ONLINE APPENDIX for: ”Ex-post Evaluation of Mergers in the Supermarket Industry” Tiago Pires∗ Andre Trindade† December 6, 2017

∗ †

Deceased, formerly, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill FGV EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance. mailto: [email protected]

1

Online appendix - not for publication

Appendix: Data Construction In our sample we have, potentially, five groups of stores: a) Acquirer stores in the merger market; b) Target stores that become the acquirer’s stores in the merger market; c) Acquirer stores in other markets that are outside the zone of influence; d) Other stores in the merger market; and e) Other stores in other markets that are outside the zone of influence. It is important to note the following: • Group b) - Target stores that become the acquirer’s stores in the merger market - very few of them exist in our sample and, also, the current analysis that identifies a separate effect for that group is subject to the caveat described in footnote 26. • Group c) - Acquirer stores in other markets that are outside the zone of influence stores in markets without events, but that belong to chains that acquire new stores in a different market. The same is valid for Other stores in other markets that are outside the zone of influence • An “Other” chain in event city A can be an acquirer chain in event city B. For this reason, we use the following approach: In every merger market we classify the store according to its role in that market: If it participates as an acquirer, it goes into group a; if it is present in a merger market but not directly participating in the operation, it is classified into group d. However, for markets outside the zone of influence, we cannot use that approach. Consequently, we do the following: All of the stores that are outside event markets that belong to a chain that acquires any store during the sample is classified as an acquirer store in a non-event market (i.e., group c)). If a store belongs to a chain that does not buy any store in any other market, it is classified in group e). • Timing of the events for group c) - Acquirer stores in other markets that are outside the zone of influence - we have “turned on” the treatment for this group following the A-1

Online appendix - not for publication first acquisition that each chain makes.

Appendix: Additional Tables Year

Nbr of FTC actions

1996

1

1997

1

1998

2

1999

4

2000

2

2001

2

2002

2

2003

0

2004

0

2005

0

2006

0

2007

2

2008

0

2009

0

2010

1

2011

0

2012

1

Table A1: Count of FTC actions in the supermarket sector (1996-2012)

A-2

-0.0188 (0.0225) 0.0355*** (0.0046)

(2) logVariety

0.0036 (0.0087) 0.0370*** (0.0070)

(3) logVariety

(4) logVariety

(5) logPrice 0.0019 (0.0017) 0.0048* (0.0026) 0.0009 (0.0020)

(6) logPrice

0.0035** (0.0017) 0.0004 (0.0020)

(7) logPrice

(8) logPrice

A-3

Table A2: Weighted LS (using propensity scores) estimates of merger effects

0.0327*** -0.0010 (0.0045) (0.0020) Post-Merger x Long-Run x Other (Event) 0.0390*** 0.0023 (0.0064) (0.0025) Post-Merger x Short-Run x Acquirer (Event) -0.0647** 0.0133*** (0.0279) (0.0024) Post-Merger x Long-Run x Acquirer (Event) 0.0151 -0.0011 (0.0203) (0.0027) Post-Merger x Acquirer (Non-Event) 0.0027 -0.0077* 0.0071 0.0018 0.0137*** 0.0145*** 0.0133*** 0.0129*** (0.0047) (0.0043) (0.0049) (0.0040) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0008) Observations 29,991 29,991 29,991 29,991 2,934,893 2,934,893 2,934,893 2,934,893 R-squared 0.8816 0.8821 0.8825 0.8840 0.9724 0.9724 0.9724 0.9724 Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of available UPC’s in each store/quarter (columns 1 to 4), and the logarithm of the average of the recorded weekly prices in each store/quarter (columns 5 to 8). In columns 1 to 4 each observation is a store/quarter, whereas in the other columns each observation is a store/quarter/upc. Observations are reweighted to balance the mean characteristics of the treated and control group. The weight of each observation of the treated group is the inverse of the propensity score; and the weight of each observation in the control group is the inverse of one minus the propensity score. Propensity scores were estimated using a logit regression where the dependent variable is an indicator variable for whether a store is in a city with a merger. Regressors include the population in a 5-mile radius and the median household income in the state in 2002. Post-merger is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a merger took place in the city and 0 otherwise. “Acquirer” denotes the chain that acquired other stores, whereas “Other” denotes chains in markets with mergers that did not participate in the merger. All specifications include a constant and store and time (quarter) fixed effects. Columns 5 to 8 also include UPC fixed effects. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by store. Stars denote the significance level of coefficients: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Post-Merger x Short-Run x Other (Event)

Post-Merger x Long-Run (Event)

Post-Merger x Short-Run (Event)

Post-Merger x Other (Event)

Post-Merger x Acquirer (Event)

Post-Merger (Event)

(1) logVariety 0.0214*** (0.0068)

Online appendix - not for publication

-0.0174 (0.0217) 0.0397*** (0.0044)

(2) logVariety

0.0038 (0.0088) 0.0380*** (0.0063)

(3) logVariety

(4) logVariety

(5) logPrice 0.0023 (0.0018) -0.0009 (0.0025) 0.0033 (0.0022)

(6) logPrice

0.0044** (0.0017) 0.0012 (0.0021)

(7) logPrice

(8) logPrice

A-4

Table A3: OLS estimates of merger effects using alternative control group #1

0.0357*** 0.0005 (0.0046) (0.0021) Post-Merger x Long-Run x Other (Event) 0.0423*** 0.0048* (0.0052) (0.0026) Post-Merger x Short-Run x Acquirer (Event) -0.0731*** 0.0107*** (0.0281) (0.0023) Post-Merger x Long-Run x Acquirer (Event) 0.0106 -0.0064** (0.0198) (0.0026) Post-Merger x Acquirer (Non-Event) -0.0114*** -0.0152*** -0.0100** -0.0124*** 0.0074*** 0.0071*** 0.0073*** 0.0066*** (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007) Observations 31,311 31,311 31,311 31,311 3,058,630 3,058,630 3,058,630 3,058,630 R-squared 0.8841 0.8843 0.8844 0.8850 0.9736 0.9736 0.9736 0.9736 Note: Specification using alternative control group #1 using a distance (100miles) criterion. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of available UPC’s in each store/quarter (columns 1 to 4), and the logarithm of the average of the recorded weekly prices in each store/quarter (columns 5 to 8). In columns 1 to 4 each observation is a store/quarter, whereas in the other columns each observation is a store/quarter/upc. Post-merger is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a merger took place in the city and 0 otherwise. “Acquirer” denotes the chain that acquired other stores, whereas “Other” denotes chains in markets with mergers that did not participate in the merger. All specifications include a constant and store and time (quarter) fixed effects. Columns 5 to 8 also include UPC fixed effects. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by store. Stars denote the significance level of coefficients: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Post-Merger x Short-Run x Other (Event)

Post-Merger x Long-Run (Event)

Post-Merger x Short-Run (Event)

Post-Merger x Other (Event)

Post-Merger x Acquirer (Event)

Post-Merger (Event)

(1) logVariety 0.0259*** (0.0064)

Online appendix - not for publication

A-5 -0.0150*** (0.0049) 21,831 0.7851

-0.0174*** (0.0043) 21,831 0.7851

-0.0088 (0.0211) 0.0113** (0.0054)

(2) logVariety

-0.0137*** (0.0050) 21,831 0.7853

-0.0089 (0.0087) 0.0154** (0.0066)

(3) logVariety

0.0221*** (0.0062) 0.0050 (0.0062) -0.0721*** (0.0264) 0.0241 (0.0193) -0.0134*** (0.0044) 21,831 0.7865

(4) logVariety

-0.0008 (0.0014) 2,117,456 0.9718

(5) logPrice 0.0034* (0.0020)

-0.0030** (0.0014) 2,117,456 0.9718

-0.0104*** (0.0033) 0.0077*** (0.0024)

(6) logPrice

-0.0009 (0.0014) 2,117,456 0.9718

0.0038** (0.0018) 0.0031 (0.0023)

(7) logPrice

Table A4: OLS estimates of merger effects using alternative control group #2

Note: Specification using alternative control group #2 composed of stores of the same chain in the same state. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of available UPC’s in each store/quarter (columns 1 to 4), and the logarithm of the average of the recorded weekly prices in each store/quarter (columns 5 to 8). In columns 1 to 4 each observation is a store/quarter, whereas in the other columns each observation is a store/quarter/upc. Post-merger is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a merger took place in the city and 0 otherwise. “Acquirer” denotes the chain that acquired other stores, whereas “Other” denotes chains in markets with mergers that did not participate in the merger. All specifications include a constant and store and time (quarter) fixed effects. Columns 5 to 8 also include UPC fixed effects. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by store. Stars denote the significance level of coefficients: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Observations R-squared

Post-Merger x Acquirer (Non-Event)

Post-Merger x Long-Run x Acquirer (Event)

Post-Merger x Short-Run x Acquirer (Event)

Post-Merger x Long-Run x Other (Event)

Post-Merger x Short-Run x Other (Event)

Post-Merger x Long-Run (Event)

Post-Merger x Short-Run (Event)

Post-Merger x Other (Event)

Post-Merger x Acquirer (Event)

Post-Merger (Event)

(1) logVariety 0.0063 (0.0065)

0.0025 (0.0021) 0.0109*** (0.0029) 0.0009 (0.0031) -0.0160*** (0.0033) -0.0037** (0.0014) 2,117,456 0.9718

(8) logPrice

Online appendix - not for publication

Online appendix - not for publication

Post-Merger (Event)

(1) logVariety 0.0425** (0.0211)

Post-Merger x Acquirer (Event)

(2) logVariety

0.0218 (0.0175) 0.0425** (0.0211)

Post-Merger x Other (Event) Post-Merger x Acquirer (Non-Event)

(3) logPrice -0.0054 (0.0075)

(4) logPrice

-0.0213** (0.0087) -0.0054 (0.0075)

0.0207 0.0159 (0.0258) (0.0110) Adjusted HHI / 10000 0.0981 0.0981 -0.0241 -0.0241 (0.0755) (0.0755) (0.0339) (0.0339) Observations 999 999 97,657 97,657 R-squared 0.9641 0.9641 0.9703 0.9703 Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of available UPC’s in each store/quarter (columns 1 and 2), and the logarithm of the average of the recorded weekly prices in each store/quarter (columns 3 and 4). In columns 1 and 2 each observation is a store/quarter, whereas in the other columns each observation is a store/quarter/UPC. Adjusted HHI is the difference between the HHI and the estimated effect from a merger on the HHI. The estimated effect of a merger is obtained by projecting the HHI on a dummy variable for whether a merger had occurred, a constant, and city and time fixed effects. HHI is calculated using the market shares of each parent company. Market shares are calculated from the Nielsen TDLinx data set. The sample is restricted to treated cities (61 cities) and 45 control cities for the years of 2002 and 2006. All specifications include a constant, store and time (quarter) fixed effects. Columns 3 and 4 also include UPC fixed effects. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by store. Stars denote the significance level of coefficients: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A5: Estimates of merger effects adjusting for HHI

A-6

29,985 0.9585 6.381

0.0225*** (0.0068) 0.0062*** (0.0021)

(1) Fruit Juices

29,985 0.9591 6.381

0.0023 (0.0017) 0.0181*** (0.0034) 0.0476*** (0.0047) -0.0234 (0.0287) -0.0225 (0.0222)

(2) Fruit Juices

29,985 0.9024 4.232

-0.0059 (0.0092) 0.0206*** (0.0044)

(3) Milk

29,985 0.9025 4.232

0.0204*** (0.0043) -0.0164* (0.0086) -0.0047 (0.0112) 0.0246 (0.0234) -0.0075 (0.0221)

(4) Milk

29,714 0.9449 6.085

0.0323*** (0.0049) -0.0102*** (0.0020)

(5) Soft Drinks

29,714 0.9450 6.085

-0.0113*** (0.0019) 0.0271*** (0.0037) 0.0434*** (0.0044) 0.0090 (0.0184) 0.0189 (0.0155)

(6) Soft Drinks

Table A6: OLS estimates of merger effects on variety for each product category

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1

Observations R-squared Mean Dependent Variable

Post-Merger x Long-Run x Acquirer (Event Cities)

Post-Merger x Short-Run x Acquirer (Event Cities)

Post-Merger x Long-Run x Other (Event Cities)

Post-Merger x Short-Run x Other (Event Cities)

Post-Merger x Acquirer (Non-Event Cities)

Post-Merger (Event Cities)

Dep.Variable = logVariety

29,717 0.9573 5.357

0.0254** (0.0106) 0.0434*** (0.0045)

(7) Tea

29,717 0.9574 5.357

0.0409*** (0.0042) 0.0167** (0.0074) 0.0463*** (0.0106) -0.0128 (0.0401) -0.0037 (0.0314)

(8) Tea

29,740 0.8825 4.416

0.0697*** (0.0114) 0.0116* (0.0064)

(9) Water

29,740 0.8828 4.416

0.0042 (0.0063) 0.0859*** (0.0103) 0.1022*** (0.0153) -0.0177 (0.0264) -0.0133 (0.0219)

(10) Water

29,991 0.9487 4.610

0.0807*** (0.0127) -0.0022 (0.0049)

(11) Other

29,991 0.9490 4.610

-0.0064 (0.0044) 0.0931*** (0.0085) 0.1070*** (0.0091) -0.0167 (0.0520) 0.0307 (0.0422)

(12) Other

Online appendix - not for publication

A-7

1,449,707 0.9282 0.983

0.0090*** (0.0025) 0.0130*** (0.0009)

(1) Fruit Juices

1,449,707 0.9282 0.983

0.0108*** (0.0008) 0.0084*** (0.0028) 0.0179*** (0.0035) 0.0072* (0.0042) -0.0160*** (0.0051)

(2) Fruit Juices

58,136 0.9811 0.696

-0.0156*** (0.0031) 0.0226*** (0.0019)

(3) Milk

58,136 0.9811 0.696

0.0229*** (0.0018) -0.0192*** (0.0026) -0.0147*** (0.0033) -0.0128 (0.0110) -0.0128 (0.0106)

(4) Milk

786,427 0.9761 -0.0603

0.0036* (0.0020) 0.0112*** (0.0012)

(5) Soft Drinks

786,427 0.9761 -0.0603

0.0129*** (0.0012) -0.0019 (0.0024) -0.0027 (0.0023) 0.0256*** (0.0036) 0.0221*** (0.0030)

(6) Soft Drinks

Table A7: OLS estimates of merger effects on price for each product category

Observations R-squared Mean Dependent Variable

Post-Merger x Long-Run x Acquirer (Event Cities)

Post-Merger x Short-Run x Acquirer (Event Cities)

Post-Merger x Long-Run x Other (Event Cities)

Post-Merger x Short-Run x Other (Event Cities)

Post-Merger x Acquirer (Non-Event Cities)

Post-Merger (Event Cities)

Dep.Variable = logPrice

173,890 0.4491 1.053

0.0150*** (0.0053) -0.0067*** (0.0018)

(7) Tea

173,890 0.4491 1.053

-0.0074*** (0.0016) 0.0221*** (0.0058) 0.0143* (0.0077) 0.0094 (0.0071) 0.0079 (0.0090)

(8) Tea

145,696 0.9704 0.718

0.0104*** (0.0029) 0.0055*** (0.0014)

(9) Water

145,696 0.9704 0.718

0.0059*** (0.0014) 0.0132*** (0.0032) 0.0053 (0.0037) 0.0225*** (0.0040) 0.0156*** (0.0061)

(10) Water

321,037 0.4728 1.096

-0.0430*** (0.0027) 0.0067*** (0.0012)

(11) Other

321,037 0.4729 1.096

0.0079*** (0.0012) -0.0466*** (0.0027) -0.0485*** (0.0040) -0.0249*** (0.0033) -0.0285*** (0.0037)

(12) Other

Online appendix - not for publication

A-8

(2) Milk

(3) Soft Drinks

A-9

-0.0137 (0.0335) 0.0253*** (0.0093) 0.0450*** (0.0045) 5.1937*** (0.0061) 29,717 0.9583 5.264

(4) Tea -0.0216 (0.0252) 0.1148*** (0.0141) 0.0025 (0.0065) 4.2422*** (0.0117) 29,740 0.9100 4.233

(5) Water

Table A8: OLS estimates of merger effects on variety, for each product category - National Brands only

-0.0278 0.0391 0.0040 (0.0234) (0.0295) (0.0166) Post-Merger x Other (Event Cities) 0.0331*** 0.0378** 0.0337*** (0.0048) (0.0159) (0.0049) Post-Merger x Acquirer (Non-Event Cities) 0.0058*** 0.0345*** -0.0141*** (0.0020) (0.0054) (0.0023) Constant 6.2228*** 3.7815*** 5.8273*** (0.0033) (0.0105) (0.0033) Observations 29,985 29,985 29,714 R-squared 0.9611 0.9277 0.9329 Mean Dependent Variable 6.236 3.826 5.883 Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Post-Merger x Acquirer (Event Cities)

Dep.Variable = logVariety (National Brands)

(1) Fruit Juices

0.0141 (0.0439) 0.1070*** (0.0086) 0.0002 (0.0047) 4.4578*** (0.0070) 29,991 0.9457 4.515

(6) Other

Online appendix - not for publication

(1) Fruit Juices

(2) Milk

(3) Soft Drinks

A-10

0.1128*** (0.0350) 0.2044*** (0.0232) -0.0434*** (0.0063) 2.8787*** (0.0129) 29,697 0.9162 2.798

(4) Tea

(5) Water 0.0742** (0.0290) -0.0133 (0.0112) 0.0236*** (0.0060) 2.4770*** (0.0100) 29,714 0.7771 2.524

Table A9: OLS estimates of mergers effect on variety, for each product category - Private Label only

-0.0031 -0.0287 0.0812*** (0.0379) (0.0294) (0.0255) Post-Merger x Other (Event Cities) 0.0376*** -0.0342*** 0.0824*** (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0135) Post-Merger x Acquirer (Non-Event Cities) -0.0233*** 0.0299*** -0.0022 (0.0036) (0.0081) (0.0089) Constant 4.4183*** 3.0253*** 4.3306*** (0.0080) (0.0090) (0.0098) Observations 29,985 29,599 29,708 R-squared 0.8829 0.8760 0.9226 Mean Dependent Variable 4.344 3.014 4.339 Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Post-Merger x Acquirer (Event Cities)

Dep.Variable = logVariety (Private Label)

0.1369*** (0.0337) 0.0703*** (0.0128) -0.0849*** (0.0108) 1.9464*** (0.0132) 29,987 0.9005 2.141

(6) Other

Online appendix - not for publication

Online appendix - not for publication

Appendix: Additional Figures Figure A1: Averages by treatment group Detrended price in control and treated cities

0

0

.5

Detrended price 1 1.5

Detrended variety 500 1,000

2

1,500

2.5

Detrended Variety in control and treated cities

Before merger Control

After Merger Treated

Before merger

Buyers

Control

(a) Variety

After Merger Treated

Buyers

(b) Prices

Note: Average value of detrended variety for control, treated, and acquirers stratified by whether observations are from before or after the merger. The control group includes all stores in cities without mergers, the treatment group includes all stores in cities with mergers, and acquirers include all stores from chains that acquired stores during the merger. The values for treated and acquirer are simple averages, whereas the values for control are weighted averages. To calculate those weighted averages we start by determining the proportion of mergers that have already occurred (or have not yet occurred) in each time period. The after-merger weight of an observation in period t is the ratio of the proportion of mergers in period t to the sum of the values of the proportion of mergers that are associated with each observation in the control group. The before-merger weight is equivalent to the after-merger weight but uses the proportion of mergers that have not yet occurred.

A-11

Online appendix - not for publication

Percent 10 0

0

5

5

Percent 10

15

15

20

20

Figure A2: Histogram of HHI in treated cities

0

2000

4000 6000 HHI in 2002

8000

10000

2000

(a) 2002

4000

6000 HHI in 2006

8000

10000

(b) 2006

Note: Histogram of HHI in treated cities. HHI is calculated using the market shares of each parent company. An observation is a city in the treatment group (61 observations). Market shares are calculated from the Nielsen TDLinx data set.

A-12

ONLINE APPENDIX for

Dec 6, 2017 - that acquired other stores, whereas. “Other” denotes chains in mark ets with mergers that did not participate in the merger. All sp ecifications include a con stan t and store and time. (quarter) fixed effects. Columns. 5 to. 8 also includ e. UPC fixed effects. Robust standard errors. (in paren theses) are clustered.

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Online Appendix ...... that, outside of this class, the more discerning and accuracy orders are ...... Mathematical Statistics and Probability, pages 93–102, 1951.

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(Online Appendix). By Filipe R. Campante and Quoc-Anh Do. This appendix contains two parts: first, the Data Appendix de- scribes the variables and sources used ... (uniformly) “random” deviations do not change the rankings of distributions as ...

Online Appendix
to small perturbations of preferences and technologies. Indeed, this equilibrium would break if population 1 earned slightly higher salaries, needed slightly smaller land plots, ..... Figure 6 plots the locus of. (D.7) in the space (E,P) (see solid c

online appendix
May 15, 2015 - revenues comes from online orders in year t. Share of ... Share of the total wage bill paid to workers with a college ...... No telecom No computer ..... Table IV), we calculate the first term on the right hand side: the proportional.