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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW IMMIGRATION COURT 1961 STOUT STREET, SUITE 3101 DENVER, COLORADO 80294

In The Matter Of:

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Ol Respondents.

Date:

JtitU' 0'0,2015

IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS

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File Nos.:

A# 206 ~ A#206 ' A#206 '

CHARGES:

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Section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA or the Act), as amended, in that, Respondent is an immigrant who, at the time of application for admission, is not in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing card, or other valid entry document required by the Act, and a valid unexpired passport, or other suitable travel document, or document of identity and nationality as required under the regulations issued by the Attorney General under section 211(a) ofthe Act; Section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Act, as amended, in that, an alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who anived in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General.

APPLICATIONS:

Asylum pursuant to INA § 208; Withholding of Removal pursuant to INA § 241(b)(3); Relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT) pursuant to 8 C.P.R. §§ 1208.l6(c), 1208.17, 1208.l8.

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT:

ON BEHALF OF SERVICE:

Camila Palmer, Esq. Elkind Altel1nan Harston, PC 1860 Blake Street, Suite 420 Denver, CO 80202

Christy Downs, Assistant Chief Counsel U.S. Department of Homeland Security 12445 East Caley Avenue Centennial, CO 80111

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WRITTEN DECISION

I.

Procedural History

Lead respondent,· (Respondent), .is a male, native and citizen of Honduras, who entered the United States at or near Hidalgo, Texas, on or about May 20,2014. Respondent did not then possess or present a valid immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing identification card, or other valid entry document, and was not then admitted or paroled after inspection by an immigration officer. Based on the foregoing allegations, the Depmiment of Homeland Security (DHS) served Respondent with a Notice to Appear (NTA) on July 10,2014, charging him as removable from the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Act. The NTA was filed on July 16, 2014, thereby vesting jurisdiction with the Batavia, New York Immigration Court. On July 18,2014, Respondent, upon paying bond, was released from the Batavia, New York detention facility, and subsequently joined his family in Aurora, Colorado. On January 13, 2015, Respondent filed a Motion to Change Venue (Motion) with the Batavia Court in which he admitted the factual allegations asserted against him and conceded the charge of removability in the NTA. The Court granted Respondent's Motion on January 29, 2015. Respondent's wife, S. :t, and two-vear-old son,. Or are riders in this case. Ms. OJ . and n are natives and citizens of Honduras, who entered the United States without being paroled, at or near Hidalgo, Texas, on or about May 20, 2014. Ms. 01 ~xhibit 1; D~ 1m"s Exhibit 1. Based on the foregoing allegations, DHS served Ms. OJ tld I IT with NTAs on May 25,2014, charging them as removable from the United States pursuant to Section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Act. Those NTAs were filed on September 9, 2014, thereby vesting jurisdiction with this Court. On November 6,2014, Ms. 01 odged an 1-589, Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal (Ms. 0: . 's 1-589). On November 12,2014, Ms. OJ ;89 was filed with the Court. On Februm'y 4, 2015, the COUli consolidated the lead and rider cases. Appearing before the COUli, Respondent filed an 1-589, Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal (1-589) on February 11,2015. On that date, Ms, 0: ! and D. admitted the factual allegations asselied against them and conceded the charges of removability in the NTAs. The Court designated Honduras as the country of removal, should removal become necessary. On May 27,2015, Respondent and Ms. 01 "1 testified as to the merits of Respondent's asylunl claim. DHS did not present any rebuttal Testimony. For the reasons set fmih below, the Court will grant Respondent's application for asylum.

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Documentary Evidence

The documentary evidence within Respondent's Record of Proceeding (ROP) consists of Respondent's Exhibits 1-6. The documentary evidence within Ms. 0] ROP consists of Ms. s Exhibits '1-10. The documentary evidence within Dl ; ROP consists of Child's Exhibits 1-2. The Court has given thorough consideration to all evidence submitted, regardless of whether that evidence is specifically named in this decision.

III.

Testimony Presented A. Testimonial Evidence of Respondent

The following is a summary of Respondent's testimony. The Court finds, for the reasons stated below, that Respondent is credible and therefore credits his version of the facts. Respondent testified that he was born in Honduras, in the municipality of ~ . ,and that he is twenty-six years old. In 2007, when Respondent was seventeen years old, he enlisted to become a police officer in order to serve his country and "care for the population." Upon completion of a training course, Respondent was assigned to the department of 1. Every six to twelve months, Respondent was systematically reassigned to apparently as an effort by the police different municipalities within the department of force to prevent officers from making "too many friends who [would] ask [officers] for favors." In 2012, while stationed in I t, Respondent was contacted by ,( "), the head of the criminal cartel '" " Respondent testified that L, facilitated an extensive drug-smuggling network in Honduras. E , accompanied by men in his organization, often approached police officers and implored them to either cany out work for him or simply to ignore the cartel's criminal activity. E ' approached Respondent on many occasions, and asked Respondent to work for him. Respondent would refuse E s offers each time, stating that he worked solely "for the betterment of [his] country." Because Respondent was "not interested" in assisting' 1: "threatened Respondent on mUltiple occasions. In 2012, Respondent filed a threats. transfer request with the police department in response to E

LI first attacked Respondent while his transferal request was pending. While he was assigned to regulate traffic and search passing vehicles (an exercise refened to as an "operativo"), Respondent stopped a vehicle owned by E ' and engaged in a search of that vehicle. E: was not in the vehicle at the time Respondent stopped it. Finding all weapons inside the vehicle and in the possession of its passengers to be legally registered, Respondent )n his motorbike, allowed the vehicle to pass through. Weeks later, while traveling to md the four individuals who were passengers in the Respondent was intercepted by E vehicle Respondent had searched. The four individuals seized Respondent's service weapon and physically assaulted him. E warned Respondent not to interfere with his operations, and threatened to kill Respondent and his family if he continued to do so. Respondent stated that it was his job to search vehicles. L continued beating Respondent, and E restated his offer of employment. Respondent refused, stating that his "focus was to work for

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[his] country and do a good job," Upon aniving home, Respondent told his wife and mother-inlaw that he had been involved in a motorbike accident, fearing that the truth would affect his wife's already-risky pregnancy. Respondent was taken to the local hospital, where his injuries were recorded and treated. See Ms. Oi ) Exhibit 9 at 36. Respondent testified that his superiors in the police department were often either uninterested in, or actively opposed to, obstructing cartel activity, and that some of his colleagues on the police force worked for 1 . In January 2013, while Respondent was working a solo night shift, he witnessed a small airplane land in an open field, Moments later, a group of individuals surrounded the plane, unloaded packages from it, and loaded the packages into vehicles. Believing this activity to be drug smuggling, Respondent called the police chief of a neighboring town and requested assistance. The chief ordered Respondent to stop the activity on his own, however Respondent refused, believing he would be killed if he did. Reinforcements did not anive until an hour later, though Respondent testified that he was only thirty minutes away from the nearest police station. Due to the delayed police response and the hazardous, potentially-lethal order of the police chief, Respondent testified that he believed the police chief himself was involved in the drug smuggling operation. A few weeks later, Respondent received a notification from the police headquarters in Tegucigalpa stating that his presence was required at a program called COBRA. Because his wife was due to give birth, Respondent objected to participation in this program. He was told, however, that he would be terminated if he failed to attend. When he reported to the COBRA program, Respondent and approximately thirty other individuals were taken to the mountains and subjected to sleep deprivation, constant harassment, and physical abuse. He was made to endure tear gas and beatings while stripped to his underwear. When Respondent asked a superior why he was being subjected to this abuse, Respondent was told that he should have remained silent instead of reporting the airplane landing and the activity he witnessed. Though the COBRA program was initially set to last one month, Respondent testified that, because he "was resisting the training, that [he] was not leaving, [he] was not quitting, they prolonged it to seven weeks.'~ . After returning from the COBRA program, Respondent was assigned to a neighboring state, the department of. I. Here, Respondent again encountered E . When Respondent expressed surprise to find E mtside o f · , El ~tated "I am everywhere and I have people everywhere. Wherever you go, I will always lIDO you." E then repeated his demand that Respondent work for him. Respondent again refused. Upon this refusal, E threatened Respondent, stating that he knew that Respondent had a family In'eatened to kill Respondent and and he knew where Respondent lived. E Respondent's wife and family if Respondent remained steadfast in his refusal to work for him. Respondent requested a transfer but was denied by the police department. When Respondent realized that he could not avoid L in Honduras, he decided to move his family to the United States. Respondent put in a vacation request with the police force, and when his request was granted, he left his cell phone, uniform, and weapon with his mother, and fled to the United States with his wife and son. Respondent also testified that-in the event of his return to Honduras-L would immediately learn of his presence in the country, and that E , his men, or the police would kill him.

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B. Testimonial Evidence of The following is a summary of S the reasons stated below, that Ms. 0 her version of the facts.

testimony. The Court finds, for 's testimony is credible and therefore credits

testified that she was born in Honduras in the village of: Ms. OJ , and that she resided in: until coming to the United States in 2014. Ms. 01 iVorked in a phone store until 2009, when she married Respondent. With Respondent, Ms. 0 had a "good life." Respondent supported her with his salary, and together they built two homes. testified that Respondent did not tell her about his encounters with Ms. OJ L until April 2014, when Respondent came home tenified and told her "the whole thing." Respondent's disclosure triggered Ms. OJ memories of events that coincide with Respondent's testimony, including the day in December 2012, when Respondent was accosted on the highway by E and four of his men. On that occasion, Respondent returned home "very beaten up," and told her that he had had a motorbike accident. Ms. 01 also testified that, upon returning from the COBRA program in Tegucigalpa, Respondent was "so thin and so mistreated you could not recognize him as him." Ms. 0: also described an instance in which she was approached by a police officer while waiting for the bus. The officer, who was stationed at an operativo, asked Ms. 0' . if she was the wife of Respondent and began to talk to her. After receiving a phone call, he told Ms. Ms. 0,_... 'you'll see what's going to happen now." A vehicle arrived which Ms. 0 described as "a vehicle that everybody knows [as] the vehicle that the drug smugglers use." After the driver exchanged money with the officer, the officer let a convoy of vehicles pass without inspecting them. Subsequently, the officer said to Ms. OJ . , "You see, this is what your husband, I , should do for you. If he would do what I do, he would have you as a queen." Ms. 0 testified that is "constantly active," and is the most well-known cartel in the area. She fears both the cartel and the police, because many police officers also work for the cartel. Because Respondent is well-known, Ms. 0 expressed her certainty that her family would be killed immediately in the event of their return to Honduras.

IV.

Asylum

Asylum is a discretionary form of relief available to aliens physically present or arriving in the United States, who apply for relief in accordance with sections 208 or 235(b) of the Act. INA § 208(a)(1); see INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,444 (1987). The Court may grant asylum to an applicant who establishes that he is a "refugee" as defmed in section 101 (a) (42) of the Act. INA § 208(b)(1)(A). The burden of proof is on the applicant to make this showing. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a).

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A. Credibility and Corroboration In all applications for asylum and withholding of removal, the Court must make a threshold determination of the alien's credibility. INA §§ 208(b)(1)(B)(ii)-(iii), 241(b)(3)(C); Matter ofO-D-, 21 I&N Dec. 1079, 1081 (BlA 1998). The applicant's testimony is of the utmost importance in proving an asylum claim because of the difficulty of procuring documentary evidence after having fled one's country. Wiransane v. Ashcroft, 366 FJd 889, 897 (10th Cir. 2004). Thus, an applicant's testimony, standing alone, may be sufficient to meet the burden of proof if it is demonstrably credible, persuasive, and probative of facts sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee. Id.; Matter ofDass, 20 I&N Dec. 120, 124 (BlA 1989); INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.l3(a). The Court may require additional evidence to corroborate an applicant's otherwise credible claim, and the applicant must provide such evidence unless he does not have it and cannot reasonably obtain it. INA § 208(b)(1 )(B)(ii); Matter ofJ-Y-C-, 24 l&N Dec. 260, 266 (BlA 2007). An applicant may be given the "benefit of the doubt" ifthere is some ambiguity regarding an aspect of his asylum claim. Matter ofY-B-, 21 I&N Dec. 1136, 1139 (BIA 1998). In some cases, an applicant may be found credible even if he has trouble remembering specific facts. See, e.g., Matter ofB-, 21 l&N Dec. 66,70-71 (BlA 1995). While minor and isolated discrepancies in the applicant's testimony are not necessarily fatal to credibility, omission of key events coupled with numerous inconsistencies may lead to a finding that the applicant is not credible. Matter ofA-S-, 21 l&N Dec. 1106, 1109-1110 (BrA 1998). Testimony is not credible if it is inconsistent, inherently improbable, or contradicts current country conditions. Matter ofS-M-J-, 21 l&N Dec. 722, 729 (BrA 1997). An adverse credibility finding must be supported by "specific and cogent" reasons that have a legitimate nexus to the finding in the case. Matter ofA -S-, 21 l&N Dec. at 1110. The following factors may be considered in assessing an applicant's credibility: demeanor, candor, responsiveness, inherent plausibility of the claim, the consistency between oral and written statements, the internal consistency of such statements, the consistency of such statements with evidence of record, and any inaccuracy or falsehood in such statements, regardless of whether it goes to the hemi of the applicant's claim. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(iii); Matter ofJ-Y-C-, 24 I&N Dec. at 262; Matter ofS-B-, 24 I&N Dec. 42,43 n.1 (BIA 2006). The COUli finds that Respondent and Ms. O:~_ are credible. Their demeanor was sincere, their testimony conformed to the information provided in Respondent's application for relief, and they were consistent on direct and cross-examination. Upon careful consideration of all the facts of record, individually and cumulatively, the Court finds Respondent and Ms. 0: , are credible witnesses. B. Timeliness - One Year Asylum Deadline The COUli finds tllat Respondent's application for asylum is timely. In order to be eligible to apply for asylum, an applicant must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he filed his asylum application witllin one year following the date of his last entry into the United States. INA § 208(a)(2)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(2)(i). Respondent arrived in the United States

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on May 20, 2014. He filed his application on February 11, 2015. As such, his application is timely. C. Refugee Status The Court finds that Respondent has established that he is eligible for asylum. An asylum applicant bears the burden of proving that he is a "refugee" as defined in section 101(a)(42) of the Act. INA § 208(b)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a); Matter ojS-M-J-, 21 I&N Dec. at 724. This requires the applicant to prove that he is outside his country of nationality and is unable or unwilling to return to or avail himself of that country's protection because he has suffered past persecution or has a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. INA § 101(a)(42); INS. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992); Matter oflv1-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 227,230 (BIA 2014). Where the persecutor has mixed motives, the applicant must demonstrate that an actual or imputed protected ground was or will be at least one central reason for the persecution. INA § 208(b)(l)(B)(i); see also Matter ofJ-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I&N Dec. 208,211-12 (BIA 2007). The Court does not require direct evidence as to persecutors' motives; it may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S.at 483. Persecution is a threat to life or freedom or the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ, in a way that is regarded as offensive. Woldemeskel v. INS, 257 FJd 1185, 1188 (lOth Cir. 2001); Matter ojAcosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211, 222 (BIA 1985). The harm must be committed by the govenunent, or by forces that the government is either unwilling or unable to controL Wiransane v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 889,893 (lOth Cir. 2004). In order for such acts to rise to the level of persecution, they must be "more than just restrictions or threats to life and liberty." Woldemeskel, 257 F.3d at 1188; see also Hayrapetyan v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 1330, 1337 (lOth Cir. 2008). In determining whether an applicant has shown harm rising to the level of . persecution, the Court considers incidents in the aggregate. See Hayrapetyan, 534 FJd at 133738; see also Matter of o-z- & I-Z-, 22 I&N Dec. 23,26 (BIA ,1998). As the Court finds that Respondent has demonstrated an independent well-founded fear of future persecution on account of his membership in a particular social group, the Court declines to evaluate his past persecution claim. An applicant is deemed to have the requisite well-founded fear if it is reasonably likely that the applicant would be persecuted upon returning to his country of nationality on account of one of the five protected grounds and is unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protections of that country based upon such fear. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2). See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,440 (1987) (noting that an alien need only show that his removal would create a "reasonable probability"-as low as a 10% chance-of persecution). 1. Particular Social Group To demonstrate past persecution on account of a particular social group, Respondent must (1) specify the pmticular social group, (2) show that he is a member of that group, and (3) show that he has a well-founded fear of persecution based on his membership in that group. 7

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Matter ofW-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 208, 223 (BIA 2014). The Board requires a particular social group to meet the following three characteristics in order to be recognized under the Act: immutability, social distinction, and particularity. Matter of M-E- V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014); Matter ofW-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. at 212; Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d 641, 648 (lOth Cir. 2012). Establishing that a particular social group deserves protection for purposes of asylum does not require that the respondent demonstrate that all members of that group are destined for persecution. R.R.D. v. Holder, 746 F.3d 807,809 (7th Cir. 2014) The Court finds Respondent to be a member of his defined particular social group, "fol1ner honest Honduran police officers." Based upon Respondent's testimony, the Court understands "honest" to refer not only to a police officer with an internal, ideological point-ofview opposed cartel activity and government corruption, but one who is also outspoken in his disdain and is motivated to continue fighting against those forces in his country. Respondent testified that his prime motivation to join the police force was "to care for the population," and he has demonstrated his personal commitment to that goal through his continual defense of the law, despite abuse from L and his own superiors. Notably, DRS does not dispute that Respondent acted honestly in his capacity as a police officer. For the reasons set forth below, the Court also finds that the group made up of former honest Honduran police officers constitutes a particular social group recognized under the Act. The BIA has interpreted "particular social group" to mean "persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic," such as sex, color, familial relationship, or a shared past experience. Matter ofAcosta, 19 I&N Dec. at 233 (emphasis added). An immutable characteristic is one that the respondent cannot change, or that is so fundamental to his identity or conscience that he should not be compelled to forsake it. Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 658 F.3d 1222, 1229 (10th Cir. 2011); Matter ofAcosta, 19 I&N Dec. at 233. The Board does not require a "voluntary associational relationship" among group members. Matter of C-A-, 23 I&N Dec. 951, 956-57 (BIA 2006). ImpOliantly, the Tenth Circuit has recognized that the particular social group of "former police officers" may constitute one that is cognizable and protected under the Act. See Estrada-Escobar v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 1042, 1047 (lOth Cir. 2004) (citing Cruz-Navarro v. INS, 232 F.3d 1024, 1029 (9th Cir. 2000)); Matter of Fuentes, 19 I&N Dec. 658,662 (BIA 1988). Notably, the Seventh Circuit has held that appending the word "honest" to "police" does not necessarily destroy cognizability). R.RD. v. Holder, 746 F.3d 807. The Court finds that Respondent's status as a former honest Honduran police officer is immutable, as it is a characteristic "beyond the capacity of the respondent to change." Matter of Fuentes, 19 I&N Dec. 658,662 (BIA 1988). See R.R.D. v. Holder, 746 F.3d at 810 ("Being a former agent is an immutable characteristic; nothing R.R.D. can do will erase his employment history"). Additionally, the modifier "honest" is an immutable characteristic held by Respondent because it is one of conscience and is fundamental to his identity. Matter ofAcosta, 19 I&N Dec. at 233. Apart from immutability, the BIA also requires social distinction, meaning that society must "perceive those with the characteristic in question as members of a social group." RiveraBarrientos v. Holder, 658 F.3d at 1231-32 (internal citation omitted); Matter ofM-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. at 237; Matter ofW-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. at 212. Social distinction asks "whether those

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with a common immutable characteristic are set apart, or distinct, from other persons within the society in some significant way." Matter ofM-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. at 238. Evidence must also show that "society in general perceives, considers, or recognizes persons sharing the particular characteristic to be a group." Matter ofW-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. at 217. The Court fmds that evidence in the record supports Respondent's contention that the social group of former honest Honduran police officers is viewed by Honduran society as a discrete category of persons. To be celiain, police officers in Honduran society are a conspicuous class of individuals that are highly contentious and considerably discussed. See, e.g., Ms. i ; Exhibit 9 at 186-89 ("the national commissioner for human rights ... has emphasized the need to purge all the 'bad' [officers], and separate them from the 'good' ones"); Id at 191-93 (examining "the macho cops of Honduras"); Id at 207-12 (noting that corrupt police officers are "contributing to the volatility" within Honduras, and have often been accused of killing citizens). Furthermore, because police and governmental corruption are widely viewed by the Honduran public as serious and pervasive defects in the Honduran justice system, honest police officers are viewed as distinct within the broader class of police officers. See, e.g., id at 207-12,225 ("cases [of institutional corruption] severely erode Hondurans' trust in their justice system"). The third requirement of a recognized paliicular social group is partiCUlarity. Particularity requires that the proposed group be capable of description in a manner "sufficiently distinct that the group would be recognized, in the society in question, as a discrete class of persons." Matter ofS-E-G, 24 I&N Dec. at 584. Courts will decline to recognize a group as a "particular social group" if it is defined too narrowly so as to correspond only to a particular applicant. See Matter ofC-A-, 23 I&N Dec. at 959. Likewise, a group so broadly defined that delineating from among a "large swath of potential members" would be difficult is not a recognized particular social group under section 208 of the Act. Matter ofA-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I&N Dec. 69,76 (BIA 2007) (finding that "wealthy Guatemalans" do not constitute a particular social group due to overbreadth). The Court finds that the group formulation "former honest Honduran police officers" is sufficiently particular as it is one that includes more than one person. See Fatin v. INS, 12 FJd 1233, 1238 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that in the broad, literal sense, the baseline requirement for a particular social group is that the set includes more than one person). Evidence in the record indicates that many Honduran police officers remain honest despite widespread corruption. Specifically, Human Rights Watch reported that "in Apri12013, the then-chief of Directorate for Investigation and Evaluation of the Police Career told Congress that, of230 police evaluated for 's Exhibit 9 at 165-66.204. Furthermore, a news corruption, 33 failed." Ms. organization reported that, "[in Honduras,] up to 40 percent of police are suspected of ties to organized crime". Id. at 204. Additionally, the terms are, on their face, sufficiently clear and precise to define the group with particularity. See Matter ofM-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 227, 239 (BIA 2014) (citing Matter ofA-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I&N Dec. 69, 76 (BIA 2007) ("A particular social group must be defined by characteristics that provide a clear benchmark for determining who falls within the group")).

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2. Nexus to a Protected Ground

In addition to fmding Respondent's purported particular social group to be cognizable under the Act, the Court finds that Respondent has demonstrated a nexus between the harms he fears and the protected ground. A respondent applying for asylum must demonstrate that the risk of persecution is on account ofhis membership in the specified particular social group. Such a causal nexus is required to support a grant of asylum. See INA. § 208(b)(1 )(B)(i); see also INA § 101(a)(42)(A). Asylum is not available to victims of indiscriminate violence, unless they are singled out on account of a protected ground. "Acts of common criminality or personal hostility" do not establish eligibility for asylum. Vatuley v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 1207, 1209 (10th Cir. 2003). Those targeted for violence, abduction, or extOltion by a gang or cartel due to their affluence are not generally recognized to be members of a particular social group. See Matter ofA-M-E- & JG-U-, 24 I&N Dec. 69 (BIA 2007). To establish well-founded fear of persecution, "the evidence must demonstrate that (1) the alien possesses a belief or characteristic a persecutor seeks to overcome in others by means of punishment of some sort; (2) the persecutor is already aware, or could easily become aware, that the alien possesses this belief or characteristic; (3) the persecutor has the capability of punishing the alien; and (4) the persecutor has the inclination to punish the alien." Matter ofAcosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211, 226 (BIA 1985). Respondent's experiences in Honduras indicate that he has been singled out for persecution rather than subjected to generalized criminal activity. As such, the instant case is more complicated than one in which a respondent simply resists wholesale forced recruitment, see, e.g., IN.S, v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992); Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 666 FJd 641 (10th Cir. 2012) or extortion. See, e.g., Matter ofV-T-S-, 21 I&N Dec. 792 (BIA 1997) (holding that criminal acts committed against an individual are not persecution). In Matter of sE-G-, 24 I&N Dec at 587, the Tenth Circuit held that the respondents-Salvadoran youths who had resisted gang recruitment-were not "in a substantially different situation from anyone who [had] crossed the gang, or who is perceived to be a threat to the gang's interests." Unlike the respondents in Matter ofS-E-G-, Respondent in the instant case was targeted exactly because of his status as all honest police officer, and actions taken by:E and LI ., as well as the government represent an effort to overcome this ideological stance. In Karki v. Holder, the Tenth Circuit held that a respondent's political opinion "may be a central reason for persecution from a group that attempts to forcibly recruit him, even if the organization'S initial targeting of the individual was not politically motivated." Karki v. Holder, 715 F.3d 792, 803 (10th Cir. 2013); see also INA § 208(b)(1 ) (B) (i) (protected ground must only be "one central reason" for persecution). Similarly, in the instant case, what began as L unexceptional attempts at recruitment later became violent punishment for Respondent's honest police work. Though members of L often approached police officers and solicited their assistance for cartel operations, Respondent was personally sought out by E after the cartel leader learned of Respondent' s stance, which-identical to the respondent in Karki-Respondent affirmatively expressed and demonstrated on multiple first employed physical violence against occasions. Karki v. Holder, 715 F.3d at 804. E Respondent after Respondent briefly detained his men and searched their vehicle. When f I and his men confronted Respondent, they told him "not to interfere," and beat him badly. See Ms. Or' ~ .. 's Exhibit 9 at 37. In response, Respondent stated that his "focus

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was to work for [his] country." After Respondent witnessed and reported drug-smuggling activity, he was sent to the COBRA program and was subjected to mental and physical abuse, clearly in an effort by his superiors to teach him that honest, morally-motivated police work would not be tolerated. Indeed, his superior at COBRA specifically told him that he should have "remained silent" after witnessing the drug smuggling activity and should not have reported it. Furthermore, although Respondent was transferred multiple times, E I consistently pursued, located, and targeted him. In Matter of Fuentes, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held that the respondent did not establish a well-founded fear of persecution based on the particular social group of former Salvadoran police officers. The BIA reasoned that the harm suffered by the respondent arose out of "danger that one with ties to a participant in a violent struggle might expect if he ventures into an area of open conflict." Matter of Fuentes, 19 I&N Dec. 658, 662. Conversely, in the instant case, the persecution feared by Respondent is not simply a function of the nature of . his employment; Respondent is entrenched in a "rich stew of corruption" in which threats of harm arise not just from the crinlinals he was tasked with targeting, but from his superiors in the police force as well. Ms. 0. 's Exhibit 9 at 200. Respondent, then, faced a choice: he could avoid harm by joining the corrupt police officers and working for the cartel, or he could remain faithful to his ideals and continue to put himself and his family at risk. In considering whether a threat of harm posed by a "past opponent" in a conflict rises to the level of persecution, "the most fundamental question" is whether the respondent would continue to participate in the hostilities. Matter of Fuentes, 19 I&N Dec. at 663. Though Respondent-in the event of removal-would return to Honduras as a civilian, he would still face a threat of harm commensurate to the threat posed against him during his service on the police force. See Ms. 01 l'S Exhibit 9 at 203 (describing two former Honduran police officers who were ldlled "in a crime variously attributed to gang disputes or to a cover-up of corruption in the force"). Respondent testified that ifhe were removed to Honduras, L would immediately learn of his presence in the country, and E: , his men, or the police would kill him. See R.R.D. v. Holder, 746 F.3d 807,810 (7th Cir. 2014) ("Punishing people after they are no longer threats is a rational way to achieve deterrence; indeed, the United States itself does this."); Id. at 810 (citing Escobar, 376 F.3d at 1047 ("Threats can imply a risk of future persecution if they are sufficiently menacing and credible")). 3. Subjective and Objective Showing of Fear Establishing fear of future persecution requires both a subjective and objective showing. Yan v. Gonzales, 438 FJd 1249, 1251 (lOth Cir. 2006); Sadeghi v. INS, 40 F.3d 1139, 1142 (lOth Cir. 1994); see also Matter ofMogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439,445 (BIA 1987) (a reasonable person standard is used in well-founded fear detelminations). The subjective element requires that the applicant's fear be genuinely held. Yan, 438 F.3d at 1251. The objective component requires that the applicant's fear be objectively reasonable, and is proven through "credible, direct, and specific" evidence that shows the reasonableness of the fear. Id. Specifically, the applicant must possess a belief or characteristic a persecutor seeks to overcome by means of punishment of some sort; he must demonstrate the persecutor is already aware, or could easily become aware, that the applicant possesses the belief or characteristic; he must show

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the persecutor has the capability to punish the applicant; and he must prove the persecutor has the inclination to punish the applicant. Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. at 446. The Court finds that Respondent has met his burden of establishing a subjective fear of returning to Honduras. In Honduras, Respondent was economically advantaged. Ms. Or testified that, on his salary, Respondent was able support her and build two homes. Additionally, she testified that they enjoyed a "good life" while living in , Respondent was dedicated to his country, and had no motivation to emigrate other than his "genuine apprehension or awareness of danger." Matter ofAcosta, 19 I&N Dec at 221. Specifically, Respondent credibly testified that he believes that he and his family members would be killed if he returns to Honduras. As such, he has met his burden of establishing a subjective fear of return. The Court further fmds that Lead Respondent has established that his fear of future persecution on account of his status as a former honest Honduran police officer is objectively reasonable, as he has established that both L ~artel and the Honduras police force are willing, capable, and inclined to persecute him based on his particular social group. Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439,445-46. As such the Court fmds Respondent's fear of future persecution to arise out of "adverse action by the government" as well as "criminal deeds by private persons" that "the government is unwilling or unable to protect." R.R.D. v. Holder, 746 F.3d at 809. On January 31, 2015, I _,: "may have handed himself in to authorities at the US Embassv '11 capital city Tegucigalpa." See Ms. OJ _s Exhibit 9 ; detainment in the United States eliminates at 175. DHS argues that} any probability offuturt! harm on account of Respondent's status as a former honest police officer, as E was the "main person that was allegedly persecuting the Respondent." The Court finds, however, that evidence in the record does not compellingly demonstrate that 1 : is likely to dissolve or that Respondent's apprehension of fear is tied only to J L See Ms. 01 ,'s Exhibit 9 at 176 (LI , boast "a net worth of close to $1 billion"); fd at 197 (other than, L c : is also " and its members include their father, mother, sister, and headed by L brother, all of whom have not been indicted). Respondent testified that E family members now maintain cartel operations, and that those family members know Respondent because they would typically travel with E ~ _ . In addition, Ms. 0 testified that Respondent is known by one of R _ ; associates who escaped charges, despite having been arrested by Honduran police. Respondent filliher testified that his fear of future harm is also 'Respondent's fear of the tied to the police, because "so many police are working for 1 police is supported by evidence in the record. Human Rights Watch reported that "[i]mpunity for serious police abuses is a chronic problem [in Honduras]. Police killed 149 civilians from January 2011 to November 2012." Ms. 0 s Exhibit 9 at 165. Indeed, issues of police impunity are frequently reported by news outlets, see, e.g., id. at 225 (despite "evidence strongly pointing to police as suspects" in the murder of two citizens, the officers were "mysteriously freed before their arrest warrants were ready"), and are perceived by Honduran citizens as rampant. See id at 207-12 (quoting an interviewee who stated that Honduran police "can go and attack anyone they want. For them, the rules don't exist").

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The Court also finds that the Government has not met its burden in demonstrating that relocation within Honduras is a reasonable alternative to asylum, such that it eliminates Respondent's well-founded fear of persecution. An applicant does not hold a well-founded fear of persecution if the applicant could avoid persecution by relocating to another part of the applicant's country of nationality, if under the circumstances it would be reasonable to do so. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(ii). There are several factors limiting the reasonableness of Respondent's internal location within Honduras. First, unlike Matter ofFuentes-where the group persecuting the respondent was only active in his hometown-L cartel maintains widespread control over Honduras. Matter of Fuentes, 19 I&N Dec. at 663. Ms. 0 testified that re the most well-known cartel in the area of t, and that they are "constantly active." As "one of Honduras' [sic] largest drug transport organizations,": controls land across the country, including "90 percent of the clandestine airstrips in Honduras." Ms. OJ 's Exhibit 9 at 199,230. Additionally. Ms. 0 testified that Respondent is well-known throughout Honduras. These two factors are very relevant when considered in concert with the fact that Honduras is roughly the size of Louisiana. . ·s Exhibit 9 at 208. The area of control exercised by L Ms. Or Respondent's recognition throughout Honduras, and the small geographical size of Honduras together establish that Respondent would not be able to avoid harm if he were to return to Honduras. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.l3(b)(3) (geographical limitations may be relevant to a determination of the reasonableness of internal relocation).

V.

Other Requested Relief

The Court finds that Respondent is eligible for relief in the form of asylum under section 208 of the Act. As a result, the Court does not reach Respondent's eligibility for withholding of removal under section 241 (b)(3) of the Act, or relief under the CAT.

VI.

Conclusion

Respondent has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that he filed his asylum application within one year after the date of his last entry into the United States, and is therefore eligible for asylum. INA § 208(a)(2)(B); 8 C.P.R. § 1208.4(a)(2)(i). Respondent has met his burden to establish that his life or freedom would be threatened in Honduras on account of his membership in a particular social group. INA § 241(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. 1208.16(b). The Court ·further finds that he merits a favorable exercise of discretion. 8 c.P.R. § 1208.14(a). Thus, the Court will grant Respondent's applications for asylum pursuant to section 208(a) of the Act. Accordingly, the Court will enter the following orders:

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ORDERS IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent's application for asylum relief pursuant to INA § 208 shall be GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that appeal is reserved on behalf of both parties.

]i:i~ ()L, 2015 Immigration Judge

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