Objectivity Author: Elena Pasquinelli [INSTNICOD] Contributors: none Current version (on 2006-02-09) It is asserted that successful experiences with sensory substitution devices are characterized by the projection of the experience in the external world. This assertion raises the problem of objectivity. [J. Proust, 1999] suggests in fact to redefine the traditional approach to objectivity (traditionally, objectivity is associated with independence relatively to the mental activity of the subject and with the justified distinction between the experience of the subject and the object of the experience.) in terms of distality/proximality. An animal possesses an objective world when it is able of making reference not only to the proximal sensations provoked by a stimulus but even to the stimulus as distal or to contrast an inner representing state and an external represented condition. This capacity depends on a pre-condition: that the animal is able to evaluate its own representations and to correct them when faced with contrasting evidence in order to achieve veridicality. This structural pre-requisite seems to be related to the presence of multiple sensory modalities. In fact, animals with different sensory modalities seem to possess specific mechanisms dedicated to the calibrationrecalibration of the inputs: the inputs of one sensory modality are corrected when they are not spatially coherent with the stimuli of another sensory modality [Stein & Meredith, 1993]. Veridicality is hence equated an internal condition to the organism: the coherence between experiences of different sensory modalities. Objectivity as externalization also resents of the active vs. passive character of the experience. Experiences with sensory substitution devices [Bach-y-Rita, 1982], show that external projection is the effect of active exploration of the environment, while in passive conditions the tactile pattern is perceived as a simple stimulation of the skin and recognition is impaired. However, an experience which is projected in the exterior is not necessarily true of the external world: illusions are perceptual experiences that are systematically projected distally and not experiences of proximal stimulations, but they are nonetheless considered as errors.

Other criteria must then be added and tests performed for ascertaining the truth and objectivity of an experience in mediated and non-mediated conditions. Two approaches to this issue have been proposed that have the advantage of not requiring the perceiver to step out from his own experience in order to ascertain its truth. Within these approaches objectivity depends on the structure of the experience itself or on the comparison between experiences of different subjects, but not on comparisons with the unexperienced world. The first approach consists in [Strawson, 1959]’s equation of objectivity and unperceived existence. The main criterion indicated by [Strawson, 1959] for recognizing objectivity (for establishing that an entity exists even when unperceived) is the possibility of re-identifiaction: the possibility of reidentifying the object as the same object that has been perceived before the interruption of the perceptual experience. An event that exists even when it is not experienced by a perceiver can in fact be re-identified after an interruption in the experience. A special condition must be present for re-identification to be possible: the experience must be spatially organized, since it is the reference to spatial concepts (the fact of occupying a certain parcel of space) that allows the identification of an object as the same object. The second criterion for objectivity is intersubjectivity, that is, the independence from the subject’s judgement, validity for all subjects [Carnap, 1928]. [Davidson, 1982, 1984] proposes that assigning objectivity and truth is the necessary condition for interpreting and understanding other speakers in radical interpretation. In analogy with radical translation (translation of languages which meanings are not known at all to the translator), radical interpretation assumes the charitable position that the beliefs of the interpreted are globally true and consistent with his own beliefs (charity principle), in reason of the fact speaker and interpreter share the same world. Successful communication can hence been taken as evidence for an intersubjective, objectively valid world, and the verbal exchange about common experience can be considered to enhance the objectivity of the experience for the subjects. In addition to externalization, re-identification and intersubjective communication should hence be considered as effective tests for objectivity in different mediated and nonmediated conditions.

References: Bach-y-Rita, P. (1982). Sensory substitution in rehabilitation. In M. S. L. Illis, & H. Granville (Ed.), Rehabilitation of the Neurological Patient (pp. 361-383). Oxford, UK: Blackwell Scientific. Carnap, R. (1967). The logical structure of the world. Berkeley: University of California Press. Davidson, D. (1982). Rational animals. Dialectica, 36, 318327. Davidson, D. (1984). Inquirieis into truth and interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dennett, D. C. (2001). Surprise, surprise. Comment on O’Regan and Noëcomment on O’Regan and Noë for BBS. Available: http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/noeoregan.htm. Proust, J. (1999). Mind, space and objectivity in non-human animals. Erkenntnis, 51(1), 41-58. Strawson, P. F. (1959). Individuals. An essay in descriptive metaphysics. London: Methuen.

Related items: Believability Sensory substitution

Related External Links: none