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Paved with Good Intentions : Proposals to Curb Minority Rights and Their Consequences for China Barry Sautman Modern China 2012 38: 10 originally published online 16 November 2011 DOI: 10.1177/0097700411424563 The online version of this article can be found at: http://mcx.sagepub.com/content/38/1/10

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Paved with Good Intentions: Proposals to Curb Minority Rights and Their Consequences for China

Modern China 38(1) 10­–39 © 2012 SAGE Publications Reprints and permission: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0097700411424563 http://mcx.sagepub.com

Barry Sautman1

Abstract Since 2004, academics concerned about a prospective fracturing of China’s territory have advanced proposals to phase out ethnic regional autonomy, preferential policies, and other minority rights. Riots in Lhasa, Tibet, in 2008 and Urumqi, Xinjiang, in 2009 gave greater impetus to the proposals, as they moved from academic to wider circles and complaints about preferential policies in criminal justice, family planning, and school admissions grew, with even state recognition of minorities challenged. Yet many minority and some Han intellectuals continue to see the proposals as deleterious to interethnic and minority–state relations and arguments for them based on practices in the United States and India have lacked persuasive power. The state has reacted to this discourse by reemphasizing existing policies, but it has also brought about a “subtle shift” in ethnic policies since 2010, albeit not the shift that proponents of curbing minority rights have sought. Keywords minority rights, ethnic regional autonomy, preferential policies, Ma Rong 1

Hong Kong University of Science & Technology, Kowloon, Hong Kong

Corresponding Author: Barry Sautman, Division of Social Science, Hong Kong University of Science & Technology, Clearwater Bay, Kowloon, Hong Kong Email: [email protected]

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Introduction: Lhasa, Urumqi, and Proposals to Curb Ethnic Minority Rights Riots in Lhasa and other Tibetan areas in 2008 and an anti-Han pogrom in Urumqi, Xinjiang, in 2009 were grist for the mill of Chinese intellectuals who seek to curb ethnic minority rights. They believe China’s own institutions and policies provide internal separatists with the latitude to riot and advance plans to break up China. As Han resentment against “ungrateful” minorities and calls to end “leniency” toward them poured onto the Internet in 2008–2009 (Wang and Wang, 2009), the idea of curbing the “privileges” of ethnic regional autonomy and affirmative action for minorities was given a new impetus, moving from academic to wider circles. Han have shown resentment of minority “privileges” before, for example, against Muslim Chinese Hui in nineteenth-century Yunnan (Atwill, 2007). Increased Han resentment in the nineteenth century of the ruling Manchu minority’s privileges factored in the 1911 overthrow of China’s last dynasty (Rhoads, 2000: chap. 1). In Xinjiang in the 1940s, Han resented the power gained by local Turkic elites when the central government’s presence dimmed due to civil war in “China proper” (Benson, 1990: 88–90). Yet, in the first six decades of the People’s Republic, while some Han may have resented preferential policies (youhui zhengce) for minorities in family planning, school admissions, hiring officials, poverty alleviation, bank loans, etc. (Sautman, 1998), the policies never produced strong ethnic tensions. China has seen hundreds of thousands of public protests, on many topics, but seldom if ever about minority “privileges” (Sautman, 1998: 100–102).1 Some 91% of Han live outside minority areas (National Bureau of Statistics, 2006), in places where “the question of minority rights, and thus the government’s ethnic policy, is a non-issue” (Jankowiak, 2008: 115–37). The anthropologist Mette Hansen found that most Han in minority areas accept the need for preferential policies: at her fieldwork sites in a minority area of Yunnan and Tibetan area of Gansu, “only a few Han immigrants rejected, or had any strong opinions about preferential policies for ethnic minorities.” Han dissatisfied with family planning rules “rarely directed their resentment against the minorities” (Hansen, 2005: 112–18). Proposals to “depoliticize” ethnicity by diminishing the state’s role in ethnic affairs emerged around 2004, notably from the eminent Beijing University sociologist Ma Rong (Ma, 2004; Bao, 2006: 13–16). His proposals do not aim to subordinate minorities; indeed, he is himself Hui and emphasizes the need to address discrimination. Rather, the proposals aim to solidify minority ties with multiethnic Chinese society and avoid the state’s

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fission. The proposals nevertheless would pare policies that many minority people find valuable and affect what are rights in all senses of the concept: goods inscribed in law, existing in practice, and serving as moral entitlements (Fan, 2003). After the late 2000s events in Tibet and Xinjiang, calls to curtail minority rights did align with complaints of favoritism and leniency. The strongest complaints concern a policy for minority criminals that Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Hu Yaobang issued in 1984: “two restraints [in arrests and executions] and one leniency [in treatment]” (liang shao yi kuan) (Zhang, 1991; Zhang, 2009). There have been complaints for years about favoring treatment for minority criminals, with many complaints focusing on Uygurs (Miaoye, 2003; Tam, 2010). Many Chinese believe the policy is applied generally (Moore, 2009; Tam, 2009), but it is supposed to be used only in minority areas and not for “developed” minorities or minority persons who have long lived in Han areas or among Han, or those with a decent education, or CCP members and state cadres (Zhao Bingzhi, 1988: 68; Xiao, 1996: 268–69). The policy is implemented, however, and “in legal and civil disputes, authorities throughout the nation tend to side with ethnic minorities for the sake of preserving ethnic unity, even to the dissatisfaction of the Han” (Lai, 2010: 77).2 This “leniency” contrasts with over-incarceration of minorities elsewhere in the world.3 Chinese officials are aware that complaints about preferential policies in criminal justice, family planning, and school admissions grew after the riots and that even state recognition of minorities is challenged on the internet (Cai, 2009; Thum, 2009). Soon after the Urumqi riot, Wang Yang, CCP Politburo member and Party Secretary of Guangdong, where a Uygur/Han clash among factory workers had been a spur to the Urumqi riot, said that “[ethnic] policies themselves will definitely need adjustments. . . . If adjustments are not made promptly, there will be some problems” (Chloe Lai, 2009; Reuters, 2009b). State Ethnic Affairs Commission (SEAC) ViceMinister Wu Shimin averred that “some people think the government is treating ethnic minorities too well and even complain the policies go too far” (Xie, 2009), yet “a deeper understanding is needed when it comes to making policies at the local level” (UPI, 2009). The September 2009 Communiqué of the CCP Central Committee (CCPCC) 4th Plenum directed departments to study how to eliminate factors adverse to ethnic relations (Wen Wei Po, 2009). While some officials dropped hints of possible changes in ethnic policies, others affirmed them. SEAC Minister Yang Jing said “we must stick to [our ethnic policies] for a long time to come” (Guo, 2009). A 2009 State Council white paper held development and stability still to be the key ethnic policies

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and pledged greater subsidies to minority areas (State Council Information Office, 2009). Proponents and opponents of curbing minority rights indicate, however, that the debate is far from ended (Ma, 2009b; Tohti, 2009b) and there has been a “subtle shift” in ethnic policies from 2010, although not the shift proponents of curbing minority rights have sought. In what follows, we consider existing ethnic policies and proposals to attenuate minority rights. It will be argued that these proposals call for actions that, to varying degrees, will impair minority interests and interethnic and minority–state relations, which are best served by expanding minority rights.

Background to the Proposals: China’s Contemporary Ethnic Policies China’s autonomous areas relate to the center much like autonomous areas in other parts of the world, in that autonomies and centers have the same political system (Wang and Sha, 2002). Electoral democracies have electoral democratic autonomies. Illiberal states have illiberal autonomous areas: Iraq’s Kurdistan autonomous government, for example, represses minorities and critical media (Human Rights Watch, 2009; Dagher, 2010). Autonomies in authoritarian states have authoritarian governance; for example, southern Sudan before July, 2011 (Gettelman, 2010). China’s minorities nevertheless seem to value their areas being designated as autonomous, as such areas often receive greater state subsidies than non-autonomous ones (Guo, 2008). In 2008, the government of a Shaanxi county that was a historic home of the Qiang minority urged its residents to register as Qiang if they could prove a “blood relationship.” It hoped to reach the 30% minimum needed for designation as an autonomous county. Thousands of the 120,000 residents registered, knowing that they would now receive individual preferences and, if its application were approved, that the county would also get area-based preferences (Li, 2008).

Preferential Policies While many Han regard lower scores for admission to universities as the main preference for minorities, state subsidies to autonomous areas may be more important. A scholar has noted that “whenever the issue of fiscal transfers comes up, the central government never tires of emphasizing that ethnic regions deserve preferential treatment” (Wang Shaoguang, 2004: 118). The central government and sister provinces supplied 93% of the 2008 Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) budget and 53% of Xinjiang’s 2004 budget (Xinhua, 2009a; Wang Lequan, 2005).

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China’s preferential policies mainly exist in areas of state activity (Ogawa, 1994: 169–80). That sector is, however, shrinking. In 2007, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) only employed 22% of China’s urban workforce (Schucher, 2009: 133). Fewer than 8% of China’s urbanites worked in the state monopoly industries with the best jobs—finance, telecommunications, tobacco, public utilities, petroleum, and electricity—but were paid 55% of China’s total wages (Huang, 2009).4 Only a few preferences directly affect the private sector; for example, state bank loans to minorities to start businesses (Sautman, 1998: 104) and state programs for Uygurs to work outside Xinjiang (Ma, 2008c). As the state sector shrinks, discriminatory hiring and layoffs affect some members of minorities, such as Uygur men (MaurerFazio, Hughes, and Zhang, 2007). Privatization makes it harder to apply preferences because many private-sector bosses operate outside the control of officials or with their collusion and local officials are more empowered by the decentralization accompanying privatization. A Han who grew up in Xinjiang has explained that in the free market economy, local officials are more powerful and have much more leeway over the implementation of policies set by the central government and frequently they carry out polices that benefit themselves, which means they may distort or ignore the central government’s preferential policies toward ethnic minorities. (Weston, 2008) Indeed, the Xinjiang CCP has recognized that market forces lessen state powers of intervention, increase minority workers’ employment difficulties, especially in farm and non-state industrial work, and make it harder to implement equal opportunities (XUAR, 2001: 34–38).

Other Ethnic Policies The suppression of separatism is allowed under international law, if carried out lawfully (Sautman, 2001: 102n131). As it stands, however, such suppression is sometimes marked by the beatings and torture typically meted out by police in China (House, 1997; Nowak, 2006). The suppression of separatism is presently a net cast too wide; for example, in repressing public displays of religious respect for the Dalai Lama in some areas. It is also a net cast too narrowly, when the Chinese government fails to confront other states’ leveraging of separatism against China as a purported “strategic competitor.”5 Ethnic discrimination is illegal, but generally unpunished in China (Employment Promotion Law, 2008; Brown, 2009: 83–86). It is common in

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the private and (to a lesser extent) public sectors (CECC, 2009; Hu Ping, 2009) as well as in access to hotel rooms, the Internet, taxis, etc.6 Discrimination is never justified by cadres or academics. Top officials stress that policies should benefit minorities. For example, in a 2005 speech, Hu Jintao called for more freedom of religion, strengthened ethnic regional autonomy, Han officials learning minority languages, greater quotas for hiring minority cadres, and more recognition of their contributions (Hu Jintao, 2005). Discrimination is, however, often excused. A scholar at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, a state think-tank, has written that though it is unfair, it is understandable if a business owner is more willing to hire an employee who is more fluent in Mandarin Chinese, shares the same work ethics as the employer and is better at establishing the social networks so critical to business success in East Asian societies. (Wei, 2009) Blaine Kaltman’s 2004–2005 survey of Uygurs and Han in Urumqi, Shanghai, and Beijing determined that Han generally held discriminatory views about Uygurs, who in turn, expressed racist views about Han (Kaltman, 2007: 115– 16, 3). Herbert Yee’s 2000–2001 surveys of Uygurs and Han in Xinjiang cities also showed mutual prejudices (Yee, 2003; Yee, 2005: 42), as did Ji Ping and Gao Bingzhong’s 1987 survey (Ji and Gao, 1994). Reza Hasmath found that though Beijing ethnic minority people generally have higher educational levels than Han, most say they face discrimination with regard to high-wage, education-intensive jobs, due to stereotyping by employers, even though most interviewees grew up in Beijing, speak fluent standard Chinese, and are assimilated into Han culture (Hasmath, 2009).7 This ethnic penalty is apt to be more severe in minority areas, where language and cultural differences may be stark and serve as an excuse for discrimination (Pan, 2009; Fallows, 2006; Tohti, 2006). China’s anti-discrimination policies lack effective enforcement. The Employment Promotion Law of 2008, Article 62, allows discriminated workers to sue, but courts are directed by local officials who often have ties to business and oppose actions they regard as inhibiting growth (Peerenboom, 2009; Zeng, 2007). Laws forbidding hate-speech are also not enforced (Leibold, 2010), yet together with ethnic inequalities, Han migration, and restrictive religious policies, deprecation is a factor reinforcing separatism. Ethnically impacting policies on religion restrict religious practice and institutions, but more in the TAR and Xinjiang than elsewhere. There, CCP members, university students, state workers, and children are barred from

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public religious activities. The number of Tibetan Buddhist monks is limited and building permits for mosques are often denied in Xinjiang (USSD, 2009; USSD, 2006), where beards and head scarves are not permitted in schools and civil servants can be fired for praying during working hours (Ng, 2010: 12). State discourses of religion also have politically consequential effects. In Tibetan areas, there is official criticism of popular financial support for religious activities (PCGT, 1990) and official ad hominem attacks on the Dalai Lama, including denials that he is a religious leader (Zhao Qizheng, 2010). Xinjiang officials counterpose piety to development in order to prohibit students and government workers from fasting during the Muslim month of Ramadan (Wong, 2008). The situation is different outside the TAR and Xinjiang. In highly multiethnic Yunnan province, for example, “ethnic minorities . . . enjoy a relatively high level of religious freedom, not in opposition to the party-state but with its full blessing” and where the suspicious gaze from the central government and party is limited or even absent, the picture of religious freedom for minority nationalities becomes markedly more nuanced. It might be argued that in several instances minority nationalities have greater freedom in practicing religion than their Han Chinese neighbors. Practices such as ancestor worship, divination or cults dedicated to local deities are more likely to be tolerated by the authorities in areas with minority nationalities. (Wellens, 2009: 434–35; Economist, 2007) Such are the policies that background proposals to curb minority rights. Hotly debated after the 2008–2009 Lhasa and Urumqi events, these policies began to change subtly in 2010, but not in the way advocated by proponents of curbing minority rights.

The Proposals and Their Critics Many of Ma Rong’s analyses begin with implications of the use of official terms in the discourse of ethnicity, especially the inapt application of the term minzu to both ethnic groups, which are cultural–historical entities, and nations, which are political–territorial entities. He has helped mitigate this confusion by promoting use of zuqun as a term for ethnic groups, a move welcomed by many scholars of ethnicity (Guan, 2007; Ye, 2010). Ma Rong’s essays discuss differences for ethnic relations between politicization, which treats ethnies as groups with power and territory, and

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culturalization, which treats them as groups in which individuals merely share common cultural practices. He argues that politicized policies strengthen ethnic identities and consciousness, creating barriers to integration. China’s 1950s project of ethnic group identification set a clear identity for everyone and fixed the idea that Chinese are a multiethnic nation. Ethnic autonomy created a sense of territoriality and preferences further enhanced ethnic identities. That interethnic relations have mainly been good over 60 years is largely because of the high proportion of Han and their economic support of minorities. The present project to develop the west (Xibu da kaifa) has transferred funds and many Han have moved there, but because they know little of minority cultures, communication difficulties sometimes lead to riots, attacks, distrust, and hatred among ethnic groups. Incidents in Tibet and Xinjiang involve extremist and mob attacks that then produce discrimination against Tibetans and Uygurs by taxi drivers, hoteliers, security personnel, and others. Meanwhile, state propaganda about Huaxia zisun (descendants of the Han nucleus), long de chuanren (descendants of the dragon, a Han symbol), and Huangdi (the Yellow Emperor, mythical ancestor of Han) equates Chinese with Han and ignores minorities. China thus needs to depoliticize ethnicity (Ma, 2008b). Ma Rong argues that China’s derivation of its autonomy system from the ex-Soviet Union creates problems. Revolution cut short attempts to centralize Russia by replacing ethnic regions with provinces. The Soviets carried out ethnic registration and preferential policies (Martin, 2001), enhancing most ethnic groups’ conception of nationality, while the constitution permitted separation, so that when reforms under Mikhail Gorbachev came along, severe problems ensued. China, by copying Soviet theories and policies, remains a “multination” (duo minzu) state that arouses a desire for independence among some ethnic elites with previously weak identities. Meanwhile Han/minority disparities and Han disparagement increase minorities’ dislike of Han (Ma, 2008a). Ma Rong contends that Soviet policies transferred to China are dangerous and the key fault in the Soviet design was ethno-federalism. He notes that there was no challenge to Soviet unity from the U.S.S.R.’s creation in 1922 until 1985, but the state’s strength waned in the 1980s, once the bonds of ideology, top-down rule, and economic integration broke under Gorbachev’s restructuring (perestroika). According to Ma Rong, adherence to Sovietstyle policies now presents China with a separatist danger, even a threat of dissolution (Ma, 2007b). China, he argues, should thus adopt depoliticizing policies aimed at culturalist integration, as in the United States. There, minorities are deemed “sub-cultural” groups and ethnic groups all regard the

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United States as their nation, communicate well, intermarry, and assimilate each other. The government does not see problems of disadvantaged minorities as political issues and does not act to separately protect such groups; rather, the state and non-governmental organizations provide welfare measures. While treating all groups as politically equal, the government encourages recognition of ethnic cultural differences and U.S. scholars uphold cultural pluralism. They may insist on assimilation and the primacy of English and Christianity, but agree that ethnies can keep elements of their own cultures and that discrimination should be avoided. Thus, ethnicity is not indicated on identity cards and is not required for job applications or the census. The U.S. government also seeks to reduce residential and school segregation. Political homogeneity thus coexists with cultural diversity. Issues related to ethnicity are treated only as individual or social matters. The United States has national cohesiveness and identity; separatist tendencies exist only among the most disadvantaged minorities (Ma, 2009a). India is for Ma Rong another example of depoliticized ethnicity. He notes that a survey has shown that 90% of its citizens are proud to be Indian. Ethnic nationalist movements and guerrilla wars waged by India’s minority tribes have not been internationalized and do not threaten national unity (Ma, 2007a: 215–16). Ma Rong’s proposals are consonant with a classic liberal dislike of group rights, as expressed by Western political philosophers who decry a multiculturalism “that supports politicization of group identities” and who endorse a liberal social contract founded on individual rights (Barry, 2001: 5). Those Chinese classic liberals who endorse variants of Western classic liberalism (Liu, 2000: 48–57) also uphold individual, not group, rights. Like European, and unlike U.S. classic liberals (“conservatives”), however, they do not reflexively oppose group-oriented social welfare measures (Feng, 2009; SCMP, 2009). Other Chinese intellectuals have also sought to curb minority rights. Wang Lixiong, a writer long associated with the liberal intelligentsia and now aligned with the Dalai Lama, has said that ethnic regional autonomy is not needed if individual rights are guaranteed. Reportedly also, “Qian Xuesen [“Father of Chinese Rocketry,” d. 2009] and other leading intellectuals and dissidents [have called on the government] to re-examine the ‘favouritist’ nationality policy” (Hao, 2009). Nanjing University professor Wang Yingguo, in an essay written days after the Urumqi riot, also argues for curbing minority rights (Wang Yingguo, 2009). Like Ma Rong, he contends that preferential policies make it harder for minorities to develop a Chinese identity and that autonomous areas lock in ethnic differences (see also Zhu Lun, 2009, on autonomy

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as leading to separatism and unsuitable for China). His arguments also go far beyond Ma Rong’s and may reflect post-riots popular sentiment. Wang calls for determinedly engaging in assimilation (jianjue gao datong) and avers that its history of assimilation accounts for the Chinese nation’s excellent genes and high IQs. China’s common language, he says, prevented it from having the centuries of wars that afflicted Europe. To further assimilation, he calls for dissolving autonomous areas and basing cadre hiring solely on individual merit. All policies that give minorities rights not given Han should be cancelled. Minorities should agree to assimilate, align their identities with Han, and learn standard Chinese or not be treated like other Chinese. He calls for promoting intermarriage and large-scale Han migration to minority areas. Chinese, Wang argues, should learn from the United States by permanently incarcerating those who committed even minor offenses in the riots. Other ethnic Chinese inside and outside the country also assert a general failure of China’s ethnic policies (Lim, 2009; Ai, 2008; Teng, 2002). Ma Rong, however, does not necessarily call for derecognizing minorities or immediately ending preferential policies, but for refocusing preferences from ethnic groups to residents of poor areas, regardless of ethnicity, and for stepped-up educational programs for minorities (Ma, 2008d). Such proposals accord with those of classic liberals outside China who exclusively want a “developmental affirmative action.” That approach eschews quotas and “favoritism,” focuses only on enhancing minority persons’ individual competitive skills, and perhaps extends preferences to the poor, disabled, peasants, senior citizens, and the like (Hong, 2005: 739; Loury, 2000).8 Most public criticisms of proposals to curb minority rights appear in blogs and are non-academic. One blogger regarded Ma Rong’s references to developing countries’ ethnic policies as not backed by empirical analysis. He argued that knowledge of China’s specific history of ethnic relations is needed to judge Ma Rong’s contentions and, because of its unique history, China cannot copy the United States. The blogger noted that depoliticization means ethnic problems should not be politicized, but regarded as cultural issues; yet the political and cultural cannot be sharply distinguished and whether politicization or depoliticization benefits minority welfare more is unclear (Su, 2009). In a rare scholarly article that critiques Ma Rong’s proposals, Chen Jianyue, of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Ethnology and Anthropology Research Institute, avers that China’s policies are efforts to construct a nationality (guozu) and that its preferential policies are not unlike what is done elsewhere. He elaborates on an idea from Lenin—that every institutional arrangement should be a political arrangement that meets the interest of ethnic groups. The latter can be defined in terms of culture, as Ma does, but it goes

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too far to define them exclusively as such. Chen argues that a cultural approach alone cannot solve ethnic problems, yet Ma’s idea of depoliticization suggests just that. It is also wrong to define, as Ma has, national consciousness as equal to the nationalism of “one country, one nation.” Nor can one say that if an ethnie has its own consciousness, its differentiation from others will be so reinforced that it takes its own political, economic, cultural and even military actions. Chen holds that preferences are not institutional discrimination against Han. Attention should be paid to international experience in using preferences to aid backward areas and disadvantaged minorities. Finally, Chen has it that the Soviet Union dissolved not because of its well-designed ethnic policies, but because of difficulties in implementation, and that India has many ethnic conflicts and independence movements, while China’s policies can make it a harmonious society (Chen, 2005). The Uygur activist Ilham Tohti has stated that all minority intellectuals he knows oppose Ma Rong’s proposals, while Ma has said his proposals are supported by younger minority officials and intellectuals in minority areas he has visited (Tohti, 2009a; Ma, 2009b). Tohti spoke on the proposals in late 2009 at his home base, Minzu University. Woeser, the Tibetan writer/activist, reported that he said that China’s minorities should struggle to safeguard their rights and interests as China’s ethnic policies encounter more problems; otherwise, as recent Tibet and Xinjiang incidents show, there may be grave consequences. He contended that both mainstream and dissident scholars agree that “the problem is coming from China’s autonomous regions and admonish authorities for giving ethnic minorities too much special treatment and strengthening the factors that lead to disloyalty and [splittism] in the autonomous regions.” Tohti was harshly critical of this idea, saying that getting rid of ethnic minority self-government was a lousy idea that, if pursued, was sure to run counter to its intended goal and lead to even more trouble . . . [A]t present, the issue is that the autonomous region polices haven’t been truly implemented, so that there have been problems in terms of protecting the culture, language, and religious freedoms of ethnic minorities when compared to regular citizens. Tohti held that the question is not whether autonomy should subsist, “but how it can be better implemented and developed” and that current theoretical underpinnings of China’s ethnic policies are lacking and should be reexamined in light of the experience of other countries. All policies adopted should be implemented (Woeser, 2009c).

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Placing the Debate in Comparative Perspective Proponents of curbing minority rights argue that China should depoliticize its policies by curbing autonomy and preferences and, perhaps, by derecognizing minorities. Critics respond that proponents lack evidence; the problem is not autonomy and preferences per se, but their inadequate implementation. Critiques generally fail, however, to point out misconceptions about ethnic policies common to the proposals.

State Recognition: The Sine Qua Non of Minority Rights Many ethnic groups seek state recognition as a first step to eliciting official actions against discrimination (Williams, 2009) and even states well-reputed for liberal democratic rights have moved to recognize their minorities, for example, Norway and Sweden with the Sami (Henriksen, 2008). Ma Rong rightly observes that state recognition politicizes minority group identities and, where combined with territoriality, creates a potential for separatism, especially if foreign states back it (Ma, 2008d). Recognition is, however, a condition precedent to addressing ethnic group disparities and, rather than reinforcing separatism, state recognition can counter it. In Canada, nonrecognition of the Quebecois as a “nation within a united Canada”—until all parliamentary parties agreed to do so in 2006—had boosted the separatist Bloc Québécois (CTV, 2006). France’s “model of the integration of individuals and not of the recognition of communities” (Laachir, 2007: 104) impedes efforts to deal with inequalities that have led to a series of riots since 1981. It was only after the large 2005 riots that an equal opportunities law emerged; yet, although “study after study shows that discrimination against minorities is massive in the labor market, in the workplace, in dealing with the police, etc.,” lack of state recognition of minorities makes the law difficult to implement (Laurent and Lamont, 2009).9 Non-recognition has played a role in the insurgency by Kurds, who are 20% of Turkey’s population. The framers of Turkey’s 1924 constitution rejected recognition as sought by ethnic minorities. Major Kurdish rebellions ensued in 1925, 1930, and 1938. The current (1981) constitution similarly bans “the division of the Turkish Nation into sub-entities.” In the early 1990s, resistance began again and the government forcibly resettled Kurds, closed Kurdish religious schools, and banned teaching and broadcasting in Kurdish (Yegen, 2009). China’s minorities would likely regard a curbing of official recognition in the same way that Quebecois, France’s African-descended minorities, and Kurds have viewed Canada, France, and Turkey’s non-recognition. They would see it as a subordination of minorities, through denying their

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distinctiveness and collective cultural existence, thus failing to fulfill even the antecedent condition for mitigating ethnic inequalities. Derecognition, by eliminating anti-discrimination protections, would likely create intense minority resentment: the 1972 Sri Lanka constitution’s elimination of a ban on discrimination against minorities is accounted an issue that triggered the civil war with the Tamil minority (Chellaney, 2010).

Ethnic Regional Autonomy and Separatism: The Missing Link The Soviet collapse has led proponents of curbing minority rights to claim a logical link between ethnic-based separatism and territorial autonomy, yet the latter neither inherently promotes nor mitigates separatism. It arguably facilitated separatism where Georgia was small and weak, while large and strong Russia backed Abkhazia and South Ossetia independence (Cornell, 2002). In other instances, increases in autonomy have seemingly diminished pro-independence sentiment. In 1998, 52% of Scots said they would vote for independence if a referendum were held; in 2009, after a decade of devolution of powers to Scotland, only 20% backed full independence (MacAskill and Hetherington, 1998; Currie, 2009). In a 1995 referendum, 49.5% of Quebecois backed independence. Since then, Quebec’s powers have been further enhanced (Simeon, 2004: 114) and support for independence in 2009 stood at 34% (AFP, 2009). State rejection of autonomy has also bolstered separatism, as in Thailand’s Muslim south (Storey, 2008). Each instance of ethnic-based territorial autonomy needs to be examined for specific factors that make it disrupt or promote state coherence. Ethnic regional autonomy in China also cannot be equated with ethnofederalism, which involves a much higher degree of constitutionally based decentralization (Guibernau, 2007: 42). CCP rule at all levels guarantees a low degree of political decentralization. From its inception, the PRC government rejected Soviet ethno-federalism, which in any case scarcely existed in practice (Lundberg and Zhou, 2009: 318). Drafters of China’s 1954 and 1982 constitutions rebuffed federalist proposals (Ghai and Woodman, 2009: 32). Premier Zhou Enlai expressly rejected Soviet-style federalism in 1957 (Zhou Enlai, 1984) and in 1987 Deng Xiaoping commented that Mao had been right to not copy Soviet federalism (Lai Hongyi, 2009: 10). After the U.S.S.R.’s collapse, China drew lessons about Soviet ethnic policies and implemented a policy of duo yuan yi ti (diversity in unity) and a “nation-state model” centered on the concept of Zhonghua minzu (Chinese nation), to further distance itself from ethno-federalism (Zhou and Hill, 2009:

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5–9). Even if China had features of ethno-federalism, studies indicate that where unitary states use some ethno-federalist principles to assuage minorities, they are not necessarily weakened (Bunce, 2004). Unlike the U.S.S.R., which contained a super-sized, ethnic-based Russian Federated Soviet Socialist Republic, China has no equivalent core ethnic region or “single ethnic federal region that enjoys dramatic superiority in population,” as China’s Han are divided among the country’s provinces (Hale, 2005: 65). Yet all post–World War II instances of ethno-federal state collapse have been in states with core ethnic regions; no state without one has experienced state breakup or large-scale civil war (Hale, 2004: 166, 192). The lack of a core-ethnic region obviates the main state-weakening feature present in the ethno-federalist arrangements of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia (Hale, 2008: 97). There is also no minority power concentration in China. Minority areas have a low degree of mainly cultural autonomy. Ma Rong derives, from his understanding of the Soviet experience, a scenario of latent “ethnocracy” in China: minorities form their autonomous area’s ruling group, create policies and laws that favor their ethnies over others, regard their areas as their own territories, prevent in-migration of other ethnies, and solely manage their areas’ resources (Ma, 2008d). That scenario was hardly present in the U.S.S.R. and has not occurred at all in China. From the mid-1950s to the early 1980s, non-Russian Party First Secretaries in Central Asian and Trans-Caucasus republics built neotraditional, patron–client networks, based on their ethnic groups (Martin, 2002), which positioned minority elites to create independent states, but only when and only because Soviet central authority collapsed. In Soviet Central Asia, the part of the U.S.S.R. that most closely resembled Tibet and Xinjiang in terms of development and subsidization, local leaders opposed Soviet state dissolution (Kotz and Weir, 2007: 141), because subsidies improved Central Asian living standards (Smith, 1989: 68–74). The assumed Soviet-like minority power concentration has not happened in China. In Tibet, a Tibetan/Han “stabilizing group” (wending jituan) connected to the central government strongly opposes a return of the Tibetan exiles (Wang Lixiong, 1998: 410–11). A similar group exists in Inner Mongolia (Bulag, 2000). In any case, China will not collapse due to separatism; rather separation can only occur if China’s central government collapses.

Preferential Policies: Less Effect Than Imagined Proposals to reduce ethnic preferences, or subsume them in a larger category of mostly non-ethnic ones, do not recognize that existing policies have not had the commonly assumed substantial effect on ethnic disparities.

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Overestimates of their effect neglect the fact that privatization has weakened ethnic preferences and that “in mixed areas where both minorities and majority live, minorities have a much lower income than the Han” (Barabantseva, 2009: 244) while the overall material gap between Han and minorities and Han areas and minority areas continues to widen (Dreyer, 2005: 82). Subsidies to autonomous areas and laxer family planning enforcement also benefit Han in minority areas (Hansen, 2005: 117).

A “Subtle Shift” in Ethnic Policies? Rather than curbing ethnic autonomy and preferences, the Chinese government has reaffirmed them. It is also slightly modifying these policies, partly in reaction to the riots, global financial crisis, and adverse weather that played havoc in Tibet and Xinjiang in 2008–2009, but also because migration and economic diversification in minority areas continue to aggravate interethnic inequalities (Hu Yue, 2010; Hopper and Webber, 2009).10 Top officials reaffirmed ethnic policies in late 2009–early 2010. Vice Premier Hui Liangyu, the Politburo’s only minority member, said the policies were successful and should be continued (Xinhua, 2009c), while Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) member Jia Qinglin said the CCP would stick to its policies and explore a solution to ethnic issues with Chinese characteristics (Xinhua, 2010a). Yet, in fall 2009, after top leaders visited minority areas, a Chinese source reported that “speculation continues to persist that there may be a subtle shift in China’s ethnic policy in the future” (Wang Jiamin, 2009). A series of meetings soon confirmed the speculation. The January 2010 Fifth Tibet Work Forum of top leaders, unlike previous Tibet Work Forums, did not focus on infrastructure building, but on increasing household incomes, especially in rural areas, and on improving social services. Tibet-related policies were no longer to be confined to the TAR, but to apply in all Tibetan areas. Hu Jintao called for “four adherences”: to the Party’s leadership, to the socialist system, to ethnic regional autonomy, and, in a new formulation, to development “with Chinese characteristics,” but also “Tibetan traits.” The proclaimed aim now is to close by 2020 the gaps between Tibetan and national average income levels and provisions of public services (CECC, 2010b), partly by making compulsory the previously voluntary supply by provinces of “aid Tibet” funds, so that the 0.1% of national revenues that flow to Tibet will double its subsidies under the 12th Five Year Plan (Sing Tao, 2010; Ta Kung Pao, 2010). Tenzin Dhondup and Lian Xiangmin, scholars at the China Tibetology Center, have termed the Fifth Work Forum approach a major policy change

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that would make Tibetan areas more integrated (Shi, 2010). Their colleagues Lurang Dramdul and Zhang Yun have stated that in contrast to past Tibet Work Forums, the fifth focused not on fast economic development, but on improving livelihood and well-being (ICT, 2010; Dyer, 2010). Whether the new approach will be meaningfully applied remains to be seen (Lafitte, 2010), but it is unlikely that such goals can be realized without expanding autonomy to enable Tibetan areas to diverge more sharply from the general policies of provinces that contain them and without increasing area-based and individually based preferential policies. In October 2009, 500 officials sent to Xinjiang to “inspect social situations and collect people’s suggestions” found that though GDP had increased tenfold in the past two decades, Uygurs benefitted much less than Han (Xinhua, 2010b; O’Neill, 2010a). It was decided to accelerate development in southern Xinjiang areas of high minority concentration, reduce the region’s north/ south gap, diminish rich/poor disparities, and implement “fairness and impartiality” (Wen Wei Po, 2010). China’s first “ethnic unity law” was also enacted in Xinjiang in late 2009. It forbids “contents and acts not beneficial to ethnic unity” and requires ethnic unity education on the history of Xinjiang, minority development, and so on. Beyond being a measure to suppress separatism or squelch discussion of ethnic conflict, the law can be viewed as a step toward penalizing incitement of ethnic hatred, an approach to protecting minorities found in many countries. Indeed, administrative punishments have been handed down against both Han and minority people who have spread messages that “destroy ethnic unity” (CECC, 2010a). Further indications of a “subtle shift” came in March–April 2010. A Xinjiang Hui Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference delegate publicly stated that “Looking back to the course of the coal, oil and gas exploration, I think we need to ask how much the projects have benefited the people of all ethnic groups in Xinjiang” and that several southern Xinjiang prefectures were a century behind Guangdong in development (Li, 2010). PSC members Li Keqiang and Zhou Yongkang presided over a conference on Xinjiang’s development and Hu Jintao conducted a Politburo meeting on the subject. As with Tibetan areas, emphasis is now to be on “improving people’s livelihood” (Xinhua, 2010c). The 2010 meetings also instituted an “aid Xinjiang” system similar to that applied to Tibetan areas (Guangzhou ribao, 2010; Xinjiang ribao, 2010): 19 well-off provinces must reserve 0.3% to 0.6% of their annual revenue to invest in and to aid Xinjiang (Huang, 2010b; Cui, 2010). The First Xinjiang Work Forum, in May 2010, introduced more preferential policies and earmarked RMB 100 billion for aid and development (Huang 2010a; O’Neill, 2010b). The April 2010 Politburo meeting

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also removed long-serving Xinjiang Party Secretary Wang Lequan, whose replacement, former Hunan Party secretary Zhang Chunxian, is expected to adopt a “soft stance” more respectful of minority rights (Ming Pao, 2010).11

Conclusion: Minority Rights and the Prospects for Ethnic Peace While proponents of curbing minority rights reflect a prominent strand of thinking about ethnic policies, present indications are that the government intends to basically maintain existing policies. Yet, state leaders are also not convinced they can sharply increase minority rights. Reasons for this reluctance include the common, but unsupported idea that ethnic mobilization caused the Soviet collapse, concerns about the relationship between increased rights and state capacity to deal with untoward consequences, perceived threats of external intervention in Tibet and Xinjiang, and popular Han claims that preferences and “leniency” are unfair and induce riots. Although the “subtle shift” now ongoing goes against proposals to curb minority rights, a political basis for their future diminution remains. The public debate may be among intellectuals, but state leaders do take seriously the ideas of Ma Rong, China’s most prominent ethnologist. Debates over ethnic policies have already had an impact among leaders (Reuters, 2009a), among whom proposals to curb minority rights could have greater resonance if more riots occur in Tibet or Xinjiang. Even absent such incidents, proposals will continue to be advanced as greater demographic, economic, and ideational diversities engendered by reform and opening up stir the ethnic pot in minority and Han areas. Greater diversity through migration is only part of what is causing the stir. The increasing diversity of economic activity in minority areas has also disadvantaged minorities more than Han. A Xinjiang specialist has observed that In the 1980s, a pragmatic set of policies allowed Uighurs to pursue their cultural and commercial interests, creating a layer of loyal urbanites, concentrated in Urumqi, who could imagine a model of success on both Chinese and Uighur terms. In the 90s however, the Uighur economy was swamped by the influx of east coast commerce and these Uighur elites lost any bargaining power they once enjoyed. Hong Kong businessmen crowded out local Uighur firms, villagers gave up their land and water to large-scale agricultural ventures, and cross-border merchants lost their position in the growing trade with China’s Central Asian neighbors. (Brophy, 2010)

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There is, moreover, a diversification of thinking, in which broader rights consciousness among minorities confronts decreasing elite regard for group rights generally. If state leaders recognize that increased diversities affecting state–minority and Han–minority interactions require rethinking ethnic policies, the result may be enhanced minority rights. Party leaders have at times sought expanded preferences (see XUAR, 2001) that in turn require strengthened ethnic autonomy.12 Scholars and officials, in public and private discussions, have floated proposals for expanding minority rights, including minority areas restricting in-migration to skilled Han,13 enhanced use of minority languages in offices and schools, more say for minorities in family planning, greater “due benefit compensation” for extracted minority area resources, more official posts reserved for minorities and Malaysian-like hiring quotas throughout the economy, Singapore-style mandated ethnic integration of neighborhoods, intra-Party preferential policies even at high levels, legal mechanisms for prosecuting ethnic discrimination claims, stepped up payment for poor minority children to attend school, and an end to most restrictions on religious practice. The present reluctance to sharply expand minority rights may change if comparative analysis shows enhanced rights more often produce ethnic peace than ethnic conflict. The supposed new Han consensus of resentment is not in itself decisive, as its internet outpourings do not necessarily represent Han in general. Moreover, however widespread it may be, this sentiment is not deeply felt, unlike the pervasive resentment of the rich in China.14 In any case, most minority people and many Han will not endorse curbing minority rights, but are more likely to advance proposals for increasing rights, some of which may be acceptable to the state. Acknowledgments Thanks to Frank Pieke and Elena Barabantseva for the “Global Politics in China” conference at which an earlier version of this article was presented and for useful suggestions about its revision, to Ma Rong, for generous sharing of his thoughts and learned works, to Yang Shengmin and Guan Kai for their leadership of the huge public forums and faculty seminar at Minzu University at which a later version was presented, and to the Modern China editors and reviewers for an expeditious review.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

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Funding The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes   1. There were 90,000 “mass incidents” a year in 2007–2009 that each involved 1,000 or more persons (Ching, 2010).   2. Uygur economist Ilham Tohti has said that minority criminals benefit from the policy, but it should end, as it dissatisfies Han. “Urumuqi jushi zaidu jinzhang zibei liang he shui” (Urumqi’s situation is once more nervous and it prepares itself with grain and water) (Tohti, 2009a). Tibetan writer Woeser’s claim (Woeser, 2009a; Woeser, 2009b) that the policy does not exist is based on her examination of cases involving political offenses, for which the policy was never intended, and on a couple atypically politicized common criminal cases.   3. The 2008 incarceration rate for U.S. blacks was six times that of whites (West and Sabol, 2009: 18).   4. In Tibet, “private” firms produced 60% of 2008 industrial output (Xinhua, 2009b).   5. On U.S. and Indian support for Tibetan exile groups, see Sautman, 2009. On the most significant U.S. support for the World Uygur Congress, see NED, 2009.   6. A Uygur journalist has attributed hotel and internet discrimination to local police regulations that do not bar Uygurs, but do create administrative problems for businesses that serve them (Saimaiti, 2009).   7. Discrimination among Han, for example, against Henan natives in Beijing, is also pervasive. See Liu Haiye, 2006: 13–14.   8. For example, the British government has proposed instituting positive discrimination for poor whites (Express, 2009).   9. The non-recognition policy also makes the total absence of metropolitan minorities from the French parliament an official non-topic (Chung, 2009). 10. On inequalities in urban Xinjiang, see Hopper and Webber, 2009. 11. Urumqi Party Secretary Li Zhi was replaced in September 2009. His successor, Zhu Hailun, came to Xinjiang as a teenager and has always served in heavily Uygur areas (Wang Weibo, 2009). 12. A 2006 National People’s Congress Standing Committee inspection team decried that higher-level organs impose uniformity on autonomous areas, causing problems in education, employment and health care (Lundberg and Zhou, 2009: 322). 13. From September 2009, all Xinjiang firms and companies working in Xinjiang must hire at least half their new employees from among “locals” and are urged to recruit more from among minorities (Ren, 2009). 14. In a random sample survey, “96% of the [Chinese] public said they feel resentful toward the rich” (Wu, 2009).

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Biography Barry Sautman is a political scientist and lawyer at the Hong Kong University of Science & Technology. He is the author of, most recently, All that Glitters Is Not Gold: Tibet as a Pseudo-State (2009) and, with Yan Hairong, of East Mountain Tiger, West Mountain Tiger: China, Africa, the West and “Colonialism” (2007).

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