Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 42 (2006) 314–322 www.elsevier.com/locate/jesp

Get mad and get more than even: When and why anger expression is eVective in negotiations Marwan Sinaceur 1, Larissa Z. Tiedens ¤ 518 Memorial Way, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-5015, USA Received 19 August 2003; revised 16 November 2004 Available online 11 July 2005

Abstract We hypothesized that anger expressions increase expressers’ ability to claim value in negotiations, but only when the recipients of these expressions have poor alternatives. This eVect occurs because anger expression communicates toughness, and only recipients who have poor alternatives are aVected by the toughness of their counterpart. In Experiment 1, participants read a scenario about a negotiator who either was angry or not. In Experiment 2, dyads negotiated face-to-face after one negotiator within each dyad was advised to show either anger or no emotion. In both studies, recipients of anger expressions who had poor alternatives conceded more. Experiment 2 also provided evidence that toughness ascribed to the expresser mediated the eVect of anger expression on claiming value. © 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Keywords: Negotiation; Anger; Emotion expression; Tough; Strategic

“The way in which he made use ƒ of anger contributed to make one feel what a mastery he had of the terrible game in which he was engagedƒ” (De Gaulle, 1954/ 1964, pp. 57–58). In his memoirs, French President Charles De Gaulle recalled his impressions of Winston Churchill. De Gaulle says that Churchill was persuasive by conveying toughness. According to De Gaulle, one tactic Churchill used was the expression of anger. In this way, De Gaulle suggested that anger might be used strategically in negotiations and that its advantage might rest in its ability to create the perception that the expresser is tough. In this paper we examine De Gaulle’s claim by investigating whether people who express anger in a negotiation are eVective in inducing more concessions in their negotiation partners. *

Corresponding author. E-mail address: [email protected] (L.Z. Tiedens). 1 Present address: Department of Organizational Behavior, INSEAD, Boulevard de Constance, 77305 Fontainebleau, France. 0022-1031/$ - see front matter © 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2005.05.002

Experienced emotions in negotiation Most of the existing research on aVect in negotiation has focused on emotional experience, rather than on emotional expression. That research has consistently found that experiencing positive emotions is beneWcial to negotiators, but that experiencing negative emotions is not. For example, negotiators in a positive mood are less likely to adopt contentious behaviors, and more likely to propose alternatives, and suggest trade-oVs than negotiators in a neutral mood. In turn, when negotiators feel good, negotiation outcomes are better (Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Forgas, 1998). Other research has demonstrated a negative impact of negative feelings in negotiation. Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, and Raia (1997) found that negotiators who felt angry achieved fewer joint gains than did negotiators who had more positive feelings. Similarly, Pillutla and Murnighan’s (1996) participants who felt angry refused oVers that served their economic interests. Although the results from the literature on felt emotion in negotiations do not seem to support De Gaulle’s

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observations about Churchill, they may be irrelevant to Churchill’s strategy. De Gaulle did not say that Churchill necessarily felt anger while being so persuasive, he merely indicated that he “used” it, which could mean that he expressed it without feeling the slightest bit angry. Research on emotional expression suggests that emotional expressions can occur independently from feelings (Fridlund, 1991; Tourangeau & Ellsworth, 1979) and can have independent eVects (McCaul, Holmes, & Solomon, 1982). Thus, expressions of anger might have diVerent eVects than feelings of anger. In this paper, we argue that anger expressions are noticed and processed by negotiators and that the inferences people draw based on these expressions aVect negotiation behavior.

Anger expressions and resulting inferences People are quite adept at noticing and reading the emotion expressions of others. In fact, research has shown that people are very accurate when matching cues (from the face, the voice, or the body) to the emotional state of the expresser (Ekman, 1993; Scherer, 1986). Observers infer more than felt aVect from such expressive cues; they also infer characteristics of the expresser. In particular, people believe that someone expressing anger is dominant (Knutson, 1996; Tiedens, 2001; Tiedens, Ellsworth, & Mesquita, 2000), strong, and tough (e.g., Clark, Pataki, & Carver, 1996; Karasawa, 2001; Knutson, 1996). Although the eVect of anger expressions on perceptions of toughness has not been demonstrated in the domain of negotiation, it seems likely that this eVect would generalize, and that such perceptions could aVect the outcome of the negotiation. In general, people concede more to negotiators they perceive as tough or dominant than to those they perceive as soft or submissive (e.g., Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; Komorita & Brenner, 1968; Pruitt, 1981; Yukl, 1974). If anger expressions lead to perceptions of toughness, and perceptions of toughness generally lead to concessions, it seems possible that anger expressions in negotiations would result in concessions.

Perceived alternatives moderate responses to toughness People’s perception of their alternatives dramatically inXuences concession making. Better alternatives increase one’s walk away point, reduce one’s perceived dependence on the counterpart, and thus decrease concessions (Bacharach & Lawler, 1980; Kelley, Beckman, & Fischer, 1967; Mannix, Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989; Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994). In fact, people’s perception of their alternatives may aVect their behavior more strongly than any other kind of information (White, Valley, Bazerman, Neale, & Peck, 1994).

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One advantage of having good alternatives is that it makes the negotiator less susceptible to the tactics of the opponent (Lawler & Bacharach, 1979; Tedeschi, Lindskold, Horai, & Gahagan, 1969; Yukl, 1974), particularly tactics that involve creating the perception of toughness. When recipients have good alternatives tough tactics might result in impasses or the unwillingness to compromise but as Yukl (1974) showed, a strategy relying on tough moves was eVective at inducing concessions from recipients who did not have any alternatives. Similarly, Komorita and Barnes (1969) found that negotiators who had unattractive alternatives conceded a lot when they were confronted with tough behavior from their counterparts, whereas negotiators with an acceptable alternative were unaVected. Thus, if anger communicates toughness, it should function like other strategies that rely on conveying toughness, and only aVect those who perceive themselves as having unattractive alternatives.

Experiment 1 Method Participants One-hundred-Wfty-seven undergraduates (68 female, 89 male) at a large U.S. University participated in the study for $10 payment. They were recruited from an electronic mailing list that advertises opportunities to participate in studies. This study was conducted in conjunction with other studies presented in a random order during a mass-testing session. Materials All participants read a negotiation vignette in which they were asked to imagine that they were playing the role of a negotiator who was Wnalizing a deal about the sale of technical equipment (see Appendix A for full text). The vignette informed participants that they were negotiating the terms of the warranty, which involved three issues: liability coverage; time needed for possible repair; and a discount for spare parts. The negotiation dialogue was comprised of eleven statements made alternately by the participants’ character and their counterpart. The only aspects of the vignette that varied across conditions were (a) the participants’ character’s alternatives and (b) the emotional tone of the counterpart’s last four statements. Alternatives manipulation. The alternatives manipulation consisted of information given prior to the dialogue. It read as follows, with the poor perceived alternatives wording in parentheses: You are (are not) working on many other deals right now. It is a good (slack) period for your company. Business is prosperous (rare). It will be easy (diYcult) to Wnd another

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deal if the one with this customer does not work out. Therefore, it will not (will) be such () a problem if you lose this customer. You have (do not have) many alternatives in this negotiation. Your bargaining power is quite high (low). Approximately half of the participants (N D 78) read the good alternatives version and the other half (N D 79) read the poor alternatives version in which the words in parentheses replaced the prior word. Emotion manipulation. The last four statements made by the counterpart in the dialog were presented either with the phrase “He, in an angry way:” (anger condition, N D 80) or “He, without being angry:” (no anger condition, N D 77) displayed right before the statement. The dialogue itself did not vary. Measures Dependent variables. Participants were instructed to consider what terms they would agree to for the warranty. The liability component was measured as follows: “What liability coverage would you grant? Please indicate any number between 0.1 million and 15 million. 0.1 million is the smallest concession possible, 15 million is the biggest concession possible.” The repair time was measured as follows: “What repair time would you grant? Please indicate any number between 36 and 12 h. Thirty-six hours is the smallest concession possible, 12 h is the biggest concession possible.” The discount item was measured as follows: “What discount for spare parts would you grant? Please indicate any number between 10% and 60%. Ten percent is the smallest concession possible, 60% is the biggest concession possible.” Six participants answered outside the intervals given in the warranty components items and so they were excluded from the subsequent analyses. Manipulation checks. Participants rated the extent to which they thought the counterpart expressed anger during the negotiation on a 6-point scale that ranged from 1 D “Not at all” to 6 D “Extremely.” Participants also rated the extent to which they felt they had many attractive alternatives to this negotiation on a 6-point scale that ranged from 1 D “Not at all” to 6 D “Extremely.”

main or interaction eVects on perceived anger expression due to the alternatives factor. Another 2 (Emotion Expression) £ 2 (Participants’ Alternatives) ANOVA on the alternatives manipulation check showed that participants in the poor alternatives condition felt that they had fewer attractive alternatives to the negotiation (M D 2.90, SD D 1.11) than participants in the good alternatives condition (M D 4.24, SD D 1.20; F(3, 147) D 50.34, p < .001). There were no main or interaction eVects on perceived alternatives due to the emotion expression factor. Concessions A total concessions variable was created. For liability and discount, a higher score indicated that participants made a bigger concession on those issues. However, for repair time, a lower score indicated that participants made a bigger concession on that issue. Thus, the repair time variable was reversed. Since each variable was on a diVerent scale, we standardized them, and then we added them together to create a total concessions score. A 2 (Emotion Expression: Angry vs. Not Angry) £ 2 (Participants’ Alternatives: Poor vs. Good) ANOVA was conducted on the total amount of concessions granted. There was an emotional expression main eVect, F (3, 147) D 4.51, p < .05, such that participants granted more concessions to an angry counterpart (M D +.36, SD D 2.26) than to a non-angry counterpart (M D ¡.35, SD D 1.87). There was also a main eVect of alternatives, F (3, 147) D 5.02, p < .05, as participants with good alternatives conceded less (M D ¡.37, SD D 2.05) than participants with poor alternatives (M D +.38, SD D 2.09). The interaction between emotion and alternatives was marginally signiWcant, F (3, 147) D 3.57, p D .06. The means are displayed in Fig. 1. When participants had poor alternatives, there was a signiWcant diVerence in the means (t (147) D 2.87, p < .005); participants granted more concessions to angry counterparts (M D +1.04,

Results Manipulation checks A 2 (Emotion Expression: Angry vs. Not Angry) £ 2 (Participants’ Alternatives: Poor vs. Good) ANOVA on the anger manipulation check showed that participants in the anger expression condition thought that their counterpart expressed more anger (M D 5.01, SD D .97) than participants in the no anger expression condition (M D 2.21, SD D 1.25; F(3, 147) D 235.17, p < .001). There were no

Fig. 1. Total of concessions granted by participants in Study 1. Note. A higher score indicates that participants granted more concessions.

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SD D 2.03) than to non-angry counterparts (M D ¡.29, SD D 1.96). There was no diVerence between the angry (M D ¡.33, SD D 2.28) and non-angry (M D ¡.40, SD D 1.79) conditions, t (147) D .16, ns, among participants who had good alternatives.

in the experiment for course credit. A total of 142 (72 female, 70 male) participants were organized into 71 same-sex dyads (36 female, 35 male). There were no main or interaction eVects due to gender or national context on any of the variables, so these factors are not discussed further.

Discussion

Materials and procedure Negotiation exercise. All participants role-played a job contract negotiation. Participants were randomly assigned to either the role of a candidate or of a recruiter. Pairs of candidates and recruiters negotiated over the terms of a prospective employment situation. Participants were provided with information about the context of the negotiation and their preferences for it. The materials were in French, which is a native language for both Moroccans and French. Participants were told that they could not show their counterpart any of their materials. The negotiation was comprised of four issues: salary, vacation, location, and equipment provided by the company. Participants were given a payoV schedule along with their role information. As in other negotiation tasks used by researchers (e.g., Thompson, 1991), it was emphasized that the point values speciWed in the payoV schedules were to determine their negotiation strategy. The payoV structures were created such that salary was a distributive issue (i.e., a higher point value for the candidate translated into a lower point value for the recruiter). Vacation and equipment were integrative issues in that participants could optimize their joint gain by combining the two issues. SpeciWcally, the vacation issue was worth more to the recruiter, while the equipment issue was worth more to the candidate. This diVerence in valuation made trading-oV possible by conceding on the issue worth less to gain on the issue worth more (Neale & Bazerman, 1991). Location was a congruent issue as candidates and recruiters had the same preferences on that issue (Thompson & Hastie, 1990).

This study provides evidence for the combined eVect of anger expression and recipients’ perception of their alternatives on concessions. SpeciWcally, recipients with poor alternatives made more concessions to counterparts expressing anger than to non-angry counterparts. There are always questions about the degree to which people’s self-reported behavioral intentions in response to a scenario capture the actual behavior people would engage in if they encountered a similar situation (e.g., Cook & Campbell, 1979; but see Robinson & Clore, 2002). Selfreport is subject to stereotypes or beliefs about the ways in which social interactions tend to play out, and the explicit nature of the emotion manipulation may have heightened this problem. Therefore, we thought it was important to examine the eVect of anger expression in negotiation with a procedure that would allow us to measure concession behavior. This was one goal of Experiment 2. In Experiment 2 we also wanted to explore the eVect of anger expression in a variable-sum negotiation. The outcomes of many negotiations are determined not only by recipients’ concessions but also by the capacity of the negotiating dyad to Wnd integrative agreements (Neale & Bazerman, 1991). And, anger expressions might decrease the cooperative behaviors necessary for creating value (Allred, 1999). If so, the damage of anger expressions might outweigh the beneWts, making anger a dangerous tactic in negotiations. Thus, in Experiment 2 we also examined the impact of anger expression on value creation. The eVect demonstrated in Experiment 1 is consistent with the idea that anger can be considered a tough strategy since previous literature has shown that other strategies relying on toughness lead to concessions only in people who perceive themselves to have poor alternatives. In Experiment 2 we further tested this proposed mechanism by examining whether perceptions of toughness mediated the eVect of anger on people with poor perceived alternatives.

Experiment 2 Method Participants Sixty-eight students (30 female, 38 male) at a large French “Grande Ecole” and 80 students (46 female, 34 male) at a large Moroccan “Grande Ecole” participated

Emotion manipulation. After reading their role instructions, participants were given a set of negotiation recommendations, which were adapted from Kopelman, Rosette, and Thompson (2005). To create consistency across the two conditions, participants in both the neutral and anger conditions were told they needed to use their emotions to demonstrate their strength and power. And, all participants were told that they should follow the advice of experts. However, the two conditions varied in terms of what these experts recommended. In the neutral condition (N D 34) participants were told that experts advised to hide their emotions. They were given a set of recommendations about how to control their emotions, such as staying calm, keeping a poker face, and keeping their voice steady. Participants

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in the anger condition (N D 37) were advised to express anger. They were given a set of recommendations about expressing anger such as using facial expressions (e.g., frowning), physical expressions (e.g., banging their Wst on the table), and to use aggressive sentences (e.g., “This negotiation really makes me angry,” “You’re beginning to get on my nerves”). Participants in the candidate role were not given any emotion instructions. Alternatives. Since the eVect of anger expression on concession only occurs among people who perceive themselves as having poor alternatives, it was only among those people that we wanted to examine the mediating role of perceived toughness. Thus, we told all candidates that they had poor alternatives. SpeciWcally, candidates read: As a Candidate, you have no other job oVer. The job market is not good. It is diYcult to Wnd a job. Therefore, you do not think that you will have other oVersƒ. In short, it will be a problem if you do not come to an agreement with the Recruiter. You do not have many alternatives to this negotiation. Your bargaining power is relatively low. After the negotiation, participants were asked to indicate whether they reached an agreement or not, and, if there was an agreement, what the outcome on each of the four negotiation issues was. Following the negotiation, they completed a questionnaire. Finally, they were debriefed. Measures Emotion manipulation checks. To check the eVectiveness of the anger expression manipulation, participants were asked to rate how much their counterpart expressed anger on a 6-point scale that ranged from 1 D “Not at all” to 6 D “Extremely.” Perception of alternatives. Participants’ perception of their alternatives was measured with the question, “Did you feel that you had many attractive alternatives to this negotiation?” This question could be answered by either “Yes” or “No.” Outcome variables. Participants were asked to indicate the agreement, if any, reached for each of the four issues they had negotiated. If no agreement was given for any of the issues, the outcome was considered as an impasse. The total number of points was computed according to the payoV schedules. Perception of toughness. Participants rated the extent to which the adjective “tough” described their counterpart. This rating was made on a 6-point scale that ranged from 1 D “Not at all” to 6 D “Extremely.”

Results Manipulation checks ConWdentiality of the instructions Three dyads had members who showed their instructions to their opponent. Two of these were in the neutral condition, and one was in the anger expression condition. These dyads were removed from the subsequent analyses. Emotion expression Recipients (candidates) in the anger expression condition rated their counterpart (recruiter) as expressing more anger (M D 3.59, SD D 1.67) than did recipients in the emotion neutral condition (M D 1.90, SD D 1.27; F (1, 63) D 20.65, p < .001). Alternatives Four participants who played the role of the recipient (candidate) did not answer the perception of alternatives item. Two of them were in the anger expression condition; the other two were in the emotion neutral condition. These participants could not be included in analyses in which alternatives perception was a variable, but were included in all other analyses. Among the remaining participants playing the role of recipients, 43 (67.2%) said that they had few attractive alternatives; the remaining 21 (32.8%) said that they had many attractive alternatives (2 (1, N D 64) D 7.56, p < .01). We also examined the relationship of anger expression to recipients’ perception of their alternatives; they were not related (2 (1, N D 64) D .97, ns), suggesting that recipients’ perception of having good alternatives and their perceptions of their counterpart’s emotional expression were independent. The majority of participants perceived their alternatives as we intended, however a sizable number of them did not. We are not sure why our instructions allowed for such variance. It may be that some participants did not pay attention to the alternatives component of the instructions, it may be that the negotiation itself inXuenced perception of alternatives, or it might be that since the participants would soon be job candidates themselves, some projected their desires for the future onto this role play. Whatever the reason, we saw this unintended consequence as potentially fortuitous in that it allowed us to once again examine whether diVerences in perceptions on alternatives interacted with anger expressions. However, we began our analyses as we had originally planned by comparing the angry condition to the neutral condition. Then, we performed supplemental analyses that took advantage of the variation in subjective perception of alternatives to further test our hypotheses.

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Impasses There were three impasses. Two of them occurred in the anger expression condition; the other occurred in the emotion neutral condition. Value claiming Value claiming was operationalized as the percentage of the total points that the expresser got. A one-way (Emotion Expression: Anger Expression vs. Neutral Expression) ANOVA on claiming value yielded a signiWcant eVect. Angry expressers claimed more value (M D 61.50%, SD D 9.24%) than did neutral expressers (M D 56.60%, SD D 10.40%, F (1, 63) D 4.05, p < .05). Value creation Value creation was measured by the total points earned by the dyad (possible range D 9200–18,000). A one-way Emotion Expression ANOVA showed no eVect of anger expression on creating value (F (1, 63) D .04, ns; Manger D 16,076 ; Mneutral D 16,013). Toughness as a mediator Next, we examined whether recipients’ perception of the expresser’s toughness mediated the eVect of anger

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expression on claiming value. We followed the approach of Baron and Kenny (1986) and the results of the regression analyses are presented in Fig. 2, Panel 1. As shown in Fig. 2, regression analyses found that anger expression predicted both value claiming and perceptions of toughness, that perceptions of toughness predicted value claiming, and that when anger expression and toughness simultaneously predicted value claiming, only toughness remained a signiWcant predictor. The Sobel test indicates whether the mediator signiWcantly reduces the eVect of the independent variable. This test showed that indeed the eVect of anger expression was signiWcantly reduced when toughness was a simultaneous predictor (z D 2.02, p < .05). Supplementary analysis Since a number of participants perceived themselves as having good alternatives we used this variation to further test our model by examining diVerences between dyads in which the recipients perceived themselves to have poor alternatives and those who perceived themselves to have good alternatives. These analyses must be interpreted with caution since alternatives was not a randomly assigned variable. Nonetheless, they provide another lens with which to examine the hypotheses. We re-conducted the analyses with a design with two factors: Emotion Expression and Recipients’ perception of their alternatives (poor vs. good). A 2 (Emotion

Fig. 2. Mediation by perceived toughness in Study 2. Note. The analyses depicted in panel 2 include only dyads in which the candidate perceived his or her alternatives as poor. *p < .05, **p < .01. ***p < .001.

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Expression) £ 2 (Recipients’ perception of their alternatives) ANOVA was conducted on perceived anger expression. As before, recipients in the anger condition thought that their counterpart expressed more anger (M D 3.48, SD D 1.68) than recipients in the neutral condition (M D 1.81, SD D 1.28), F (3, 57) D 16.45, p < .001. There were no main or interaction eVects on perceived anger expression due to the perception of alternatives factor. Then, a 2 (Emotion Expression) £ 2 (Recipients’ perception of their alternatives) ANOVA was conducted on claiming value. There was a main eVect for emotional expression (F (3, 57) D 5.32, p < .05), because angry expressers successfully claimed more value than neutral expressers. There was also a main eVect of recipients’ perception of their alternatives (F (3, 57) D 4.94, p < .05), because expressers claimed more value when recipients perceived themselves as having poor alternatives (M D 60.72%, SD D 9.79%) than when recipients perceived themselves as having good alternatives (M D 55.31%, SD D 9.29%). These main eVects were qualiWed by a marginal interaction (F (3, 57) D 3.37, p D .07). The means are displayed in Fig. 3. In probing the interaction, we found that when recipients felt they had poor alternatives, there was a signiWcant diVerence in the means (t (57) D 3.67, p < .001), since angry expressers claimed more value (M D 65.77%, SD D 8.81%; N D 20) than neutral expressers (M D 55.68%, SD D 8.10%; N D 21). However, when recipients felt they had good alternatives, there was no diVerence in the means (angry M D 55.88%, N D 12; neutral M D 54.73%, N D 8; t (57) D .29, ns). Tukey, post hoc multiple comparisons tests showed that the only signiWcant diVerence was between the anger expression—poor perceived alternatives cell and the other three cells. Finally, we examined whether recipients’ perception of the expresser’s toughness mediated the eVect of anger expression on claiming value among those recipients who felt they had poor alternatives. The results are provided in Panel 2 of Fig. 2, and as can be seen, the perception of toughness mediated the eVect that anger expression had on claiming value among those recipients who felt they had poor alternatives. A Sobel test showed that the eVect of anger expression was signiWcantly

Fig. 3. Concessions granted by participants in Study 2.

reduced when toughness was a simultaneous predictor (z D 2.32, p < .05).

General discussion These studies examined whether anger expression increases the expresser’s value claiming in negotiations. Experiment 1 showed that participants intended to concede more to an angry counterpart than to a non-angry counterpart when they perceived having poor alternatives. Experiment 2 extended this Wnding to a face-to-face interaction, using a negotiation task where there was potential for integrative agreements. It provided further support for the posited eVect of anger expression on claiming value when recipients perceived having poor alternatives. Since alternatives was not randomly assigned, we cannot be certain about causality in that study, yet the results closely mirrored those from the Wrst study. Study 2 further showed that recipients’ perception of the expresser’s toughness mediated this eVect. And, anger did not diminish value creation. Taken together, these studies provide converging evidence that anger expressions increase expressers’ ability to claim value in negotiations, when, but only when, the recipients of these expressions believe they have poor alternatives. Experiment 1 had strong internal validity since everything in the negotiation scenario was kept constant except participants’ alternatives and their counterpart’s emotional expression. Experiment 2 was lower in internal validity since there was likely variation across dyads, but by observing people behaving in negotiations it provides more external validity. In this study we gave some negotiators advice based on the results of our Wrst study (the anger condition), whereas others got advice that is perhaps more consistent with folk-theories of emotion expression in negotiation (Thompson, Medvec, Seiden, & Kopelman, 2001). In both conditions, participants were told to get the other party to concede, but participants who received the anger expression advice were able to claim more value than those who kept a poker face. SpeciWcally, expressions of anger create the perception that the expresser is tough in negotiations. Recipients who perceive themselves as having poor alternatives respond to the expresser’s toughness by conceding. The current studies thus suggest that the existing Wndings on the eVects of negative emotional experience do not extend to the eVects of anger expression. Whereas feeling angry has been shown to lead to bad negotiation outcomes, we showed that expressing anger can lead to good negotiation outcomes. This suggests that anger expressions can be used as a distributive strategy in negotiations, but one that should be used with caution. After all, some research has shown that expressing an emotion can result in feeling the

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emotion (Levenson, Heider, Ekman, & Friesen, 1992; Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988) and so one possible downside of the strategic expression of anger is that it could produce the experience of anger. Although that did not appear to be a problem in Study 2, expressing anger for a longer period of time could have that eVect. Another possible risk involved with the expression of anger is that it could result in negotiation partners avoiding future negotiations. As such, the expression of anger may be a strategy best suited for relatively short single-shot negotiations. But, in that context, expressions of anger appear to be a powerful strategy for claiming value.

Appendix A You work for a company that designs, manufactures, and sells technical equipment. You have a Wnal negotiation meeting with one of your clients today. [Alternatives manipulation goes here] Your counterpart and you have agreed on the majority of the issues relating to the deal, but there is still a warranty to be negotiated. You do not see any point in including a warranty in the deal because it is well-known in the industry that your products are highly reliable. Still, your counterpart keeps insisting on it. He wants a warranty and he wants the warranty to include agreements about: (a) the amount of liability coverage in case of a breakdown; (b) the time needed for repairing the equipment, in case of a breakdown; (c) and a discount applicable to the purchase of spare parts. Your company has provided you information about what kind of deal would be acceptable. In general, the company wants the lowest amount of liability coverage, the most amount of time available for Wxing repairs, and the lowest discount for spare parts. At the same time, your company set maximum conditions for you. Your company will accept 15 million dollars liability at most, at least 12 h needed for repairing any damaged equipment, and a 60% discount for spare parts at most. Again, this corresponds to the maximum conditions you can aVord so that the proWt on the deal remains positive for your company, but would not be considered ideal. Here is how the negotiation proceeds: He: “How about a warranty for the material. If there are problems, we want you to give us damages, at least 5 million dollars in damages.” You: “Our reputation for the quality of this technical equipment is almost unmet in the industryƒ The technology we developed has been well-tried and is highly safe.” He: “Good. Then you won’t mind formally including the three warranty items in the agreement.” You: “We have never encountered any failure problem with this equipment. It is highly reliable. You can check our clients references as well as the quality tests.”

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He, (without being angry) in an angry way: “We cannot aVord to have your equipment decreasing or stopping the production in our factory even for a day. We cannot play with the production rates.” You: “We have never failed our clients. We care a lot about the relationships with our clients. Our maintenance engineers are experts in their Weld. And our aftersales service is very eYcient and reacts instantly. We would repair the equipment within 36 h.” He, (without being angry) in an angry way: “We don’t want to put the production at that much risk. A 20-h repair time is the most I can agree to. I also need to have no less than a 50% discount when purchasing the needed spare parts. I want those in addition to the 5 million dollars in damages I mentioned earlier.” You: “But what you’re asking for now was not in the original agreement.” He, (without being angry) in an angry way: “You talked about quality and services, and now you do not want to put them in the agreement.” You: “We cannot be held responsible for every failure that would occur. For instance, if there’s a power cutƒ” He, (without being angry) in an angry way: “You are not serious people.” Note: Emotion manipulation appears in the last four statements made by the counterpart. In the anger expression condition the preWx read “He, in an angry way” and in the No anger expression condition the preWx read “He, without being angry.”

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