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Oeconomics of Knowledge, Volume 1, Issue 2, 4Q 2009

Individual vs Collective Choice in Corporate Finance

Teodora ALECU, PhD International Tax Advisor, Bucharest, Romania E-mail: twa2twa[at]yahoo[dot]com

Abstract:

The paper is meant to be an extension of the theories of choice, empirical analysis and theories concerning communication between macro-economic sub-systems and even between (sub) systems. A new perception will be given to all these theories and a different meaning of the factors influencing finance decisions will be shown. Another factor is introduced taking into account one’s choice, which restructures somehow the perception of the function of individuals’ choice. I named it factor α (alpha) which is a spirituality factor provoking exchanges of information between economic sub-systems. This leads to a rearrangement of the economic and social patterns of behavior and of choice directly influencing the finance decisions and re-equilibrating the inter-conditioning subsystems of the world.

Keywords: Theory of choice, utility, median voter, empirical analysis, corporate and public finance, spirituality factor, private and public consumption, budget allocation, public and private goods.

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Oeconomics of Knowledge, Volume 1, Issue 2, 4Q 2009

The

individual

consumer

represents

the

key

factor

in

the

movement, development or stagnation of any individual or public finance operation. Back to any decision of legal persons stays the decision of individuals based on their ultimate balance between their subjective opinion and the rationing they made. Harold Hotelling introduced a theorem focusing on the individuals’ reaction for consumption and the feedback in action of private and public bodies. According to Hotelling, “competitors differentiate their goods and services as little as possible in order to maximize demand from the public”. The marginal cost pricing is important, as the cost of any additional extra unit of manufactured good or service rendered is to be seen through the eyes of the individual’s preferences. Anthony Downs enlarged the vision and made a picture of the macroeconomic reality having as constraint the individuals’ subjective preference. Public bodies, public institutions, not only private companies, have to carry the activity under the circumstances of scared resources and individual preference for certain goods and services, which cannot be always explained. According to Anthony Downs, the authorities put in place “specific regulatory policies aimed at influencing how growth occurs, mainly within a locality” and private companies look for “smart growth”,

which

encouraging

include

higher

“limiting

density

outward

development,

(apparent) revitalizing

expansion,

older

areas,

preserving open space”. Authorities and public institutions want sustainable growth and regional

development;

companies

want

to

obtain

smart

growths

materialized in higher profits and expansion of the business capacities. Taking out a macroeconomic system from inertia can be made by large public subsidies, that “invisible hand” of the state can speed the engine of the region. Public subsidies mean public investments, goods and services

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Oeconomics of Knowledge, Volume 1, Issue 2, 4Q 2009

supplied to the people and financed by the government, via the State Budget system. Let’s assume that qj represent private goods and qk represent public goods, while pj is the price of am unit of private good and ck is the cost of an unity of collective good. Ri represents the revenue of the individual expressing or which is able to express the consumption decision. The demand for both private and public goods can be summarized in a function, as below: (1) qj = qj(pj, ck, Ri), having j = 1, 2, … J - the individuals demand for private goods (2) qk = qk(pj, ck, Ri), having k = 1, 2, … K – the individuals demand for public goods.

Financing public goods and services is guaranteed under the budget allocation system, as decided by the government.

Public subsidies are

allocated to public goods and services. Communities are benefiting from these engines of development. On the other hand, communities are contributing to the budgets to be allocated, by paying all kind of taxes. William S. Comanor introduces the Median Voter Rule and the Theory of Political Choice. Decisions of public institutions and politicians is taken in a way so that to maximize the satisfaction of the people and thus the number of votes. However, in practice, the median preference is not always observed. According to the Median Voter Model (Roger D. Congleton), the old economic models based on the majority decision making are replaced with monitoring the preference of the median individual behavior. Observing the behavior of the median decision making is one of the simplest ways to monitor the “possible model of

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Oeconomics of Knowledge, Volume 1, Issue 2, 4Q 2009

majoritarian decision making”. The economic function of the overall individual’s preference is utility. The individual’s response depends on its personal utility of benefiting from the rights to use of certain goods and services.

maxU

i

( q j , qk )

q j , qk

J

K

j 1

k 1

 p j q j   pk qk  Ri where

pk  ck

, with



1 N

the financing tax born by the individual i and i = 1,

2, ..., N.

q j  q j ( p j , ck , Ri , N ) qk  qk ( p j , ck , Ri , N )

Each individual has a personal decision system. Preferences are characteristics of each individual. Each community, at its turn, shows different preferences. Each individual will decide for that good or service which minimize its losses determined by the quantities of goods and volumes of services he needs and the quantities and volumes he actually gets. The individual has a “strategic behavior” which will allow that the individual obtain the best solution under the circumstances of the constraints given. Overall utility from the individual’s perspective is the best measure of its satisfaction which will push the person to take a certain action: to want and take steps to obtain certain private and public goods and

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Oeconomics of Knowledge, Volume 1, Issue 2, 4Q 2009

services. The maximized utility leads to an acquisition decision and/or to a decision to use free of charge certain goods. Individual utilities lead to a collective utility of the community. If we monitor all the utility functions, characteristic for each individual, the median individual called M will has its maximized utility of the preference accomplished as follows:

maxU

M

( q j , qk )

q j , qk

J

K

 p q  p j 1

j

j

k 1

M k

(ck , RM )qk  RM

The demand functions show as follows:

q Mj  q Mj ( p j , pk (ck , RM ), RM ) qkM  qkM ( p j , pk (ck , RM ), RM )

The elasticity of the individuals demand becomes:

 qM E  k  RM

Assuming that

 qM E  kM  pk

  qM   E  k   RM

  pkM   E    RM

   0 

 qM    E  kM   pk

  pkM   E    RM

  

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Oeconomics of Knowledge, Volume 1, Issue 2, 4Q 2009

Therefore, if

 qM E  k  RM

   0 

and

 qkM E   RM

 qkM   pkM    E  M   E    pk   RM

  

then the elasticity

of the total income which can be allocated to consumption will be positive and K public good is qualifies as a superior good.

If

 qM E  k  RM

 qM   pM    E  kM   E  k   pk   RM

  

then the K good will qualify as an inferior good.

The function of the collective demand for public goods is driven by the demand function of the median individual M.

qkM  qkM ( p j , p Mk (ck , RM )) where

qkM

is the quantity of public good needed and asked for by the

median individual,

pkM

is the price, or the cost of the public good, and

RM

is the income of

the median individual (if he pays for the good) or the income available to be spent by the authorities for offering the public good to the median individual.

qkM 

qk* N

where

qkM

is the quantity of goods the median individual wishes to buy,

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qk*

Oeconomics of Knowledge, Volume 1, Issue 2, 4Q 2009

is the total quantity of goods available to people, N is the total

number of individual forming the collectivity. λ is a parameter which describes the consumption of public goods and public services K. The quantities of public goods and services available to be put at disposal to a community are described by the following function:

qk*  qk* ( p j , p Mj (ck , R M , N ,  ), R M , N ,  ) N

And

 p ( p , R , N )q i 1

i k

k

i

k

 Gk

, where Gk represents the total expenses

from state budget for financing the public goods and services for the community. The above mentioned theories and functions seem very simple and for this reason they have been subject to criticism. Simple things are however the best in many cases, as people need solution and clear arguments to base their decisions on. What I want to draw the attention to, is that economic models must be reoriented and a new vision stays at the gate of the new centuries. Any use of goods and services has as base the individual choice. As outlined above, collectivities consist of individuals and individuals decisions represent the base for any political and economical action. Individuals must be seen in their complexity. The utility a good or services has from the perspective of an individual also depends on an α subjective factor. The education, spirituality and intuition lead the individual to a decision. To maximize the utility of an individual means to maximize the individual’s sense of accomplishment of its wishes, destiny so that he can live in complete happiness and harmony. Peaceful minds and joyful harts, as well as a healthy body are desiderates of an

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Oeconomics of Knowledge, Volume 1, Issue 2, 4Q 2009

individual. The means by which such desiderates are achieved are not the same for each individual, not even when we are talking about basic needs as food. Some individuals go to fast-foods, others are vegetarians. Some individuals need to feel security in their lives, but many have an equilibrium in their mind and feel no insecurity, so there is no need for so many additional government expenditures in this area. Humans’ sense is towards a perfect equilibrium and harmony, with a touch of joy and satisfaction of their lives. The decisions of the individuals are guided by a subjective factor α which without many explanations makes the person feel that he is on the right path. Communities’ decisions should be guided by the sense of enlargement of the personal satisfaction.

maxU

M

( q j , qk )

q j , qk

crucially depends on the personal invisible sense α which

comes from the inner of the individuals and makes them be in harmony with their invisible purpose of life.

References BRAN P.

Economics of value, Academy of Economic Studies Publishing House, Bucharest, 2002

Mosteanu T.

Budgetary policies and techniques, University Publishing, Bucharest, 2004

Congleton R.

The Median Voter Model, Encyclopedia of Public Choice, 2002

Comanor W.

The Median Voter Rule and the Theory of Political Choice, University of California, 2002

Individual vs Collective Choice in Corporate Finance

corporate and public finance, spirituality factor, private and public consumption ... and individual preference for certain goods and services, which cannot be.

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