CAUSE NO(s). 742 THE STATE OF TEXAS, Plaintiff, v. Jan Patrick Baker, Defendant in Error.

§ § § § § § §

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TERRELL COUNTY, TEXAS 63rd JUDICIAL DISTRICT DUNS number: 006848369

RESPONDENT’S SPECIAL APPEARANCE AND MOTION TO QUASH AND DISMISS THE INDICTMENT – 2ND AMENDED

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: COMES NOW Jan Patrick Baker, appearing specially and not generally, in his common law capacity and of common right as one of the People of Texas and Defendant in Error (“Baker”) in the above styled and numbered cause and files this Motion to Quash and Dismiss the Indictment against him, and for cause would show the Court as follows:

I. NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT. Baker stands charged by a one (1) count indictment, however, the body of the Indictment instrument alleges no specific offense or class of offense under any specific code, nor any specific details comprising the necessary elements of an offense, therefore, Baker can only guess as to what specific charge and classification is being made against him based solely upon other conflicting documents in his possession and relative to the matter that may or may not have any force of law as to determining or providing him with proper Notice of the specific classification of charge that is actually being made against him. In which case, Baker’s best guess as to what Page 1 of 1

the State is accusing him of is EVADING ARREST OR DETENTION, pursuant to Section 38.04(b)(2)(A), Texas Penal Code, a third (3rd) degree felony. The indictment alleges that “on or about” the 13th day of March, 2015, the Defendant: [did then and there intentionally flee from Russell Weatherby, a person the defendant knew was a peace officer, to wit: a Texas Department of Public SafetyHighway Patrol Division Trooper attempting to lawfully arrest or detain the said JAN PATRICK BAKER, and JAN PATRICK BAKER did then and there use a vehicle while the said JAN PATRICK BAKER was in flight]. (Emphasis added).

II. LEGAL OVERVIEW. All citizens accused of any crime have the right to adequate notice of the specific charges under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and article 1, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution.1 These constitutional guarantees require a defendant to be given notice of the “nature and cause” of the accusation against him so that he may prepare a defense, and plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of further prosecutions for the same offense.2 The requirement of notice “with sufficient clarity and detail” is designed to “enable the defendant to anticipate the State's evidence and prepare a proper defense to it.” 3 “[T] he accused is not required to anticipate any and all variant facts the State might hypothetically seek to establish.” 4 1

In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948); Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948); Moff v. State, 154 S.W.3d 599, 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Garcia v. State, 981 S.W.2d 683, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). 2

Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974); Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-764 (1962); Garcia v. State, 981 S.W.2d at 686 (Meyers, J., concurring); Moore v. State, 473 S.W.3d 523, 523 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971). 3

Garcia 12. State, 981 S.W.2d at 685 (citing Eastep v. State, 941 S.W.2d 130, 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)).

4

Brasfield v. State, 600 S.W.2d 288, 295 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980), overruled on other grounds by Janecka v. State, 739 S.W.2d 813, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Drumm v. State, 560 S.W.2d 944, 947 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).

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The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure implements and supplements these constitutional requirements and provides guidelines by which to measure the sufficiency of an indictment. For instance, under Article 21.03, “[e]verything should be stated in an indictment which is necessary to be proved.” Article 21 .04 requires that the “certainty required in an indictment is such as will enable the accused to plead the judgment that may be given upon it as a bar of any prosecution for the same offense.” 5 And Article 21.1 1 states that “[a]n indictment shall be deemed sufficient which charges the commission of the offense in ordinary and concise language in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is meant, and with that degree of certainty that will give the defendant notice of the particular offense with which he is charged...” Under Article 27.08 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, exceptions to the substance of an indictment can be raised where “it does not appear therefrom that an offense against the law was committed by the defendant” and “it contains matter which is a legal defense or bar to the prosecution” (emphasis added). Defects of form can be raised under Article 27.09 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, although a defect of form should not render an indictment insufficient unless it "prejudice[s] the substantial rights of the defendant." See Article 21.19. Defects of substance and form can result in a dismissal of an indictment or require an amendment of the indictment. See, e.g., Articles 28.07 and 28.09 to 28.1 1 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The issue of “[w]hether an indictment fails to charge an offense at all is an entirely different issue from whether the indictment fails to provide adequate notice.” 6 5

This statutory requirement of “certainty” is “distinct from, and independent of, the constitutional requirement of adequate notice.” Garcia v. State, 981 S.W.2d at 685 n.3 (citing G. Dix & R. Dawson, Texas Criminal Practice and Procedure § 20.104 (1995); 2 W. Lafave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 19.2(b) at 445446 (1984). 6

Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 399 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Olurebi v. State, 870 S.W.2d 58, 62 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).

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III. LEGAL GROUNDS FOR RELIEF. Baker objects to the lack of a proper verified criminal complaint, which was required to be filed prior to the prosecutor seeking an indictment. Baker objects to the lack of a proper Information, which was required to be filed prior to the prosecutor seeking an indictment. Baker objects to both the form and the substance of the indictment. Baker believes that, besides being retaliatory and baseless, the indictment is factually insufficient in that “it does not appear therefrom that an offense against the law was committed by the defendant” and “it contains matter which is a legal defense or bar to the prosecution,” (emphasis added), thus, it fails to allege an offense under Article 27.08 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

III-A. NO PROPERLY VERIFIED AND FILED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT AND INFORMATION INVALIDATES THE INDICTMENT. Baker is being made to answer for an infamous crime of which no one has properly accused him of committing. Therefore, the State of Texas is unlawfully and illegally restricting him at his liberty and seeking to prosecute him without authority or jurisdiction. Baker was charged by indictment only, succeeded solely by a warrant of arrest issued from the Office of the District Court Clerk. However, there is no proper statement of probable cause or verified Complaint in the court record to support the issuance of any warrant or to provide a prosecutor with the necessary authority to create and file the required Information with any court having jurisdiction, much less with a grand jury, and which Information is also missing Page 4 of 4

from the court record. “[i]t is fundamental that the name of the complaining witness is a necessary requisite to a valid indictment or information.” EX PARTE BOB LEWIS, 1976.TX.41549; 544 S.W.2d 430, (12/22/76) (emphasis added). Absent a valid Complaint there is no complaining witness against Baker for the purpose of filing an information or seeking an indictment. The prosecution has stated that the Affidavit for Warrantless Arrest made by Texas Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) Highway Patrol Division Trooper Russell Weatherby (“Trooper Weatherby”) before Justice of the Peace for Precincts 1 & 2, Corina Arredondo (“J.P. Arredondo”) serves as the Complaint in this matter. However, Baker believes that instrument has a severe legal deficiency of form and substance that invalidates it both as a proper probable cause statement for a warrant and as a proper Complaint. The statement of probable cause for the warrant does not list a single substantive fact setting forth any of the required elements in support of the charge being made against Baker. It lists only the statute that was allegedly violated and nothing more, which means the warrant is basically blank and devoid of any factual assertions whatsoever supporting probable cause as well as in the specifics and manner in which it fails to “[s]tate the time and place of the commission of the offense, as definitely as can be done by the affiant” (emphasis added). There are no specific details as to the time and place of the alleged offense stated within the affidavit for warrantless arrest, which is what D.A. Hernandez states is being used as the required Complaint. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 21.03 requires that “As a general rule, any element that must be proved should be stated in an indictment. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 21.03 (Vernon 1989); Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 338 (Tex Crim.App.1995); Ex parte Elliott, 746 S.W.2d 762, 764 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). This rule

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applies to an information. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 21.23 (Vernon 1989).” 7 There are also no such details in the Information required to be filed by the prosecuting attorney for the state, because D.A. Hernandez has never filed an Information in this case neither prior to nor after having unlawfully and illegally obtained this secret Indictment from the grand jury in violation of Art. 16.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Baker’s due process right to an examining trial. The affidavit of warrantless arrest filed by Trooper Weatherby is factually deficient and incapable of providing any probable cause for a warrantless arrest, and it should never have been signed and approved by a magistrate as a valid Affidavit for Warrantless Arrest, and brings into question the judicial competency of J.P. Arredondo for having signed it as it currently reads. And there should be no question that it fails to meet the statutory and due process requisites of a valid complaint in that alleges no specific facts relating to the specifics of the alleged offense. It is neither possible nor plausible that D.A. Hernandez is not aware of these highly obvious legal deficiencies in the Affidavit/Complaint, therefore, the only logical conclusion is that he simply doesn’t care. Perhaps it is because he is so focused on obtaining an indictment and conviction of Baker, in violation of his legal duty under Article 2.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure “[n]ot to convict, but to see that justice is done,” that he is willing to overlook such petty details in his pursuit of ‘justice.’ It may even be, proverbially, to simply get Baker “out of his hair” so as to put a stop to Baker’s efforts of exposing the rampant public corruption in Terrell County Texas. Corruption that couldn’t remain in existence if the sitting D.A. was doing his job, or, unless he was complicit in it.

7

Green v. State, 951 SW 2d 3, Tx.Ct.Crim.App (1997).

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It cannot be stressed enough that the current cause raises significant questions about how the grand jury came to indict Baker. If the cause was initiated by the grand jury, then what person thereon had personal knowledge that Baker allegedly committed some crime, and by what method does that person avoid the civic duty of filing a proper Complaint before someone authorized to take and verify such a Complaint? If the grand jury did not come by this knowledge on its own via one of its members, but, rather, by way of the prosecuting attorney, then the prosecutor must be viewed as the actual accuser in the matter. Especially considering that D.A. Hernandez once again failed to properly perform his known legal duty under the law before seeking an indictment (an act that is itself a direct criminal violation of Texas law), which was to prepare a proper information based upon a properly verified and formatted substantive complaint, attach said complaint to the information, and submit both to some proper magistrate in accordance with Article 2.05 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. However, if such is the case, it creates an untenable conflict with the ends of justice and the rights of Baker. In Peter B. Peterson v. STATE TEXAS (12/20/89), 1989, TX.41854; 781 S.W.2d 933, the court held that a prosecutor cannot be the sole initiator of a criminal prosecution, especially one where s/he would be the prosecutor in the matter, when the court stated: “An information is a "primary pleading in a criminal action on the part of the State," Article 27.01, V.A.C.C.P., a written pleading in behalf of the State drawn, filed and presented by a prosecuting attorney charging an accused with an offense that may be prosecuted under the law. Article 21.20, V.A.C.C.P. in order to "protect its citizens from the inherent dangers arising from the concentration of power in any one individual," Kennedy v. State, 161 Tex. Crim. 303, 276 S.W.2d 291 (1955) (Opinion on Motion for Rehearing, at 664), the Legislature precluded a prosecutor from presenting an information "until affidavit has been made by some credible person Page 7 of 7

charging the defendant with an offense," and also mandated, "The affidavit shall be filed with the information." Article 21.22, supra. Such an affidavit is, of course, a complaint within the meaning of Article 15.04, V.A.C.C.P. "In other words, a prosecuting attorney is not authorized to institute prosecutions in the county court upon his independent act or of his own volition." Kennedy v. State, supra, at 294. One may not be "both the accuser and the prosecutor is misdemeanor cases." Wells v. State, 516 S.W.2d 663, at 664 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974). Compare Glass v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 598, 288 S.W.2d 522 (1956); Catchings v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 342, 285 S.W.2d 233, at 234 (1955). If the Indictment alone is to be considered the charging instrument, then where is the jurat required for verification? As none appears on the face of the instrument, the Indictment can only be presumed to serve as a mere presentment by the grand jury consequent to having either been provided with, or having themselves submitted to the prosecuting attorney for the state, a properly filed Complaint. So, whose affirmation is verified on the face of the Indictment? In State of Texas v. Carroll Pierce the Court held: "A valid complaint is a prerequisite to a valid information. Holland v. State, 623 S.W.2d 651, 652 (Tex. Cr. App. 1981). Without a valid complaint, the information is worthless. Williams v. State, 133 Tex. Crim. 39, 107 S.W.2d 996, 977 (Tex. Cr. App. 1937). A jurat is the certificate of the officer before whom the complaint is made stating that it was sworn to and subscribed by the Applicant before the officer. Carpenter v. State, 153 Tex. Crim. 99, 218 S.W.2d 207, 208 (Tex. Cr. App. 1949). A jurat is essential, for without it, the complaint is fatally defective and will not support an information. Shackelford v. State, 516 S.W.2d 180, (Tex. Cr. App. 1970). The jurat must be dated and signed by the official character. See 22 Tex. Jur. 3d, Criminal Law, Section 2266 at 490. Thus, a complaint not sworn to before any official or person in authority is insufficient to constitute a basis for a valid conviction. Nichols v. State, 171 Tex. Crim. 42, 344 S.W.2d 694, (Tex. Cr. App. 1961) (citing Purcell v. State; 317 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Cr. App. 1958)); see also Eldridge v. State, 572 S.W.2d 716, 717, n.1 (Tex. Cr. App. 1978); Wheeler v. State, 172 Tex. Crim. 21, 353 S.W.2d 463, (Tex. Cr. App. 1961); Morey v. State, 744 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. App. 1988, no pet.). Even where the jurat on the complaint reflects that it was sworn to before a named person but does not show the authority of such person to act, the complaint is void. Johnson v. State, 154 Tex. Crim. 257, 226 S.W.2d 644, (Tex. Cr. App. 1950); Smola v. State, 736 S.W.2d 265, 266 (Tex. App. Page 8 of 8

1987, no pet.). The complaint is also void when the jurat contains no signature but only shows the office such as "County Attorney of Jones County, Texas." Carter v. State, 398 S.W.2d 290, (Tex. Cr. App. 1966). When a jurat showed that the complaint had been sworn to before "Lavern I. McCann, Hockley County, Texas," the complaint was insufficient to support the information. Carpenter v. State, 218 S.W.2d at 208-09. In the early case of Neiman v. State, 29 Tex. Civ. App. 360, 16 S.W. 253 (Tex. Ct. App. 1891), the complaint was sworn to before "Wm. Greer J.P." It was held that the letters "J.P." could not be inferred to mean Justice of the Peace and an official who had the authority to administer the oath." (Emphasis added). "When a jurat on a complaint shows that the oath was administered to the Applicant by a party designated as county attorney but who in reality is an assistant county attorney, the complaint is void. Thomas v. State, 169 Tex. Crim. 369, 334 S.W.2d 291, 292 (Tex. Cr. App. 1960); see also Aleman v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 265, 284 S.W.2d 719, (Tex. Cr. App. 1956); Stalculp v. State, 99 Tex. Crim. 279, 269 S.W. 1044, 1045 (Tex. Cr. App. 1925). When the assistant or deputy is authorized by law to administer the oath himself, he may not administer it in the name of his principal and may not certify that the principal administered the oath by and through him as an assistant. Goodman v. State, 85 Tex. Crim. 279, 212 S.W. 171 (Tex. Cr. App. 1919)." State of Texas v. Carroll Pierce (09/25/91), 1991.TX.41404; 816 S.W.2d 824. (Emphasis added). If the instrument was prepared and presented to the grand jury by the prosecutor, who then is the actual accuser in the matter, and by what authority did the prosecutor initiate a prosecution solely by presentment of an already prepared Indictment or simply an oral presentation to the grand jury? To avoid situations where the State stands as both accuser and prosecutor, procedures were put in place directing the grand jury as to how it would proceed through the course of an indictment. In the current cause, these procedures have been abridged in such a fashion so as to deny Baker in his fundamental due process rights, specifically, his right to know and face his accuser, right to an examining trial, and the right to challenge the array of grand jury members prior to their impanelment. Page 9 of 9

III-B. RETALIATORY AND INCORRECT CHARGE. Baker has previously objected to the Indictment due to it being facially invalid in that it alleges specific facts relative to the elements of the alleged offense that are patently incorrect and untrue. However, Baker was misinformed by not only his own attorney, but also by 83rd District Judge Robert Cadena (“Judge Cadena”) and 63rd District Court Judge Enrique Fernandez (“Judge Fernandez”), and local District Attorney Frederico Hernandez (“D.A./ D.A. Hernandez”) (who is also the initiator8 of this criminal allegation and the prosecutor in this matter), that the facts alleged in the Indictment don’t have to be exactly accurate in order to be valid. Baker believes this to be not only intentional misinformation as to the requisite accuracy and validity of the Indictment, but a knowing willful and wrongful effort to undermine his right of due process and “custom tailoring” of the facts that the prosecution must prove at trial. Baker remains steadfast in his objection that the Indictment alleges specific facts that the prosecution is fully aware are untrue and are exculpatory on their face. On or about April 2, 2015, the contents of the court record were examined. At which time County/ Court Clerk Martha Allen faxed D.A. Hernandez an answer to a communication with the subject “Re: Request for Examining Trial” and stating what was currently filed in the court record. At that time, five (5) items were in the court record; 1) Order appointing counsel, 2) Notice of withdrawal of appointed counsel, 3) Demand for an examining trial, 4) Demand to produce, 5) PR bond.

8

As no criminal complaint appears to have ever been filed before D.A. Hernandez in this matter, coupled with his failure to properly prepare and present an information to the proper court or to the grand jury as required by the provisions of Article 2.03 of the Code of Criminal Procedure prior to his seeking and obtaining an indictment, it must be presumed that he alone is the person making a criminal allegation to the grand jury.

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On April 13, 2015, Judge Cadena personally signed the order to reassemble the grand jury on May 12, 2015, at 9:00am, the same day as Baker’s previously scheduled examining trial, which was also scheduled for May 12, 2015, at 10:30am, and for which the order was originally signed on April 9, 2015, again, by Judge Cadena himself. Which proves that Judge Cadena was completely aware that Baker’s right to an examining trial was being violated by D.A. Hernandez in total disregard for the laws of Texas, and that Judge Cadena was acting in concert and collusion to aid and abet same. Making it no surprise that the only case heard by the grand jury on May 12, 2015, was Baker’s. Furthermore, this provides enormously strong prima facie evidence that there was at least some degree of ex parte communication occurring between Judge Cadena and D.A. Hernandez’s office in relation to Baker’s case. Baker further asserts that a charge under Penal Code Section 38.04 is unlawful and invalid in light of Section 545.421, Texas “Transportation” Code (“ “Transportation” Code ”) as being the more relevant and controlling statute,9 Section 38.04(d), Texas Penal Code, notwithstanding, as all events that led up to the existing allegation against Baker are a direct result of a knowingly willful and wrongful application of the “Transportation” Code to Baker and his private conveyance by the arresting officer in this matter, Trooper Weatherby. As there is no actual indication that the Texas Legislature intended to supersede or repeal Section 545.421, “Transportation” Code by the later amendment of Section 38.04 of the Texas Penal Code to include Subsection (d), Baker should have been charged with a Class B 9

Section 311.026(b), Texas Government Code, “If the conflict between the general provision and the special or local provision is irreconcilable, the special or local provision prevails as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision is the later enactment and the manifest intent is that the general provision prevail.” (Emphasis added).

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misdemeanor under Section 545.421 of the “Transportation” Code and not a felony of the 3rd Degree under Section 38.04 of the Penal Code, provided any actual grounds exist for any charges against Baker at all. The provisions of Section 545.421, “Transportation” Code, is not a lesser included offense within Section 38.04, Penal Code,10 it is completely separate from, and almost identical in form and substance to, Section 38.04, Penal Code. However, Section 545.421 charges a substantially lesser penalty for what is a virtually identical offense. Sec. 545.421.

FLEEING OR ATTEMPTING TO ELUDE POLICE OFFICER; OFFENSE.

(a)

A person commits an offense if the person operates a motor vehicle and wilfully fails or refuses to bring the vehicle to a stop or flees, or attempts to elude, a pursuing police vehicle when given a visual or audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop.

(b)

A signal under this section that is given by a police officer pursuing a vehicle may be by hand, voice, emergency light, or siren. The officer giving the signal must be in uniform and prominently display the officer's badge of office. The officer's vehicle must bear the insignia of a law enforcement agency, regardless of whether the vehicle displays an emergency light.

(c)

Except as provided by Subsection (d), an offense under this section is a Class B misdemeanor.

(d)

An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor if the person, during the commission of the offense, recklessly engages in conduct that places another in imminent danger of serious bodily injury.

(e)

A person is presumed to have recklessly engaged in conduct placing another in imminent danger of serious bodily injury under Subsection (d) if the person while intoxicated knowingly operated a motor vehicle during the commission of the offense. In this subsection, "intoxicated" has the meaning assigned by Section 49.01, Penal Code.

(Emphasis added). The “Transportation” Code version of the offense specifically stipulates “wilfully fails or

10

Farrakhan v. State, No. PD-1984-06 Tx.Ct.Crim.App (Mar 12, 2008).

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refuses to bring the vehicle to a stop” within its provisions, a specific act and character of circumstance that is completely omitted from Section 38.04, Penal Code. These specific elements more closely reflect Baker’s self-protective actions with his private conveyance and the proper context of the March 23, 2015, incident with Trooper Weatherby than any of the provisions of Section 38.04, Penal Code. Furthermore, as it was an alleged “transportation” offense that Trooper Weatherby was using as his alleged authority to perpetrate the crimes of unlawful restraint, false imprisonment, and official misconduct against Baker, without either reasonable suspicion or probable cause, then, it should be axiomatic that the “Transportation” Code specific offense is the only one that State could lawfully and legally apply to any legal “person” who allegedly “wilfully fails or refuses to bring the vehicle to a stop.” It is also not constitutionally viable that the provisions of Section 38.04(d) would apply as an alternative method of prosecution in this matter, as that would mean that Baker, and others similarly situated, could potentially be charged twice using different levels of charges for virtually the same offense stemming from the same series of events, thus potentially creating a double jeopardy issue. Furthermore, the very existence of Section 38.04(d), Penal Code, in simultaneous concert with the existence of Section 545.421, “Transportation” Code, creates a serious public notice and due process issue in that anyone charged with “eluding” would have no way of knowing which statue the State could or would try to apply and use to charge them, despite the appearance of a specific category of legal application based upon the subject matter context of the particular code under which the initial law enforcement contact arose, i.e. some Penal Code offense versus some “Transportation” Code offense. Page 13 of 13

This issue is then further compounded by what certainly appears to be an equal protection and application of the laws issue, where one person can be charged and convicted of a felony while another is charged and convicted of a misdemeanor for what factually and circumstantially amounts to virtually the exact same offense, but having very different levels of punishment. As such, Baker, and anyone else similarly situated, are not being given sufficient notice of the actual charge being made against them so that s/he can prepare to defend against those allegations, and is being placed in the very real danger of being twice held in jeopardy for the same offense. Swabado v. State, 597 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Amaya v. State, 551 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); U.S. CONST amend. X, VI, and XIV; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10, § 15 and § 19. This potentially makes either Section 38.04(d) of the Texas Penal Code, or Section 545.421, of the “Transportation” Code, unconstitutional on its face in light of the existence of the other. In which case, the issue becomes even further compounded under the “cruel and unusual punishment” prohibitions of Article 1, Section 13 of the Texas Constitution, wherein it states “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted. All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.” (Emphasis added). Baker wonders how is it not cruel and unusual punishment to charge a man with a felony of the 3rd Degree or a Class B misdemeanor, or any crime at all, for acting in what he feels is in the best interest of his personal safety and welfare by seeking a public place where other people may act as witnesses to any and all unlawful and illegal acts that may be perpetrated by those Page 14 of 14

with a presumed authority to harass, injure and kill with virtual impunity simply because they are a government employee? Therefore, under the circumstances as they exist, Baker believes that he can and should only be indicted and charged under Section 545.421, “Transportation” Code,11 if any valid charge and cause for indictment against Baker legally exists at all.

III-C. INDICTMENT CONTAINS ELEMENTS PROVING INNOCENCE OF THE ALLEGED OFFENSE. Baker’s understanding of the elements of the allegation for which he has been indicted leads him to believe that there is a required element of the charge itself that proves fatal to the indictment and the criminal allegation in its entirety, and is actually exculpatory in nature, and serves to exonerate Baker of the alleged offense. The charge for which Baker was indicted under Section 38.04(b)(2)(A) requires the element of a “vehicle” as being the means of “evading.” However, in Section 38.04(c)(1), the term “vehicle,” as used to commit the act of “evading,” is declared by Sec. 38.04(c)(1) to have the same meaning as the term “vehicle” defined under Sec. 541.201 of the “Transportation” Code. Section 38.04(c)(1) reads: (c)

In this section: (1)

"Vehicle" has the meaning assigned by Section 541.201, Transportation Code.

Texas “Transportation” Code Section 541.201(23) defined “vehicle” as: (23) 11

"Vehicle" means a device that can be used to transport or draw

Azeez v. State, 248 S.W.3d 182; 2008 Tex. Crim. App.

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persons or property on a highway.

The term does not include:

(A)

a device exclusively used on stationary rails or tracks; or

(B)

manufactured housing as that term is defined by Chapter 1201, Occupations Code.

Considering the actual subject matter of the “Transportation” Code, and the definition of “vehicle” in Section 541.201(23) of that code, then a “vehicle” must be a device that not only can perform the functions defined within that term, but must also be actively in use for the purpose of “transportation.” And even if the state’s argument is that the term “vehicle” is to be given a general rather than specific meaning so as to make it applicable to any one or more of the specific types of devices listed within the entirety of Sec. 541.201 rather than only that of “vehicle” under Subitem (23) of that section, that does not change the subject matter context of the definition itself to apply to anything other than those devices being used to engage in “transportation.” Any device listed within Sec. 541.201 is legally a “vehicle” only when “transportation” itself is the business related activity for which it is being used by a “carrier,” “operator,” or “driver.” This is a clear indication that the only manner of “vehicle” that can support the element of the alleged offense is one that has the same meaning, and therefore, the same legal subject matter purpose and use, as that found for the term “vehicle” in the “Transportation” Code, thus, a device is only a “commercial/ motor/ vehicle” when it is being used for “transportation” by a “carrier,” “operator,” or “driver.” Which means that it should be perfectly clear that it is not the design or method of propulsion built into a device that makes it a “commercial/ motor/ vehicle” or that serves to make its use upon the public right-of-way an act of “transportation,” but rather, it is the existence of “transportation” that determines whether or not a device is legally a Page 16 of 16

“commercial/ motor/ vehicle.” And this same standard holds true for “carrier,” “operator,” “driver,” or any other legally defined capacities or objects found within the “Transportation” Code. See Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 133 S. Ct. 735 (2013). Therefore, the only type of “vehicle” that is statutorily acceptable in proving that element is one that the prosecution can prove beyond a reasonable doubt was being used for the purpose of “transportation” at the time of the commission of the alleged offense of “evading with a vehicle.” This means that the term “vehicle” does not simply mean anything with wheels or that moves under anything other than human power provided either with or without an engine, including, but not limited to, Baker’s private conveyance. As Baker was never engaged in “transportation” as a “carrier,” “operator,” or “driver,” and there exists no substantive evidence that would prove otherwise, and Baker was not using his private conveyance as a “commercial/ motor/ vehicle” to engage in “transportation,” it cannot be lawfully or legally inferred that his private conveyance meets the statutory requirements and meaning of the term “vehicle,” thus, it fails to substantiate the charge against Baker. In fact, it completely disproves the element, thus legally negating the charge against Baker.

III-D. VIOLATION OF BAKER’S RIGHT TO AN EXAMINING TRIAL AND TO CHALLENGE GRAND JURY ARRAY. Baker was deprived of his due process rights when D.A. Hernandez sought a secret grand jury indictment prior to Baker receiving an examining trial, specifically, his right to know and face his accuser, to have an examining trial, and to challenge the array of grand jury members prior to impanelment. The Texas Constitution - Article 1 - BILL OF RIGHTS

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Section 10 - RIGHTS OF ACCUSED IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury. He shall have the right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof. He shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself, and shall have the right of being heard by himself or counsel, or both, shall be confronted by the witnesses against him and shall have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, except that when the witness resides out of the State and the offense charged is a violation of any of the anti-trust laws of this State, the defendant and the State shall have the right to produce and have the evidence admitted by deposition, under such rules and laws as the Legislature may hereafter provide; and no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense, unless on an indictment of a grand jury, except in cases in which the punishment is by fine or imprisonment, otherwise than in the penitentiary, in cases of impeachment, and in cases arising in the army or navy, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger. (Amended Nov. 5, 1918.)

(Emphasis added).

Baker never had any opportunity to head off this whole prosecutorial process through the presentation of exculpatory evidence at a proper examining trial or to challenge the validity of any alleged evidence in the state’s possession. An examining trial is defined within Article 2.11 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure as follows: Texas Code of Criminal Procedure by Article 2.11. [35] [62] [63] EXAMINING COURT. When the magistrate sits for the purpose of inquiring into a criminal accusation against any person, this is called an examining court.

(Emphasis added).

Baker has been indicted, bound to the court for trial, and yet, no one has made any valid Complaint against him. No credible person has presented any proper Complaint to any magistrate, and no court clerk has ever received any proper Complaint against Baker from the magistrate of an examining court. Neither has any clerk been affected with the legal duty to keep Page 18 of 18

safe said Complaint and other documents resulting from an examining trial and then deliver them up to the next grand jury. Baker has the right to ask "Who is Baker's accuser?" And, at this point, D.A. Hernandez seems to think that it is the grand jury rather than himself, as he appears to hold the opinion that the grand jury could somehow act first as Baker’s accuser, and then, act as the presenter of an indictment, and do both absent a properly formed and verified Complaint and the requisite accompanying Information that D.A. Hernandez is required by law to prepare, sign, and submit in his official capacity with said Complaint attached pursuant Article 21.22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. D.A. Hernandez also appears to believe that the grand jury serves as the legal plaything of any governmental prosecutor such as himself, and can be compelled to act solely at his/her behest to “True Bill” an indictment. Apparently, Texas prosecutors now seem to have reached the erroneous conclusion that the need for a valid Complaint and Information prior to indictment and prosecution has somehow and at some point been discredited. Furthermore, Baker was never afforded the opportunity to challenge the grand jury array prior to their impanelment, because the prosecutor for the state and the judge of the 83rd District Court conspired and colluded to get a grand jury indictment in secret and in direct willful and wrongful violation of Texas law and Baker’s right to make that challenge. In point of fact, Baker was denied access to any and all information as to the composition of the grand jury members until more than a year after the indictment was handed down, and has only recently managed to get the list of names so as to see who was part of the array that indicted him. In this instance, Baker’s deprivation of the right to challenge the grand jury array resulted in an indictment by a grand jury whose foreman, and at least one other member as currently known, has a previous personal and official confrontational and disagreeable history with Baker. Page 19 of 19

The grand jury foreman, Timothy Scott Mitchell (“T.S. Mitchell”), is Chairman of the appointed five-member board designated as the “Terrell County Underground Water Conservation District,” and was one of the main members responsible for numerous attempts to unlawfully and illegally convert or outright steal the private water rights of the People living there, to which Baker and many others very publicly objected and protested during confrontations at public meetings and personal discussions on the subject. There is also the issue of many of the people of Terrell County, including, but not limited to Baker, that have also protested the numerous insider contracts and backroom deals to which several “important” persons of wealth and political power residing in or around Terrell County are party. And these potentially unlawful and illegal activities, at least some of which, if not actually all, are known to and ignored by local public officials, including District Judges Fernandez and Cadena, D.A. Hernandez, the Sheriff, and several others. Another member of the grand jury, Terry Black, is the spouse of USBP Agent ‘Billy’ Black (“Agent Black”), who was the #2 USBP Agent-in-Charge in Terrell County when Baker reported several other USBP agents that were harassing him by repeatedly racing their USBP vehicles back and forth along Baker’s property and fence line for no apparent legitimate purpose, but rather to incite his dogs into a frenzy and panic his livestock. A friend of Baker’s, John Hagan (“Hagan”), reported this behavior to Agent Black while Baker listened in on the threeway conversation, a fact of which Agent Black was unaware when he repeatedly denied that his subordinates were terrorizing Baker’s animals. However, within minutes of Hagan informing Agent Black that Baker was listening at the same time he was watching Agent’s Black’s subordinates outside of his property, Agent Black’s subordinates suddenly ceased their actions and vacated the area. Page 20 of 20

Baker believes that it was his and other reports from the People of Terrell County alleging that Agent Black and his superior, USBP Agent-in-Charge Earnest Rodriquez (“AiC Rodriquez”), were “turning a blind eye” to this and even more egregious unlawful and illegal behavior by their subordinates, such as the destruction of private property, destruction of livestock fences, and criminal trespass. And Baker has good cause to believe that it was these actions and reports of supervisory and subordinate misconduct that eventually resulted in Agent Black’s reassignment. Later, USBP Agent-in-Charge Thaddeus Cleveland (“AiC Cleveland”) was also involved in a previous attempt by USBP Agent Collier (“Agent Collier”) to perform an illegal “transportation” stop on Baker at a point upon the public right-of-way that is well beyond the vicinity of the Texas border or any border checkpoint, neither of which Baker had been anywhere near. At the time that Agent Collier engaged in the illegal attempt to seize Baker at his liberty without warrant or lawful authority, Baker had called 911 and advised them of the situation, and, instead of pulling over for the illegal stop, traveled to the Sheriff’s office before stopping. It was at that time that AiC Cleveland arrived on-scene and demanded that Baker get out of his van and go into the sheriff’s office, and Baker declined to do so. As they had no lawful authority to make a “transportation” stop on a Texas public right-of-way, both AiC Cleveland, Agent Collier, and approximately twelve other Agents, eventually left, but not without suffering the embarrassment of being told by Baker that they were acting unlawfully and criminally by what they had done in pursuing Baker with no probable cause and no legal authority. The Sheriff Deputy Howard admitted that Baker had broken no laws. Baker was free to go at that point. Furthermore, Agent Black was one of the federal officers that blocked the public right-ofPage 21 of 21

way in order to prevent Baker from reaching a publicly populated area of more relative safety on March 23, 2015, while pointing a loaded weapon at him. Which further leads Baker to believe that Black’s spouse, grand jury member Terry Black, might “have an axe to grind” with him. Article 19.31(a), items 5 and 6 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure allows a challenge to a grand jury member as follows: Art. 19.31.

CHALLENGE TO JUROR.

(a) A challenge to a particular grand juror may be made orally for any of the following causes: [5.]

6.

That the juror has a bias or prejudice in favor of or against the person accused or suspected of committing an offense that the grand jury is investigating; That from hearsay, or otherwise, there is established in the mind of the juror such a conclusion as to the guilt or innocence of the person accused or suspected of committing an offense that the grand jury is investigating as would influence the juror's vote on the presentment of an indictment;

(Emphasis added).

As detailed above, Baker had ample valid legal grounds to disqualify at least two of the grand jury members prior to impanelment, and potentially more. However, Baker could have most likely had the entire jury array disqualified under Article 19.31(a) item 6 due to D.A. Hernandez’s illegal use of hearsay witness testimony to obtain the Indictment, as set forth in specific detail in section III-E of this document. Article 20.19 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure instructs the grand jury as follows: Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 20.19. [391] [442-443] Grand jury shall vote. After all the testimony which is accessible to the grand jury shall have been given in respect to any criminal accusation, the vote shall be taken as to the presentment of an indictment, and

Page 22 of 22

if nine members concur in finding the bill, the foreman shall make a memorandum of the same with such data as will enable the attorney who represents the State to write the indictment.

(Emphasis added).

How can ‘all the testimony’ be ‘accessible to the grand jury’ if the individual being accused is never given a chance to appear and make a rebuttal to the alleged facts being presented against him or her, or introduce mitigating or potentially exculpatory evidence against the allegation(s)? These rights are essential to individual due process, and are precisely why the legislature very clearly intended that a prosecuting attorney not have the power to seek an indictment in secret. In the instant case, the prosecuting attorney somehow made a presentment to a grand jury without ever having a proper complaint or creating the requisite information. A prosecutor can bring a crime to the knowledge to the grand jury only when a complaint has already been made to a prosecuting attorney by someone other than themselves. Article 21.20, V.A.C.C.P. in order to “protect its citizens from the inherent dangers arising from the concentration of power in any one individual,” Kennedy v. State, 161 Tex. Crim. 303, 276 S.W.2d 291 (1955) (Opinion on Motion for Rehearing, at 664), the Legislature precluded a prosecutor from presenting an information “until affidavit has been made by some credible person charging the defendant with an offense,” and also mandated, “The affidavit shall be filed with the information.” While Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Articles 2.04 and 2.05 authorize the prosecuting attorney to take complaints and issue oaths, nothing in law directs a complaint to a grand jury. All criminal complaints are directed to some magistrate. When a complaint is made before a prosecuting attorney, s/he can take the complaint but, s/he must file the complaint with a magistrate of the county as follows: Page 23 of 23

Art. 2.05. WHEN COMPLAINT IS MADE. If the offense be a misdemeanor, the attorney shall forthwith prepare an information based upon such complaint and file the same in the court having jurisdiction; provided, that in counties having no county attorney, misdemeanor cases may be tried upon complaint alone, without an information, provided, however, in counties having one or more criminal district courts an information must be filed in each misdemeanor case. If the offense be a felony, he shall forthwith file the complaint with a magistrate of the county.

(Emphasis added).

If a peace officer has knowledge that a crime has been committed, said officer’s course of action is directed by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 2.13, which reads as follows: Art. 2.13. DUTIES AND POWERS. (a) It is the duty of every peace officer to preserve the peace within the officer's jurisdiction. To effect this purpose, the officer shall use all lawful means. (b) The officer shall: (1) in every case authorized by the provisions of this Code, interfere without warrant to prevent or suppress crime; (2) execute all lawful process issued to the officer by any magistrate or court; (3) give notice to some magistrate of all offenses committed within the officer's jurisdiction, where the officer has good reason to believe there has been a violation of the penal law; and (4) arrest offenders without warrant in every case where the officer is authorized by law, in order that they may be taken before the proper magistrate or court and be tried. (c) It is the duty of every officer to take possession of a child under Article 63.009(g).

(Emphasis added).

When a magistrate is made aware that a crime has been committed, s/he is required to hold an examining court in accordance with his/her duty under Texas Code of Criminal Page 24 of 24

Procedure Articles 2.10 and 2.11, which read as follows: Art. 2.10. DUTY OF MAGISTRATES. It is the duty of every magistrate to preserve the peace within his jurisdiction by the use of all lawful means; to issue all process intended to aid in preventing and suppressing crime; to cause the arrest of offenders by the use of lawful means in order that they may be brought to punishment. Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722.

Art. 2.11. EXAMINING COURT. When the magistrate sits for the purpose of inquiring into a criminal accusation against any person, this is called an examining court. Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722.

(Emphasis added).

Once an examining trial has been held under Chapter 16 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, and an order has been prepared showing that a determination of probable cause has been made by order pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 16.17, the complaint that initiated the examining trial, the statement of the accused (if any), and all other documents are to be sealed up and sent to the clerk of the court having jurisdiction of the offense in accordance with Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 17.30, which reads as follows: Art. 17.30. SHALL CERTIFY PROCEEDINGS. The magistrate, before whom an examination has taken place upon a criminal accusation, shall certify to all the proceedings had before him, as well as where he discharges, holds to bail or commits, and transmit them, sealed up, to the court before which the defendant may be tried, writing his name across the seals of the envelope. The voluntary statement of the defendant, the testimony, bail bonds, and every other proceeding in the case, shall be thus delivered to the clerk of the proper court, without delay. (Emphasis added).

Page 25 of 25

The court will take notice that the statutes say nothing about a prosecuting attorney until the stage described in Code of Criminal Procedure Article 17.31. The clerks who are authorized to receive these documents are directed by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 17.31 as follows: Art. 17.31. DUTY OF CLERKS WHO RECEIVE SUCH PROCEEDINGS. If the proceedings be delivered to a district clerk, he shall keep them safely and deliver the same to the next grand jury. If the proceedings are delivered to a county clerk, he shall without delay deliver them to the district or county attorney of his county.

(Emphasis added).

By the above, in every case where a criminal complaint has been made, the complaint is originally directed to some magistrate, who is to hold an examining trial and forward the documents had in the hearing to the proper court. There are two circumstances where this procedure could potentially be intentionally misinterpreted and bypassed, and they are contained in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 20.09, which reads as follows: Art. 20.09. DUTIES OF GRAND JURY. The grand jury shall inquire into all offenses liable to indictment of which any member may have knowledge, or of which they shall be informed by the attorney representing the State, or any other credible person.

(Emphasis added).

Because of the ambiguity of its language, Article 20.09 potentially could lead to an indictment without a criminal complaint ever having been filed. Were a grand jury to bring an indictment based on the personal knowledge of a grand juror or “some credible person,” it is conceivable that there would be no criminal complaint of record, as the grand jury members might not be aware of and understand the legal importance and necessity of a proper Complaint, Page 26 of 26

making it be the legal duty of the prosecuting attorney for the state to inform them of that requirement prior to an indictment. In such a case, however, the indictment could not be recorded in the minutes of the grand jury as contemplated by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 20.22(b) which reads as follows: Art. 20.22. [(b)]

PRESENTMENT ENTERED OF RECORD.

If the defendant is not in custody or under bond at the time of the presentment of indictment, the indictment may not be made public and the entry in the record of the court relating to the indictment must be delayed until the capias is served and the defendant is placed in custody or under bond.

(Emphasis added).

In order for a magistrate to issue a warrant of arrest and subsequently place an accused individual into custody or on bond as directed by Article 20.22 supra, there must already be a proper Complaint filed with that magistrate upon which to base the warrant as well as for the subsequent commitment order or to place him or her bond. However, there is no Complaint in this case, just as there is no Information based upon said Complaint in the record. Furthermore, the provisions of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 19.27 serves to prevent a prosecutor from stacking a grand jury against an accused by granting any person the right to challenge the grand jury array prior to the jury being impaneled, or, if the grand jury is already impaneled, to challenge the array in a Motion to Quash Indictment (see Muniz v. State, 672 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Tex.Crim.App 1984)): Art. 19.27. ANY PERSON MAY CHALLENGE. Before the grand jury has been impaneled, any person may challenge the array of jurors or any person presented as a grand juror. In no other way shall objections to the qualifications and legality of the grand jury be heard. Any person confined in jail in the county shall upon his request be brought into court to make such challenge.

Page 27 of 27

(Emphasis added).

However, Muniz, supra, notwithstanding, Article 19.27 is extremely specific about the fact that the composition of the grand jury cannot be challenged for either qualifications or legality after it has been impaneled. Which makes those opinions of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals as discussed herein even more outrageous and egregious, as these opinions state that the right to an examining trial and to challenge the pre-impanelment composition of the grand jury is automatically denied to the accused if the prosecuting attorney for the state can manage to convince a district judge to impanel a grand jury in secret whereby the prosecutor may convince them to issue an indictment, and, thus, simultaneously deny the accused in both the right to an examining trial and to challenge the composition of the grand jury array before it can be impaneled. Especially when, as is the case here, no proper allegation of criminal activity by means of a verified Complaint and Information has ever been filed in the matter. This is compounded by the fact that the specific language of Article 19.27 would appear to negate the ability to challenge the jury array and any subsequent indictment by means of a Habeas writ or a motion to quash the indictment, as at least some grounds for doing so will almost certainly pertain to the qualifications or legality of certain members of the grand jury directly. Therefore, any challenge to the indictment after the fact would, as a matter of law, have to be automatically denied by the courts if the motion made any argument whatsoever that the indictment was improper solely for reasons relating to the legality or qualifications of the grand jury members that made and presented it. Which would mean that the accused individual’s right to due process could be shoved aside by the prosecutor stacking the secret grand jury with Page 28 of 28

persons that have a private bias or vendetta against the accused or that are in any other manner disqualified from sitting upon the grand jury. And there is no recourse written into the law for the accused to obtain remedy for this harm. Nor can Baker locate any statutory authority for the courts to simply provide such alternative remedy without first declaring that provision of Article 19.27 unconstitutional as being a violation of due process. To further prevent secret grand jury indictments, the Legislature enacted Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 16.01, creating a specific prohibition against the seeking of an indictment prior to giving proper, sufficient and timely notice to an accused individual that s/he may have need to avail him/herself of the other statutory right granted by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 19.27, supra: Art. 16.01. EXAMINING TRIAL. When the accused has been brought before a magistrate for an examining trial that officer shall proceed to examine into the truth of the accusation made, allowing the accused, however, sufficient time to procure counsel. In a proper case, the magistrate may appoint counsel to represent an accused in such examining trial only, to be compensated as otherwise provided in this Code. The accused in any felony case shall have the right to an examining trial before indictment in the county having jurisdiction of the offense, whether he be in custody or on bail, at which time the magistrate at the hearing shall determine the amount or sufficiency of bail, if a bailable case. If the accused has been transferred for criminal prosecution after a hearing under Section 54.02, Family Code, the accused may be granted an examining trial at the discretion of the court.

(Emphasis

added).

In the 1967 case of Trussell v. State, 414 S.W.2d 466 (Tex.Crim.App 1967), without citing a single point of authority or any explanation for doing so, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rendered null and void the statutory right of an accused to an examining trial by nothing Page 29 of 29

less than unlawful judicial fiat and legislating from the bench. The court effectually ruled that a prosecutor may do that which s/he is specifically forbidden by statute to do, and may secretly present to a grand jury the name of a person who has not been afforded the statutorily granted right to an examining trial or to receive proper, sufficient and timely notice of a potential indictment so as to exercise his/her right to challenge both the charging instrument and the composition of the grand jury array prior to the jury being impaneled, or, at the very least, to know the composition of the grand jury if they have already been impaneled so as to make a proper challenge to the array by means of a writ of habeas corpus and to the charging instrument by a motion to quash or set aside, an effort which Article 19.27 of the Code of Criminal Procedure appears to make null and void from inception. Apparently, the justices comprising the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals at the time decided that they could rely upon United States Supreme Court rulings setting the minimum standards and requirements for federal examining trials, as the means to somehow nullify Texas law and the greater level of protections that the Texas Legislature had directly afforded the People in relation to such proceedings within the state. Our Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has gone on to hold in the following cases that an examining trial is only available to the accused if the accused requests it, yet, no such language or inference exists in the statute. And it must be recognized that Baker did request an examining trial, in writing, before any other actions were taken by anyone, including the Indictment. The Court has also held that only those charged with a felony have the right to an examining trial, but this simply cannot be true when examined under the microscope of substantive and procedural due process, as most misdemeanor cases are preceded by a warrantless arrest, which requires a probable cause determination all its own prior and in addition to the probable cause Page 30 of 30

determination relating to the alleged offense(s) in a criminal matter. The rule-of-thumb being that, if the initial warrantless detention or seizure was itself unlawful, then, any evidence or statements discovered thereafter must be considered as “fruit of the poison tree,” and would then be inadmissible for the purpose of any subsequently related criminal allegation(s). Without an examining trial, just where, when, and how does someone accused of a misdemeanor ever receive the opportunity to challenge the facts and evidence against them for the purpose of preserving any appealable error on the record relating to the probable cause determination, or, potentially ending a criminal prosecution before it can ever begin? Furthermore, as the examining trial is the only opportunity provided for in the criminal process whereby a determination if probable cause can be made by a neutral and detached magistrate, who is also the only person authorized by law to sign an order relating to a finding of probable cause or for the purpose of signing an order of commitment to jail upon such finding pursuant Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Articles 16.17 and 16.20 respectively, and as probable cause is a fundamental foundational pillar of both subject matter and in personam jurisdiction, a finding of probable cause at an examining trial can be nothing less than mandatory in order for any court to have the required jurisdiction to proceed in the matter and to protect the due process rights of the accused. Therefore, as a matter of law, jurisdiction, and due process, it cannot be made the responsibility of the accused to request an examining trial, or that the courts can declare the right to such a trial shall be presumed waived by the accused if no such request is made, but, rather, it is actually a mandatory requirement upon the court under the laws of Texas to set a date and time for that proceeding to take place and to ensure that it does. The basis for such reasoning is that an examining trial is the only proceeding set forth in Texas law for making a determination Page 31 of 31

of probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate relating to both a warrantless arrest and the validity of the allegations against the accused, and, therefore, it simply cannot be voluntarily waived by the accused, as probable cause goes to the two primary pillars supporting the State’s jurisdiction to sit in judgement of a matter, subject matter and in personam jurisdiction. The only reasonable and acceptable exception to this requirement would be a case where the accused voluntarily confessed to the crime(s) prior to the conducting of an examining trial, as that would satisfy both the probable cause and jurisdictional requirements without a judicial finding and order. Further, there is no lawful authority or power vested in a grand jury, especially when being spoon-fed information of alleged criminal activity solely by the prosecuting attorney for the state, and without benefit of mitigating, contradictory, or exculpatory presentation of evidence by the accused or his/her counsel, to make any sort of probable cause determination. Indeed, it must be asked if it is even lawfully possible to qualify the members of a grand jury to make such a determination, as such determinations are lawfully and legally required to be made by a properly sworn neutral and detached judicial magistrate, although, considering the willful and wrongful violations of law being perpetrated by our Texas Courts in violation of the rights of the accused, it appears to be a moot point at this time. What’s more, it should not even require an argument to undermine and deny any position that would argue that probable cause can be rightfully determined by the prosecuting attorney for the state any more than it would be to argue that they may initiate a criminal complaint of their own volition, regardless of the classification of the allegations involved and most especially when they are prosecuting the matter. “"In other words, a prosecuting attorney is not authorized to institute prosecutions in the county court upon his independent act or of his own Page 32 of 32

volition. Kennedy v. State, supra, at 294. One may not be both the accuser and the prosecutor in misdemeanor cases.” Wells v. State, 516 S.W.2d 663, at 664 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974). Compare Glass v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 598, 288 S.W.2d 522 (1956); Catchings v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 342, 285 S.W.2d 233, at 234 (1955). (Emphasis added, internal quotes omitted). How then does an indictment serve as a lawfully and legally valid determination of probable cause in relation to the validity of both a warrantless arrest and any related allegation(s) of criminal activity that would serve as the means to validly and lawfully displace both the statutory requirement and due process need for a proper examining trial for any alleged criminal offense rather than just felonies alone? It contains no proper jurat requiring that it be signed under penalty of perjury as certifying the truth of the allegations made therein as a sworn criminal statement requires, and it does not require that the person signing it have any competent firsthand knowledge of the facts alleged. It is in every way legally possible insufficient as the basis for stating or making a probable cause determination or as the sole instrument of accusal. The rulings in Trussell and later court opinions have had the undeniable effect of denying an accused individual in their right to an examining trial as specifically granted by statute, such right being nothing less than a requirement for both procedural and substantive due process rights to mean anything at all. These rulings further serve to chill or deny the accused in the due process right of preserving any appealable error that may be exposed relating to a finding of probable cause, impeachability of witness testimony, or the validity and admissibility of evidence. These rulings also destroy the individual’s right to challenge the grand jury array prior to impanelment. And the most egregious and detrimental effect of all, these rulings have unlawfully created judicial sanction and consent for both the lower courts and prosecutors statewide to engage in criminal violations of state law, specifically, Texas Penal Code Secs. Page 33 of 33

39.02 and 39.03, which reads as follows: Sec. 39.02. (a)

ABUSE OF OFFICIAL CAPACITY.

A public servant commits an offense if, with intent to obtain a benefit or with intent to harm or defraud another, he intentionally or knowingly: (1)

violates a law relating to the public servant's office or employment; or

(2)

misuses government property, services, personnel, or any other thing of value belonging to the government that has come into the public servant's custody or possession by virtue of the public servant's office or employment.

(b)

An offense under Subsection (a)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor.

(c)

An offense under Subsection (a)(2) is: (1)

a Class C misdemeanor if the value of the use of the thing misused is less than $100;

(2)

a Class B misdemeanor if the value of the use of the thing misused is $100 or more but less than $750;

(3)

a Class A misdemeanor if the value of the use of the thing misused is $750 or more but less than $2,500;

(4)

a state jail felony if the value of the use of the thing misused is $2,500 or more but less than $30,000;

(5)

a felony of the third degree if the value of the use of the thing misused is $30,000 or more but less than $150,000;

(6)

a felony of the second degree if the value of the use of the thing misused is $150,000 or more but less than $300,000; or

(7)

a felony of the first degree if the value of the use of the thing misused is $300,000 or more.

(d)

A discount or award given for travel, such as frequent flyer miles, rental car or hotel discounts, or food coupons, are not things of value belonging to the government for purposes of this section due to the administrative difficulty and cost involved in recapturing the discount or award for a governmental entity.

(e)

If separate transactions that violate Subsection (a)(2) are conducted pursuant to one scheme or continuing course of conduct, the conduct may be considered as one offense and the value of the use of the things misused in the transactions may be aggregated in determining the classification of the offense.

(f)

The value of the use of a thing of value misused under Subsection (a)(2) may not exceed:

Page 34 of 34

(1)

the fair market value of the thing at the time of the offense; or

(2)

if the fair market value of the thing cannot be ascertained, the cost of replacing the thing within a reasonable time after the offense.

Sec. 39.03. (a)

OFFICIAL OPPRESSION.

A public servant acting under color of his office or employment commits an offense if he: (1)

intentionally subjects another to mistreatment or to arrest, detention, search, seizure, dispossession, assessment, or lien that he knows is unlawful;

(2)

intentionally denies or impedes another in the exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power, or immunity, knowing his conduct is unlawful; or

(3)

intentionally subjects another to sexual harassment.

(b)

For purposes of this section, a public servant acts under color of his office or employment if he acts or purports to act in an official capacity or takes advantage of such actual or purported capacity.

(c)

In this section, “sexual harassment” means unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, submission to which is made a term or condition of a person's exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power, or immunity, either explicitly or implicitly.

(d)

An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor, except that an offense is a felony of the third degree if the public servant acted with the intent to impair the accuracy of data reported to the Texas Education Agency through the Public Education Information Management System (PEIMS) described by Section 42.006, Education Code, under a law requiring that reporting. (Emphasis added).

The simple elements constituting criminal violations of the above Penal Code statutes make the denial of an examining trial by our prosecutors and courts nothing short of an ongoing criminal conspiracy and criminal enterprise under Title 18 of the United States Code and state law. Page 35 of 35

In the instant case, it had to be clear to the presiding judge that the indictment had been presented to the court in violation of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 20.22, that the prosecutor had presented a person to a grand jury for indictment that the prosecutor knew fullwell had been denied the rights granted by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Articles 16.01 and 19.27. The violation of Articles 20.22 and 19.27 were accomplished by the denial of the right to an examining trial in violation of Art 16.01. The court opinions on this subject are not only wrong as a matter of law and a complete lack of constitutional authority to make such rulings, but are blatantly criminal in their hubris and utter disregard of an accused individual’s constitutionally and statutorily protected rights, are a violation of the separation of powers clause under Article 2 of the Texas Constitution, are a violation of properly enacted procedural law under the Code of Criminal Procedure, and directly violate the fundamental individual right to due process of law rather than merely the rule of a group of men and women operating through judicial and prosecutorial collusion and consensus as to how they want it to work. How is it anything less than an “unreasonable” act of sedition to have judges sitting upon the bench in the highest criminal court in Texas that have unilaterally declared the judicial department to be totally superior to the legislative in determining what legislation it will follow and what legislation it will simply choose to disregard in relation to criminal procedure and the legislatively protected rights of the accused? Is this behavior not the very thing that the courts are presuming to be unlawful and illegal acts by those appearing before them for prosecution and appeal? Where is even the appearance of judicial integrity, competency, fairness, and impartiality in that? Is the argument that the legislature actually has no power to enact laws to dictate certain procedures for the courts to follow or to protect the rights of individuals caught up Page 36 of 36

in the criminal judicial process? If so, then why not simply declare the statute unconstitutional rather than just criminally ignoring it or legislating from the bench to rewrite it in accordance with judicial and prosecutorial perspectives and desires? What the Court of Criminal Appeals has done in these opinions is to declare that the Court itself is not only above the law, but above the legislature as well, and it has the power and authority to sanction and protect knowingly criminal violations of law and other criminal acts perpetrated by the lower courts and state prosecutors against the people of Texas. This is an unconstitutional oligarchy in action, and this oligarchy is committing sedition and treason against us all. No reasonable person of ordinary prudence can read Article 16.01 and construe it as anything other than a prohibition specifically preventing a prosecutor from seeking an indictment until the accused has been given notice and opportunity for an examining trial where s/he can obtain a proper determination of probable cause for any warrantless search or seizure of his person or property, present exculpatory evidence, question witnesses, and obtain a legal determination as to what evidence will be admissible at trial. This exculpatory evidence would then be available to any subsequently impaneled grand jury under the dictate of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 2.01, which reads as follows: Art. 2.01. DUTIES OF DISTRICT ATTORNEYS. Each district attorney shall represent the State in all criminal cases in the district courts of his district and in appeals therefrom, except in cases where he has been, before his election, employed adversely. When any criminal proceeding is had before an examining court in his district or before a judge upon habeas corpus, and he is notified of the same, and is at the time within his district, he shall represent the State therein, unless prevented by other official duties. It shall be the primary duty of all prosecuting attorneys, including any special prosecutors, not to convict, but to see that justice is done. They shall not suppress facts or secrete witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused.

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Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722. Amended by Acts 1981, 67th Leg., p. 801, ch. 291, Sec. 98, eff. Sept. 1, 1981.

(Emphasis added).

And once it is determined and notice has been given that a grand jury is to be impaneled to hear a complaint against the Accused for the purpose of indictment, the Accused could then exercise his or her right to an opportunity to challenge the grand jury array. Had Baker been allowed access to the full protections and due process rights contained in the constitutions and laws, the full sets of facts and evidence relating to any allegations of criminal conduct by Baker would have been available to the grand jury. And, if such facts and evidence proved exculpatory or as an affirmative defense, then, it is almost certain that no indictment would have ever happened and no criminal prosecution commenced. The case law makes it clear that everything involving the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals unlawful and illegal denial of an examining trial to an accused individual evolved from Trussell. Trussell and its progeny, Ash v. STATE, 420 S.W.2d 703 (1967), Murphy v. STATE, 24 S.W.2d 231 (1968), Bryant v. STATE, 423 S.W.2d 320 (1968), Ward v. STATE, 427 S.W.2d 876 (1968), Harris v. STATE, 457 S.W.2d 903 (1970), Brown v. STATE, 475 S.W.2d 938 (1971), Whittington v. STATE, 781 S.W.2d 338 (1989), and others, as precedent, are totally worthless, as each and every one of the resulting opinions directly sanctions the willful and wrongful violation of state law and the due process rights of the accused by every court and prosecutor statewide.

III-E. DISTRICT ATTORNEY HERNANDEZ WILLFULLY AND WRONGFULLY PRESENTED HEARSAY TESTIMONY TO THE GRAND JURY. Page 38 of 38

In direct violation of the spirit and intent of Article 19.31(a) item 6, D.A. Hernandez allowed one Amanda Herman (“Ms. Herman”) to provide, at best, hearsay testimony, and at worst, suborned perjurious testimony, to the grand jury regarding the alleged facts surrounding the events of March 23, 2015, and the criminal allegations against Baker. The problem with Ms. Herman’s testimony is that Ms. Herman has no competent firsthand knowledge of any of the related and relevant facts involving Baker, as she was not present at any time or at any of the actual locations during any of the events and incidents that occurred during the entirety of March 23, 2015. Therefore, how could Ms. Herman have taken an oath to provide factual and truthful answers to any inquiries made by members of the grand jury in relation to facts that might result in an indictment allegedly relating to a crime of which she neither had nor has any personal knowledge? How is it that D.A. Hernandez can use hearsay testimony to obtain a grand jury indictment while causing Baker to be denied even the semblance of fairness and impartiality, as well as subverting Baker’s right to an examining trial and grand jury challenge that would have potentially made Ms. Herman’s ‘testimony’ irrelevant and inadmissible to even a ‘stacked’ grand jury like this one, or, for that matter, an opportunity to appear before the grand jury himself so as to provide rebuttal facts and evidence refuting Ms. Herman’s statements and alleged facts?

IV. EXERCISE OF RIGHT TO DEMAND RELIEF. Due to the conflicting classifications of the alleged offense, and of the facts relative to the different classifications and subject matter of the allegations in the Indictment, Baker is being Page 39 of 39

charged and indicted under the wrong code and statute. And given TROOPER WEATHERBY’s complete lack of probable cause to detain or arrest Baker for any “transportation” related offense whatsoever, including that of allegedly “speeding” at the time and place of initial contact, and in conjunction with the other factual and statutory information of which the court must take judicial notice as provided herein under Rule 201, Texas Rules of Evidence, it is Baker’s assertion that the Indictment does not provide adequate notice of the charges against him such that he can adequately prepare for trial, be protected from being twice held in jeopardy for the same conduct, and to be adequately informed of which law applies to his case, in violation of his rights pursuant to the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 10, 15 and 19 of the Texas Constitution. WHEREFORE, Baker moves that the Court quash the Indictment, and, if either instrument actually exists as required by law, to also quash the Complaint and Information against him, and to so provide a written order that each of these instruments be quashed and this case dismissed with prejudice.

Respectfully Submitted,

__ORIGINAL SIGNED___ Jan Patrick Baker, Sui Juris ***

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Quash Indictment was Faxed to the attorney for the State on November 18, 2016, at Fax Number 830775-0352

___ ORIGINAL SIGNED ________ Jan Patrick Baker, Sui Juris

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CAUSE NO(s). 742 THE STATE OF TEXAS, Plaintiff, v. Jan Patrick Baker, Defendant in Error.

§ IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF § § TERRELLCOUNTY, TEXAS § § 63rd JUDICIAL DISTRICT § §

ORDER

On this day came on to be heard Defendant’s Motion to Quash Indictment. The Court, having considered the motion and argument of counsel, it is hereby ordered that _______ the Indictment is quashed

_______ with/ _______ without/ prejudice; and

_______ the Information is quashed _______ with/ _______ without/ prejudice; and _______ the Complaint is quashed _______ the case is dismissed

_______ with/ _______ without/ prejudice; and _______ with/ _______ without/ prejudice.

SIGNED this ____ day of _____________________, 20____.

______________________________ JUDGE PRESIDING

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