生成文法の哲学的意義 阿部潤 ２０１５年１２月１２日・１３日 慶應義塾大学 ＜哲学の目的＞ 「哲学の目的は思考の論理的明晰化である。 哲学は学説ではなく、活動である。 哲学の仕事の本質は解明することにある。 哲学の成果は「哲学的命題」ではない。諸命題の明確化である。 思考は、そのままではいわば不透明でぼやけている。哲学はそれを明晰 にし、限界をはっきりさせねばならない。」 （ウィットゲンシュタイン１９３３：四・一一二） 「細心且つ正確な実験に依らない限り、即ち心の様々な事情及び状況から 起る個々の結果の観察に依らない限り、心の様々な力能及び性質に関する 何等かの思念を作ることは、外物の場合と等しく不可能であるに相違ない … 飽くまで実験を行い、すべての結果を極めて単純な且つ極めて少数の原 因から解明し、依って以て全原理を能う限り普遍的ならしめるように力め なければならない … （ヒューム１７３９〜４０、２３〜２４ページ） ＜言語の生成文法的アプローチ＞ １）内在的 (internalist)：人間の脳内にある言語能力を研究対象とする ２）自然主義的 (naturalistic)：自然界の一部としてその方法論に従う ３）心理学的 (mentalistic)：物理的基盤から抽象されたレベルで研究を行う

i

New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind Noam Chomsky 1 New Horizons in the Study of Language − 人間の言語能力が真に種固有のものであること デカルト：自由な思考を表現する言語使用が「精神」の存在を証明する 人間言語の離散的無限性 (discrete infinity) →生得的特性（ヒューム：the original hand of nature; 本能） − 「言語器官 (language organ) 」を仮定 “The faculty of language can reasonably be regarded as a ‘language organ’ in the sense in which scientists speak of the visual system, or immune system, or circulatory system, as organs of the body.”

(p. 4)

「遺伝子は分子的に見ると DNA の断片で、染色体上の一定の場所をしめ、 四種の塩基、A（アデニン）、T（チミン）、G（グアニン）、C（シトシン）を 文字として一列に書かれた遺伝的命令文とみなすことができる。」 （木村資生著『生物進化を考える』 （岩波新書）ｐ．１９６） 「遺伝子は、自然淘汰の単位として役立つだけの長い世代にわたって続き うる染色体物質の一部と定義される。」 （リチャード・ドーキンス著『利己的な遺伝子』ｐ．５４） メンデルの法則：優性と劣性の対立遺伝子 雑種第一代：Aa 、雑種第二代：AA, Aa, aA, aa − モジュラー的アプローチ： “We hope to understand the full complexity by investigating parts that have distinctive characteristics, and their interactions.” − 言語器官の基本的特性：遺伝子によって特徴付け 経験 → 初期状態 (initial state) → 言語 (I-language)

1

(ibid.)

− １９５０年代の「認知革命」： 言語行動とその産出物の研究から内在的メカニズムの研究へ “The cognitive perspective regards behavior and it products not as the object of inquiry, but as data that may provide evidence about the inner mechanisms of mind…”

(p. 5)

自然科学とりわけ生物学の一部としての位置づけ；但し “mentalistic” − １７、１８世紀の「第１認知革命」： フンボルト：“the infinite use of finite means” 「言語そのものは、出来上がった作品（エルゴン）ではなくて、活動性（エ ネルゲイア）である。それ故、言語の本当の定義は、生成に即した定義しか あり得ないことになる。」

（『言語と精神』第１２節）

「発話というものは、言語の要素を駆使して、気儘に飛び廻ろうとする思考 を無際限に組み合わせてゆこうと思うのであるし、こういう組み合わせの無 限性がいささかでも制限されることがないよう留意するものである。このよ うに、あり得る思考結合をすべて表現するということの根底に横たわってい るのが、文の構成である。そして単一な文の部分となり得るそれぞれのもの が、恣意的にではなく、文というものの本質から汲み取られた必然性に従っ て、配列されたり分離されたりするとき、上述の思考の自由の飛翔が可能と なるのである。」 （『言語と精神』第２７節） − 記述的妥当性 (descriptive adequacy) と説明的妥当性 (explanatory adequacy)： 「刺激の貧困」問題 “Language acquisition seems much like the growth of organs generally; it is something that happens to a child, not that the child does.”

(p. 7)

→ “Principles and Parameters” アプローチの誕生; “Minimalist Program” − 言語の内在的アプローチと外界との関係 言語表現と外界との関係： Hume’s (1740) principle: the “identity which we ascribe” to things is “only a fictitious one” “The semantic properties of words are used to think and talk about the world in terms of the perspectives made available by the resources of the mind, …” 2

(p. 16)

<-> 現代の言語哲学では、「語は何を指し示すか」が議論される ex. 「本」／「トルストイの『戦争と平和』」は何を指し示すか？ − デカルト：言語使用の創造性 二元論 (dualism)：人間の身体や他の動物などはその機能特性を機械論的に捉 えることが可能なのに対して、人間の精神はその創造的な思考の働き 故に機械論的把握を越えている。 i) これまで話したり聞いたりしたことのない文を無際限に生み出したり理 解したりすることが可能 (innovative) ii) 刺激からの自由 (stimulus-free) iii) 状況に対する適切さ (appropriate to situations) “Generative grammar seeks to discover the mechanisms that are used, thus contributing to the study of how they are used in the creative fashion of normal life.”

(p. 17)

2 Explaining Language Use − パットナム：人間言語に対する自然主義的 (naturalistic) アプローチへの疑問 （１）自然類としての「人間」を別扱い “we are not, realistically, going to get a detailed explanatory model for the natural kind ‘human being’,” because “we are partially opaque to ourselves, in the sense of not having the ability to understand one another as we understand hydrogen atoms.”

(Putnam 1978)

→ 二元論的扱い 共通感覚 (common sense) の概念と科学的概念の混同 Brentano’s thesis: “intentionality won’t be reduced and won’t go away” (Putnam 1988a: 1) “intentionality is a primitive phenomenon, in fact the phenomenon that relates thought and thing, minds and the external world.”

(ibid.: 1-2)

“the commonsense version of the world is just as legitimate as the scientific version.”

(ibid.: 2)

3

視覚の研究の場合： perceptual content, veridical perception (the direct perception of stimuli as they exist), intentional attribution （２）脳科学及び心理学の研究と言語の意味の研究の関係 “when we ‘think the word cat’ … a configuration C is formed in the brain. ‘This is fascinating if true,’ … ‘but what is its relevance to a discussion of the meaning of cat’ …? – the implication being that there is no relevance” (Putnam 1988a) → 言語の意味に対する外在的 (externalist) アプローチを示唆 脳研究の一部としての計算処理−表示 (C-R) システムの意義 “In the case of language, the C-R theories have much stronger empirical support than anything available at other levels, and are far superior in explanatory power … in isolation from C-R theories, the ERP observations are just curiosities, lacking a theoretical matrix.”

(p. 25)

→ 原子や分子、神経細胞に基づく脳研究の優位性の否定 ex. １９世紀化学の物理学への影響 “the mental is the neurophysiological at a higher level” -> the neurophysiological may turn out to be “the mental at a lower level” 排他的物質主義 (eliminative materialism) のドクトリンにおける “the material” の定義の欠如 − 言語に対する外在的アプローチ： “public language” “public meanings; cf. Frege (1892) “speak the same language” “the basic function of natural languages is to mediate communication” ＜—＞語彙の意味的特性に対する内在的アプローチ：cf. house vs. home ex. I-variant of Frege’s telescope: “sense” vs. performance systems “a lexical item provides us with a certain range of perspectives for viewing what we take to be the things in the world, … The terms themselves do not refer, … but people can use them to refer to things, viewing them from particular points of view…” 4

(p. 36)

− 日常言語と科学言語の関係 language faculty vs. “science-forming faculty” no motivation for “public language” ex. 束縛理論で用いられる “refer” の意味するもの (3) a.

It brings good health’s rewards.

b. Good health brings its rewards. c. (4) a.

Its rewards are what make good health worth striving for. [There is a flaw in the argument], but it was quickly found.

b. [The argument is flawed], but it was quickly found. “following a rule”: Jones follows a rule if he conforms to the practice or norms of the community. - Wittgenstein’s skeptical paradox concerning rule following; cf. Chomsky (1986) “Given a rule R, there is no fact about my past experience (including my conscious mental states) that justifies my belief that the next application of R does or does not conform to my intentions. There is, Wittgenstein argues, no fact about me that tells me whether I am following R [“plus”] or R’ [“quus”], which coincides with R in past cases but not future ones.”

(Chomsky 1986: 225)

Quus ⊕ : If x, y > 57, then x ⊕ y = x + y otherwise, x ⊕ y = 5 ex. 68 ⊕ 57 = 5 -> Each application of a rule is “a leap in the dark.” My application of a rule “is an unjustified stab in the dark. I apply the rule blindly.” 「それゆえ、＜規則に従う＞ということは一つの実践である。そして、規則 に従っていると信じていることは、規則に従っていることではない。だか ら、ひとは規則に＜私的に＞従うことができない。さもなければ、規則に 従っていると信じていることが、規則に従っていることと同じことになっ てしまうだろうから。 （ウィトゲンシュタイン『哲学探求』二〇二番）

5

「我々の現実の共同体は、アディション [＝足し算] の計算に関して（おお

よそ）一様である。アディションのの概念をマスターしたと認められる人 は、… 彼が与えた個々の答えが共同体が与える答えと一致した時、… そ の時はじめて共同体によって、アディションの概念をマスターしたと判断 されるのである。そしてそのようなテストに合格した人は、アディション が出来る人としてその共同体に受け入れられ、また、その他の十分多くの 場合において同様なテストに合格した人は、言語の一般水準の使い手とし て、かつ、その共同体の一員として、受け入れられるのである。」 （クリプキ『ウィトゲンシュタインのパラドックス』１７９ページ） - Wittgenstein’s solution is far from descriptively adequate. overgeneralization by children; sleeped instead of slept, brang instead of brought -> “the proposed analysis is descriptively inaccurate. Typically, we attribute rule-following in the case of notable lack of conformity to prescriptive practice or alleged norms.”

(p. 31)

- The rules in question may or may not be followed in behavior. -> The rules are not descriptions of behavior or of regularities in behavior. - 生成文法：「人は無意識的に言語規則に従う」 - Putnam (1975): “Extension is not determined by psychological state.” (p. 222) è “It is possible for two speakers to be in exactly the same psychological state, even though the extension of the term A in the idiolect of the one is different from the extension of the term A in the idiolect of the other.” (ibid.) è “to give up the idea that psychological state … determines intension, or to give up the idea that intension determines extension.” (ibid.) ‘Twin Earth’ story: ‘water’ is not H2O but XYZ. At a time (1750) when chemistry was not developed on either Earth or Twin Earth, “Oscar1 and Oscar2 understood the term ‘water’ differently in 1750 although they were in the same psychological state, … Thus the extension of the term ‘water’ … is not a function of the psychological state of the speaker by itself.” 6

(p. 224)

(Q) Why should we accept it that the term ‘water’ has the same extension in 1750 and in 1950?

-> ostensive definition: “same liquid” argument

- Putnam (1988a): “social cooperation plus contribution of the environmental theory of the specification of reference” “social cooperation” -> “division of linguistic labor” ex. elm vs. beech “contribution of the environment”: “No one on Earth or Twin Earth would have noticed that the word had a different meaning in 1750, but in my view they would have had a different meaning.”

(Putnam 1988a: 31-32)

è 自然言語と科学用語の区別の必要性 “Someone on Earth in 1750, if he had been taken to Twin Earth … would have taken Twin Earth water for water, but he would have been making a mistake; he would have been thinking that it was the same substance that he knew by the name “water” on Earth.

(Putnam 1988a: 31)

è 「間違いを犯している」とする根拠は？ 「１７５０年当時の不可分な液体である「水」と１９５０年現在の H2O で ある「水」を科学者は同じものを指し示していると考えるのか」 è 科学の共約可能性 (commensurability)：cf. クーン “the fact that an English speaker in 1750 might have called XYZ ‘water’, while he or his successors would not have called XYZ water in 1800 or 1850 does not mean that the ‘meaning’ of ‘water’ changed for the average speaker in the interval. … What changed was that in 1750 we would have mistakenly thought that XYZ bore the relation sameL to the liquid in Lake Michigan, while in 1800 or 1850 we would have known that it did not. (Putnam 1975: 225) “Electron” is treated as “preserving at least its reference intact through all of this theory change” and “Bohr’s 1934 theory as a genuine successor to his 1900 theory”

(Putnam 1988a: 13)

“All interpretation depends on charity, because we always have to discount at least some differences in belief when we interpret” è Kripke’s (1972) rigid designator and essential property 7

(ibid.)

− ディビッドソン：“study of everything” (1)

First [=literal] meaning is systematic.

(2)

First meanings are shared.

(3)

First meanings are governed by learned conventions or regularities. The systematic knowledge or competence of the speaker or interpreter is learned in advance of occasion of interpretation and is conventional in character. (Davidson 1986b: 436)

“claims about what would constitute a satisfactory theory are not, …, claims about the propositional knowledge of an interpreter, nor are they claims about the details of the inner workings of some part of the brain. They are rather claims about what must be said to give a satisfactory description of the competence of the interpreter. … It does not add anything to this thesis to say that if the theory does correctly describe the competence of an interpreter, some mechanism in the interpreter must correspond to the theory.”

(ibid.: 438)

“this principle [= (2)] does not demand that speaker and interpreter speak the same language. … What must be shared is the interpreter’s and the speaker’s understanding of the speaker’s words.”

(ibid.: 438)

As for (3), prior theory vs. passing theory “What must be shared for communication to succeed is the passing theory. For the passing theory is the one the interpreter actually uses to interpret an utterance, and it is the theory the speaker intends the interpreter to use. … But the passing theory cannot in general correspond to an interpreter’s linguistic competence. … Every deviation from ordinary usage, as long as it is agreed on for the moment … is in the passing theory as a feature of what the words mean on that occasion.

(ibid.: 442)

è ex. malapropism: a nice derangement of epitaphs (= a nice arrangement of epithets) “‘Mastery’ of such a language would be useless, since knowing a passing theory is only knowing how to interpret a particular utterance on a particular occasion.” (ibid.: 443) 8

“what interpreter and speaker share, to the extent that communication succeeds, is not learned and so is not a language governed by rules or conventions known to speaker and interpreter in advance; but what the speaker and interpreter know in advance is not (necessarily) shared, and so is not a language governed by shared rules or conventions.”

(ibid.: 445)

“there are no rules for arriving at passing theories, … I conclude that there is no such thing as a language… There is therefore no such thing to be learned, mastered, or born with. We must give up the idea of a clearly defined shared structure which language-users acquire and then apply to cases.”

(ibid.: 446)

“The general framework or theory [of a language], whatever it is, may be a key ingredient in what is needed in interpretation, but it can’t be all that is needed since it fails to provide the interpretation of particular words and sentences as uttered by a particular speaker.”

(ibid.: 444)

- Reply by Dummett (1986): “One natural choice for the fundamental notion of a language is that of a common language as spoken at a given time … we shall have to acknowledge the partial, and partly erroneous, grasp of the language that every individual speaker has.” (Dummett 1986: 468)

3 Language and interpretation: empirical inquiry

philosophical

reflections

and

− ダメットの言語観： “A language is a practice in which people engage. … a practice is essentially social in the different sense that it is learned from others and is constituted by rules which it is part of social custom to follow.”

(Dummett 1986: 473)

“The natural choice for the fundamental notion of language is … a language in the ordinary sense in which English is a language, …” → 言語獲得の研究において、子供の言語をいかに特徴付けるか？

9

(ibid.)

→ “The study of ‘language’ in Dummett’s sense verges on ‘the study of everything,’…”

(p. 50)

“in rational inquiry we idealize to selected domains in such a way … as to permit us to discover crucial features of the world. … Data and observations, … are of no particular interest in themselves, but only insofar as they constitute evidence that permits one to determine fundamental features of the real world …”

(p. 49)

→ 「刺激の貧困」の問題 → 「言語知識 (knowledge of language) 」を「言語運用能力 (ability to use language) 」と同定できるか？ “Jones’s knowledge remained constant while his ability to put his knowledge to use improved, declined, recovered, etc.”

(p. 51)

− クワイン Quine (1953) “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” analytic truth = grounded in meanings, independently of matters of fact synthetic truth = grounded in fact analyticity = definition or synonymy? ex. A bachelor is an unmarried man. “The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, … is a man-made fabric which impinges upon experience only along the edges.” “A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions readjustments in the interior of the field. … But the total field is so underdetermined by its boundary conditions, experience, that there is much latitude of choice as to what statements to reevaluate in the light of any single contrary experience.”

-> holism

è “conceptual scheme” の否定 “the considerations which guide him in warping his scientific heritage to fit his continuing sensory promptings are, where rational, pragmatic.”

-> pragmatism

→ “The philosophical debate over these matters has been misleading because it has focused on very simple examples, examples involving words that lack the relational structure of such terms as chase and persuade.” (Chomsky 1988a: 33-4) 10

− クワイン流の言語研究の手法： “holism” “behaviorism” Quine (1987) “Indeterminacy of Translation Again” The indeterminacy thesis: notions like meaning, analyticity, and synonymy are essentially unclear. -> Radical translation, basically a behaviorist approach observation sentences (ex. ‘Gavagai’) + analytical hypotheses “Their manuals might be indistinguishable in terms of any native behavior that they gave reason to expect, and yet each manual might prescribe some translations that the other translator would reject.”

(p. 8)

ex. phrase structure analysis of “John contemplated the problem” - Indeterminacy vs. underdetermination: “The indeterminacy of translation differs from the underdetermination of science in that there is only the natives’ verbal behavior for the manuals of translation to be right or wrong about.”

(p. 9)

- Quine (1972) “Methodological Reflections on Current Linguistic Theory” “Given two systems that determine the same infinite set of well-formed English sentences, Chomsky’s doctrine imputes to the natives an unconscious preference for one system of rules over another, equally unconscious, which is extensionally equivalent to it.” “If it is to make any sense to say that a native was implicitly guided by one system of rules and not by another extensionally equivalent system, this sense must link up somehow with the native’s dispositions to behave in observable ways in observable circumstances.” → 言語の生得的特性を無視、恣意的な証拠の限定 cf. 言語学的証拠 (linguistic evidence) vs. 心理学的証拠 (psychological evidence) ex. perceived displacement on clicks → “Evidence does not come labeled ‘for confirming theories’ (‘psychological evidence’) or ‘for purposes of “simplicity and general translatability”’ (‘linguistic evidence’).”

(p. 55) 11

Quine’s (1986) reply to the Coordinate Structure Constraint: “This striking uniformity appeals to me not as a hint of a trait of all language, but as a hint of genetic kinship of the languages that seem most readily grammatized by appeal to phrase-shifting transformations.”

(p. 185)

→ 「刺激の貧困」の問題のすり替え、言語獲得の観点の欠如 − 反「生得的概念」、反「生得仮説 (innateness hypothesis) 」：パットナム “there is something like an array of innate concepts and … these are to a large degree merely ‘labeled’ in language acquisition”

(p. 65)

→ “To have given us an innate stock of notions which includes carburetor, bureaucrat, … evolution would have had to be able to anticipate all the contingencies of future physical and cultural environments.”

(Putnam 1988a: 15)

→ 免疫学: “an innate stock of antibodies” by Niels Kaj Jerne “People who are supposed to be defenders of ‘the innateness hypothesis’ do not defend the hypothesis or even use the phrase, because there is no such general hypothesis; rather, only specific hypotheses about the innate resources of the mind, in particular, its language faculty.”

(p. 66)

- Quinean thesis of “meaning holism”: “revision can strike anywhere” → 自然言語と科学言語の混同、言語能力 (competence) と言語使用の混同

4 Naturalism and dualism in the study of language and mind Deflating the terms 心 (mind)、心的 (mental) 自然主義 (naturalism): “a ‘naturalistic approach’ to the mind investigates mental aspects of the world as we do any others, seeking to construct intelligible explanatory theories, with the hope of eventual integration with the ‘core’ natural sciences.” (p. 76) = 方法論的自然主義 (methodological naturalism) <-> 方法論的二元主義 (methodological dualism)

12

Language in naturalistic inquiry − 理想化 “A serious study will attempt to determine what ‘pure’ states of the language faculty would be under ideal conditions, abstracting from a host of distortions and interferences in the complex circumstances of ordinary life, thus hoping to identify the real nature of the language faculty and its manifestations”

(p. 78)

− 言語の多様性 “Slight changes in an intricate system may yield what appear to be dramatic phenomenal differences; thus languages may appear to differ radically from one another, though they differ only in rather marginal ways …”

(p. 79)

cf. 言語獲得における「刺激の貧困」 − 脳科学との統合 (unification) の問題 Varieties of naturalism - Baldwin (1993): 形而上学的自然主義 (metaphysical naturalism) vs. 認識論的自然主義 (epistemic naturalism) 形而上学的自然主義: by Dennett, “philosophical accounts of our minds, our knowledge, our language must in the end be continuous with, and harmonious with, the natural sciences”

(Baldwin 1993: 172)

現代版認識論的自然主義: by Quine, “epistemology naturalized” “the study of knowledge and belief must be incorporated within a narrow branch of behaviorist psychology of no known scientific interest”

(p. 80)

cf. traditional epistemic naturalism: “its primary concern is not with our continuity with the great chain of physical being but with the spontaneous availability to us of common sense beliefs which conflict with sceptical possibilities. (Baldwin 1993) − 形而上学的自然主義： “philosophical accounts” とは？ “the natural sciences” は何を指し示すのか？ Today’s physics? “Perhaps tomorrow’s physics will incorporate some version of today’s accounts (whether termed ‘philosophical’ or not), even if the latter are not continuous with today’s physics.” 13

(p. 82)

→ 統合 (unification) の問題 cf. １９世紀化学と量子力学の誕生、 デカルトの機械的哲学 (mechanical philosophy) とニュートンの理論 − 自然科学とは？ 心身問題 (mind-body problem)：デカルトの二元論 “Newton eliminated the problem of ‘the ghost in the machine’ by exorcising the machine; the ghost was unaffected.”

(p. 84)

“Lacking that [= a new notion of body], the phrase ‘material’ (‘physical’, etc.) world simply offers a loose way of referring to what we more or less understand and hope to unify in some way.”

(ibid.)

- La Mettrie, Joseph Priestley: “The material world is whatever we discover it to be, with whatever properties it must be assumed to have for the purposes of explanatory theory.” (Chomsky 1988a: 144) “In the study of human psychology, if we develop a theory of some cognitive faculty (the language faculty, for example) and find that this faculty has certain properties, we seek to discover the mechanism of the brain that exhibit these properties and to account for them in the terms of the physical sciences -- keeping open the possibility that the concepts of the physical sciences might have to be modified, just as the concepts of Cartesian contact mechanics had to be modified ...”

(ibid.: 144-145)

Materialism and its critics − 唯物主義 (materialism)：「心的なもの (mental) を物理的なもの (physical) に 還元する」ことによって心身問題の解決を図る − 唯物主義の批判：Nagel (1993) “Searle contends that none of these [materialistic] theories could possibly provide an account of what pain, hunger, belief, vision, and the like really are, because all they talk about is what is externally observable – the organism’s behavior and its causal structure – and a description of something exclusively in those terms fails to guarantee that it has any consciousness at all”

(Nagel 1993: 101)

“This radical thesis, that consciousness is a physical property of the brain in spite of its subjectivity, and that it is irreducible to any other physical properties, is the metaphysical heart of Searle’s position.” 14

(ibid.: 103)

− 心理主義 (mentalism) の批判：Burge (1992) What Burge calls “naturalism” (= “physicalism”): “there are no mental states, properties, events, objects, sensations over and above ordinary physical entities, entities identifiable in the physical sciences or entities that common sense would regard as physical.”

(Burge 1992: 31)

“mentalistic talk and mental entities would eventually lose their place in our attempts to describe and explain the world”

(ibid.: 33)

→ “mentalistic talk” や “mental entities” が共通感覚 (common sense) の概 念に基づいている → “mental” を “physical” に置き換えた場合、それが共通感覚に基づく限 り、何の問題も生じない。 → もし、“mental” をチョムスキーが意図する意味に取れば、統合の問題に 帰せられる。 cf. Davidson (1980): “anomalism of the mental” “while there are causal relations between mental and physical events, there are no psychophysical laws that that connect them in an appropriate explanatory scheme.”

(p. 88)

cf. Ethnoscience = the study of common-sense concepts as a branch of naturalistic inquiry Access to consciousness 反心理主義の根拠： - Nagel (1993): “Chomsky’s Language Acquisition Device … is not a set of unconscious mental rules at all, but simply a physical mechanism – for it is incapable of giving rise to subjective conscious thought whose content consists of those rules themselves.” (Nagel 1993: 109) - Quine (1972): rule fitting vs. rule guiding “Behavior fits a rule whenever it conforms to it; whenever the rule truly describes the behavior. But the behavior is not guided by the rule unless the behaver knows the rule and can state it.”

(Quine 1972: 386)

<-> Chomsky and his followers recognize an intermediate condition: -> unconscious knowledge 15

“Two extensionally equivalent systems of grammatical rules need not be equally correct. The right rules are the rules that the native speakers themselves have somehow implicitly in mind.”

(ibid.)

Just as bodies obey the law of falling bodies, “English speakers obey, …, any and all of the extensionally equivalent systems of grammar that demarcate the right totality of well-formed sentences.”

(ibid.: 388)

- Searle’s notion of access to consciousness in principle: 盲視 (blindsight) = a case of mere “blockage,” not “inaccessibility in principle” → 遺伝子の突然変異によって、盲視の種が生じた場合はどうか？ → 「言語知識」についても、突然変異によって意識化できなくなったと すれば、「原理的には意識化できる」ケースと考えられるか？ Further varieties of dualism − 生得仮説 (innateness hypothesis) vs. 一般的習得メカニズム (general learning mechanism) Quine’s behaviorism: “‘the behaviorist approach is mandatory’ (Quine 1990: 37) for the study of language because, in acquiring a language, ‘we depend strictly on overt behavior in observable situations.’ (p. 38)”

(p. 101)

→ 「子供の発達と栄養の関係」とのアナロジー Quine’s radical translation paradigm: 言語学者、言語獲得中の子供、言語使用に携わる大人が、すべて一様 な仕方で、獲得言語もしくはその発話者と関わる。 観察文とそれに対応する状況、Assent or dissent、基本的な推論 cf. Davidson’s (1986b) passing theory 統合 (unification) の問題の還元 (reduction) の問題へのすり替え “The disparity between theories of mind and what has been learned about neurophysiology ‘creates a crisis for those who believe that the nervous system is precise and ‘hardwired’ like a computer’”

(Edelman 1992: 27f.)

“the gap between the apparent algorithmic, digital character of language and the observed variability and continuous flux of individual experience and neural structure.”

(p. 103-4) 16

→ “the mental is the neurophysiological at a higher level” → “eliminative materialism” → neural-net (connectionist) models → computer (hardware vs. software) models: cf. functionalism cf. Kripke’s (1982) skeptical argument: “what program a machine is following is not an objective fact about the machine,

and

that we can

distinguish

between a machine’s

malfunctioning and its following its program only in terms of the intention of the designer. … If a machine fell from the sky, there would be no answer to the question: ‘What program is it following?’” (Chomsky 1986: 238)

5 Language as a natural object − 統合 (unification) の問題： “we can do no more than seek ‘best theories,’ with no independent standard for evaluation apart from contribution to understanding, and hope for unification but with no advance doctrine about how, or whether, it can be achieved.”

(p. 112)

− 心身問題 (mind-body problem)： Priestley: “Matter is no more ‘incompatible with sensation and thought’ than with attraction and repulsion.”

(p. 113)

But see a discussion by Nagel (1993) − 機能主義 (functionalism)： - Could a machine think? - Could it be in pain? “people think, not their brains, which do not, though their brains provide the mechanisms of thought.”

(p. 113)

‘Can machines think?’ -> “it is not a question of fact, but a matter of decision”

(p. 114)

- the Turing Test: Turing suggests that being able to perform indistinguishably from a human thinker is to be able to think. 17

- Descartes and his followers: experimental tests for “other minds” “The project of machine simulation was actively pursued, but understood as a way to find out something about the world.”

(p. 114)

ex. Jacques de Vaucanson: mechanical duck - unification problem: Functionalism divorces the cognitive sciences from a biological setting. Putnam, “The Nature of Mental States”

(Beakley & Ludlow 1992)

The formula of the soul can be thought of as a Turing machine, an abstract computing machine. -> Pain, or the state of being in pain, is a functional state of a whole organism. a multiple instantiation argument -> no reduction of the psychological state pain to a single type of neurophysiological state is possible. Against the brain-state theory: If we can find even one psychological predicate which can clearly be applied to both a mammal and an octopus, but whose physical-chemical ‘correlate’ is different in the two cases, the brain-state theory has collapsed. For the functional-state theory: We identify organisms as in pain, or hungry, or angry, or in heat, etc., on the basis of their behavior. è to find a normal form of psychological theories of different species Ned Block, “Troubles with Functionalism”

(Beakley & Ludlow 1992)

- Imagine that we hire out the adult population of China to enact the literal Turing Machine. Though the Chinese assemblage would pass a Turing test, we are not inclined to believe that it thinks; cf. John Searle’s “Chinese room” − 自然科学と通俗科学 (folk science) の区別： “whatever may be learned about folk science will have no relevance to the pursuit of naturalistic inquiry into the topics that folk science addresses in its own way, a conclusion taken to be a truism in the study of what is called “the physical world” but considered controversial or false … in the study of the mental aspects of the world.”

(p. 119) 18

− 理想化 (idealization)： “we take an I-language to be an instantiation of the initial state, idealizing from actual states of the language faculty.”

(p. 123)

“it [= idealization] is the procedure we follow in attempting to discover reality, the real principles of nature.”

(ibid.)

− 言語表現と外界との関係：「指示」(reference) の問題 “Suppose we postulate that corresponding to an element ‘a’ of phonetic form there is an external object ‘*a’ that ‘a’ selects as its phonetic value”

(p. 129)

-> Frege’s “Bedeutung” 自然言語と科学言語の区別

6 Language from an internalist perspective — 内在的 (internalist) 自然主義的 (naturalistic) アプローチ 方法論的自然主義 (methodological naturalism) <-> 方法論的二元主義 (methodological dualism) <-> “common, public languages”, Frege’s “Bedeutung” − 人間の信念／思考体系 (folk science) と言語能力の語彙意味体系との関係 → この二つの相互作用によって世界をどう認知するかが決定する − 反心理主義 (mentalism)：“eliminative materialism” -> no mind-body problem, except in one respect: “our theoretical understanding of language, mind, and people generally is so shallow, apart from limited domains, that we can only use our intuitive resources in thinking and talking about these matters.”

(p. 138)

− 自然科学分野各々の持ち分： “The particular natural sciences are commonly recognized to be largely artifacts and conveniences, which we do not expect to carve nature at its joints”

(p. 139)

<-> “There has been much heated debate over what the subject matter of linguistics really is, what categories of data are permitted to bear on it. cf. 言語学的証拠 (linguistic evidence) vs. 心理学的証拠 (psychological evidence)

19

(ibid.)

− ダメットのテーゼ：“scientific accounts fall short of philosophical explanation for conceptual reasons”

(p. 140)

“The naturalistic account would be a ‘psychological hypothesis,’ but not a ‘philosophical explanation,’ because it does not tell us ‘the form in which [the body of knowledge] is delivered’ (Dummett 1991; 1993: xi).” (pp. 140-141) <-> Hume’s science of human nature “philosophical explanation” -> “access to consciousness” ex. 言語能力を意識化可能な火星人の例 B. Smith (1992): “what reason is there to believe an account of mental structures can deliver a philosophically satisfying account of knowing one’s own language, reconcilable with the facts about meaning and use?

(B. Smith 1992: 134)

“it is a condition on any satisfactory account of the meanings of words that it tells us what counts as using those words correctly, i.e. in accordance with certain normative patterns of use.”

(ibid.: 135)

Wright (1989): problems of “first-person authority” “Chomsky’s suggestion, that the identity of followed rules is a strictly theoretical question, threatens, … to make a total mystery of the phenomenon of non-inferential, first person knowledge of past and present meanings, rules and intentions.”

(Wright 1989: 236)

“Each of us is, for the most part, effortlessly authoritative, without inference, about our past and present intentions, about the rules we ‘have in mind,’ about how we understand or have understood particular expressions.”

(ibid.)

- Problem of attribution of belief: “the problem of determining when we should attribute belief, or [flowers and meteors] rising and turning and aiming towards [the light and the Earth] – when we are justified in doing so?”

(p. 147)

è Quinean indeterminacy “No one seeks to clarify the philosophically necessary conditions for a comet to be truly aiming at the Earth … another intentional attribution.” è How about Putnam’s (1975) Twin-Earth case? 20

(ibid.)

- manifestation of “intelligence” and “language use”: whether machines think? “It is taken to be a crucial task for the theory of meaning to construct notions that would apply to any creature however constituted, real or imagined.”

(ibid.)

− 内在主義 (internalism) vs. 外在主義 (externalism): meanings are “in the head,” or are externally determined? è Putnam’s (1975) Twin-Earth thought experiment “That there is a relation between our words and things in the world is fundamental to our existence; thought without a relation to things in the world is empty.”

(Putnam 1992: 383)

外在主義による音声理論 (phonetic theory) とはいかなるものか？ 科学の共約可能性 (commensurability) 人間言語と科学言語の区別の必要性 “Are the contents of thought externally determined”? -> Baker’s (1988) locust-cricket example “unless the external world determines the contents of thought of an agent, ‘it is an utter mystery how that agent’s thoughts can be publicly available to another’ (Bilgrami 1992: 4)”

(p. 154)

-> “Smith assumes that Jones is identical to him, modulo some modifications M, and then seeks to work out M, a task that may be easy, hard, or impossible. Insofar as Smith succeeds, he attributes to Jones the expression that his own mind constructs, including its sound and meaning, communication being a more-or-less affair.”

(ibid.)

cf. Davidson’s (1986b) passing theory “common, public language”: è “Speaking the same language is much like ‘living near’ or ‘looking like’” (p. 155) 「言語」は存在するか？(Putnam 1992): “Languages and meanings are cultural realities.”

(Putnam 1992: 385)

“the argument [= the argument against the reality of culture] should not be taken seriously, for at bottom it just reduces to this: either show that cultures can be defined essentialistically, or admit that we should forget about them and return to the serious business of computer modeling. And that is just a prejudice.”

(ibid.) 21

è “these ‘cultural realities’ do not contribute to understanding how language is acquired, understood, and used, how it is constituted and changes over time, how it is related to other faculties of mind and to human action generally.” (p. 157) cf. “cultural artifacts” “standard languages” - The Language Myth by V. Evans “Evans suggests that the narrow focus on syntax impedes progress in research on the complex phenomenon of human language, and urges that researchers ought to move beyond misleading computer analogies and modularity concepts. In support of these arguments, The Language Myth presents research results from a wide variety of sources … that … cast doubts on the narrowly focused Chomskyan framework, and show the benefits of considering language as a complex trait that evolved over time, embedded in general cognition and human culture.”

(Behme and Evans 2015: 150)

- Internalist approach to vision: cf, Marr (1982), Ullman (1979) 網膜イメージから視覚野への写像の研究 “No notion like ‘content,’ or ‘representation of’ figures within the theory,” (p. 159) 思考実験（１） ：ある人間 X の双子 X’を想定し、唯一の違いは X’ の

経験がすべてバーチャルな世界であった場合

思考実験（２） ：人間は実は自然選択の影響を受けずに、別の惑星で作

られて地球に送られてきた場合

→ 内在的アプローチは何の影響も受けない

7 Internalist explorations − ヒュームの人間の本性研究 vs. 人間の共通感覚 (common sense) の研究 “the secret springs and principles, by which the human mind is actuated in its operations”

(Hume 1748/1975: 14, Section 9)

→ カントの先験的認識論

22

− 二つの異なった「心理学的一般化」 PG1: the discoveries about “what infants know” PG2: if Peter wants X, thinks that obtaining X requires doing Y, and is easily capable to Y, then he will typically do Y. Mental and physical reality The faculty of language Interpretation of interface levels Lexical items - “Mentalese”: language of thought; cf. Fodor Some questions of legitimacy — パットナムの生得的意味表示理論に対する反駁： 1) “meaning is holistic.”; cf. Quine “sentences meet the test of experience ‘as a corporate body,’ and revision can strike anywhere. For the sciences, the formula seems fair enough …”

(p. 186)

言語使用と内在的言語のメカニズムの区別の欠如 2) 反生得仮説： “I know of no innateness hypothesis, though there are specific hypotheses about just what is innate.”

(p. 187)

3) “the division of linguistic labor” and the “contribution of the environment” (7) a. “When we understand a word or any other ‘sign’, we associate that word with a ‘concept’.” b.

The concept determines the reference of the word (or sign).

語の指し示すものはその概念によっては決まらない。 ＜—＞内在的言語学 (I-linguistics) (8) a. b.

When X understands the word Y, X makes use of its properties. The properties might include I-sound and I-meaning and, if so, the latter play a part in determining what X refers to in using W.

Ex. the word “robin” in British and American English: 23

(9) “The word ‘robin’ does not refer to the same species of bird in Britain and in the United States. PeterGB and PeterUs are in relevant respects the same, and are unaware of (9). (10)

PeterUS uses the word “robin” to refer to one species of bird, and PeterGB to refer to a different species.

“The enterprise would not be carried forward by invoking ‘the real meaning (denotation)’ of words in a ‘common language’ that is partially known and shared, …”

(p. 192)

＜参考文献＞ Beakley,

B.

&

P.

Ludlow.

1992.

The

Philosophy

of

Mind:

Classical

Problems/Contemporary Issues. MIT Press. Behme, C. & V. Evans. 2015. Leaving the Myth Behind: A Reply to Adger (2015). Lingua 162: 149-159. Evans, Vyvyan. 2014. The Language Myth: Why Language Is Not an Instinct. Cambridge University Press. Kripke, S.1982. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Harvard University Press. Quine, W.V. 1953. Two Dogmas of Empiricism. In From a Logical Point of View. Harvard University Press. ウイットゲンシュタイン『論理哲学論考』岩波文庫 ウィトゲンシュタイン『哲学探求』大修館書店 ヒューム『人性論 第一篇 知性に就いて（上）』岩波文庫 フンボルト『言語と精神』法政大学出版局 リチャード・ドーキンス『利己的な遺伝子』紀伊國屋書店 木村資生『生物進化を考える』岩波新書

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