Keil 1 Benjamin Keil University of Kansas, Ph.D. Candidate (Philosophy) Please do not cite or publish without permission. Marx's Criticisms of Utilitarianism and Their Applicability

While Marx offers a detailed analysis of certain topics, such as economics, his writings on ethics are generally considered to be incompletely developed. This, however, cannot be said for Marx's arguments against the ethical position known as utilitarianism. On this topic he gives multiple arguments all of which result in the conclusion that utilitarianism is an inadequate moral theory. Yet one might wonder if Marx's arguments apply to contemporary forms of utilitarianism or merely those formulations from Marx's own time period. I shall argue that Marx's anti-utilitarian arguments do not apply to some more contemporary forms of utilitarianism. Consequently, although Marx's arguments suffice to reject one sort of utilitarianism, this does not therefore mean that his arguments are applicable to all forms of utilitarianism. This thesis shall be demonstrated through the following argumentation. First I shall give an overview of Marx's three main criticisms of utilitarianism. Second, I shall consider hedonistic utilitarianism and demonstrate the applicability of Marx's arguments against it. Third, I will consider two alternative forms of utilitarianism, ideal and negative. I will show that Marx's arguments are inapplicable to these utilitarian formulations, and thus conclude that while Marx's arguments are effective against at least certain forms of utilitarianism, Marx's arguments alone will not reject all forms of utilitarianism. I begin, of course, by reviewing what exactly Marx's anti-utilitarian arguments are. These arguments are drawn not only from the Young Marx's German Ideology, but also from the Mature Marx's first volume of Capital. These shall be referred to as Marx's revolutionary,

Keil 2 individualistic, and exclusivistic arguments. Marx’s revolutionary argument fundamentally asserts that utilitarianism justifies the current capitalistic system. Given that a nontrivial part of Marx's career was devoted to demonstrating capitalism's flaws, it should be no surprise that any system which justifies it will not meet with Marx's approval. Marx's argument begins by claiming that the meaning of the theory of utility (or utilitarianism) comes from its economic components: “From the outset the utility theory had the aspect of a theory of general utility, yet this aspect only became fraught with meaning when economic relations, especially division of labour and exchange, were included.” (Marx [1976] 413) When these economic relations are included in utilitarianism's calculus, the actions of private individuals were considered generally useful and thus become justified by utilitarianism. By virtue of including this economic content into utilitarianism's account, however, Marx argued that utilitarianism changed into a justification for the current state of affairs rather than a revolutionary paradigm: The economic content gradually turned the utility theory into a mere apologia for the existing state of affairs, an attempt to prove that under existing conditions the mutual relations of people today are the most advantageous and generally useful. It has this character among all modern economists. (Marx [1976] 413-414) Thus utilitarianism, instead of pushing towards revolution or needed social changes, has instead become a justification for the existing order and its exploitive relations. Second, Marx criticizes utilitarianism for being too individualistic. This, of course, partially stems from Marx's emphasis on man's communal aspect and the importance of his species being. So any system which concludes that man's essence can be found absent his relations with other men will be criticized. This is exactly the ground on which Marx criticizes Bentham, an early developer of utilitarianism. Marx argues that in Bentham's theory, man “[O]nly looks to himself. The only force that brings [men] together and puts them in relation

Keil 3 with each other, is the selfishness, the gain and the private interests of each. Each looks to himself only, and no one troubles himself about the rest...” (Marx [1924] 195) Utilitarianism thereby encourages men to be selfishly individualistic and live in defiance of their species being, and consequently utilitarianism ought to be rejected. Third, Marx offers what I term the exclusivistic argument. To put it in perhaps more understandable terms, Marx claims that utilitarianism focuses on the utility of an interaction to the exclusion of other important aspects of human relationships. Marx offers this argument in two stages. He begins by asserting that, in utilitarianism, utility is the sole element considered: “The relation of 'usefulness'...is supposed to be the sole relation of individuals to one another...” (Marx [1976] 408, emphasis in original) Having established that utilitarianism is only concerned with usefulness, Marx then illustrates the occurrence of this problem in Bentham's works: “The complete subordination of all existing relations to the relation of utility, and its unconditional elevation to the sole content of all other relations, occurs for the first time in Bentham’s works…” (Marx [1976] 412-413, emphasis mine) Marx's criticism, then, is that utilitarianism is exclusively concerned with utility, and such an understanding fails to account for the true diversity of human interactions. Marx has thereby offered three independent reasons to reject utilitarianism. If any of these three arguments are effective, then it would be clear that utilitarianism ought to be rejected. What is less clear, however, is the applicability of these arguments to all forms of utilitarianism. For, it must be noted, two of the arguments offered refer explicitly to Bentham's form of utilitarianism. Consequently, if Marx's arguments refute Bentham's utilitarianism but not other kinds, then Marxists will need to deploy additional arguments to reject these remaining forms of utilitarianism. I shall now consider hedonistic, ideal, and negative utilitarianism. It

Keil 4 shall be argued that Marx's arguments are clearly applicable to Bentham's hedonistic utilitarianism. However I will argue that Marx's arguments do not apply ideal or negative utilitarianism. All forms of utilitarianism, of course, emphasize the importance of utility. A way to distinguish between different sorts of utilitarianism is to understand what constitutes utility. Hedonistic utilitarianism, obviously, will understand utility in terms avoiding pain and furthering pleasure. Bentham notes the importance of these in his utilitarian formulation when he writes: Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters: pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do as well as to determine what we shall do...They govern us in all we do in all we say in all we think every effort we can make to throw off our subjection will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. The principle of utility recognizes this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system... (Bentham 5) Consequently Bentham advances a hedonistic understanding of utility: By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question or what is the same thing in other words to promote or to oppose that happiness. (Bentham 6) Insofar as a given action promotes the happiness of those under consideration, then, hedonistic utilitarianism considers it to be the morally correct action. Given how often Marx's arguments explicitly referred to Bentham and his conception of utility, one ought not be surprised that Marx's arguments are particularly effective against hedonistic conceptions of utilitarianism. Let us first consider Marx's revolutionary argument, keeping in mind that Marx's criticism hinges on the economic content which was co-opted into utilitarianism. This economic emphasis, Marx argues, lead to utilitarianism's justification of the current state of affairs instead of being revolutionary. Hedonistic utilitarianism, it must be noted, need not have contained this economic content

Keil 5 that Marx criticizes. After all, there is no overarching reason for an ethical theory to have economic content at all. Marx's analysis is correct, however: Hedonistic utilitarianism did come to have an affinity with economics. This was noted by, among others, Hutchison: It has often been pointed out, obviously with much truth, that Bentham's development of, and emphasis on, the two concepts of maximisation and utility make him above all the ancestor of neo-classical economic theorising...[T]hese ideas were developed in Bentham's political, legal and philosophical writings. (Hutchison 290) Although it need not have had economic content, then, hedonistic utilitarianism did come to be associated with its economic emphasis on utility. It is beyond this paper's purposes to delve into whether or not the economic content of hedonistic utilitarianism did, in fact, turn it into an apologia for the current state of affairs. Since we are examining only the question of whether Marx's arguments apply to hedonistic utilitarianism, it must be concluded that hedonistic utilitarianism is, indeed, subject to Marx's revolutionary argument. Let us consider Marx's individualistic argument and its applicability to hedonistic utilitarianism. It could be argued that Bentham evades Marx's argument by structuring his utilitarianism in terms of what provides happiness for “the party whose interest is in question” (Bentham 6) and that this party need not necessarily be construed as being an individual, but could perhaps be society as a whole. However, this response to Marx's argument would be an unfaithful understanding of Bentham. Bentham, it seems, was every bit as much of an individualist as Marx claimed. Consider just one example from Utilitarianism: The community is a fictitious body composed of the individual persons who are considered as constituting it...The interest of the community then is what the sum of the interests of the several members who compose it...It is in vain to talk of the interest of the community without understanding what is the interest of the individual. (Bentham 6-7) Based on Bentham's own words, then, we must conclude that hedonistic utilitarianism is indeed

Keil 6 as individualistic as Marx's argument claims, and consequently that hedonistic utilitarianism is directly subject to Marx's second objection. Let us now consider whether Marx's third argument is applicable to hedonistic utilitarianism. It must be noted that even in Bentham's initial description of utilitarianism he understands mankind to be under the rule of pleasure and pain, and that hedonistic utilitarianism adopts this as the basis of the theory. In other words, then, hedonistic utilitarianism understands that only pain and pleasure are worth considering, and establishes these as the basis for its understanding of utility. Inherently hedonistic utilitarianism will elevate utility above all other factors because hedonistic utilitarianism believes that pain and pleasure are the only “sovereign masters” of human existence. Consequently, Marx's third argument is applicable to hedonistic utilitarianism. Let us now consider ideal utilitarianism. I shall argue that, unlike hedonistic utilitarianism, Marx's arguments are inapplicable to ideal utilitarianism. This will be shown by first by exploring what ideal utilitarianism claims and then turning to Marx's arguments. Ideal utilitarianism advocates a wider understanding of utility than mere pleasure as claimed by Bentham. G.E. Moore, a main developer of ideal utilitarianism, holds that instead of pursuing pleasure we ought to pursue that which is good in itself. Moore argues that there are two things which are good in themselves: By far the most valuable things, which we know or can imagine, are certain states of consciousness, which may be roughly described as the pleasures of human intercourse and the enjoyment of beautiful objects. No one, probably, who has asked himself the question, has ever doubted that personal affection and the appreciation of what is beautiful in Art or Nature, are good in themselves; nor, if we consider strictly what things are worth having purely for their own sakes, does it appear probable that any one will think that anything else has nearly so great a value as the things which are included under these two heads. (Moore 188-189, emphasis in origianl) Based on this understanding, both in Principia Ethica and elsewhere, Moore develops a version

Keil 7 of utilitarianism which advocates the pursuit of these goods. As we shall see, this wider understanding of utility avoids the problems Marx identified in utilitarianism. Let us first consider Marx's revolutionary argument and its applicability to ideal utilitarianism. It is crucial here to recall that Marx did not argue that utilitarianism itself is antirevolutionary. Marx's more subtle argument is that the economic content of utilitarianism caused it to become justificatory of the current system rather than advocating its reform. Ideal utilitarianism, however, has no such economic content and is instead focused on those things which are good “purely for their own sakes.” Moreover, nowhere in Principia Ethica or elsewhere does Moore lay a decidedly economic emphasis upon the means of gathering these intrinsically good things he identifies. Consequently, we may conclude that the necessary economic antecedent to Marx's argument is not present in ideal utilitarianism, and consequently that Marx's revolutionary argument does not apply to ideal utilitarianism. Ideal utilitarianism, further, is not devoted to individualism in the same way that hedonistic utilitarianism is, and consequently Marx's second attack is also inapplicable. The thrust of Marx's attack came from his conclusion that, in utilitarianism, what brings men together is selfishness – that one “looks to himself only and no one troubles about the rest” (Marx [1924] 172) Ideal utilitarianism, however, offers two responses. First, ideal utilitarianism is not concerned about that which is good for the individual, unlike hedonistic utilitarianism. Instead, its emphasis is upon those things which are good for their own sakes. Because of this radical contextual shift, ideal utilitarianism shifts away from a lone individual pursuing his selfish interests and towards an individual pursuing that which is intrinsically good. Even if this argument is unconvincing, however, a separate one presents itself. It must be

Keil 8 recognized that one of ideal utilitarianism's intrinsic goods is, roughly, the joy of human fellowship. Instead of each “looking to himself only,” then, ideal utilitarianism recognizes that human kinship is what ought to be pursued and is thus a forthright rejection of the kind of individualism Marx criticized. Both in its emphasis and its means, then, ideal utilitarianism constitutes a rejection of individualism and is thereby not subject to Marx's second argument. Because ideal utilitarianism has a wider understanding of what constitutes utility, this will also render the exclusivistic argument inapplicable. For indeed unlike Marx's argument claims, ideal utilitarianism does not assert that usefulness is the sole relation of individuals to each other. Further, it does not elevate utility to the exclusion of all other relations; it merely asserts that its understanding of utility identifies those things which are worth pursuing for their own sake. This leaves open the claim that other relations exist and are important – it just closes off the claim that such relations are important for their own sake. Furthermore, G.E. Moore himself criticized utilitarianism for the same reason Marx offered in his exclusivistic argument. Moore writes: In thus insisting that what is right must mean what produces the best possible results Utilitarianism is fully justified. But with this correct contention there has been historically, and very naturally, associated a[n]...error. The best possible results were assumed to consist only in a limited class of goods, roughly coinciding with those which were popularly distinguished as the results of merely useful or interested actions (Moore 106) It would, of course, be highly odd for Moore to criticize hedonistic utilitarianism on this ground and be unaware of the exact same problem in ideal utilitarianism. Rather, this quotation demonstrates that Moore was aware of the problem posed by claims like Marx's exclusivistic argument. This is no doubt why Moore's theory entails that the best possible results are not the most useful results, but rather those which pursue most those intrinsic goods he identifies. Consequently Moore was aware of arguments like Marx's exclusivistic argument, agreed with its

Keil 9 criticism, and took steps to avoid that problem in ideal utilitarianism. On these grounds, then, I conclude that Marx's three anti-utilitarian arguments are inapplicable to and thus ineffective against ideal utilitarianism. Let us now consider negative utilitarianism and whether or not Marx's arguments will apply to it. As before, I shall begin by clarifying what negative utilitarianism entails and then examining it in relation to Marx's three arguments. The negative utilitarianism I shall consider was advanced by Popper in his book The Open Society and Its Enemies. Popper notes that “It adds to clarity in the fields of ethics, if we formulate our demands negatively, i.e. if we demand the elimination of suffering rather than the promotion of happiness.” (Popper 285) Consequently, instead of pursuing the greatest happiness for the greatest number, Popper argues that utilitarianism's demand should be formulated in the negative: Instead of the greatest happiness for the greatest number, one should demand, more modestly, the least amount of avoidable suffering for all; and further, that unavoidable suffering – such as hunger in times of an unavoidable shortage of food – should be distributed as equally as possible. (Popper 285) Popper advances his argument primarily because he believes that there is no moral call to make someone who is well off even better off. There is, however, an immediacy in the call to alleviating another's suffering (Popper 285) Let us now consider the applicability of Marx's three arguments to negative utilitarianism. In relation to the revolutionary argument, two responses can be offered. The first is similar to the response given in ideal utilitarianism: negative utilitarianism has avoided appealing to economic content and thus Marx's argument is inapplicable. The second reply highlights a unique strength of negative utilitarianism. Since negative utilitarianism is dedicated to the alleviation of suffering, it in fact can never be a “mere apologia”

Keil 1 for the current state of affairs if Marx is correct about the suffering which takes place in capitalism. Given Marx's emphasis on the exploitation which inherently takes place in capitalism, Marx necessarily recognizes the suffering under capitalism. If capitalism indeed entails suffering which could be alleviated, negative utilitarianism insists that there is a moral obligation to minimize that suffering. If communism would, on the whole, entail less suffering than capitalism, negative utilitarianism could even be used to justify communism. From two different perspectives, then, Marx's revolutionary argument is inapplicable to negative utilitarianism. Let us now turn to Marx's individualistic argument. Popper's negative utilitarianism can offer two potential replies; if either of these are successful it would demonstrate that Marx's argument does not apply to negative utilitarianism. The first is a conceptual claim: Unlike hedonistic utilitarianism, negative utilitarianism places no special emphasis on one's own suffering relative to another's suffering. Hedonistic utilitarianism is concerned with maximizing the pleasure experienced by the advocate of hedonistic utilitarianism – its emphasis is on the first-person perspective and on “my” pleasure. Negative utilitarianism, contrariwise, gives no especial weight to “my” avoidable suffering as opposed to “her” avoidable suffering; it claims that both are equally worthy of efforts to remedy the situation. Consequently negative utilitarianism places no especial emphasis on individualism in its consideration of suffering. Furthermore, one of the strengths of negative utilitarianism is that we do tend to care about the sufferings of others. One explanation of this was given by Acton: Those who care for other people, or who have, as we say, a genuine concern for them, regard the sufferings of others as at any rate analogous to their own. Knowing what it is to suffer themselves, they have fellow-feeling for the sufferings of others, and knowing how, when they suffer, they often wish for help, they imagine other people as similar in this respect, and are inclined to help them. (Acton 90)

Keil 11 Negative utilitarianism recognizes that there is a certain sympathetic urgency felt in the call to alleviate suffering – we have experienced sufferings of our own which renders us able to sympathize with others' sufferings. Once their sufferings are sympathized with, this will incline an individual to care about and work towards remedying the suffering of another. Instead of each man “looking to himself” or being only selfishly interested in his own interests, negative utilitarianism encourages us to see the sufferings of others, feel sympathy by virtue of similarity to our own suffering, and then help that suffering individual. Marx's individualistic argument is inapplicable both because negative utilitarianism does not emphasize the first-person perspective and also because it encourages sympathetic efforts to remedy others' sufferings. If either of these claims are true, this will mean that Marx's revolutionary argument does not apply to negative utilitarianism. Let us now consider the third and final anti-utilitarian argument offered by Marx in its relation to negative utilitarianism. Negative utilitarianism is not subject to Marx's exclusivity argument by virtue of its recognizing two other important aspects of human life. Popper argues that negative utilitarianism is to be pursued along with two other primary goods: development of a society which is tolerant of those who are themselves tolerant, and developing a society which discourages despotism. Even R.N. Smart, a strong critic of negative utilitarianism, recognized this fact when he wrote: “Professor Popper...propounds two other principles to set alongside negative utilitarianism, viz, (briefly) 'Tolerate the tolerant' and 'No tyranny'” (Smart 3). Rather than unconditionally elevating utility above all other relations, Popper's negative utilitarianism recognizes that utility must be pursued along with two other societally-important relations. Consequently Marx's exclusivity argument fails to be applicable to Popper's negative utilitarianism.

Keil 1 At this point my analysis has shown that Marx's anti-utilitarian arguments are inapplicable against at least two separate forms of utilitarianism. Does this mean, however, that Marx would actually approve of either ideal or negative utilitarianism? I think this possibility unlikely. It is unlikely for two reasons. First, Marx was clearly not interested in identifying himself as a utilitarian and took great pains to distance his claims from those made by utilitarians. Given the obvious distaste which Marx holds for utilitarianism, then, this suggests a low likelihood that Marx would be in favor of either ideal or negative utilitarianism. Second, although his anti-utilitarian arguments do not address ideal or negative utilitarianism, the implications of these positions would be at odds with positions Marx held. One can, for instance, easily imagine Marx criticizing the “bourgeois values” expressed in ideal utilitarianism's conception of the good. Further negative utilitarianism is also devoted to the “No tyranny” principle, which would be in clear conflict with Marx's belief in the dictatorship of the proletariat as a means of establishing full communism. Although Marx's anti-utilitarian arguments do not apply to these new utilitarian formulations, then, this should not be read as a claim that ideal or negative utilitarianism would be compatible with Marxism. It does mean, however, that additional anti-utilitarian arguments will need to be given to reject these positions rather than merely relying upon the arguments given by Marx. In short, then, we have examined Marx's three anti-utilitarian arguments and examined their limits. We have seen how his arguments are clearly applicable to hedonistic utilitarianism. Marx's arguments, however, do not apply to and thus cannot refute ideal and negative utilitarianism. Consequently, while Marx's arguments will suffice for rejecting hedonistic utilitarianism, additional anti-utilitarian arguments will have to be given to address these more

Keil 1 recent and sophisticated forms of utilitarianism.

Keil 1 Works Cited: Acton, Harry. “Negative Utilitarianism.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 37 Supp. (1963): 83-114. Print. Bentham, Jeremy. Utilitarianism. London: Foote, 1890. Print. Hutchinson, Terence. “Bentham as an Economist.” The Economic Journal. 66.262 (1956): 288306. Print. Marx, Karl. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (Volume 1). Trans. Samual Moore & Edward Aveling. Chicago: Kerr & Co., 1924. Print. Marx, Karl. “The German Ideology.” Karl Marx & Frederick Engels Collected Works, Vol. 5. Ed. Jack Cohen et al. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976. 19-539. Print. Moore, George. Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1959. Print. Popper, Karl. The Open Society & Its Enemies. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1963. Print. Smart, R.N. “Negative Utilitarianism” Mind. 67.268 (1958): 542-543. Print.