History US market USD 10bn

INV theme

Industry

Focused player on Infants Group sales 1% of US CURRENT MARKET SIZE Mgt Not crook

Peers Business model Rev = 650crs Min = 20%

FY15

EBITA margin

Guidance Segment breakup

Psychology factors

Key Parameters

6-7% % allocation

Reasons to buy

Increase post merger/expansion

Why Not something else

Wholesale & Brand TOO MUCH FOCUS More sale DIVERETED TO UNLISTED ARM

Stock template

When to sell

Reasons not to BUY

No merger by June 2017

Industry history

Why Re-rating

See key parameters

Prior probability

Company history

Pending Done

What all went WRONG IN INUDSTRY See CF Analysis

Working capital D/E =

Business model

Debt

BS analysis

What can kill the idea

leverage =

Ecosystem

Profitability

NOT RELEVANT 6.2X 16x

AVG [2006]

Sh pattern

PB

EV/EBITA

Current [TTM]

Owner Earnings ~ = EBITA

Valuation

FX gains EBITA excluding Scrap sales

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Promoters FIIs & DIs

55%

Pending

Infant wear [0-24months]

75%

Mostly related party Fabrics [25%]

Exclude to calculate core sales & Margins

Product wise [FY14]

At nominal losses

Revenue mix

FY 14 = 260crs

15 yr avg Export incentives

2007 = 40crs 2013 = 80crs

Fabrics = 46%

Capital employed

6-7% of sales FY14

Contract manufacturing CWIP FY 14 = 17crs

70%

Other Design + manufacturing

Segment breakup

30%

Garments % contribution to EBITA

EBITA mix

Fabrics

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04-08

70%

09-10

55%

11-14

30%

Export incentives

Nominal losses

7% of sales

Nopes

Brand power

Only 12 companies of KGL scale Economies of scale Globally Difficult Labour intensive Quality

Easy/difficult for competitor to replicate Entry Barriers

Approvals

Mental models

Social Audit Yes

Working in Favour Working against

Does it make life difficult for competitors? Yes

> 600 factories shut down in Tripura High compliance cost

Porter 5 forces

Environmental issues

Pricing power

Kitex CLAIMS to meet all NORMS...

Reflected in Gross margins

Quality

Unknown

Limited suppliers

Scale, capacity Competitive advantage

Intensity of competition among existing players.

Access to skilled labour

But GM indicate LOW Capital intensive ?

UNKNOWN Bangladesh

Threat of substitutes

Business model

Vietnam

HIGHLY

Capital allocation

3-5% of EBITA

Moderate

Compensation

Bargaining power of customers

FY14 5% of EBITA

Supply of Infant wear restricted Unknown

No instance of MISALLOCATION

Management

Bargaining power of suppliers

Unlisted arm capacity > listed arm Trustworthy?

FG inventory almost NIL Take it or leave it....

KCL Repeated aggressive guidance in the past

Sellers Market

Operating skills

Good

Debt/EBITA < 2x

Bullet proof capital structure?

Debt/4yr avg OCF Debt/4yr avg FCF

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3-6x [last three years] 3-6x [last three years]

Yes

Price Risk HUGE

NOPES Customer concentration

Business Risk

11BN

Scale of opportunity

Temp blip, CANNOT KILL THE COMPANY

USD 25bn Canada + China + Japan

Key Risks

Conflict of interest Unknown

Carter share 1%

Growth

Europe

NO PROPER DISCLOSURES Innocent untl proven guilty

KGL current focus only on USA

USA

JJ mills > 40% of consolidated sales

Mgt Risk Europe contribution still very minor

Srilanka

EV/EBITA [TTM]

Nopes Margin expansion

Valuation

Post merger SLIGHT DECLINE Probably STABLE

PE expansion/Contraction

What will drive share price

Bangladesh But JJ Europe sales

Past, NEVER FAVOURED UNLISTED ARM OVER LISTED ONE

Key Parameters

16x

Core EBITA FY14 = 72crs PB

6.3X

Yes Revenue growth

Ready to hold for 5-10 YRS

20-25% CAGR over 10 yrs possible

Yes

EBITA = 108crs

50% GROWTH IN 3 YRS INR 580crs

50% decline in price after 3 yrs

Implied EV @ 115

EV/EBITA = 5x Min EV = 1,150

Current EV = 1.127 Possibility of CAPITAL LOSS REMOTE

Daily essential, NO FASHION TRENDS

ContrarianValueEdge.com

10X EBITA MULTIPLE

In absence of clear data, forming a hypothesis & then trying to prove or otherwise using data

Strong competitive advantage

Mgt is not crook JJ vs KGL standalone EBITDA margins

Hypothesis

See Text players sheet Major players ROIC 15yrs avg < 15%

Key textile players

KGL ROIC > 24%

Returns better than industry[Source: Capital line]

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Preference to KGL over KCL...see KCL sheet 2007 to 13

Probably OO 2 type operator Basant rule: Innocent till proven guilty Aggressive guidance in the past Conflict of interest because of KCL

Remuneration

Integrity

2014

3 to 4% of EBITA 6% of EBITA

> 80% is by way of commission But no salary from KCL

Red flags

Mgt is not crook

Inconsistency in some DATA shared in AGM

Odds in favour of successful execution > 15 yrs SAME MD No instance of misallocation

Capital allocation

Competentcy

Proven performance Did not sacrifice margins in 2011: core Sales decline by 30% Political ambitions

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Post 2004 FY 11

Sales declined ONLY ONCE

Gr Profit Flat

2003-10 > 90% > 100% increase in cotton prices

Capacity utilisation

2011 ~ 77%

192 days

1999-2002

60 days

2003-09

30 days

2010-14

44 days AVG ~ 62 days

2002-08

AVG ~ 52 days

2009-14

~ 48 days

> 30%

2014

core EBITA > 10% inc

Strong competitive advantage

Gross profit

Adj for processing charges NO DECLINE post 2002

FY10-11

CCC

> 100% increase

Spike in cotton prices

Receivable days

2014

Sales declined by 30% Margins

Nominal FG inventory [Majority is RM]

Increased

GP & core EBITA

CCC = Cash conversion cycle

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Flat

Rev ROIC = 13% 15 yr AVG

Alok Indus

Asset TO =0.8x

Home text Bathrobes

Rev

Welspun India

Terry Towels ROIC = 11% 15 yr AVG Asset TO =0.7x

Textile players Arvind Garment division Rev > 1K crs > 90% exports Yarn = 70%

ROIC = 14%

Rev

2002-07

Vardhman textiles

Asset TO =1.7x ROIC = < 4%

Asset TO = 1x

Gokaldas exports

LOSSES INR appreciation Cotton prices

ROIC = 14% 15 yr AVG

2008-13 Asset TO =1.5x

Fabric = 30%

2011-14 Reasons cited

Slow down in US Link 2013 sales < 2007

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Set up in 2005

KCL capacity> KGL????

KCL faced rev decline in H1 FY13 due to order cancellation ICRA [KGL could have diverted orders to KCL, but DID NOT..

KGL core EBITDA margin > KCL

KCL

KCL sources BULK of its fabrics from KGL

KCL extended its corporate guarantee to KGL in 2012 FY 13 decline in GROUP sales KCL margins < KGL: Shows KGL sold fabric at premium to KCL KGL given preference over KCL

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Infant clothing security standards Huge entry barriers Customers Social & Environmental norms. HUGE

Less dependent on Fashion trends Rapid technology obsolesce risk LOW

Huge opportunity

MORE of the SAME STUFF

Mgt NEED NOT be SMART everyday like RETAIL

USA

KGL current focus only on USA 11BN

Market Size

USD 25bn Canada + China + Japan Carter share 1%

Rev are more predictable Europe

Reasons to buy

100% increase in capacity Company claims by FY 16

By FY17

Other positives

only 50% in production lines Mgt claims NO more labour

30-50% ADDITIONAL LABOUR Automatic Plant

expansion

Strong competitive adv

Not sure Looks like mainly for CARTER To confirm? Carter Guidance 10% CAGR for next 5 years

ContrarianValueEdge.com

See Hypothesis Going by past numbers

8-9% increase Competition with customers

INR depreciation by 50% FY11-14 New processing plant

EBITDA expansion

Own brands/Wholesale dist plan

Unnecessary DISTRACTION

Sustainable at 25% or back to 13% HISTORICAL AVG

Difficult to inc price by retailers

More working capital intensive

End market HIGHLY COMPETITIVE

Reasons not to BUY

Other negatives

Babies R u FINANCIALLY WEAK TOP 4 > 80% Bankruptcy of large retailers

Asset turnover = 1.4x 15 yrs AVG

2008 crisis

Customers

Temporary blip Within 6-12M alternate customer Debt/EBITA < 2x No Bankruptcy issue

HIGHLY ASSET INTENSIVE

FA/Total assets = 52% Sales/ Total Assets OCF &FCF mostly NEGATIVE

What happens if co loses TOP customer

Low fixed cost Sales need to decline by 40% to result in losses

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Latest = 62%

Birth rate in advanced countries

What went wrong in past

NoT much PUBLIC INFO on competition

Aggressive guidance in the past...

I DONT THINK SO, but not cyclical too

Other negatives

Company claim recession proof 0-7 yrs

China

Cheap exports

Eventually might catch up

Pak Lanka

RISK DIFFICULT TO ASSESS EVEN IN FUTURE

Carter 2006-09 6% CAGR 20% decline in 2002 KGL

Labour intensive

Recession Top line 5%

Carter 2007

0-2 yrs 8%

20% inflation

NOT Recession proof business All textile companies citing THIS MAJOR RISK

30% decline in KGL core sales 2011

Power exp

Spike in cotton prices KGL Flat sales to single digit decline

Increased fr 2 to 5% Kitex Frequent power cuts leads to losses in 1997 RM stage much higher

2000-02 KGL cited recession in exports as reason in ARs

ContrarianValueEdge.com

Vardhman: 11% of sales

turn out to be CROOK > business DIVERTED TO UNLISTED ARM

Mgt

Steep APPRECIATION OF INR

What can kill the idea Customers compete on price

Termination of export incentives

Labour cost

Indian labour cost Customers opt other cheap destinations

ContrarianValueEdge.com

8 Y AVG

Div Payout ratio

8-10%

EBITA

21%

Margin analysis

Asset turnover

ROIC [4yrs avg] 24%

FY04-14

ROIC

27%

Spread

12%

1.3x

ROIC - Interest rate

Derived ROE

ROIC + Spread * Debt-equity ratio

-31% Steep inc in cotton prices Or One time sales jump in FY10

1997-2004

FY11 FY09-14

77%

Capacity utilisation -40%

Capacity

Sales CAGR

Volumes FY10

> 130%

24%

178K/day ????

1997-2001

Profitability Capacity Utilisation

FY11-14

38%

FY03-10

USD terms

Growth in USD nominal??

13%

137k/day

FY11-14

FY04-14

2009..14 = 7%

2007

FY 14

Capacity utilisation

20%

55K/day

2008-11

35%

17K/day

2005

FY11

> 100% 77% ?

FY 14 PUZZLE Flat FY05-11 INR 32-35 / Unit INR 85/unit

FY99-2002

INR 70/unit

Cash flow analysis

ASP

FY97-98

Product mix changes a lot

EBITDA margin

25%

Depreciation % sales INR 30-36 INR 40-48

Interest % sales

1998-2011 53

FY12

58

FY13

60

FY14

3%

PBT breakup

1993-97

PBT Margin

INR USD

5% 17%

1.1X Asset turnover

FY14 1.3x 15 yr avg 1.4x

Du Pont analysis [4yrs AVG]

18% Pre-tax RoA PBT/Total assets 2.5x Leverage [Assets/Equity] FY14 =1.8x Pre-tax ROE AVG

42%

Book tax rate

34%

Cash tax rate

30%

Tax rate Net margin

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x%

18%-20%

FY02-11 avg

15%-16%

FY12-14

Excl Fabric sales, incl export incentives

Probably increasing automation Or might be contract labour 47% CAGR 17k to 178k Capacity

EBITDA margin

FY04 to 08

Emp cost

80% CAGR 49% CAGR

Core sales Emp cost CAGR

7% CAGR @ 178K Capacity Flat 11% CAGR

FY09 to 14

Margin analysis

Core sales

Gross margin

FY 11 ~31% decline in sales Relaed party 2-3% 5-6%

FY99-2010 FY11-14

Excluded fabric sales

Power Accounting adjustments

Nominal sales After merger, inter segment sales

Deduct processing charges for Gross margins Include export incentives in sales

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GM = Garment sales minus RM minus processing charges

FY 99-2001

~40%

FY03-10

FY12-14

Gross margin

~40%

~55% INR depreciation?

Processing plant set up in FY08

Reason Gross margin

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Customers

No Union

State of labour

Excellent facilities to labour See you tube videos...

No RAPID change

Changes in technology

Ecosystem Possible

Regulations

Environmental issues

Labour Cotton prices

Suppliers Exposure to inflation

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RM

Flat sales UK ops LOSSES Space 15% CAGR 5 yrs Profitable

Mothercare UK

India

Wholesaler

International China

resells to > 14k retail

Focus

Gerber

Latam

> 14 yrs old customer Unlisted co.

What happens in West follows in rest of world

Major customer Children wear 13% of Sales

Kohl

ROE = 15% 5 yrs avg

First 10 Rows Kitex products Troubled past

Exclusive stores

Babies R Us

0-4yrs 30% of sales

Division of TOYS R US UNLISTED

> USD4bn debt due in 2018

International 14% of sales

Kitex Claim to supply MAJORITY to first 10 Rows

FY 14 Guidance Flat sales 4 decline in last 5 yrs 9%

SSS

Major Customer

Customers

Children's Place

Total purchase of infant

FY 14 ROE

14%

4th decline in 5 years SSS

Guidance of 10% Y/Y growth next 5 years

FY 10

5%

EBITA margin

38%

Gross margin

> USD 1bn

Kohl > 33% wholesale

Toys R us Walmart etc > 100 yrs old

Mothercare Kohl

Carter brand 0-7 yrs

KCL [unlisted private arm]

> 4 yrs

Children's Place

Carter

Currently buys through agents Per Kitex Direct purchase target > 150M by FY 17

> 80% of sales Top 4 customers ICRA

NOT a MAJOR CUSTOMER YET

Group

> 80% of sales

Kitex relationship

30% market share in organised retail - 0-24 months

USA

AVG ROE > 15%

ICRA

10% Sales CAGR

2006-13 7 yrs > 80% sales

Top ten products Company call it STAPLE PRODUCTS

ContrarianValueEdge.com

Per Kitex

Baby Wear [0-2 yrs] 13.5% USD 3bn Per Carter - USD 22bn

Play wear [0-7 yrs] 70%, USD 16bn

Rough est based on AR of Carter

SleepWear [0-7yrs] 5%, USD 1.2bn Appears to be flat since 2006 per Carter AR

US Market Size [0-7 yrs

0-2 yrs

~ 10bn

Carter gaining Market share from Mom n Pop stores 2006

USD 24bn

2010

USD 22bn

2013

USD 19bn

Looks like change in definition

Market size Per Carter

29 Crs unit sales 2012 0-7 yrs Assuming 0-2 yrs 30% 9 crs units

Per Children Place [0-4yrs - 30% of sales]

Kitex Full capacity by FY 15 1.2crs per annum

Social compliance norm across customers

Industry

Carter

Market share in organised retail is 25% Guidance of 10% CAGR for next 5 yrs Limited experience in direct sourcing My take: Will look for ESTABLISHED and BIG PLAYER LIKE KITEX

Design by customer is the norm

Primarily COTTON 0-2 yrs products Kitex ready access to Cotton in India

END MARKET- Highly competitive China Main

USD 25bn market China + Japan + Canada Per Carter NOT sure whetther Kitex will benefit

Bangladesh

Probably, per ARs of customers

Lanka

Outside US market

Directly

Sourcing

India NOT material Children's Place India Sourcing

Says Benefitting fr Bangladesh > 80% through agents Carter Plan to increase direct sourcing

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5.5L/month 7.5L

FY15

11L

FY 16

Current EXPECT DELAYS IN EXPANSION 48T /day

Kitex group

This Was limiting growth

< 12 Global companies

24 to 48T in 2013 INR 100crs Capex

Capacity > 1L /month

Fabric capacity

NONE makes profit

7.5L/Month

STILL required to MEET Quality

Winlu [China]

Peers

Winlu China serious issue in Fabric

Reduced to 6.5l/month Wages cost Problems Social & Environmental cost

Jay Jay Mills Gyn Foreign peers info from co _No public info

ContrarianValueEdge.com

Singapore based 6.5L /month

Niche sement 43% of Sales

Care analysis

Gerber Initial years > 90% Mother Care

Co able to pass on RM hikes Stable margins High RM inventory to safeguard price volatility

Customers [2008 data]

Walmart Target

Jay Jay Mills

2014 [Consolidated]

UK = 43% Top 5 customers > 85%

Knitting 10 to 18T/day 62 crs capex Processing 8 to 24T/day

US = 43% Geography

2013 JJ mills History

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JJ vs Kitex [excluding fabric sales]

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10MT/day 8 MT/day 1,800

Knitting

Fabric processing

Sewing machines [Garmenting unit] > 85%

1999

2010

Set up

Bala subramanium

Top 5 customers

Tirupur, Tamilnadu

Moderate increase in ASP Bleaching Top 5 Customers > 85% USA > 50% Processing & knitting division

2011

2007

50 crs capex

JJ mills History

Begin Inhouse

Dyeing

Earlier outsourced

Printing Drop in volumes, INR appreciation?

Vol declined by 20% ASP > 23%

43% of Sales

2012

Gerber Initial years > 90%

Garment sales FLAT Customers Knitting 10 to 18T/day 62 crs capex Processing 8 to 24T/day

Walmart

2008

2013

Mother Care

Target Capex 40crs Expansion

to 10T/day [Grey fabric] Knitting, Embroidery & Sewing

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40% inc in sales Probably Fabric processing plant

1995

Incorporated

2014

US To target NEW MARKETS EUROPE PLAN TO LAUNCH OWN BRAND

Incur losses

1997

Aggressive guidance

Frequent power cuts

1998

Cited WC limit inadequate, limiting growth

22% inc in sales No capacity expansion

1999

2012

GUESS 2012 Full utilisation No spare capacity lead to FLAT SALES IN 2013

History

Talked about worldwide recession

Profits decline by 50%

2000 Steep Inc in Cotton prices

Co quote int & Quota charges Strategic shift to DIRECT SALES than through agents

2011

FLAT SALES Capacity utilisation 77%

2002 New capacity operational 32% increase in sales

20% decline in sales Co cited recession in exports

2010 2004

Overseas Branch in Taiwan

Only 4% sales inc Capacity limit NOT SURE

Reason Worldwide recession

FULL CAPACITY utilisation

2009 2008

Guided inc in sales by increasing productivity To explore option to exports FABRICS

ContrarianValueEdge.com

2009 SALES FLAT

To commission new plant by Dec 2006 One year delay

INR 25 crs sales for 1999

2006 1998

NOT crossed 25crs till 2003 1999-2002 sales between 15-17 crs

Processing plant by Mar 2007 On time

2006 2000

Actual by Dec-13, 9M delay

Actual sales INR 15crs

Aggressive guidance

INR 100 crs capex Sch date Mar-13

inr 30CRS Sales guidance fr 2011

2012

2003

INR 50crs for 2004 Actual sales INR 36crs

Fabric processing plant

2005 By the SAME & EXISTING CEO& CHAIRMAN

ContrarianValueEdge.com

125crs for 2006 Actual 106crs

FY01-08 - 60days FY10-14 - 50days 48 days

Receivable days

FY 14 Nominal FG

INR 3-5 crs 40 days

FY 01-07

AVG 90 days

FY08-13

Inventory

NWC OCF

RM days

FY14 - 10 days

Cash flow analysis

16%

FY01-08

24%

FY11-14

Due to RM inventory

Outliers [32% & 1%]

% of sales

FY09 & 10

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Manufacturing process

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Grade Yarn

Oeko-Text Standard Class I Legally required for < 3yrs kid

Manufacturing process China

Cotton

50-60% of world stock

Dec-13

Polyster Filament Yarn

PFY

Substitute for cotton Can it be used for Kids garments exports???

4% to GDP

Indian textile industry

17% to exports 2nd largest employer AFTER AGRICULTURE

Floating Topic

ContrarianValueEdge.com

Clarifications from Mgt

Capacity expansion progress

To follow closely More info on competitors

Care reports

ContrarianValueEdge.com

Children later in life

Working for business

Demographic trends

High income, more spend Grand parents spending more than previous generations

Psychology factors Working against business

ContrarianValueEdge.com

by FY16 NO. 1 infant manucter GLOBALLY Possibiity of merger in next 2-3 yrs

Other positives

No standards for infants clothes Yet In INDIA

Current promoter holding 54%, post merger ~ 74-75% Carter, Mother care international expansion

ContrarianValueEdge.com

Kitex Mindmap_2014-06.pdf

Business model. See key parameters Why Re-rating. Why Not something else. % allocation. 6-7%. Increase post merger/expansion. When to sell. Wholesale ...

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