Thinking Skills and Creativity 8 (2013) 34–44

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Moods, emotions and creative thinking: A framework for teaching Douglas P. Newton ∗ Durham University, School of Education, Leazes Road, Durham DH1 1TA, UK

a r t i c l e

i n f o

Article history: Received 19 March 2012 Received in revised form 28 May 2012 Accepted 30 May 2012 Available online 30 June 2012

Keywords: Emotion–creativity interaction Teaching framework

a b s t r a c t When planning and teaching, attention is generally given to cognition while the effect of mood and emotion on cognition is ignored. But students are not emotionless thinkers and the effect can make a difference to their thought. This is particularly evident when attempting to foster creative thinking. This article draws on research to describe aspects of creative thought and problem-solving, moods and emotions, and some of their interactions. It uses these to construct a framework to help teachers of students at all levels plan for, think about, manage and mediate creative thinking in classrooms. The framework takes into account the flow of changing moods and emotions as tasks progress and accommodates individual thinking and collaborative group work. Implications for practice and teacher training are considered. © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction Thinking has a variety of goals and some are highly valued for what they can do for the thinker and for others (Craft, 1999; Pink, 2005; Shaheen, 2010; Sharp & Le Métais, 2000). Creative thought is one of these (Newton, 2012a). Commonly, emotions are seen as primitive responses which can impede thought (Ragozinno, Km, Hassert, Minniti, & Kiang, 2003) but creative thought, particularly in the arts, tends to be the exception with high creativity being popularly linked with emotional excess (Averil, Chon, & Hahn, 2001; Gino, Agote, Miron-Spektor, & Todorova, 2009; Russ, 1996; Sternberg, 1985). However, the subtle and complex interaction between emotions and creative thought is common and needs no excess. Nevertheless, it has tended to be ignored by those whose work bears on teaching and learning (Adler & Obstfeld, 2007; Hargreaves, 2000). Immordino-Yang and Damasio (2007: 3) contend that this is a serious omission as, ‘we feel, therefore we learn’. A teacher’s success in fostering creative thought could be greater if the teacher gave some attention to the ‘feeling’ involved in learning. This account describes some of the interactions between moods, emotions and creative thought and draws out some implications for the teacher. It begins with a short description of creativity then outlines emotions, moods and related states. These are brought together in an account of some studies of their interaction which are then used to suggest a framework to support the development of creative thinking skills. 2. Creativity Popularly, creativity is seen as something you either have or do not have and, if you have it, it reveals itself spontaneously and inexplicably (Sternberg, 2006). Like other thought, creativity rests on unconscious processes but it is neither mystical nor ineffable (Osborne, 2003). Carruthers (2002: 226) has pointed out that ‘anyone who is imagining how things could be other than they are will be thinking creatively’. Nevertheless, creative behaviours are complex, drawing partly on an ability

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to associate or generate combinations of previously unconnected ideas to produce something more or less novel or original, at least to that person (Nassif, 2004). Novelty alone is not sufficient; it must be associated with appropriateness, plausibility, fitness-for-purpose or rightness-of-fit in the eyes of others (Amabile, 1996; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; Newton, 2010, 2012a; Siegesmund, 1998). Achieving these ends involves conscious and unconscious decisions on both the micro and macro scale (Sternberg, 2006). For instance, when painting, Matisse appeared to work in a rapid, continuous manner but slow-motion film shows he hesitated before each brush stroke, presumably as he decided what to do (Merleau-Ponty, 1964). Novelty and appropriateness may be achieved in a variety of ways but some may be particularly clever, elegant well-crafted, simple or economical (O’Quin & Besemer, 1989), commonly seen as a desirable quality which Glück, Ernst, and Unger (2002) have called impression. The precise terms used depend on the domain. In science, for instance, explanations of the world are fairly tightly constrained by scientific plausibility and parsimony. Generating a scientific explanation is often called problem solving. In art, on the other hand, the ‘problem’ is much less constrained and, while a representation must have a rightnessof-fit and be rewarding in some way, the process is rarely described as problem solving, although it could be cast in that form. Similarly, the weight afforded each attribute can vary with the domain. For instance, artists may value originality of subject more than rightness-of-fit while many architects value appropriateness (for them, function) more than originality (Glück et al., 2002; Newton & Donkin, 2011). Cropley (2001) and Craft (2008) also add the desirability of wise and ethical creativity. While some product or solution may be novel, what gives rise to it is a process. Perlovsky and Levine (2010) argue that this has its distant origins in the evolution of the ability to represent the world mentally and to manipulate these representations to fit changing circumstances. Some forty thousand years ago, this ability blossomed as humans, perhaps with the help of language, exploited the creative process in their art and technology to make it ‘one of the most striking features of the human species’ (Carruthers, 2002: 226). On this basis, most people have the potential to be creative but it may not be equally distributed or well-developed (Boden, 2004). Governments in the West, and increasingly elsewhere, see economic advantage in workplace creativity (see e.g., Sharp & Le Métais, 2000). To gain that advantage, teachers are widely urged to foster creativity across the curriculum (see e.g., DfES, 2003; Milne, 2007; Newton & Newton, 2010; Park, Soo-Young, Oliver, & Cramond, 2006; QCA, 2005; Tan, 2000). At the same time, a creative, non-conformist disposition is seen as encouraging democratic attitudes, at least as they are defined by UNESCO (2006). But, creativity can be suppressed or stifled by educational practices which avoid and discourage it, or by cultures which value other abilities more (Averil et al., 2001; Craft, 2002; Garner, 2007). At the same time, novelty, appropriateness, elegance and their relative importance may be different in different cultures (Al-Karasneh & Saleh, 2010; Niu, 2009; Sofowara, 2007). For instance, the Confucian tradition has generally given more weight to appropriateness than to novelty (Averil et al., 2001). With an increasingly global economy and shrinking world, such differences can matter in education as various cultures come together for learning and trade. However, they should not be taken to imply that one cultural group is innately less creative than another or that there are no differences in creative dispositions within an otherwise homogenous group. Not everyone sees widespread creativity as something which is good (Cropley, Cropley, Kaufman, & Runco, 2010). Osborne (2003), for instance, believes a profusion of novel products will make life unstable, unsettling and socially disturbing. On the other hand, fostering a creative disposition can also be of direct, personal benefit to learners insofar as it equips them to cope successfully with new situations and solve problems – in short, it gives them a life skill (Newton, 2012a). This, alone, would be a worthwhile outcome. However, teachers’ conceptions of creativity tend to be narrow and lack differentiation and specificity. While most recognise that novelty is an attribute, they can be unclear about other attributes and the variety of creative opportunities in specific curriculum contexts (Newton, 2012b).

3. Emotions, moods, dispositions and traits Emotions are mental states arising from personal evaluations of the world which prompt a readiness to act in support of well-being (Damasio, 2000; Oatley & Jenkins, 1996). Episodes of emotion, like fear at the sight of a snake, are generally produced by a specific event, person or object and have a relatively short duration ranging from seconds to hours. Such emotions can produce rapid responses without recourse to conscious thought but with evident survival value (Frijda, 2004; Lahikainen, Kirmanen, Kraav, & Taimalu, 2003; LeDoux, 1989, 2000; Plutchik, 1980). Moods, however, generally refer to low intensity diffuse states which can last from hours to months. Isen (1993) suggested that moods have a self-regulatory function which provides information about one’s general state of being relative to the world (see also, Hullett, 2005). Some states, like depression and anxiety, can be very long lasting and may be described as dispositions or traits (e.g., George & Zhou, 2002; Madjar & Oldham, 2002; Oatley & Jenkins, 1996). People often learn that certain kinds of events generally threaten or promote their well-being. This knowledge can produce a more or less sustained state of readiness to respond to events in a particular way (Frijda, 1986). For instance, most know that examinations matter so feel anxious as one approaches. In effect, emotions provide information about the environment and, in particular, can reflect the perceived nature of a task in its context (Frijda, 1988; Schwartz & Clore, 2003). Of course, the intensity of the emotion varies from person to person, as does how well each copes with it. For some, it can be disabling and generate long-term academic problems (Richards & Hadwin, 2011). Feelings refer only to the private experience of mental states and cannot be observed by someone else (Damasio, 2000). Emotions, moods, dispositions and traits, however, are wider and include effects which might be noticed by, for instance, a teacher.

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Although these mental states may be distinguished by duration, it is a loose distinction. While moods can be more enduring than emotions, Lazarus (1991) has pointed out that some moods are fleeting and readily displaced as the situation changes. This has particular relevance for the creative or problem solving process which extends over time. During such an event, emotions and moods can develop and change in what has come to be called the stream or flow of affective experience (e.g., Vandekerckhove & Panskepp, 2009; Watson, 2000). Emotions, moods, dispositions and traits can all shape creative thought (Mumford, 2003) but, in the normal course of classroom events, strong emotions may be less evident than moods, dispositions and traits in the stream of affective experience and it is moods that are more susceptible to change in that flow of experience. Affective experience can be classified in various ways. A long-standing division has been according to their hedonic tone, that is, their association with pleasant or unpleasant feelings. Happiness and joy, for instance, have pleasant, positive hedonic tones; sadness and depression have unpleasant, negative hedonic tones. It is also possible to be in a neutral state which, nevertheless, may have consequences for thought (Diener & Lucas, 2000). Moods and emotions have also been divided into those which activate and those which deactivate. Thus, happiness and anger are activating while serenity and sadness are deactivating. A third division is into those which prompt approach and those which prompt avoidance, often referred to as promotion and prevention focused moods, respectively. Happiness, sadness and frustration, for example, tend to produce approach while serenity, fear and anxiety produce avoidance. This means that each mood can be more or less pleasant, more or less activating and more or less directing at the same time (Baas, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008). Responses to moods and emotions (or, at least, their expression), vary with people and culture. Those in some Eastern societies, for instance, have been described as reserved (Chon, Kim, & Ryoo, 2000; Hahn, Lee, & Ashton, 1999) but so have some in the West at certain times and we should not assume that such differences are permanent or universal within a particular society. As Averil et al. (2001) have pointed out, the prevailing norms of a society and the process of enculturation shape people’s behaviour and these vary with time and place. 4. Moods and creative thought interacting Plato talked of the rational mind struggling to master the emotions, like a charioteer with an unruly horse, while Aristotle put the emotions to use in persuasive argument (Kristjánsson, 2007; Sokolon, 2006). Care is needed, however, as ´ ␪о␨, commonly translated as ‘emotion’, may not be entirely synonymous with what emotion means to us (Konstan, ␲␣ 2006). Aristotle, for instance, did not include happiness amongst his emotions and Rosenwein (2010) illustrates similar difficulties in understanding emotional expression in history. For example, ‘love’ of a leader in medieval times can mean that most agree with the leader. Consequently, Rosenwein describes history as a succession of emotional communities, each with more or less overlapping understandings of emotion. Nevertheless, interpretations of the past influence those who inherit it. Descartes in the seventeenth century cut firmly between reason and passion (Damasio, 1994). This helped to shape the ethos of what followed so, for instance, Thomas Jefferson saw American independence as demonstrating that reason alone is what counts (Lehrer, 2009). Kant (1785/2002) took this to its limit and made morality a matter of logic. Not all agreed. Hume (1739/1978) argued that ‘passions’ have the prime role in directing affairs, although they may be modified by reason. Deutscher (2011) has demonstrated that neither Hume’s nor Kant’s views are entirely tenable in their extreme forms and that reason and emotion are not separable. Lehrer (2009, 20) goes further: ‘If it weren’t for our emotions, reason wouldn’t exist at all’. This is not to say that emotion has been ignored in education. For instance, while Bloom’s 1956 taxonomy of educational objectives began with the cognitive domain, the affective domain was added later but the interaction of the domains was of little concern at that time. Anderson and Krathwohl’s revision of the taxonomy acknowledged the involvement of affect but is confined to the cognitive domain (Moseley et al., 2005). 4.1. Task context Adler and Obstfeld (2007) consider moods and emotions to be central to motivation and whether there will even be creative engagement with a task. They point to the importance of how the task is framed, enjoyment and interest being more relevant for those in positive moods while task importance and the need for a high quality outcomes being more significant for those in negative moods. For those in a positive mood, satisfaction tends to come from the task’s intrinsic interest, agreeableness and the generation of many solutions. At the outset, happy participants tend to look for opportunities for these sources of satisfaction. If these are not evident, they alter the task to supply them (Hirt, Devers, & McCrea, 2008). For those in a negative mood, satisfaction is in the recognition and reward they believe will come from success (e.g., Gasper, 2004; George & Zhou, 2002; Kaufman, 2003; Kaufman & Vosberg, 1997; Vosberg, 1998). At the same time, participants are often subject to a controlling regime. If this is one of coercion, obligation, punishment, comparison with ‘better’ performers, and fine control of action, there is likely to be stress, anxiety and stifled creativity (Adler & Obstfeld, 2007; Avey et al., 2011). Substituting autonomy for constraint tends to encourage creative behaviours probably because of the freedom it gives to imagination and the exploration of ideas (Hon, 2012). Perhaps counter-intuitively, offering high quality products as exemplars tends to reduce novelty and stimulate copying, particularly for those who are inclined to be adventurous with ideas, like those in a positive mood. Rook and van Knippenberg (2011) suggest that pointing out the potential gains of a good

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idea with the help of weak ideas, products or solutions could encourage more adventurous thought. Nevertheless, although careful meta-analyses of many studies confirm such findings, there are enough exceptions to indicate that this is not the full story (e.g., Baas et al., 2008; Davis, 2009).

4.2. Thinking on task Positive moods have often been found to promote creative thought and problem solving (e.g., Fredrickson, 2004; Hirt et al., 2008; Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987; Isen, Johnson, Mertz, & Robinson, 1985; Kaufman, 2003; Vosberg, 1998). One explanation is that such moods are consistent with a situation that is benign, safe and open to unguarded exploration, experimentation and play. Attention is broad and thinking flexible and divergent and the number and quality of ideas is greater. Positive moods also reduce concerns about being judged, something which can suppress creativity. These positive mood effects, however, tend to decline as time passes and they can predispose people to accept less than optimum solutions (e.g., Clore, Gaspar, & Garvin, 2001; Fiedler, 1988; Fredrickson, 2001; George & Zhou, 2002; Grawitch & Munz, 2005; Kaufman, 2003; Schwartz, 2001; Schwartz & Clore, 2003). Negative moods are not necessarily inimical to creative thought; they can help to produce solutions in complex problem solving situations but thinking strategies are often different from those induced by positive moods. For instance, those in a negative mood have been found to give more attention to collecting information to use in solving a problem than those in a positive mood (Spering, Wagener, & Funke, 2005). In some circumstance, a negative mood can produce greater creativity than positive moods. The mood induced by social rejection, for example, has been found to increase the creativity of those engaged in artwork (Akinola & Mendes, 2008). Negative moods tend to produce cautious, focused, close attention; thinking becomes convergent, analytical, careful, systematic, persistent and concerned with detail and can produce well thought-out ideas (e.g., Gasper, 2004; George & Zhou, 2002; Fredrickson, 2004; Kaufman, 2003; Martin & Stoner, 1996; Schwartz, 2001; Schwartz & Clore, 2003). In other words, there is the potential for creative success in both moods but the character of that success may be different (Spering et al., 2005). Some effects of moods are explained by other theories. According to the level of activation view, the capacity for complex thought increases as the level of mental arousal increases but only up to a point. After that, more intense arousal takes mental resources away from the task to attend to the source of arousal or its effects. At some optimum level, which may be different for different people, the potential for creative thought is greatest (De Dreu, Baas, & Nijstad, 2008), an effect which is also notably evident with children (Russ & Grossman-McKee, 1990). A skilful analysis by Baas et al. (2008), however, found that the effects of mood on creativity were explained better by combinations of theories. In particular, the interplay of activation and self-regulation can predict many of the observed effects. For example, happiness is both activating and promotion focused and so favours an engagement with the task which could be productive, probably aided by happiness’s ability to widen attention and increase flexibility of thought. Sadness, on the other hand, is promotion focused but deactivating so does not favour an engagement with the task. Anxiety, while being activating, is prevention focused and induces avoidance so also fails to support creativity.

4.3. Promoting productive thinking The creative situation, however, is not constant. Amongst other things, there are times for generating ideas, for evaluating ideas, for adjusting and refining ideas, for testing ideas, and for starting again. Whatever the mood at the outset, it may change in a stream of affective experience. At times, the mood may not produce the kind of thinking best suited to the current needs (e.g., Kröper, Fay, Lindberg, & Meinel, 2011). For instance, successfully generating promising solutions to a problem may be exhilarating but those now need careful, detailed evaluation. Similarly, a failed idea may be depressing but now new ideas are needed. Some people can change their moods themselves (Averil et al., 2001; Phelps, 2006). In the absence of successful self-regulation, a team leader or supervisor may try to manage events to sustain productive thought. When creativity is expected in the workplace, being treated with kindness, respect and dignity (what George (2007) referred to as interactional justice) coupled with an acceptance that creativity is never certain, encourages expansive thought and risk taking. Supervisors who show interactional justice and are receptive to ideas encourage others to make the most of their thinking, whether moods are positive or negative (George, 2007). George also found that ‘developmental feedback’ could help people make the most of their current mode of thought: those in a positive mood are encouraged to engage in expansive thinking and to generate ideas, those in a negative mood are encouraged to use their systematic, bottom-up thinking to make progress. Complex as this is, it may not be the full story. Adler and Obstfeld (2007) have pointed out that research may be biased towards studies of successful creativity and away from failed creativity. At present, there is also a greater interest in experiments on creative thinking in the workplace than in the classroom. This means that care is needed in extending such findings to other contexts. While they could be very useful for informing the teaching of older students (particularly those learning in ‘authentic’, real-world situations), care is needed when applying them to younger learners who may not think or respond in entirely the same way. Nevertheless, there are good indications that children’s responses broadly reflect those of adults (Rader & Hughes, 2005).

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Fig. 1. A framework for thinking about fostering creativity and problem solving in teaching and learning contexts.

5. Some lessons for the teacher Various strategies have been used to support the creative process ranging from collections of useful ideas, such as that of Bowkett (2007), to systematic tools like the Theory of Inventive Problem Solving (TRIZ; Altshuller, 2000). Between these is de Bono’s Cognitive Research Trust (CoRT) programme with its well-known Six Thinking Hats strategy (e.g., de Bono, 1995). This directs attention to particular kinds of thought seen as needed at a given time. For instance, ‘Time to wear a White Hat’ indicates that more information needs to be collected to inform further thought. The Red Hat refers directly to affect and allows the thinker to express feelings about ideas without the need to justify them. de Bono (1987) believes that emotions change the brain’s chemistry so that a different brain is doing the thinking, thereby bringing diversity to thought aimed at solving a problem. At times, this could be true but the stream of affective experience may also produce an emotion which closes down productive thought. Studies of CoRT’s thinking tools show they are often enjoyed although their effectiveness is less clear except, perhaps, for learners with Special Educational Needs (Moseley et al., 2005). Less well-known is Hurson’s (2008) Productive Thinking by Design, a sequence of steps through the design process, each offering ‘tools and techniques’. Here, emotion (as discontent with the present) is seen only as a motivator. Strategies for supporting creativity could benefit from a consideration of the stream of affect. Fig. 1 depicts the typical components of creative activity in this way. 5.1. A framework for thinking about creativity and problem solving The institution and the teacher generally establish a regime to facilitate learning, represented in Fig. 1 by the allencompassing learning situation. This can vary widely but reflects, amongst other things, the institution’s goals and the teacher’s beliefs about learning and how to achieve it. Regimes may, for instance, be relaxed or coercive or both at different times. Given that creativity does not thrive on anxiety, fear of failure, pressure for quick solutions, micro-management, or a fixation with information acquisition, oppressive or coercive regimes may reduce opportunities for creative thought (Adler & Obstfeld, 2007). Within the learning situation, the teacher often selects and sets the task. Creativity tasks in the classroom are rarely like those of laboratory investigations which may, for instance, ask people to create as many origami bird models as possible (e.g., Fischer et al., 2007). Instead, they are usually embedded in a curriculum context with success measured by what counts as novelty, appropriateness and elegance in that context. Teachers need to know what these mean in each domain they teach. Each learner brings various mental attributes to the task, including knowledge, know-how, capacities, habits, dispositions, attitudes, values and emotions and moods. Teachers are usually very aware of the moods generated in previous lessons: students may arrive discontented, bored and frustrated from dull lessons or immoderately elated after a badly managed lesson. Such moods affect attention, perception and the recall and use of knowledge and know-how. Subsequent engagement with the task produces its own ‘stream of affective experience’ which interacts with thought. For instance, problem finding (as opposed to having a problem supplied by the teacher) and solving can generate intense emotional experiences, possibly due to the amount of personal investment (Ritchie, Shore, LaBanca, & Newman, 2011). Even very young children find and solve problems. One child wanted to write that she was four-and-a-half years old. She could write the four but not the half but she solved the problem by depicting a half of the figure four next to the first four and was proud of her solution (Worthington & Carruthers, 2003). Fig. 1 does not mark off matters of affect sharply from matters of cognition to emphasise that cognition may not be without affect and its very elements are often be coloured by it (Heyward, 2010; Willis, 2007).

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1. Know creativity

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2. Recognise emotions and moods

3. Construct a Frame

4. Consider the Situation

5. Think about the Learners

6. Negotiate the Stream

Fig. 2. Working with moods and emotions while fostering creative thinking.

There may be individual and group creativity (indicated in Fig. 1 by overlaid learners). In group work, happy people are generally more cooperative than unhappy people (Hom & Arbuckle, 1988). Of course, that mood may change as the stream of affective experience takes a different course. The moods of group members also interact. In particular, the mood of a dominant member can spread to others and can suppress or support creative thought. Apathy, for example, can be contagious and adversely affect the quality of creative outcomes, if any are produced at all (Hood, 2008). Group composition is also important and some children are unhappy if they must always work in a group. There are times when people feel that we could be more productive working alone. 5.2. Working with the stream of affect The creative process involves various kinds of thinking and can be untidy. To compound this, each thinking hat, to use de Bono’s expression, may be worn in a variety of moods thereby multiplying the thinking conditions many times over. In other words, what a teacher faces is potentially much more diverse than is generally recognised. How might the teacher handle this? Two possibilities suggest themselves. The first is to take a broad view and simply make the most of whatever the stream of affect brings. The second is to attempt a sensitive management of the stream. Both, however, may benefit from some preliminary preparation. In particular: 5.2.1. Know creativity What counts as creativity depends on the context or domain, such as history or science or art. Some notions of creativity are vague, narrow and flawed and could adversely affect what a teacher provides and supports (see, e.g., Newton, 2012b). While, in general, we might look for novelty, appropriateness and elegance, a teacher needs to be more specific and know what these mean in a given context. They also need to know what does not count as subject-specific creativity. For instance, a teacher may need to know that opportunities for scientific creativity include generating explanations of the world and constructing practical tests of them. At the same time, the teacher should know that following instructions to make a Solar System model probably involves little creativity, at least as defined here (Newton & Newton, 2009). Similarly, in Art, a teacher should know that splashing paint around in new ways is not enough, there must be some rightness-of fit (Newton & Donkin, 2011). 5.2.2. Recognise emotions and moods Most of us can identify powerful emotions like anger, fear and elation. Moods, however, can be more difficult. They tend to reveal themselves through body language and the tone of verbal responses. Some ‘mood watching’ may help a teacher develop an awareness of moods and their flavour amongst their students. Mature students are often able and willing to disclose how they feel but young children are less likely to be able to label their moods. To begin with, limiting attention to hedonic tone (e.g., feeling good, feeling low) simplifies things. Judgments of intensity could be added later (e.g., feeling very good, feeling a little low). Planning and practice draw on this preliminary preparation. Fig. 2 shows this schematically. 5.2.3. Construct a frame How a task is framed is likely to shape how students feel about it. Interest underpins a lot of positive emotion and can broaden thinking and prepare learners for generating ideas (Willis, 2007). Interest stems from, for instance, self-relevance,

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curiosity, mysteries, and challenges which develop competence (Astleitner, 2000; Newton, 1990). The effect is even stronger with children (Baas et al., 2008). Allowing freedom of thought and action also fosters creative thinking as in project work when the exploration of a topic is given to the student (Ritchie et al., 2011). 5.2.4. Consider the situation Over time, students tend to develop feelings about a subject or teacher which they bring with them and which colour their thinking. In the relatively recent past, some teenagers saw school music as boring and useless. They would arrive feeling resentful and truculent. Unsurprisingly, the typical music teacher was often ‘a martinet, short on temper and quick on the pre-emptive strike’ (Ross, 1975: 185). This, of course reinforced the negative moods of the students. Older students will also bring moods with them. Roy (2007, 221) described her ‘terrifying’ experience of high school practical science in Canada. She felt she was expected to find the ‘right’ answer and the sooner the better. The learning situation generated such powerful, negative emotions that it seriously impeded learning and made her dread the next session. The teacher did nothing to alleviate it. Creativity does not thrive on anxiety, fear of failure or pressure for quick answers (Adler & Obstfeld, 2007). Teachers acquire habitual ways of organising learning activities and should consider if they are likely to inhibit creativity. 5.2.5. Think about the learners Each learner brings emotions and moods. If the students arrive discontented, bored and frustrated or immoderately elated, it can affect productive thought. Teachers may resort to coercion and suppression to ensure compliance but produce a situation inimical to creative thinking. Learners also respond in different ways. How young children view and interact with the world changes as they mature and this may materially affect their creative disposition. For instance, children play and this can exercise divergent thinking and generate positive moods. While they may be imaginative and generate lots of unusual ideas, these are likely to be concrete and often, from an adult’s point of view, inappropriate. At the same time, children can have poor self-control and may be more readily deflected from a task by moods and emotions. More controversially, some argue that brain development affects creative behaviours in teenagers, who, they argue, lack empathy, are impulsive, prone to risk taking, and seek autonomy and sensation in attempts to activate strong emotions (Giedd, 2008; Payne, 2010; Sercombe, 2010). Overly strong emotions are obstacles to task-related attention, flexible and divergent thinking. On the other hand, a craving for autonomy could be used to advantage in project work. Whether or not these stem from brain development, or lack of it, matters less than that the teacher recognises these tendencies in their practices. Recognising moods and allowing for differences can, therefore, be useful. Teachers should also consider how their own dispositions are perceived by others. Moods are infectious so a teacher can present a demeanour which makes moods worse. At times, a teacher will organise students into groups. Being able to collaborate in problem solving is a useful skill which can benefit from a positive mood as this fosters cooperation. Negative moods, however, are contagious, particularly if evident in a dominant student (Johnson, 2008). To compound this, a disengaged student can stimulate responses in a teacher which increase disengagement (Skinner & Belmont, 1993; Sutton & Wheatley, 2003). One tactic would be to join the group and, in effect, become the dominant member for a while. Some students may also need to learn how to work in a group, showing consideration for others, listening and thinking about what is suggested. Intense emotions tend to interact adversely with cognition. Shaping moods needs moderation to avoid such emotions. Someone who frequently exhibits uncontrollable emotions may need specialist help. Tasks which threaten to expose low ability or sensitivities publicly, can generate anxiety and fear which impede creativity and, instead, generate coping, selfimage preserving strategies (Thompson & Perry, 2005). Asking students to write a poem and read it to the class could lead to task avoidance, prevarication, or deliberately writing nonsense in order to avoid the risk of ridicule. Such responses can be avoided with forethought. 5.2.6. Negotiating the stream The creative process can benefit from particular states of mind. At some points, a free and easy feeling may help to generate ideas; at others, serious consideration of alternatives may produce the best outcome. Ways of working with the stream of affect could vary from going with the flow to controlling it. Going with the flow means accepting the prevailing mood; after all, moods do not last forever (although they may outlast a lesson). Doing nothing failed for Roy (2007) but it need not be like that. Some teachers intuitively compensate for adverse interactions between thinking and moods. Roy pointed to another teacher who accepted ‘mistakes’ as normal and patiently provided stress-free time for more expansive thought. Similarly, faced with students who are somewhat low, a teacher going with the flow could emphasise the seriousness of the task and the importance of the outcome. With students who are more positive, the teacher may have to focus attention on the quality of their more prolific ideas. When ideas are thin on the ground, the teacher might hint at other possibilities. At the other extreme is the production of particular moods in learners using, say, emotive pictures. Deliberately inducing moods in this way could be risky in the classroom; it tends to be confined to experimental studies where there is effective provision for mood repair afterwards. Sometimes, however, emotions and moods are the intended outcome of learning and Immordino-Yang (2011) describes the use of stories which evoke emotions like sadness, compassion and pity and enable discussion of such feelings in their context. Between these are strategies like those which people use themselves to control their moods, consciously or otherwise. Even children as young as 5 or 6 years show awareness of some of them (Davis et al., 2010) although children may not always use them well and can make emotions like anxiety worse by their actions (Carthy, Horesh, Apter, & Gross, 2010).

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It seems reasonable to help students use such strategies to manage their moods so that they gain from the opportunities provided. Particularly effective for changing negative to positive moods are behavioural strategies which involve physical activity, such as a short period of exercise, tidying, non-competitive play. Relaxation through, for instance, deep breathing, relaxing the body, having a short break, or taking two minutes of quiet time, can have the same effect. Even acting as if you are in the desired mood can be useful. Thought alone can also be effective as when thinking of something more congenial, thinking about a past or future happy event (What will you do next weekend? How will you feel?). Distraction from an unsupportive mood also has a useful effect and music can be used in that way (see, e.g., Augustine & Hemenover, 2009; Carthy et al., 2010; Davis et al., 2010; Parkinson & Totterdell, 1999; Schnall & Laird, 2003; van Goethem & Sloboda, 2011). But even helpful moods do not last forever and may need to be refreshed by, for instance, a short break or change of activity, a (moderate) use of humour or simply suggesting, ‘Let’s relax for a couple of minutes’. Some of these will be more acceptable in some contexts than others but teachers should not forget their own powers of persuasion through modelling–moods are catching (Bettencourt, Gillett, Gall, & Hull, 1983; Mackintosh & Mathews, 2003; Willis, 2007). Such strategies should not be applied indiscriminately. If the prevailing mood is already appropriate, they can alter it for the worse (Augustine & Hemenover, 2009). Perhaps counter-intuitively, announcing incentives for good performance tends to narrow thinking which may be useful for weighing options but can close down idea generation (De Dreu, Nijstad, & Baas, 2011). Urging students to suppress, inhibit or vent a mood is ineffective in changing a mood (Augustine & Hemenover, 2009). Some students, however, can regulate their own emotions so that drawing their attention to the need for a mood change can work (Forgas & Vargas, 2000). In other words, supportive feedback need not be confined to matters of cognition. Older students, collectively, may be able to manage moods themselves. For example, undergraduates learning about the nature of science were given pictures of large rocks on the flat, lifeless floor of a dry lake bed in Death Valley, California. Tracks stretched away from the rocks – the rocks had moved. What caused it? After some very frivolous suggestions, one student said, ‘OK, seriously!’ Now in a moderately cheerful mood, they began to suggest plausible explanations. When these were collected for evaluation, the mood spontaneously became serious and the thinking analytical. 6. Concluding considerations Teachers are widely expected to foster creative thinking in their students. This needs an understanding of creativity in specific curriculum contexts, how it can be affected by moods and what they might do about it. But thought and mood are not the only things which affect creativity; the quality of support, resources, sources of distraction and personalities also matter. When dealing with moods, however, there may need to be a consideration of ethical matters. In particular, is it right to manipulate moods? Probably few would argue against helping someone feel happy but most would pause at deliberately making someone sad, particularly when that is a trusting child. Social rejection, for instance, can promote artistic creativity but it is generally not an acceptable strategy in a classroom. However, ‘Without attempting to alter the child’s basic emotional character, educators may select learning activities that maximise educational progress’ (Levinson, 1999: 206). Nevertheless, a teacher needs to guard against inducing excessive emotional or lasting negative moods in learners. At the same time, we should not assume that mental peculiarity is inimical to creative thought. Popularly, creativity tends to be associated with mental disturbance, epitomized by the artist, Van Gogh. There seems to be some foundation for the belief. Studies in various (Western) countries have found that those with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder and depression are over-represented in artistic occupations and creative activities. It is suggested that creativity gives these people a feeling of well-being (Galvez, Thommi, & Ghaemi, 2009; Kyaga, Lichtenstein, Boman, Hultman, & Långström, 2011). Children with bipolar disorder also tend towards higher levels of creativity (Simeonova, Chang, Strong, & Ketter, 2005). Severe emotional disabilities, however, are generally better left to experts. If teachers are to mediate and manage task engagement with reference to emotions, it would help if they are able to recognise emotions and moods but can they do it? Recognising emotions and moods in others is a part of what some call emotional intelligence. Goleman (1995) is of the view that expert teachers have it. There is evidence that the ability to recognise some emotions in facial expressions is at least partly innate but develops and widens with experience. There can be very high levels of recognition of emotions such as anger, fear, sadness and surprise from facial expression and vocal tone (Keltner, Ekman, Gonzago, & Beer, 2003; Scherer, Johnstone, & Klasmeyer, 2003). The ability varies, however, from person to person and is generally better when observing those who are known well and from familiar cultures and socio-economic groups (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2003; Elfenbein, Marsh, & Ambady, 2002). This suggests that teachers will have some ability to recognise emotions in their students, particularly if they know them well. However, moods can be milder and more diffuse than such emotions and could be more difficult to recognise. D’Mello, Taylor, Davidson, and Graesser (2008), in seeking to make their electronic ‘AutoTutor’ responsive to the users’ emotions, tested two ‘accomplished’ teachers’ abilities to recognise the emotions of such users and did not find them to be reliable. These teachers, however, were only two in number, they were not familiar with the users and no vocal clues to moods were reported. It was found subsequently that providing training with Ekman’s Facial Action Coding System (Ekman & Friesen, 2003) greatly improved emotional recognition (Graesser et al., 2006). This suggests that teachers are likely to have some ability at emotion and mood recognition, particularly when working with students they know. Even when the ability is not strong, it may be open to development through practice and training. Given that moods and emotions are central to thinking and action and give them particular forms, they should not be ignored by teachers attempting to foster thinking skills. Teachers need to consider their potential effects in their planning, in the learning atmosphere they provide, and in how they negotiate the flow of affective experience. Rarely mentioned

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in teacher training, or only tied to class control, moods and emotions should be more evident in learning how to teach and to foster creative thinking. At present, a pedagogical vocabulary for discussing mood/emotion/cognition interaction is undeveloped and is needed. Studies which explore and test teaching strategies for the effective management of this interaction are also needed. For those whose pre-service training is apprentice-like and entirely or largely school-based, becoming aware of the need and acquiring the vocabulary, knowledge and skills could be difficult when practices do not already exist in schools. In other words, this is another instance of the need for a kind of teacher training where introducing new knowledge and practices in education is made possible, as it can be in research-informed training in a university.

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