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John White on philosophy of education and philosophy

Theory and Research in Education 2014, Vol. 12(1) 120­–127 © The Author(s) 2014 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1477878513517342 tre.sagepub.com

Harvey Siegel

University of Miami, USA

Abstract John White offers a provocative characterization of philosophy of education. In this brief reaction, I evaluate the characterization and urge the maintenance of a strong connection between philosophy of education and philosophy.

Keywords John Dewey, John White, Philip Kitcher, philosophy, philosophy of education, practical philosophy

John White (2013) holds that philosophy of education should not be, consider itself to be, or strive to be a branch of the parent discipline: it has probably never been this way and it is ‘not realistic to expect more than . . . a very partial interest in our field [i.e., philosophy of education] within philosophy departments’ (p. 295). In his paper, White focuses on philosophy of education’s responsibility to aid in the conception and execution of broad social and economic policies that will enable people to live good, meaningful lives in the face of the pressures of global capitalism. I am grateful to White for his generous review of and reflections stimulated by The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Education (Siegel, 2009), and in what follows, I address some of those reflections. Where White is critical, he raises considerations well worth the attention of the philosophy of education community. White is right that since the 1950s, even in the heyday of participation, the numbers of general philosophers participating in philosophy of education were small. And I am heartened by his reports of current participation in the United Kingdom. We agree that there are pockets of general philosophical activity in philosophy of education on both Corresponding author: Harvey Siegel, Department of Philosophy, University of Miami, P. O. Box 248054, Coral Gables, FL 331244670, USA. Email: [email protected]

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sides of the pond, and I think we agree that this is a good thing. I think it important to do what we can to increase such activity. I don’t think White would agree, but I would be delighted to be wrong about that. So what (else), if anything, do we disagree about here? It is this: unlike White, I think it vital to the health of philosophy of education that it continue to engage in, cultivate relationships with, and see itself as part of the parent discipline – as ‘part of philosophy’s portfolio’, as White quotes me (p. 295). He wonders whether philosophy of education is in fact a branch of philosophy: on White’s view, it is not such a branch in the sense that ‘philosophy departments should normally have someone on the staff with a specialist interest in educational questions’ (p. 295). This, as he rightly says, ‘has probably never been the case’, if what is meant is that many or most philosophy departments have in fact not had such specialists – a handful have, but a far greater number have not (p. 295). But of course this is not the relevant sense. We are agreed on the fact just mentioned. (Of course, as White notes (p. 296), it by no means follows from that fact that things wouldn’t be better if they were otherwise; that is, if philosophy departments did routinely have such specialists on their faculties. I certainly do think that its coming to pass would be a very good thing for philosophy of education.) By ‘philosophy of education is a branch of philosophy’, I mean to urge rather that to the extent that philosophy of education is entitled to that title – that is, that it is rightly conceived as philosophy of education, rather than history of education, sociology of education, educational psychology, educational policy, or educational thought uninformed by a solid training in the parent discipline – it must be conceived as such a branch. Being such a branch, it is of course connected both to the core areas of philosophy – epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and so on – and to the world of educational practice. Philosophy of education is in this way Janus-faced, simultaneously looking inward to the parent discipline and outward to the world of education (Phillips and Siegel, 2013; Siegel, 2007). In this respect, it is like other areas of practical philosophy: philosophy of science, philosophy of law, bioethics, environmental philosophy, and so on also look both inward and outward in this way. And it is clear why this is how things must be with so-called ‘practical’ sub-disciplines of philosophy: without the outward-looking stuff it isn’t practical; without the inward-looking stuff it isn’t philosophy. I quite agree with White that it is a good thing for philosophers of education to work, in conjunction with scholars in a broad range of allied disciplines, and with teachers, policy-makers, and others, to help improve both their understanding of the world of education – White is surely right that ‘philosophers of education should welcome engagement with other disciplines that can help them towards a fuller, sometimes more synoptic, understanding of their subject’ (p. 297) – and the world of education itself. However, this is not the only good thing philosophers of education can and should do. We should also strive to be excellent philosophers, advancing philosophical scholarship concerning education and participating fully in the world of philosophy as well as that of education. It is of course a good thing that philosophers of education work to improve educational practice and the broader social and economic policies and practices in which education has a place. But, to repeat, this is not the only good thing that philosophers of education can and should do.

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Of course not everyone can do everything: some philosophers of education are better equipped and more disposed to work on the improvement of schools and other educational institutions; others wisely and effectively devote themselves to broad questions of social policy; still others are well suited to concentrate their efforts on yet other endeavors, including more straightforwardly philosophical ones. Some do several such things. The universe of desirable philosophy of education activities is large, and we should let at least a hundred if not a thousand flowers bloom. I do not say that all philosophers of education should devote themselves to the pursuit of the deeply philosophical questions that are raised by reflection on educational activities or that connect with general philosophy, or to the establishment of philosophy of education’s proper place within the world of general philosophy. I say only that these latter are perfectly appropriate activities in which philosophers of education might engage, and that we should resist the urge to limit philosophy of education to the improvement of educational practice or to questions of broad social policy. Its practitioners should see philosophy of education as having an intellectual integrity of its own, and it is perfectly appropriate for some, many, most, or even all of them to aim at deepening our collective understanding of the broad range of philosophical questions that arise from reflection on educational activities (Siegel, 1981a, 1981b, 1983). It is perfectly appropriate for them to aim at the other good things White recommends as well. We should avoid a ‘one size fits all’ conception of our legitimate professional activities. White’s challenge to philosophers of education is clearly put. He quotes Philip Kitcher, who suggests that philosophers’ most important tasks are to articulate further the Deweyan connection between democracy and education, to probe more accurately the economic preconditions of democratic education, to expose as precisely as possible the sources of conflict between capitalism, as we now have it, and Dewey’s ambitious project, and, on that basis, to conceive of ways of modifying the economic constraints (p. 299, quoting Kitcher, 2009: 315)

imposed on the Deweyan democratic educational project by the operation and influence of capital. He then traces Kitcher’s analysis of the deep conflict between capitalism and Deweyan education that seems to sound the death knell for any hopes for such an education unless ‘ways of modifying the economic constraints’ can be devised by ‘chang[ing] economic conditions so that democracy and Deweyan education both become possible’ (p. 300, quoting Kitcher, 2009: 314). White then asks, Faced with this scenario, what, if anything, should philosophy of education do? It could take the view that all this has nothing to do with its own academic mission. But if it did, it would miss the opportunity of helping to head off the possible threat to the well-being of our own and other citizens now on the cards. On this more positive view of its role, it would have to work closely with others – academics in other fields, politicians, and others – who are equally concerned about the future and anxious to secure a decent life for every citizen, even if economic conditions get much worse. For this, it needs to have some kind of picture of possible ways forward. This has to be on a macro scale, not one confined to education alone. It needs to depict a society – in the home

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country and elsewhere – in which not only the few, but everyone has [a] an income above that required for bare subsistence; [b] adequate space in their lives for fulfilling relationships and intrinsically worthwhile activities, including work activities; [c] other necessary conditions of a civilised life, like self-respect and an ethos of mutual cooperativeness and treatment of others as equals. (p. 301, emphasis in original)

Is my earlier insistence that it is a good thing that some of the members of the community of philosophers of education do philosophy as well as work to improve educational practice and address questions of broad social policy in which education plays a role, with particular individuals pursuing self-chosen paths within the broad landscape of legitimate options, a case of fiddling while Rome burns? This reaction would be understandable, especially in light of White’s depressing speculations, themselves prompted by Kitcher’s essay in the Handbook, concerning the apparently intensifying conflict between Deweyan educational aims ‘to do with equipping pupils as democratic citizens to lead a flourishing life and to help others to do so’ (p. 302) and capitalism’s antieducational and anti-humane effects. He urges philosophers of education concerned to preserve the prospects of ‘a humane life and a humane education for all’ to join with colleagues from nations across the globe, scholars from other disciplines, politicians, and policy-makers in working to hold back the destructive effects of unbridled capitalism by ‘reshaping society in an equitable way almost certainly on fewer resources than at present’ by establishing some kind of bulwarks at a national level against Smithian threats from the global economy . . . [that] would create space for measures targeting an equitable distribution of benefits and burdens, perhaps such as [1] some kind of national service for all, based not on military objectives, but tackling and reducing the large amount of unattractive work which on this scenario may well be coming Britain’s and other countries’ way; [2] a labour and welfare policy that ensures such basic needs as a more-than-subsistence income, freedom from the servitude of long hours at work, and worker participation, to the extent that this is possible in a Smithian world, in the running of state and private enterprises; [3] a taxation policy aiming at fair distribution of limited resources. (p. 302)

We should note for the record, as White himself notes, that these ‘Deweyan’ educational aims are not just Dewey’s but have in fact been embraced by ‘most left-liberal educationalists in Europe and North America since the second world war’ (p. 300). I am happy to declare myself a card-carrying member of this august left-liberal cabal: I certainly endorse (and in my small way make) efforts to create citizen-protecting bulwarks against threats posed by unchecked capital, policies that ensure basic needs, more-thansubsistence incomes, freedom from servitude, and fair taxation policies. If we must have capitalism, it must be capitalism with a human face (with apologies to Alexander Dubček). Does this mean or entail that I must give up my view of philosophy of education and defer to White’s? I don’t think so. Although perhaps understandable, the ‘fiddling while Rome burns’ reaction to my insistence on the integrity of philosophy of education is mistaken, and a defense of this view of the subject is readily forthcoming. There are four important points worth making.

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First, do White’s recommendations constitute philosophy? Supposing that philosophers of education take on White’s suggestions, and work to do the things White recommends, would they be doing philosophy of education? This of course depends upon what philosophy is, and what it is, is of course contentious. White endorses Kitcher’s endorsement of Dewey’s reconception of philosophy: as Kitcher characterizes it, Dewey bequeathed to us a conception of philosophy quite different from the one most prominent in contemporary Anglophone philosophy. Philosophy begins with study of the good life, aims to understand how opportunities for living well can be promoted by social institutions, and considers how young people, people with their lives before them, can best be prepared, as individuals and as citizens. Instead of taking metaphysics, epistemology, and the study of mind and language as core philosophical disciplines, Dewey’s rival vision would see Plato, Rousseau and Mill as large figures in a great tradition that focuses on questions of human and social development. In adopting that vision, we should add Dewey to the list, and embrace his explicit judgment that philosophy can be defined as the general theory of education. (p. 296, quoting Kitcher, 2009: 300–301, note deleted)

It should be noted that White’s endorsement of Dewey’s alternative vision of philosophy does not completely reject the ‘inwardness’ that I’ve been defending; in his brief listing of contemporary philosophy of education’s ills, he despairs (as I do) that some ‘caught up in educational issues of the day, can sometimes lose touch with their parent subject’ (p. 297). Still, he devotes a considerable amount of attention to Dewey’s and Kitcher’s alternative vision of philosophy. One advantage he sees to the embrace of the alternative vision is that with it we will no longer be forced to see ourselves as occupying the ‘subterranean depths’ of the philosophical pecking order; it ‘can lead us towards a very different self-evaluation’ (p. 297). Much more importantly, White suggests that it can help us, with the engagement of other disciplines, to achieve ‘a fuller, sometimes more synoptic, understanding’ (p. 297) of the world of education. Such an understanding is not forthcoming from philosophers who are not specialists in philosophy of education (p. 298). As White says, their contributions may advance straightforwardly philosophical understanding – ‘Topped and tailed, they could well be published as standard philosophical pieces in their own right’ (p. 298) – but not our understanding of the world of education. Is it true that philosophers who are not specialists in philosophy of education cannot contribute to the development of a fuller, more synoptic understanding of education? This is not at all obvious. But even if it is true, is it bad? I don’t see why. On the contrary, it seems to me that we should welcome all contributions, from general philosophers and philosophers of education alike, that enhance our understanding of general philosophical questions. Perhaps more to the point: can a sharp line be drawn between either general philosophy and philosophy of education or between those contributions that enhance our understanding of education and those that enhance our understanding of general philosophy? I doubt it. To take an extreme example or two, consider Russell’s theory of definite descriptions or Kripke’s demonstration of the existence of a posteriori necessary truths. Are these important achievements in general philosophy completely inert with respect to

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our understanding of the world of education? They are not. Russell’s theory, or at least the study of it, enhances our understanding of educational slogans and other educational locutions (Scheffler, 1960), and Kripke’s results deepen our grasp of truth and kinds of truth, something that is relevant to more or less every area of the curriculum. I am for this reason doubtful of any attempt to declare general philosophy, or large tracts of it, irrelevant to a deep, synoptic understanding of education. Finally (with respect to this first point), it is worth noting that what philosophy is, and so what conception of it we should embrace – Dewey’s, or ‘the one most prominent in contemporary Anglophone philosophy’ – is itself a philosophical question par excellence, as plausible a candidate as any of a philosophical question without ramifications for education or philosophers of education. And yet here it is, with such ramifications. Second, and relatedly, if we could do as Dewey, Kitcher, and White recommend, we would in effect have tamed capitalism. (In this respect, their proposal is reminiscent of Marx’s 11th thesis on Feuerbach, in which he suggests that the aim of philosophy is not to interpret the world but rather to change it.) It would be wonderful if we could manage to so tame the beast. But is it even remotely plausible that philosophy, rather than concerted social/political action, could do such a thing? Third, is it correct that the aim of education is to help students lead good or flourishing lives? What is ‘flourishing’ anyway? What is the good life? Is there but one of these, or are there many different types of good life? What counts as human and social development, as opposed to mere change? Taking Dewey, Kitcher, and White at their word, their alternative conception of philosophy relies upon the pursuit of just the kind of ‘impractical’ philosophical inquiry in which general philosophers engage. Finally, as noted above, I certainly endorse White’s and Kitcher’s (and Dewey’s) view that we should do all we can to reign in the excesses of unregulated capitalism in order to preserve the possibility of people’s living meaningful and productive lives in the face of ‘Smithian batterings from without’ (p. 302). We don’t need a new ‘vision of philosophy’ to do so. Embracing such a new vision does not aid the effort; it simply re-categorizes some social/political action as ‘philosophy’. This seems merely an empty gesture. I have already agreed that some genuinely philosophical activity (e.g. that concerning the character of the good life) can helpfully guide such action; that point is not in dispute. But does any of this require a new vision of philosophy? I don’t see why. Much of what will pass as pursuit of the new vision will also count as philosophical under the old vision. Some, such as the establishment of anti-Smithian bulwarks against the excesses of capital, will not, but its failure to constitute philosophy (under the old vision) will not in any way reduce its worth or importance. White worries that philosophy of education, if too heavily focused inwardly, ‘would miss the opportunity of helping to head off the possible threat to the well-being of our own and other citizens now on the cards’ (p. 301). But shouldn’t citizen philosophers of education help to head off the threat, whether or not such helping work counts as philosophy of education according to one or another vision of the field? The ‘vision thing’ is I fear just a red herring. White concludes by challenging philosophers of education to give up their inwardlooking, scholarly pursuits and instead address issues of social policy:

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If philosophy of education . . . is to prosper in the surely dramatic decades to come, it cannot hide from issues of wider social policy in inward-looking ‘educational applications’ of problems in general epistemology or in the text of some fashionable French philosopher. Tackling educational aspects of these broader questions – in collaboration with economists, political scientists and others – has to be at the centre of its work. (p. 302)

It is unclear what counts as ‘prospering’ in this formulation, but achieving significant philosophical insight seems not to count. This strikes me as bizarre, as if doing good philosophy does not even count in philosophy of education’s favor. In fairness, White is not ruling out the achievement of philosophical insight as counting; his claim is that ‘not hiding from issues of wider social policy’ is a necessary condition of prospering, not a sufficient condition, so he may think that that achievement also counts.1 But he is surely giving the latter short shrift and placing his emphasis squarely on the not hiding rather than the philosophical insight. Moreover, even if we set that last point aside, is it really the case that an increased presence of philosophy of education in philosophy – more faculty positions in philosophy departments, more articles on topics in philosophy of education in general philosophy journals, and so on – wouldn’t count towards prospering? This too strikes me as bizarre. There is, moreover, a lurking ambiguity here: is the suggestion that philosophers of education should not engage at all in ‘inward-looking’ philosophical work because it is not worth doing? Or is it rather that philosophers of education might legitimately do both, though the bulk of its collective activity should be collaborative work on issues of wider social policy? The ambiguity masks a false choice: either ‘hide from issues of wider social policy’, or tackle them and in doing so hide from issues of general philosophical substance. Surely, we can and should do both. Which philosophers of education do which is not a matter to be decided from on high but rather determined by philosophers of education themselves in accordance with their interests, talents, and passions. The important thing to note is that there is value in the inward-looking stuff as well as the outward-looking stuff, at least when it is done well. To think otherwise is to think that philosophy itself is not worth doing. If one thinks this, why do philosophy of education? Funding This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Note 1. Thanks, here and elsewhere, to Randall Curren for helpful suggestions on the penultimate draft.

References Kitcher P (2009) Education, democracy, and capitalism. In: H Siegel (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Education, pp. 300–318. New York: Oxford University Press. Phillips DC and Siegel H (2013) Philosophy of education. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/education-philosophy/ Scheffler I (1960) The Language of Education. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas.

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Siegel H (1981a) The future and purpose of philosophy of education. Educational Theory 31(1): 11–15. Siegel H (1981b) How ‘practical’ should philosophy of education be? Educational Studies 12(2): 125–134. Siegel H (1983) On the obligations of the professional philosopher of education. Journal of Thought 18(2): 31–37. Siegel H (2007) Philosophy of education. Encyclopaedia Britannica Online. Available at: http:// search.eb.com/eb/article-9108550 Siegel H (ed.) (2009) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Education. New York: Oxford University Press. White J (2013) Philosophy, philosophy of education, and economic realities. Theory and Research in Education 11: 294–303.

Author biography Harvey Siegel is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Miami. His interests include epistemology, philosophy of science, and philosophy of education.

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