constitution; a grid of analysis for describing and differentiating various processes of subjection and, finally, a theoretical framework for connecting individual modes of subjection to wider social structures, including structures of domination.

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No doubt, a number of other CR concepts could be discussed and, perhaps, problematized further in light of a realist interpretation of Foucault. For instance: history and the evolution of social forms (see Archer31 , Bhaskar 32 , Jessop 33 ), human flourishing, internal critique, judgmental rationality (so different from judgmental rationalism), etc. Although in the case of the present paper, a Foucaultian take on the transitive dimension of knowledge and on the occupation of social positions extends and inflects CR without really disrupting or negating it, it is difficult to know a priori whether such disruptions may arise or not for other central concepts of CR.

References Ackroyd, S. and S. Fleetwood, Eds. (2000). Realist perspectives on management and organisations. Critical realism--interventions. London ; New York, Routledge. Al-Amoudi, I. (2007). "Redrawing Foucault’s social ontology." Organization 14(4): 543-563. Archer, M. S. (1995). Realist social theory: The morphogenetic approach. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Archer, M. S. (2000). Being human: the problem of agency. Cambridge, U.K. ; New York, Cambridge University Press. Bhaskar, R. (1978). A realist theory of science. Hassocks, Sussex Atlantic Highlands, N.J., Harvester Press ; Humanities Press. Bhaskar, R. (1998). The possibility of naturalism: A philosophical critique of the contemporary human sciences. London ; New York, Routledge. Boyne, R. (1990). Power-Knowledge and Social Theory: the Systematic Misinterpretation of Contemporary French Social Theory in the Work of Anthony Giddens. Giddens' theory of structuration : a critical appreciation. C. G. A. Bryant and D. Jary. London, Routledge: 252. Dreyfus, H. L. and P. Rabinow (1982). Michel Foucault: Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics. Brighton, Harvester. Fairclough, N. (2005). "Discourse Analysis in Organization Studies: The Case for Critical Realism." Organization Studies (01708406) 26(6): 915-939. Fleetwood, S. (1996). "Order without equilibrium: A critical realist interpretation of Hayek's notion of spontaneous order." Cambridge Journal of Economics 20(6): 729-747. Fleetwood, S. (2004). An ontology for organisation and management studies. Critical realist applications in organisation and management studies. S. Fleetwood and S. Ackroyd. London ; New York, Routledge: 27-54. Fleetwood, S. (2005). "Ontology in organization and management studies: A critical realist perspective." Organization 12: 197-222. Fleetwood, S. and S. Ackroyd, Eds. (2004). Critical realist applications in organisation and management studies. London ; New York, Routledge.

31

Archer, M. S. (1995). Realist social theory: The morphogenetic approach. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Bhaskar, R. (1998). The possibility of naturalism: A philosophical critique of the contemporary human sciences. London ; New York, Routledge. 33 Jessop, B. (2005). ". Critical Realism and the Strategic-Relational Approach." New Formations 56: 40-53. 32

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Foucault, M. (1965). Madness and civilization; a history of insanity in the age of reason. New York,, Pantheon Books. Foucault, M. (1971). The Order of Things: an Archaeology of the Human Sciences. New York,, Pantheon Books. Foucault, M. (1972). The archaeology of knowledge. London,, Tavistock Publications. Foucault, M. (1977). Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison. New York, Pantheon Books. Foucault, M. (1978). The history of sexuality. New York, Pantheon. Foucault, M. (1985). The use of pleasure / Uniform Title: Usage des plaisirs. English. New York, Pantheon Books. Foucault, M. (1986). The care of the self / Uniform Title: Souci de soi. English. New York, Pantheon Books. Foucault, M. and C. Gordon (1980). Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings, 1972-1977. Brighton, Harvester. Foucault, M. and P. Rabinow (1986). The Foucault reader. Harmondsworth, Penguin. Jessop, B. (2005). ". Critical Realism and the Strategic-Relational Approach." New Formations 56: 40-53. Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe (1985). Hegemony and socialist strategy: Towards a radical democratic politics. London, Verso. Marsden, R. (1999). The nature of capital: Marx after Foucault. London ; New York, Routledge. Pollner, M. and D. H. Zimmerman (1971). The Everyday World as a Phenomenon. Understanding everyday life: Toward the reconstruction of sociological knowledge. J. D. Douglas. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul: xii, 358 p. Reed, M. (1998). Organizational Analysis as Discourse Analysis. Discourse and organization. D. Grant, T. Keenoy and C. Oswick. London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif., Sage Publications: viii, 248 p. Reed, M. (2000). "The limits of discourse analysis in organizational analysis." Organization 7(3): 524-530.

i

The expression meta-theory is coined by Fleetwood and refers to the set of ontological statements supporting a

research programme. ‘Meta-theory’ is typically contrasted with ‘methodology’, ‘techniques’ and ‘substantive theories’. Cf. Fleetwood, S. (2004). An ontology for organisation and management studies. Critical realist applications in organisation and management studies. S. Fleetwood and S. Ackroyd. London ; New York, Routledge: 27-54. and Fleetwood, S. (2005). "Ontology in organization and management studies: A critical realist perspective." Organization 12: 197-222. ii

The world is the referent par excellence. However, if we accept that the world is intrinsically differentiated, it is

possible to think of other, more or less general, referents such as: entities, powers, plants, coffee, the smell of coffee, my impressions when I smell coffee, that impression I had the other day when I smelled some coffee, and so on. iii

These practices are non-discursive in the sense Foucault assigns to discourse. Under an alternative conception such

as Laclau and Mouffe’s, all the practices and entities enumerated herein would be considered as discursive. Cf. Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe (1985). Hegemony and socialist strategy: Towards a radical democratic politics. London, Verso.

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