Ideologies of Jihad in Europe   Final draft of article published in Terrorism and Political Violence Volume 23, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 173 - 200 By PETTER NESSER FFI’s (Norwegian Defence Research Establishment’s) Terrorism Research Group, Kjeller, Norway The article explores ideological fault lines among Sunni Muslim militants (jihadists) in Europe since the mid-1990s. It argues there have been disputes among the militants about whether to prioritize local struggles or Al Qaeda’s global war, and about the legitimacy of launching terrorist attacks in European states offering political asylum to Muslims. It concludes that Europe’s militants have become more ideologically unified in conjunction with the invasions of Afghanistan, Iraq and the Mohammed drawings, seeing European countries as legitimate and prioritized targets, and identifying with Al Qaeda. Keywords: Europe, terrorism, jihadism, ideology. Author: Petter Nesser is a research fellow with FFI’s Terrorism Research Group. Trained in the areas of social science, Middle Eastern Studies and Arabic, he has conducted extensive research on Islamist militancy in Europe. Nesser has communicated his research results through academic channels and the media in Norway and internationally. The author would like to thank colleagues at FFI’s Terrorism Research Group, Sean O’Neill, Dominique Thomas and Will McCants for sharing sources and insights. Address correspondence to Petter Nesser, Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt, Postboks 25, 2027 Kjeller, Norway. E-mail: [email protected]

Introduction    ”If I was asked about 11 September, shall we do it or not, I would have said no”.1 Since the 1980s Europe has functioned as a sanctuary and support base for Sunni Muslim militants (jihadists), from different ideological orientations. From the mid-1990s, and increasingly after 9/11 there has been a shift to terrorist violence inside Europe by militants residing in the region, or coming from abroad. In 1995 terrorists linked to the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) staged a series of bomb attacks in France killing eight people and injuring more than 200.2 Between 1998 and the invasion of Iraq, European security services intercepted several Al Qaeda linked terrorist cells preparing attacks against U.S., Israeli, French and Russian targets. 3 After the invasion of Iraq several European countries became targets for terrorist cells with varying ties to Al Qaeda, many of whom included Europeans by citizenship, or ethnicity.4 These cells managed to execute lethal attacks in the Spain, the Netherlands and the UK. What have been the main ideological fault lines and dilemmas concerning the conduct of jihadist terrorism in Europe? This article argues that, ideologically, Europe’s militant 1   

Islamist networks have undergone three phases of evolution.5 During the early to mid-1990s, local and internationalist trends co-existed in relative harmony, focusing on struggles to topple Muslim regimes and against foreign occupation of Muslim countries. The main ideological disputes during this period occurred over the killing of Muslims in local conflicts. The second phase, lasting roughly from the late 1990s until the 2003 invasion of Iraq, was characterized by ideological disarray, by which Europe’s militants were torn between local and global causes. The third phase, beginning around the Iraq invasion and lasting until present day, seems to be characterized by a process of ideological unification, and a new generation of jihadists embracing Al Qaeda’s ideology of “global jihad”, seeing European nations as both legitimate and prioritized targets. An important ideological dilemma during the last two periods appears to have been the religious legitimacy of launching terrorist operations in non-Muslim host states offering political asylum to Muslims. Regarding this question, ideological discourses on security treaties between Muslims and non-Muslims appear to have played a significant role in either obstructing or promoting attacks in Europe. There have been recurring discussions about security treaties on radical websites, and many captured terrorists possessed texts dealing with the topic.

What is jihadism?  In this article the words “jihadism” and “jihadist” refer to Sunni Muslim militant ideologies and movements calling for armed struggle “in the cause of God” (jihad fi sabil Allah), aiming to defend Muslim territories, to establish Islamic Emirates, and re-establish the Caliphate.6 Just like other militant ideologies, jihadism deals with three main questions: why do we fight, who are the legitimate and most important enemies to be defeated, and how can they be defeated? Different jihadist trends answer these questions differently. For example, for Al Qaeda, the U.S. is the most important enemy and should be attacked anywhere with all available means, including suicide terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, whereas local militant groups in Muslim countries tend to prioritize the battle against their respective regimes. Perhaps the most important intellectual source of contemporary jihadism is the Egyptian radical Islamist Sayyid Qutb. In the 1960s Qutb called upon a “vanguard” of true believers to excommunicate the “ignorant” (jahili) Egyptian regime, which had failed to implement Islamic law and introduced westernized societal institutions and practices, - and wage Holy War against the rulers modeled on the Prophet’s re-capturing of Mecca.7 Jihadism emerged as an internationally oriented movement during the 1980s, among Arab volunteers taking part in the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan, - also referred to as the “Arab Afghans”. In Afghanistan Egyptian socio-revolutionary ideas mixed with the Saudi brand of salafism, evolving into the so-called “salafist-jihadist” movement, which established branches and networks throughout the Muslim world, as well as in western countries, mostly in Europe.8 While Qutb’s ideology essentially may be considered political realism covered with religious symbols, Saudi salafism brought to the table a stronger focus on the religious principles of absolute monotheism (tawhid) strict adherence to the Qur’an and the Prophet’s Traditions (al-sunnah), and emulation of the first Muslims, - the pious ancestors (al-salaf alsalih).9 On ideological feature of jihadism in Europe, which is rooted in salafism, is the division of the world into two separate spheres, “the land of Islam” (dar al-Islam) governed by Islamic law (al-shariah), and “the land of unbelief” (dar al-kufr), which may transform into “the land of war” (dar al-harb or dar al-jihad) under given conditions. In the land of war every Muslim has a religious obligation to fight (the article argues that, over the years Europe has gradually gone from being defined as “dar al-kufr” only to “dar al-jihad”).10 2   

Salafist-jihadism may be divided into two main categories based on its political rationales; 1) classical or 2) global. Here, “classical jihad” refers firstly to armed struggle to overthrow Muslim world regimes and establish Islamic states, and secondly, to armed struggle against non-Muslims occupying Islamic territories, for example the Afghan War of Liberation. Global jihad is the armed struggle against all enemies of Islam (but primarily the far enemy, the U.S.), anywhere, and with all available means. The global jihad aims to deter western interference in the Muslim countries (mainly military and economic interference, but also cultural influences).11 Because salafist-jihadism implies literally pursuing the warrior traditions of the first Muslims it mixes fundamental ideological principles (who are we, who are our enemies and why do we fight?) and practical issues (how do we fight?). Accordingly, militant ideologues issue rulings based on the warfare of Mohammed’s armies relating to the strategic-tactical level. For example, they may impose upon Europe’s jihadists to flee to a secure base (undertake hijra) and prepare for armed struggle, or to conduct terrorist operations in lands of unbelievers, according to the circumstances (see below).12

Who are Europe’s jihadists?  In this article “Europe’s jihadists” refers to militant Sunni Muslims involved in concrete terrorist acts in Europe, and to a broader subculture of radicals centered mainly on the UK, but stretching across Europe. The European networks have involved many different individuals, gangs, groups and networks with varying ties to jihadist movements and organizations in the Muslim countries. Militant Sunnis in Europe seem to differ somewhat from counterparts in Muslim countries in terms of the level of organization, religious-political identity, enemy perception and activism strategy. For example, apart from a few semiorganized groups focused on propaganda and support activities there exist few, if any clearly defined militant organizations in Europe equivalent to Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), or Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which are running websites and presenting ideological programs and strategies for violent jihad in Europe.13 Ideologically European countries are considered by jihadists as lands of unbelief. Identifying with the Prophet, his Companions and Supporters in Medina, Europe’s militant Sunnis like to portray themselves as a “vanguard” of true believers surrounded by an “ocean of unbelief”, supporting and preparing for Holy War.14 Living among the unbelievers is a controversial topic addressed by jihadist ideologues and subjected to religious rulings. There appears to be consensus among followers of Al Qaeda that Muslims are allowed to live in lands of unbelief according to security treaties (covenants of security) granting mutual safety between Muslims and the host state. The Muslims cannot enter a covenant unless they are in a state of weakness, and the treaty cannot last for more than ten years. While living among the unbelievers, the Muslims are obliged to plan and prepare for armed struggle, - and resume fighting as soon as possible.15

Methodology  Mainly due to the relative absence of clearly defined organizations and ideological templates for a European jihad, studying ideological dilemmas and fault lines is methodologically challenging. With no single document specifying the causes, aims and strategic visions of militants in Europe, there is a need to rely on other indicators. The following takes a closer look at the origins of Europe’s jihadist networks and discusses factors internal and external to the networks that contributed to shaping ideological trends. Next, the author provides a sense of what kinds of ideological influences jihadist terrorists have been exposed to by looking at evidence from terrorism investigations. 3   

For example, did the terrorists maintain ties to known ideologues? If so, what was their ideological position? Likewise, to the extent the terrorists nurtured ties to organizations abroad, what was the ideological orientation of these organizations? Further, what kind of ideological sources surfaced in the investigations of active terrorist cells? And last, what did the terrorists own justifications (retrieved from testimonies from trials, transcripts from surveillance material etc), their target selection and attack methods tell us about their ideological affiliations?16 For example, there have been several examples on terrorist cells in Europe plotting suicide attacks against American targets, - the typical modus operandi of Al Qaeda. If the terrorists justified their actions with reference to a global war against Islam in the manner of Al-Qaeda, this indicates a strong ideological affinity with bin Laden’s group and the global jihad ideology. Conversely, if an Algerian terrorist cell places bombs in Paris and justifies the attacks with reference to France’s political interference in Algeria, it indicates a classical jihad approach. Looking at such indicators may thus enable us to situate various jihadist cells and networks operating in Europe along the classical and global jihad spectrum. Approaching ideological dilemmas fault lines through indicators rather than in-depth analyses of ideological texts and discourses, the study should be considered exploratory and hypotheses generating.

The origins of jihadism in Europe  Jihadism came to Europe during the 1980s and early 1990s with a critical mass of activists, leaders and ideologues involved in local insurgencies, separatist and anti-occupation struggles throughout the Arab countries, in Afghanistan, Pakistan (Kashmir), Chechnya and Bosnia. London and the UK emerged as the main ideological center for Europe’s militant communities. The British capital was labeled “Londonistan” by European security officials because the city served as a base and transit place for militant Sunnis going to Afghanistan. The label was also slang for British authorities turning a blind eye to radicalism and offering sanctuary to suspected terrorists.17 Because of the concentration of Islamist hardliners and ideologues, the UK emerged as a popular destination for radicals from all over Europe, and other parts of the world. They travelled to the UK in order to interact with militant groups, attend the sermons of famous preachers, and make the contacts necessary to attend training camps and religious schools in Pakistan, Afghanistan and other places. Terrorism investigations in Europe have revealed that many jihadist terrorists in Europe had been in touch with, and attended sermons by radical preachers in London in addition to training camps overseas.18 Importantly, there were also militant subcultures, radical mosques and ideological mentors in other European countries (for example in Milan, Madrid, Paris, Hamburg etc), but the community in London stood out as the most vigorous and influential. Well-known activists who played important roles in setting up and expanding militant networks from London include among others, the Palestinian Omar Abu Omar alias Abu Qatada, the Egyptian Mustafa Kamil Mustafa alias Abu Hamza, and the Syrians Omar Bakri Mohammed and Mustafa Setmariam Nasir alias Abu Musab al-Suri (consult appendix for biographies). Abu Qatada, who has been referred to by journalists as “Al Qaeda’s Ambassador to Europe”, acted as religious mentor for a number of militant groups formed by Arab Afghanistan veterans (such as the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA), Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), and the Jordanian al-Tawhid wa’l Jihad). 19 Omar Bakri headed the self-declared salafist-jihadist, Pakistani-based al-Muhajiroun organization from localities in Edmonton, Tottenham, whereas Abu Hamza was the leader of a North-African based militant group called Supporters of Shariah centred on the Finsbury Park mosque.20 Abu Musab alSuri was a more independent activist and strategic advisor with ties to multiple radical groups, 4   

including Al Qaeda. These entrepreneurial activists and others facilitated recruitment, radicalization and training of two generations of jihadists in Europe.21 The first generation was dominated by people from Arab origins aiming to ignite Islamic revolutions in their home countries and to function as a mobile guerrilla force travelling between Muslim countries protecting co-religionists from injustices, aggression and foreign occupation. Abu Qatada was the leading ideologue for the Arab warriors. The first generation militants were trained and indoctrinated in Al Qaeda linked religious training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Witness accounts from the Afghan camps report that recruits were given special courses in the doctrines of Sayyid Qutb and other ideologues.22 The first generation recruited, radicalized and trained a second generation consisting of young men who were born and raised in European countries. This generation had little or no personal experience with armed conflicts in Muslim countries. Many activists of the second generation militants came from Pakistani origins. Others came from multiple ethnicities, including European backgrounds. Abu Hamza and Omar Bakri Mohammed important charismatic leaders for the new generation, and within the frameworks of al-Muhajiroun, Supporters of Shariah and likeminded groups across Europe they socialized young European radicals into adapting Al Qaeda’s worldview and enemy perception. Second generation activists who are either linked to, or heavily inspired by Al Qaeda, constitute today’s main terrorism threat to Europe. Young European jihadists, some of whom have received training in Al Qaeda linked training camps on the Afghan-Pakistani border, were behind the killing of Theo Van Gogh in Holland, the attacks on the London subway on 7 July 2005, and several attempted attacks in the UK, Spain, Denmark, Germany and other European countries that contributed militarily to the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq. Importantly, the generation terminology is an analytical tool signifying phases in the evolution of Islamist militancy in Europe, and does not correspond to first and second generation immigrants. The second generation of jihadist networks includes first, second, third generation immigrants, as well as ethnic Europeans.

Internet as source of ideology  After 9/11 several radical mosques and centres in Europe were closed down, and radical preachers went in and out of prisons for inciting violence. In this security climate the second generation activists oriented themselves increasingly towards the Internet as one source of ideology. Online, the activists obtained free and direct access to a wide spectrum of ideological material, translated into multiple languages, enabling them to shop around for messages resonating with their beliefs and objectives. Al Qaeda and likeminded groups ran websites since the early 1990s, but the online activity accelerated in conjunction with September 11 and the Iraq war. The most important websites (mother sites) during the first years of Al Qaeda’s Internet venture included Al-Nida and Al-Ansar al-Islami web forums. These forums were outlets for genuine messages from Al Qaeda and allied groups. Also, Al Qaeda ran its own media production company since 2001 named al-Sahab (The Cloud). Moreover, associates and sympathizers established websites and media-companies distributing messages from the mother sites, for example the Global Islamic Media Front.23 Coinciding approximately with the invasion of Iraq, new mother sites appeared online, such as Ekhlaas, Al-Hisba, Buraq and Al-Fallujah. Another important outlet accessed by European jihadists was the so-called Monotheism and Jihad Platform (minbar al-tawhid wa’l jihad), also known and the Maqdisi library, containing all the most influential ideological works by salafist jihadist theoreticians.24 In recent years, Al Qaeda improved the apparatus for distribution of propaganda and operational advice online. Part of this development was an effort to make ideology accessible for western recruits. And so, originally Arabic language websites began to launch English 5   

sections and translate propaganda to multiple languages, including European languages. For example, the Global Islamic Media Front set up a German branch and the London jihadist crowd launched all-English web forums.25 In addition, Islamic radicals established their own translation service called At-Tibyan Publications administered from London, targeting nonArabic speakers.26

What ideological material did Europe’s jihadists access?   Information from terrorism investigations shows that European militants accessed three main categories of ideological sources: classical and contemporary Middle Eastern salafist ideologues; statements by Al Qaeda’s leaders and spokesmen, as well as sermons, writings and audio-visual speeches by Europe based radical preachers.27 They accessed these materials via three main platforms: radical mosques and study circles in Europe, religious schools and training camps in Afghanistan or Pakistan, as well as websites and discussion forums on the Internet. The main topics of interest seem to be religious justification for jihad and martyrdom in general, justification for attacks against specific enemies (the U.S., Israel and their allies), justification for specific strategies and tactics such as martyrdom operations and the use of weapons of mass destruction, and the excommunication (takfir) and killing of Muslims. The GIA-linked terrorists who bombed Paris in 1995 left little evidence of their ideological influences. Leading figures escaped prosecution, or were shot dead by French gendarmeries, and those who went on trial were elusive about their motivations and ideological leanings. Moreover, the GIA as a group produced very little ideological material of its own.28 Judicial documents from trials of the first Al Qaeda linked cells that were disrupted in Europe between 1998 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq contained only general references to ideological influences from radical mosques and study circles in Europe and training camps in Afghanistan.29 In these cases, judicial documents rarely referenced specific ideological texts and statements. One exception was the verdict against the so-called “Frankfurt Cell” operating in 2000, in which “indoctrinating” warrior hymns from Afghanistan (anashid) were quoted.30 When Spanish investigators recovered files from computers belonging to the terrorists behind the 2004 Madrid attacks, on the other hand, they retrieved loads of ideological materials downloaded from websites, - which justified terrorism and offered rulings on strategic and tactical issues.31 The Madrid cell got hold of most of their ideological sources from the Maqdisi library and diverse distributor sites.32 The material included classical theorists such as the medieval scholar Ibn Taymiyyah; the founder of Saudi salafism/wahhabism, Mohammed Ibn Abd al-Wahhab; author of the manifest for modern jihadism Sayyid Qutb; godfather of the internationalist Arab Afghan movement Abdullah Azzam; as well as contemporary theorists such as bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, the Jordanian Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi, and a number of ideologues from Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Syria and Kuwait.33 Notably, the material also included texts and audiovisual speeches by Abu Qatada. Further investigations of the Madrid bombings revealed that several people in the broader network around the attack cell had been in touch with Qatada in London. According to a key witness, one member linked to the terrorist cell, Mouhannad al-Mallah, said that Abu Qatada had the same position in Europe as Al Qaeda had in the world; that he was the person in Europe calling for attacks, recruiting members, giving them missions to fulfill.34 The killer of the filmmaker Theo Van Gogh in the Netherlands, Mohammed Bouyeri, downloaded English translations of Ibn Taymiyyah’s and Sayyid Qutb’s works and translated them into Dutch language. According to the expert witness, Professor Rudolph Peters, Ibn Taymiyyah’s writings on Prophet Traditions (ahadith) justifying individual punishment of people insulting Islam were an important trigger for Bouyeri.35 In addition he downloaded a number of works by Abu Hamza al-Masri. According to Peters, because of Bouyeri’s poor 6   

Arabic, Hamza’s writings functioned as an entrance to militant ideologies. The writings of Abu Hamza were retrieved from the belongings of several terrorist suspects and convicts in the UK and other European countries, and many terrorists operating in the UK had attended his sermons at the Finsbury Park mosque.36 Other members of Mohammed Bouyeri’s Dutch based terrorist cell, the “Hofstadgroup”, accessed ideological texts and propaganda produced in London and uploaded material on the Internet.37 Bouyeri and his accomplices consulted texts concerning the rejection of democracy and man-made laws, and clarification about the legitimacy of conducting operations in Holland.38 The terrorist cell which attempted to execute car bomb attacks in central London, and against Glasgow airport in 2007 (known as the “Doctors’ Cell”) also downloaded ideological texts and propaganda from the Internet. One individual involved in the plot spent time in Iraq the year before the operation where he, allegedly, joined Al Qaeda in Iraq. On a computer retrieved from a car used in the attempted suicide attack on the airport terminal in Glasgow, experts secured ideological and strategic texts and audio-visual material by Al Qaeda’s leaders bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, the former head of Iraqi branch, the late Abu Musab alZarqawi, and several texts by Al Qaeda associated preachers and activists in Saudi Arabia, such as Sulayman ibn Nasir Al-Ulwan, Husayn ibn Mahmud and Hamud bin Uqla al-Shuaybi. Several of the texts had been downloaded from At-Tibyan Publications.39 The ideological texts dealt with rulings on the conduct of suicide bombings and weapons of mass destruction, and rulings on the killing of Americans outside the Iraqi theater of war.40 There were also concrete signs that the cell was influenced by Abu Qatada. In a letter from Qatada that was smuggled out from prison and published on the Internet in 2009, the preacher explains how he encountered members of the cell Bilal Talal Abdul Samad Abdulla and Mohammed Asha inside prison, and how he was impressed by them. He also claimed that Abdullah had told him that he had been influenced by Qatada’s audio taped sermons.41

Europe as support base  “I knew that this game would be dangerous, and that it would be beneficial to us to push the jihadist current forward in a new phase after the Afghanistan-period if we exploited this opening correctly. If we erred in this, it would have fatal consequences. It was almost like a mission by special commandos operating behind the enemy lines, but of a political-security-media [not military] character.” 42 During the 1980s, following the ideology of Sayyid Qutb, Islamist radicals from Arab countries fled to Europe in order to escape persecution by their regimes. 43 In European countries many of them joined support networks for insurgents in their home countries, the anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan, as well as mujahidin in Bosnia, Chechnya and Kashmir. Ideologically, before Al Qaeda declared jihad against Jews and Crusaders in 1998, Europe’s jihadists seem to have agreed on the legality, utility and necessity of supporting jihad in Muslim countries from “behind enemy lines”.44 However, ideological conflicts did emerge over the conduct of local struggles, especially concerning the excommunication and killing of fellow Muslims, as well as over the allocation of resources: questions of which armed conflicts should benefit from fundraising efforts. Moreover, there were fierce conflicts between militant and the moderate (political) Islamists such as the European branches of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and the Muslim Brotherhood.45 The most important project and mobilizing cause for the European militant networks in the early 1990s, however, was the Algerian Civil War and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA).46 The GIA was formed by Algerian Afghanistan veterans in concert with local guerilla groups, which had been operating in Algeria from the late 1970s.47 At first, the GIA adopted the 7   

ideology of the Arab Afghans, educating its cadre in texts by Sayyid Qutb and the theorizing of Al Qaeda strategists Abu Musab al-Suri and Ayman al-Zawahiri.48 The first leaders of the GIA such as Qari Said and al-Sharif Qusmi had close ties to Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Arab Afghans living in Europe.49 However, when the struggle in Algeria got out of hand under the leaderships of Emirs Djamel al-Zitouni and Antar Zuwabri, and the GIA excommunicated the Algerian people and declared war on competing Islamist groups, the organization clashed ideologically with Al Qaeda and supporters in Europe.50 Abu Qatada was an ardent supporter of the GIA, and he theologically justified strategies and tactics used by the group in the war against the military regime. He issued a religious ruling in which he defended the killing of the wives and children of representatives of the regime.51 After Zitouni loyalists killed leading FIS activists Mohammed Said and Abd al-Rasaq Rajam, as well as emissaries of the Libyan Islamic Fighting group during 1995 (accusing them of collaborating with the regime and propagating political Islamism), the group’s supporters in London and co-editors of the GIA magazine al-Ansar, Abu Qatada, Abu Musab al-Suri and representatives of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, withdrew their support on the grounds that the GIA failed to provide evidence that the murdered Islamists had in fact been collaborating with the government.52 Abu Qatada, who had built much of his reputation and following around supporting the GIA, was reluctant to denouncing the group, but he was left with no choice when Zitouni exceeded the limits of extremism and lost popular support. A protagonist of “classical jihad” in Muslim countries, Qatada concentrated mainly on supporting insurgents and terrorists the Middle East and the Chechen separatists. Illustrating his focus on local struggles, in one of his his most popular texts written during the 1990s Qatada stressed that fighting “the groups of apostasy that govern the lands of the Muslims….takes precedence over others besides them from the polytheists and the hypocrites and the people of the book”.53 Displaying populist characteristics, by the time of the September 11 attacks, Qatada issued statements and gave interviews in which he vehemently supported bin Laden’s strategy.54 Before his personal assistant Bisher al-Rawi, however, he reportedly spoke against the attack and criticized Al Qaeda.55 After Abu Qatada denounced the GIA he concentrated on backing the Chechen rebels before he was arrested for inciting violence in 2002. Although London’s main pundits had turned their backs on the GIA, there were forces within Europe’s militant underground which continued to back the group. Qatada pupil Abu Hamza took over the editing of al-Ansar and stood shoulder to shoulder with the GIA until the statement by Emir Antar Zuwabri, in which he excommunicated the Algerian people in August 1997.56 Just like Qatada, Abu Hamza was first and foremost a protagonist of “classical jihad”, his main passions being the Algerian struggle and the war in Bosnia. When the GIA became too extreme, he started focusing on the prospects for establishing an Islamic state in Yemen. The third major ideologue-preacher among the London jihadist crowd, the Syrian Omar Bakri Mohammed, was mainly focused on the liberation of Kashmir and dreamt about an Islamic revolution in Pakistan.57 Europe’s most influential ideologues were thus for all intents and purposes proponents of “classical jihadism”. When Al Qaeda proposed the global strategy of striking the far enemy in the second half of 1990s, they were forced to position themselves vis-à-vis bin Laden. Rather reluctantly is seems, they gradually accepted the call for global jihad. Qatada, Hamza and Bakri condoned and hailed the September 11 attacks, but for strategically or ideological reasons (or both) they seem to have had certain reservations about launching terrorist attacks in western countries.

8   

Classical jihad in Europe    “The un-Islamic regime’s oppressive practices which are backed by France were never seen except during the French occupation over 132 years and which is still continuing today. France is now a full partner in Genocide by paying mercenaries and rewarding its agents and financing arms deals”.58 The GIA’s bombings in France during 1995 were ordered by Emir Djamel Zitouni and the group’s Chief of External Affairs Radwan Abu Basir against the advice of the group’s Advisory Council.59 The main ideological driver for the attacks in France appears to have been the enemy perception of Zitouni, seeing the Algerian regime as the main enemy, but France as a “full partner” in the war triggered by the army’s cancelling of Algeria’s first democratic elections (1992), in which the political Islamist party, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was poised to win.60 He appears to have considered the campaign in France an integrated part of, and necessary condition for success on the Algerian battlefield. An off-shoot of the Arab Afghan salafist-jihadist movement, the GIA was always fiercely anti-western, and violently opposed to French interference in Algerian affairs. The anti-westernism was expressed through hateful characterizations of France and the U.S., and accusations that these powers covertly supported the apostate regime in killing Algeria’s Muslims. According to GIA communiqués, France committed “disgusting crimes” against the Algerian Muslim community (ummah), and pressured the tyrannical (taghut) Algerian regime to “slaughter” innocent and unarmed civilians.61 Djamel Zitouni blamed French colonialism for the “oppressive practices” of the “un-Islamic regime”, and characterized France as an accomplice in “genocide” by supporting the military regime.62 The GIA gradually stepped up operations against French interests and citizens inside Algeria before the group internationalized the conflict.63 The Al Qaeda associated strategist Abu Musab al-Suri boasts about having planted the seeds of the idea to transfer the battle to French soil. He claims to have advised the third Emir of the GIA Sharif Qusmi that attacks in France, “…would be beneficial to draw France into an openly declared support for the Algerian regime, a support which existed, but only in secrecy. This will unify the Islamic Nation around the jihad in Algeria as it unified the Islamic Nation in Afghanistan against the Soviets”.64 The GIA campaign in France was controversial and disputed ideologically and strategically in Algeria (opposed by the majority of GIA’s Advisory Council) and certainly, the attacks in France caused problems for the group’s supporters in Europe. The campaign jeopardized support cells in France, Belgium, the UK and other countries, and thus stole resources from an organization with its back against the wall locally, locked in fierce conflict with various defector groups, the FIS and its armed wing AIS, - in addition to taking serious military defeats in clashes with the Algerian army and security forces. To what extent the perpetrators of the attacks were committed to the ideology of Zitouni’s faction of the GIA remains unknown. Several members of the terrorist network had been indoctrinated and received training in the Algerian Khalden camp in Afghanistan, but the attacks also included marginalized immigrant youths from French suburbs recruited, socialized and trained in France. Although GIA’s terrorist campaign in France had strategic elements to it and was consistent with the strategic thinking of Al Qaeda, the extreme beliefs, ambitions and recklessness of one man, Djamel Zitouni seem to have been a very important triggering factor.

Global jihad in Europe  Between 1998 and 2003 European security services uncovered several plans by Al Qaeda linked cells to execute attacks against U.S., Jewish, French and Russian targets. The terrorists’ 9   

target selection, attack methods, as well as justifications offered by leading figures indicated that these cells lacked a unified enemy perception and strategic vision.65 Identifying partly with local insurgents in Muslim countries and partly with Al Qaeda’s global war, it seems as if both ideologues and operational activists within Europe’s militant networks disagreed on the questions of who constituted the most important enemies and how to combat them. Moreover, because of the crackdowns of Algerian networks in the wake of the GIA terrorism campaign in France, the strategic value of Europe as a support base had decreased both for the GIA and other militant groups. When Europe’s jihadists came under increased scrutiny by the security services it became problematic for them, ideologically, to justify living in the land of the unbelievers.

Striking local or global enemies? After Al Qaeda issued the declaration of global war against Jews and Crusaders in 1998, European and intelligence services and U.S. counterparts received information that a number of Arab-based terrorist cells linked to Al Qaeda planned attacks against U.S. and Israeli interests in Europe. In December 1998 Al Qaeda reportedly struck a deal with an ex-GIA member going by the alias Abu Doha.66 Abu Doha acted as a facilitator and recruiter for Algerian guesthouses and training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan.67 Allegedly, in exchange for funding and support, Doha’s network in Europe was to execute terrorist attacks on behalf of Al Qaeda inside Europe.68 Little is known about the ideological affinities of Abu Doha’s terrorist network. Its members attended sermons of Qatada and Hamza in London and became indoctrinated in religious schools and training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan.69 Doha’s men typically maintained simultaneous links to GIA defector groups in Algeria (such as The Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) and Protectors of the Salafist Call) which prioritized the struggle against the Algerian regime; Al Qaeda calling for war against the U.S. and Israel; and militant pundits in London ideologically fluctuating between local and global aspirations. The terrorists’ target selection and legitimizations suggested that the multiple allegiances caused disarray. For example, the Algerian members of the “Frankfurt Cell” preparing to bomb the Christmas marketplace in Strasbourg on New Year’s Eve 2000 seems to have disagreed both among themselves and with their central leadership over enemy perceptions and target selection. Whereas the original mission of the cell was to bomb US or Israeli targets for Al Qaeda, they decided instead to bomb French civilians in line with the Algerian perception of France as enemy number one. Moreover, although recruits at Al Qaeda’s camps in Afghanistan were urged to commit martyrdom operations, the militants planned remote control attacks and planned to escape to Algeria after the operation.70 A second Algerian cell linked to Abu Doha, but headed by the Algerian Djamel Beghal seemed to identify more clearly with Al Qaeda’s ideology than the “Frankfurt Cell”. Beghal’s group took orders directly from bin Laden and planned suicide operations against the U.S. embassy in Paris and an American airbase in Belgium.71 Justifying their actions, members of the cell used Al Qaeda rhetoric complaining about global injustices against Muslims, specifying the suffering of the Palestinians at the hands of Israel.72 However, the cell members also seemed to identify strongly with Algerian insurgents, lambasting French interference in Algeria and “persecution” of Algerians in France.73 A third Doha-linked and Algerian based terrorist cell uncovered in France appeared to be even more complex in terms of its ideological allegiances. Just like the “Frankfurt Cell”, the terrorists appear to have been commissioned by Al Qaeda agents to strike US and Israeli targets. Members of the cell were GIA defectors who had become recruited and radicalized first in Algeria and later joined Al Qaeda run training camps in Afghanistan and Georgia. 10   

Identifying strongly with Chechen rebels they decided to attack the Russian embassy in Paris, indirectly hurting French interests. Another good example on Arab-based cells that ideologically seemed situated somewhere in between classical and global jihad, is a plan by the Jordanian terrorist group alTawhid to execute attacks on Jews in Germany. Al-Tawhid was headed by the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and mentored ideologically by Abu Qatada. Al-Zarqawi started out as a local radical. He co-founded the Jordanian jihadist movement together with Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi and Abu Qatada in 1989-90, after which he became implicated in local terrorist acts and arrested. Released from prison in 1999 he sought to join Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden personally rejected him as a member on the grounds that he was too extreme and too inclined to sectarian violence, combating impious Muslims (especially the Shias).74 Al Qaeda kept al-Zarqawi on as a close ally, though, and helped him establish a camp in Herat on the Iranian border especially for Middle Eastern militants. During the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, al-Zarqawi escaped to Iraq via Iran and eventually became the leader of Al Qaeda’s wing in Iraq. While Al-Zarqawi’s group fought the Americans in Iraq, he appears to have maintained a predilection for launching attacks against the Jordanian regime, Shia Muslims and Israeli targets, however. Al-Zarqawi’s focus on the regional Middle Eastern conflict and his hatred for Israel is also illustrated by his famous statement “we fight in Iraq with our eyes on Jerusalem”.75 The fact that al-Zarqawi’s terrorist cell in Germany decided to strike Jewish rather that than German targets (although Germany had deployed forces to Afghanistan) indicate that the cell was closer to pursuing regional Middle Eastern objectives than Al Qaeda’s globalist aspirations. 76

Should we stay, or should we go? Strengthening the hypothesis about ideological identity crisis, in 1999 Abu Hamza addressed the dilemmas of living “Islamically in the land of the unbelievers” in a speech before his congregation in London, as well as foreign guests from Sweden, France and Germany. The speech was filled with contradictory and confusing statements about the role of Muslims in Europe.77 Hamza opened by explaining it was forbidden to stay among the unbelievers, and that Muslims had to constantly plan and prepare for leaving.78 Whereas in interviews with the media Hamza spoke about a covenant of security between British Muslims and the government, implying that the country’s Muslim citizens were not permitted to harm British interests, before his followers behind closed doors, he referred to the covenant of security concept simply as “crap”.79 The main project of militants in Europe (that according to Hamza were not allowed to stay there in the first place) was to safeguard themselves and their families, engage in the calling to Islam (dawa), prepare for jihad and travel to the battlefields. However, while focusing on dawa, they also had an obligation to engage in jihad, and were permitted to kill unbelievers for “any reasons”.80 In other speeches, Hamza also talked about how to conduct jihad and the permissibility of using any means available.81 Although Abu Hamza justified violent jihad in any country, including non-Muslim host states, he remained mainly focused on supporting insurgencies and liberation wars in Yemen, Chechnya and Kashmir until he was arrested in 2004.

Global jihad against Europe  11   

“In the present abnormal situation, where there is no application of the Shari’ah laws upon the earth, the Muslims worldwide find themselves scattered living beneath the laws of Kufr from the East of the East’s and the West of West’s. Since there is no Daar ul-Islaam for the Muslims to make Hijrah to, each individual Muslim has a specific relationship pertaining to his own security with the country he is residing in. It is important to emphasise that a Muslim either has a contract of security with the nation he is residing in or not. If a person has a contract or covenant of safety (Aqd Amaan) with the United Kingdom, this does not mean that individual also has a covenant with the United States or with any other Kufr allied country”. 82

Europe as enemy for Al Qaeda Between the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, jihadist ideologues and opinion makers in Europe and internationally focused more on Europeans as enemies and called for attacks against European countries. As rationale for targeting European interests the militants did not only point to the deployment of troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also to “insults” against Muslims, such as the ban on veils and the publishing of Prophet Mohammed caricatures by the Danish newspaper Jyllandsposten in 2005. At the operational level the call for jihad translated into terrorism. Cells erupting from the second generation of jihadist networks in Europe began to plan prepare and execute attacks against the U.S.’s European allies. The terrorists’ justifications in threat communiqués, martyrdom testaments, or during interrogations and trial hearings echoed recent speeches by the Al Qaeda leadership, accusing Europeans of leading a crusade against Islam.83 Although several European countries contributed to the invasion of Afghanistan, Europe had a relatively marginal place in Al Qaeda’s enemy perceptions until 2002.84 Then, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri used to speak in more general terms about the Europeans’ role in the historical crusades and European colonialism, - focusing mainly on France, UK and Italy. In addition they condemned France post-colonial interference in Algeria and the UK for its role in the first Gulf War. After European countries sent troops to Afghanistan, Al Qaeda increasingly began to mention and threaten specific European countries. For example, in October 2002 al-Zawahiri threatened Germany and France. France did not send troops in Iraq, but has contributed in Afghanistan and is generally perceived as an arch-enemy by most Islamists because of the support for the Algerian regime.85 In November 2002, bin Laden issued a statement in which he threatened all of the U.S.’s allies.86 In May 2003 al-Zawahiri threatened the U.S., UK, Australia and Norway for their military contributions in Iraq.87 In an October 2003 statement, bin Laden threatened Spain, the UK, Australia, Poland, Japan and Italy, and said that Al Qaeda would attack the U.S. allies at the “suitable time and place”.88 However, Europe as a collective term was almost non-existent in Al Qaeda’s ideological communication before bin Laden’s speech “The first letter to Europe’s people”, which was released in April 2004, nearly one month after the Madrid bombings.89 In this statement Al Qaeda’s Emir offered a truce to “our neighbours north of the Mediterranean”, saying the attacks in Madrid were consequences of European contributions to the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Semi-diplomatically, the world’s most famous Saudi appealed to the “The European people” to pressure their authorities to accept the truce offer within a threemonth deadline. The truce would begin the moment the last European soldier left Muslim territories.90 After the April speech there has been a tendency towards Al Qaeda (especially bin Laden) talking to the Europeans as one entity (although Al Qaeda still threatens specific countries in the communiqués). 12   

The terrorists that launched the attacks in Madrid and London appear to have identified themselves strongly with Al Qaeda, echoing the organization’s ideological statements and adapting its symbols.91 For example, the Madrid bombers called themselves “The Military Wing of The Supporters of Al Qaeda in Europe”, or “The Supporters of God” (ansar allah), and the cell behind the 7 July 2005 attacks in London referred to themselves as soldiers of Allah, focused on global jihadist causes such as Afghanistan, Palestine and Iraq, and lionized Al Qaeda.92 Lately, there has also been a marked increase threats against European countries by Al Qaeda’s regional branches and allies, such as the Algerian-based Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, known by the acronym TTP), although such threats have yet to materialize as attacks on European soil.93

Global crusades, persecution and insults against the Prophet In recent years Al Qaeda’s leadership has increasingly portrayed domestic European politics as a manifestation of the global crusade against Islam and Muslims. In February 2004 alZawahiri portrayed the forbidding of veils in French schools as “a new sign of the enmity of the western crusaders against Muslims even while boasting of freedom, democracy and human rights...”, an enmity equivalent to “the burning of villages in Afghanistan, the destruction of houses over the heads of their inhabitants in Palestine, the massacre of children and the theft of oil in Iraq”.94 In April 2006 Al Qaeda’s media wing al-Sahab released an audiotape in which bin Laden condemned the caricatures of Prophet Mohammed and instigated the”youths of Islam” to kill the cartoonists and punish Danish authorities for allowing the publication.95 During 2006, 2007 and 2008 al-Zawahiri and bin Laden repeatedly threatened European countries because of the cartoons.96 Addressing insults against Islam in Europe Al Qaeda referred to Ibn Taymiyyah’s sunnah-based rulings on individual punishment (killing) of whoever insults the Prophet. According to Taymiyyah, whereas other types of violations of treaties between Muslims and non-Muslims do not necessarily justify jihad, the killing of people who had offended Islam is “specifically commanded”.97

Security treaties and Jihad in Europe In wake of the invasion of Iraq ideological disputes seemed to intensify among important opinion makers in Europe and internationally about treaties between Muslims and nonMuslims. In the UK, the leader of al-Muhajiroun, Omar Bakri Mohammed was for a long time a propagator of a covenant of security between British Muslims and British authorities. As explained by Bakri, a Muslim living in a non-Muslim country enjoying protection for himself, his family and being able to practice his religion, finds himself in dar al-aman (the land of safety).98 According to the covenant of security the protected Muslim is forbidden to harm wealth and citizens of the country offering such protection. However, Bakri emphasized that the protected is not prohibited from participating in jihad in other countries, be it in Muslim countries, in Europe, or the U.S. (for example 9/11).99 Omar Bakri highlighted two specific factors disqualifying a security contract between a given government and the individual Muslim citizen. Firstly, the deal is off the minute a country starts arresting Muslim citizens on a “wide scale”.100 Secondly, the contract is broken when the host country supports or participates in acts of war against Muslims. By arresting and combating Muslims the protector state turns into “dar al-fitnah” (a country in which Muslims no longer enjoy security), something that essentially justifies jihad. 101 Omar Bakri portrayed himself and his ideological position on covenants of security as constraint jihadist terrorism in Britain. 13   

There is also evidence that there were frictions among Bakri’s followers on the issue of security treaties. Reportedly, a group of British-Pakistanis convicted for planning attacks in the UK during the spring of 2004 left al-Muhajiroun because they disagreed with Bakri over the covenants’ principle, and oriented themselves towards Abu Hamza and Al Qaeda in Pakistan instead.102 After the invasion of Iraq and increasing counter-terrorism operations against Islamist radicals in the UK, Bakri could no longer justify the existence of a security contract before his followers. Accordingly, in January 2005, he annulled the pact from his exile in Lebanon, - on the Internet service PalTalk.103 Bakri’s al-Muhajiroun had, however, begun to adopt a more extreme position before the London bombings. Members and spokesmen for the organization started to voice threatening statements to the public. In April 2004 members of al-Muhajiroun’s Luton branch claimed they looked forward to and prayed for an attack in London. They added that an attack would occur “because bin Laden has said that it would happen, like in Bali, Turkey and Madrid”.104 One of the radicals stated that he would like to see”mujahidin coming to London and killing thousands, either with nuclear weapons or with germs...if they need a hiding place they can stay with me, and if they need fertilizer [reference to the terrorist cell disrupted in March 2004 planning fertilizer bomb attacks in central London] then I will tell them where to get it”.105 The leader of al-Muhajiroun Luton, the 24-year-old Ishtiaq Alamgir alias Saif al-Islam (The Sword of Islam), said attacks against the UK were legitimate, as long as they were not executed by Muslims being protected by UK authorities. He said he was radicalized by alMuhajiroun, and inspired by Al Qaeda, which he supported 100%. He added that the UK had violated the covenant when the country sent troops to Iraq (curiously, participation in Afghanistan does not seem to have been sufficient for annulment of the pact from alMuhajiroun’s perspective).106 In October 2004 al-Muhajiroun became banned after UK authorities sanctioned new terrorism laws, and the group became divided into al-Ghuraba (The Strangers) and The Saved Sect. Spokesmen for the groups, Omar Bakri’s protégées Anjem Choudary, Abu Izzadeen (Trevor Brookes), and Abu Uzair voiced threatening statements to the British press in August 2005, in which they hailed the London bombers and emphasized over and over again that the covenant of security was no longer valid. All of them have since been arrested for supporting terrorism. Abu Uzair told the BBC’s show Newsnight; ”We don’t live in peace with you anymore, which means the covenant of security no longer exists. That is why those four bombers attacked London. They believed there was no covenant of security and for them, their belief was they were allowed to attack the UK... for them it was allowed, for them it was particularly allowed....Because me my self my belief has not been attacked personally me myself. For them the banner has been raised for jihad in the UK, which means for them it is allowed for them to attack, and they probably have many other cells in the UK”.107 Abu Izzedin, said that the Europeans and the Brits had to expect attacks after they rejected bin Laden’s truce offer in April 2004; “Osama bin Laden, excuse me, Sheik Osama bin Laden, he offered to the British public and the European people at large an offer of ceasefire. He said that if they roared up against their governments……brought their troops back home...he promised not to attack them”.108 Izzedin added that suicide operations should be considered legitimate “mujahidin activity” and “completely praiseworthy”.109 Just like Al Qaeda’s leadership, Bakri’s followers’ drew linkages between European (British) foreign policy and persecution of Muslims in Europe (Britain).110 14   

A popular topic on websites and discussion forums, the principle of security treaties has been commented and ruled upon by pro-Al Qaeda ideologues as well as critics of the organization. In his famous critique of Al Qaeda, the former leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Al-Sayyid Imam bin Abd al-Aziz Al-Sharif alias Dr. Fadl claimed that operations by Muslims obtaining permits of stay (for example visas) in western countries were not permissible.111 The UK based preacher Abd-al Munim Mustafa Halima alias Abu Basir alTartousi expressed similar views condemning the attacks in London on July 7, 2005 as violations of a covenant of security.112 The Saudi sheikh Hamud bin Uqla al-Shuaybi on the other hand, ruled that the September 11 attacks were permissible as the bombers did not violate any covenants when entering the U.S. on visas. According to the Saudi, jihad against the unbelievers is an obligation regardless of security pacts, and because if there indeed was a mutual security pact it had already been violated by the Americans.113 In an open Q&A session with al-Zawahiri on the Internet he received a question based on Dr. Fadl’s criticisms, about whether Muslims who have obtained visas non-Muslim countries should consider themselves obligated by a covenant of security. 114 Al-Zawahiri referred to “The Exoneration”, a book in which he answered to the criticisms by Dr. Fadl. Stressing the mutual nature of security treaties, al-Zawahiri presented a series of examples on how visas to western countries have not implied safety and security for Muslims. Aiming to show how westerners had violated treaties, al-Zawahiri highlighted how western countries had allowed the U.S. to arrest Muslims on their territories (the practice of extraordinary rendition), and that Muslims in living in the West had been forced to pay taxes that finance warfare in the Muslim world. Also, he emphasized that Muslims in western countries were prevented from offering their children proper Islamic education; that they were prevented from practising their faith, and that the authorities allowed insults against Islam and Muslims, such as the Mohammed drawings.115 Al-Zawahiri’s extensive discussion demonstrates that the principle of security contracts is too important to be ignored by Al Qaeda, and that the organization aims to make visible violations of such contracts in order to radicalize Diaspora Muslims. Although circumstantial evidence points to some importance of covenants of security in either constraining or radicalizing Islamists in Europe (based on their individual interpretations of whether their countries have violated the covenant, or not), it seems to be generally accepted by pro-Al Qaeda activists that European contributions to the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and arrests of Islamists in Europe have violated the conditions for security pacts between Europeans and Muslim immigrants. After European security services cracked down on central militant networks in London, other European cities and the Internet appear to have become more important in the dissemination of ideology. For example, in Germany radical Islamist community linked to the Uzbek, Al Qaeda associated Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), socialized ethnic Germans and Turks into militant worldviews and sent them to the Afghan-Pakistani border for training.116 Some of these youths appeared on propaganda films by Al Qaeda’s media company al-Sahab urging attacks against Germany at home and abroad, and appealing to the Germans to vote for the withdrawal of German troops in the Muslim world in upcoming elections.117 A GermanTurkish terrorist cell linked to the IJU planned attacks against American (and possibly also German and Uzbek targets) in Germany during the fall of 2007.118 On the Internet, several commentators and opinion makers spread radicalism via their cyber aliases.119 However, in terms of producing genuine ideological communication, no-one seem to have managed to replace London’s main ideologues; Qatada, Hamza and Bakri). The young pundits of Europe’s second generation networks appear to function more as distributors than producers of ideological material, - for now.

15   

Conclusions  Jihadists in Europe have faced a number of dilemmas related to identity, enemy perception and strategy. Surrounded by infidels, but at the same time living in peaceful democracies far away from battlefields, and having poor prospects for causing widespread Islamization (let alone establishing Islamic states), the militants appear to have had hard times defining their role and identity vis-à-vis counterparts in the Muslim countries, - especially Al Qaeda. Symptomatically, apart from semi-organized Al Qaeda associated groups focusing mainly on propaganda and support activities, as of yet, there seems to exist no defined European Al Qaeda branch spearheading terrorism inside the region. This article contends that Europe’s militants ideologically have moved gradually from relative agreement on concentrating on the local struggles, via disarray, towards a more unified global enemy perception and military strategy. Both individual European states and Europe as a collective appear to have become more prioritized enemies both for Al Qaeda associated groups inside Europe and Al-Qaeda’s regional branches and allies in Muslim countries. In terms of the operational strategies, ideological material retrieved from investigations justify terrorism inside western host states, and the use of weapons of mass destruction and martyrdom operations as means of combat. Combining analysis of ideological discourses and the circumstances of operational cells, there seems to have been a relative mismatch between ideological-strategic unity and operational capabilities when it comes to staging terrorist operations in Europe. For example, the Algerian GIA had secured capabilities and networks in Europe, but appeared internally divided on the ideological justifications and strategic benefits of a terrorism campaign in France. The Al Qaeda linked cells disrupted between 1998 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq went through ideological indoctrination and paramilitary training in Al Qaeda’s training camps in Afghanistan. However, despite training and the close affiliations with Al Qaeda, these terrorists did not seem to be able to decide properly on whether to prioritize near or the far enemy. The terrorists also appeared to be somewhat ambivalent to Al Qaeda’s preference for suicide terrorism. The new generation of militants in Europe seems to be more unified in seeing European governments as full partners in the perceived war on Islam by the U.S. and Israel, on the one hand, and seeing European nations as pursuing anti-Islam domestic policies; persecuting and insulting Muslims, on the other hand. Moreover, after consulting ideological texts and opinion makers, and Al Qaeda’s propaganda via the Internet, they seem bent on using all necessary means in the struggle, even the martyrdom attacks. While coming across as ideologically coherent, the main weaknesses of the new generation seem to pertain to the lack of arenas for activism (as many radical mosques have been closed or remain under surveillance) and the limitations of the Internet in terms of obtaining sufficient terrorist training.120 Despite that the jihadist threat to Europe appears to have become more direct and globally oriented; apart from the relative strategic success of the Madrid attacks (see footnote), the terrorists have thus far achieved little apart from spreading Islamophobia, as well as toughening immigration and anti-terrorism laws.121 Moreover, European troops remain part of the peacekeeping operation and military efforts in Afghanistan and most of the terrorist plans in Europe keep getting thwarted. Out of more than seventy incidents registered by the author, the great majority was intercepted or failed at the operational level.122 At the same time, European police and intelligence services have disrupted important fundraising, weapons smuggling, and recruitment networks, in addition to arresting central ideologue preachers and propagandists. It is important to keep in mind, however, that counter-terrorism arrests are always a double-edged sword. Imprisoned ideologues remain able to recruit and radicalize inmates, 16   

while at the same time smuggling out ideological statements, which are being published on the Internet. There are also signs that ideologues spending time in European prisons that previously were mostly concerned with “classical” jihadism (such as Abu Qatada and Abu Hamza) increasingly support Al Qaeda’s global struggle.123 A relative absence of ideologues prioritizing armed struggle in Muslim countries (compared to Al Qaeda’s potent, Internet driven propaganda machinery) may also contribute to increasing ideological coherence and “globalization” of Europe’s jihadist trends.

Appendix  Abu Qatada Abu Qatada (’Umar Abu ’Umar, or “The Palestinian”), was born in Palestine in 1960. As a youth he joined the Tabligh movement. He obtained a bachelor in Islamic jurisprudence at the University of Amman in 1984. Qatada and his ideological mentor Abu Mohammed alMaqdisi (living in Kuwait) founded the first Jordanian jihadist movement, which they called “The Sunnis” (ahl al-sunnah wa’l jama’a). In 1991, Qatada travelled to Peshawar, Pakistan (via Malaysia), where he finished an MA in Islamic Jurisprudence and, through his contacts with Maqdisi, obtained a post as a lecturer at The Open Islamic University, an institute set up for the religious education of Arab Afghans. In 1993 he applied for asylum in the UK for himself and his family and started to preach at The Four Feathers Youth Club, known as the Baker Street Mosque. Qatada also gave lectures at his home, a semi-detached apartment in Acton. Together with the Al Qaeda associated strategist and “pen jihadist” Abu Musab al-Suri, Qatada edited the GIA mouthpiece al-Ansar. He also edited and distributed the magazine of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group’s (LIFG), al-Fajr. The magazines reported from the jihadist battlefields in Algeria, Bosnia, etc (communiqués from the groups, fatwas from various jihadist ideologues, etc). Qatada himself wrote articles, commentaries and religious rulings in al-Ansar until 1996, when he withdrew his support for the GIA.124

Abu Hamza Abu Hamza al-Masri (The Egyptian) aka Mustafa Kamil Mustafa, was born into an Alexandrian middle class family in 1958, and arrived in London as a student and adventurer in 1979. He married and had a child with a British woman and obtained permanent permission to stay in the UK in 1982. After a fight over infidelity ending in divorce, Hamza turned to religion, and took up studying engineering at Luton University. He joined an Islamic study circle, and in 1987 Hamza travelled on Hajj in Mecca where he met Abdullah Azzam who educated him in jihad ideologies. Back in London Hamza mingled with jihadists and attended meetings with Omar Abd al-Rahman. After completing his studies in 1991, Hamza moved to Afghanistan with his new Moroccan wife, where he ended up as a bomb maker in the Derunta camp in Jalalabad. Hamza lost both his hands and an eye in an explosion in 1993 while he was preparing explosives. He was subsequently forced by Pakistani intelligence (ISI) to return to the UK as part of a campaign to expel foreign jihadists. In London, Hamza became the pupil of Abu Qatada, before he established himself as an independent preacher. In 1994 he formed the radical group Supporters of Shariah (SoS). In 1995 Hamza travelled to Bosnia to join jihad against the Serbs. Back in the UK he became imam at a radical mosque in Luton attended by pro-GIA jihad of the Bosnian jihad. In 1997 (in competition with Abu Qatada) Hamza was elected khatib at the Finsbury Park Mosque and made it the hub for jihadists in Europe. The mosque had been dominated by Asian moderates (Pakistanis and Bengalis), but with Hamza in charge it became a base for North African jihadists. In March 2000, Hamza and SoS took total control of the mosque by force. When 17   

the war ended in Bosnia, Hamza needed a new mobilizing cause. He aligned himself with the GIA and in 1998 he took over the editing and publishing of al-Ansar. When the GIA lost the remaining support, Hamza shifted to focusing on local jihad in Yemen. He sent several SoS cadres (including his son) to Yemen to train and assist Yemeni anti-state attacks.125

Omar Bakri Mohammed Born into a wealthy family in Aleppo, Syria, in 1958, Omar Bakri Mohammed enrolled in Islamic boarding schools from the age of five. As a youth he joined the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and obtained a bachelor in Islamic jurisprudence in Damascus. Persecuted by Syrian security for his affiliation with the Brotherhood, Bakri fled from Syria to Beirut, Lebanon, where he completed a MA in Islamic jurisprudence and joined Hizb al-Tahrir (HT). Bakri continued his studies at al-Azhar in Cairo before travelling to Saudi Arabia in 1979, where he completed a doctoral thesis. In Saudi Arabia he formed a HT cell against the advice of the organization’s global leadership in Kuwait, which opposed the formation of a Saudi Branch. When HT’s leaders expelled Bakri he formed his own organization al-Muhajiroun (AM), in Jeddah, in 1983. In 1985, Bakri was expelled from Saudi Arabia because the regime considered him a threat. Bakri wanted to go to Pakistan, in his view the ideal base for Islamic activism. Because he had a multiple entry visa to the UK from a former visit, he ended up in London instead. In the UK Bakri established a new HT branch, again without approval of HT’s leaders. By 1986 Bakri had recruited 400 members. In 1996 he cut all ties to HT and reactivated alMuhajiroun. By 2003 AM had 160 members, an estimated 700 followers and around 7000 “contact points” (sympathizers) across the globe. AM had sub-divisions in more than 30 UK cities, and international branches in Lebanon, Ireland, Pakistan, and the U.S. In London, AM represented the “middle way” hardcore jihadists and extreme political activists such as HT. Al-Muhajiroun was banned by the UK authorities in October 2004, and Omar Bakri went into exile in Lebanon in 2005 after the attacks on the London underground (which involved people associated with al-Muhajiroun). From Lebanon he continued to communicate with his followers via the Internet service PalTalk.126

Abu Musab al-Suri The radicalized Syrian Muslim Brother Abu Musab Al-Suri fled to Afghanistan via Spain in the late 1980s after president al-Assad massacred the Syrian Muslim Brothers in Hama in 1982. Al-Suri later became a propagandist and strategic thinker for Al Qaeda and associated jihadist combatant groups (several of which maintained support networks in Europe, for example Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). After participating in the founding of Al Qaeda, al-Suri acted as a propagandist and strategic advisor for Al Qaeda and the GIA in Madrid and London from 1991 and onwards. During Taliban rule in Afghanistan from the latter half of the 1990s, al-Suri acted as a liaison between Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and in the late 1990s, he was implicated in organizing interviews with bin Laden for the international press. A sophisticated strategic thinker characterizing himself as a “pen jihadist”, Al-Suri developed the doctrine of decentralized jihad. 127 The doctrine recommends independent, “home-grown” terrorist cells with no, or a minimum of central leadership (seen by some as the formula for jihadist terrorism in Europe). Al-Suri’s relationship with Al Qaeda was thorny, and in periods he operated independently from bin Laden’s group as a freelance jihadist, a trainer and advisor offering courses in Afghanistan.128

18   

Abu Basir al­Tartousi  The London based Syrian Abd-al Munim Mustafa Halima, or Abu Basir al-Tartousi is described as an important salafist opinion maker, frequently quoted and discussed on extremist websites. Seemingly acting independently of specific militant groups, Tartousi was previously well-regarded by the jihadist crowd for justifying international terrorism. However, Tartousi lost credibility when he criticized the 7 July cell for violating the covenant of security.129

                                                       

1

Jihadist ideologue Omar Abu Omar alias Abu Qatada, as quoted in United States District Court of Colombia, “Jamil El-Banna et al. vs. George W. Bush President of the United States et al”, dated 21 October 2004, p 67. 2 Brynjar Lia and Åshild Kjøk, “Islamist Insurgencies, Diasporic Support Networks, and Their Host States: The Case of the Algerian GIA in Europe 1993-2000,” report, FFI, 2001. 3 Petter Nesser, ”Jihad in Europe,” report, FFI, 2004. 4 Alison Pargeter, The New Frontiers of Jihad Radical Islam in Europe (London: I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2008). 5 The article defines ideology as systematic, normative thinking about how to change societies. Ideologies typically contain descriptions of societal problems, specifying their causes (diagnosis); the reasons why the problems should be solved; who should solve them (rationale); as well as prescriptions on how to solve the problems and the consequences of solving them (prognosis), John Wilson, Introduction to Social Movements (New York: Basic Books, 1973). 6 The “jihadism” terminology disputed and indeed sub-optimal, for a good discussion see Jarret M. Brachman, Global jihadism: theory and practice (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp 4 ff. Consult also Quintan Wiktorowicz, ”A Genealogy of Radical Islam,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 28, Issue 2 February 2005 , pages 75 – 97. 7 Sayyid Qutb wrote primarily about the situation in Egypt, but emphasized that the principle applied to the whole world, Sayyid Qutb, Milestones (Revised Translation 1990) (Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1964) and Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006). 8 Consult Camille al-Tawil, Al-Qaida and Her Sisters, the Story of the Arab Jihadis (in Arabic) (Beirut: Dar alSaqi, 2008). 9 The main salafist principles are monotheism (tawhid), being loyal to Islam and disavowing everything unIslamic (wala wa’l bara), correcting un-Islamic behavior through the principle of enjoining the good and forbidding the evil (hisba), always trying to convert and Islamize people (dawa), and (for the salafist jihadists) jihad fi sabil Allah (jihad in the cause of God), in the meaning of armed struggle, Roel Meijer (ed), Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement, (London/New York: Hurst/Columbia University Press, 2009). Most Islamists seek to be as salafist as possible, and use the term to distinguish between themselves and the non-pious, the deviants, the apostates, the hypocrites and the unbelievers. In practice, the term salafist is used about Islamists who go to lengths to emulate the Prophet and his Companions, by way of how they dress, pray, ibid. 10 For a “salafist jihadist” exposition of the concepts, see Omar Bakri Mohammed, The World Is Divided into Two Camps…Daar Ul-Kufr and Daar Ul-Islaam (London: Ad-Da’wah Publications, 2004). 11 For a more fine grained classification of the political rationales of jihadism, consult Thomas Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp 6 ff. Hegghammer differentiates between “socio-revolutionary Islamism” (toppling of local regimes), “classical jihadism” (liberation of occupied Muslim countries), and “global jihadism” (the global war of Al Qaeda and likeminded groups. 12 For example, the book regarded a major inspiration for the salafist jihadist trends, Milestones, emphasizes the duty of training before going into battle; making tactical truces with the enemies or fleeing to a secure base in times of weakness, see Sayyid Qutb, Milestones (Revised Translation 1990) (Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1964). 13 There have been communiqués on the Internet in the names of Al Qaeda in Northern Europe, Al Qaeda in Britain, Al Qaeda in Sweden etc, calling for attacks on the U.S.’s European allies, but they have not been traced to operational cells, consult for example “Skepticism greets “Al Qaeda in Britain” founding,” Reuters, 16 January 2008. 14 Sayyid Qutb, Milestones (Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1999). 15 The common understanding of covenants between Muslims and unbelievers was summarized by the jihadist translation service At-Tibyan Publications in a note to bin Laden’s speech dated 16 December 2004 as follows: “....The Sheikh (bin Laden) is talking about “Covenants in Islam”, which is a very crucial topic. Because of the vital importance of this topic, we will address it separately, at a later date, insha Allah. But here is a brief

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                                                                                                                                                                          summary: Covenants in Islam are a regulated matter and the regulations are spelled out clearly in Quran. Also the consensus of Islamic scholars has been known for very long time. Muslims are allowed to enter into covenant agreement(s) with their enemies when they (Muslims) are weak, and only under the following conditions: - The length of any covenant should not be for more than ten years under any circumstances. - Muslims are obligated to use the time of covenant to prepare and strengthen themselves to resume Jihad as soon as possible. - Once Muslims state of weakness has changed, they are obligated to call off the covenant, inform their enemies of their decision to call the covenant off, and resume Jihad. - Covenant agreement (s) is/are automatically cancelled if the enemies attack any Muslim or Muslim land anywhere. – And Also this Taghuts are Murtadeen and thair covenant are not valid, ect.)” 16 For a more detailed exposition of indicators on the various drivers of jihadist cells in Europe, consult Petter Nesser, “Jihad in Europe: A Survey of the Motivations for Sunni Islamist Terrorism in Post-Millennium Europe,” report, FFI, 2004. 17 Sean O'Neill and Daniel McGrory, The Suicide Factory, Abu Hamza and the Finsbury Park Mosque (London: Harper Perennial, 2006). 18 See for example Petter Nesser, “Jihad in Europe: A Survey of the Motivations for Sunni Islamist Terrorism in Post-Millennium Europe,” report, FFI, 2004 and Lorenzo Vidino and Steven Emerson, Al Qaeda in Europe (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2005), Alison Pargeter, The New Frontiers of Jihad Radical Islam in Europe (London: I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2008) and Sean O'Neill and Daniel McGrory, The Suicide Factory, Abu Hamza and the Finsbury Park Mosque (London: Harper Perennial, 2006). 19 See for example Mark Honigsbaum and Alan Travis, “Al-Qaida's 'spiritual ambassador' faces return to Jordan,” Guardian 12 August 2005. 20 The organization al-Muhajiroun was formed in 1996, and focused primarily on supporting the separatist struggle in Kashmir, see Quintan Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising; Muslim Extremism in the West (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers inc, 2005). Members of the group have rarely been tied to concrete in terrorist acts before the early 2000s, when several members were involved in terrorism in Pakistan/Kashmir and Israel. After the invasion of Iraq, several people involved in terrorism in Europe (including the London bombers) had been affiliated with al-Muhajiroun. 21 Abu Qatada, Abu Hamza and Omar Bakri are assumed to have had a particularly strong ideological influence on Europe’s jihadists. From the early 1990s until quite recently they interacted with a substantial number of militants convicted of terrorism in Europe and abroad. Leading figures of well-known terrorist cells in Europe, such as the London-bombers, attended sermons and study circles of the London preachers and members of terrorist cells accessed ideological texts and propaganda material produced by them, see for example Sean O'Neill and Daniel McGrory, The Suicide Factory (London: Harper Perennial, 2006), and Omar Nasiri, Inside the Jihad (New York: Basic Books, 2006). 22 Omar Nasiri, Inside the Jihad (New York: Basic Books, 2006), p 150. 23 Brynjar Lia, "Al-Qaeda online: understanding jihadist internet infrastructure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, December 2005. 24 Hanna Rogan, "Jihadism Online: A study of how al-Qaida and radical Islamist groups use the Internet for terrorist purpose," report, FFI, 2006. 25 James Brandon, “Virtual Caliphate; Islamic Extremists and Their Websites,” Centre for Social Cohesion, 2008. 26 Consult At-Tibyan Publications, URL: http://www.tibyan.co.cc/ 27 The ideological material corresponds largely to material available on the Internet library Minbar al-Tawhid wa’l Jihad analyzed by the acknowledged Combating Terrorism Centre, CTC, William McCants (ed), “Militant Ideology Atlas, Executive Report,” report, Combating Terrorism Centre, West Point, 2006 and William McCants (ed), “Militant Ideology Atlas, Research Compendium, ”report, Combating Terrorism Centre, West Point, 2006. 28 Camille al-Tawil, The Armed Islamic Movement in Algeria (in Arabic) (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 1998), p 73 ff. 29 Federal Court of Justice in Karlsruhe, “Indictment of the Unemployed Hairdresser and Asylum Applicant Shadi Moh'd Mustafa Abdalla Alias Emad Abdelhadie,” (in German, translation courtesy Peter Bergen), Federal Court Frankfurt am Main, “Verdict in the Criminal Case against Mr Djilali Benali (“Aeurobui Beandali”) et al,” (in German), dated 20 June 2003, with author. 30 Federal Court Frankfurt am Main, “Verdict in the Criminal Case against Mr Djilali Benali (“Aeurobui Beandali”) et al,” (in German), dated 20 June 2003, with author. 31 Court of First Instance no 6 of the Audencia National, “Proceedings 20/2004,” (Indictment of the Madrid bombers) (in Spanish, translated by Tine Gade), dated 10 April 2006, with author, p 436 ff. 32 Court of First Instance no 6 of the Audencia National, “Proceedings 20/2004,” (Indictment of the Madrid bombers) (in Spanish, translated by Tine Gade), dated 10 April 2006, with author, pp 1428 ff.

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The Madrid bombers e.g. downloaded several texts by the Saudi jihadist ideologues Abd al-Aziz al-Jarbu and Nasir bin Hamad al-Fahd, Court of First Instance no 6 of the Audencia National, “Proceedings 20/2004,” (Indictment of the Madrid bombers) (in Spanish, translated by Tine Gade), dated 10 April 2006, with author, pp 436 ff. 34 Court of First Instance no 6 of the Audencia National, “Proceedings 20/2004,” (Indictment of the Madrid bombers) (in Spanish, translated by Tine Gade), dated 10 April 2006, with author, p. 1217 35 According to Rudolph Peters, covenant of security rationales functioned as constraints on Mohammed Bouyeri and the “Hofstadgroup” seeking theological justifications for terrorism in the Netherlands. Peters argues Bouyeri found the solution in Taymiyyah’s ruling on individual punishment for people insulting the Prophet, while other members of the network went “preacher shopping” among self-declared religious advisors such as the ethnic Dutchman Abdul Jabbar Van de Ven seeking permission to use violence in their home-country, Rudolph Peters, “Dutch Extremist Islamism: Van Gogh's Murderer and His Ideas,” in Jihadist Terrorism and the Radicalization Challenge in Europe, ed. Rik Coolsaet (ed.) (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), p 116. 36 Consult Helen Carter, “Beheading Plot Trial Told of Abu Hamza Material,” Guardian 31 January 2008 and Sean O'Neill and Daniel McGrory, The Suicide Factory, Abu Hamza and the Finsbury Park Mosque (London: Harper Perennial, 2006). 37 Albert Benschop, “Chronicle of a Political Murder Foretold: Jihad in the Netherlands,” report, University of Amsterdam, 2005. 38 Rudolph Peters, “Dutch Extremist Islamism: Van Gogh's Murderer and His Ideas,” in Jihadist Terrorism and the Radicalization Challenge in Europe, ed. Rik Coolsaet (ed.) (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), p 116. 39 Woolwich Crown Court, “The Queen v Bilal Talal Abdul Samad Abdulla and Mohammed Jamil Abdelqadader Asha, Opening note,” 7 October 2008, with author, p 254 ff. 40 Ibid., p 76. 41 Abu Qatada, “Adress to the Muslims from Abu Qatada/Umar Bin Mahmud Abu Umar,” (in Arabic) (dated March 2009), via URL: http://zuheer17.blogspot.com/2009/03/blog-post_2002.html. 42 Mustafa Setmariam Nasir alias Abu Musab al-Suri, “A Summary of My Testimony on the Holy Struggle in Algeria, 1988-1996” (in Arabic, 2004), (translated excerpts courtesy Brynjar Lia). 43 In the manifest for jihadism “Milestones”, Qutb, called on Muslims to leave Muslim societies not governed by Islamic law (undertake hijra) and establish bases in which Muslims can prepare for war (fard ayn jihad) against their governments (like the Prophet and his Companions in Medina), consult Sayyid Qutb, Milestones (Revised Translation 1990) (Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1964). Ideologically, many jihadists appear to perceive Europe to be the modern day Medina (for a vanguard of true believers aiming to restore the Caliphate), a base in which to prepare for violent Islamization. 44 Abu Musab al-Suri, “A Summary of My Testimony on the Holy Struggle in Algeria, 1988-1996,” (in Arabic), 2004 (translated excerpts courtesy Brynjar Lia). 45 At the forefront of the jihadist mocking of political Islamists was Abu Qatada, who considered the Muslim Brotherhood deviant for “throwing itself on the threshold of the Taghut [tyranny]” by joining political processes and negotiating with non-believers, Abu Qatada, "Between the Two Methods,” (translated excerpts courtesy Will Mccants),” Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l Jihad. 46 The war between Muslims and Serbs in Bosnia was very important in the radicalization of European Islamists in the early 1990s and was seen by many jihadists as a potential base for the mujahidin in Europe, see Evan F. Kohlmann, Al-Qaida's Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian Network (London: Berg, 2004). While Bosnia is known to have been a radicalizing factor in the lives of Europe-based radical preachers and terrorist operatives, no acts of terrorism seem to have been triggered directly by events in Bosnia, however, such as was the case with the Algerian war, the insurgency in Chechnya, and later the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, see Petter Nesser, “Jihad in Europe: A Survey of the Motivations for Sunni Islamist Terrorism in Post-Millennium Europe,” report, FFI, 2004 and Lorenzo Vidino and Steven Emerson, Al Qaeda in Europe: The New Battleground of International Jihad (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2005). The war in Bosnia was first and foremost a symbol of atrocities against civilian Muslims, and the failure of western powers to prevent genocide. 47 The main groups were the MIA guerrillas, headed by Mustafa Bouyali, and youth gangs from Algiers’ suburbs under the leadership of Mohammed Alal, see Camille al-Tawil, The Armed Islamic Movement in Algeria (in Arabic) (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 1998). 48 Abu Musab al-Suri, "A Summary of My Testimony on the Holy Struggle in Algeria, 1988-1996 ," (translated excerpts courtesy Brynjar Lia). 49 Indeed, Qari Said sat on Al Qaeda’s Advisory Council (majlis al-shura) in the organization’s formative period, consult Camille al-Tawil, Al Qaeda and Her Sisters, the Story of the Arab Jihadis (in Arabic) (Beirut: Dar al-Saqi, 2008). 50 According to Abu Musab al-Suri, Zitouni rejected the salafi-jihadism of the Arab Afghans and burnt books by Qutb, al-Zawahiri and al-Suri, Umar Abd al-Hakim, "Summary of My Testimony on the Holy Struggle in

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                                                                                                                                                                          Algeria, 1988-1996 (in Arabic), Courtesy Brynjar Lia," (2004). Zitouni pursued his own ideology close to the Madkhali School of Islamic thought. 51 Qatada defended this fatwa in a televised debate in November 2000 and in an interview with CNN in November 2001, consult Special Immigration Appeals Commission, “Abu Qatada Vs Secretary of State for the Home Department,” 2007. 52 Camille al-Tawil, Al Qaeda and Her Sisters, the Story of the Arab Jihadists (in Arabic) (Beirut: Dar al-Saqi, 2008), p 195 ff. 53 Abu Qatada, “Charcteristics of the Victorious Party in the Foundation of the State of the Believers (the Land of Ash-Sham),” At-Tibyan Publications. 54 Abu Qatada, “Globalization and the Troops of the Jihad,” (in Arabic), Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l Jihad, 2001. 55 United States District Court of Colombia, “Jamil El-Banna et al vs George W. Bush President of the United States et al”, dated 21 October 2004, p 67. 56 Camille al-Tawil, The Armed Islamic Movement in Algeria (in Arabic) (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 1998), pp 216 ff. 57 Mahan Abedin, “Al-Muhajiroun in the UK: An Interview with Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammed,” Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, volume 1, no. 7, 2004. 58 Abu Abdulrahman Amin (Djamel Zitouni), “Open Letter to All Muslims,” (English translation) in ISLAMREPORT (American Islamic Group, 1995). 59 The majority of the Council, especially the Algerianists, opposed Zitouni’s plan, on the grounds that it would divert resources from the war in Algeria and jeopardize international support networks, Camille al-Tawil, Al Qaeda and Her Sisters, the Story of the Arab Jihadists (in Arabic) (Beirut: Dar al-Saqi, 2008), p 201. 60 Abu Abdulrahman Amin (Djamel Zitouni), “Open Letter to All Muslims,” (English translation) in ISLAMREPORT (American Islamic Group, 1995). 61 Camille al-Tawil, The Armed Islamic Movement in Algeria (in Arabic) (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 1998), p 162. 62 Abu Abdulrahman Amin (Djamel Zitouni), “Open Letter to All Muslims,” (English translation) in ISLAMREPORT (American Islamic Group, 1995). 63 Under GIA’s first Emir, Abd al-Haq Layada, the group operated as a genuinely local insurgent group, targeting mainly representatives and symbols of the regime. After Layada, leadership was transferred to Aish Bin Amar, who was killed shortly afterwards by security forces, in August 1993. The next leader of the GIA, Saif Allah Jafar al-Afghani (Saif Allah) opened new fronts for the GIA. He announced that “he who fights us with the pen, we will fight with the sword”, and urged his fighters to attack secularist intellectuals and journalists critical of the mujahidin. Saif Allah was also the first GIA leader to suggest the expulsion of French citizens from Algeria. During the fall of 1993 Saif Allah declared war on all foreigners in the country. In a communiqué he gave the foreigners one month to leave the country before the GIA would attack them. Saif Allah was killed in February 1994 and replaced by the Afghanistan veteran Sharif Qusumi (Abu Abdullah Ahmad). Qusumi continued the brutalization of the GIA and the aggression against foreigners, especially the French (during his reign the GIA killed several French teachers and workers for oil companies), Camille al-Tawil, The Armed Islamic Movement in Algeria (in Arabic) (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 1998). 64 Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p 156. 65 For an exposition of diverging organizational-ideological allegiances and motivational patterns, consult Petter Nesser, “Jihad in Europe,” report, FFI, 2004. 66 United States District Court Southern District of New York, “United States of America vs. Abu Doha,” 2001. 67 High Court of Paris, “Verdict against Marbah, Lebik, Benahmed et al,” (translated by Tine Gade), dated 14 June 2006 with author, p 27 ff, Sean O'Neill and Daniel McGrory, The Suicide Factory (London: Harper Perennial, 2006). 68 John Hooper and Nick Hopkins, “Al Qaeda Cell in UK “Planned Attack”,” Guardian, 26 October 2001, United States District Court Southern District of New York, “United States of America vs Mokhtar Haouari,” (hearing), dated 3 July 2001, “United States of America vs Mokhtar Haouari,”(hearing), dated 5 July 2001. 69 “Verdict in the Criminal Case against Mr Djilali Benali ("Aeurobui Beandali") et al,” (in German), Federal Court Frankfurt am Main, dated 20 June 2003, with author, p 14 ff. 70 Hanna Rogan, “Violent Trends in Algeria since 9/11,” CTC Sentinel 1, no. 12, 2008, Algerian jihadists, GSPC/AQIM did not start to utilize suicide bombers as a tactic before 11 April 2007, after joining Al Qaeda. It is believed, however, that the GIA planned to blow up, or crash an aircraft over Paris in December 1994, Camille al-Tawil, The Armed Islamic Movement in Algeria (in Arabic) (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 1998), p 194 ff. 71 Petter Nesser, “Jihad in Europe,” report, FFI, 2004. 72 Claiming first they wanted to strike a Jewish synagogue, during interrogations they argued they were interested in a “media-effective” operation aiming to “help the Palestinian people “Verdict in the Criminal Case against Mr Djilali Benali (“Aeurobui Beandali”) et al,” (in German), Federal Court Frankfurt am Main, dated 20 June 2003, with author.

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                                                                                                                                                                          73

Ibid. and Peter Taylor, “Inside Story, a Jihad Warrior in London,” Guardian 9 February 2004, “The Third World War: Al Qaeda, the Breeding Ground”, documentary, (BBC, Peter Taylor, 2004). 74 Saif al-Adel, “The Jihad Biography of the Leader of Slaugther Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi,” (in Arabic), Global Islamic Media Front, 2005. 75 Yassin Musharbash, “Greetings from the Butcher of Baghdad,” Spiegel 26 April 2006. 76 Federal Court of Düsseldorf, “Indictment of the Jordanian Citizen of Palestinian Origin, Mohamed Ghassan Ali Saud Abu Dhess et al,” (in German), dated 27 August 2003, with author. 77 Abu Hamza, “How to Live Islamically in the Land of the Kuffar,” (1999), video file with author downloaded from the jihadist web forum Al-Hesbah. 78 In the speech Hamza states“...because we are studying now our existence in Europe, then this is Dar al-Harb, Dar al-Kufr, it implies many-many things. One of those things is that we have to enjoin the good and forbid the evil and make sure it is Dar al-Islam somehow, or we have to plan to leave. Otherwise we are doing a very, very great haram...What is Dar al-Kufr, it is haram to stay in Dar al-Kufr, cause basically you have to compromise with your religion”, Abu Hamza, “How to Live Islamically in the Land of the Kuffar,” (1999) 79 In the speech Hamza states “it [the notion of security pacts] gives the people the impression that it is halal for them to stay there and it is okay for them to stay there as long as they have mosques, the more mosques they have, the more Islamic the state it is, and that is why we start listening to this crap that this is dar al-aman, the dar of safety and of security”, Abu Hamza, “How to Live Islamically in the Land of the Kuffar,” (1999). 80 About killing unbeliever Hamza states “If he doesn’t respect Dawa, kill him......You have to understand that Dawa is good but it doesn't survive alone. There are many prophets before Muhammad ... they were killed because they did not have the sword with them”, Abu Hamza, “How to Live Islamically in the Land of the Kuffar,” (1999). 81 “The preachings of Abu Hamza,” Guardian 7 February 2006 82 Omar Bakri Mohammed, The World Is Divided into Two Camps…Daar Ul-Kufr and Daar Ul-Islaam (London: Ad-Da’wah Publications, 2004), p 66 83 Consult e.g. the martyrdom testaments of the London bombers Mohammed Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer, Wasiya Fursan Ghaswat London [Testaments of the Knights of the London Attacks], Al-Sahab Media Production, 2006 and the letters Mohammed Bouyeri pinned to the body of Theo Van Gogh. Petter Nesser, “The Slaying of the Dutch Filmmaker,” report, FFI, 2005, p 29. 84 An overview of Al Qaeda communiqués between 1990 and 2002 by Thomas Hegghammer contains very few references to Europe, Thomas Hegghammer, “Documentation on Al-Qaida: Interviews, Communiqués and other Primary Sources 1990-2002,” (in Norwegian), report, FFI, 2003. 85 Ibid., p 184. 86 “The Complete Archive of Speeches and Sermons by the Imam of the Mujahidin Usama Bin Muhammad Bin Laden,” (in Arabic) Shabakat al-Buraq al-Islamiyya, 2007. 87 “'Al-Qaeda' statement: Full text,” BBC News 21 May 2003. Norway did not contribute to the invasion, however. 88 Retrieved from “The Complete Archive of Speeches and Sermons by the Imam of the Mujahidin Usama Bin Muhammad Bin Laden,” (in Arabic), Shabakat al-Buraq al-Islamiyya, 2007. 89 A search for the word Europe in a complete collection of Bin Laden’s speeches between 2001 and 2006 returned four hits, “The Complete Archive of Speeches and Sermons by the Imam of the Mujahidin Usama Bin Muhammad Bin Laden (in Arabic),” (Shabakat al-Buraq al-Islamiyya, 2007). 90 Similar communiqués were issued by the GIA leadership in connection with the terrorist attacks in France in 1995- The GIA’s Emir Zitouni said operations would stop if France withdrew its support for the Algerian regime. Zitouni also “invited” French president Chirac to Islam, according to the Prophet’s traditions, consult Brynjar Lia and Åshild Kjøk, “Islamist Insurgencies, Diasporic Support Networks, and Their Host States: The Case of the Algerian GIA in Europe 1993-2000,” report, FFI, 2001. 91 One letter linked to the Madrid bombers stated “We regard whoever supports the American occupation as our enemy, and see the Spanish government as responsible for the killing of each element of its forces in Iraq or outside of Iraq,” Court of First Instance no 6 of the Audencia National, “Proceedings 20/2004,” (Indictment of the Madrid bombers) (in Spanish, translated by Tine Gade), dated 10 April 2006, with author pp 542-544. 92 Consult for example the martyrdom testament of Mohammed Siddique Khan, in which he states that “Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world. And your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters. Until we feel security, you will be our targets. And until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop this fight. We are at war and I am a soldier”, “London Bomber: Text in Full,” BBC News, 2 September 2005. 93 See for example Jean-Pierre Filiu,”The Local and global Jihad of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghrib,” The Middle East Journal, Volume 63, Number 2, Spring 2009 , pp. 213-226 (14) and "Taliban Pakistan tuakkid

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                                                                                                                                                                          istihdaf uruba wa amrika" [Taliban Pakistan Confirm Targeting of Europe and the U.S.] al-Hayat 30 September 2010. There have also been one attempt to launch attacks in Spain terrorists with alleged ties to the Pakistani Taliban, see Fernando Reinares, “A case study of the January 2008 Suicide Bomb Plot in Barcelona,” CTC Sentinel, January 2009, pp 5-7. 94 “Headscarf Ban May Cause Attack on France,” Daily Times, 26 February 2004. 95 In November 2007 bin Laden again appealed to Europeans to pressure their governments to withdraw forces from Muslim lands (specifying Blair, Brown, Berlusconi, Asnar and Sarkozy), or face the consequences. In March 2008 bin Laden warned the EU and portrayed the publication of the “insulting drawings” of the Prophet as “within the framework of new crusade” demanding ”punishment”, and claiming that ”The Pope and the Vatican” had been involved in the crime. He added that the cartoons represented a worse crime than bombings of “villages that collapsed over our women and children”, Osama bin Laden, “O People of Islam,” Al-Sahab Media Production, 2006. 96 “May Our Mothers Be Bereaved If We Do Not Defend Our Prophet,” Al-Sahab Media Production, 2008. 97 Consult extracts from Ibn Taymiyyah’s al-sarim al-maslul ala shatim al-rasul, quoted in al-Zawahiri’s Exoneration, At-Tibyan Publications, downloaded via URL: http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/osc/exoneration.pdf. 98 Abu Hamza mocked the concept of security pacts in Abu Hamza, “How to Live Islamically in the Land of the Kuffar,” video, al-Hesbah, 1999, with author. 99 Omar Bakri Mohammed, The World Is Divided into Two Camps…Daar Ul-Kufr and Daar Ul-Islaam (London: Ad-Da’wah Publications, 2004), p 66. 100 Bakri states that individual Muslims are no longer restricted by the contract “as soon as the state begins to arrest the Muslims on a wide scale without charge, or publicly declares its animosity or hatred towards the Muslims and Islam”, Omar Bakri Mohammed, The World Is Divided into Two Camps…Daar Ul-Kufr and Daar Ul-Islaam (London: Ad-Da’wah Publications, 2004), p 67. 101 Bakri states that “non-Muslim lands of safety turned into lands of jihad when the countries declared their physical, verbal and financial support for many Western countries that have wasted the blood of Muslims, raped Muslim women and stolen the resources of Muslims”. Although Bakri preached that the Covenant applied to UK Muslims he mentioned the UK as one example of such violations, together with the U.S. and Australia, Omar Bakri Mohammed, The World Is Divided into Two Camps…Daar Ul-Kufr and Daar Ul-Islaam (London: AdDa’wah Publications, 2004), p 63. 102 Rosie Cowan, Richard Norton-Taylor, and Audrey Gillian, “Police search emails for trail to Pakistan, Canadian accused of aiding UK suspects," Guardian, 1 April 2004. 103 On the Internet Bakri declared “I believe the whole of Britain has become Dar ul-Harb... the kuffar has no sanctity for their own life or property...", and he urged his followers to join jihad "wherever you are". He added that "Al Qaeda and all its branches and organisations of the world, that is the victorious group and they have the emir and you are obliged to join. There is no need . . . to mess about”, Sean O’Neill and Yaakov Lappin, “Britain's Online Imam Declares War as He Calls Young to Jihad,” Times 17 January 2005. 104 David Cohen, “Terror on the Dole,” London Evening Standard 20 April 2004. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid. 107 BBC2 Newsnight (TV-program) 1 August 2005 (authors notes), see also Lisa Myers, "Fighting words in an anxious London, "MSNBC News 3 September 2005. 108 Ibid. 109 Ibid. 110 In a propaganda document Bakri’s pupils addressed UK foreign policy, the judicial system, secularism in schools, discrimination and racism against Muslims, Islam’s”internal enemies” (Muslims and Islamists cooperating the with the UK government and spying on the true believers, for example the Metropolitan Police’s Muslim Contact Unit), etc, see “The British Plans for Islam & Muslims a Continuation of the Crusader Wars,” (Ad-Da’wah Publications, 2004). 111 The criticisms against the ideology and methods of Al Qaeda was pulished as an 111 pages book entitled “Guiding Jihadist Action in Egypt and the World” by the Arabic Newspaper al-Jarida, downloaded from URL: http://www.aljareeda.com/aljarida/Default.aspx. 112 Abu Basir al-Tartousi has written extensively on the covenant of security; consult Abdul Mun'em Mustafa Halīmah Abu Basīr, “Covenants & Security in Islam,” available on URL: http://www.en.altartosi.com/Covenants-eng.pdf. 113 Consult Hamud Bin Uqla al-Shuaybi, “The Clarification of what happened in America,” At-Tibyan Publications, URL: http://tibyan.wordpress.com/. 114 Ayman al-Zawahiri, “The Open Meeting with Shaykh Ayman Al-Zawahiri Part One,” Al-Sahab Media Production, 2008. 115 Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Exoneration,” Al-Sahab Media Production, 2008.

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Guido Steinberg, "The Islamic Jihad Union,” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2008. “IJU releases message from German-speaking militant,” NEFA, 2009. 118 Petter Nesser, “Lessons Learned from the September 2007 German Terrorist Plot,” CTC Sentinel 1, no. 4, 2008. 119 James Brandon, “Virtual Caliphate; Islamic Extremists and Their Websites,” Centre for Social Cohesion, 2008. 120 The new generation of jihadists has an urge to become full-blown mujahidin like their predecessors, and they travel abroad to attend religious schools and training camps despite security risks, jeopardizing their operations, see for example Petter Nesser, “How Did Europe’s Gobal Jihadis Obtain Training for Their Militant Causes?,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 20, no. 2, 2008. 121 By “success” the author means that by timing the attacks with the Spanish general elections the terrorists prompted a chain of events that eventually led to the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq. There were important intervening variables between the launching of the attacks and the withdrawal, however, most importantly the governing conservative party’s handling of the crisis. The government’s initial attempt to blame the attacks on the Basque terrorist group ETA (despite clear indication that Islamist radicals were behind them), is believed to have caused loss of confidence among the voters contributing to the socialist party (which had withdrawal of the troops from Iraq on its election program) winning the elections. The success was “relative” in the way that they did not lessen Spain’s resolve in combating terrorism. The withdrawal of forces from Iraq was followed by re-deployment of soldiers to Afghanistan; see for example William Rose, Rysia Murphy and Max Abrahms, "Does Terrorism Ever Work? The 2004 Madrid Train Bombings," International Security, Vol. 32, No. 1, 2007, pp 185-192. Fernando Reinares, "The Madrid Bombings and Global Jihadism," Survival, vol. 52, no. 2, April–May 2010, pp. 83–104. 122 Petter Nesser, “Chronology of Jihadism in Western Europe 1994-2007: Planned, Prepared, and Executed Terrorist Attacks,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 10, 2008. 123 Abu Qatada, “Address to the Muslims from Abu Qatada/Umar Bin Mahmud Abu Umar,” (in Arabic) (dated March 2009), via URL: http://zuheer17.blogspot.com/2009/03/blog-post_2002.html 124 Based on Muhammad Al-'Arsan, “The Deportation of Abu Qatada to Jordanm” Amman Net (in Arabic) 13 August 2005, “Who Is Abu Qatada the Palestinian, Who Demands the Islamic Army Release of the Reporter Johnston," (in Arabic) The Palestine Network for Dialogue, 2007, and e-mail Correspondence with Dominique Thomas March 2008, March 2008. 125 Sean O'Neill and Daniel McGrory, The Suicide Factory (London: Harper Perennial, 2006) 126 Mahan Abedin, “Al-Muhajiroun in the UK: An Interview with Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammed,” Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor 1, no. 7 (2004), Quintan Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers inc, 2005), and biography in Omar Bakri Mohammed, “the World Is Divided into Two Camps…” Daar Ul-Kufr and Daar Ul-Islaam (London: Ad-Da’wah Publications, 2004). 127 Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007) 128 Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). 129 In 2008 Tartousi issued a fatwa prohibiting suicide operations http://forums.islamicawakening.com/showthread.php?t=20144&highlight=baseer , http://forums.islamicawakening.com/showthread.php?t=20144&highlight=baseer, and James Brandon, “Virtual Caliphate; Islamic Extremists and Their Websites,” report, Centre for Social Cohesion, 2008. 117

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