Matchings with Externalities and Attitudes

Simina Brânzei Aarhus University, Denmark Joint with Tomasz Michalak, Talal Rahwan, Kate Larson, and Nicholas Jennings

Matchings Intensely studied class of combinatorial problems:

One-to-One: The stable marriage problem One-to-Many: House allocation problems, assigning medical interns to hospitals Many-to-Many: Most labor markets, friendships

Externalities Also known as transaction spillovers Third parties are influenced by transactions they did not agree to

Positive externalities: Education, immunization, environmental cleanup, research Negative externalities: Environmental pollution, smoking, drinking and driving

Externalities in Matchings Matchings are a natural model for studying externalities Agents influenced not only by their own choices (matches), but also by the choices that other agents make Existing work in economics assumes agents have a different utility for every state of the world Can bounded rational agents reason about such games? ➢ Succinct model of externalities in matchings (polynomial-size preferences in the number of agents)

Model Let G = (M, W, Π) be a matching game, where M and W are agents on the two sides of the market Denote by Π(m, w | z) the influence of match (m, w) on agent z (if the match forms) The utility of an agent z in matching A is: u z , A=



 m , w ∈ A

 m , w∣z

Model Stability is a central question in game theoretic analyses of matchings Given a game, which matchings are such that the agents don't have incentives to (i) cut existing matches or (ii) form new matches? The stable outcomes depend on the solution concept used ➢ This work: pairwise stability and the core

Solution Concept Core Stability Given a matching game G = (M, W, Π), a matching A of G is core-stable if there does not exist a set of agents B ⊆ N, which can deviate and improve the utility of at least one member of B while not degrading the others. N ? B

Solution Concept Deviation Each member of a deviating coalition B must perform some action: either sever a match with an agent in N, or form a new match with an agent in B

Response Given matching A and deviation A' of coalition B, the response Γ(B, A, A') defines the reaction of the agents outside B upon the deviation

Solution Concept Stability A matching is stable if no coalition can deviate and improve the utility of at least one member while not degrading the other members in the response of N \ B How will society respond to a deviation? The deviators need to estimate the response of the residual agents (which may be intractable)

Attitudes Optimism: Deviators assume the best case reaction from the rest of the agents; hoping for the formation of matches good for the deviators and removal of all bad matches (attitude à la “All is for the best in the best of all the possible worlds”) Neutrality: No reaction (the deviators behave as if the others are not going to do anything about the deviation) Pessimism: Worst case reaction (deviators assume the remaining agents will retaliate in the worst possible way)

Attitudes

Many other definitions possible:

Contractual: Assume retaliation from agents hurt by the deviation, and no reaction from the rest Recursive core (Koczy): when a coalition deviates, the residual agents react rationally (maximize their own payoff in the response)

Many-to-Many Matchings Empty Neutral Core

xn

Δ

Δ

Δ

The complete matching is Pareto optimal, but unstable The empty matching may be stable depending on ε, Δ -ε -ε x1 y1

Δ

yn

Many-to-Many Matchings Empty Neutral Core (II) The complete matching is a tragic outcome for everyone; may be stable depending on ε, Δ +ε



xn

y1 -Δ





x1



yn

Many-to-Many Matchings The cores are included in each other

Pessimistic Core Neutral Core

Optimistic Core

Many-to-Many Matchings

Core

Optimism

Membership

P

Nonemptiness

NP-complete

Neutrality

Pessimism

coNP-complete coNP-complete NP-hard

NP-hard

Many-to-Many Matchings Theorem: Checking membership to the neutral core is coNP-complete. Proof (sketch): ➢



Show the complementary problem is NP-complete Given I = (U, s, v, B, K), construct game G = (M, W, Π) and matching A such that A has a blocking coalition if and only if I has a solution

Many-to-Many Matchings

A = {(m2, w2), (m1), (w1), (x1), …,

x1

y1

xi

yi

m1 m2

i

xn

-B -ε

) ui v(

coalition ↔ I has a solution

-s (u )

(xn), (y1), ..., (yn)} has a blocking

yn w1

ε K-

w2

One-to-One Matchings Known as the stable marriage problem ➢ the Gale-Shapley algorithm used to compute stable outcomes

The Core with Externalities: ➢



Without externalities, the core is equivalent to the pairwise stable set The equivalence between pairwise stability and the core no longer holds with externalities

One-to-One Matchings with Externalities Moreover, under arbitrary Π values, even a pairwise stable solution does not always exist

Empty Neutral Pairwise Stable Set +1

m1 m2

-1

w1 w2

One-to-One Matchings with Externalities

However, a pairwise stable matching under neutrality and pessimism always exists when Π is non-negative. ➢ Run Gale-Shapley by ignoring externalities and breaking ties arbitrarily

One-to-One Matchings with Externalities Pairwise Stable Set

Optimism

Neutrality Pessimism

Membership

P

P

P

Nonemptiness

NP-complete

P

P

Core

Optimism

Neutrality

Pessimism

Membership

P

coNP-complete

coNP-complete

Nonemptiness

NP-complete

NP-hard

NP-hard

Discussion More refined solution concepts – interesting line of work in economics (e.g. the recursive core) Externalities in social networks ➢ On platforms such as Facebook, agents are influenced by the matchings of others (friendships, subscriptions) ➢

Such cumulative effects can be expressed with additive models, but what is the right solution concept for bounded rational agents in such settings?

Matchings with Externalities and Attitudes

Optimism: Deviators assume the best case reaction from the rest of ... matches good for the deviators and removal of all bad .... Externalities in social networks.

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