Warsaw Economic Seminars

WES

Hour: 17.10 Date: November, 30th (Thursday) 2017 Place: Room: 5C, building C, SGH

Pairwise stable matching in large economies

Michael Greinecker University of Graz

Abstract:

This paper provides a model of stable pairwise matchings in two-sided matching markets based on the joint statistical distribution of the characteristics of the agents involved for environments with many agents on both sides of the market. Stable matchings exist in full generality with and without the possibility of transfers between agents and even in the presence of externalities. The stable matchings in our model exactly capture the limiting behavior of stable matching in large finite matching markets in terms of the joint distribution of characteristics. We also show that the model could be reformulated in terms of individual agents.

Joint work with: Christopher Kah (Innsbruck University)

Warsaw Economic Seminars organized by Warsaw School of Economics & Faculty of Economics, University of Warsaw www: https://sites.google.com/site/warsaweconseminars/ e-mail: [email protected].