“Lived Bodies: Phenomenology and the Flesh” Elizabeth Grosz I.

Corporeal Phenomenology  Rejecting the Cartesian dualism of mind and body  The subject: 1. a “being-to-the-world” 2. a “subject committed to the world”

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3. a subject of perception and behavior as well as cognition and reflection The body: 1. both object (for other) and a lived reality (for the subject) 2. “sense-borrowing” and “form-giving” The case of the brain-damaged aphasic Schneider

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The “corporeal schema”, or body image

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II.

The Visible and the Invisible  The resonances that Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on lived experience and perception has with feminist attempts to harness experience in political evaluation 

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The concept of “the flesh: “the condition of both seeing and being seen, of touching and being touched, and of their intermingling and possible integration, a commonness in which both subject and object participate” The visible and vision

III.

The Senses  Sight as a spatial sense  Hearing as a temporal sense  Touch as a contact sense  The interaction and transposability of the senses

IV.

The Reversibility of the Flesh  Double sensation 1. The various graduations between subjectivity and objectivity 2. The indeterminate and reversible phenomenon of the being touched of the touching  The slippage in the double sensation 

V.

The body as a “being of two leaves”

Feminist Phenomenology?  Merleau-Ponty’s avoidance of the question of sexual difference and specificity 

Irigaray’s critiques

1. The tangible as capable of an existence autonomous from the visible 2. The role of the visual in phallocentrism VI.

Sexuality and the Lived Body  The question of the body in its sexual being in Merleau-Ponty’s theoretical paradigm  The relationship between Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of sexuality and feminist attempts to think a radical notion of sexual difference