Market Dynamics in Human Rights Protection Clifford Bob Department of Political Science Duquesne University

Market Dynamics in Human Rights Protection

Abstract Despite human rights NGOs’ many achievements, their coverage of abuses is often spotty, inconsistent, and transitory. There are significant disparities in resources devoted to seemingly similar human rights problems in different regions or even within the same country. Some major human rights problems have never received much attention or resources from key NGOs, while other issues involving seemingly lesser abuses have become focuses of human rights activism. As a step toward understanding these disparities, this article extends the new organizational/economic perspective on human rights activism. To do so, the article applies basic economic principles to the relations between local actors and transnational NGOs, positing that their relations can be usefully seen in market terms. The article first explains the meaning of key terms, describing the market and constructing supply and demand curves. Next it discusses predictable ‘failures’ resulting from the market nature of rights activism. As such, the article primarily aims to establish a new and useful heuristic for understanding the distribution and dynamics of human rights activism.

Introduction Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) play crucial roles in preventing and alleviating human rights abuses. Acting singly or in loosely formed transnational advocacy networks (TANs) together with foundations, media outlets, and international organizations (Keck & Sikkink 1998), NGOs research and report on violations, draw attention to abuses, provide services and advice to threatened individuals, apply pressure strategies such as sanctions and boycotts, and lobby foreign governments to implement more forceful measures, including military intervention. In these and many other ways, NGOs such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the International Commission of Jurists, Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de ‘lHomme and dozens of others have become central actors in the contemporary human rights scene. And by proclaiming the universality, interdependence, and indivisibility of all rights, NGOs and the human rights movement have established an ambitious agenda. Yet despite human rights NGOs’ achievements and oratory, their coverage of abuses is often spotty, inconsistent, and transitory. There are vast disparities in resources devoted to seemingly similar human rights problems in different regions or even within the same country. Some major human rights problems have never received much attention or resources from key NGOs, while other issues involving seemingly lesser abuses have become focuses of human rights activism (Bob, 2002; Ron, Ramos & Rodgers, 2005) An underlying cause of unevenness in rights activism is, of course, the sheer number of situations worldwide that arguably comprise human rights ‘violations.’ No one could reasonably expect that NGOs, with their limited resources and personnel, could end or even address all abuses worldwide. Yet important questions remain: How do NGOs select the issues and causes to which they devote their resources? Why do some human rights problems gain major NGO attention, while others linger for long periods in obscurity? What is the reality behind the rhetoric of universal, interdependent, indivisible rights? Scholars and policymakers have developed a number of perspectives on these questions. Some have despaired of finding a rational basis for vast disparities in international concern for seemingly similar abuses. As Jan Egeland, United Nations Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, has stated, ‘I don't know why one place gets attention and another not. . . . It's like a lottery, where there are 50 victimized groups always trying to get the winning ticket, and they play every night and they lose every night. I myself have said that the biggest race against the clock is Darfur, but in terms of numbers of people displaced, there are already more in Uganda and the eastern Congo’ (Hoge, 2004.) More optimistic observers argue that there is a logic, indeed a beneficent logic to international human rights activism. Abused individuals and groups gain transnational support by making appeals overseas. These pleas ‘boomerang’ back in the form of NGO and TAN pressure on repressive governments (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). In turn, such pressure can strengthen the position of local actors, force governments to make concessions, reinforce international resolve, and ultimately compel abusive states to improve human rights records (Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999). In this view, selfless NGOs scour the globe for the worst abuses. Weighing the needs of downtrodden groups worldwide, they focus on situations involving bodily harm to vulnerable groups and legalized inequality of opportunity (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). In effect, there is a ‘meritocracy of suffering’ in which the worst violations arouse the most human rights activism. As for NGOs, they are seen as fundamentally different from other participants in world politics. Power may motivate states, and profit move multinational corporations. But NGOs are viewed as principled, moral actors. For them, cosmopolitan altruism dominates, and organizational interest plays such a secondary role that it seldom merits scholarly attention (Smith, Pagnucco and Chatfield 1997; Florini, 2000; Khagram, Riker, & Sikkink, 2002). In contrast to the foregoing work, an emergent organizational/economic approach holds that human rights NGOs are not fundamentally different from other transnational political actors. While their motivations may be political or even moral, they behave in much the same way as other actors, albeit with different goals (Willetts, 1982). For instance, Sell & Prakash (2004), examining NGO campaigns to expand global access to HIV/AIDS treatment drugs, argue that analysts of transnational politics should treat NGOs as interest groups little different from businesses in their efforts to change government policies. Cooley & Ron (2002) document fierce competition between NGOs for contracts to support democracy building efforts in Eastern Europe. Finally, Bob (2002, 2005) introduces the metaphor of a transnational support ‘market’ in which needy groups ‘sell’ themselves to NGO patrons, whose concerns are both altruistic and self-interested. In this view, a form of exchange is central to the relationship between those needing and those providing transnational support (cf. Wolfsfeld 1997; Kalyvas 2003). Structural and

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strategic factors, more than morality, contribute to NGOs’ determinations of where to allocate their activism. Certain countries, for instance ones with higher media profiles or greater linkages to key international actors, attract greater NGO activism (Ron, Ramos & Rodgers, 2005; Smillie & Minear 2004; cf. Saideman, 2002). Holding country constant, certain groups also attract greater NGO support, typically groups with superior resources, knowledge of media and NGO routines, and pre-existing contacts with international actors--all of which facilitate marketing strategies (Bob 2005; cf. Wolfsfeld 1996). While further testing of these contending perspectives is warranted, this article builds on the latter view. I do so for several reasons. First, although Keck and Sikkink’s work, as well as subsequent scholarship following their approach (Risse, Ropp & Sikkink, 1999) touches on the question of why some human rights issues win more support than others, its main focus is another question--how transnational networks develop (once established) and the impacts of these networks on states and international organizations. By contrast, scholarship in the organizational/economic perspective has focused more directly on variations in transnational support for particular issues. Second, the organizational approach, while still including a relatively small number of studies, runs the methodological gamut from large-n studies (Ron, Ramos & Rodgers, 2005) to systematic, small-n studies (Bob, 2005, Sells and Prakash, 2004). Common conclusions from these plural approaches suggest that the organizational perspective has solid empirical grounding. Third, while relatively new to the human rights context, the organizational perspective meshes well with a substantial body of research in cognate disciplines such as management and marketing concerning the behavior of nonprofit organizations (Salamon 1997; Andreasen 1995). Finally, it is worth noting that many human rights NGOs themselves use economic principles, methods, and terminology in their own daily practices. As one example, Amnesty International-USA President William Schulz devotes a recent book to new ideas about how to ‘make the human rights ‘sale’--to build a broader constituency for human rights, to convince larger numbers of people that human rights matter’ (Schulz 2001, 7; see also AlertNet 2005). More broadly, Amnesty, Human Rights Watch, and other NGOs view themselves as ‘brands,’ developing and using brand management and expansion techniques (Amnesty 2004; Cohen, 1995) This article extends and deepens the organizational/economic perspective. Where other scholars primarily use the terms ‘market’ and ‘exchange’ metaphorically (Bob 2005; Kalyvas 2003), this article applies basic economic principles to the relations between local actors and transnational NGOs. First, the article explains the meaning of key terms, describing the market and constructing supply and demand curves. Next the article discusses predictable ‘failures’ resulting from the market nature of rights activism. As such, the article primarily aims to establish a new and useful heuristic for understanding the distribution and dynamics of human rights activism. I leave to others the task of testing the concepts I propose here. One important caveat: In applying economic principles, this article does not argue that rights activism is identical to commercial interactions. Human rights work is suffused with moral values, political ideals, and personal convictions largely alien to the commercial realm. Moreover, as discussed below, there are differences between a market for goods and a market for human rights activism. Just as certainly, however, the participants in transnational human rights interactions are not motivated by altruism alone. This is most obvious for those suffering abuses--who chiefly (and appropriately) seek their own, rather than some other groups’ relief from repression. But it holds also for the ‘principled’ human rights NGOs who, at least superficially, seem motivated solely by the noble goal of helping those under threat. In fact, however, as many NGO principals themselves acknowledge, moral and material concerns mix both within NGOs themselves and in their interactions with the groups they aid (Schulz, 2001; Terry 2004; Weissman, 2004). There is a more basic point: NGOs are ‘organizations’. They should be analyzed as such rather than emphasizing their principled or moral characteristics, as much of the existing literature does (Willetts 1996; Clark 2001). While economic and organizational concepts may seem alien to certain realms such as rights activism, this should not deter scholars from using them for analytic purposes (cf. French, 2005; Zelizer, 2005). Indeed, precisely because NGOs use moral appeals, employing basic economic tools can help illuminate otherwise obscure disjunctions between human rights rhetoric and reality. At the same time, such tools may help uncover unexamined aspects of transnational activism and disclose new possibilities for improvements in NGO performance.

Constructing the Human Rights Market Underpinnings of the Market: Needs, Costs, and Scarcity

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The market model has two players: ‘local’ groups suffering rights violations; and transnational human rights NGOs with resources available to help those groups.1 These resources include credibility in reporting about violations; various forms of expertise, e.g., skill in producing reports about violations and in tapping the media, foreign governments, and international organizations; access to those entities; and monetary or in-kind support for those suffering abuses. For analytic purposes, I bracket the source of local groups’ oppression, whether state action, economic structure, or social discrimination.2 No matter what the source of their subjugation, all these groups have needs, most generally that the problems they suffer be relieved. In specific terms, such needs may include removal of a repressive regime, change in an abusive policy, or lifting of an unjust condition. In some situations, aggrieved individuals and groups in one country will seek to satisfy those needs by gaining support from entities outside the home state, including Diaspora groups (Hockenos 2003; Byman 2001), foreign states (Saideman 2001, 2002), international organizations, and transnational human rights NGOs.3 Of course, outsiders will seldom be able to bring complete relief, and they may in fact make some situations worse (Kuperman 2004). Moreover, among the foregoing forms of outside aid, NGO activism in itself is relatively weak. However, it is far from insignificant in its effects on local conflicts, and it often serves as a catalyst or contributor to intervention by other actors. Thus, many local groups suffering a wide variety of ‘oppressions’ seek the aid and support of transnational human rights NGOs. While the needs of local groups are relatively obvious, transnational rights NGOs also have important needs, though ones different from those of local actors. Like all organizations, NGOs must concern themselves with their own survival and growth, notwithstanding their moral principles and political agendas. Part of this is accomplished directly, through fundraising and/or membership drives (Cohen, 1995). In addition to these obvious administrative tasks, NGOs also have substantive goals, most broadly improving the human rights conditions of individuals and groups suffering abuses. Beyond their moral dimension, such activities provide NGOs with prestige, legitimacy, and a raison d’etre, critical to attracting the funds and members that keep them alive. In addition, providing support in one case often increases organizational ‘capital’ such as credibility, information-gathering skills, or contacts with key governmental or media personnel, helping the NGO in future activities. This is not meant to suggest that NGOs act only instrumentally or that they view those they support as means. Most NGOs and the people who work for them are motivated by high principle and make real sacrifices in their work. Nonetheless, there is an important organizational dimension to NGO activities, and NGO needs are fulfilled in part by aiding those suffering abuses. These mutual, indeed complementary needs create clear incentives for interaction between transnational NGOs and local actors. What is the character of these interactions? If support was costless and resources unlimited, a purely altruistic relationship might arise. But the reality is different. For local groups to generate support and NGOs to provide it is costly. And resources are scarce for both parties. As a result, in the distribution of human rights support, as in many other areas of life, ‘tragic choices’ must be made (Calabresi & Bobbitt 1978). Little of the literature on human rights activism recognizes these facts. For instance, Keck and Sikkink’s ‘boomerang’ model takes little cognizance of the fact that ‘throwing’ a ‘boomerang’--that is making a transnational appeal--requires time, effort, and money. The costs to those suffering abuses involve, first, drawing attention to their issue and, second, actually attracting support. Both of these are complex and difficult tasks, with no guarantee of success. Many local groups are incapable of doing this, for lack of resources, knowledge, or contacts to help them. Similarly, for NGOs to ‘adopt’ particular clients involves significant direct, indirect, transaction and opportunity costs. Most directly, providing support costs money, consumes staff time, and depletes 1 By using the term ‘local’, I mean to emphasize that most of those suffering abuses do so at the hands of their own state authorities and are involved, as an initial matter, in largely domestic conflicts. 2 As discussed below, these issues do influence the likelihood of a particular issue eliciting activism. 3 For discussion of when support is likely to be sought, see Conclusion below. [In deciding whether to seek overseas support, ‘blockage’ is not a key issue. Rather, the key factors include: does the aggrieved party believe it to be in its strategic advantage to seek overseas support. This is far from true in every case, and will depend on a wide variety of factors, most importantly the likely responses of the home state. Second, does the group have the resources to seek overseas support, a matter discussed under the topic of ‘barriers to entry.’]

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organizational resources. Less obviously, there are indirect costs or risks to helping a new client. For instance, taking on the ‘wrong’ client or issue can sully the reputation of an NGO and exact serious costs (Jordan 2001; Power 2001). Transaction costs—incurred in gathering information about a new human rights issue, evaluating it, and deciding on responses--are also important. Finally, there are opportunity costs to the provision of support. To the extent that an NGO devotes itself to one cause, it cannot give as much to another. Given the costs and scarcity of international support, interactions between local groups and transnational NGOs cannot be viewed as purely altruistic. Rather, for analytic purposes, they are better modeled as market-like exchanges in which NGOs selectively aid local clients who in turn provide valuable if often intangible ‘goods’ to NGOs.4 No doubt these transnational interactions mix rational and moral elements. On one hand, the provision of aid has clear moral bases; but on the other hand, to understand where NGOs distribute their scarce resources, economic exchange plays a key role. Notably, the concept of ‘exchange’ has long been applied to social analyses outside the commercial realm and to transactions involving both tangible and intangible goods (Blau 1964; Waldman 1972; Tarrow 1998; Kalyvas 2003). To gain a deeper understanding of these exchanges and their implications for human rights activism, it is helpful to use basic economic tools long used to analyze commercial markets. In consumer markets, it is relatively easy to identify buyer and seller because the exchange involves a good or service for money. From that identification, one can then develop a demand curve, showing the buyer/consumer’s willingness to purchase a particular quantity of a product at a specific price, and a supply curve, illustrating the seller/producer’s willingness to produce a particular quantity at a specific price. By contrast, in the market for human rights support, such identification is more arbitrary. Is the ‘product’ the support sought by the local group? Or is it the local ‘client’ sought by the human rights NGO?5 In this article, I define it as the latter in large part because this emphasizes a crucial fact often overlooked in the literature on human rights: the agency of local oppressed groups. Based on this definition, I model the NGO as the ‘buyer/consumer’ of human rights issues, and those suffering abuses as the ‘sellers/suppliers’ of this ‘product’. It bears emphasis again that I make these analogies purely for heuristic purposes. I do not argue that local groups “produce” their own persecution or “manufacture” their oppression out of thin air. Often powerful actors, particularly states, mistreat and repress individuals and groups for a variety of reasons. What local groups do, however, some more successfully than others, is to draw attention to the abuses they suffer and to make their causes appealing to potential NGO supporters. In doing so, abused groups follow one pathway to the human rights market. Similarly, in describing NGOs as ‘buyers’ of human rights problems, I do not argue that they live off of other people’s repression. On the contrary, in many circumstances NGO activism has helped alleviate human rights problems. NGOs, however, are at least in part in the ‘business’ of supporting those suffering human rights violations. More generally, NGOs are one component of a vast nonprofit ‘industry’ competing against one another for scarce dollars and influence (Salamon 1997). One further conceptual note: in commercial usage, ‘buyer’ and ‘seller’ designations signify activity by both parties: sellers producing or distributing their goods; and buyers searching for goods to meet their needs. By contrast in the human rights realm, both the scholarly and policy literatures often view ‘victims’ primarily as objects of abuse, suggesting that they passively await aid (Roldán 2002). The word ‘victim’ itself carries this connotation. Yet it is clearly a misconception. Those suffering abuses seldom go quietly into the night. Rather they and their representatives not only resist abuses directly, but also clamor for help from the outside world. Regarding the latter, they use a variety of strategies, from issuing rhetorical appeals to taking actions designed to attract the international media (Kuperman 2004; Kalyvas 2003; Wolfsfeld 1996). Indeed, without some action by ‘victims,’ their plight will often not enter the human rights marketplace at all (Bob 2005). Moreover, as discussed below, their actions once in the marketplace strongly affect their ability to gain support. (Which groups can take these actions and why are 4 How then should they be seen? In situations of ‘tragic choice,’ some method must be chosen to allocate scarce goods. While a variety of mechanisms are theoretically possible, the most common mechanism, particularly where such choices are made in weakly institutionalized settings involving highly decentralized actors and serial decisionmaking, is a market (Calabresi & Bobbitt, 1978). 5 In this sense, the human rights market more closely resembles one involving barter of one good for another, rather than a good for money.

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critical questions discussed below.) Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) idea that local actors launch transnational ‘boomerangs’ calling for support therefore advances the literature. But it could also create a second misconception, that NGOs wait to be struck by appeal ‘boomerangs’ before intervening overseas. In fact in many cases, NGOs actively seek local clients to serve as exemplars of new campaign issues, as ‘test cases’ for novel claims, or simply as ‘poster children’ for the organization’s good works (Cohen, 1995). Thus, like buyers and sellers in commercial markets, both those suffering abuses and those offering succor must be seen as active participants in the transnational support market. Market Definition and Barriers to Entry An initial issue in studying any market is determining its extent: its geographic scope and product ‘range’ (Stigler & Sherwin, 1985). This determination is necessary not only for analytic but also for practical purposes: producers need to identify both their own market and the products they compete against in that marketplace. For human rights activism, where many NGOs demanding clients have international reach and where support may be provided through action in the NGOs’ home state (rather than in the distant site of violence), it is appropriate to think of a world market. The range of products included in a market typically hinges on the consumers’ willingness to consider the products fungible. With regard to human rights activism, although some NGOs have relatively narrow mandates, most define human rights issues generally. As long as violations fit within certain categories, in particular those defined by the ICCPR and to a lesser extent the ICESCR, they have the potential of gaining NGO support. The ICCPR and ICESCR are of course broad instruments, and therefore the precise boundaries of the human rights market are somewhat unclear (as is also often the case with consumer markets).6 As in other markets, there are ‘barriers to entry’ in the market for human rights activism. These barriers result from the fact that bringing alleged rights violations to market--making them known and attractive to key NGO buyers--is costly. There are a number of ‘factors of production.’ First information about violations must be elevated to the international level. While the costs of communication have fallen in recent years, for any particular incident of abuse to attract international attention remains difficult, timeconsuming and expensive. Some of the barriers are structural, unequally distributed, and difficult for particular local groups to overcome. For instance, groups from countries with higher international profiles, whether because of geostrategic importance, pariah status, sheer size, or some other reason, have an advantage in entering the market over those from less visible places. As a result of this advantage, groups from the former places need to expend fewer resources to enter the market than similarly oppressed groups from the latter (Wolfsfeld 1997). In addition to structural barriers, other barriers are strategic and potentially malleable by the groups themselves. Among these are the skills, knowledge, and framing that local groups use to project their causes (Bob 2005). A second production factor for local groups seeking to enter the human rights market involves collecting, analyzing, and converting basic facts about the abuse into a form easily intelligible to NGO decisionmakers. Typically, such work is seen as the job of human rights NGOs--as it in fact is. However, the NGOs’ work occurs after an abuse or a campaign has been launched. Often a local group seeking human rights assistance needs to undertake a similar, if more limited, process to gather sufficient credible facts to interest an NGO in its cause (Saro-Wiwa 1995). (Notably as well, to the extent it does so, the local group reduces the NGOs’ costs of investigation prior to a decision to support). As a third ‘production factor’, alleged abuses often require ‘packaging’ to make them more appealing to international audiences--so that they fit accepted definitions of ‘abuse’ (Stone 2001; Hilgartner & Bosk 1988) In a related vein, to make these ‘pitches’ most effective, abused groups need information about the identity, interests, and tastes of potential NGO consumers. Gathering this information, making contacts, and gaining access again consumes the resources of local groups. In sum, notwithstanding recent advances in communications and other technologies, barriers to entering the human rights market remain significant. Only groups with sufficient ‘capital’ will be able to do so. Here ‘capital’ refers to knowledge, money, and contacts for a group to make itself known to potential supporters overseas (Bourdieu, 1991). As between groups suffering similar violations, those with greater amounts of such capital will have an advantage in entering the human rights market. A lack of capital is not an absolute bar to entering the rights market. In some cases, rights NGOs make particular efforts to find ‘forgotten cases’ to support. But 6 See below for how this works.

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more typically, without sufficient ‘capital’, oppressed groups will be unable to search for outside support or will do so ineffectively, limiting their likelihood of entering the rights market and gaining NGO assistance. Before leaving the topic of entry barriers, its reverse side is also worth noting: groups that have already entered the human rights market and obtained support will have significant advantages over newcomers in maintaining their ‘market share’ of support. Already visible and already having ‘loyal customers,’ these causes may remain prominent for long periods, even as newer and equally important issues vie for market entry and support. . Supply and Demand Curves Even if the human rights market cannot be precisely defined, it is still possible to analyze it using economic tools. Some of the most basic and useful are supply and demand curves, constructed with ‘quantity’ on the x-axis and ‘price’ on the y-axis. In the human rights market, ‘quantity’ indicates the number of rights issues available for support. Note that this number may differ considerably from the number of violations actually occurring worldwide. Only those that NGOs know of and therefore can potentially intervene in can be considered to be ‘in the market’ at any particular time. In other words, the barriers to entry noted above significantly limit the number of violations available for human rights activism. In commercial markets, ‘price’ refers to the gross amount the buyer ‘pays’ and seller ‘receives’ for a good. As discussed above, both parties hope to reap benefits from transactions in the human rights market. Thus, price can be modeled as the gross amount of support the local group receives and the NGO provides. To facilitate theorizing, I assume that these amounts are the same. Note, however, that there are differences between these two values resulting from the fact that in the human rights market, an NGO seldom ‘pays’ the local group; rather the group receives an intangible benefit from the NGO’s support. Similarly, in the transaction, the NGO does not ‘purchase’ a tangible product; rather it too receives intangible benefits such as acclaim and recognition for its human rights work. Notably, the discrepancy between the benefits accruing to each party is not unique to the human rights market, however. Discrepancies occur as well in many commercial transactions (due to taxes, subsidies or other factors). Using these definitions, supply and demand curves may be constructed (Figure 1). The supply curve, S, shows the quantity of human rights issues that producers make available for a given amount of support. The higher the amount of support that NGOs are willing to provide, the more that local groups will ‘produce,’ that is, seek to project their causes overseas. Of course, domestic factors, ones largely out of the control of these groups, also play a critical role in determining whether and to what extent they will seek outside aid. These include the level of repression, the forms it takes, the extent to which it limits access to outside support, and the availability of domestic remedies. In addition, as discussed above, the cost of entry into the market also limits the supply of human rights issues. Holding the foregoing variables constant, however, the greater the amount of NGO support available the more that local groups will seek to project their causes overseas. For instance, in the environmental field, Carrie Meyer has described the growth of local ecology organizations in Ecuadorean villages when international actors suddenly made funds available (Meyer 1997; see also Bjornlund 2001). The social movement concept of political opportunities offers a broader formulation of this point. As political opportunities rise, the number of groups seeking support is likely to rise too (Tarrow 1998). This creates an upward sloping supply curve, familiar to students of elementary economics. The demand curve, D, shows the number of human rights issues that NGOs will support at a given price. Ceteris paribus, the higher the ‘price’ of support, the lower the number of local groups that NGOs will be willing to support; that is, the more costly it is to intervene in a particular situation, the lower the amount of support provided and the less likely that a particular client will be chosen. Conversely, the lower the cost of support, the more that NGOs will do so. This means that NGOs will be less likely to act on issues costing more to support directly, posing higher risks and offering fewer benefits to the NGO, requiring greater efforts to investigate, and exacting greater opportunity costs.7 Together this creates a downward sloping demand curve. This is not to say that NGOs will avoid intervention in big and costly issues. But it does suggest that, ceteris paribus, when NGOs triage among equally difficult issues, they are likely to support the ones whose ‘price’ is relatively low. This also suggests that as the price of support for one issue rises, NGOs are likely to increase their demand for other, cheaper issues. In economic terms, most human rights abuses are ‘substitutes’. It is of course true that NGO staff may develop personal ties to 7 See Conclusion for further discussion of how theseabstract principles play out in concrete terms.

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particular client groups and individuals, reducing the purely economic reasoning that might otherwise dominate decisions on supporting particular causes.8 But given the scarcity of NGO resources for support and given the scope of human rights needs worldwide, organizational considerations always play an important role. As in commercial markets, the human rights market will tend toward an equilibrium price at which the quantity supplied and demanded are equal. That equilibrium will change in response to various factors, both long and short term, that shift the supply or demand curves. In the long term, it is likely that in recent decades there has been a secular shift in the supply curve from S to S’ because the cost of key factors of ‘production’ has declined for groups suffering violations. For instance, recent innovations in transportation and communication technologies make it cheaper than in the past for those suffering abuses to make their problems known overseas. As a result, particular local groups can increase the number of their appeals, with little change in their costs. Meanwhile, others, previously unable to make appeals because of their costs, are drawn into the market. The cost of another production factor, information about major human rights NGOs, has probably also declined. Thanks to new media and communication technologies, it is probably easier than in the past for local groups and their representatives to know which NGOs to approach and how to do so. Notably, assuming a constant number of NGOs, NGO resources, and therefore demand, either one of these shifts in the supply curve would mean a greater number of groups gaining support but at a reduced ‘price’, i.e., the amount of aid that any one needy group receives would shift from P1 to P2. As suggested above, in recent decades the demand curve has probably also shifted outward with the explosion in NGO numbers since the 1950s (Smith, 1997; Keck & Sikkink, 1998) and consequent increase in international resources for those suffering human rights violations (Meyer, 1995; Bjornlund, 2001; McAdam, 1999). Putting this in economic terms, the demand curve has shifted outward from D to D’. As a result, we would expect NGOs to pay a higher price and more local actors to be supported. Ceteris paribus, the quantity of human rights issues made available internationally would have climbed higher along the supply curve (from Q1 to Q2). Combined with an outward shifting supply curve, it is likely that a new equilibirium has been reached at Pt. 4. In addition to long-term shifts in the supply and demand curves, short term changes are also likely. For example, a state’s decision to use repression against a domestic foe may create temporary shifts, suddenly and unexpectedly ‘flooding’ the market with new human rights ‘products’ (assuming at least some of the abused groups have sufficient resources to overcome barriers to entry). All things equal, such a short-term increase in supply is also likely to have a damaging effect on the value of NGO support provided to needy groups. As the number of needy groups and/or the degree of need shifts from Q1 to Q2, demand for them remains the same. As a result, the new equilibrium is at P2, where the new supply and continuing demand curves intersect. From the standpoint of any single abused group, this means that the amount of support they receive will decline. Of course, this assumes no change in NGO demand--a reasonable assumption in the short term but one which may not hold in the longer term. For instance, in response to crises, NGOs will usually seek to increase their resources. Moreover, at any one time, NGOs may have slack capacity, unused resources perhaps in the form of reserve funds that can be deployed when emergencies arise. Elasticity of Supply and Demand The price and quantity of human rights support will change based on other factors beyond shifts in the supply and demand curves. Another key factor is the shape of those curves, a matter which hinges on the elasticity of supply and demand. The price elasticity of demand measures the percent change in demand resulting from an increase in a product’s price (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 30). In general, price elasticity depends on the availability of close substitutes for a good. If there are many substitutes, price elasticity is high. Buyers will readily switch to substitutes as the price of a good increases. If there are few substitutes, demand is price inelastic and buyers will not switch as the price of a good rises. 8 Such ties--completely understandable as a result of any long term human relationship--may introduce ‘biases’ into the support decision. These biases in turn move the market away from its ‘normal’ operation on the basis of organizational considerations. Notably, however, they do not improve the ‘morality’ of the support market. Rather, they introduce personalistic reasons for favoring one group over another, rather than objective notions of need.

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In the human rights market, with large numbers of human rights issues, NGOs will have elastic demand curves with respect to price, especially in the long run but also in the short run. There are many substitutes for the ‘goods’ they seek—i.e., other equally abused groups. A purely economistic viewpoint would hold that as one becomes more ‘expensive’—that is, either the amount of support required increases or the risks of finding information about the group (or the costs to reduce those risks) increases—the NGO will move to another human rights issue (all things equal). Of course, such factors as personal ties and organizational inertia will slow these processes. Similarly, if the NGO views their existing client as part of a broader campaign which has yet to yield its payoff, it may be less likely to move to a substitute cause.9 But all else equal, NGOs are likely to shift to different causes as the price of supporting a particular one rises. There is one important exception. Occasionally, in the short run, NGOs will have inelastic demand curves with respect to price. For instance, they may have significant need for a particular type of human rights issue—perhaps to serve as a ‘test case’ or ‘poster child’ in an ongoing campaign. Thus the NGO will seek out and support a particular local group that meets the NGO’s immediate need even at high cost (in finding it—or providing resources). Notably again, however, this decision will hinge on the NGOs’ ‘needs,’ not necessarily on the needs of the abused group or the larger pool of abused groups that might potentially have been objects of NGOs support. (Of course, NGO decisions about starting particular campaigns will be made on the same combination of moral and organizational factors as the decision about which group to support.) What about the elasticity of supply by local groups seeking human rights assistance? Such groups will usually have inelastic supply curves with respect to key ‘production’ inputs, especially in the short run. That is, few will have the resources-- time, money, personnel, and knowledge--needed to mount a campaign for support at short notice. To the extent that any local groups do have such resources, the groups most likely to have them will be those with pre-existing connections to potential supporters (that is, those who have already overcome key barriers to entry). In the short term, such groups will have advantages over newcomers who are less likely to have the necessary expertise and contacts. Market Power In any market, the relative power of buyers and sellers depends on several factors. One of the most important is the number of buyers or sellers in the market, with small numbers of either creating market distortions. In the human rights market, there are large numbers of local actors with significant needs seeking support,10 but only a relatively small number of NGOs with limited resources providing it. This creates oligopsony conditions, leading to predictable results in the price and quantity of support supplied.11 In any oligopsony, buyers will purchase a smaller quantity and at a lower price than they would in a purely competitive market.12

9 In economic terms, this situation might be modeled as one in which NGOs have invested in a campaign and are continuing to pay costs into the campaign with hopes of realizing a final goal. Assuming such a goal has been realized, however, the NGOs’ previous support would be considered a ‘sunk cost,’ one that could not be recovered and therefore would not influence a later decision between supporting the earlier cause or some new one. 10 There are even larger numbers attempting to, but not yet succeeding in, entering the market. 11 A monopsony involves a single buyer in a marketplace. 12 This is the case because in a competitive market, the buyer takes the price as given by the seller. Price and marginal value are the same; that is, an NGO will support victim groups up to the point that the additional value or utility it receives equals its marginal cost in providing support. In such a case, the marginal cost will be the same as both the average cost and the price. An oligopsonist, however, purchases a good for a price below its marginal value. Because the average cost (supply) curve is rising, the marginal cost curve lies above it. The oligopsonist buys a quantity, where marginal cost and marginal value intersect, which will be further to the left on the demand curve (at a lower quantity than in a competitive market). Similarly, the oligopsonist will buy at a price lower than he would in a competitive market--based on the price level found on the supply (average cost) curve, which will be below the price in a competitive market (i.e., where supply and demand curves intersect).

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The degree to which this is the case, will hinge on the market power of the oligopsonist, which varies with several factors: the number of buyers, the interaction among the buyers (competition vs. collusion), and the elasticity of supply. With respect to the first two factors, the lower the number of buyers and the greater their collusion, the greater the oligopsony power. In the human rights market, there are a small but significant number of NGOs, thereby reducing the effects of oligopsony. On the other hand, some studies indicate that there are a handful of major ‘gatekeeper’ NGOs, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, whose choice of clients and causes sets the human rights agenda for smaller NGOs--even if this occurs without overt collusion (Bob 2005; cf. Wolfsfeld 1997). With regard to the third factor, elasticity of supply for human rights causes is low, as discussed above. This suggests that NGOs have significant market power vis-à-vis the local groups seeking their support.13 New human rights violations occur because of exogenous factors, primarily government violations, not because of action by the local groups. Moreover, in most cases ‘production’ of violations (i.e., making them accessible to the market) is slow, difficult, and competitive, notwithstanding new technologies and consequent shifts in the supply curve. As discussed previously, even existing violations cannot be brought to market quickly because factors of production do not allow this to occur rapidly. The effects of NGO market power are significant. Most importantly, NGOs’ power means that local groups seeking support must usually sell themselves, raising awareness about their claims and framing them to make themselves appealing to NGOs (especially gatekeepers with power to shape the interests and concerns of other NGOs). One exception to this hypothesis merits attention. As suggested above, local groups may enjoy significant market power in rare circumstances where NGOs are seeking a particular type of client for a particular campaign. Consumer (NGO) and Producer (Local Group) Surpluses The market model is useful in predicting how long local groups will search for and NGOs supply support. Here the economic concepts of consumer and producer surpluses are useful. In the following discussion, I first examine these concepts in abstract terms, assuming that both NGOs and support-seekers have perfect information. Below, I first lay out the concepts in admittedly abstract and unrealistic terms. Then, I examine a more realistic scenario involving incomplete or asymmetric information. As organizations interested in their own survival and growth, rational NGOs will have a price that they are willing to pay for involvement in a particular kind of human rights issue and in a whole array of issues (an annual budget). If the cost of intervention for a particular cause is at or below that price, the NGO will support it. In such a case, the NGO enjoys a ‘consumer surplus’. It will have ‘purchased’ a cause at a price below what it would have been willing to offer given its own interests and needs (the amount of the surplus equals the difference between what the NGO would have been willing to pay to provide support and what it in fact did pay).14 It is worth noting as well that because the demand curve is downward sloping, the NGO will gain the greatest benefit for the first human rights ‘product’ it purchases and lesser amounts for each additional one thereafter. When the benefit derived from the next client is equal to the actual price of supporting it, the NGO would be indifferent about supporting the case; when the benefit is less than the price, it would not do so. Summing the consumer surpluses of all NGO supporters, one can obtain the ‘aggregate consumer surplus’ in the human rights market. ‘Producer surplus’ measures a similar concept for the groups that bring their human rights problems to the attention of NGOs. Some of these groups are able to do so at a cost lower than the benefit they receive from NGO support. The groups therefore receive a benefit from the ‘production’ of this support which is equal to the difference between the cost of production and the value of support received. This is the group’s producer surplus. As in the case of consumer surplus, the more support that a group attracts, the less valuable the next unit of support will be. Therefore, a rational group with complete information would seek support only up to the point at which the costs of doing so will equal the benefits derived. If the cost of producing support exceeds its value to the local group, the latter would no longer seek it. Summing the producer surpluses of all groups receiving support, we obtain the ‘aggregate producer surplus’ in the human rights market. 13 If supply is highly elastic, the oligopsonist receives little benefit because the difference between average and marginal cost is small. But if the supply curve is relatively inelastic, the opposite is true. 14 In microeconomics, ‘consumer surplus’ is the difference between the maximum amount a buyer would be willing to spend on a product and the actual price spent (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2001).

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Thus far the foregoing discussion has assumed perfect information by both sides to the human rights exchange. As in any competitive market, however, information will never be perfect and there will be significant differences in information available to the groups demanding and the NGOs supplying international support. These differences create inefficiencies. Consider the situation of the groups seeking human rights assistance. Given the competitive market which they inhabit and the various internal and external motivations driving those who may support them, these groups cannot be sure of how much they will need to produce to secure support. Even when some support is secured, they also face a dilemma. They cannot be sure of the amount and continuity of support provided by an NGO. While they may receive signals from the NGO about its level of involvement—anything from the amount given, to personallyexpressed interest level--they cannot be certain that NGO support will continue, or will continue at current levels. Finally, it is seldom the case that abused groups can know when the costs of obtaining support exceed the benefits. As a result, they have an incentive to ‘over-produce’—to seek more aid than is economically efficient—because they do not know how much they will in fact receive or its value. This wastes resources, since the generation of more support and the maintenance of existing aid is costly. At a minimum it diverts scarce resources away from internal needs to the generation of external support. As a top East Timorese activist stated in 1999, explaining his group’s unpreparedness for self-government, ‘We have been so focused on raising public awareness about our cause that we didn’t seriously think about the structure of a government’ (Lynch, 1999). Moreover, such activity can be dangerous, if the local group seeks to generate greater resources through public protest or other mobilizations that typically will raise its international profile--but risk greater state repression. This point suggests one with broader significance for the human rights market concerning the problem of ‘moral hazard’. When one party is insured/supported by another and has control over information about its own behavior, it has an incentive to engage in risky behavior. In the human rights market, the problem arises for groups that are being supported by NGOs. In this situation, local groups will be tempted to taker greater risks if they believe that the NGOs will help support them (Kuperman 2008; Kuperman 2004). If this expectation is correct, then in any individual case, NGOs may expend more of their support on a particular case than they would have originally expected--or, alternatively, they may not in fact provide the support, leaving the local group at risk. Moral hazard affects more than particular NGOs. It also alters the ability of the entire human rights market to allocate resources efficiently. Groups that gain the support of human rights organizations may take more risks with repressive regimes and be less willing to compromise on key political issues than they would previously. These actions, logical from the standpoint of a group that believes itself ‘insured’ from major harm, have broader consequences, however. When repression comes and NGOs respond, they are diverting their scarce resources to an existing client. Other groups, whose underlying needs may be equal, will therefore have a smaller pool of human rights resources to tap; the supply of these resources will have declined, making it all the harder for them to secure support. Conclusion In the foregoing pages, I have presented, in abstract form, a market perspective on human rights activism. In doing so, I acknowledge that altruism plays a role in NGOs’ support decisions. But to better understand the particulars of support, I have emphasized the organizational and economic aspects of these decisions. Taking the market perspective provides new insights about a number of issues in human rights activism. First, there is the question of which groups seek overseas support and why. Keck & Sikkink (1998) argue that local groups will seek support from distant activists if domestic political channels are blocked, perhaps because a state is highly repressive or simply unresponsive. The market perspective takes a more catholic view: even groups not suffering domestic blockage may seek support; meanwhile many that are highly repressed will not be able or willing to do so. ‘Blockage’ alone is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain support. Instead, market forces better explains the support process. To be sure, some blocked groups do not have the ‘capital’ to enter the market or market themselves there--and often they will remain unsupported. Meanwhile, other groups suffering little if any domestic blockage will seek and gain overseas support, thereby bolstering their chances at home. A second implication of the market perspective concerns the human rights issues which gain traction internationally. Using organizational approaches, it can be seen that scarcity of resources may play a role in limiting NGOs’ very conception of what constitutes a ‘human rights’ violation. Observers and critics have long noted that economic and social rights have been relatively neglected by major NGOs in favor of a civil and political rights ‘core’. There are a variety of cultural and historical reasons for this,

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including lack of fit with existing NGO methodologies (Roth 2004) and with dominant Western ideas about ‘core’ human rights (Chandhoke 2004; Ignatieff 2001; Gutmann 2001; Alston 1984). However, it is also true that despite the breadth and vagueness of these international instruments, there are important social problems that may not (yet) be considered human rights violations. Groups suffering these problems face difficulties ‘breaking into’ the human rights market with their new ‘products.’ These grievances may not be defined as human rights issues and may therefore be ignored until the group succeeds in expanding or redefining the market (Bob 2008). Even within the human rights ‘core,’ resource scarcity circumscribes the number and identity of groups and individuals that NGOs can help (AlertNet 2005). As described in this article, ‘price’ will be a key consideration in a support decision. But the needs of local groups will be only one of many factors contributing to the determination of price. As Human Rights Watch (2001) has stated in explaining its decisions to become involved in certain cases but not others: The failure to include a particular country or issue often reflects no more than staffing limitations and should not be taken as commentary on the significance of the problem. There are many serious human rights violations that Human Rights Watch simply lacks the capacity to address. Other factors affecting the focus of our work … include the severity of abuses, access to the country and the availability of information about it, the susceptibility of abusive forces to outside influence, the importance of addressing certain thematic concerns, and the need to maintain a balance in the work of Human Rights Watch across various political divides. Clearly, this publicly circulated document indicates that Human Rights Watch uses a number of factors other than need in determining where to devote its scarce resources.15 In some cases, a local group’s need will co-vary with these other factors; but in other cases, it will not. Indeed, following the logic of this article, it is likely that those least able to enter the market and those whose causes have the highest ‘price’ will receive less support than other human rights issues. To conclude, the argument here is not that human rights activism can be reduced to economic principles alone. Even in commercial markets that is seldom the case. The claim here is more modest and analytic: thinking about human rights activism in market terms can open new insights about gaps between human rights rhetoric and reality. While there may be several possible ways to understand how an NGOs’ support decisions are made, the concept of ‘price’ in a human rights marketplace offers a useful means of doing so. References AlertNet, 2005. Tip Sheet: How to ‘Sell’ Forgotten Emergencies. Reuters Foundation. Available online at http://www.alertnet.org/thefacts/reliefresources/112849858584.htm, accessed March 15, 2006. Alston, Philip, 1984. ‘Conjuring up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control,’ American Journal of International Law 78 (1984), 607-21. Amnesty International, 2004. ‘Globalizing Justice! Amnesty International Integrated Strategic Plan 20042010,’ Toolkit 3. Available online at http://www.amnesty.org.nz/Publicdo.nsf/bf25ab0f47ba5dd785256499006b15a4/fada703607576556cc256d 080016acfa/$FILE/ISP.htm#_Toc30575023, accessed July 19, 2004. Andreasen, Alan R., 1995. Marketing Social Change : Changing Behavior to Promote Health, Social Development, and the Environment. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Bjornlund, Eric, 2001. ‘Democracy Inc’, Wilson Quarterly Summer: 18--24. Blau, Peter M., 1964. Exchange and Power in Social Life. New Brunswick: Transaction Books. Bob, Clifford, 2002. ‘Merchants of Morality’, Foreign Policy 129: 36-45. 15 It is likely that other considerations play a role as well but are not mentioned because of potential repercussions for the NGO (see generally Calabresi & Bobbitt 1978).

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Bob, Clifford, 2005. The Marketing of Rebellion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bob, Clifford, ed. 2008. The International Struggle for New Human Rights. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Bourdieu, Pierre, 1991. Language and Symbolic Power. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Byman, Daniel, 2001. Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements. Washington: RAND Corporation. Calabresi, Guido & Philip Bobbitt, 1978. Tragic Choices. New York: W. W. Norton. Chandhoke, Neera, 2004. Conceits of Civil Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Clark, Ann Marie, 2001. Diplomacy of Conscience: Amnesty International and Changing Human Rights Norms. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Cohen, Stanley, 1995. The Impact of Information about Human Rights Violations: Denial and Acknowledgment. Jerusalem: Centre for Human Rights, Hebrew University. Cooley, Alex & James Ron, 2002. ‘NGO Scramble: Transnational Action and Organizational Survival’, International Security 27(1): 5-39. Florini, Ann M., ed., 2000. The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society. Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange; Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. French, James, 2005. The Economy of Prestige: Prizes, Awards, and the Circulation of Cultural Value. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Gutmann, Amy, 2001. ‘Introduction’, in Michael Ignatieff, 2001. Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry. Princeton: Princeton University Press (vii-xxviii). Hertel, Shareen, 2006. ‘New Moves in Transnational Advocacy: Getting Labor and Economic Rights on the Agenda in Unexpected Ways,’ forthcoming in Global Governance. Hilgartner, Stephen & Charles L. Bosk, 1988. ‘The Rise and Fall of Social Problems: A Public Arenas Model’, American Journal of Sociology 94: 53-78. Hockenos, Paul, 2003. Homeland Calling: Exile Patriotism and the Balkan Wars. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Hoge, Warren, 2004. ‘Rescuing Victims Worldwide 'From the Depths of Hell,'’ New York Times, 10 July. Human Rights Watch, 2002. ‘Introduction,’ in Human Rights Watch World Report 2001. http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/intro/index.html (accessed May 18, 2004). Ignatieff, Michael, 2001. Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Jordan, Grant, 2001. Shell, Greenpeace and Brent Spar. New York: Palgrave-MacMillan. Kalyvas, Stathis N., 2003. ‘The Ontology of ‘Political Violence’: Action and Identity in Civil Wars’, Perspectives on Politics 1(3): 475-94. Keck, Margaret E. & Kathryn Sikkink, 1998. Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

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Khagram, Sanjeev, James V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds., 2002. Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Kuperman, Alan J., 2008. ‘The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans.’ International Studies Quarterly 52: 49-80. Kuperman, Alan J., 2004. ‘Humanitarian Hazard: Revisiting Doctrines of Intervention.’ Harvard International Review 26: 64-8. Lynch, Colum, 1999. ‘Timor Fears Trojan Horse in Indonesia Independence Offer.’ Interview with Constancio Pinto. Boston Sunday Globe, Feb. 7, 1999, A3. McAdam, Doug, 1999. Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970, 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Meyer, Carrie A, 1995. ‘Opportunism and NGOs: Entrepreneurship and Green North-South Transfers’, World Development 23(8): 1277-1289. Pindyck, Robert S. and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 2001. Microeconomics, 5th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. Power, Jonathan, 2001. Like Water on Stone: The Story of Amnesty International. Boston: Northeastern University Press. Risse, Thomas, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds., 1999. The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Robinson, Piers, 2000. ‘The Policy-Media Interaction Model: Measuring Media Power During Humanitarian Crisis’, Journal of Peace Research 37(5): 613-633. Roldán, Mary, 2002. La Violencia in Anioquia, Colombia, 1946-1953. Durham: Duke University Press. Ron, James, Howard Ramos, & Kathleen Rodgers, 2005. ‘Transnational Information Politics: NGO Human Rights Reporting, 1986-2000’, International Studies Quarterly 49(3): 557-587. Roth, Kenneth, 2004. ‘Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by an International Human Rights Organization’, Human Rights Quarterly 26: 63-73. Saideman, Stephen M., 2002. ‘Discrimination in International Relations: Analyzing External Support for Ethnic Groups’, Journal of Peace Research 39(1): 27-50. Stephen M. Saideman, 2001. The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy, and International Conflict. New York: Columbia University Press. Salamon, Lester, M., 1997. Defining the Nonprofit Sector: A Cross-National Analysis. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Saro-Wiwa, Ken, 1995. A Month and a Day: A Detention Diary. New York: Penguin. Schulz, William F., 2001. In Our Own Best Interest: How Defending Human Rights Benefits Us All. Boston: Beacon Press. Sell, Susan K. and Aseem Prakash, 2004. ‘Using Ideas Strategically: The Contest between Business and NGO Networks in Intellectual Property Rights’, International Studies Quarterly 48(1): 143-175.

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Smillie, Ian and Larry Minear, 2004. The Charity of Nations: Humanitarian Action in A Calculating World. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press. Smith, Jackie, 1997. ‘Characteristics of the Modern Transnational Social Movement Sector’, in Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield, & Ron Pagnucco, eds, Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press (42-58). Smith, Jackie, Charles Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco, 1997. Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity beyond the State. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. Stigler, George J. & Robert A. Sherwin, 1985. ‘The Extent of the Market’, Journal of Law & Economics 27(--): 555-585. Stone, Deborah, 2001. Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decisionmaking, rev’d ed. New York: W. W. Norton. Tarrow, Sidney, 1998. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tarrow, Sidney, 2005. The New Transnational Activism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Terry, Fiona, 2002. Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Waldman, Sidney R., 1972 Foundations of Political Action: An Exchange Theory of Politics. Boston: Little, Brown. Weissman, Fabrice, ed., 2004. In the Shadow of ‘Just Wars’: Violence, Politics and Humanitarian Action. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Willetts, Peter, 1996. ‘The Conscience of the World’: The Influence of Non-Governmental Organisations in the UN System. Washington: Brookings Institution. Willetts, Peter, ed., 1982. Pressure Groups in the Global System: The Transnational Relations of IssueOriented Non-Governmental Organizations. New York: St. Martin's Press. Wolfsfeld, Gadi, 1997. Media and Political Conflict: News from the Middle East. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Zelizer, Viviana A., 2005. The Purchase of Intimacy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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FIGURE 1.

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