On Halakhah #9: Halakhah and New Technologies David Zvi Kalman - [email protected] Richard Feynman, Surely You’re Joking, Mr. Feynman!, pp. 284-7 One day, two or three of the young rabbis came to me and said, "We realize that we can't study to be rabbis in the modern world without knowing something about science, so we'd like to ask you some questions." Of course there are thousands of places to find out about science, and Columbia University was right near there, but I wanted to know what kinds of questions they were interest in. They said, "Well, for instance, is electricity fire?" "No," I said, "but... what is the problem?" They said, "In the Talmud it says that you're not supposed to make fire on a Saturday, so our question is, can we use electrical things on Saturdays?" I was shocked. They weren't interested in science at all! The only way science was influencing their lives was so they might be able to interpret better the Talmud! They weren’t' interested in the world outside, in natural phenomena; they were only interested in resolving some question brought up in the Talmud. Electricity

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Rabbi Yehuda Yuval Rosenberg, (d. 1935, Montreal), Me’or HaḤashmal (publ. 1924 & 1929)

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Question: Whether it is permissible to use electrical illumination on holidays by pressing or flipping a button in the wall, or whether it is prohibited because it is considered the “production of fire.”...Indeed, have seen that many are lax on themselves in this matter [in 1924 edition: whereas stringency [humra] in this [matter] will constitute a decree which most of the public is not able to abide]. Among the learned, there are those who permit it and those who forbid it. More than once, conflict has erupted among them because of this. The reasons that have been heard from both sides have no basis of textual evidence... In all the cases mentioned in the Mishnah and elucidated in the Rambam, such as one who rubs pieces of wood together or who strikes stone with pieces of metal or who focusses the sun’s rays onto a piece of fla. In each of these cases, one is doing melakha by working with his own hands in order to create a fire, and one cannot say that these activities are simply an indirect cause of “carrying of a flame.” This is not the case for electric light, since the essential activity of producing current for the purpose of illumination is done in the electricity plant by other people by means of machines. They produce two

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types of electrical current by means of friction and through the power of the machines there, which they operate so that the machines will distribute [the electricity] and the two types of current will flow on two copper wires. Pressing the button is only the activity of touching or connecting two separate copper wire ends at this junction in order that this copper wire become a kind of bridge or a conduit for the flow of electrical current in order that the current’s movement not be interrupted at the place where the copper wire is interrupted and [instead] be able to flow into the lightbulb in order to unite with the second electric current. From this it is obvious that pressing a button on the wall is only an indirect cause of “carrying a flame” and is not the same as all those cases mentioned in the Mishna and in Rambam... One who performs the act of pressing a button is certainly not able to produce two electrical currents through his action...Since there is a prohibition of “carrying a flame” on Shabbat, it is fitting here to say that the ruling is in according with [the Talmudic principle of] “neither this one nor that one is unable to perform the [prohibited] action alone,” since we follow the opinion of R’ Yoḥanan and R’ Meir that they are both liable for such an act. For any time that two copper wires in the wall of the house are disconnected, the plant worker is unable to transfer fire and illuminate the house with electrical light without the action of pressing the button. Similarly, the one pushing the button in the house cannot transfer the fire and electrically illuminate his house if work at the plant momentarily ceases producing the two types of current. Therefore, it is prohibited on Shabbat. But on holidays, when there is no prohibition transferring fire and we instead only need to rule on prohibition of creating a fire...this is certainly similar to the case of “this one can perform the action and this one cannot,” since only the powers in the plant with their machines are able to produce the two electrical currents, whereas the one in the house, even if he presses the button for the rest of his life, will not produce any current. The one who pushes the button is only a supporting agent in order that the two electrical current flow into the lightbulb and combine and create illumination. And in the Talmud several Amoraim states that [being a supporting agent] is not really agency... What emerges from this whole discussion is that pressing a button on the wall in order for electric illumination is ab initio permissible on holidays. And if Israel are not prophets, they are at least the sons of prophets. But to do this on Shabbat is forbidden, and the arrogant ones who permit it on Shabbat speak falsely about our prophetic inheritance and have no knowledge of Torah and desecrate Shabbat with their actions. R’ Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (d. 1995), Me’orei Esh (publ. 1934): Indeed this is to announce that I have written all this only as a theoretical discussion [pilpul] in Halakha and not for practical application [lema’aseh]. For even if it were true that [turning electric lights on and off on Jewish holidays] is permissible, it nonetheless looks entirely like weekday actions and it is possible to be concerned about an adverse reaction in that the common people [hehamon] will think

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that [it is permitted] because it is not real fire and they will come to light and extinguish [electricity] on the Sabbath as well. Even though we should not add decrees to those of our sages, may their memory be a blessing, nonetheless leave Israel be, who have treated it as forbidden. (ME, 78, 155) Letter from R’ Rosenberg to R’ Auerbach (1935): Your Torahship knows that I also realize that here [in the case of electricity] there are factors [tending toward] prohibition and toward permission. However there is a great obligation on the part of the rabbis of the generation to be on the side of permission as much as possible... for just as it is an obligation [mitzvah] to say some- thing that will be obeyed [nishma], so it is an obligation not to say something that will not be obeyed (Talmud Bavli: Yevamot 65b). For this [prohibiting turning electric lights on and off on Jewish holidays] is a decree that the majority of the community is unable to uphold, and the masses will certainly not listen to the voice of the rabbis who prohibit. [T]he arguments for permission for which I laboured, and which I found... are poured forth [smoothly] like a mirror, and they can be refuted neither by logical arguments [sevarot] nor by difficulties [kushiyot] from the latter halakhic authorities [aharonim]. It is understood that the gates of rejoinders [teruzim] have not been locked. If they decree upon me the punishment of Hell [Gehinom] for this [responsum], it would be better for me to be in Hell along with the myriads of Israel who light and extinguish electricity on holidays, rather than to be in Paradise [Gan Eden] with the elite [yehidei segullah], who instead of loving righteousness have chosen love of wickedness.

2. Is the Lab-Created Burger Kosher?, by Yehuda Shurpin http://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/2293219/jewish/Is-the-Lab-Created-BurgerKosher.htm

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Question: Scientists have recently demonstrated that they can now take stem cells from a cow and build them into hamburgers that look, feel and (almost) taste like the real thing. What does Jewish law have to say? Is this considered real meat? Is it kosher? Response: This is a fascinating question that needs to be studied carefully by expert rabbis when the issue becomes more practical and Petri-dish burgers become an affordable option. But here are some preliminary thoughts on the subject to give you some perspective. Meat from Heaven What makes this question so intriguing is that this is an example of how those seemingly fantastic Aggadic tales in the Talmud are nowadays becoming a starting point for new halachik questions. There is actually a discussion in the Talmud about whether meat that does not come from an animal is considered kosher, although the origin of the meat in this case was even more miraculous: A story of Rabbi Shimeon ben Chalafta, who was walking on the road, when lions met him and roared at him. Thereupon he quoted from Psalms: “The young lions roar for prey and to beg their food from G‑d,” and two lumps of flesh descended [from heaven]. They ate one and left the other. This he brought to the study hall and propounded: Is this fit [for food] or not? The scholar answered: “Nothing unfit descends from heaven.” Rabbi Zera asked Rabbi Abbahu: “What if something in the shape of a donkey were to descend?” He replied: “You ‘howling yorod,’ did they not answer him that no unfit thing descends from heaven?” (bSanhedrin59b) Miraculous meat appears again in the Talmud, although this time it was man-made: Rabbi Chanina and Rabbi Oshaia would spend every Sabbath eve studying the “Book of Creation” by means of which they created a calf and ate it. (bSanhedrin65b) In discussing this story, later commentators debate whether such an animal would require shechitah (kosher slaughter) in order to be eaten. Rabbi Yeshayah Halevi Horowitz, known as the Shelah, writes that it is not considered a real animal and does not need shechitah. Others write that while a technical interpretation of Biblical law may not require such an animal to be slaughtered, the rabbinical prohibition of “marit ayin” (not engaging in acts that look misleadingly similar to forbidden activity) would necessitate slaughter--lest an onlooker think that ordinary meat is

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being consumed without shechitah. (See Pischei Teshuvah on Yoreh Deih 62:1) Test-Tube Beef So far we have discussed “miracle meat” that came from heaven or was created by spiritual means. Some commentators defined this meat as miraculous because it did not come from a naturally-born animal. But do we consider any meat that does not come from a naturally-born animal to be “miracle meat”? Or does it need to come through an actual miracle? How about test-tube meat, which does come from actual animal cells? In this case the dictum that “no unfit thing descends from heaven” obviously would not apply. Here are some of the issues that will need to be explored: ● The Cells The scientist extracted the cells of a real animal and used them to grow the tissues in a Petri dish. If, and that is not a small if, the mere cells are considered substantial enough to be called meat, this may present a problem. In addition to the prohibition of eating a limb from a living animal, there is an additional injunction not to eat any meat that was severed from a live animal. This is an issue for non-Jews as well as Jews, since Noahide law dictates that non-Jews may not eat even a minute amount of meat that was separated from a living animal. For Jews, if the cells are considered real meat, then presumably they would need to be extracted from a kosher animal that was slaughtered according to Jewish law. Another consideration is that there is a halachik concept, “the product of non-kosher is itself not kosher, and the product of that which is kosher is itself kosher.” While at first glance this would seem to imply that the cells need to come from a kosher source, it is not clear whether the above rule would apply to microscopic cells that were extracted from an animal. ● The Product In Jewish law, a food that contains only a minuscule amount of a non-kosher ingredient can still be considered kosher if the non-kosher ingredient is nullified (usually) by at least a factor of 60 to 1. At first glance it would appear that we can apply this rule to our scenario, since the original cells are greatly outnumbered by the “meat” produced. However, halachah states that the above rule does not apply to a “davar hama’amid,” an ingredient that establishes the form of the item. The essential ingredient can never be nullified, no matter how small it is. It would seem that the same rule applies to the cells that are essential to growing the meat. If they don’t come from a kosher source, they can never be nullified, and whatever is created with them is also not kosher. As noted earlier, these are just preliminary thoughts on the subject. Any halachik ruling would have to come from rabbis who are expert in these matters.

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Since I was asked by a former student, here are my quick thoughts on some Halakhic questions regarding the new "meat". These were merely quick thoughts. For people who have a need to think about this through a Halakhic lens - i.e. for ve-dibarta bam purposes only, not Halakhic:

R’ Elisha Ancselovits, private correspondence, 2013: Here are quick thoughts: 1. Such meat (which was never alive) is kosher without humane slaughter (i.e. shehita). Halakhically, even a breathing fetus calf that was removed after a cow's slaughter (ben paku'a) is minimally acceptable as food (i.e. mi-de-orraita) if it was killed in any way - although the humane cultural standard (mi-de-rabannan) is to slaughter it. All the more so, this meat. 2. As regards the question of whether such meat must have originally come from the cells of a humanely slaughtered animal, the question is whether one relates to how this meat was originally acquired (as one might be bothered by using a human cell strain that was acquired unethically) or whether one relates to the constantly new cells as unrelated to the original meat (as one might relate to a cell strain as having no connection to an original unethical act). Since the problematic of killing an animal inhumanely for food is not so severe (is not assur be-hana'a), the origins of the cells and thus the meat should not matter; it is no different than permitting a calf born to a mortally wounded animal because the calf is independent of the cow even as we forbid an egg (and debatably a chick) laid from a wounded hen. These new cells were not part of the dead animal. As regards the question of whether we should have some degree of sensitivity to how these cells were acquired, there is a Tannaitic debate whether the viable calf born to a mortally wounded cow is forbidden or permitted to the altar. Does one associate the calf with the mother that either had not been protected enough against predators/the elements or had been fed sharp wounding objects negligently? The accepted position is that the calf is acceptable even as a sacrifice to G-d. All the more so as regards this "meat" in which the cells are made from cells that have been made from cells, paralleling a calf born to a calf that had been born to a mortally wounded animal; there are no triggers to recall the original animal. Note: this argument does not permit killing an animal inhumanely (tza'ar ba'alei hayyim) in order to begin this process.

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3. As regards the injunction against eating meat and milk, this new meat had no mother. Thus, the meat is no longer meat. It is all the more so not a domesticated species in spite of the fact that anything born to a species is considered part of that species no matter what it looks like. I will separate the two questions of species and of being an animal: 3a. If a calf is born with genetic mutations that make it appear more like a pig, it is still kosher calf meat. In other words, because it shares the grazing, biological and mating traits of a calf and not a pig regardless of its appearance - it is a calf. In fact, even if it born dead, as a fetus, it is forbidden to cook and eat with milk - but that again is because it is the embryo that might have been born alive and suckled. In our case there is no emotional relationship (or even economic relationship) between cooking a killed calf/kid in the milk of a cow that is being milked until it will in turn be killed (etc etc), since this "meat" was never a developing calf. This meat is not an embryo. 3b. As regards the lesser injunction against cooking/eating milk with any meat, this "meat" does not come from an animal that was born or gestated. This meat is no different than a plant. Thus, although it has the texture of meat, the injunction does not apply. 3c. However, there is another more general - and weaker - prohibition (that is rooted in the injunction against eating milk and meat together) to consider: the prohibition against wasting protein by eating things like meat and fish together. Such haughtiness has been considered dangerous, a potential cause of leprosy, by the rabbis (and other cultures). There is in fact a modern (since 16th century) debate over whether one should also avoid eating fish with milk/cheese. True, rich people circumvented that injunction by relating to the custom of rich Europeans to eat the fish and meat in separate courses as sufficient to not be considered gluttonous in consuming both fish and meat together. Nonetheless: I do not see room for circumvention in this case in which permitting such "meat" and milk together would also lead to people cooking and eating killed meat with dairy once the two types of meats are similar enough, cooking and eating such "meat" with milk should be forbidden. This is not a new "fence" but rather an application of the old fence that forbid cooking even chicken with almond milk without adding almonds to maintain the psychological barrier against even chicken and milk. In fact, even those who argued that almonds need not be added because the chicken is clearly not beef/goat/sheep (and the "milk" tastes completely different than real milk), would forbid mixing "meat" that (will soon) taste like meat with real milk.

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Jews...in Space! R’ Levi Yitzchak Halperin, 5762(=2002) The law of the Torah are for one who is living during a time when night and day together constitute a 24-hour period, and for whom 30 days make a lunar month and approximately 365 days make a day. But this is not the case for a person who is in a situation where every hour and a half a full day passes, and within a span of 24 hours approximately 16 “days” have already passed; for whom a week is 16 “days” times 7, and for whom a month is 16 “days” times 30, and for whom a year 365 times 16 “days,” for according to this he would be obligated to put on tefillin 16 times every day, be obligated to say the Shema 32 times a day, and have to keep Shabbat three times evey day, and every 20 days have to make Rosh Hashanah, Yom Kippur, Sukkot, Hannukah, Purim, Pesach, and Shavuot. As well, it doesn’t make sense that the time should change based on the location which he is currently flying over, so that it might be Shabbat for several seconds and then not Shabbat for several more seconds, and the same for the Shema and all the other topics. Therefore it is obvious that the Torah has been given for those who live according to the time structure that exists on the face of the earth, which the moon and sun regulate, and not at all according to some other metric. However, we can support such a person’s position. This is a Gemara in Shabbat 69b: R’ Yehudah says: One who is travelling in the desert and does not know when Shabbat is, he should count six days and keep the seventh day. Hiyya b. Rav said: Keep one day and count six days. What are they arguing about? One rabbi is reasoning according to the creation of the world (i.e. six days and then Shabbat) and the other rabbi is reasoning according to Adam (who was created right before Shabbat). ... Therefore, a person may begin counting his hours and days according to Israel time, for if he marks exactly when he first flew over Israel, as well as the day of the week and of the month at that point, he can begin counting from then. Amazon Prime Air

An Old-New Kiddush Levanah: (cited on http://opensiddur.org/2011/07/dancing-with-the-moon-innovations-in-the-kiddush-levanain-light-of-the-first-moon-landing/#note-3440-1) Jewish Telegraphic Agency, July 22, 1969: Thoughtful Jews have speculated about the impact on Judaism’s religious outlook that would be made

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by man’s successful exploration of space. In a small way the answer began to emerge within hours of the historic Apollo 11 moon landing and exploration by Astronauts Neil Armstrong and Col. Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr. The word came from Israel where Gen. Shlomo Goren, the Armed Forces’ Chief Chaplain, issued instructions about a change in the prayer for the blessing of the new moon which is said each month. The old blessing was worded: .‫ וְ ֵאינִ י יָ כוֹל לִ יגַּ ע ָבְּך ‏‬.‫רוֹקד לְ נֶ גְ ֵדְּך‬ ֵ ‫כְּ ֵשׁם ֶשׁ ֲאנִ י‬ :‫אוֹיְבי לִ יגַּ ע ִבּי לְ ָרﬠָ ה ‏‬ ַ ‫כַּ ְך ל ֹא יוּכְ לוּ כָּ ל‬ As I dance before you and cannot touch you, so my enemies will not be able to touch me. It now reads:

‫כשם שאני רוקד נגדך ואיני נוגע ביך‬ .‫כך אם ירקדו אחרים כנגדי לא יגעו בי ‏‬ As I dance against you and do not touch you, so others, if they dance against me to harm me, they will not touch me. The new version of the prayer is actually an old one found in the Talmud in Masekhet Soffrim [‫מסכת‬ ‫]סופרים‬, chapter 20 [section 2].

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‫וכך נלע"ד‬   ‫פרשת ויקהל תשע"א‬ ‫מתוקן פרשת אמור תשע"ב‬

APPENDIX  Table of Rulings for Common Electronics    The  variety  of  electrical  appliances  and  electronic  applications  is  vast  and  growing  by  the  day.  It  is  impossible to discuss every form available today or to anticipate what innovations will be introduced in  the coming years. For this reason our project has focused on broad principles and applied them to some  of the more common devices from which other applications may be extrapolated. There will certainly be  need for further studies as technology and its surrounding culture continue to develop. Recall that even  permitted  activities  may  be  avoided  in  order  to  further  differentiate  Shabbat  from  the  weekday.  Even  forbidden  activities  may  be  permitted  as  discussed  above  when  overridden  by  countervailing  halakhic  values  such  as  pikuah  nefesh,  saving  a  life. We  here  designate  activities  which  are  biblically  forbidden  except  to  protect  life  as  ‫אסור‬.  Activities  which  are  rabbinically  forbidden  unless  superseded  by  a  countervailing halakhic value are categorized as (‫פטור אבל אסור )פטור א"א‬. Another name for this is ‫אסור דרבנן‬.  Activities which we consider to be permitted outright are categorized as ‫מותר‬.  

  Appliance Cellular/Smart Phone Computer (desktop, laptop, hand-held, tablet etc.) Digital Camera, Voice Recorder

Possible Concern(s) ‫ שבות‬,‫תולדת כותב‬

Shabbat ‫אסור‬

Yom Tov ‫אסור‬

‫תולדת כותב‬

‫אסור‬

‫אסור‬

‫תולדת כותב‬

‫אסור‬

‫אסור‬

Electric scooter or wheelchair

‫גזירה שמא יתקן‬,‫טלטול‬

‫פטור א"א‬

‫פטור א"א‬

Electric Dishwasher

‫תולדת בישול‬

‫אסור‬

‫מותר‬

Elevator

‫שבות‬

‫מותר‬

‫מותר‬

E-reader

‫תולדת כותב‬

‫פטור א"א‬

‫פטור א"א‬

Fan (air) Heating element (cook range, hair dryer; kettle; instant hot tap; pool heater etc.) Inserting batteries, connecting power cords Intercom

‫מכה בפטיש‬

‫מותר‬

‫מותר‬

‫תולדת בישול‬

‫אסור‬

‫מותר‬

‫מתקן מנא‬

‫אסור‬

‫אסור‬

‫שבות‬

‫מותר‬

‫מותר‬

‫ מכה בפטיש‬,‫ בונה‬,‫מבעיר‬

‫מותר‬

‫מותר‬

‫ שבות‬,‫תולדת כותב‬

‫אסור‬

‫אסור‬

‫שבות‬

‫מותר‬

‫מותר‬

‫תולדת בישול‬ ‫שבות‬

‫אסור‬ ‫פטור א"א‬

‫מותר‬ ‫פטור א"א‬

‫שבות‬

‫פטור א"א‬

‫פטור א"א‬

Lighting fixture (Incandescent, fluorescent, LED)

Magnetic stripe card Type I (credit, debit, fare cards) Magnetic stripe card Type II (key cards) Microwave oven Music player (MP3) Analog Telephone

Comments Records call and text info Captures user data; downloads and saves files. Unless automated Permitted ‫משום כבוד הבריות‬ for disabled people. Heats water; timer operation permissible ‫משום טירחא‬ Permitted for visiondisabled users in passive mode ‫משום כבוד הבריות‬

‫לא גזרו שבות במקום סכנה‬

‫לא גזרו שבות במקום סכנה‬

To be avoided; permitted for ‫חולה שאין בו סכנה‬

 

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